\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Carlos CABALLERO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent Carlos Caballero-Martinez, Petitioner v. William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2044\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Carlos Caballero-Martinez\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\nWilliam P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1198\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Carlos Caballero-Martinez\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\nWilliam P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: December 11, 2018\\n Filed: April 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Carlos Caballero-Martinez petitions for review of two orders from the Board\\nof Immigration Appeals (BIA). The first order denied his motion to administratively\\nclose or remand to the immigration judge and the second order denied his motion to\\nreopen and reconsider the first denial. We grant the petition for review and affirm in\\npart and remand in part.\\n\\n I. Background\\n A native and citizen of Mexico, Caballero-Martinez entered the United States\\nillegally in 2000. He has four children, three of whom are United States citizens.\\n\\n In September 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated\\nremoval proceedings against Caballero-Martinez. At his removal hearing,\\nCaballero-Martinez admitted to being in the United States illegally. However, he\\nrequested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1229b. Section 1229b(b)(1)(D)\\nallows for cancellation of removal if the βremoval would result in exceptional and\\nextremely unusual hardship to the alienβs spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of\\nthe United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.β\\nCaballero-Martinez claimed his children would suffer βexceptional and extremely\\nunusual hardshipβ if he were removed.\\n\\n Immigration Judge (IJ) Paula Davis conducted Caballero-Martinezβs removal\\nhearing. However, IJ Davis retired before issuing a decision; the case was then\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fassigned to IJ Glen Baker. IJ Baker reviewed the proceedings and IJ Davisβs draft\\ndecision, and he adopted βthe reasoning and conclusions therein.β Petβrβs Add. at 20.\\n\\n In a February 2016 order, IJ Baker found Caballero-Martinezβs βchildren\\n[were] good students in school and [did] not have any learning problems or other\\nmental health problems.β Id. at 18. He noted that β[t]he principal hardship factor\\nidentified by [Caballero-Martinez] is difficulty in finding work in his hometown and\\nthat he would struggle [to] find a place for his family to live.β Id. Though the IJ found\\nCaballero-Martinezβs hardship testimony credible, he ultimately held that\\nCaballero-Martinez had βnot provided evidence to establish that his qualifying\\nrelatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond that,\\nwhich would normally be expected to result from deportation of an alien with close\\nfamily members in the United States.β Id. at 19.\\n\\n In March 2016, Caballero-Martinez appealed IJ Bakerβs order to the BIA. He\\nagain argued his children would suffer βexceptional and extremely unusual hardshipβ\\nif he returned to Mexico; he also argued that, by allowing a judge who had not been\\npresent at his cancellation hearing to issue a decision in his case, the immigration\\ncourt had violated his due process rights as well as the Immigration and\\nNaturalization Act (INA) and its implementing regulations.\\n\\n While the appeal was still pending, Caballero-Martinez became the victim of\\na criminal assault. Based on this development, Caballero-Martinez applied to the\\nUnited States Citizenship and Naturalization Services (USCIS) for a U Visa. The\\nU Visa (Form I-918) is a type of non-immigrant visa available to crime victims who\\nassist law enforcement. In November 2016, Caballero-Martinez filed a motion with\\nthe BIA to remand for a continuance, or, in the alternative, for administrative closure\\nof removal proceedings, pending adjudication of his U Visa petition.\\nCaballero-Martinez also contended the BIA should remand to allow the IJ to consider\\nadditional hardship evidence, claiming his children had begun performing poorly in\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fschool. DHS opposed the motion. USCIS did not issue a Form I-797 Notice of\\nActionβi.e. a filing receipt for Caballero-Martinezβs U Visa petitionβuntil\\nDecember 2016, after he filed his motion to remand.\\n\\n The BIA denied Caballero-Martinezβs motion to remand or administratively\\nclose in April 2017 (βthe April orderβ). The April order began by finding IJ Bakerβs\\ndecision was neither substantively nor procedurally unsound, citing regulations\\npermitting the use of substitute IJs. The BIA then found Caballero-Martinezβs\\nadditional hardship evidence was unlikely to alter the outcome of his case and thus\\ndeclined to remand. The BIA also declined to administratively close or remand\\npending the U Visa petitionβs adjudication, explaining that Caballero-Martinez βha[d]\\nnot put forward an adequate basis to temporarily remove his case from the Boardβs\\ndocket or, if remanded, from the Immigration Judgeβs active calendar.β Id. at 9. The\\nBIA noted in a footnote that Caballero-Martinez had not provided evidence, such as\\na βNotice of Action,β that his application had been received by USCIS. The BIA also\\nexplained that β[t]he regulations provide exclusive jurisdiction over [U Visa]\\napplications to the DHS and also specifically address U [V]isa βpetitionersβ with final\\norders of removal. The filing of the application has no effect on the Governmentβs\\nauthority to execute a final order . . . .β Id. (internal citation omitted). The order did\\nnot specify whether it was denying Caballero-Martinezβs request on jurisdictional or\\nevidentiary grounds.\\n\\n After receiving a filing receipt from USCIS, Caballero-Martinez moved the\\nBIA to reopen and reconsider his case in May 2017. The BIA denied his request for\\nreconsideration in December 2017 (βthe December orderβ), explaining that\\nCaballero-Martinezβs βmotion relies on evidence that he submitted on appeal and by\\nmotion.β Id. at 3. The BIA also declined to reopen, reiterating that the hardship\\nevidence presented as part of his November 2016 motion was not sufficient to change\\nthe outcome of the proceedings. Finally, the BIA reaffirmed its refusal to\\nadministratively close proceedings βbased on [Caballero-Martinezβs] intent to pursue\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fa U visa application.β Id. The BIA explained that in the April order, βwe noted that\\n[Caballero-Martinez] purported that he mailed the U [V]isa application to USCIS but\\nhe did not provide evidence that the application was received, such as by a Notice of\\nAction (Form I-797). While [Caballero-Martinez] has now included receipt of his\\n[U Visa] application, this does not alter the reasons for our denial of his request for\\nadministrative closure.β Id. at 3β4.\\n\\n Caballero-Martinez now petitions this court for review of both the BIAβs April\\nand December orders. Caballero-Martinez argues the BIAβs April order failed to\\naddress whether the use of a substitute IJ violated the INA or its implementing\\nregulations. He also argues the BIA erred in its April order by applying the incorrect\\nstandard to his motion to remand for consideration of additional hardship evidence\\nand by denying his motion to remand for a continuance pending the adjudication of\\nhis U Visa petition. Additionally, he argues the BIA erred in its December order by\\ndeclining to reopen and reconsider his case after he provided proof of his U Visaβs\\nfiling.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Use of a Substitute IJ\\n Caballero-Martinez argues the BIA failed to address whether using a substitute\\nIJ violated the INA or its implementing regulations in its April order; he claims the\\nBIA exclusively addressed his due process argument. We disagree and affirm the\\nBIAβs decision to allow the use of the substitute IJ.\\n\\n We have previously upheld the use of substitute IJs in immigration cases. See\\nNjoroge v. Sessions, 709 F. Appβx 380, 381 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In Njoroge,\\nthe IJ who conducted the petitionerβs removal hearing retired before issuing a\\ndecision, so the decision was issued by a substitute IJ. Id. at 380. Upon reviewing the\\nevidence, the substitute IJ determined the petitioner was not credible and denied his\\nasylum claim. Id. On appeal from a BIA order sustaining the substitute IJβs denial,\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fpetitioner contended βthat several regulatory and statutory requirements were violated\\nby reason of the second IJβs credibility determinations made in the absence of an\\nopportunity to observe [the petitionerβs] demeanor in a face-to-face setting.β Id. at\\n381. However, we held that βbecause it was the BIAβs decision that constituted the\\nfinal reviewable agency action, which did not rely on the credibility determination\\nwhen it analyzed the merits of [the petitionerβs] claims,β the petitionerβs rights had\\nnot been violated. Id.\\n\\n Caballero-Martinez attempts to distinguish Njoroge by arguing the BIA here\\nβexplicitly affirmed the IJβs factual findings,β Petβrβs Br. at 27, while the BIA in\\nNjoroge did not rely on the IJβs credibility determinations. Njoroge, 709 F. Appβx at\\n381. Unlike in Njoroge, however, where the substitute IJ did not find petitioner\\ncredible, IJ Baker did find Caballero-Martinez credible; ultimately, the IJ denied\\nrelief not because Caballero-Martinez was insincere in alleging hardship, but because\\nhis hardship evidence was insufficient. Here, Caballero-Martinez does not contest the\\nIJβs credibility findings. Rather, he contests the IJ and the BIAβs weighing of the\\nevidence.\\n\\n The April order indicates that the BIA did, in fact, consider\\nCaballero-Martinezβs hardship evidence; its ultimate agreement with the IJβs\\ndetermination does not render its decision invalid. Because the BIAβs April order\\nrelied on an uncontested credibility determination, our decision here does not conflict\\nwith our decision in Njoroge. Rather, Njoroge supports the proposition that\\nimmigration courts may use substitute IJs.\\n\\n Furthermore, the use of a substitute IJ is supported by the INAβs implementing\\nregulations, which the BIA cited in the April order. The record therefore plainly\\ncontradicts Caballero-Martinezβs claim that the BIA did not address his statutory or\\nregulatory arguments in its April order. In fact, the BIA thoroughly discussed the\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fstatutory and regulatory bases for using a substitute IJ. Specifically, the BIA cited to\\nand quoted 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1240.1(b) for support. Section 1240.1(b) provides that\\n\\n\\n [i]f an immigration judge becomes unavailable to complete his or her\\n duties, another immigration judge may be assigned to complete the case.\\n The new immigration judge shall familiarize himself or herself with the\\n record in the case and shall state for the record that he or she has done\\n so.\\n\\n In denying cancellation, IJ Baker complied with the regulations. At the end of\\nhis order, IJ Baker stated that he had reviewed the proceedings conducted by IJ Davis,\\nas well as her draft decision. Caballero-Martinez has presented no evidence that IJ\\nBaker did otherwise. Caballero-Martinezβs attempt to cast doubt on IJ Bakerβs review\\nby noting that his order is erroneously captioned as an oral decision is likewise\\nunavailing. The order is a written decision regardless of its caption.\\n\\n\\n β[T]he BIA need not revisit in detail every issue raised concerning the original\\norder.β Camacho v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 378, 381 (8th Cir. 2018). Rather, βthe BIAβs\\nobligation is to βconsider the issues raised and announce its decision in terms\\nsufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not\\nmerely reacted.ββ Id. (quoting Camarillo-Jose v. Holder, 676 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th\\nCir. 2012)). The BIAβs substantial discussion of the statutory and regulatory bases for\\nusing a substitute IJ were sufficient for our review purposes.\\n\\n B. Additional Hardship Evidence\\n Caballero-Martinez also argues the BIA erred in not remanding his case to the\\nIJ after he submitted additional hardship evidence. In both its April and December\\norders, the BIA denied remand on the basis that the additional hardship evidence was\\nunlikely to alter the outcome of the case, citing to Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec.\\n464 (BIA 1992). Caballero-Martinez denies Coelhoβs validity, claiming the BIA\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fabrogated Coelho in In re L-O-G, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413 (BIA 1996).\\nCaballero-Martinez argues that, per L-O-G, the BIA should remand when presented\\nwith potentially worthwhile new evidence. He asks us to remand to the BIA with\\ninstructions to apply his preferred, lower standard.\\n\\n β[T]he BIAβs interpretation of immigration laws and regulations receives\\nsubstantial deference.β Muiruri v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 2015). We have\\nrepeatedly upheld the BIAβs application of the Coelho likely-to-change-the-result\\nstandard, recognizing that βthe BIA will remand only if the evidence is of such a\\nnature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the IJ were reopened, with\\nall the attendant delays, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case.β\\nClifton v. Holder, 598 F.3d 486, 492 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Berte\\nv. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also Lee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851,\\n855 (8th Cir. 2014); Vargas v. Holder, 567 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n We specifically decline to interpret L-O-G as abrogating Coelho. Such an\\ninterpretation would conflict with our prior cases and is contrary to the L-O-G\\ndecision itself. The BIA in L-O-G explicitly distinguished Coelho, explaining that\\nwhere, as in Coelho, βthe alien had already had an opportunity to fully present and\\nlitigate his request for discretionary relief from deportation . . . . reopening should not\\nbe granted unless the alien had met the βheavy burdenβ of showing that the new\\nevidence presented βwould likely change the result in the case.ββ L-O-G, 21 I. & N.\\nDec. at 419β20 (quoting Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 473). Caballero-Martinez βhad\\nan opportunity to fully present and litigate his request for discretionary relief from\\ndeportationβ before the immigration court, so βreopening should not be granted unless\\nthe alien ha[s] met βthe heavy burdenβ of showing that the new evidence presented\\nβwould likely change the result in the case.ββ Id. at 420 (emphasis added) (quoting\\nCoelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 473).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f Accordingly, we hold that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in\\nreviewing Caballero-Martinezβs request to submit additional hardship evidence.1\\n\\n C. U Visa Petition\\n Caballero-Martinezβs final argument is that the BIA erred in its April order by\\ndeclining to remand or administratively close his case to await resolution of his\\nU Visa petition. He also claims the BIA erred in its December order by declining to\\nreopen and reconsider his case after he submitted proof that USCIS had received his\\npetition. Caballero-Martinez specifically argues that the BIA erroneously departed\\nfrom its established policy by declining to apply ββa rebuttable presumptionβ in favor\\nof delaying removal proceedings to await the adjudication of a U [V]isa,β Petβrβs Br.\\nat 20, as articulated in Matter of Sanchez-Sosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 807, 815 (BIA 2012).\\n\\n βWe review both the denial of a motion to remand and the denial of a motion\\nto reopen for abuse of discretion.β Clifton, 598 F.3d at 490. βThe BIA abuses its\\ndiscretion if its decision is without rational explanation, departs from established\\npolicies, invidiously discriminates against a particular race or group, or where the\\nagency fails to consider all factors presented by the alien or distorts important aspects\\nof the claim.β Id. at 490β91 (quoting Vargas, 567 F.3d at 391).\\n\\n In Sanchez-Sosa, the BIA established a policy by articulating factors an IJ\\nshould consider in determining whether to continue removal proceedings pending the\\n\\n\\n 1\\n To the extent Caballero-Martinez challenges the BIAβs underlying\\ndetermination that the new evidence likely would not change the result of the case,\\nthat determination is unreviewable by this court. An appellant who βquestion[s]\\nwhether the BIA accurately assessed or, ultimately, gave due weight to the[]\\n[hardship] factors . . . attacks the BIA determination that the evidence failed to show\\nan extraordinary and extremely unusual hardship. This finding, however, is precisely\\nthe discretionary determination that Congress shielded from our review.β\\nNunez-Portillo v. Holder, 763 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fadjudication of a U Visa application. I. & N. Dec. at 812. IJs may grant continuances\\non the basis of pending U Visa petitions even though they do not have jurisdiction\\nover U Visa petitions. Id. at 812. According to Sanchez-Sosa, IJs should consider β(1)\\nthe DHSβs response to the [alienβs] motion [to continue]; (2) whether the underlying\\nvisa petition is prima facie approvable; and (3) the reason for the continuance and\\nother procedural factors.β Id. at 812β13. As part of proving the approvability of their\\npetition, aliens are also encouraged to provide βa receipt indicating that the petition\\nhas been submitted to the USCIS.β Id. at 814. Where βthe alien shows that he has\\nfiled a completed application before the USCIS . . . and the petition appears to meet\\nthe necessary criteria to be granted, then any delay not attributable to the alien βaugurs\\nin favor of a continuance.ββ Id. (quoting Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 793\\n(BIA 2009). βAs a general rule, there is a rebuttable presumption that an alien who\\nhas filed a prima facie approvable application with the USCIS will warrant a\\nfavorable exercise of discretion for a continuance for a reasonable period of time.β\\nId. at 815. βOn remand, the respondents should be given a final opportunity to\\nprovide copies of and proof regarding the filing of their application with the USCIS\\nand to otherwise meet the criteria established in this decision for the Immigration\\nJudgeβs consideration of their request for a continuance.β Id. at 816.\\n\\n A recent unpublished BIA decision suggests that, when a respondent files a\\nmotion to remand pending the adjudication of his U Visa application during the\\npendency of his appeal, remand to the IJ is appropriate. See In Re: Jose Luis\\nGutierrez-Rodriguez A.K.A. Jose Gutierrez, No. AXXX XX5 106 - ELO, 2016 WL\\n6519977, at *5 (DCBABR Sept. 26, 2016). In Gutierrez-Rodriguez, the BIA\\nremanded following respondentβs filing of a U Visa noting βthat the Immigration\\nJudge should have the opportunity to develop the record with regard to these\\nconsiderations in issuing a new decision.β Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f 1. The April Order\\n In its April order, the BIA offered two rationales for denying\\nCaballero-Martinezβs request to await adjudication of his U Visa petition: Caballero-\\nMartinezβs failure to provide an βadequate basisβ for pausing removal proceedings\\nand the BIAβs lack of jurisdiction over U Visa petitions. Petβrβs Add. at 9. Though\\nCaballero-Martinez requested either remand or administrative closure in his motion,\\nthe BIAβs April order characterized Caballero-Martinez as having only requested\\nadministrative closure with respect to the U Visa petition. However, the BIA cited to\\nboth Sanchez-Sosaβa remand caseβand Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688,\\n696 (BIA 2012)βan administrative closure caseβfor support, suggesting the BIA\\nconsidered both grounds for relief.\\n\\n On appeal, the government argues that both of the bases identified by the BIA\\njustified its decision not to remand. The government also specifically argues Sanchez-\\nSosaβand its rebuttable presumption in favor of remandβdo not apply here. The\\ngovernment distinguishes Sanchez-Sosa procedurally, noting that respondent in that\\ncase requested a continuance before the IJ, while Caballero-Martinez requested\\nadministrative closure directly from the BIA. Therefore, according to the government,\\nthe applicable precedent for the BIA was Avetisyan.\\n\\n Addressing the facts of this case, the governmentβs views of the applicability\\nof Sanchez-Sosa and Avetisyan are inaccurate. The record indicates that\\nCaballero-Martinez requested either remand for a continuance or administrative\\nclosure, pending the adjudication of his U Visa petition. Therefore, the governmentβs\\nargument that only Avetisyan controls is unpersuasive.2\\n\\n 2\\n Furthermore, Avetisyanβs continued validity has been called into question by\\nMatter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), a recent decision by the\\nAttorney General essentially ending the practice of administrative closure. Caballero-\\nMartinez has indicated that he is waiving his administrative closure argument for the\\npurpose of this appeal. We agree that resolving the question of whether the BIA\\nproperly denied administrative closure is not necessary to the resolution of this case.\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f We are likewise unconvinced by the governmentβs argument that Caballero-\\nMartinezβs requesting remand for a continuance from the BIA rather than a\\ncontinuance directly from the IJ prevents Sanchez-Sosa from controlling the result.\\nThe criminal assault against Caballero-Martinez occurred after the IJ had already\\nissued his order. The assaultβthe event triggering his U Visa eligibilityβoccurred\\ntoo late to enable Caballero-Martinez to request a continuance before the IJ. We see\\nno distinguishing feature that would cause the principle stated in Sanchez-\\nSosaβpausing removal proceedings pending the adjudication of a petition potentially\\nrendering removal inapplicableβto operate differently depending on whether the\\ntriggering event occurs while the case is before the IJ or before the BIA.\\n\\n The governmentβs reliance on the BIAβs lack of jurisdiction over U Visa\\npetitions as a basis for denying remand is shaky at best. In Clifton, we rejected the\\nargument that a lack of jurisdiction over the underlying petition justified denying\\nremand. 598 F.3d at 493. The question was whether βthe BIA abuse[s] its discretion\\nby refusing to remand and reopen removal proceedings solely on the ground that the\\nBIA lacks jurisdiction over an application for adjustment of status that has been filed\\nwith and pends before USCIS,β and we answered it in the affirmative. Id. The issues\\nhere and in Clifton are sufficiently similar for us to hold that to the extent the BIA\\ndeclined to remand Caballero-Martinezβs case due to its lack of jurisdiction over his\\nU Visa application, it erred.\\n\\n Nevertheless, the BIA did not err in denying Caballero-Martinezβs motion to\\nremand. Unlike in Clifton, the BIA did offer a rational and non-jurisdictional reason\\nfor denying Cabellero-Martinezβs remand motion: his failure to provide the BIA with\\nevidence of his U Visa petitionβs filing. It is unclear from the BIAβs language whether\\nother factorsβsuch as DHSβs opposition to the motionβinfluenced the BIAβs\\ndetermination that Caballero-Martinez had not put forward an βadequate basisβ for\\nremand. But Caballero-Martinezβs failure to submit a filing receipt renders the BIAβs\\nApril order affirmable.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f 2. The December Order\\n The BIA suggested in its April order that it had denied Caballero-Martinezβs\\nmotion because of his failure to provide proof of his U Visa petitionβs filing. In\\nresponse, Caballero-Martinez submitted the required Notice of Action, along with a\\nmotion to reopen and reconsider his request for remand or administrative closure.\\nHowever, the BIA denied the motion in the December order, noting that β[w]hile the\\nrespondent has now included a receipt of his Form I-918 application, this does not\\nalter the reasons for our denial of his request for administrative closure.β Petβrβs Add.\\nat 4. The BIA apparently construed Caballero-Martinezβs motion to reopen and\\nreconsider solely as requesting administrative closure, making no mention of remand\\nfor a continuance and citing no remand-specific case law.\\n\\n In offering such an abbreviated explanation, the BIA failed to offer a coherent,\\nβrational explanationβ for its denial of Caballero-Martinezβs motion to reopen or\\nreconsider. Clifton, 598 F.3d at 490. In other words, the BIA did not βannounce its\\ndecision in terms sufficient to enable [us] to perceive that it has heard and thought\\nand not merely reacted.β Camacho, 910 F.3d at 381 (quoting Camarillo-Jose, 676\\nF.3d at 1143. The BIA did not specify its previous reasons for denial, leaving us to\\ninfer these reasons from its previous order. Since the BIA cited both evidentiary and\\njurisdictional concerns in Aprilβi.e., no filing receipt, no authority over U Visa\\npetitionsβyet declined to credit the filing receipt in December, we are left to\\nspeculate whether the BIAβs βreasons for denialβ in December were jurisdictional\\nrather than evidentiary.\\n\\n Rather than speculate, we remand for clarification on two interconnected\\nissues. First, we ask the BIA to clarify its βreasons for denialβ from the April\\ndecision. As noted, the BIA suggested in its April order that it denied Caballero-\\nMartinezβs motion for both evidentiary and jurisdictional reasons. Footnoted\\nlanguage implied the missing filing receipt was substantively decisive, but the\\nvagueness of the main textβs languageβthat Caballero-Martinez βha[d] not put\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fforward an adequate basis to temporarily remove his case from the Boardβs docket or,\\nif remanded, from the Immigration Judgeβs active calendarββleaves open the\\npossibility that his request was substantively inadequate in several respects but that\\nthe BIA only chose to highlight the missing filing receipt. Petβrβs Add. at 9. Reading\\nthe April and December orders together, the reasons for the BIAβs decision not to\\nremand pending the U Visaβs adjudication are unclear.\\n\\n Second, since Caballero-Martinez requested not only administrative closure but\\nalso remand, we ask the BIA to explain its decision not to apply the Sanchez-Sosa\\nfactors to Caballero-Martinezβs remand request in its December analysis. In short, we\\nask the BIA to explain why it ultimately made no difference that Caballero-Martinez\\nincluded a U Visa filing receipt in his renewed motion when Sanchez-Sosa suggests\\na completed application weighs in favor of pausing the removal process. 25 I. & N.\\nDec. at 815.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n The BIAβs April order is affirmed. The BIAβs December order is affirmed in\\npart and remanded in part for clarification consistent with the issue raised in this\\nopinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1767,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606930,"string":"4,606,930"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Douglas DRUGER, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Douglas Druger"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1381"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Wollman, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1381\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Douglas Druger\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Douglas Druger argues the district court1 erred by denying his motion for\\njudgment of acquittal, because there was insufficient evidence to support two of the\\ncounts of his conviction. We affirm the district court.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n In March 2014, the Audrain County Sheriffβs office began investigating Robert\\nReno for suspected trafficking of methamphetamine in and around Mexico, Missouri.\\nThis investigation led to a warrant for a wiretap on Reno and an investigation by the\\nU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The wiretap revealed an ongoing drug\\noperation in which Druger was participating. Druger rented a bifurcated warehouse\\nbuilding and sub-leased half of the building to Reno. In December of 2015, the DEA\\nobtained warrants to search the warehouse, Renoβs residence, and Drugerβs residence.\\nIn Drugerβs residence, law enforcement found scales, pipes, and plastic baggies, some\\nof which tested positive for methamphetamine residue. The law enforcement officers\\nalso discovered $7,000 in cash in a safe and four firearms β at least three of which\\nwere loaded β throughout the house.\\n\\n In 2016, a state law enforcement investigation of Druger was also launched,\\nresulting in a second warrant to search Drugerβs residence. During a sweep of the\\nhouse officers discovered 36.02 grams of methamphetamine inside the toilet and\\nrelated plumbing. The officers also found digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, and\\nother paraphernalia, along with a firearm in the bedroom.\\n\\n A grand-jury indicted Druger on five counts related to drug possession,\\ntrafficking, and the use of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.2 A six-day jury\\ntrial ensued. At the close of the Governmentβs case in chief, Druger moved for\\njudgment of acquittal on all five counts. The district court denied Drugerβs motion\\nand the jury subsequently convicted him on all five counts. Druger now appeals the\\ndistrict courtβs denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on count five:\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The grand-jury issued an eight-count indictment relating to the conspiracy\\nbetween Robert Reno and Douglas Druger to distribute methamphetamine. Druger\\nwas named in counts one, five, six, seven, and eight.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fpossession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(c)(1)(A); and count seven: possession with the intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1).\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on\\nthe sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. De La Torre, 907 F.3d 581, 594\\n(8th Cir. 2018). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict\\nand also accept all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id. This is a βvery\\nstrictβ standard of review βand we will reverse a conviction only if we conclude that\\nno reasonable jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.β\\nId. As long as one theory based on the evidence presented could allow for a\\nreasonable jury to find Druger guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the\\njury verdict. See id.\\n\\n A. Possession of a Firearm\\n\\n Based on the evidence presented during trial, we conclude a jury could find\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that Druger possessed firearms in furtherance of a drug\\ncrime.\\n\\n Drugerβs conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) required the Government\\nto show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Druger knowingly possessed a firearm,\\nand (2) a nexus existed between the same firearm and the drug crime. See United\\nStates v. Close, 518 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting such a nexus requires more\\nthan simultaneous possession). βThe jury may infer that the firearm was so used\\nβwhen it is kept in close proximity to the drugs, it is quickly accessible, and there is\\nexpert testimony regarding the use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.ββ\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fUnited States v. Goodrich, 739 F.3d 1091, 1098 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Close, 518\\nF.3d at 619).\\n\\n The nexus between the drug crime and firearms may be established in a variety\\nof ways. For instance, digital scales, paraphernalia, and large amounts of unexplained\\ncash are circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking. United States v. Johnson, 474\\nF.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). The use of firearms to protect the proceeds of drug\\ntrafficking violates 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c). United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 421\\n(8th Cir. 1993). Drugs do not need to be found next to the firearms in order to\\nestablish a nexus, particularly when there is testimony that drug sales occurred in\\nproximity to where the gun was found. Johnson, 474 F.3d at 520 (affirming a\\nconviction even though no drugs were found in the apartment with the gun). A nexus\\ncan exist when a firearm is in proximity to items identified as relating to drug\\ntrafficking. Id.\\n\\n When executing the 2015 warrant, the authorities found four firearms\\nthroughout Drugerβs residence. While it is true the authorities did not find significant\\nquantities of illegal drugs during this search, that fact is easily explained and not fatal\\nto the juryβs verdict considering the circumstances. Testimony established the\\nauthorities were delayed in executing the warrant because Druger had barricaded the\\ndoors. A woman who routinely purchased methamphetamine from Druger testified\\nDruger told her after the search that he had flushed methamphetamine down the toilet\\nwhile the police were seeking entry. Thus, the jury had a basis to believe there were\\nillegal drugs in the residence at the same time as the firearms found there.\\n\\n The Government presented additional evidence to demonstrate a nexus between\\nthe firearms and Drugerβs drug trafficking crime. Officers found two of the firearms\\nin the basement along with items which tested positive for drug residue. Officers\\nfound two additional weapons in proximity to a large quantity of unexplained cash.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fFurthermore, a witness testified Druger sold drugs out of the basement and she knew\\nabout the shotgun, which officers discovered in the rafters. See Johnson, 474 F.3d\\nat 520 (explaining testimony of drug transactions occurring on the premises where a\\nfirearm is found is sufficient evidence unless the testimony is βincredible or\\nunsubstantial on its faceβ). Based on the combined evidence of the firearms, the\\npipes with residue, the digital scales, the drug ledger, and the testimony from\\nDrugerβs customer, a reasonable jury could conclude Druger was using the firearms\\nto protect the proceeds of his drug sales. See Edwards, 994 F.2d at 421 (βProtection\\nof drug proceeds furthers a drug trafficking crime, and use of a firearm to guard such\\nproceeds therefore violates Β§ 924(c).β).\\n\\n Finally, the Government introduced text message conversations in which\\nDruger discussed the possible sale of a βbig-guyβ and told Reno, βIβll have my strap\\non me bro.β Expert testimony explained the phrase βbig-guyβ referred to one pound\\nof methamphetamine and the phrase βstrapβ referred to a handgun. Looking at all of\\nthe evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have\\nconcluded a nexus existed between Drugerβs possession of at least one of the firearms\\nand the trafficking of drugs.3\\n\\n B. Possession of Illegal Drugs with Intent to Distribute\\n\\n Druger also challenges count seven of the indictment for possession with intent\\nto distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). Conviction under this section\\nrequires the Government to βprove that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed the\\nmethamphetamine; and (2) had intent to distribute it.β United States v. Trejo, 831\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Using a special verdict, the jury unanimously found all four firearms where\\nused in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Thus, the denial of Drugerβs motion\\nmust be upheld as long as there was sufficient evidence for at least one of the four\\nfirearms. See United States v. Boyle, 700 F.3d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fF.3d 1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 2016). Count seven specifically applies to the state-level\\ninvestigation in 2016 and the resulting discovery of methamphetamine in the\\nplumbing during the execution of the second warrant.\\n\\n Druger claims the 36.02 grams of methamphetamine found in his home in 2016\\nwas for personal use. Thus, Druger concedes the element of possession but\\nchallenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he intended to distribute. Two\\nseparate lines of evidence presented by the Government, however, support the juryβs\\nfinding.\\n\\n During the 2016 search of Drugerβs residence, police found the\\nmethamphetamine, along with digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, other paraphernalia,\\nand a firearm. The Government presented testimony demonstrating 36.02 grams is\\na distribution amount. Testimony also established that drug paraphernalia such as\\nsmall baggies, scales, and scoops are all indicia of drug distribution. Officers\\nrecovered a firearm in the home during this search. All told, this evidence gave the\\njury a basis to believe Druger intended to distribute the methamphetamine found in\\nhis house instead of merely using it himself. See United States v. Thompson, 881\\nF.3d 629, 632β33 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating drug paraphernalia, prior sales, and the\\npresence of a firearm support an inference of intent to distribute).\\n\\n In addition, a witness testified she purchased methamphetamine from Druger\\nbeginning in 2015 and she continued to do so after the execution of the federal\\nwarrant in December of 2015. This court has held that β[u]nless the testimony is\\nimplausible on its face, . . . we defer to the juryβs determination of whether an\\naccomplice is credible.β United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2017).\\nOn appeal, Druger has not challenged the plausibility of his customerβs testimony.\\nThus, we conclude the evidence provided a sound basis for the district court to\\nconclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nDruger was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. See\\nDe La Torre, 907 F.3d at 594.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs ruling.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384183/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606930/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Douglas DRUGER, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1381\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Douglas Druger\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: December 14, 2018\n Filed: April 4, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Douglas Druger argues the district court1 erred by denying his motion for\njudgment of acquittal, because there was insufficient evidence to support two of the\ncounts of his conviction. We affirm the district court.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\f I. Background\n\n In March 2014, the Audrain County Sheriffβs office began investigating Robert\nReno for suspected trafficking of methamphetamine in and around Mexico, Missouri.\nThis investigation led to a warrant for a wiretap on Reno and an investigation by the\nU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The wiretap revealed an ongoing drug\noperation in which Druger was participating. Druger rented a bifurcated warehouse\nbuilding and sub-leased half of the building to Reno. In December of 2015, the DEA\nobtained warrants to search the warehouse, Renoβs residence, and Drugerβs residence.\nIn Drugerβs residence, law enforcement found scales, pipes, and plastic baggies, some\nof which tested positive for methamphetamine residue. The law enforcement officers\nalso discovered $7,000 in cash in a safe and four firearms β at least three of which\nwere loaded β throughout the house.\n\n In 2016, a state law enforcement investigation of Druger was also launched,\nresulting in a second warrant to search Drugerβs residence. During a sweep of the\nhouse officers discovered 36.02 grams of methamphetamine inside the toilet and\nrelated plumbing. The officers also found digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, and\nother paraphernalia, along with a firearm in the bedroom.\n\n A grand-jury indicted Druger on five counts related to drug possession,\ntrafficking, and the use of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.2 A six-day jury\ntrial ensued. At the close of the Governmentβs case in chief, Druger moved for\njudgment of acquittal on all five counts. The district court denied Drugerβs motion\nand the jury subsequently convicted him on all five counts. Druger now appeals the\ndistrict courtβs denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on count five:\n\n\n 2\n The grand-jury issued an eight-count indictment relating to the conspiracy\nbetween Robert Reno and Douglas Druger to distribute methamphetamine. Druger\nwas named in counts one, five, six, seven, and eight.\n\n -2-\n\fpossession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 924(c)(1)(A); and count seven: possession with the intent to distribute\nmethamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1).\n\n II. Discussion\n\n We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on\nthe sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. De La Torre, 907 F.3d 581, 594\n(8th Cir. 2018). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict\nand also accept all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id. This is a βvery\nstrictβ standard of review βand we will reverse a conviction only if we conclude that\nno reasonable jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.β\nId. As long as one theory based on the evidence presented could allow for a\nreasonable jury to find Druger guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the\njury verdict. See id.\n\n A. Possession of a Firearm\n\n Based on the evidence presented during trial, we conclude a jury could find\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that Druger possessed firearms in furtherance of a drug\ncrime.\n\n Drugerβs conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) required the Government\nto show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Druger knowingly possessed a firearm,\nand (2) a nexus existed between the same firearm and the drug crime. See United\nStates v. Close, 518 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting such a nexus requires more\nthan simultaneous possession). βThe jury may infer that the firearm was so used\nβwhen it is kept in close proximity to the drugs, it is quickly accessible, and there is\nexpert testimony regarding the use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.ββ\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fUnited States v. Goodrich, 739 F.3d 1091, 1098 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Close, 518\nF.3d at 619).\n\n The nexus between the drug crime and firearms may be established in a variety\nof ways. For instance, digital scales, paraphernalia, and large amounts of unexplained\ncash are circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking. United States v. Johnson, 474\nF.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). The use of firearms to protect the proceeds of drug\ntrafficking violates 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c). United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 421\n(8th Cir. 1993). Drugs do not need to be found next to the firearms in order to\nestablish a nexus, particularly when there is testimony that drug sales occurred in\nproximity to where the gun was found. Johnson, 474 F.3d at 520 (affirming a\nconviction even though no drugs were found in the apartment with the gun). A nexus\ncan exist when a firearm is in proximity to items identified as relating to drug\ntrafficking. Id.\n\n When executing the 2015 warrant, the authorities found four firearms\nthroughout Drugerβs residence. While it is true the authorities did not find significant\nquantities of illegal drugs during this search, that fact is easily explained and not fatal\nto the juryβs verdict considering the circumstances. Testimony established the\nauthorities were delayed in executing the warrant because Druger had barricaded the\ndoors. A woman who routinely purchased methamphetamine from Druger testified\nDruger told her after the search that he had flushed methamphetamine down the toilet\nwhile the police were seeking entry. Thus, the jury had a basis to believe there were\nillegal drugs in the residence at the same time as the firearms found there.\n\n The Government presented additional evidence to demonstrate a nexus between\nthe firearms and Drugerβs drug trafficking crime. Officers found two of the firearms\nin the basement along with items which tested positive for drug residue. Officers\nfound two additional weapons in proximity to a large quantity of unexplained cash.\n\n -4-\n\fFurthermore, a witness testified Druger sold drugs out of the basement and she knew\nabout the shotgun, which officers discovered in the rafters. See Johnson, 474 F.3d\nat 520 (explaining testimony of drug transactions occurring on the premises where a\nfirearm is found is sufficient evidence unless the testimony is βincredible or\nunsubstantial on its faceβ). Based on the combined evidence of the firearms, the\npipes with residue, the digital scales, the drug ledger, and the testimony from\nDrugerβs customer, a reasonable jury could conclude Druger was using the firearms\nto protect the proceeds of his drug sales. See Edwards, 994 F.2d at 421 (βProtection\nof drug proceeds furthers a drug trafficking crime, and use of a firearm to guard such\nproceeds therefore violates Β§ 924(c).β).\n\n Finally, the Government introduced text message conversations in which\nDruger discussed the possible sale of a βbig-guyβ and told Reno, βIβll have my strap\non me bro.β Expert testimony explained the phrase βbig-guyβ referred to one pound\nof methamphetamine and the phrase βstrapβ referred to a handgun. Looking at all of\nthe evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have\nconcluded a nexus existed between Drugerβs possession of at least one of the firearms\nand the trafficking of drugs.3\n\n B. Possession of Illegal Drugs with Intent to Distribute\n\n Druger also challenges count seven of the indictment for possession with intent\nto distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). Conviction under this section\nrequires the Government to βprove that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed the\nmethamphetamine; and (2) had intent to distribute it.β United States v. Trejo, 831\n\n\n 3\n Using a special verdict, the jury unanimously found all four firearms where\nused in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Thus, the denial of Drugerβs motion\nmust be upheld as long as there was sufficient evidence for at least one of the four\nfirearms. See United States v. Boyle, 700 F.3d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 2012).\n\n -5-\n\fF.3d 1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 2016). Count seven specifically applies to the state-level\ninvestigation in 2016 and the resulting discovery of methamphetamine in the\nplumbing during the execution of the second warrant.\n\n Druger claims the 36.02 grams of methamphetamine found in his home in 2016\nwas for personal use. Thus, Druger concedes the element of possession but\nchallenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he intended to distribute. Two\nseparate lines of evidence presented by the Government, however, support the juryβs\nfinding.\n\n During the 2016 search of Drugerβs residence, police found the\nmethamphetamine, along with digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, other paraphernalia,\nand a firearm. The Government presented testimony demonstrating 36.02 grams is\na distribution amount. Testimony also established that drug paraphernalia such as\nsmall baggies, scales, and scoops are all indicia of drug distribution. Officers\nrecovered a firearm in the home during this search. All told, this evidence gave the\njury a basis to believe Druger intended to distribute the methamphetamine found in\nhis house instead of merely using it himself. See United States v. Thompson, 881\nF.3d 629, 632β33 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating drug paraphernalia, prior sales, and the\npresence of a firearm support an inference of intent to distribute).\n\n In addition, a witness testified she purchased methamphetamine from Druger\nbeginning in 2015 and she continued to do so after the execution of the federal\nwarrant in December of 2015. This court has held that β[u]nless the testimony is\nimplausible on its face, . . . we defer to the juryβs determination of whether an\naccomplice is credible.β United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2017).\nOn appeal, Druger has not challenged the plausibility of his customerβs testimony.\nThus, we conclude the evidence provided a sound basis for the district court to\nconclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that\nDruger was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. See\nDe La Torre, 907 F.3d at 594.\n\n -6-\n\f III. Conclusion\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs ruling.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Douglas DRUGER, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1381\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Douglas Druger\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Douglas Druger argues the district court1 erred by denying his motion for\\njudgment of acquittal, because there was insufficient evidence to support two of the\\ncounts of his conviction. We affirm the district court.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n In March 2014, the Audrain County Sheriffβs office began investigating Robert\\nReno for suspected trafficking of methamphetamine in and around Mexico, Missouri.\\nThis investigation led to a warrant for a wiretap on Reno and an investigation by the\\nU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The wiretap revealed an ongoing drug\\noperation in which Druger was participating. Druger rented a bifurcated warehouse\\nbuilding and sub-leased half of the building to Reno. In December of 2015, the DEA\\nobtained warrants to search the warehouse, Renoβs residence, and Drugerβs residence.\\nIn Drugerβs residence, law enforcement found scales, pipes, and plastic baggies, some\\nof which tested positive for methamphetamine residue. The law enforcement officers\\nalso discovered $7,000 in cash in a safe and four firearms β at least three of which\\nwere loaded β throughout the house.\\n\\n In 2016, a state law enforcement investigation of Druger was also launched,\\nresulting in a second warrant to search Drugerβs residence. During a sweep of the\\nhouse officers discovered 36.02 grams of methamphetamine inside the toilet and\\nrelated plumbing. The officers also found digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, and\\nother paraphernalia, along with a firearm in the bedroom.\\n\\n A grand-jury indicted Druger on five counts related to drug possession,\\ntrafficking, and the use of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.2 A six-day jury\\ntrial ensued. At the close of the Governmentβs case in chief, Druger moved for\\njudgment of acquittal on all five counts. The district court denied Drugerβs motion\\nand the jury subsequently convicted him on all five counts. Druger now appeals the\\ndistrict courtβs denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on count five:\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The grand-jury issued an eight-count indictment relating to the conspiracy\\nbetween Robert Reno and Douglas Druger to distribute methamphetamine. Druger\\nwas named in counts one, five, six, seven, and eight.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fpossession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(c)(1)(A); and count seven: possession with the intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1).\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on\\nthe sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. De La Torre, 907 F.3d 581, 594\\n(8th Cir. 2018). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict\\nand also accept all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id. This is a βvery\\nstrictβ standard of review βand we will reverse a conviction only if we conclude that\\nno reasonable jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.β\\nId. As long as one theory based on the evidence presented could allow for a\\nreasonable jury to find Druger guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the\\njury verdict. See id.\\n\\n A. Possession of a Firearm\\n\\n Based on the evidence presented during trial, we conclude a jury could find\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that Druger possessed firearms in furtherance of a drug\\ncrime.\\n\\n Drugerβs conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) required the Government\\nto show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Druger knowingly possessed a firearm,\\nand (2) a nexus existed between the same firearm and the drug crime. See United\\nStates v. Close, 518 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting such a nexus requires more\\nthan simultaneous possession). βThe jury may infer that the firearm was so used\\nβwhen it is kept in close proximity to the drugs, it is quickly accessible, and there is\\nexpert testimony regarding the use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.ββ\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fUnited States v. Goodrich, 739 F.3d 1091, 1098 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Close, 518\\nF.3d at 619).\\n\\n The nexus between the drug crime and firearms may be established in a variety\\nof ways. For instance, digital scales, paraphernalia, and large amounts of unexplained\\ncash are circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking. United States v. Johnson, 474\\nF.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). The use of firearms to protect the proceeds of drug\\ntrafficking violates 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c). United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 421\\n(8th Cir. 1993). Drugs do not need to be found next to the firearms in order to\\nestablish a nexus, particularly when there is testimony that drug sales occurred in\\nproximity to where the gun was found. Johnson, 474 F.3d at 520 (affirming a\\nconviction even though no drugs were found in the apartment with the gun). A nexus\\ncan exist when a firearm is in proximity to items identified as relating to drug\\ntrafficking. Id.\\n\\n When executing the 2015 warrant, the authorities found four firearms\\nthroughout Drugerβs residence. While it is true the authorities did not find significant\\nquantities of illegal drugs during this search, that fact is easily explained and not fatal\\nto the juryβs verdict considering the circumstances. Testimony established the\\nauthorities were delayed in executing the warrant because Druger had barricaded the\\ndoors. A woman who routinely purchased methamphetamine from Druger testified\\nDruger told her after the search that he had flushed methamphetamine down the toilet\\nwhile the police were seeking entry. Thus, the jury had a basis to believe there were\\nillegal drugs in the residence at the same time as the firearms found there.\\n\\n The Government presented additional evidence to demonstrate a nexus between\\nthe firearms and Drugerβs drug trafficking crime. Officers found two of the firearms\\nin the basement along with items which tested positive for drug residue. Officers\\nfound two additional weapons in proximity to a large quantity of unexplained cash.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fFurthermore, a witness testified Druger sold drugs out of the basement and she knew\\nabout the shotgun, which officers discovered in the rafters. See Johnson, 474 F.3d\\nat 520 (explaining testimony of drug transactions occurring on the premises where a\\nfirearm is found is sufficient evidence unless the testimony is βincredible or\\nunsubstantial on its faceβ). Based on the combined evidence of the firearms, the\\npipes with residue, the digital scales, the drug ledger, and the testimony from\\nDrugerβs customer, a reasonable jury could conclude Druger was using the firearms\\nto protect the proceeds of his drug sales. See Edwards, 994 F.2d at 421 (βProtection\\nof drug proceeds furthers a drug trafficking crime, and use of a firearm to guard such\\nproceeds therefore violates Β§ 924(c).β).\\n\\n Finally, the Government introduced text message conversations in which\\nDruger discussed the possible sale of a βbig-guyβ and told Reno, βIβll have my strap\\non me bro.β Expert testimony explained the phrase βbig-guyβ referred to one pound\\nof methamphetamine and the phrase βstrapβ referred to a handgun. Looking at all of\\nthe evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have\\nconcluded a nexus existed between Drugerβs possession of at least one of the firearms\\nand the trafficking of drugs.3\\n\\n B. Possession of Illegal Drugs with Intent to Distribute\\n\\n Druger also challenges count seven of the indictment for possession with intent\\nto distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). Conviction under this section\\nrequires the Government to βprove that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed the\\nmethamphetamine; and (2) had intent to distribute it.β United States v. Trejo, 831\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Using a special verdict, the jury unanimously found all four firearms where\\nused in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Thus, the denial of Drugerβs motion\\nmust be upheld as long as there was sufficient evidence for at least one of the four\\nfirearms. See United States v. Boyle, 700 F.3d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fF.3d 1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 2016). Count seven specifically applies to the state-level\\ninvestigation in 2016 and the resulting discovery of methamphetamine in the\\nplumbing during the execution of the second warrant.\\n\\n Druger claims the 36.02 grams of methamphetamine found in his home in 2016\\nwas for personal use. Thus, Druger concedes the element of possession but\\nchallenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he intended to distribute. Two\\nseparate lines of evidence presented by the Government, however, support the juryβs\\nfinding.\\n\\n During the 2016 search of Drugerβs residence, police found the\\nmethamphetamine, along with digital scales, baggies, drug pipes, other paraphernalia,\\nand a firearm. The Government presented testimony demonstrating 36.02 grams is\\na distribution amount. Testimony also established that drug paraphernalia such as\\nsmall baggies, scales, and scoops are all indicia of drug distribution. Officers\\nrecovered a firearm in the home during this search. All told, this evidence gave the\\njury a basis to believe Druger intended to distribute the methamphetamine found in\\nhis house instead of merely using it himself. See United States v. Thompson, 881\\nF.3d 629, 632β33 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating drug paraphernalia, prior sales, and the\\npresence of a firearm support an inference of intent to distribute).\\n\\n In addition, a witness testified she purchased methamphetamine from Druger\\nbeginning in 2015 and she continued to do so after the execution of the federal\\nwarrant in December of 2015. This court has held that β[u]nless the testimony is\\nimplausible on its face, . . . we defer to the juryβs determination of whether an\\naccomplice is credible.β United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2017).\\nOn appeal, Druger has not challenged the plausibility of his customerβs testimony.\\nThus, we conclude the evidence provided a sound basis for the district court to\\nconclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nDruger was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. See\\nDe La Torre, 907 F.3d at 594.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs ruling.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1768,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606931,"string":"4,606,931"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES EIGHTEEN, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dr. Matthew Jerome CONCANNON, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3447"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Wollman, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3447\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dr. Matthew Jerome Concannon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Eleven years ago, Matthew Concannon, M.D., signed a general guaranty for a\\ncompany that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial\\nadvisor. What his friend purportedly failed to mention in this otherwise routine\\nexercise of obtaining his signature was that the guaranty would saddle Concannon\\nwith millions of dollars in debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was\\nunable to repay. Concannon urges us to conclude that he was defrauded by his friend,\\n\\fthat his friend acted without his authority in delivering the guaranty to the bank, or\\nthat the bankβs successor in interest, Radiance Capital Receivables (Radiance), lacks\\na proper chain of title to enforce the guaranty. The district court1 determined that\\nConcannon was liable, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Concannon graduated from medical school at the University of Missouri in\\n1987. After training in hand and microsurgery, he returned to the University to join\\nthe medical school faculty. There, Concannon retained the services of JosΓ© Lindner2\\nupon the suggestion of a faculty mentor. Lindner served as a financial planner and\\ntax preparer for several prominent physicians in the area. The two became friends,\\nand Concannon enlisted Lindner to advise him financially, prepare his taxes, and\\ngenerally assist with his various business ventures.\\n\\n Concannon left the University in late 2006, and Lindner assisted him in\\nopening his own private medical practice shortly thereafter. Lindner handled the\\nbusinessβs books and continued assisting with Concannonβs tax and financial matters,\\nincluding drafting and preparing the operating agreement for Concannonβs holding\\ncompany. Concannon trusted Lindner βmore than [he could] describeβ and gave\\nLindner complete access to his financial and business records. Concannon testified\\nin an unrelated matter that, in his words, βI paid [Lindner] to act on my behalf. . . . As\\na matter of routine, Iβwhen [Lindner] would give me stuff to sign, I would just sign\\nit.β\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Missouri.\\n 2\\n Lindner passed away in 2010.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Lindner also managed his own commercial real estate developments, one of\\nwhich involved an entity named Providence Farms, LLC (Providence). Lindner\\noffered Concannon an opportunity to obtain a dollar-for-dollar tax credit by investing\\nin Providence and its various infrastructure construction projects, and Concannon\\nagreed to invest $600,000. Lindner handled Concannonβs involvement with\\nProvidence and regularly sought his signature on related documents, including those\\npurporting to add Concannonβs holding company as a member of Providence with a\\n50% ownership interest. Concannon also signed guaranties permitting Lindner to\\nobtain and renew, on Providenceβs behalf, millions of dollars in loans from various\\nfinancial institutions.\\n\\n Concannon signed a general guaranty for Providence on January 24, 2008. The\\ndocument listed Premier Bank as the lender and guaranteed all of Providenceβs\\nβpresent and future debtsβ of βevery type, purpose and description,β including,\\nβwithout limitation, all principal, accrued interest, attorneyβs fees and collection\\ncosts.β Unbeknownst to Concannon, Providence teetered on the brink of foreclosure\\nat the time, and various banks had required Lindner to obtain guarantors and investors\\nto keep Providence afloat. In subsequent years, Concannon also made personal loans\\nto Lindner at the latterβs request to enable Providence to make its loan payments.\\nConcannon insisted on collateral for one such $240,000 loan in late 2009. Around\\nthat time, he attended two meetings between Premier Bank and Lindner, during which\\nthe bank informed Lindner that it needed payment on the loans.\\n\\n Providence did not make its loan or interest payments and defaulted. The\\ncompany and its projects were a sham; Concannon did not receive a tax credit or a\\nmembership interest, and the infrastructure projects which he purportedly funded with\\nhis investments in Providence were never constructed.\\n\\n Premier Bank failed in 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation\\n(FDIC) took over its assets, which included the right to collect from Providence. The\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fFDIC created the entity CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 (CADC), which the FDIC\\nowned jointly with a private investment company, and sold Premier Bankβs assets to\\nit. CADC obtained a consent judgment against Providence in Missouri state court in\\nSeptember 2014 for $15.7 million plus interest. Concannon had been dismissed as\\na defendant in the state action, and he did not object to the consent judgment. CADC\\nthen sold Providenceβs debt obligations to Radiance in May 2016 and thereafter\\nexecuted and filed an Assignment of Judgment in Missouri state court assigning the\\nconsent judgment against Providence to Radiance.\\n\\n Radiance filed suit in federal district court against Concannon to collect the\\nburgeoning amount owing from the consent judgment, which now approaches $22\\nmillion. Relevant here, Radiance claimed that Concannon breached his guaranty.\\nThe district court granted Radianceβs summary judgment motion in part, concluding\\nthat Radiance had a valid assignment of Providenceβs debt. Following a bench trial\\nin October 2017, the district court determined that Lindner had acted with\\nConcannonβs actual authority to deliver the signed guaranty to Premier Bank and that\\nConcannon failed to establish a fraud-in-factum defense. The court ordered\\nConcannon to pay the full amount owing on the consent judgment and granted\\nRadianceβs motion for attorneysβ fees. After denying Concannonβs request to amend\\nthe findings and judgment, the court entered final judgment. The parties agree that\\nMissouri law applies in this diversity action.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Concannon contends that Radiance lacks the right to enforce the consent\\njudgment because the assignment of Providenceβs debt from the FDIC to CADC was\\ninvalid. As a party seeking to collect a debt owed another, Radiance must prove valid\\neach assignment serving as a βlink in the chain between the party to which the debt\\nwas originally owed and the party trying to collect the debt.β CACH, LLC v. Askew,\\n358 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Mo. 2012). We review de novo the district courtβs determination\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthat the chain of assignments was valid. Hanson v. FDIC, 113 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir.\\n1997) (standard of review).\\n\\n Concannon claims that the FDIC exceeded its statutory authority by creating\\nand co-owning CADC and by entering into structured transactions between CADC\\nand private investors. He contends that because the FDIC acted without authority in\\ndoing so, its transfer of Premier Bankβs assets to CADC was void as a matter of law.\\n\\n β[A]n agency may only exercise those powers Congress has given it.β Saxton\\nv. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2018) (Stras, J., concurring).\\nIn response to the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, Congress enacted the Financial\\nInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to enable the\\nFDIC to act as a receiver for failed institutions. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183\\n(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). FIRREA grants the FDIC\\nβunprecedented powers so that it may function efficaciously as a receiver or\\nconservator of insolvent financial institutions.β Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d\\n106, 111 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Hanson, 113 F.3d at 871 (βAs a receiver, the FDIC\\nhas substantial powers over [a failed institutionβs] assets.β).\\n\\n We conclude that the FDICβs creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bankβs\\nassets thereto fall within its broad power. Under FIRREA, the FDIC has authority to\\nact as a receiver, 12 U.S.C. Β§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii), and to assume βall rights, titles,\\npowers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,β Β§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).\\nAccordingly, the FDIC was authorized to assume Premier Bankβs right to collect\\nProvidenceβs debt. Because the FDIC also had the authority under Β§ 1821(d)(2)(E)\\nto dispose of Premier Bankβs assets, we conclude that it acted within its incidental\\npowers when it created CADC and sold Premier Bankβs assets to it. Id.\\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) (permitting the FDIC to transfer assets); Β§ 1821(d)(2)(J)(i)-(ii)\\n(permitting the FDIC to βexercise . . . such incidental powers as shall be necessary to\\ncarry out [specifically granted] powersβ and βtake any action authorized by this\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fchapter, which the [FDIC] determines is in the best interests of the depository\\ninstitution, its depositors, or the [FDIC]β). Section 1821(d)(2)(K) authorized the\\nFDIC to use the services of a private entity to dispose of Premier Bankβs assets. The\\ndistrict court therefore properly determined that the assignment of rights from the\\nFDIC to CADC was valid. Concannon does not dispute the validity of the assignment\\nfrom CADC to Radiance, and thus we conclude that Radiance may enforce the\\nconsent judgment.\\n\\n In so concluding, we reject Concannonβs argument that the FDICβs incidental\\npowers are limited to acts strictly necessary to dispose of the bankβs assets. His\\ntheory is not supported by case law, and a reasonable reading of FIRREAβs text\\nauthorizes the FDIC to act as it did here. We further reject Concannonβs claim that\\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(F)βs express grant of authority to organize depository institutions\\nprecludes the FDIC from creating non-depository entities like CADC. Concannonβs\\nreading would frustrate both FIRREAβs text, which permits the use of incidental\\npowers, and its purpose, which grants the FDIC broad discretion to dispose of a failed\\ninstitutionβs assets. See Watt v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.\\n2006) (β[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating\\ngeneral purpose.β (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.\\n23 (1983))).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Concannon next argues that the district court erred in concluding that Lindner\\nacted as his agent with implied actual authority when delivering the guaranty to\\nPremier Bank. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp.,\\n854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1993) (explaining the unconditional delivery element of\\na breach of guaranty claim). βAgency is the fiduciary relationship resulting from the\\nmanifestation of consent by an agent to a principal that the agent will act on the\\nprincipalβs behalf and subject to his control.β Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Prot. Dist.,\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f257 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Mo. 2008). Whether this principal-agent relationship exists\\nis generally a question of fact. See Bus. Bank of Saint Louis v. Old Republic Natβl\\nTitle Ins. Co., 322 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). Concannon does not\\nseriously dispute the district courtβs finding that he and Lindner had such a\\nrelationship.3\\n\\n Instead, he contends that Lindner delivered the guaranty without his authority\\nand therefore acted outside the scope of any agency relationship. In the context of a\\nprincipal-agent relationship, the principal is responsible for his agentβs acts as long\\nas the agent acts with actual or apparent authority. Id. Actual authority may be\\nexpress or implied. Id. The former βexists when the principal explicitly tells the\\nagent what to do,β and the latter, implied actual authority, βconsists of those powers\\nincidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.β Id. at 552, 554 (quoting\\nHardcore Concrete, LLC v. Fortner Ins. Servs., Inc., 220 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Mo. Ct.\\nApp. 2007)). β[T]he relationship of principal and agent cannot be presumed but must\\nbe proved,β and thus, β[i]mplied powers, like any others, must be bottomed on some\\nact or acquiescence of the principal, express or implied.β Dudley v. Dumont, 526\\nS.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Whether an agentβs actions were incidental\\nand necessary to carry out the express authority is also a question of fact. See Bus.\\nBank of Saint Louis, 322 S.W.3d at 554.\\n\\n\\n Concannon argues that delivering the guaranty was not reasonably necessary\\nto carry out any grant of express authority that he had given to Lindner to prepare\\nvarious operating agreements, calculate his taxes, and take care of other business\\nmatters. However, the district court found that Concannon signed the guaranty and\\nunderstood that he was signing it; that he had admitted in a prior deposition that he\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Concannon also does not dispute that Lindner physically delivered the\\nguaranty to Premier Bank, nor that, if Lindner acted as his agent when delivering the\\nguaranty, the delivery would be his act.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fhad paid Lindner to act on his behalf and had thought or assumed that Lindner acted\\non his behalf in giving him documents to sign; that he had relied on Lindner for\\nvarious tax and financial services, particularly related to Providence Farms; and that\\nhe generally had relied on Lindner to take care of his business matters. Concannon\\ndoes not dispute these findings. The record also indicates that Concannon testified\\nthat he and Lindner had previously discussed working together on a deal and that he\\nhad been βlooking forwardβ to partnering with Lindner and investing in Providence.\\nAfter signing the guaranty, Concannon twice accompanied Lindner to meetings with\\nPremier Bank to discuss Providenceβs debt. Concannon also claimed $1,370,648 in\\nnonpassive losses related to Providence during the tax years of 2007, 2008, and 2009.\\nThese facts support a determination that Concannon gave Lindner express authority\\nto draft and execute all documents related to his involvement in Providence Farms;\\nthat Concannonβs purpose in granting this express authority was both to obtain what\\nhe thought was a tax credit and to join Lindner in financing Providenceβs various\\ninfrastructure projects; and that securing guarantors to ensure Providenceβs continued\\noperations was incidental to that express grant of authority. We thus conclude that\\nthe district court did not clearly err in determining that Lindner acted with implied\\nactual authority in delivering the guaranty to Premier Bank on Concannonβs behalf.\\nSee Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard\\nof review).\\n\\n Concannon contends that the guaranty is nonetheless unenforceable because\\nPremier Bank failed in its duty to ensure that Lindner acted with Concannonβs\\nauthority when delivering the guaranty. See, e.g., Erickson v. Civic Plaza Nat. Bank,\\n422 S.W.2d 373, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (βA third person dealing with an agent . . .\\nhas the duty of ascertaining for himself, the agentβs authority.β). Because Lindner\\nacted with implied actual authority, Premier Bank would have found that Lindner was\\nacting well within his scope of authority had it inquired. Its failure to so inquire does\\nnot relieve Concannon of liability. See Dalton & Marberry, P.C. v. NationsBank,\\nN.A., 982 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Mo. 1998) (βIn Missouri, a payee bank may avoid\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fliability by proving that the agent has actual or apparent authority from the drawer-\\ndepositor.β); see also Luechtefeld v. Marglous, 151 S.W.2d 710, 716 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n1941) (determining that the plaintiff could βprove the authority of the agent Voss to\\ndeliver the note and deed of trust and collect the proceeds of said saleβ by βshowing\\nimplied or apparent authority.β). To the extent that Concannon argues that Premier\\nBank had a special duty to inquire in the context of a loan guaranty, which he claims\\nis akin to a contract offer, our conclusion is unchanged: any inquiry by Premier Bank\\nwould have revealed that Lindner acted with implied actual authority when delivering\\nthe guaranty.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Concannon disputes the district courtβs findings that Lindner did not\\nmisrepresent the guaranty and that Lindner was not his fiduciary in relation to\\nProvidence Farms. He also disputes the courtβs conclusion that he, Concannon, was\\ngenerally negligent, all of which led it to reject his fraud in the factum defense. Such\\nfraud is a misrepresentation as to the nature of the act being done; that is, βthe\\nfraud-feasor intends one thing and the victim intends another thing.β Wolf v. St.\\nLouis Pub. Serv. Co., 357 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). A defendant\\nseeking to invoke such a defense in Concannonβs situation must show (1) that he\\nsigned a document in ignorance of its true character; and (2) that his act was due to\\nmisrepresentations or fraudulent conduct on the part of another party and not to his\\nown negligence. Rau v. Robertson, 260 S.W. 751, 754 (Mo. 1924). Fraud in the\\nfactum voids a contract ab initio. Id. We review the district courtβs factual findings\\nfor clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Wright, 730 F.3d at 737. A\\nfactual finding is clearly erroneous βonly if it is not supported by substantial evidence\\nin the record, if it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with the\\ndefinite and firm conviction that an error was made.β Id. (quoting Urban Hotel Dev.\\nCo. v. President Dev. Grp., L.C., 535 F.3d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 2008)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Concannon contends that he was deceived as to the true nature of the guaranty\\nand instead believed it to be a βroutine and necessary document related to a tax\\nshelter.β But the district court found as a fact that Concannon understood that he was\\nsigning a guaranty, which, if supported by substantial evidence, refutes his fraud\\ndefense and renders immaterial whether Lindner acted as his agent and whether\\nConcannon was generally negligent. That is, if Concannon knew he was signing a\\nguaranty for Providenceβs debts, he cannot have believed that his act was βof a\\ndifferent nature than what it really [wa]s.β Wolf, 357 S.W.2d at 957 (determining that\\nthe plaintiff, induced to sign a release by false representations that his medical bills\\nwould nonetheless be paid, was not deceived as to the nature of the release and\\ntherefore stated a claim for fraud in the inducement, not fraud in the factum).\\n\\n We conclude that the district courtβs finding is not clearly erroneous.\\nConcannon read and sought legal advice regarding other documents Lindner prepared\\nfor him, including his holding companyβs operating agreement. He had signed other\\ndocumentation in the past to assist Providence in securing loans. After signing the\\nguaranty, he attended meetings between Premier and Lindner discussing Providenceβs\\ndebt. Moreover, the guaranty is unambiguous; the words βALL PRESENT AND\\nFUTURE DEBTSβ appear on the first page, and Concannon signed below the clear\\nlabel βGUARANTOR.β In light of these facts, the court was free to reject\\nConcannonβs testimony that he did not understand the guaranty and would not have\\nsigned it if he had. The record is devoid of any evidence that Lindner concealed or\\notherwise misrepresented the guaranty. See Rau, 260 S.W. at 755. Any failure by\\nLindner to explain the full extent of the guarantyβthat Concannonβs signature would\\nguarantee millions in loans that Lindner had already obtained on Providenceβs\\nbehalfβdoes not negate Concannonβs knowledge of the βtrue characterβ of the\\nguaranty. See id. at 754 (distinguishing fraud in the inducement, which βimplies that\\nplaintiff knew that the document embodied a contract of release, but that she was\\ninduced to sign it through the fraud of the defendant,β from fraud in the factum,\\nwhich implies that the plaintiff βbelieved [the instrument] to be of an entirely\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fdifferent characterβ). Because the district courtβs factual finding that Concannon\\nunderstood what he was signing and knew it to be a guaranty is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence, Concannonβs fraud in the factum defense necessarily fails.\\n\\n The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those on which\\nConcannon relies. In Rau, for example, the defendant offered to pay Rauβs lost wages\\nafter he had hit her with his car, causing her to miss work. He later visited her at the\\nhospital and, while she was βweak and sick and nervous, and impatient to leave the\\nhospital to go home,β asked her to sign what he portrayed as a receipt for his payment\\nof her wages. Id. at 755. He βfolded it as to disclose to her merely the place of\\nsignature, concealing apparently even the heading: βRelease of Claim, Emma Rau\\nagainst John M. Robertson.ββ Id. Because Rau thought she was signing a receipt\\nwhen she signed a release, and in spite of her choice not to read before signing, the\\ncourt remanded for the jury to decide βwhether through defendantβs fraudulent\\nconduct and representations she was led to sign without further investigation an\\ninstrument she did not intend to execute.β Id. In contrast, the record here supports\\nthe district courtβs finding that Concannon knew that the instrument was a guaranty.\\nConcannon also relies on language from Liddell v. Lee, 159 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo.\\n1942), which recognizes situations in which a fraud victim βimpose[s] trust and\\nconfidence in the [fraud-feasor].β Nevertheless, the defense requires the victim to be\\ndeceived as to the type of document being signing or the terms therein, and\\nConcannon was not.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384184/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606931/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES EIGHTEEN, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dr. Matthew Jerome CONCANNON, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3447\n ___________________________\n\n Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Dr. Matthew Jerome Concannon\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\n Filed: April 4, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Eleven years ago, Matthew Concannon, M.D., signed a general guaranty for a\ncompany that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial\nadvisor. What his friend purportedly failed to mention in this otherwise routine\nexercise of obtaining his signature was that the guaranty would saddle Concannon\nwith millions of dollars in debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was\nunable to repay. Concannon urges us to conclude that he was defrauded by his friend,\n\fthat his friend acted without his authority in delivering the guaranty to the bank, or\nthat the bankβs successor in interest, Radiance Capital Receivables (Radiance), lacks\na proper chain of title to enforce the guaranty. The district court1 determined that\nConcannon was liable, and we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Concannon graduated from medical school at the University of Missouri in\n1987. After training in hand and microsurgery, he returned to the University to join\nthe medical school faculty. There, Concannon retained the services of JosΓ© Lindner2\nupon the suggestion of a faculty mentor. Lindner served as a financial planner and\ntax preparer for several prominent physicians in the area. The two became friends,\nand Concannon enlisted Lindner to advise him financially, prepare his taxes, and\ngenerally assist with his various business ventures.\n\n Concannon left the University in late 2006, and Lindner assisted him in\nopening his own private medical practice shortly thereafter. Lindner handled the\nbusinessβs books and continued assisting with Concannonβs tax and financial matters,\nincluding drafting and preparing the operating agreement for Concannonβs holding\ncompany. Concannon trusted Lindner βmore than [he could] describeβ and gave\nLindner complete access to his financial and business records. Concannon testified\nin an unrelated matter that, in his words, βI paid [Lindner] to act on my behalf. . . . As\na matter of routine, Iβwhen [Lindner] would give me stuff to sign, I would just sign\nit.β\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the\nWestern District of Missouri.\n 2\n Lindner passed away in 2010.\n\n -2-\n\f Lindner also managed his own commercial real estate developments, one of\nwhich involved an entity named Providence Farms, LLC (Providence). Lindner\noffered Concannon an opportunity to obtain a dollar-for-dollar tax credit by investing\nin Providence and its various infrastructure construction projects, and Concannon\nagreed to invest $600,000. Lindner handled Concannonβs involvement with\nProvidence and regularly sought his signature on related documents, including those\npurporting to add Concannonβs holding company as a member of Providence with a\n50% ownership interest. Concannon also signed guaranties permitting Lindner to\nobtain and renew, on Providenceβs behalf, millions of dollars in loans from various\nfinancial institutions.\n\n Concannon signed a general guaranty for Providence on January 24, 2008. The\ndocument listed Premier Bank as the lender and guaranteed all of Providenceβs\nβpresent and future debtsβ of βevery type, purpose and description,β including,\nβwithout limitation, all principal, accrued interest, attorneyβs fees and collection\ncosts.β Unbeknownst to Concannon, Providence teetered on the brink of foreclosure\nat the time, and various banks had required Lindner to obtain guarantors and investors\nto keep Providence afloat. In subsequent years, Concannon also made personal loans\nto Lindner at the latterβs request to enable Providence to make its loan payments.\nConcannon insisted on collateral for one such $240,000 loan in late 2009. Around\nthat time, he attended two meetings between Premier Bank and Lindner, during which\nthe bank informed Lindner that it needed payment on the loans.\n\n Providence did not make its loan or interest payments and defaulted. The\ncompany and its projects were a sham; Concannon did not receive a tax credit or a\nmembership interest, and the infrastructure projects which he purportedly funded with\nhis investments in Providence were never constructed.\n\n Premier Bank failed in 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation\n(FDIC) took over its assets, which included the right to collect from Providence. The\n\n -3-\n\fFDIC created the entity CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 (CADC), which the FDIC\nowned jointly with a private investment company, and sold Premier Bankβs assets to\nit. CADC obtained a consent judgment against Providence in Missouri state court in\nSeptember 2014 for $15.7 million plus interest. Concannon had been dismissed as\na defendant in the state action, and he did not object to the consent judgment. CADC\nthen sold Providenceβs debt obligations to Radiance in May 2016 and thereafter\nexecuted and filed an Assignment of Judgment in Missouri state court assigning the\nconsent judgment against Providence to Radiance.\n\n Radiance filed suit in federal district court against Concannon to collect the\nburgeoning amount owing from the consent judgment, which now approaches $22\nmillion. Relevant here, Radiance claimed that Concannon breached his guaranty.\nThe district court granted Radianceβs summary judgment motion in part, concluding\nthat Radiance had a valid assignment of Providenceβs debt. Following a bench trial\nin October 2017, the district court determined that Lindner had acted with\nConcannonβs actual authority to deliver the signed guaranty to Premier Bank and that\nConcannon failed to establish a fraud-in-factum defense. The court ordered\nConcannon to pay the full amount owing on the consent judgment and granted\nRadianceβs motion for attorneysβ fees. After denying Concannonβs request to amend\nthe findings and judgment, the court entered final judgment. The parties agree that\nMissouri law applies in this diversity action.\n\n II.\n\n Concannon contends that Radiance lacks the right to enforce the consent\njudgment because the assignment of Providenceβs debt from the FDIC to CADC was\ninvalid. As a party seeking to collect a debt owed another, Radiance must prove valid\neach assignment serving as a βlink in the chain between the party to which the debt\nwas originally owed and the party trying to collect the debt.β CACH, LLC v. Askew,\n358 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Mo. 2012). We review de novo the district courtβs determination\n\n -4-\n\fthat the chain of assignments was valid. Hanson v. FDIC, 113 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir.\n1997) (standard of review).\n\n Concannon claims that the FDIC exceeded its statutory authority by creating\nand co-owning CADC and by entering into structured transactions between CADC\nand private investors. He contends that because the FDIC acted without authority in\ndoing so, its transfer of Premier Bankβs assets to CADC was void as a matter of law.\n\n β[A]n agency may only exercise those powers Congress has given it.β Saxton\nv. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2018) (Stras, J., concurring).\nIn response to the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, Congress enacted the Financial\nInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to enable the\nFDIC to act as a receiver for failed institutions. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183\n(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). FIRREA grants the FDIC\nβunprecedented powers so that it may function efficaciously as a receiver or\nconservator of insolvent financial institutions.β Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d\n106, 111 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Hanson, 113 F.3d at 871 (βAs a receiver, the FDIC\nhas substantial powers over [a failed institutionβs] assets.β).\n\n We conclude that the FDICβs creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bankβs\nassets thereto fall within its broad power. Under FIRREA, the FDIC has authority to\nact as a receiver, 12 U.S.C. Β§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii), and to assume βall rights, titles,\npowers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,β Β§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).\nAccordingly, the FDIC was authorized to assume Premier Bankβs right to collect\nProvidenceβs debt. Because the FDIC also had the authority under Β§ 1821(d)(2)(E)\nto dispose of Premier Bankβs assets, we conclude that it acted within its incidental\npowers when it created CADC and sold Premier Bankβs assets to it. Id.\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) (permitting the FDIC to transfer assets); Β§ 1821(d)(2)(J)(i)-(ii)\n(permitting the FDIC to βexercise . . . such incidental powers as shall be necessary to\ncarry out [specifically granted] powersβ and βtake any action authorized by this\n\n -5-\n\fchapter, which the [FDIC] determines is in the best interests of the depository\ninstitution, its depositors, or the [FDIC]β). Section 1821(d)(2)(K) authorized the\nFDIC to use the services of a private entity to dispose of Premier Bankβs assets. The\ndistrict court therefore properly determined that the assignment of rights from the\nFDIC to CADC was valid. Concannon does not dispute the validity of the assignment\nfrom CADC to Radiance, and thus we conclude that Radiance may enforce the\nconsent judgment.\n\n In so concluding, we reject Concannonβs argument that the FDICβs incidental\npowers are limited to acts strictly necessary to dispose of the bankβs assets. His\ntheory is not supported by case law, and a reasonable reading of FIRREAβs text\nauthorizes the FDIC to act as it did here. We further reject Concannonβs claim that\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(F)βs express grant of authority to organize depository institutions\nprecludes the FDIC from creating non-depository entities like CADC. Concannonβs\nreading would frustrate both FIRREAβs text, which permits the use of incidental\npowers, and its purpose, which grants the FDIC broad discretion to dispose of a failed\ninstitutionβs assets. See Watt v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.\n2006) (β[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating\ngeneral purpose.β (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.\n23 (1983))).\n\n III.\n\n Concannon next argues that the district court erred in concluding that Lindner\nacted as his agent with implied actual authority when delivering the guaranty to\nPremier Bank. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp.,\n854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1993) (explaining the unconditional delivery element of\na breach of guaranty claim). βAgency is the fiduciary relationship resulting from the\nmanifestation of consent by an agent to a principal that the agent will act on the\nprincipalβs behalf and subject to his control.β Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Prot. Dist.,\n\n -6-\n\f257 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Mo. 2008). Whether this principal-agent relationship exists\nis generally a question of fact. See Bus. Bank of Saint Louis v. Old Republic Natβl\nTitle Ins. Co., 322 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). Concannon does not\nseriously dispute the district courtβs finding that he and Lindner had such a\nrelationship.3\n\n Instead, he contends that Lindner delivered the guaranty without his authority\nand therefore acted outside the scope of any agency relationship. In the context of a\nprincipal-agent relationship, the principal is responsible for his agentβs acts as long\nas the agent acts with actual or apparent authority. Id. Actual authority may be\nexpress or implied. Id. The former βexists when the principal explicitly tells the\nagent what to do,β and the latter, implied actual authority, βconsists of those powers\nincidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.β Id. at 552, 554 (quoting\nHardcore Concrete, LLC v. Fortner Ins. Servs., Inc., 220 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Mo. Ct.\nApp. 2007)). β[T]he relationship of principal and agent cannot be presumed but must\nbe proved,β and thus, β[i]mplied powers, like any others, must be bottomed on some\nact or acquiescence of the principal, express or implied.β Dudley v. Dumont, 526\nS.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Whether an agentβs actions were incidental\nand necessary to carry out the express authority is also a question of fact. See Bus.\nBank of Saint Louis, 322 S.W.3d at 554.\n\n\n Concannon argues that delivering the guaranty was not reasonably necessary\nto carry out any grant of express authority that he had given to Lindner to prepare\nvarious operating agreements, calculate his taxes, and take care of other business\nmatters. However, the district court found that Concannon signed the guaranty and\nunderstood that he was signing it; that he had admitted in a prior deposition that he\n\n\n 3\n Concannon also does not dispute that Lindner physically delivered the\nguaranty to Premier Bank, nor that, if Lindner acted as his agent when delivering the\nguaranty, the delivery would be his act.\n\n -7-\n\fhad paid Lindner to act on his behalf and had thought or assumed that Lindner acted\non his behalf in giving him documents to sign; that he had relied on Lindner for\nvarious tax and financial services, particularly related to Providence Farms; and that\nhe generally had relied on Lindner to take care of his business matters. Concannon\ndoes not dispute these findings. The record also indicates that Concannon testified\nthat he and Lindner had previously discussed working together on a deal and that he\nhad been βlooking forwardβ to partnering with Lindner and investing in Providence.\nAfter signing the guaranty, Concannon twice accompanied Lindner to meetings with\nPremier Bank to discuss Providenceβs debt. Concannon also claimed $1,370,648 in\nnonpassive losses related to Providence during the tax years of 2007, 2008, and 2009.\nThese facts support a determination that Concannon gave Lindner express authority\nto draft and execute all documents related to his involvement in Providence Farms;\nthat Concannonβs purpose in granting this express authority was both to obtain what\nhe thought was a tax credit and to join Lindner in financing Providenceβs various\ninfrastructure projects; and that securing guarantors to ensure Providenceβs continued\noperations was incidental to that express grant of authority. We thus conclude that\nthe district court did not clearly err in determining that Lindner acted with implied\nactual authority in delivering the guaranty to Premier Bank on Concannonβs behalf.\nSee Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard\nof review).\n\n Concannon contends that the guaranty is nonetheless unenforceable because\nPremier Bank failed in its duty to ensure that Lindner acted with Concannonβs\nauthority when delivering the guaranty. See, e.g., Erickson v. Civic Plaza Nat. Bank,\n422 S.W.2d 373, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (βA third person dealing with an agent . . .\nhas the duty of ascertaining for himself, the agentβs authority.β). Because Lindner\nacted with implied actual authority, Premier Bank would have found that Lindner was\nacting well within his scope of authority had it inquired. Its failure to so inquire does\nnot relieve Concannon of liability. See Dalton & Marberry, P.C. v. NationsBank,\nN.A., 982 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Mo. 1998) (βIn Missouri, a payee bank may avoid\n\n -8-\n\fliability by proving that the agent has actual or apparent authority from the drawer-\ndepositor.β); see also Luechtefeld v. Marglous, 151 S.W.2d 710, 716 (Mo. Ct. App.\n1941) (determining that the plaintiff could βprove the authority of the agent Voss to\ndeliver the note and deed of trust and collect the proceeds of said saleβ by βshowing\nimplied or apparent authority.β). To the extent that Concannon argues that Premier\nBank had a special duty to inquire in the context of a loan guaranty, which he claims\nis akin to a contract offer, our conclusion is unchanged: any inquiry by Premier Bank\nwould have revealed that Lindner acted with implied actual authority when delivering\nthe guaranty.\n\n IV.\n\n Concannon disputes the district courtβs findings that Lindner did not\nmisrepresent the guaranty and that Lindner was not his fiduciary in relation to\nProvidence Farms. He also disputes the courtβs conclusion that he, Concannon, was\ngenerally negligent, all of which led it to reject his fraud in the factum defense. Such\nfraud is a misrepresentation as to the nature of the act being done; that is, βthe\nfraud-feasor intends one thing and the victim intends another thing.β Wolf v. St.\nLouis Pub. Serv. Co., 357 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). A defendant\nseeking to invoke such a defense in Concannonβs situation must show (1) that he\nsigned a document in ignorance of its true character; and (2) that his act was due to\nmisrepresentations or fraudulent conduct on the part of another party and not to his\nown negligence. Rau v. Robertson, 260 S.W. 751, 754 (Mo. 1924). Fraud in the\nfactum voids a contract ab initio. Id. We review the district courtβs factual findings\nfor clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Wright, 730 F.3d at 737. A\nfactual finding is clearly erroneous βonly if it is not supported by substantial evidence\nin the record, if it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with the\ndefinite and firm conviction that an error was made.β Id. (quoting Urban Hotel Dev.\nCo. v. President Dev. Grp., L.C., 535 F.3d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 2008)).\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f Concannon contends that he was deceived as to the true nature of the guaranty\nand instead believed it to be a βroutine and necessary document related to a tax\nshelter.β But the district court found as a fact that Concannon understood that he was\nsigning a guaranty, which, if supported by substantial evidence, refutes his fraud\ndefense and renders immaterial whether Lindner acted as his agent and whether\nConcannon was generally negligent. That is, if Concannon knew he was signing a\nguaranty for Providenceβs debts, he cannot have believed that his act was βof a\ndifferent nature than what it really [wa]s.β Wolf, 357 S.W.2d at 957 (determining that\nthe plaintiff, induced to sign a release by false representations that his medical bills\nwould nonetheless be paid, was not deceived as to the nature of the release and\ntherefore stated a claim for fraud in the inducement, not fraud in the factum).\n\n We conclude that the district courtβs finding is not clearly erroneous.\nConcannon read and sought legal advice regarding other documents Lindner prepared\nfor him, including his holding companyβs operating agreement. He had signed other\ndocumentation in the past to assist Providence in securing loans. After signing the\nguaranty, he attended meetings between Premier and Lindner discussing Providenceβs\ndebt. Moreover, the guaranty is unambiguous; the words βALL PRESENT AND\nFUTURE DEBTSβ appear on the first page, and Concannon signed below the clear\nlabel βGUARANTOR.β In light of these facts, the court was free to reject\nConcannonβs testimony that he did not understand the guaranty and would not have\nsigned it if he had. The record is devoid of any evidence that Lindner concealed or\notherwise misrepresented the guaranty. See Rau, 260 S.W. at 755. Any failure by\nLindner to explain the full extent of the guarantyβthat Concannonβs signature would\nguarantee millions in loans that Lindner had already obtained on Providenceβs\nbehalfβdoes not negate Concannonβs knowledge of the βtrue characterβ of the\nguaranty. See id. at 754 (distinguishing fraud in the inducement, which βimplies that\nplaintiff knew that the document embodied a contract of release, but that she was\ninduced to sign it through the fraud of the defendant,β from fraud in the factum,\nwhich implies that the plaintiff βbelieved [the instrument] to be of an entirely\n\n -10-\n\fdifferent characterβ). Because the district courtβs factual finding that Concannon\nunderstood what he was signing and knew it to be a guaranty is supported by\nsubstantial evidence, Concannonβs fraud in the factum defense necessarily fails.\n\n The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those on which\nConcannon relies. In Rau, for example, the defendant offered to pay Rauβs lost wages\nafter he had hit her with his car, causing her to miss work. He later visited her at the\nhospital and, while she was βweak and sick and nervous, and impatient to leave the\nhospital to go home,β asked her to sign what he portrayed as a receipt for his payment\nof her wages. Id. at 755. He βfolded it as to disclose to her merely the place of\nsignature, concealing apparently even the heading: βRelease of Claim, Emma Rau\nagainst John M. Robertson.ββ Id. Because Rau thought she was signing a receipt\nwhen she signed a release, and in spite of her choice not to read before signing, the\ncourt remanded for the jury to decide βwhether through defendantβs fraudulent\nconduct and representations she was led to sign without further investigation an\ninstrument she did not intend to execute.β Id. In contrast, the record here supports\nthe district courtβs finding that Concannon knew that the instrument was a guaranty.\nConcannon also relies on language from Liddell v. Lee, 159 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo.\n1942), which recognizes situations in which a fraud victim βimpose[s] trust and\nconfidence in the [fraud-feasor].β Nevertheless, the defense requires the victim to be\ndeceived as to the type of document being signing or the terms therein, and\nConcannon was not.\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES EIGHTEEN, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dr. Matthew Jerome CONCANNON, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3447\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dr. Matthew Jerome Concannon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Eleven years ago, Matthew Concannon, M.D., signed a general guaranty for a\\ncompany that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial\\nadvisor. What his friend purportedly failed to mention in this otherwise routine\\nexercise of obtaining his signature was that the guaranty would saddle Concannon\\nwith millions of dollars in debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was\\nunable to repay. Concannon urges us to conclude that he was defrauded by his friend,\\n\\fthat his friend acted without his authority in delivering the guaranty to the bank, or\\nthat the bankβs successor in interest, Radiance Capital Receivables (Radiance), lacks\\na proper chain of title to enforce the guaranty. The district court1 determined that\\nConcannon was liable, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Concannon graduated from medical school at the University of Missouri in\\n1987. After training in hand and microsurgery, he returned to the University to join\\nthe medical school faculty. There, Concannon retained the services of JosΓ© Lindner2\\nupon the suggestion of a faculty mentor. Lindner served as a financial planner and\\ntax preparer for several prominent physicians in the area. The two became friends,\\nand Concannon enlisted Lindner to advise him financially, prepare his taxes, and\\ngenerally assist with his various business ventures.\\n\\n Concannon left the University in late 2006, and Lindner assisted him in\\nopening his own private medical practice shortly thereafter. Lindner handled the\\nbusinessβs books and continued assisting with Concannonβs tax and financial matters,\\nincluding drafting and preparing the operating agreement for Concannonβs holding\\ncompany. Concannon trusted Lindner βmore than [he could] describeβ and gave\\nLindner complete access to his financial and business records. Concannon testified\\nin an unrelated matter that, in his words, βI paid [Lindner] to act on my behalf. . . . As\\na matter of routine, Iβwhen [Lindner] would give me stuff to sign, I would just sign\\nit.β\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Missouri.\\n 2\\n Lindner passed away in 2010.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Lindner also managed his own commercial real estate developments, one of\\nwhich involved an entity named Providence Farms, LLC (Providence). Lindner\\noffered Concannon an opportunity to obtain a dollar-for-dollar tax credit by investing\\nin Providence and its various infrastructure construction projects, and Concannon\\nagreed to invest $600,000. Lindner handled Concannonβs involvement with\\nProvidence and regularly sought his signature on related documents, including those\\npurporting to add Concannonβs holding company as a member of Providence with a\\n50% ownership interest. Concannon also signed guaranties permitting Lindner to\\nobtain and renew, on Providenceβs behalf, millions of dollars in loans from various\\nfinancial institutions.\\n\\n Concannon signed a general guaranty for Providence on January 24, 2008. The\\ndocument listed Premier Bank as the lender and guaranteed all of Providenceβs\\nβpresent and future debtsβ of βevery type, purpose and description,β including,\\nβwithout limitation, all principal, accrued interest, attorneyβs fees and collection\\ncosts.β Unbeknownst to Concannon, Providence teetered on the brink of foreclosure\\nat the time, and various banks had required Lindner to obtain guarantors and investors\\nto keep Providence afloat. In subsequent years, Concannon also made personal loans\\nto Lindner at the latterβs request to enable Providence to make its loan payments.\\nConcannon insisted on collateral for one such $240,000 loan in late 2009. Around\\nthat time, he attended two meetings between Premier Bank and Lindner, during which\\nthe bank informed Lindner that it needed payment on the loans.\\n\\n Providence did not make its loan or interest payments and defaulted. The\\ncompany and its projects were a sham; Concannon did not receive a tax credit or a\\nmembership interest, and the infrastructure projects which he purportedly funded with\\nhis investments in Providence were never constructed.\\n\\n Premier Bank failed in 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation\\n(FDIC) took over its assets, which included the right to collect from Providence. The\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fFDIC created the entity CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 (CADC), which the FDIC\\nowned jointly with a private investment company, and sold Premier Bankβs assets to\\nit. CADC obtained a consent judgment against Providence in Missouri state court in\\nSeptember 2014 for $15.7 million plus interest. Concannon had been dismissed as\\na defendant in the state action, and he did not object to the consent judgment. CADC\\nthen sold Providenceβs debt obligations to Radiance in May 2016 and thereafter\\nexecuted and filed an Assignment of Judgment in Missouri state court assigning the\\nconsent judgment against Providence to Radiance.\\n\\n Radiance filed suit in federal district court against Concannon to collect the\\nburgeoning amount owing from the consent judgment, which now approaches $22\\nmillion. Relevant here, Radiance claimed that Concannon breached his guaranty.\\nThe district court granted Radianceβs summary judgment motion in part, concluding\\nthat Radiance had a valid assignment of Providenceβs debt. Following a bench trial\\nin October 2017, the district court determined that Lindner had acted with\\nConcannonβs actual authority to deliver the signed guaranty to Premier Bank and that\\nConcannon failed to establish a fraud-in-factum defense. The court ordered\\nConcannon to pay the full amount owing on the consent judgment and granted\\nRadianceβs motion for attorneysβ fees. After denying Concannonβs request to amend\\nthe findings and judgment, the court entered final judgment. The parties agree that\\nMissouri law applies in this diversity action.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Concannon contends that Radiance lacks the right to enforce the consent\\njudgment because the assignment of Providenceβs debt from the FDIC to CADC was\\ninvalid. As a party seeking to collect a debt owed another, Radiance must prove valid\\neach assignment serving as a βlink in the chain between the party to which the debt\\nwas originally owed and the party trying to collect the debt.β CACH, LLC v. Askew,\\n358 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Mo. 2012). We review de novo the district courtβs determination\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthat the chain of assignments was valid. Hanson v. FDIC, 113 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir.\\n1997) (standard of review).\\n\\n Concannon claims that the FDIC exceeded its statutory authority by creating\\nand co-owning CADC and by entering into structured transactions between CADC\\nand private investors. He contends that because the FDIC acted without authority in\\ndoing so, its transfer of Premier Bankβs assets to CADC was void as a matter of law.\\n\\n β[A]n agency may only exercise those powers Congress has given it.β Saxton\\nv. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2018) (Stras, J., concurring).\\nIn response to the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, Congress enacted the Financial\\nInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to enable the\\nFDIC to act as a receiver for failed institutions. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183\\n(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). FIRREA grants the FDIC\\nβunprecedented powers so that it may function efficaciously as a receiver or\\nconservator of insolvent financial institutions.β Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d\\n106, 111 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Hanson, 113 F.3d at 871 (βAs a receiver, the FDIC\\nhas substantial powers over [a failed institutionβs] assets.β).\\n\\n We conclude that the FDICβs creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bankβs\\nassets thereto fall within its broad power. Under FIRREA, the FDIC has authority to\\nact as a receiver, 12 U.S.C. Β§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii), and to assume βall rights, titles,\\npowers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,β Β§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).\\nAccordingly, the FDIC was authorized to assume Premier Bankβs right to collect\\nProvidenceβs debt. Because the FDIC also had the authority under Β§ 1821(d)(2)(E)\\nto dispose of Premier Bankβs assets, we conclude that it acted within its incidental\\npowers when it created CADC and sold Premier Bankβs assets to it. Id.\\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) (permitting the FDIC to transfer assets); Β§ 1821(d)(2)(J)(i)-(ii)\\n(permitting the FDIC to βexercise . . . such incidental powers as shall be necessary to\\ncarry out [specifically granted] powersβ and βtake any action authorized by this\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fchapter, which the [FDIC] determines is in the best interests of the depository\\ninstitution, its depositors, or the [FDIC]β). Section 1821(d)(2)(K) authorized the\\nFDIC to use the services of a private entity to dispose of Premier Bankβs assets. The\\ndistrict court therefore properly determined that the assignment of rights from the\\nFDIC to CADC was valid. Concannon does not dispute the validity of the assignment\\nfrom CADC to Radiance, and thus we conclude that Radiance may enforce the\\nconsent judgment.\\n\\n In so concluding, we reject Concannonβs argument that the FDICβs incidental\\npowers are limited to acts strictly necessary to dispose of the bankβs assets. His\\ntheory is not supported by case law, and a reasonable reading of FIRREAβs text\\nauthorizes the FDIC to act as it did here. We further reject Concannonβs claim that\\nΒ§ 1821(d)(2)(F)βs express grant of authority to organize depository institutions\\nprecludes the FDIC from creating non-depository entities like CADC. Concannonβs\\nreading would frustrate both FIRREAβs text, which permits the use of incidental\\npowers, and its purpose, which grants the FDIC broad discretion to dispose of a failed\\ninstitutionβs assets. See Watt v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.\\n2006) (β[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating\\ngeneral purpose.β (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.\\n23 (1983))).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Concannon next argues that the district court erred in concluding that Lindner\\nacted as his agent with implied actual authority when delivering the guaranty to\\nPremier Bank. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp.,\\n854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1993) (explaining the unconditional delivery element of\\na breach of guaranty claim). βAgency is the fiduciary relationship resulting from the\\nmanifestation of consent by an agent to a principal that the agent will act on the\\nprincipalβs behalf and subject to his control.β Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Prot. Dist.,\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f257 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Mo. 2008). Whether this principal-agent relationship exists\\nis generally a question of fact. See Bus. Bank of Saint Louis v. Old Republic Natβl\\nTitle Ins. Co., 322 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). Concannon does not\\nseriously dispute the district courtβs finding that he and Lindner had such a\\nrelationship.3\\n\\n Instead, he contends that Lindner delivered the guaranty without his authority\\nand therefore acted outside the scope of any agency relationship. In the context of a\\nprincipal-agent relationship, the principal is responsible for his agentβs acts as long\\nas the agent acts with actual or apparent authority. Id. Actual authority may be\\nexpress or implied. Id. The former βexists when the principal explicitly tells the\\nagent what to do,β and the latter, implied actual authority, βconsists of those powers\\nincidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.β Id. at 552, 554 (quoting\\nHardcore Concrete, LLC v. Fortner Ins. Servs., Inc., 220 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Mo. Ct.\\nApp. 2007)). β[T]he relationship of principal and agent cannot be presumed but must\\nbe proved,β and thus, β[i]mplied powers, like any others, must be bottomed on some\\nact or acquiescence of the principal, express or implied.β Dudley v. Dumont, 526\\nS.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Whether an agentβs actions were incidental\\nand necessary to carry out the express authority is also a question of fact. See Bus.\\nBank of Saint Louis, 322 S.W.3d at 554.\\n\\n\\n Concannon argues that delivering the guaranty was not reasonably necessary\\nto carry out any grant of express authority that he had given to Lindner to prepare\\nvarious operating agreements, calculate his taxes, and take care of other business\\nmatters. However, the district court found that Concannon signed the guaranty and\\nunderstood that he was signing it; that he had admitted in a prior deposition that he\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Concannon also does not dispute that Lindner physically delivered the\\nguaranty to Premier Bank, nor that, if Lindner acted as his agent when delivering the\\nguaranty, the delivery would be his act.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fhad paid Lindner to act on his behalf and had thought or assumed that Lindner acted\\non his behalf in giving him documents to sign; that he had relied on Lindner for\\nvarious tax and financial services, particularly related to Providence Farms; and that\\nhe generally had relied on Lindner to take care of his business matters. Concannon\\ndoes not dispute these findings. The record also indicates that Concannon testified\\nthat he and Lindner had previously discussed working together on a deal and that he\\nhad been βlooking forwardβ to partnering with Lindner and investing in Providence.\\nAfter signing the guaranty, Concannon twice accompanied Lindner to meetings with\\nPremier Bank to discuss Providenceβs debt. Concannon also claimed $1,370,648 in\\nnonpassive losses related to Providence during the tax years of 2007, 2008, and 2009.\\nThese facts support a determination that Concannon gave Lindner express authority\\nto draft and execute all documents related to his involvement in Providence Farms;\\nthat Concannonβs purpose in granting this express authority was both to obtain what\\nhe thought was a tax credit and to join Lindner in financing Providenceβs various\\ninfrastructure projects; and that securing guarantors to ensure Providenceβs continued\\noperations was incidental to that express grant of authority. We thus conclude that\\nthe district court did not clearly err in determining that Lindner acted with implied\\nactual authority in delivering the guaranty to Premier Bank on Concannonβs behalf.\\nSee Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard\\nof review).\\n\\n Concannon contends that the guaranty is nonetheless unenforceable because\\nPremier Bank failed in its duty to ensure that Lindner acted with Concannonβs\\nauthority when delivering the guaranty. See, e.g., Erickson v. Civic Plaza Nat. Bank,\\n422 S.W.2d 373, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (βA third person dealing with an agent . . .\\nhas the duty of ascertaining for himself, the agentβs authority.β). Because Lindner\\nacted with implied actual authority, Premier Bank would have found that Lindner was\\nacting well within his scope of authority had it inquired. Its failure to so inquire does\\nnot relieve Concannon of liability. See Dalton & Marberry, P.C. v. NationsBank,\\nN.A., 982 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Mo. 1998) (βIn Missouri, a payee bank may avoid\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fliability by proving that the agent has actual or apparent authority from the drawer-\\ndepositor.β); see also Luechtefeld v. Marglous, 151 S.W.2d 710, 716 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n1941) (determining that the plaintiff could βprove the authority of the agent Voss to\\ndeliver the note and deed of trust and collect the proceeds of said saleβ by βshowing\\nimplied or apparent authority.β). To the extent that Concannon argues that Premier\\nBank had a special duty to inquire in the context of a loan guaranty, which he claims\\nis akin to a contract offer, our conclusion is unchanged: any inquiry by Premier Bank\\nwould have revealed that Lindner acted with implied actual authority when delivering\\nthe guaranty.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Concannon disputes the district courtβs findings that Lindner did not\\nmisrepresent the guaranty and that Lindner was not his fiduciary in relation to\\nProvidence Farms. He also disputes the courtβs conclusion that he, Concannon, was\\ngenerally negligent, all of which led it to reject his fraud in the factum defense. Such\\nfraud is a misrepresentation as to the nature of the act being done; that is, βthe\\nfraud-feasor intends one thing and the victim intends another thing.β Wolf v. St.\\nLouis Pub. Serv. Co., 357 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). A defendant\\nseeking to invoke such a defense in Concannonβs situation must show (1) that he\\nsigned a document in ignorance of its true character; and (2) that his act was due to\\nmisrepresentations or fraudulent conduct on the part of another party and not to his\\nown negligence. Rau v. Robertson, 260 S.W. 751, 754 (Mo. 1924). Fraud in the\\nfactum voids a contract ab initio. Id. We review the district courtβs factual findings\\nfor clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Wright, 730 F.3d at 737. A\\nfactual finding is clearly erroneous βonly if it is not supported by substantial evidence\\nin the record, if it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with the\\ndefinite and firm conviction that an error was made.β Id. (quoting Urban Hotel Dev.\\nCo. v. President Dev. Grp., L.C., 535 F.3d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 2008)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Concannon contends that he was deceived as to the true nature of the guaranty\\nand instead believed it to be a βroutine and necessary document related to a tax\\nshelter.β But the district court found as a fact that Concannon understood that he was\\nsigning a guaranty, which, if supported by substantial evidence, refutes his fraud\\ndefense and renders immaterial whether Lindner acted as his agent and whether\\nConcannon was generally negligent. That is, if Concannon knew he was signing a\\nguaranty for Providenceβs debts, he cannot have believed that his act was βof a\\ndifferent nature than what it really [wa]s.β Wolf, 357 S.W.2d at 957 (determining that\\nthe plaintiff, induced to sign a release by false representations that his medical bills\\nwould nonetheless be paid, was not deceived as to the nature of the release and\\ntherefore stated a claim for fraud in the inducement, not fraud in the factum).\\n\\n We conclude that the district courtβs finding is not clearly erroneous.\\nConcannon read and sought legal advice regarding other documents Lindner prepared\\nfor him, including his holding companyβs operating agreement. He had signed other\\ndocumentation in the past to assist Providence in securing loans. After signing the\\nguaranty, he attended meetings between Premier and Lindner discussing Providenceβs\\ndebt. Moreover, the guaranty is unambiguous; the words βALL PRESENT AND\\nFUTURE DEBTSβ appear on the first page, and Concannon signed below the clear\\nlabel βGUARANTOR.β In light of these facts, the court was free to reject\\nConcannonβs testimony that he did not understand the guaranty and would not have\\nsigned it if he had. The record is devoid of any evidence that Lindner concealed or\\notherwise misrepresented the guaranty. See Rau, 260 S.W. at 755. Any failure by\\nLindner to explain the full extent of the guarantyβthat Concannonβs signature would\\nguarantee millions in loans that Lindner had already obtained on Providenceβs\\nbehalfβdoes not negate Concannonβs knowledge of the βtrue characterβ of the\\nguaranty. See id. at 754 (distinguishing fraud in the inducement, which βimplies that\\nplaintiff knew that the document embodied a contract of release, but that she was\\ninduced to sign it through the fraud of the defendant,β from fraud in the factum,\\nwhich implies that the plaintiff βbelieved [the instrument] to be of an entirely\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fdifferent characterβ). Because the district courtβs factual finding that Concannon\\nunderstood what he was signing and knew it to be a guaranty is supported by\\nsubstantial evidence, Concannonβs fraud in the factum defense necessarily fails.\\n\\n The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those on which\\nConcannon relies. In Rau, for example, the defendant offered to pay Rauβs lost wages\\nafter he had hit her with his car, causing her to miss work. He later visited her at the\\nhospital and, while she was βweak and sick and nervous, and impatient to leave the\\nhospital to go home,β asked her to sign what he portrayed as a receipt for his payment\\nof her wages. Id. at 755. He βfolded it as to disclose to her merely the place of\\nsignature, concealing apparently even the heading: βRelease of Claim, Emma Rau\\nagainst John M. Robertson.ββ Id. Because Rau thought she was signing a receipt\\nwhen she signed a release, and in spite of her choice not to read before signing, the\\ncourt remanded for the jury to decide βwhether through defendantβs fraudulent\\nconduct and representations she was led to sign without further investigation an\\ninstrument she did not intend to execute.β Id. In contrast, the record here supports\\nthe district courtβs finding that Concannon knew that the instrument was a guaranty.\\nConcannon also relies on language from Liddell v. Lee, 159 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo.\\n1942), which recognizes situations in which a fraud victim βimpose[s] trust and\\nconfidence in the [fraud-feasor].β Nevertheless, the defense requires the victim to be\\ndeceived as to the type of document being signing or the terms therein, and\\nConcannon was not.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1769,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606932,"string":"4,606,932"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"CMI ROADBUILDING, INC. ; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd., Plaintiffs - Appellants v. IOWA PARTS, INC., Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1075"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Beam, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1075\\n ___________________________\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding, Inc.; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Iowa Parts, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding appeals the district court's1 adverse grant of summary\\njudgment in favor of Iowa Parts in this trademark secrets and intellectual property\\ncase. We affirm the district court.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding owns assets related to the manufacturing of asphalt and\\nconcrete plants, as well as landfill and dirt compaction equipment. CMI\\nRoadbuilding purchased these from a host of other companies, and after a series of\\nmergers and acquisitions, the end result is that CMI Roadbuilding now2 holds assets,\\nincluding intellectual property, from companies formerly called Terex Corporation;\\nCedarapids, Inc.; and Standard Havens; as well as the CMI Corporation's own line of\\nasphalt plants (collectively CMI Roadbuilding). As noted, CMI Roadbuilding is in\\nthe business of manufacturing and selling asphalt plants, related equipment, and for\\na time, also sold replacement parts. Sometime around 1999, Terex significantly\\ndownsized its operationβfrom 1200 employees to 200βand stopped selling\\nreplacement and after-market parts for its products, and instead sought vendors to do\\nso for them. CMI Roadbuilding sent the technical drawings, plans and\\nspecificationsβ\\\"engineering documents\\\" that are required to make an asphalt plant\\nand its component partsβto the vendors who were in the business of making these\\nreplacement and after-market parts.\\n\\n In 2002, Iowa Parts got into the market of becoming a vendor of replacement\\nparts that were previously designed and manufactured by Terex, Cedarapids, Standard\\nHavens, and CMI. Iowa Parts was formed by the former head of Standard Havens'\\nParts Department, Michael Hawkins. Iowa Parts represents that its parts meet\\n\\\"original equipment manufacturer\\\" (OEM) specifications. Several employees at Iowa\\nParts used to work at the various companies that merged into CMI Roadbuilding.\\nIncluded in this group was Jay King, former parts manager at Terex; Rick Merritt, a\\ndraftsman for Cedarapids and Terex; and Timothy Franck, who worked in some\\n\\n 2\\n The disparate timing of these various mergers and acquisitions makes\\nreference to the various companies and parties somewhat confusing. For instance,\\nwhile Terex acquired Cedarapids in 1999, CMI Roadbuilding did not acquire Terex\\nuntil 2013, after many of the key events at issue in this dispute took place.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcapacity for Cedarapids and Terex. In order to build the parts, Iowa Parts approached\\nother vendors who had been given engineering documents from CMI Roadbuilding\\nand its predecessors, and asked if those vendors would manufacture parts for Iowa\\nParts. Some of the vendors additionally provided drawings to Iowa Parts that they\\nhad obtained from CMI Roadbuilding. Iowa Parts also \\\"reverse engineered\\\" other\\ncomponent parts by using a string line and a tape measure.\\n\\n On May 29, 2002, Terex sent a letter to King, reminding him of his duty of\\nloyalty to his former company and that it would be \\\"a crime\\\" for him to disclose any\\nof CMI Terex's trade secrets without authorization. The letter also stated that it knew\\nIowa Parts had been contacting and recruiting Cedarapids customers. Undeterred,\\nIowa Parts continued manufacturing component parts. As evidence of CMI\\nRoadbuilding's knowledge of this, during deposition testimony, the parts manager for\\nCMI Roadbuilding testified that Iowa Parts directly competed with CMI\\nRoadbuilding from Iowa Parts' inception in 2002. The manager noted that during this\\ntime frame she was perplexed as to how Iowa Parts could quickly and easily provide\\ncustomers with quotes for parts, while she at CMI Roadbuilding struggled to provide\\nprice information about component parts for its own products. Evidence in the\\nsummary judgment record also indicates that Iowa Parts advertised regularly in trade\\nmagazines between 2002 and 2014, and that Terex advertised in the same magazine.\\nIowa Parts also attended and advertised at prominent asphalt trade shows.\\nRepresentatives of Terex attended at least one of these same trade shows. Further,\\nIowa Parts' current website, www.iowapartsusa.com, which began operating in July\\n2011, advertises its business model, the parts it manufactures for asphalt plants, and\\nnotes that its employees gained knowledge in the business while working for CMI\\nRoadbuilding's predecessors.\\n\\n More recently, and what amounts to the real genesis of the current dispute,\\nIowa Parts transitioned from making smaller and cheaper ($50 to $250) parts to larger\\ncomponent parts, which cost more in the range of $300,000 to $400,000. Once CMI\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fRoadbuilding found out about this turn of events, CMI Roadbuilding instituted the\\npresent action on February 22, 2016, alleging: (1) Iowa Parts violated the Defend\\nTrade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836, by converting CMI\\nRoadbuilding's trade secrets; (2) that Iowa Parts violated the similar Iowa trade\\nsecrets law, Iowa Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), Iowa Code Β§ 550; (3) a\\ncommon law claim that Iowa Parts converted its trade secrets; and (4) that Iowa Parts\\nwas unjustly enriched by taking CMI Roadbuilding's trade secrets.\\n\\n Ultimately, CMI Roadbuilding moved for summary judgment, and Iowa Parts\\nfiled a competing motion for summary judgment, alleging that the three-year statute\\nof limitations on the statutory claims had run because CMI Roadbuilding knew much\\nearlier than February 2013 what Iowa Parts was doing, and that CMI Roadbuilding\\ndid not keep the trade secrets \\\"secret\\\" because they distributed them to several\\nvendors. The district court agreed with Iowa Parts on the statute of limitations\\nargument, rejecting CMI Roadbuilding's theory that the \\\"discovery\\\" doctrine should\\ntoll the statute because CMI Roadbuilding knew, or should have known, well before\\nFebruary 2013 that its trade secrets were being used by Iowa Parts.\\n\\n With regard to the conversion claim, the court found that even if a longer five-\\nyear statute of limitations did not bar the conversion action, conversion is the \\\"civil\\nequivalent\\\" to theft. The court determined that while conversion could be available\\nin a trade secrets claim if the offending party actually interfered with the original\\nowner's use of the secrets, in this case, Iowa Parts' use of the engineering documents\\nhas not actually deprived CMI Roadbuilding of any of its trade secrets. The court\\nnoted that CMI Roadbuilding has never lost the ability to control and utilize the\\ndocuments it maintains, and it still retains all of the engineering documents. Finally,\\nwith regard to unjust enrichment, the court found that CMI Roadbuilding would have\\nhad an adequate remedy at law if it had timely brought suit, and thus, the equitable\\ndoctrine of unjust enrichment was unavailable. CMI Roadbuilding appeals.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Summary judgment is appropriate \\\"if the movant shows that there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \\\"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, the\\ndiscovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show'\\\" an absence of a\\ngenuine dispute as to a material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031,\\n1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Our review is de\\nnovo. Id.\\n\\n A. Statutory Causes of Action\\n\\n The DTSA creates a private right of action for an owner of a trade secret when\\nthat secret has been misappropriated, if the secret relates to a product used in\\ninterstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836. Trade secrets include, as relevant here,\\n\\\"scientific, technical . . . engineering information, including patterns, plans, . . .\\ndesigns.\\\" Id. Β§ 1839(3). However such information only qualifies as a trade secret\\nif the owner has \\\"taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret\\\" and the\\ninformation has economic value. Id. Β§ 1839(3). \\\"Misappropriation\\\" essentially\\nmeans to acquire the trade secret of another by improper means and without the\\nowner's consent. Id. Β§ 1839(5)-(6). The UTSA is similar and both statutes have a\\nthree-year statute of limitations for bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation.\\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836(d); Iowa Code Β§ 550.8. CMI Roadbuilding brought the instant\\naction on February 22, 2016. Iowa Parts began doing business in or around 2002,\\nwith CMI Roadbuilding's abundant knowledge. In order to succeed in litigation\\nunder both statutes, CMI Roadbuilding must not have had actual or imputed\\nknowledge of a violation prior to February 22, 2013, for the claims to survive\\nsummary judgment. CMI Roadbuilding argues that it did not \\\"discover\\\" Iowa Parts\\nwas actually using trade secrets until the more expensive parts were being produced\\nin 2016, and that the discovery rule tolls application of the statute of limitations.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the injured\\nperson knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, the fact and cause\\nof the injury. Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995). The rule\\nextends when the plaintiff \\\"first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a\\nreasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its\\ncause.\\\" Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa\\n1993). The ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed.\\nFranzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). Once a plaintiff is on\\ninquiry notice, he is charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent investigation\\nwould have disclosed, and has a duty to do such an investigation, regardless of the\\nplaintiff's exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff need\\nonly know a problem exists. Id. While this can be an issue for the factfinder, it is not\\nalways so. See, e.g., Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 2017) (holding\\nthat this inquiry can be one for the factfinder \\\"unless the issue is so clear it can be\\nresolved as a matter of law\\\"). While Iowa Parts has the burden of proving the statute\\nof limitations bars the action, CMI Roadbuilding has the burden of proving the\\ndiscovery rule tolls application of the statutory bar. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc.\\nv. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Here CMI Roadbuilding cannot establish its burden of proving that the\\ndiscovery rule saves its statutory causes of action. In 2002, Terex sent King a letter\\nindicating a possible problem existed with Iowa Parts and its engineering documents\\nand warned that it was illegal for it to use them without authorization. Iowa Parts\\ntook no evasive action to conceal its activities; it continued to sell its parts to CMI\\nRoadbuilding's customers, advertise in common industry trade journals, and promoted\\nitself with exhibits at an asphalt trade show which representatives from CMI\\nRoadbuilding's predecessor companies attended. CMI Roadbuilding was likely at the\\nearliest on inquiry notice at the time its predecessor Terex sent the letter to King in\\n2002, but also was continuously on notice beyond that time due to Iowa Parts'\\nadvertising, exhibiting, and sales activities.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f CMI Roadbuilding argues that it could not have discovered that its trade secrets\\nwere being misappropriated, triggering the running of the statute, until the evolution\\nof Iowa Parts' business into the business of providing large components. It argues\\nthat it reasonably did not know whether Iowa Parts was misappropriating its trade\\nsecrets when it was making smaller parts since those parts can be reverse engineered\\nand possibly built without engineering documents. This argument ignores the\\napplication of the inquiry notice portion of the discovery rule. As stated above, the\\nultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen, 377\\nN.W.2d at 662. CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that a problem with\\npossible misappropriation of its trade secrets might exist well before February 2013.\\nAt the point it was on notice there was a possible problem, it had a duty to\\ninvestigate, regardless of its exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. As\\nthe district court noted, Iowa Parts established itself as a direct competitor of CMI\\nRoadbuilding almost as soon as it began operating, as noted by CMI Roadbuilding's\\nparts manager. It advertised in magazines, it promoted itself at industry trade shows,\\nand it maintained a website explaining the company's and employees' background and\\nrelation to CMI Roadbuilding and its predecessors. Accordingly, we affirm the\\ndistrict court's disposition of this issue.\\n\\n B. Conversion\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding next claims the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment on its conversion claim. The Iowa statute of limitations for this state law\\nclaim is likely five years, per Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4) (five-year limitation for injuries\\nto property); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 477 n.2\\n(Iowa 1990) (assuming without deciding that this five-year statute of limitations\\napplied to a conversion claim rather than a general two-year tort statute of limitations\\nbased upon the parties' agreement on the issue). Thus, CMI Roadbuilding must not\\nhave been on inquiry notice before February 2011. Assuming that Iowa law would\\neven recognize a claim for conversion of intellectual property, e.g., Kendall/Hunt\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fPubl'g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (affirming the ruling that\\nconversion did not extend to protect intellectual property in the form of the design\\nand layout of a book), as is the case with the statutory claims, it is clear that CMI\\nRoadbuilding was on notice of a possible problem with its trade secrets as early as\\n2002, shortly after Iowa Parts formed as a company. Accordingly, the district court\\ncorrectly granted summary judgment on the conversion claim.\\n\\n C. Unjust Enrichment\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding's final claim is that Iowa Parts will be unjustly enriched if\\nCMI Roadbuilding is not allowed to pursue its intellectual property rights claim at\\nthis juncture. The district court held that even if the unjust enrichment claim was not\\ntime-barred, which it likely was, see Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4), Iowa Parts was entitled\\nto summary judgment because an equitable claim fails when there is an adequate\\nremedy at law. Where a party seeks damages pursuant to both a statutory and an\\nequitable claim, the very existence of the statutory claims bars recovery on the\\nequitable claim, \\\"even if recovery under the[] statutes is time-barred.\\\" United States\\nv. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013). In Bame, we found that, under\\nMinnesota law, a time-barred cause of action arising under a fraudulent transfer\\nstatute precluded the plaintiff from asserting an unjust enrichment claim. Id. We\\nfound that it was the existence of, not the efficacy of, an adequate legal remedy that\\nprecluded the equitable claim. Id. CMI Roadbuilding's citation to cases from the\\nfederal district courts of Iowa for the contrary conclusion are inapposite. Case law\\nfrom the Iowa state courts indicates that the law in Iowa is the same as, not more\\nbroadly construed, than Minnesota law in Bame. Indeed, Iowa law recognizes that\\n\\\"[e]quity generally will not provide relief where an adequate remedy at law existed\\nand defendant was denied that relief for appropriate legal reasons.\\\" Mosebach v.\\nBlythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). See also State ex rel. Palmer v.\\nUnisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 n.2 (Iowa 2001) (\\\"The adequacy of a legal\\nremedy is a general limitation on the exercise of equity jurisdiction . . . .\\\"). While\\n\\n -8-\\n\\falternative theories can be pled, a plaintiff cannot recover from both. Mosebach, 282\\nN.W.2d at 758, 761 (noting that plaintiffs had pleaded equitable issues in the\\nalternative to their contract claims, which ultimately failed). CMI Roadbuilding\\ncould have had viable claims under the statutory schemes if it had timely brought the\\nclaims. Accordingly, an equitable claim cannot provide alternative relief, and the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that Iowa Parts was making its\\ncomponent parts, possibly with its engineering documents and other trade secrets,\\nstarting in 2002 and continuing thereafter. As Iowa Parts notes in its brief, \\\"the only\\nthing that has changed since 2002 is that Iowa Parts now sells directly competing\\nparts that are significantly more expensive than they had in the past.\\\" Because the\\nstatute of limitations has run on the statutory claims and conversion claim, and the\\nremaining equitable claim fails on the merits, we affirm the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384185/\", \"author_raw\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606932/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: CMI ROADBUILDING, INC. ; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd., Plaintiffs - Appellants v. IOWA PARTS, INC., Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1075\n ___________________________\n\n CMI Roadbuilding, Inc.; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n Iowa Parts, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\n Filed: April 4, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\n\n CMI Roadbuilding appeals the district court's1 adverse grant of summary\njudgment in favor of Iowa Parts in this trademark secrets and intellectual property\ncase. We affirm the district court.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\fI. BACKGROUND\n\n CMI Roadbuilding owns assets related to the manufacturing of asphalt and\nconcrete plants, as well as landfill and dirt compaction equipment. CMI\nRoadbuilding purchased these from a host of other companies, and after a series of\nmergers and acquisitions, the end result is that CMI Roadbuilding now2 holds assets,\nincluding intellectual property, from companies formerly called Terex Corporation;\nCedarapids, Inc.; and Standard Havens; as well as the CMI Corporation's own line of\nasphalt plants (collectively CMI Roadbuilding). As noted, CMI Roadbuilding is in\nthe business of manufacturing and selling asphalt plants, related equipment, and for\na time, also sold replacement parts. Sometime around 1999, Terex significantly\ndownsized its operationβfrom 1200 employees to 200βand stopped selling\nreplacement and after-market parts for its products, and instead sought vendors to do\nso for them. CMI Roadbuilding sent the technical drawings, plans and\nspecificationsβ\"engineering documents\" that are required to make an asphalt plant\nand its component partsβto the vendors who were in the business of making these\nreplacement and after-market parts.\n\n In 2002, Iowa Parts got into the market of becoming a vendor of replacement\nparts that were previously designed and manufactured by Terex, Cedarapids, Standard\nHavens, and CMI. Iowa Parts was formed by the former head of Standard Havens'\nParts Department, Michael Hawkins. Iowa Parts represents that its parts meet\n\"original equipment manufacturer\" (OEM) specifications. Several employees at Iowa\nParts used to work at the various companies that merged into CMI Roadbuilding.\nIncluded in this group was Jay King, former parts manager at Terex; Rick Merritt, a\ndraftsman for Cedarapids and Terex; and Timothy Franck, who worked in some\n\n 2\n The disparate timing of these various mergers and acquisitions makes\nreference to the various companies and parties somewhat confusing. For instance,\nwhile Terex acquired Cedarapids in 1999, CMI Roadbuilding did not acquire Terex\nuntil 2013, after many of the key events at issue in this dispute took place.\n\n -2-\n\fcapacity for Cedarapids and Terex. In order to build the parts, Iowa Parts approached\nother vendors who had been given engineering documents from CMI Roadbuilding\nand its predecessors, and asked if those vendors would manufacture parts for Iowa\nParts. Some of the vendors additionally provided drawings to Iowa Parts that they\nhad obtained from CMI Roadbuilding. Iowa Parts also \"reverse engineered\" other\ncomponent parts by using a string line and a tape measure.\n\n On May 29, 2002, Terex sent a letter to King, reminding him of his duty of\nloyalty to his former company and that it would be \"a crime\" for him to disclose any\nof CMI Terex's trade secrets without authorization. The letter also stated that it knew\nIowa Parts had been contacting and recruiting Cedarapids customers. Undeterred,\nIowa Parts continued manufacturing component parts. As evidence of CMI\nRoadbuilding's knowledge of this, during deposition testimony, the parts manager for\nCMI Roadbuilding testified that Iowa Parts directly competed with CMI\nRoadbuilding from Iowa Parts' inception in 2002. The manager noted that during this\ntime frame she was perplexed as to how Iowa Parts could quickly and easily provide\ncustomers with quotes for parts, while she at CMI Roadbuilding struggled to provide\nprice information about component parts for its own products. Evidence in the\nsummary judgment record also indicates that Iowa Parts advertised regularly in trade\nmagazines between 2002 and 2014, and that Terex advertised in the same magazine.\nIowa Parts also attended and advertised at prominent asphalt trade shows.\nRepresentatives of Terex attended at least one of these same trade shows. Further,\nIowa Parts' current website, www.iowapartsusa.com, which began operating in July\n2011, advertises its business model, the parts it manufactures for asphalt plants, and\nnotes that its employees gained knowledge in the business while working for CMI\nRoadbuilding's predecessors.\n\n More recently, and what amounts to the real genesis of the current dispute,\nIowa Parts transitioned from making smaller and cheaper ($50 to $250) parts to larger\ncomponent parts, which cost more in the range of $300,000 to $400,000. Once CMI\n\n -3-\n\fRoadbuilding found out about this turn of events, CMI Roadbuilding instituted the\npresent action on February 22, 2016, alleging: (1) Iowa Parts violated the Defend\nTrade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836, by converting CMI\nRoadbuilding's trade secrets; (2) that Iowa Parts violated the similar Iowa trade\nsecrets law, Iowa Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), Iowa Code Β§ 550; (3) a\ncommon law claim that Iowa Parts converted its trade secrets; and (4) that Iowa Parts\nwas unjustly enriched by taking CMI Roadbuilding's trade secrets.\n\n Ultimately, CMI Roadbuilding moved for summary judgment, and Iowa Parts\nfiled a competing motion for summary judgment, alleging that the three-year statute\nof limitations on the statutory claims had run because CMI Roadbuilding knew much\nearlier than February 2013 what Iowa Parts was doing, and that CMI Roadbuilding\ndid not keep the trade secrets \"secret\" because they distributed them to several\nvendors. The district court agreed with Iowa Parts on the statute of limitations\nargument, rejecting CMI Roadbuilding's theory that the \"discovery\" doctrine should\ntoll the statute because CMI Roadbuilding knew, or should have known, well before\nFebruary 2013 that its trade secrets were being used by Iowa Parts.\n\n With regard to the conversion claim, the court found that even if a longer five-\nyear statute of limitations did not bar the conversion action, conversion is the \"civil\nequivalent\" to theft. The court determined that while conversion could be available\nin a trade secrets claim if the offending party actually interfered with the original\nowner's use of the secrets, in this case, Iowa Parts' use of the engineering documents\nhas not actually deprived CMI Roadbuilding of any of its trade secrets. The court\nnoted that CMI Roadbuilding has never lost the ability to control and utilize the\ndocuments it maintains, and it still retains all of the engineering documents. Finally,\nwith regard to unjust enrichment, the court found that CMI Roadbuilding would have\nhad an adequate remedy at law if it had timely brought suit, and thus, the equitable\ndoctrine of unjust enrichment was unavailable. CMI Roadbuilding appeals.\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fII. DISCUSSION\n\n Summary judgment is appropriate \"if the movant shows that there is no genuine\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\nlaw.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, the\ndiscovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show'\" an absence of a\ngenuine dispute as to a material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031,\n1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Our review is de\nnovo. Id.\n\n A. Statutory Causes of Action\n\n The DTSA creates a private right of action for an owner of a trade secret when\nthat secret has been misappropriated, if the secret relates to a product used in\ninterstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836. Trade secrets include, as relevant here,\n\"scientific, technical . . . engineering information, including patterns, plans, . . .\ndesigns.\" Id. Β§ 1839(3). However such information only qualifies as a trade secret\nif the owner has \"taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret\" and the\ninformation has economic value. Id. Β§ 1839(3). \"Misappropriation\" essentially\nmeans to acquire the trade secret of another by improper means and without the\nowner's consent. Id. Β§ 1839(5)-(6). The UTSA is similar and both statutes have a\nthree-year statute of limitations for bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation.\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836(d); Iowa Code Β§ 550.8. CMI Roadbuilding brought the instant\naction on February 22, 2016. Iowa Parts began doing business in or around 2002,\nwith CMI Roadbuilding's abundant knowledge. In order to succeed in litigation\nunder both statutes, CMI Roadbuilding must not have had actual or imputed\nknowledge of a violation prior to February 22, 2013, for the claims to survive\nsummary judgment. CMI Roadbuilding argues that it did not \"discover\" Iowa Parts\nwas actually using trade secrets until the more expensive parts were being produced\nin 2016, and that the discovery rule tolls application of the statute of limitations.\n\n -5-\n\f The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the injured\nperson knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, the fact and cause\nof the injury. Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995). The rule\nextends when the plaintiff \"first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a\nreasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its\ncause.\" Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa\n1993). The ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed.\nFranzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). Once a plaintiff is on\ninquiry notice, he is charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent investigation\nwould have disclosed, and has a duty to do such an investigation, regardless of the\nplaintiff's exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff need\nonly know a problem exists. Id. While this can be an issue for the factfinder, it is not\nalways so. See, e.g., Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 2017) (holding\nthat this inquiry can be one for the factfinder \"unless the issue is so clear it can be\nresolved as a matter of law\"). While Iowa Parts has the burden of proving the statute\nof limitations bars the action, CMI Roadbuilding has the burden of proving the\ndiscovery rule tolls application of the statutory bar. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc.\nv. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2005).\n\n Here CMI Roadbuilding cannot establish its burden of proving that the\ndiscovery rule saves its statutory causes of action. In 2002, Terex sent King a letter\nindicating a possible problem existed with Iowa Parts and its engineering documents\nand warned that it was illegal for it to use them without authorization. Iowa Parts\ntook no evasive action to conceal its activities; it continued to sell its parts to CMI\nRoadbuilding's customers, advertise in common industry trade journals, and promoted\nitself with exhibits at an asphalt trade show which representatives from CMI\nRoadbuilding's predecessor companies attended. CMI Roadbuilding was likely at the\nearliest on inquiry notice at the time its predecessor Terex sent the letter to King in\n2002, but also was continuously on notice beyond that time due to Iowa Parts'\nadvertising, exhibiting, and sales activities.\n\n -6-\n\f CMI Roadbuilding argues that it could not have discovered that its trade secrets\nwere being misappropriated, triggering the running of the statute, until the evolution\nof Iowa Parts' business into the business of providing large components. It argues\nthat it reasonably did not know whether Iowa Parts was misappropriating its trade\nsecrets when it was making smaller parts since those parts can be reverse engineered\nand possibly built without engineering documents. This argument ignores the\napplication of the inquiry notice portion of the discovery rule. As stated above, the\nultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen, 377\nN.W.2d at 662. CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that a problem with\npossible misappropriation of its trade secrets might exist well before February 2013.\nAt the point it was on notice there was a possible problem, it had a duty to\ninvestigate, regardless of its exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. As\nthe district court noted, Iowa Parts established itself as a direct competitor of CMI\nRoadbuilding almost as soon as it began operating, as noted by CMI Roadbuilding's\nparts manager. It advertised in magazines, it promoted itself at industry trade shows,\nand it maintained a website explaining the company's and employees' background and\nrelation to CMI Roadbuilding and its predecessors. Accordingly, we affirm the\ndistrict court's disposition of this issue.\n\n B. Conversion\n\n CMI Roadbuilding next claims the district court erred in granting summary\njudgment on its conversion claim. The Iowa statute of limitations for this state law\nclaim is likely five years, per Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4) (five-year limitation for injuries\nto property); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 477 n.2\n(Iowa 1990) (assuming without deciding that this five-year statute of limitations\napplied to a conversion claim rather than a general two-year tort statute of limitations\nbased upon the parties' agreement on the issue). Thus, CMI Roadbuilding must not\nhave been on inquiry notice before February 2011. Assuming that Iowa law would\neven recognize a claim for conversion of intellectual property, e.g., Kendall/Hunt\n\n -7-\n\fPubl'g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (affirming the ruling that\nconversion did not extend to protect intellectual property in the form of the design\nand layout of a book), as is the case with the statutory claims, it is clear that CMI\nRoadbuilding was on notice of a possible problem with its trade secrets as early as\n2002, shortly after Iowa Parts formed as a company. Accordingly, the district court\ncorrectly granted summary judgment on the conversion claim.\n\n C. Unjust Enrichment\n\n CMI Roadbuilding's final claim is that Iowa Parts will be unjustly enriched if\nCMI Roadbuilding is not allowed to pursue its intellectual property rights claim at\nthis juncture. The district court held that even if the unjust enrichment claim was not\ntime-barred, which it likely was, see Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4), Iowa Parts was entitled\nto summary judgment because an equitable claim fails when there is an adequate\nremedy at law. Where a party seeks damages pursuant to both a statutory and an\nequitable claim, the very existence of the statutory claims bars recovery on the\nequitable claim, \"even if recovery under the[] statutes is time-barred.\" United States\nv. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013). In Bame, we found that, under\nMinnesota law, a time-barred cause of action arising under a fraudulent transfer\nstatute precluded the plaintiff from asserting an unjust enrichment claim. Id. We\nfound that it was the existence of, not the efficacy of, an adequate legal remedy that\nprecluded the equitable claim. Id. CMI Roadbuilding's citation to cases from the\nfederal district courts of Iowa for the contrary conclusion are inapposite. Case law\nfrom the Iowa state courts indicates that the law in Iowa is the same as, not more\nbroadly construed, than Minnesota law in Bame. Indeed, Iowa law recognizes that\n\"[e]quity generally will not provide relief where an adequate remedy at law existed\nand defendant was denied that relief for appropriate legal reasons.\" Mosebach v.\nBlythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). See also State ex rel. Palmer v.\nUnisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 n.2 (Iowa 2001) (\"The adequacy of a legal\nremedy is a general limitation on the exercise of equity jurisdiction . . . .\"). While\n\n -8-\n\falternative theories can be pled, a plaintiff cannot recover from both. Mosebach, 282\nN.W.2d at 758, 761 (noting that plaintiffs had pleaded equitable issues in the\nalternative to their contract claims, which ultimately failed). CMI Roadbuilding\ncould have had viable claims under the statutory schemes if it had timely brought the\nclaims. Accordingly, an equitable claim cannot provide alternative relief, and the\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment.\n\nIII. CONCLUSION\n\n CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that Iowa Parts was making its\ncomponent parts, possibly with its engineering documents and other trade secrets,\nstarting in 2002 and continuing thereafter. As Iowa Parts notes in its brief, \"the only\nthing that has changed since 2002 is that Iowa Parts now sells directly competing\nparts that are significantly more expensive than they had in the past.\" Because the\nstatute of limitations has run on the statutory claims and conversion claim, and the\nremaining equitable claim fails on the merits, we affirm the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: CMI ROADBUILDING, INC. ; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd., Plaintiffs - Appellants v. IOWA PARTS, INC., Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1075\\n ___________________________\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding, Inc.; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Iowa Parts, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding appeals the district court's1 adverse grant of summary\\njudgment in favor of Iowa Parts in this trademark secrets and intellectual property\\ncase. We affirm the district court.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding owns assets related to the manufacturing of asphalt and\\nconcrete plants, as well as landfill and dirt compaction equipment. CMI\\nRoadbuilding purchased these from a host of other companies, and after a series of\\nmergers and acquisitions, the end result is that CMI Roadbuilding now2 holds assets,\\nincluding intellectual property, from companies formerly called Terex Corporation;\\nCedarapids, Inc.; and Standard Havens; as well as the CMI Corporation's own line of\\nasphalt plants (collectively CMI Roadbuilding). As noted, CMI Roadbuilding is in\\nthe business of manufacturing and selling asphalt plants, related equipment, and for\\na time, also sold replacement parts. Sometime around 1999, Terex significantly\\ndownsized its operationβfrom 1200 employees to 200βand stopped selling\\nreplacement and after-market parts for its products, and instead sought vendors to do\\nso for them. CMI Roadbuilding sent the technical drawings, plans and\\nspecificationsβ\\\"engineering documents\\\" that are required to make an asphalt plant\\nand its component partsβto the vendors who were in the business of making these\\nreplacement and after-market parts.\\n\\n In 2002, Iowa Parts got into the market of becoming a vendor of replacement\\nparts that were previously designed and manufactured by Terex, Cedarapids, Standard\\nHavens, and CMI. Iowa Parts was formed by the former head of Standard Havens'\\nParts Department, Michael Hawkins. Iowa Parts represents that its parts meet\\n\\\"original equipment manufacturer\\\" (OEM) specifications. Several employees at Iowa\\nParts used to work at the various companies that merged into CMI Roadbuilding.\\nIncluded in this group was Jay King, former parts manager at Terex; Rick Merritt, a\\ndraftsman for Cedarapids and Terex; and Timothy Franck, who worked in some\\n\\n 2\\n The disparate timing of these various mergers and acquisitions makes\\nreference to the various companies and parties somewhat confusing. For instance,\\nwhile Terex acquired Cedarapids in 1999, CMI Roadbuilding did not acquire Terex\\nuntil 2013, after many of the key events at issue in this dispute took place.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcapacity for Cedarapids and Terex. In order to build the parts, Iowa Parts approached\\nother vendors who had been given engineering documents from CMI Roadbuilding\\nand its predecessors, and asked if those vendors would manufacture parts for Iowa\\nParts. Some of the vendors additionally provided drawings to Iowa Parts that they\\nhad obtained from CMI Roadbuilding. Iowa Parts also \\\"reverse engineered\\\" other\\ncomponent parts by using a string line and a tape measure.\\n\\n On May 29, 2002, Terex sent a letter to King, reminding him of his duty of\\nloyalty to his former company and that it would be \\\"a crime\\\" for him to disclose any\\nof CMI Terex's trade secrets without authorization. The letter also stated that it knew\\nIowa Parts had been contacting and recruiting Cedarapids customers. Undeterred,\\nIowa Parts continued manufacturing component parts. As evidence of CMI\\nRoadbuilding's knowledge of this, during deposition testimony, the parts manager for\\nCMI Roadbuilding testified that Iowa Parts directly competed with CMI\\nRoadbuilding from Iowa Parts' inception in 2002. The manager noted that during this\\ntime frame she was perplexed as to how Iowa Parts could quickly and easily provide\\ncustomers with quotes for parts, while she at CMI Roadbuilding struggled to provide\\nprice information about component parts for its own products. Evidence in the\\nsummary judgment record also indicates that Iowa Parts advertised regularly in trade\\nmagazines between 2002 and 2014, and that Terex advertised in the same magazine.\\nIowa Parts also attended and advertised at prominent asphalt trade shows.\\nRepresentatives of Terex attended at least one of these same trade shows. Further,\\nIowa Parts' current website, www.iowapartsusa.com, which began operating in July\\n2011, advertises its business model, the parts it manufactures for asphalt plants, and\\nnotes that its employees gained knowledge in the business while working for CMI\\nRoadbuilding's predecessors.\\n\\n More recently, and what amounts to the real genesis of the current dispute,\\nIowa Parts transitioned from making smaller and cheaper ($50 to $250) parts to larger\\ncomponent parts, which cost more in the range of $300,000 to $400,000. Once CMI\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fRoadbuilding found out about this turn of events, CMI Roadbuilding instituted the\\npresent action on February 22, 2016, alleging: (1) Iowa Parts violated the Defend\\nTrade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836, by converting CMI\\nRoadbuilding's trade secrets; (2) that Iowa Parts violated the similar Iowa trade\\nsecrets law, Iowa Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), Iowa Code Β§ 550; (3) a\\ncommon law claim that Iowa Parts converted its trade secrets; and (4) that Iowa Parts\\nwas unjustly enriched by taking CMI Roadbuilding's trade secrets.\\n\\n Ultimately, CMI Roadbuilding moved for summary judgment, and Iowa Parts\\nfiled a competing motion for summary judgment, alleging that the three-year statute\\nof limitations on the statutory claims had run because CMI Roadbuilding knew much\\nearlier than February 2013 what Iowa Parts was doing, and that CMI Roadbuilding\\ndid not keep the trade secrets \\\"secret\\\" because they distributed them to several\\nvendors. The district court agreed with Iowa Parts on the statute of limitations\\nargument, rejecting CMI Roadbuilding's theory that the \\\"discovery\\\" doctrine should\\ntoll the statute because CMI Roadbuilding knew, or should have known, well before\\nFebruary 2013 that its trade secrets were being used by Iowa Parts.\\n\\n With regard to the conversion claim, the court found that even if a longer five-\\nyear statute of limitations did not bar the conversion action, conversion is the \\\"civil\\nequivalent\\\" to theft. The court determined that while conversion could be available\\nin a trade secrets claim if the offending party actually interfered with the original\\nowner's use of the secrets, in this case, Iowa Parts' use of the engineering documents\\nhas not actually deprived CMI Roadbuilding of any of its trade secrets. The court\\nnoted that CMI Roadbuilding has never lost the ability to control and utilize the\\ndocuments it maintains, and it still retains all of the engineering documents. Finally,\\nwith regard to unjust enrichment, the court found that CMI Roadbuilding would have\\nhad an adequate remedy at law if it had timely brought suit, and thus, the equitable\\ndoctrine of unjust enrichment was unavailable. CMI Roadbuilding appeals.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Summary judgment is appropriate \\\"if the movant shows that there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). \\\"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, the\\ndiscovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show'\\\" an absence of a\\ngenuine dispute as to a material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031,\\n1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Our review is de\\nnovo. Id.\\n\\n A. Statutory Causes of Action\\n\\n The DTSA creates a private right of action for an owner of a trade secret when\\nthat secret has been misappropriated, if the secret relates to a product used in\\ninterstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836. Trade secrets include, as relevant here,\\n\\\"scientific, technical . . . engineering information, including patterns, plans, . . .\\ndesigns.\\\" Id. Β§ 1839(3). However such information only qualifies as a trade secret\\nif the owner has \\\"taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret\\\" and the\\ninformation has economic value. Id. Β§ 1839(3). \\\"Misappropriation\\\" essentially\\nmeans to acquire the trade secret of another by improper means and without the\\nowner's consent. Id. Β§ 1839(5)-(6). The UTSA is similar and both statutes have a\\nthree-year statute of limitations for bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation.\\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1836(d); Iowa Code Β§ 550.8. CMI Roadbuilding brought the instant\\naction on February 22, 2016. Iowa Parts began doing business in or around 2002,\\nwith CMI Roadbuilding's abundant knowledge. In order to succeed in litigation\\nunder both statutes, CMI Roadbuilding must not have had actual or imputed\\nknowledge of a violation prior to February 22, 2013, for the claims to survive\\nsummary judgment. CMI Roadbuilding argues that it did not \\\"discover\\\" Iowa Parts\\nwas actually using trade secrets until the more expensive parts were being produced\\nin 2016, and that the discovery rule tolls application of the statute of limitations.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the injured\\nperson knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, the fact and cause\\nof the injury. Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995). The rule\\nextends when the plaintiff \\\"first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a\\nreasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its\\ncause.\\\" Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa\\n1993). The ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed.\\nFranzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). Once a plaintiff is on\\ninquiry notice, he is charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent investigation\\nwould have disclosed, and has a duty to do such an investigation, regardless of the\\nplaintiff's exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff need\\nonly know a problem exists. Id. While this can be an issue for the factfinder, it is not\\nalways so. See, e.g., Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 2017) (holding\\nthat this inquiry can be one for the factfinder \\\"unless the issue is so clear it can be\\nresolved as a matter of law\\\"). While Iowa Parts has the burden of proving the statute\\nof limitations bars the action, CMI Roadbuilding has the burden of proving the\\ndiscovery rule tolls application of the statutory bar. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc.\\nv. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Here CMI Roadbuilding cannot establish its burden of proving that the\\ndiscovery rule saves its statutory causes of action. In 2002, Terex sent King a letter\\nindicating a possible problem existed with Iowa Parts and its engineering documents\\nand warned that it was illegal for it to use them without authorization. Iowa Parts\\ntook no evasive action to conceal its activities; it continued to sell its parts to CMI\\nRoadbuilding's customers, advertise in common industry trade journals, and promoted\\nitself with exhibits at an asphalt trade show which representatives from CMI\\nRoadbuilding's predecessor companies attended. CMI Roadbuilding was likely at the\\nearliest on inquiry notice at the time its predecessor Terex sent the letter to King in\\n2002, but also was continuously on notice beyond that time due to Iowa Parts'\\nadvertising, exhibiting, and sales activities.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f CMI Roadbuilding argues that it could not have discovered that its trade secrets\\nwere being misappropriated, triggering the running of the statute, until the evolution\\nof Iowa Parts' business into the business of providing large components. It argues\\nthat it reasonably did not know whether Iowa Parts was misappropriating its trade\\nsecrets when it was making smaller parts since those parts can be reverse engineered\\nand possibly built without engineering documents. This argument ignores the\\napplication of the inquiry notice portion of the discovery rule. As stated above, the\\nultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen, 377\\nN.W.2d at 662. CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that a problem with\\npossible misappropriation of its trade secrets might exist well before February 2013.\\nAt the point it was on notice there was a possible problem, it had a duty to\\ninvestigate, regardless of its exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. As\\nthe district court noted, Iowa Parts established itself as a direct competitor of CMI\\nRoadbuilding almost as soon as it began operating, as noted by CMI Roadbuilding's\\nparts manager. It advertised in magazines, it promoted itself at industry trade shows,\\nand it maintained a website explaining the company's and employees' background and\\nrelation to CMI Roadbuilding and its predecessors. Accordingly, we affirm the\\ndistrict court's disposition of this issue.\\n\\n B. Conversion\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding next claims the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment on its conversion claim. The Iowa statute of limitations for this state law\\nclaim is likely five years, per Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4) (five-year limitation for injuries\\nto property); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 477 n.2\\n(Iowa 1990) (assuming without deciding that this five-year statute of limitations\\napplied to a conversion claim rather than a general two-year tort statute of limitations\\nbased upon the parties' agreement on the issue). Thus, CMI Roadbuilding must not\\nhave been on inquiry notice before February 2011. Assuming that Iowa law would\\neven recognize a claim for conversion of intellectual property, e.g., Kendall/Hunt\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fPubl'g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (affirming the ruling that\\nconversion did not extend to protect intellectual property in the form of the design\\nand layout of a book), as is the case with the statutory claims, it is clear that CMI\\nRoadbuilding was on notice of a possible problem with its trade secrets as early as\\n2002, shortly after Iowa Parts formed as a company. Accordingly, the district court\\ncorrectly granted summary judgment on the conversion claim.\\n\\n C. Unjust Enrichment\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding's final claim is that Iowa Parts will be unjustly enriched if\\nCMI Roadbuilding is not allowed to pursue its intellectual property rights claim at\\nthis juncture. The district court held that even if the unjust enrichment claim was not\\ntime-barred, which it likely was, see Iowa Code Β§ 614.1(4), Iowa Parts was entitled\\nto summary judgment because an equitable claim fails when there is an adequate\\nremedy at law. Where a party seeks damages pursuant to both a statutory and an\\nequitable claim, the very existence of the statutory claims bars recovery on the\\nequitable claim, \\\"even if recovery under the[] statutes is time-barred.\\\" United States\\nv. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013). In Bame, we found that, under\\nMinnesota law, a time-barred cause of action arising under a fraudulent transfer\\nstatute precluded the plaintiff from asserting an unjust enrichment claim. Id. We\\nfound that it was the existence of, not the efficacy of, an adequate legal remedy that\\nprecluded the equitable claim. Id. CMI Roadbuilding's citation to cases from the\\nfederal district courts of Iowa for the contrary conclusion are inapposite. Case law\\nfrom the Iowa state courts indicates that the law in Iowa is the same as, not more\\nbroadly construed, than Minnesota law in Bame. Indeed, Iowa law recognizes that\\n\\\"[e]quity generally will not provide relief where an adequate remedy at law existed\\nand defendant was denied that relief for appropriate legal reasons.\\\" Mosebach v.\\nBlythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). See also State ex rel. Palmer v.\\nUnisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 n.2 (Iowa 2001) (\\\"The adequacy of a legal\\nremedy is a general limitation on the exercise of equity jurisdiction . . . .\\\"). While\\n\\n -8-\\n\\falternative theories can be pled, a plaintiff cannot recover from both. Mosebach, 282\\nN.W.2d at 758, 761 (noting that plaintiffs had pleaded equitable issues in the\\nalternative to their contract claims, which ultimately failed). CMI Roadbuilding\\ncould have had viable claims under the statutory schemes if it had timely brought the\\nclaims. Accordingly, an equitable claim cannot provide alternative relief, and the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n CMI Roadbuilding was on inquiry notice that Iowa Parts was making its\\ncomponent parts, possibly with its engineering documents and other trade secrets,\\nstarting in 2002 and continuing thereafter. As Iowa Parts notes in its brief, \\\"the only\\nthing that has changed since 2002 is that Iowa Parts now sells directly competing\\nparts that are significantly more expensive than they had in the past.\\\" Because the\\nstatute of limitations has run on the statutory claims and conversion claim, and the\\nremaining equitable claim fails on the merits, we affirm the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1770,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607381,"string":"4,607,381"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"William Anthony LOFTON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Lofton v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2847"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wollman, Arnold, Benton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2847\\n ___________________________\\n\\n William Anthony Lofton\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: April 5, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The district court denied William Anthony Loftonβs 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\\nwhich alleges that he no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal. In light of\\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), we reverse and hold that Lofton no\\nlonger has three prior felony convictions that qualify as predicate offenses under the\\nArmed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).\\n\\f A jury convicted Lofton of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) in July 2007. The presentence report recommended an\\nenhancement under the ACCA, which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for\\ndefendants with three prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions. See 18\\nU.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(1). The report listed five such convictions: unlawful delivery of\\ncannabis, theft, two aggravated battery convictions, and aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. The sentencing court applied the ACCA enhancement and sentenced Lofton\\nto 327 monthsβ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Lofton filed a direct\\nappeal challenging only his conviction, and we affirmed. United States v. Lofton, 557\\nF.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n The Supreme Court in Johnson invalidated the ACCAβs residual clause and\\nmade its rule retroactive on collateral review in Welch v. United Sates, 136 S. Ct.\\n1257, 1264-65 (2016). Shortly thereafter, Lofton filed this 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\\nclaiming that four of his convictions were no longer violent felony convictions under\\nthe ACCA and that he was entitled to resentencing. His petition did not address his\\ndrug conviction.\\n\\n The district court denied Loftonβs petition, determining that his two aggravated\\nbattery convictions remained predicate offenses because they required the use of\\nphysical force pursuant to the ACCAβs force clause. The court also determined that\\nLoftonβs drug conviction constituted an ACCA predicate offense. Having determined\\nthat the aggravated battery and drug convictions were qualifying felonies, the district\\ncourt did not address whether Loftonβs criminal sexual abuse conviction met the\\nACCA requirements.\\n\\n While Loftonβs appeal was pending, we adopted a new standard, which requires\\nsuccessive Β§ 2255 claimants to βshow by a preponderance of the evidence that the\\nresidual clause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fv. United States, 900 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). We thereafter applied this\\nstandard at the merits stage of an initial Β§ 2255 petition. See Golinveaux v. United\\nStates, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Garcia-Hernandez v. United States,\\n915 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2019) (βWalkerβs principles govern here, at the merits\\nstage of an initial 2255 motion.β). Whether a claimant meets this burden is usually\\na factual question for the district court, which reviews the record to determine whether\\nthe sentencing court specified which ACCA clause it used. Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015.\\nIf the district court determines that the record is inconclusive, or if the parties concede\\nthat the record does not show that he was sentenced on the basis of the residual clause,\\nwe may consider the relevant background legal environment in the first instance to\\ndetermine if the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause. Golinveaux,\\n915 F.3d at 568. If the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause, but the\\nconviction qualifies as a violent felony under current law, resentencing is not required\\nbecause any error by the sentencing court would be harmless. Id. at 570; see also\\nDembry v. United States, 914 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 2019). We review de\\nnovo whether a defendantβs prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the\\nACCA. Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n I.\\n\\n It is undisputed that Loftonβs theft offense does not qualify as a violent felony\\nafter Johnson. Lofton argues that his aggravated battery convictions and his criminal\\nsexual abuse conviction likewise do not qualify. Because the convictions do not fall\\nunder the ACCAβs enumerated offenses clause, see 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), they\\nmust qualify under the ACCAβs force clause by having βas an element the use,\\nattempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.β Id.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Physical force is βviolent forceβthat is, force capable of causing\\nphysical pain or injury to another person.β Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.\\n133, 140 (2010).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f We first consider whether criminal sexual abuse constitutes a violent felony.\\nBecause the parties concede that the record is inconclusive about whether Lofton was\\nsentenced on the basis of the residual clause, we review the controlling law at the time\\nof sentencing. Dembry, 914 F.3d at 1187. The relevant background legal\\nenvironment may establish that the sentencing court necessarily relied on the residual\\nclause, but β[i]f it is just as likely that [it] relied on the [force] . . . clause, solely or as\\nan alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant has failed to show that his\\nenhancement was due to use of the residual clause.β Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015 (first\\nalteration in original) (quoting Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th\\nCir. 2017)). Nor is it enough for Lofton to show that βthe residual clause offered the\\npath of least analytical resistance.β Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 890\\nF.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2018)).\\n\\n When Lofton was sentenced in 2008, the relevant background legal\\nenvironment shows that the court more likely than not used the residual clause to\\nclassify his criminal sexual abuse conviction as a violent felony. The now-invalidated\\nresidual clause defined a violent felony as one that βotherwise involves conduct that\\npresents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.β 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Lofton pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse,\\nwherein an adult over the age of 17 βcommits an act of sexual conduct with a victim\\nwho was under 13 years of age.β 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (1998) (current\\nversion at 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (2011)). Sexual conduct is βany\\nintentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either\\ndirectly or through clothing, of . . . any part of the body of a child under 13 years of\\nage . . . for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.β\\nId. 5/12-12(e) (2000) (repealed 2011). Our pre-2008 case law identified statutes\\nproscribing sexual contact with children as ACCA predicates under the residual\\nclause. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 438 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(Minnesota statute prohibiting sexual contact with a child under the age of 13); United\\nStates v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2005) (Missouri statutory sexual\\n\\n -4-\\n\\foffenses); see also United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2012)\\n(gathering cases). In light of the background legal environment at the time of\\nsentencing, Lofton has shown βby a preponderance of the evidence that the residual\\nclause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker, 900 F.3d\\nat 1015.\\n\\n This classification is not harmless error because a conviction thereunder does\\nnot constitute a violent felony under current law. See Golinveaux, 915 F.3d at 570\\n(upholding sentence for harmless error because conviction qualified as ACCA\\npredicate under current law). Because a defendant can violate this statute by having\\na child touch him for sexual gratification, an act that does not necessarily require βthe\\nuse, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,β\\nthe statute on its face cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate. 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i); see United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015)\\n(βThe crime has three components: a mens rea element, a physical act element, and\\nan age element. Notably absent is any requirement of force or lack of consent.β),\\nabrogated on other grounds by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).1\\n\\n We reject the governmentβs argument that violent force should not be required\\nin the context of criminal sexual abuse and hold that Loftonβs sexual abuse conviction\\ndoes not meet the force clause requirements and thus does not qualify as a predicate\\noffense under the ACCA.\\n\\n 1\\n The government seemed to concede as much at oral argument when it noted\\nthat asking a child to perform a sex act βdoesnβt necessarilyβ cause pain or require\\nforce. To the extent that the government does not concede this point, we reject its\\nargument that Lofton must identify an Illinois state court conviction under the statute\\nwherein no force was used. The state law is facially overbroad. We need inquire no\\nfurther. See United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642 (8th Cir. 2016) (βAfter\\nJohnson, [the Arkansas definition of physical force], on its face, falls short of\\nrequiring force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.β (internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n -5-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n The district court erred in determining that Loftonβs drug conviction qualifies\\nas a serious drug offense. A serious drug offense is one βfor which a maximum term\\nof imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.β 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Loftonβs Illinois conviction for unlawfully delivering cannabis has\\na maximum punishment of three yearsβ imprisonment, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1988, ch. 38, par.\\n1005-8-1(7) (current version at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-45 (2017)), and therefore\\nis not a serious drug offense under the ACCA. The government agrees. When Lofton\\nwas sentenced for his federal firearms conviction in 2008, he thus had, at most, two\\nviolent feloniesβhis aggravated battery convictionsβand should not have qualified\\nas an armed career criminal. Without the ACCA enhancement, Lofton would have\\nbeen sentenced within the 120-month statutory maximum for his federal firearms\\nconviction. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(a)(2). His 327-month sentence, imposed with the\\nerroneous enhancement, vastly exceeds this statutory maximum. Because his sentence\\nis βin excess of the maximum authorized by lawβ and therefore illegal, Β§ 2255 entitles\\nhim to relief. 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255(a); see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700,\\n705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (βAn unlawful or illegal sentence is one imposed\\nwithout, or in excess of, statutory authority.β).\\n\\n We reject the governmentβs argument that Lofton is not entitled to relief\\nbecause he procedurally defaulted his claim that his is not a serious drug offense by\\nfailing to raise it on direct appeal and in his Β§ 2255 petition. His illegal sentence\\npresents a βmiscarriage of justiceβ that Β§ 2255 permits us to correct, despite his failure\\nto raise the issue earlier. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (noting that a sentence that\\nexceeds the statutory maximum is an error of law resulting in fundamental miscarriage\\nof justice but denying Β§ 2255 motion because sentence fell within statutory range);\\nUnited States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (βWilson has\\nprocedurally defaulted this claim, but Β§ 2255 expressly makes relief available if the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fsentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, and we agree . . . that we\\nshould grant relief from the illegal sentence to avoid manifest injustice.β (internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).2\\n\\n We reverse the district courtβs order denying Loftonβs Β§ 2255 petition and\\nremand with directions to vacate the portion of his sentence that is affected by our\\nopinion. Lofton has already served a term in excess of the 120-month statutory\\nmaximum authorized for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1). See id.\\nΒ§ 924(a)(2). Accordingly, the district court shall direct that he be released from\\ncustody immediately. See, e.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir.\\n2017). Our mandate shall issue forthwith.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Because our case law permits us to correct illegal sentences, we need not\\ndiscuss whether Lofton has shown sufficient cause and prejudice to permit us to\\nreview his procedurally defaulted claim under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,\\n622 (1998). We also need not address Loftonβs argument that the government waived\\nits procedural default affirmative defense.\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384634/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607381/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Anthony LOFTON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2847\n ___________________________\n\n William Anthony Lofton\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\n Filed: April 5, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\n The district court denied William Anthony Loftonβs 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\nwhich alleges that he no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal. In light of\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), we reverse and hold that Lofton no\nlonger has three prior felony convictions that qualify as predicate offenses under the\nArmed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).\n\f A jury convicted Lofton of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) in July 2007. The presentence report recommended an\nenhancement under the ACCA, which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for\ndefendants with three prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions. See 18\nU.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(1). The report listed five such convictions: unlawful delivery of\ncannabis, theft, two aggravated battery convictions, and aggravated criminal sexual\nabuse. The sentencing court applied the ACCA enhancement and sentenced Lofton\nto 327 monthsβ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Lofton filed a direct\nappeal challenging only his conviction, and we affirmed. United States v. Lofton, 557\nF.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2009).\n\n The Supreme Court in Johnson invalidated the ACCAβs residual clause and\nmade its rule retroactive on collateral review in Welch v. United Sates, 136 S. Ct.\n1257, 1264-65 (2016). Shortly thereafter, Lofton filed this 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\nclaiming that four of his convictions were no longer violent felony convictions under\nthe ACCA and that he was entitled to resentencing. His petition did not address his\ndrug conviction.\n\n The district court denied Loftonβs petition, determining that his two aggravated\nbattery convictions remained predicate offenses because they required the use of\nphysical force pursuant to the ACCAβs force clause. The court also determined that\nLoftonβs drug conviction constituted an ACCA predicate offense. Having determined\nthat the aggravated battery and drug convictions were qualifying felonies, the district\ncourt did not address whether Loftonβs criminal sexual abuse conviction met the\nACCA requirements.\n\n While Loftonβs appeal was pending, we adopted a new standard, which requires\nsuccessive Β§ 2255 claimants to βshow by a preponderance of the evidence that the\nresidual clause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker\n\n -2-\n\fv. United States, 900 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). We thereafter applied this\nstandard at the merits stage of an initial Β§ 2255 petition. See Golinveaux v. United\nStates, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Garcia-Hernandez v. United States,\n915 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2019) (βWalkerβs principles govern here, at the merits\nstage of an initial 2255 motion.β). Whether a claimant meets this burden is usually\na factual question for the district court, which reviews the record to determine whether\nthe sentencing court specified which ACCA clause it used. Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015.\nIf the district court determines that the record is inconclusive, or if the parties concede\nthat the record does not show that he was sentenced on the basis of the residual clause,\nwe may consider the relevant background legal environment in the first instance to\ndetermine if the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause. Golinveaux,\n915 F.3d at 568. If the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause, but the\nconviction qualifies as a violent felony under current law, resentencing is not required\nbecause any error by the sentencing court would be harmless. Id. at 570; see also\nDembry v. United States, 914 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 2019). We review de\nnovo whether a defendantβs prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the\nACCA. Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 2017).\n\n I.\n\n It is undisputed that Loftonβs theft offense does not qualify as a violent felony\nafter Johnson. Lofton argues that his aggravated battery convictions and his criminal\nsexual abuse conviction likewise do not qualify. Because the convictions do not fall\nunder the ACCAβs enumerated offenses clause, see 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), they\nmust qualify under the ACCAβs force clause by having βas an element the use,\nattempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.β Id.\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Physical force is βviolent forceβthat is, force capable of causing\nphysical pain or injury to another person.β Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.\n133, 140 (2010).\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f We first consider whether criminal sexual abuse constitutes a violent felony.\nBecause the parties concede that the record is inconclusive about whether Lofton was\nsentenced on the basis of the residual clause, we review the controlling law at the time\nof sentencing. Dembry, 914 F.3d at 1187. The relevant background legal\nenvironment may establish that the sentencing court necessarily relied on the residual\nclause, but β[i]f it is just as likely that [it] relied on the [force] . . . clause, solely or as\nan alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant has failed to show that his\nenhancement was due to use of the residual clause.β Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015 (first\nalteration in original) (quoting Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th\nCir. 2017)). Nor is it enough for Lofton to show that βthe residual clause offered the\npath of least analytical resistance.β Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 890\nF.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2018)).\n\n When Lofton was sentenced in 2008, the relevant background legal\nenvironment shows that the court more likely than not used the residual clause to\nclassify his criminal sexual abuse conviction as a violent felony. The now-invalidated\nresidual clause defined a violent felony as one that βotherwise involves conduct that\npresents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.β 18 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Lofton pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse,\nwherein an adult over the age of 17 βcommits an act of sexual conduct with a victim\nwho was under 13 years of age.β 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (1998) (current\nversion at 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (2011)). Sexual conduct is βany\nintentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either\ndirectly or through clothing, of . . . any part of the body of a child under 13 years of\nage . . . for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.β\nId. 5/12-12(e) (2000) (repealed 2011). Our pre-2008 case law identified statutes\nproscribing sexual contact with children as ACCA predicates under the residual\nclause. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 438 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2006)\n(Minnesota statute prohibiting sexual contact with a child under the age of 13); United\nStates v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2005) (Missouri statutory sexual\n\n -4-\n\foffenses); see also United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2012)\n(gathering cases). In light of the background legal environment at the time of\nsentencing, Lofton has shown βby a preponderance of the evidence that the residual\nclause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker, 900 F.3d\nat 1015.\n\n This classification is not harmless error because a conviction thereunder does\nnot constitute a violent felony under current law. See Golinveaux, 915 F.3d at 570\n(upholding sentence for harmless error because conviction qualified as ACCA\npredicate under current law). Because a defendant can violate this statute by having\na child touch him for sexual gratification, an act that does not necessarily require βthe\nuse, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,β\nthe statute on its face cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate. 18 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i); see United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015)\n(βThe crime has three components: a mens rea element, a physical act element, and\nan age element. Notably absent is any requirement of force or lack of consent.β),\nabrogated on other grounds by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).1\n\n We reject the governmentβs argument that violent force should not be required\nin the context of criminal sexual abuse and hold that Loftonβs sexual abuse conviction\ndoes not meet the force clause requirements and thus does not qualify as a predicate\noffense under the ACCA.\n\n 1\n The government seemed to concede as much at oral argument when it noted\nthat asking a child to perform a sex act βdoesnβt necessarilyβ cause pain or require\nforce. To the extent that the government does not concede this point, we reject its\nargument that Lofton must identify an Illinois state court conviction under the statute\nwherein no force was used. The state law is facially overbroad. We need inquire no\nfurther. See United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642 (8th Cir. 2016) (βAfter\nJohnson, [the Arkansas definition of physical force], on its face, falls short of\nrequiring force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.β (internal\nquotation marks omitted)).\n -5-\n\f II.\n\n The district court erred in determining that Loftonβs drug conviction qualifies\nas a serious drug offense. A serious drug offense is one βfor which a maximum term\nof imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.β 18 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Loftonβs Illinois conviction for unlawfully delivering cannabis has\na maximum punishment of three yearsβ imprisonment, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1988, ch. 38, par.\n1005-8-1(7) (current version at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-45 (2017)), and therefore\nis not a serious drug offense under the ACCA. The government agrees. When Lofton\nwas sentenced for his federal firearms conviction in 2008, he thus had, at most, two\nviolent feloniesβhis aggravated battery convictionsβand should not have qualified\nas an armed career criminal. Without the ACCA enhancement, Lofton would have\nbeen sentenced within the 120-month statutory maximum for his federal firearms\nconviction. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(a)(2). His 327-month sentence, imposed with the\nerroneous enhancement, vastly exceeds this statutory maximum. Because his sentence\nis βin excess of the maximum authorized by lawβ and therefore illegal, Β§ 2255 entitles\nhim to relief. 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255(a); see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700,\n705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (βAn unlawful or illegal sentence is one imposed\nwithout, or in excess of, statutory authority.β).\n\n We reject the governmentβs argument that Lofton is not entitled to relief\nbecause he procedurally defaulted his claim that his is not a serious drug offense by\nfailing to raise it on direct appeal and in his Β§ 2255 petition. His illegal sentence\npresents a βmiscarriage of justiceβ that Β§ 2255 permits us to correct, despite his failure\nto raise the issue earlier. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (noting that a sentence that\nexceeds the statutory maximum is an error of law resulting in fundamental miscarriage\nof justice but denying Β§ 2255 motion because sentence fell within statutory range);\nUnited States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (βWilson has\nprocedurally defaulted this claim, but Β§ 2255 expressly makes relief available if the\n\n -6-\n\fsentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, and we agree . . . that we\nshould grant relief from the illegal sentence to avoid manifest injustice.β (internal\nquotation marks omitted)).2\n\n We reverse the district courtβs order denying Loftonβs Β§ 2255 petition and\nremand with directions to vacate the portion of his sentence that is affected by our\nopinion. Lofton has already served a term in excess of the 120-month statutory\nmaximum authorized for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1). See id.\nΒ§ 924(a)(2). Accordingly, the district court shall direct that he be released from\ncustody immediately. See, e.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir.\n2017). Our mandate shall issue forthwith.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Because our case law permits us to correct illegal sentences, we need not\ndiscuss whether Lofton has shown sufficient cause and prejudice to permit us to\nreview his procedurally defaulted claim under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,\n622 (1998). We also need not address Loftonβs argument that the government waived\nits procedural default affirmative defense.\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Anthony LOFTON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2847\\n ___________________________\\n\\n William Anthony Lofton\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: April 5, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The district court denied William Anthony Loftonβs 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\\nwhich alleges that he no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal. In light of\\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), we reverse and hold that Lofton no\\nlonger has three prior felony convictions that qualify as predicate offenses under the\\nArmed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).\\n\\f A jury convicted Lofton of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) in July 2007. The presentence report recommended an\\nenhancement under the ACCA, which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for\\ndefendants with three prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions. See 18\\nU.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(1). The report listed five such convictions: unlawful delivery of\\ncannabis, theft, two aggravated battery convictions, and aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. The sentencing court applied the ACCA enhancement and sentenced Lofton\\nto 327 monthsβ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Lofton filed a direct\\nappeal challenging only his conviction, and we affirmed. United States v. Lofton, 557\\nF.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n The Supreme Court in Johnson invalidated the ACCAβs residual clause and\\nmade its rule retroactive on collateral review in Welch v. United Sates, 136 S. Ct.\\n1257, 1264-65 (2016). Shortly thereafter, Lofton filed this 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255 petition,\\nclaiming that four of his convictions were no longer violent felony convictions under\\nthe ACCA and that he was entitled to resentencing. His petition did not address his\\ndrug conviction.\\n\\n The district court denied Loftonβs petition, determining that his two aggravated\\nbattery convictions remained predicate offenses because they required the use of\\nphysical force pursuant to the ACCAβs force clause. The court also determined that\\nLoftonβs drug conviction constituted an ACCA predicate offense. Having determined\\nthat the aggravated battery and drug convictions were qualifying felonies, the district\\ncourt did not address whether Loftonβs criminal sexual abuse conviction met the\\nACCA requirements.\\n\\n While Loftonβs appeal was pending, we adopted a new standard, which requires\\nsuccessive Β§ 2255 claimants to βshow by a preponderance of the evidence that the\\nresidual clause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fv. United States, 900 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). We thereafter applied this\\nstandard at the merits stage of an initial Β§ 2255 petition. See Golinveaux v. United\\nStates, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Garcia-Hernandez v. United States,\\n915 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2019) (βWalkerβs principles govern here, at the merits\\nstage of an initial 2255 motion.β). Whether a claimant meets this burden is usually\\na factual question for the district court, which reviews the record to determine whether\\nthe sentencing court specified which ACCA clause it used. Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015.\\nIf the district court determines that the record is inconclusive, or if the parties concede\\nthat the record does not show that he was sentenced on the basis of the residual clause,\\nwe may consider the relevant background legal environment in the first instance to\\ndetermine if the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause. Golinveaux,\\n915 F.3d at 568. If the sentencing court likely relied upon the residual clause, but the\\nconviction qualifies as a violent felony under current law, resentencing is not required\\nbecause any error by the sentencing court would be harmless. Id. at 570; see also\\nDembry v. United States, 914 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 2019). We review de\\nnovo whether a defendantβs prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the\\nACCA. Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n I.\\n\\n It is undisputed that Loftonβs theft offense does not qualify as a violent felony\\nafter Johnson. Lofton argues that his aggravated battery convictions and his criminal\\nsexual abuse conviction likewise do not qualify. Because the convictions do not fall\\nunder the ACCAβs enumerated offenses clause, see 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), they\\nmust qualify under the ACCAβs force clause by having βas an element the use,\\nattempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.β Id.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Physical force is βviolent forceβthat is, force capable of causing\\nphysical pain or injury to another person.β Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.\\n133, 140 (2010).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f We first consider whether criminal sexual abuse constitutes a violent felony.\\nBecause the parties concede that the record is inconclusive about whether Lofton was\\nsentenced on the basis of the residual clause, we review the controlling law at the time\\nof sentencing. Dembry, 914 F.3d at 1187. The relevant background legal\\nenvironment may establish that the sentencing court necessarily relied on the residual\\nclause, but β[i]f it is just as likely that [it] relied on the [force] . . . clause, solely or as\\nan alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant has failed to show that his\\nenhancement was due to use of the residual clause.β Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015 (first\\nalteration in original) (quoting Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th\\nCir. 2017)). Nor is it enough for Lofton to show that βthe residual clause offered the\\npath of least analytical resistance.β Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 890\\nF.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2018)).\\n\\n When Lofton was sentenced in 2008, the relevant background legal\\nenvironment shows that the court more likely than not used the residual clause to\\nclassify his criminal sexual abuse conviction as a violent felony. The now-invalidated\\nresidual clause defined a violent felony as one that βotherwise involves conduct that\\npresents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.β 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Lofton pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse,\\nwherein an adult over the age of 17 βcommits an act of sexual conduct with a victim\\nwho was under 13 years of age.β 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (1998) (current\\nversion at 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (2011)). Sexual conduct is βany\\nintentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either\\ndirectly or through clothing, of . . . any part of the body of a child under 13 years of\\nage . . . for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.β\\nId. 5/12-12(e) (2000) (repealed 2011). Our pre-2008 case law identified statutes\\nproscribing sexual contact with children as ACCA predicates under the residual\\nclause. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 438 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(Minnesota statute prohibiting sexual contact with a child under the age of 13); United\\nStates v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2005) (Missouri statutory sexual\\n\\n -4-\\n\\foffenses); see also United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2012)\\n(gathering cases). In light of the background legal environment at the time of\\nsentencing, Lofton has shown βby a preponderance of the evidence that the residual\\nclause led the sentencing court to apply the ACCA enhancement.β Walker, 900 F.3d\\nat 1015.\\n\\n This classification is not harmless error because a conviction thereunder does\\nnot constitute a violent felony under current law. See Golinveaux, 915 F.3d at 570\\n(upholding sentence for harmless error because conviction qualified as ACCA\\npredicate under current law). Because a defendant can violate this statute by having\\na child touch him for sexual gratification, an act that does not necessarily require βthe\\nuse, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,β\\nthe statute on its face cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate. 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i); see United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015)\\n(βThe crime has three components: a mens rea element, a physical act element, and\\nan age element. Notably absent is any requirement of force or lack of consent.β),\\nabrogated on other grounds by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).1\\n\\n We reject the governmentβs argument that violent force should not be required\\nin the context of criminal sexual abuse and hold that Loftonβs sexual abuse conviction\\ndoes not meet the force clause requirements and thus does not qualify as a predicate\\noffense under the ACCA.\\n\\n 1\\n The government seemed to concede as much at oral argument when it noted\\nthat asking a child to perform a sex act βdoesnβt necessarilyβ cause pain or require\\nforce. To the extent that the government does not concede this point, we reject its\\nargument that Lofton must identify an Illinois state court conviction under the statute\\nwherein no force was used. The state law is facially overbroad. We need inquire no\\nfurther. See United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642 (8th Cir. 2016) (βAfter\\nJohnson, [the Arkansas definition of physical force], on its face, falls short of\\nrequiring force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.β (internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n -5-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n The district court erred in determining that Loftonβs drug conviction qualifies\\nas a serious drug offense. A serious drug offense is one βfor which a maximum term\\nof imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.β 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Loftonβs Illinois conviction for unlawfully delivering cannabis has\\na maximum punishment of three yearsβ imprisonment, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1988, ch. 38, par.\\n1005-8-1(7) (current version at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-45 (2017)), and therefore\\nis not a serious drug offense under the ACCA. The government agrees. When Lofton\\nwas sentenced for his federal firearms conviction in 2008, he thus had, at most, two\\nviolent feloniesβhis aggravated battery convictionsβand should not have qualified\\nas an armed career criminal. Without the ACCA enhancement, Lofton would have\\nbeen sentenced within the 120-month statutory maximum for his federal firearms\\nconviction. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(a)(2). His 327-month sentence, imposed with the\\nerroneous enhancement, vastly exceeds this statutory maximum. Because his sentence\\nis βin excess of the maximum authorized by lawβ and therefore illegal, Β§ 2255 entitles\\nhim to relief. 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255(a); see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700,\\n705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (βAn unlawful or illegal sentence is one imposed\\nwithout, or in excess of, statutory authority.β).\\n\\n We reject the governmentβs argument that Lofton is not entitled to relief\\nbecause he procedurally defaulted his claim that his is not a serious drug offense by\\nfailing to raise it on direct appeal and in his Β§ 2255 petition. His illegal sentence\\npresents a βmiscarriage of justiceβ that Β§ 2255 permits us to correct, despite his failure\\nto raise the issue earlier. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (noting that a sentence that\\nexceeds the statutory maximum is an error of law resulting in fundamental miscarriage\\nof justice but denying Β§ 2255 motion because sentence fell within statutory range);\\nUnited States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (βWilson has\\nprocedurally defaulted this claim, but Β§ 2255 expressly makes relief available if the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fsentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, and we agree . . . that we\\nshould grant relief from the illegal sentence to avoid manifest injustice.β (internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).2\\n\\n We reverse the district courtβs order denying Loftonβs Β§ 2255 petition and\\nremand with directions to vacate the portion of his sentence that is affected by our\\nopinion. Lofton has already served a term in excess of the 120-month statutory\\nmaximum authorized for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1). See id.\\nΒ§ 924(a)(2). Accordingly, the district court shall direct that he be released from\\ncustody immediately. See, e.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir.\\n2017). Our mandate shall issue forthwith.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Because our case law permits us to correct illegal sentences, we need not\\ndiscuss whether Lofton has shown sufficient cause and prejudice to permit us to\\nreview his procedurally defaulted claim under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,\\n622 (1998). We also need not address Loftonβs argument that the government waived\\nits procedural default affirmative defense.\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1771,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608102,"string":"4,608,102"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eric Cortez SALLIS, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Eric Sallis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1662"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Beam, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1662\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Eric Cortez Sallis\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f After the magistrate judge1 recommended denial of Eric Cortez Sallis's motion\\nto suppress, which report and recommendation the district court2 adopted, Sallis\\npleaded guilty to count two of the indictment, possession of a firearm and\\nammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The\\ndistrict court sentenced Sallis to 120-months' imprisonment followed by three years\\nof supervised release. On appeal Sallis asserts the district court erred in denying the\\nmotion to suppress because the search conducted by law enforcement violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights. We affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to suppress.\\n\\nI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On November 27, 2016, a patient admitted at a Waterloo, Iowa, hospital\\nsuffering from multiple gunshot wounds, along with other witnesses, identified Sallis\\nas the shooter. Officers executed a search warrant at Sallis's residence where they\\nrecovered a 9mm bullet, a 9mm shell casing, and blood spatter, but Sallis was not\\npresent and officers did not recover a firearm. At the time, there were outstanding\\nwarrants for Sallis's arrest on unrelated offenses. Based on his suspected involvement\\nin the November shooting as well as his outstanding warrants, the Waterloo Police\\nDepartment disseminated information about Sallis to all of its divisions.\\n\\n On December 9, 2016, a confidential source (CI) provided information to a\\nWaterloo police officer that Sallis was staying at a particular apartment complex with\\na named female and provided the apartment number to the officer. This CI had been\\na known source to the police for a year and had provided reliable information in the\\npast that led to the discovery and seizure of stolen property, drugs, and other\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the\\nNorthern District of Iowa.\\n 2\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcontraband. The CI told the officer that more than one child was present in the\\nparticular apartment. Officers learned through a public database that the woman who\\nresided at that apartment was a relative of Sallis's and officers began surveillance of\\nthe residence. On the night of December 9, officers observed Sallis come down the\\nsteps of the apartment complex two times, enter vehicles, and engage in behavior that,\\nbased on their experience, indicated drug trafficking. When Sallis got into the\\nsecond vehicle, officers approached the car and arrested him on his outstanding\\nwarrants. On the back seat of the second vehicle near where Sallis sat, officers\\nrecovered a cellular phone, a silver bag officers had previously observed Sallis\\ncarrying into the apartment that contained 1/4 pound of marijuana, and more than\\n$1,500 in cash. The officers believed the quantity of drugs and cash retrieved were\\nconsistent with drug trafficking. Sallis would not identify the apartment number he\\nhad been in, denied living there, and said he was just \\\"visiting.\\\" Sallis also denied\\nthat anyone was in the apartment at the time and said the resident who lived there was\\non her way back.\\n\\n A sergeant involved in the surveillance decided at that time to apply for a\\nsearch warrant for the apartment based on all of the information then-available,\\nincluding what the officers' observed during surveillance, their knowledge that\\nfirearms are tools of the drug trade, Sallis's involvement with the shooting in late\\nNovember, and the fact that officers did not recover a firearm during the earlier\\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Upon request, Sallis gave the officers the phone number\\nof the woman who lived in the apartment. But, when the sergeant called the number,\\nthe female who answered was evasive when asked if she lived in the particular\\napartment and ultimately hung up during the conversation. While officers applied for\\na search warrant, the sergeant decided to secure the apartment and check on the\\nchildren that the CI said were present. Officers placed Sallis in a police car and\\nadvised him of his constitutional rights.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f There was no answer at the apartment door when officers knocked. The\\nsergeant then twisted the door knob and the door opened a short distance. A small\\nboy, who was about four or five years old, came out into the living room and was\\nvisible from the door. The boy indicated to the officers that other children were also\\nin the apartment almost simultaneous to the emergence of other children from the\\nsame hallway. Ultimately the officers entered the apartment, confirmed no adults\\nwere present by conducting a protective sweep, and secured the apartment until\\nofficers could find an adult to care for the five children.\\n\\n Shortly thereafter, the woman who resided in the apartment arrived with\\nanother woman and the officers informed the resident that Sallis was in custody and\\nthat they had applied for a search warrant. The resident told officers that Sallis\\nsometimes stayed overnight and pointed out some of Sallis's clothing laying on the\\ncouch. Officers asked the resident for consent to search her apartment and she asked\\nto first speak to Sallis to discuss the matter. When she walked out and talked to Sallis\\nnear the police car, he admitted there was marijuana and more cash in the apartment\\nand instructed her to \\\"get [his] bag\\\" and give it to the officers. Sallis told the officer\\nthat \\\"I'll give it to you,\\\" referring to the marijuana, and said the resident would get the\\nbag, explaining \\\"I'll have her go get it.\\\"\\n\\n Back in the apartment, while waiting for the warrant, the resident brought a\\nplastic tote and a bag to the living room, that she identified as both belonging to\\nSallis. Officers smelled marijuana and observed packaged marijuana in plain view\\nin the bag. This latter information regarding the marijuana was included in the search\\nwarrant affidavit being prepared contemporaneously, and that was later used to search\\nthe apartment. During the resulting warrant search, officers found bags with\\nmarijuana, scales, 9mm ammunition, and a 9mm handgun. At the time the search\\ntook place, Sallis had been transferred to the police station and while there, officers\\nadvised Sallis about finding the handgun in the apartment and Sallis made\\nincriminating statements about the firearm.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Sallis challenged the officers' warrantless entry into the apartment and sought\\nto exclude evidence obtained from the resulting warrant search, arguing that the\\nsearch violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Sallis additionally argued that there\\nwas no consent for the search of his belongings, and that the inevitable discovery\\ndoctrine did not apply. The district court held that the officers' entry into the\\napartment was justified pursuant to their community caretaking function, Sallis\\nconsented to the search, and additionally that even if the officers' entry was illegal,\\nthe evidence would still be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.\\nFollowing the denial of his motion to suppress, Sallis entered a conditional plea of\\nguilty and reserved his right to appeal the denial. Sallis now raises the same\\nobjections to the officers' search on appeal.\\n\\nII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n \\\"Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews 'legal\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.'\\\" United States v. Morris,\\n915 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552,\\n555 (8th Cir. 2014)). We will affirm the district court \\\"unless the denial of the motion\\nis unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the\\nlaw, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.\\\" United States\\nv. Gunnell, 775 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Douglas,\\n744 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n A. Initial Entry and Consent\\n\\n Sallis first challenges the district court's conclusion that the officers' initial\\nentry into the apartment was justified under the community caretaking exception to\\nthe warrant requirement. His ultimate claim is threefold, however, or more of a\\nchain-of-events claim. Sallis argues that the firearm and ammunition found during\\nthe execution of the search warrant were discovered based on the information\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcontained in the warrant affidavit that marijuana was discovered in Sallis's bag in the\\napartment, which was known because Sallis allegedly instructed the resident to give\\nhis bag to the officers, which only occurred because the officers had illegally entered\\nthe apartment and were waiting for the resident to return in order to seek her consent.\\nAs to the initial entry, Sallis claims that in this instance law enforcement lacked\\n\\\"specific and articulable facts\\\" that an emergency existed; particularly that officers\\ndid not have specific, reliable information that children were presently inside the\\nhome and in danger. Here, however, because it was Sallis's consent that led to the\\ndiscovery of the marijuana, and nothing was gained in this investigation as a result\\nof the officers' initial entry into the apartment, we focus our analysis with Sallis's\\nalleged consentβthe only legal inquiry of consequence.\\n\\n Sallis claims the search was invalid because he did not consent to the search\\nand seizure of the tote and bag brought to the officers by the resident and in which\\nofficers first observed marijuana in the apartment. At issue is Sallis's statement to the\\nresident while he sat in the patrol vehicle, instructing her to \\\"get [his] bag\\\" and give\\nit to the officers, which led to the resident returning to her apartment and retrieving\\nthe tote and bag. The officers' observation of the bag's contentsβpackaged\\nmarijuanaβwas included in the warrant application being prepared\\ncontemporaneously.\\n\\n While the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before a\\nsearch, one established exception to the warrant requirement is a search that is\\nconducted pursuant to consent. United States v. Wolff, 830 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir.\\n2016). A defendant's consent is voluntary if \\\"it was the product of an essentially free\\nand unconstrained choice, rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or\\nimplied.\\\" United States v. Morreno, 373 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2004). \\\"The\\ngovernment bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that\\nconsent to search was freely given.\\\" United States v. Aguilar, 743 F.3d 1144, 1147\\n(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Arciniega, 569 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f2009)). Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether consent was\\nvoluntary, including: \\\"a defendant's age, intelligence, and education; whether he\\ncooperates with police; his knowledge of his right to refuse consent; and his\\nfamiliarity with arrests and the legal system.\\\" United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d\\n887, 895 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts also consider \\\"environmental\\\" factors in\\ndetermining the voluntariness of consent, including: \\\"whether [law enforcement]\\nthreatened, intimidated, punished, or falsely promised something to the defendant;\\nwhether the defendant was in custody or under arrest when consent was given and,\\nif so, how long he had been detained; and whether consent occurred in a public or\\nsecluded area.\\\" Id.\\n\\n The district court credited the officers' testimony regarding the conversation\\nbetween the resident and Sallis that occurred after the officers asked her for consent\\nto search her apartment and after she requested to speak with Sallis first. The court\\nalso viewed officers' body camera videos that included the time period when Sallis\\nspoke to the resident. The court concluded that under the totality of the\\ncircumstances Sallis's instructions to the resident to \\\"go get my bag,\\\" and his repeated\\nassurance to the officers that \\\"I'll give it to you\\\" (referring to the marijuana),\\ndemonstrated his implied consent to search the bag. The court also concluded that\\nthe consent was voluntary because, although Sallis was in custody at the time, those\\nin custody can still voluntarily consent to a search, and in this instance, Sallis had\\nbeen advised of his constitutional rights and his statements were not the result of\\nofficers questioning him or asking for consent. Rather, Sallis was responding to the\\nresident and did so less than thirty minutes after he had been taken into custody and\\nless than fifteen minutes after he had been read his Miranda rights. It was the resident\\nwho asked to speak to Sallis. Given the time frame and the circumstances, we agree\\nwith the district court that the fact that Sallis was in custody at the time he talked to\\nthe resident and gave consent does not meaningfully weigh against a finding of\\nvoluntariness. Finding no error with the factual findings made by the district court,\\nwe find the denial of Sallis's motion supported by substantial evidence, and affirm the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdistrict court's conclusion that Sallis voluntarily consented to the seizure and\\nsubsequent search of the bag in the resident's apartment.\\n\\n B. Inevitable Discovery\\n\\n Here, the government argued to the district court, and the district court agreed,\\nthat even if the entry into the apartment violated Sallis's Fourth Amendment rights\\nand Sallis did not voluntarily consent to the search of his bag, the court should not\\nsuppress the evidence because it would have been inevitably discovered as a result\\nof the execution of the search warrant. We agree.\\n\\n Where information is discovered after police violate the Fourth Amendment,\\nthe evidence should not be suppressed \\\"[i]f the prosecution can establish by a\\npreponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would\\nhave been discovered by lawful means.\\\" Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).\\nOn appeal, Sallis challenges this ruling as well, claiming that because the officers\\nexploited their presence in the apartment to obtain the necessary information added\\nto the search warrant affidavit, all of the evidence obtained must be suppressed.\\nHowever, whether the officers met the resident at the threshold of the apartment or\\nwhether she found them inside as a result of their entry given concern for the well-\\nbeing of the children they believed to be present, is inconsequential in the ultimate\\nanalysis. No evidence relevant to the instant inquiry was gained as a result of these\\ninitial actions. Regardless, even assuming this initial entry was illegal and we\\nadditionally assume there were infirmities with Sallis's consent to search his bag, we\\nagree that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. Id.\\n\\n The officers had sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the warrant at\\nthe time they arrested Sallis, regardless of the later inclusion of the information that\\nmarijuana was present in the apartment. As previously noted, at the time the decision\\nwas made to prepare the search warrant affidavit, the officers had the following\\n\\n -8-\\n\\finformation from the CI and their own surveillance: (1) Sallis entered and exited the\\napartment building from the area consistent with the entry and exit from the specific\\napartment the CI told them was Sallis's location, (2) Sallis participated in what\\nappeared to their trained eyes to be drug-trafficking activities, (3) after Sallis's arrest,\\nofficers discovered marijuana and cash on the back seat of the second vehicle near\\nwhere Sallis sat, (4) the officers' general knowledge that firearms are tools of the drug\\ntrade, (5) as well as the officers' knowledge of Sallis's involvement with the shooting\\nin late November and the fact that they did not recover a firearm during the earlier\\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Accordingly, even if there were any doubt regarding\\nSallis's consent to search his bag located inside the apartment, which we already\\ndetermined was not constitutionally infirm, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.\\nUnder Nix, the evidence is admissible nonetheless, as it would have been ultimately\\nor inevitably discovered by lawful means in the execution of the warrant already\\nbeing pursued even without the additional information added after the officers\\ndiscovered the marijuana in the bag. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d\\n855, 858, 860-863 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (discussing this circuit's\\ntwo-pronged approach to Nix).\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to\\nsuppress.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385355/\", \"author_raw\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608102/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eric Cortez SALLIS, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1662\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Eric Cortez Sallis\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\n Filed: April 9, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\n\f After the magistrate judge1 recommended denial of Eric Cortez Sallis's motion\nto suppress, which report and recommendation the district court2 adopted, Sallis\npleaded guilty to count two of the indictment, possession of a firearm and\nammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The\ndistrict court sentenced Sallis to 120-months' imprisonment followed by three years\nof supervised release. On appeal Sallis asserts the district court erred in denying the\nmotion to suppress because the search conducted by law enforcement violated his\nFourth Amendment rights. We affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to suppress.\n\nI. BACKGROUND\n\n On November 27, 2016, a patient admitted at a Waterloo, Iowa, hospital\nsuffering from multiple gunshot wounds, along with other witnesses, identified Sallis\nas the shooter. Officers executed a search warrant at Sallis's residence where they\nrecovered a 9mm bullet, a 9mm shell casing, and blood spatter, but Sallis was not\npresent and officers did not recover a firearm. At the time, there were outstanding\nwarrants for Sallis's arrest on unrelated offenses. Based on his suspected involvement\nin the November shooting as well as his outstanding warrants, the Waterloo Police\nDepartment disseminated information about Sallis to all of its divisions.\n\n On December 9, 2016, a confidential source (CI) provided information to a\nWaterloo police officer that Sallis was staying at a particular apartment complex with\na named female and provided the apartment number to the officer. This CI had been\na known source to the police for a year and had provided reliable information in the\npast that led to the discovery and seizure of stolen property, drugs, and other\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the\nNorthern District of Iowa.\n 2\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\fcontraband. The CI told the officer that more than one child was present in the\nparticular apartment. Officers learned through a public database that the woman who\nresided at that apartment was a relative of Sallis's and officers began surveillance of\nthe residence. On the night of December 9, officers observed Sallis come down the\nsteps of the apartment complex two times, enter vehicles, and engage in behavior that,\nbased on their experience, indicated drug trafficking. When Sallis got into the\nsecond vehicle, officers approached the car and arrested him on his outstanding\nwarrants. On the back seat of the second vehicle near where Sallis sat, officers\nrecovered a cellular phone, a silver bag officers had previously observed Sallis\ncarrying into the apartment that contained 1/4 pound of marijuana, and more than\n$1,500 in cash. The officers believed the quantity of drugs and cash retrieved were\nconsistent with drug trafficking. Sallis would not identify the apartment number he\nhad been in, denied living there, and said he was just \"visiting.\" Sallis also denied\nthat anyone was in the apartment at the time and said the resident who lived there was\non her way back.\n\n A sergeant involved in the surveillance decided at that time to apply for a\nsearch warrant for the apartment based on all of the information then-available,\nincluding what the officers' observed during surveillance, their knowledge that\nfirearms are tools of the drug trade, Sallis's involvement with the shooting in late\nNovember, and the fact that officers did not recover a firearm during the earlier\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Upon request, Sallis gave the officers the phone number\nof the woman who lived in the apartment. But, when the sergeant called the number,\nthe female who answered was evasive when asked if she lived in the particular\napartment and ultimately hung up during the conversation. While officers applied for\na search warrant, the sergeant decided to secure the apartment and check on the\nchildren that the CI said were present. Officers placed Sallis in a police car and\nadvised him of his constitutional rights.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f There was no answer at the apartment door when officers knocked. The\nsergeant then twisted the door knob and the door opened a short distance. A small\nboy, who was about four or five years old, came out into the living room and was\nvisible from the door. The boy indicated to the officers that other children were also\nin the apartment almost simultaneous to the emergence of other children from the\nsame hallway. Ultimately the officers entered the apartment, confirmed no adults\nwere present by conducting a protective sweep, and secured the apartment until\nofficers could find an adult to care for the five children.\n\n Shortly thereafter, the woman who resided in the apartment arrived with\nanother woman and the officers informed the resident that Sallis was in custody and\nthat they had applied for a search warrant. The resident told officers that Sallis\nsometimes stayed overnight and pointed out some of Sallis's clothing laying on the\ncouch. Officers asked the resident for consent to search her apartment and she asked\nto first speak to Sallis to discuss the matter. When she walked out and talked to Sallis\nnear the police car, he admitted there was marijuana and more cash in the apartment\nand instructed her to \"get [his] bag\" and give it to the officers. Sallis told the officer\nthat \"I'll give it to you,\" referring to the marijuana, and said the resident would get the\nbag, explaining \"I'll have her go get it.\"\n\n Back in the apartment, while waiting for the warrant, the resident brought a\nplastic tote and a bag to the living room, that she identified as both belonging to\nSallis. Officers smelled marijuana and observed packaged marijuana in plain view\nin the bag. This latter information regarding the marijuana was included in the search\nwarrant affidavit being prepared contemporaneously, and that was later used to search\nthe apartment. During the resulting warrant search, officers found bags with\nmarijuana, scales, 9mm ammunition, and a 9mm handgun. At the time the search\ntook place, Sallis had been transferred to the police station and while there, officers\nadvised Sallis about finding the handgun in the apartment and Sallis made\nincriminating statements about the firearm.\n\n -4-\n\f Sallis challenged the officers' warrantless entry into the apartment and sought\nto exclude evidence obtained from the resulting warrant search, arguing that the\nsearch violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Sallis additionally argued that there\nwas no consent for the search of his belongings, and that the inevitable discovery\ndoctrine did not apply. The district court held that the officers' entry into the\napartment was justified pursuant to their community caretaking function, Sallis\nconsented to the search, and additionally that even if the officers' entry was illegal,\nthe evidence would still be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.\nFollowing the denial of his motion to suppress, Sallis entered a conditional plea of\nguilty and reserved his right to appeal the denial. Sallis now raises the same\nobjections to the officers' search on appeal.\n\nII. DISCUSSION\n\n \"Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews 'legal\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.'\" United States v. Morris,\n915 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552,\n555 (8th Cir. 2014)). We will affirm the district court \"unless the denial of the motion\nis unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the\nlaw, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.\" United States\nv. Gunnell, 775 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Douglas,\n744 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2014)).\n\n A. Initial Entry and Consent\n\n Sallis first challenges the district court's conclusion that the officers' initial\nentry into the apartment was justified under the community caretaking exception to\nthe warrant requirement. His ultimate claim is threefold, however, or more of a\nchain-of-events claim. Sallis argues that the firearm and ammunition found during\nthe execution of the search warrant were discovered based on the information\n\n -5-\n\fcontained in the warrant affidavit that marijuana was discovered in Sallis's bag in the\napartment, which was known because Sallis allegedly instructed the resident to give\nhis bag to the officers, which only occurred because the officers had illegally entered\nthe apartment and were waiting for the resident to return in order to seek her consent.\nAs to the initial entry, Sallis claims that in this instance law enforcement lacked\n\"specific and articulable facts\" that an emergency existed; particularly that officers\ndid not have specific, reliable information that children were presently inside the\nhome and in danger. Here, however, because it was Sallis's consent that led to the\ndiscovery of the marijuana, and nothing was gained in this investigation as a result\nof the officers' initial entry into the apartment, we focus our analysis with Sallis's\nalleged consentβthe only legal inquiry of consequence.\n\n Sallis claims the search was invalid because he did not consent to the search\nand seizure of the tote and bag brought to the officers by the resident and in which\nofficers first observed marijuana in the apartment. At issue is Sallis's statement to the\nresident while he sat in the patrol vehicle, instructing her to \"get [his] bag\" and give\nit to the officers, which led to the resident returning to her apartment and retrieving\nthe tote and bag. The officers' observation of the bag's contentsβpackaged\nmarijuanaβwas included in the warrant application being prepared\ncontemporaneously.\n\n While the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before a\nsearch, one established exception to the warrant requirement is a search that is\nconducted pursuant to consent. United States v. Wolff, 830 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir.\n2016). A defendant's consent is voluntary if \"it was the product of an essentially free\nand unconstrained choice, rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or\nimplied.\" United States v. Morreno, 373 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2004). \"The\ngovernment bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that\nconsent to search was freely given.\" United States v. Aguilar, 743 F.3d 1144, 1147\n(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Arciniega, 569 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir.\n\n -6-\n\f2009)). Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether consent was\nvoluntary, including: \"a defendant's age, intelligence, and education; whether he\ncooperates with police; his knowledge of his right to refuse consent; and his\nfamiliarity with arrests and the legal system.\" United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d\n887, 895 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts also consider \"environmental\" factors in\ndetermining the voluntariness of consent, including: \"whether [law enforcement]\nthreatened, intimidated, punished, or falsely promised something to the defendant;\nwhether the defendant was in custody or under arrest when consent was given and,\nif so, how long he had been detained; and whether consent occurred in a public or\nsecluded area.\" Id.\n\n The district court credited the officers' testimony regarding the conversation\nbetween the resident and Sallis that occurred after the officers asked her for consent\nto search her apartment and after she requested to speak with Sallis first. The court\nalso viewed officers' body camera videos that included the time period when Sallis\nspoke to the resident. The court concluded that under the totality of the\ncircumstances Sallis's instructions to the resident to \"go get my bag,\" and his repeated\nassurance to the officers that \"I'll give it to you\" (referring to the marijuana),\ndemonstrated his implied consent to search the bag. The court also concluded that\nthe consent was voluntary because, although Sallis was in custody at the time, those\nin custody can still voluntarily consent to a search, and in this instance, Sallis had\nbeen advised of his constitutional rights and his statements were not the result of\nofficers questioning him or asking for consent. Rather, Sallis was responding to the\nresident and did so less than thirty minutes after he had been taken into custody and\nless than fifteen minutes after he had been read his Miranda rights. It was the resident\nwho asked to speak to Sallis. Given the time frame and the circumstances, we agree\nwith the district court that the fact that Sallis was in custody at the time he talked to\nthe resident and gave consent does not meaningfully weigh against a finding of\nvoluntariness. Finding no error with the factual findings made by the district court,\nwe find the denial of Sallis's motion supported by substantial evidence, and affirm the\n\n -7-\n\fdistrict court's conclusion that Sallis voluntarily consented to the seizure and\nsubsequent search of the bag in the resident's apartment.\n\n B. Inevitable Discovery\n\n Here, the government argued to the district court, and the district court agreed,\nthat even if the entry into the apartment violated Sallis's Fourth Amendment rights\nand Sallis did not voluntarily consent to the search of his bag, the court should not\nsuppress the evidence because it would have been inevitably discovered as a result\nof the execution of the search warrant. We agree.\n\n Where information is discovered after police violate the Fourth Amendment,\nthe evidence should not be suppressed \"[i]f the prosecution can establish by a\npreponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would\nhave been discovered by lawful means.\" Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).\nOn appeal, Sallis challenges this ruling as well, claiming that because the officers\nexploited their presence in the apartment to obtain the necessary information added\nto the search warrant affidavit, all of the evidence obtained must be suppressed.\nHowever, whether the officers met the resident at the threshold of the apartment or\nwhether she found them inside as a result of their entry given concern for the well-\nbeing of the children they believed to be present, is inconsequential in the ultimate\nanalysis. No evidence relevant to the instant inquiry was gained as a result of these\ninitial actions. Regardless, even assuming this initial entry was illegal and we\nadditionally assume there were infirmities with Sallis's consent to search his bag, we\nagree that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. Id.\n\n The officers had sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the warrant at\nthe time they arrested Sallis, regardless of the later inclusion of the information that\nmarijuana was present in the apartment. As previously noted, at the time the decision\nwas made to prepare the search warrant affidavit, the officers had the following\n\n -8-\n\finformation from the CI and their own surveillance: (1) Sallis entered and exited the\napartment building from the area consistent with the entry and exit from the specific\napartment the CI told them was Sallis's location, (2) Sallis participated in what\nappeared to their trained eyes to be drug-trafficking activities, (3) after Sallis's arrest,\nofficers discovered marijuana and cash on the back seat of the second vehicle near\nwhere Sallis sat, (4) the officers' general knowledge that firearms are tools of the drug\ntrade, (5) as well as the officers' knowledge of Sallis's involvement with the shooting\nin late November and the fact that they did not recover a firearm during the earlier\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Accordingly, even if there were any doubt regarding\nSallis's consent to search his bag located inside the apartment, which we already\ndetermined was not constitutionally infirm, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.\nUnder Nix, the evidence is admissible nonetheless, as it would have been ultimately\nor inevitably discovered by lawful means in the execution of the warrant already\nbeing pursued even without the additional information added after the officers\ndiscovered the marijuana in the bag. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d\n855, 858, 860-863 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (discussing this circuit's\ntwo-pronged approach to Nix).\n\nIII. CONCLUSION\n\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to\nsuppress.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eric Cortez SALLIS, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1662\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Eric Cortez Sallis\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f After the magistrate judge1 recommended denial of Eric Cortez Sallis's motion\\nto suppress, which report and recommendation the district court2 adopted, Sallis\\npleaded guilty to count two of the indictment, possession of a firearm and\\nammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The\\ndistrict court sentenced Sallis to 120-months' imprisonment followed by three years\\nof supervised release. On appeal Sallis asserts the district court erred in denying the\\nmotion to suppress because the search conducted by law enforcement violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights. We affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to suppress.\\n\\nI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On November 27, 2016, a patient admitted at a Waterloo, Iowa, hospital\\nsuffering from multiple gunshot wounds, along with other witnesses, identified Sallis\\nas the shooter. Officers executed a search warrant at Sallis's residence where they\\nrecovered a 9mm bullet, a 9mm shell casing, and blood spatter, but Sallis was not\\npresent and officers did not recover a firearm. At the time, there were outstanding\\nwarrants for Sallis's arrest on unrelated offenses. Based on his suspected involvement\\nin the November shooting as well as his outstanding warrants, the Waterloo Police\\nDepartment disseminated information about Sallis to all of its divisions.\\n\\n On December 9, 2016, a confidential source (CI) provided information to a\\nWaterloo police officer that Sallis was staying at a particular apartment complex with\\na named female and provided the apartment number to the officer. This CI had been\\na known source to the police for a year and had provided reliable information in the\\npast that led to the discovery and seizure of stolen property, drugs, and other\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the\\nNorthern District of Iowa.\\n 2\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcontraband. The CI told the officer that more than one child was present in the\\nparticular apartment. Officers learned through a public database that the woman who\\nresided at that apartment was a relative of Sallis's and officers began surveillance of\\nthe residence. On the night of December 9, officers observed Sallis come down the\\nsteps of the apartment complex two times, enter vehicles, and engage in behavior that,\\nbased on their experience, indicated drug trafficking. When Sallis got into the\\nsecond vehicle, officers approached the car and arrested him on his outstanding\\nwarrants. On the back seat of the second vehicle near where Sallis sat, officers\\nrecovered a cellular phone, a silver bag officers had previously observed Sallis\\ncarrying into the apartment that contained 1/4 pound of marijuana, and more than\\n$1,500 in cash. The officers believed the quantity of drugs and cash retrieved were\\nconsistent with drug trafficking. Sallis would not identify the apartment number he\\nhad been in, denied living there, and said he was just \\\"visiting.\\\" Sallis also denied\\nthat anyone was in the apartment at the time and said the resident who lived there was\\non her way back.\\n\\n A sergeant involved in the surveillance decided at that time to apply for a\\nsearch warrant for the apartment based on all of the information then-available,\\nincluding what the officers' observed during surveillance, their knowledge that\\nfirearms are tools of the drug trade, Sallis's involvement with the shooting in late\\nNovember, and the fact that officers did not recover a firearm during the earlier\\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Upon request, Sallis gave the officers the phone number\\nof the woman who lived in the apartment. But, when the sergeant called the number,\\nthe female who answered was evasive when asked if she lived in the particular\\napartment and ultimately hung up during the conversation. While officers applied for\\na search warrant, the sergeant decided to secure the apartment and check on the\\nchildren that the CI said were present. Officers placed Sallis in a police car and\\nadvised him of his constitutional rights.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f There was no answer at the apartment door when officers knocked. The\\nsergeant then twisted the door knob and the door opened a short distance. A small\\nboy, who was about four or five years old, came out into the living room and was\\nvisible from the door. The boy indicated to the officers that other children were also\\nin the apartment almost simultaneous to the emergence of other children from the\\nsame hallway. Ultimately the officers entered the apartment, confirmed no adults\\nwere present by conducting a protective sweep, and secured the apartment until\\nofficers could find an adult to care for the five children.\\n\\n Shortly thereafter, the woman who resided in the apartment arrived with\\nanother woman and the officers informed the resident that Sallis was in custody and\\nthat they had applied for a search warrant. The resident told officers that Sallis\\nsometimes stayed overnight and pointed out some of Sallis's clothing laying on the\\ncouch. Officers asked the resident for consent to search her apartment and she asked\\nto first speak to Sallis to discuss the matter. When she walked out and talked to Sallis\\nnear the police car, he admitted there was marijuana and more cash in the apartment\\nand instructed her to \\\"get [his] bag\\\" and give it to the officers. Sallis told the officer\\nthat \\\"I'll give it to you,\\\" referring to the marijuana, and said the resident would get the\\nbag, explaining \\\"I'll have her go get it.\\\"\\n\\n Back in the apartment, while waiting for the warrant, the resident brought a\\nplastic tote and a bag to the living room, that she identified as both belonging to\\nSallis. Officers smelled marijuana and observed packaged marijuana in plain view\\nin the bag. This latter information regarding the marijuana was included in the search\\nwarrant affidavit being prepared contemporaneously, and that was later used to search\\nthe apartment. During the resulting warrant search, officers found bags with\\nmarijuana, scales, 9mm ammunition, and a 9mm handgun. At the time the search\\ntook place, Sallis had been transferred to the police station and while there, officers\\nadvised Sallis about finding the handgun in the apartment and Sallis made\\nincriminating statements about the firearm.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Sallis challenged the officers' warrantless entry into the apartment and sought\\nto exclude evidence obtained from the resulting warrant search, arguing that the\\nsearch violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Sallis additionally argued that there\\nwas no consent for the search of his belongings, and that the inevitable discovery\\ndoctrine did not apply. The district court held that the officers' entry into the\\napartment was justified pursuant to their community caretaking function, Sallis\\nconsented to the search, and additionally that even if the officers' entry was illegal,\\nthe evidence would still be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.\\nFollowing the denial of his motion to suppress, Sallis entered a conditional plea of\\nguilty and reserved his right to appeal the denial. Sallis now raises the same\\nobjections to the officers' search on appeal.\\n\\nII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n \\\"Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews 'legal\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.'\\\" United States v. Morris,\\n915 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552,\\n555 (8th Cir. 2014)). We will affirm the district court \\\"unless the denial of the motion\\nis unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the\\nlaw, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.\\\" United States\\nv. Gunnell, 775 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Douglas,\\n744 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n A. Initial Entry and Consent\\n\\n Sallis first challenges the district court's conclusion that the officers' initial\\nentry into the apartment was justified under the community caretaking exception to\\nthe warrant requirement. His ultimate claim is threefold, however, or more of a\\nchain-of-events claim. Sallis argues that the firearm and ammunition found during\\nthe execution of the search warrant were discovered based on the information\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcontained in the warrant affidavit that marijuana was discovered in Sallis's bag in the\\napartment, which was known because Sallis allegedly instructed the resident to give\\nhis bag to the officers, which only occurred because the officers had illegally entered\\nthe apartment and were waiting for the resident to return in order to seek her consent.\\nAs to the initial entry, Sallis claims that in this instance law enforcement lacked\\n\\\"specific and articulable facts\\\" that an emergency existed; particularly that officers\\ndid not have specific, reliable information that children were presently inside the\\nhome and in danger. Here, however, because it was Sallis's consent that led to the\\ndiscovery of the marijuana, and nothing was gained in this investigation as a result\\nof the officers' initial entry into the apartment, we focus our analysis with Sallis's\\nalleged consentβthe only legal inquiry of consequence.\\n\\n Sallis claims the search was invalid because he did not consent to the search\\nand seizure of the tote and bag brought to the officers by the resident and in which\\nofficers first observed marijuana in the apartment. At issue is Sallis's statement to the\\nresident while he sat in the patrol vehicle, instructing her to \\\"get [his] bag\\\" and give\\nit to the officers, which led to the resident returning to her apartment and retrieving\\nthe tote and bag. The officers' observation of the bag's contentsβpackaged\\nmarijuanaβwas included in the warrant application being prepared\\ncontemporaneously.\\n\\n While the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before a\\nsearch, one established exception to the warrant requirement is a search that is\\nconducted pursuant to consent. United States v. Wolff, 830 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir.\\n2016). A defendant's consent is voluntary if \\\"it was the product of an essentially free\\nand unconstrained choice, rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or\\nimplied.\\\" United States v. Morreno, 373 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2004). \\\"The\\ngovernment bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that\\nconsent to search was freely given.\\\" United States v. Aguilar, 743 F.3d 1144, 1147\\n(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Arciniega, 569 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f2009)). Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether consent was\\nvoluntary, including: \\\"a defendant's age, intelligence, and education; whether he\\ncooperates with police; his knowledge of his right to refuse consent; and his\\nfamiliarity with arrests and the legal system.\\\" United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d\\n887, 895 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts also consider \\\"environmental\\\" factors in\\ndetermining the voluntariness of consent, including: \\\"whether [law enforcement]\\nthreatened, intimidated, punished, or falsely promised something to the defendant;\\nwhether the defendant was in custody or under arrest when consent was given and,\\nif so, how long he had been detained; and whether consent occurred in a public or\\nsecluded area.\\\" Id.\\n\\n The district court credited the officers' testimony regarding the conversation\\nbetween the resident and Sallis that occurred after the officers asked her for consent\\nto search her apartment and after she requested to speak with Sallis first. The court\\nalso viewed officers' body camera videos that included the time period when Sallis\\nspoke to the resident. The court concluded that under the totality of the\\ncircumstances Sallis's instructions to the resident to \\\"go get my bag,\\\" and his repeated\\nassurance to the officers that \\\"I'll give it to you\\\" (referring to the marijuana),\\ndemonstrated his implied consent to search the bag. The court also concluded that\\nthe consent was voluntary because, although Sallis was in custody at the time, those\\nin custody can still voluntarily consent to a search, and in this instance, Sallis had\\nbeen advised of his constitutional rights and his statements were not the result of\\nofficers questioning him or asking for consent. Rather, Sallis was responding to the\\nresident and did so less than thirty minutes after he had been taken into custody and\\nless than fifteen minutes after he had been read his Miranda rights. It was the resident\\nwho asked to speak to Sallis. Given the time frame and the circumstances, we agree\\nwith the district court that the fact that Sallis was in custody at the time he talked to\\nthe resident and gave consent does not meaningfully weigh against a finding of\\nvoluntariness. Finding no error with the factual findings made by the district court,\\nwe find the denial of Sallis's motion supported by substantial evidence, and affirm the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdistrict court's conclusion that Sallis voluntarily consented to the seizure and\\nsubsequent search of the bag in the resident's apartment.\\n\\n B. Inevitable Discovery\\n\\n Here, the government argued to the district court, and the district court agreed,\\nthat even if the entry into the apartment violated Sallis's Fourth Amendment rights\\nand Sallis did not voluntarily consent to the search of his bag, the court should not\\nsuppress the evidence because it would have been inevitably discovered as a result\\nof the execution of the search warrant. We agree.\\n\\n Where information is discovered after police violate the Fourth Amendment,\\nthe evidence should not be suppressed \\\"[i]f the prosecution can establish by a\\npreponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would\\nhave been discovered by lawful means.\\\" Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).\\nOn appeal, Sallis challenges this ruling as well, claiming that because the officers\\nexploited their presence in the apartment to obtain the necessary information added\\nto the search warrant affidavit, all of the evidence obtained must be suppressed.\\nHowever, whether the officers met the resident at the threshold of the apartment or\\nwhether she found them inside as a result of their entry given concern for the well-\\nbeing of the children they believed to be present, is inconsequential in the ultimate\\nanalysis. No evidence relevant to the instant inquiry was gained as a result of these\\ninitial actions. Regardless, even assuming this initial entry was illegal and we\\nadditionally assume there were infirmities with Sallis's consent to search his bag, we\\nagree that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. Id.\\n\\n The officers had sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the warrant at\\nthe time they arrested Sallis, regardless of the later inclusion of the information that\\nmarijuana was present in the apartment. As previously noted, at the time the decision\\nwas made to prepare the search warrant affidavit, the officers had the following\\n\\n -8-\\n\\finformation from the CI and their own surveillance: (1) Sallis entered and exited the\\napartment building from the area consistent with the entry and exit from the specific\\napartment the CI told them was Sallis's location, (2) Sallis participated in what\\nappeared to their trained eyes to be drug-trafficking activities, (3) after Sallis's arrest,\\nofficers discovered marijuana and cash on the back seat of the second vehicle near\\nwhere Sallis sat, (4) the officers' general knowledge that firearms are tools of the drug\\ntrade, (5) as well as the officers' knowledge of Sallis's involvement with the shooting\\nin late November and the fact that they did not recover a firearm during the earlier\\nsearch of Sallis's residence. Accordingly, even if there were any doubt regarding\\nSallis's consent to search his bag located inside the apartment, which we already\\ndetermined was not constitutionally infirm, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.\\nUnder Nix, the evidence is admissible nonetheless, as it would have been ultimately\\nor inevitably discovered by lawful means in the execution of the warrant already\\nbeing pursued even without the additional information added after the officers\\ndiscovered the marijuana in the bag. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d\\n855, 858, 860-863 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (discussing this circuit's\\ntwo-pronged approach to Nix).\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the denial of Sallis's motion to\\nsuppress.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1772,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608103,"string":"4,608,103"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Tracy HARRELL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HANDI MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., Defendant - Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tracy Harrell v. Handi Medical Supply, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3349"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wollman, Colloton, Benton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3349\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Tracy Harrell,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Handi Medical Supply, Inc.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Tracy Harrell brought this action against her former employer, Handi Medical\\nSupply, Inc., alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and\\nthe Family Medical and Leave Act (FMLA). The district court1 granted summary\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of Minnesota.\\n\\fjudgment in favor of Handi on all claims. Harrell appeals the dismissal of only two\\nclaims under the MHRA. Without deciding whether the district courtβs rationale was\\ncorrect, we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n As the case was resolved on summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light\\nmost favorable to Harrell. Handi Medical is a medical equipment company located\\nin St. Paul, Minnesota. The company employed Harrell as a Lead Customer Service\\nRepresentative from 2012 until 2015. In 2013, the company approved Harrell for\\nintermittent leave under the FMLA, and she used the leave to support her husband,\\nwho suffers from severe bipolar disorder.\\n\\n On August 5, 2015, Handi Medicalβs management called a meeting to\\nannounce temporary changes to its customer service department. The changes\\nrequired Harrell to accept a demotion in stature by assuming responsibilities of a\\ncustomer service representative.\\n\\n Harrell left the meeting and returned to her desk. She sent an e-mail to her\\nhusband that said, βI really need to talk to you, I am upset.β She then called her\\nhusband; he became angry and threatened to come to the companyβs offices to talk\\nto the chief executive officer about the changes.\\n\\n Harrell became worried about her husband and asked to take FMLA leave for\\nthe afternoon. Human resources director Julie Peterson approved the request. Harrell\\nthen returned to her desk, swung her identification badge around her hand, and threw\\nthe badge in her purse. Co-workers reported that as Harrell prepared to leave, she\\nsaid she βhas had it with this placeβ and cursed loudly within earshot of customers.\\nWhen a co-worker asked Harrell a work-related question, Harrell responded, βYou\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fare going to need to talk to [another manager]. I am done. I got to go. I am done\\nright now.β She then departed.\\n\\n Harrellβs co-workers reported her conduct to human resources director Peterson\\nand the companyβs chief operating officer, Scott Learned. Learned interviewed two\\nmore employees about the incident, and then reported it to chief executive officer\\nMike Bailey. In response, Bailey prepared a written warning for Harrell, saying that\\nthe reported behavior would not be tolerated, and that failure to observe workplace\\nrules would result in further discipline, including termination.\\n\\n On August 11, Bailey summoned Harrell to meet with him and Learned, and\\nBailey issued the written warning. He explained that he was taking the action in\\nresponse to her conduct on August 5, and admonished her that it was unacceptable\\nto curse and complain in front of customers and other employees. Harrell disputed\\nthat she used profanity and refused to sign the document acknowledging the\\ndiscussion. She explained that she left the office frantically on August 5 because she\\nwas worried about her husband. Bailey responded that it always seemed like she had\\nan excuse. Harrell then accused Bailey of using her husbandβs disability against her.\\nBailey asked Harrell why she would tell her husband about the organizational\\nchanges if she knew that the information would upset him.\\n\\n At this point, Peterson and another manager joined the meeting. Bailey\\nallegedly βgot red-faced,β moved his chair toward Harrell, pointed at her, and asked\\nwhether she was accusing him of using her husbandβs disability against her. Harrell\\nresponded that she felt that way because Bailey was accusing her of acting\\nunprofessionally after going home due to FMLA leave. Bailey then told her never to\\naccuse him of discriminating against her because of her husbandβs condition.\\n\\n After more discussion, Bailey decided that if Harrell βtruly felt that way that\\nshe was describing that she would be better off working elsewhere.β According to\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fHarrell, company officials observed that she and her family were unhappy, and said\\nthat βmaybe we shouldβcan find an exit strategy when Scott [Learned] returns.β As\\nHarrell left the meeting, she muttered Handiβs mottoββenriching livesββin a\\ndisparaging way. Upon hearing that remark, Bailey called Harrell back into his office\\nand terminated her employment immediately.\\n\\n Harrell sued Handi Medical, alleging four claims that the company\\ndiscriminated against her in violation of the MHRA and FMLA. The only two claims\\nat issue on this appeal arise under the MHRA. One alleges discrimination against\\nHarrell based on her marital status. Under the MHRA, marital status includes\\nβprotection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or\\nbeliefs of a spouse.β Minn. Stat. Β§ 363A.03, subd. 24. The second claim asserts\\nβreprisalβ against Harrell for opposing an unlawful employment practice. βReprisalβ\\nunder the MHRA includes βintimidation, retaliation, or harassment,β and Harrell\\nalleged that Handi Medical retaliated against her for opposing discrimination based\\non marital status. Id. Β§ 363A.15. Harrell asserts that the companyβs declaration that\\nshe would be subject to an βexit strategyβ was an adverse employment action taken\\nbased on her marital status and her opposition to discrimination based on marital\\nstatus.\\n\\n The district court determined that Harrell had established a prima facie case on\\nthese claims, but rejected her argument that the discussion of an βexit strategyβ was\\nan adverse employment action. The court concluded that the only adverse\\nemployment action was the immediate termination that came in response to Harrellβs\\ncomment about βenriching lives.β With that frame of reference, the court decided that\\nHarrellβs insubordinate remark was a non-discriminatory reason for the termination,\\nand that Harrell failed to present sufficient evidence that the reason was pretextual.\\nThe court thus granted summary judgment in favor of Handi. We review the district\\ncourtβs grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ffavorable to Harrell. Thomas v. Heartland Empβt Servs. LLC, 797 F.3d 527, 529 (8th\\nCir. 2015).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Both of Harrellβs claims under the MHRA require her to establish that the\\ncompany took an adverse employment action against her and that there was a causal\\nconnection between her protected activity or status and the adverse action. See\\nDoucette v. Morrison County, 763 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2014); Hoover v. Norwest\\nPrivate Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn. 2001). One dispute on this\\nappeal concerns when Handi Medical took adverse action against Harrell.\\n\\n Harrell contends that when company officials discussed arranging an βexit\\nstrategyβ for Harrell, the company took an adverse employment action by setting in\\nmotion a process to terminate her employment. The βexit strategyβ discussion\\noccurred before Harrellβs insubordinate remark about the companyβs motto, so her\\nsarcastic reference to βenriching livesβ could not have justified implementing the\\nβexit strategy.β The district court concluded that the discussion of an exit strategy\\nwas not an adverse employment action because βthere was no agreement that an βexit\\nstrategyβ would actually happen or that Harrell would ultimately be terminated.β\\nHarrell disputes this conclusion.\\n\\n We deem it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over the meaning of the βexit\\nstrategyβ discussion. Assuming for purposes of analysis that the company took\\nadverse action against Harrell during the meeting on August 11 when Bailey raised\\nthe βexit strategy,β Handi Medical argues that there are alternative grounds on which\\nto affirm the judgment. We conclude that these other grounds have merit.\\n\\n On the reprisal claim, Harrell must establish that she engaged in protected\\nconduct, and that the company took adverse action against her because of that\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fconduct. A person engages in protected conduct when she βoppose[s] a practice\\nforbiddenβ under the MHRA. But not every complaint about alleged unlawful\\ndiscrimination is protected. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided whether\\nthe complained-of conduct must actually be unlawful for a complaint to constitute\\nprotected βopposition,β but at a minimum, Minnesota requires that the employee have\\na good-faith reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed was a violation of the\\nMHRA. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 81-82 (Minn. 2010).\\n\\n The alleged protected conduct in this case was Harrellβs complaint that Bailey,\\nby issuing the written warning on August 11, was discriminating against her because\\nof her marital statusβnamely, her husbandβs situation. It is undisputed, however,\\nthat Bailey had received reports from company staff that Harrell caused a scene in the\\noffice, made disparaging remarks about the company, and used profanity that could\\nbe overheard by co-workers and customers. Harrell disputes that she cursed in the\\noffice, but there is no dispute that Bailey acted on information from co-workers that\\nshe had done so, and Baileyβs motivation is the relevant fact.\\n\\n That Harrellβs outburst may have been triggered in part by her husbandβs\\nsituation did not support a reasonable belief that Bailey issued the written warning\\nbecause of Harrellβs marital status. Harrell admitted that if the reports to Bailey were\\naccurate, then her conduct would be cause for discipline, and there is no dispute that\\nBailey acted on such reports. After Bailey issued the warning, Harrell did raise her\\nhusbandβs situation as an excuse or explanation for her conduct. But Harrellβs marital\\nstatus did not give her license to engage in unprofessional conduct that would be\\nunacceptable from any other employee, so the companyβs unwillingness to withdraw\\nthe discipline did not supply reasonable grounds to believe that the company was\\ndiscriminating based on marital status. A baseless accusation that an employer\\nviolated the MHRA is not protected opposition under the reprisal statute. We thus\\nconclude that even if Bailey took adverse action against Harrell during the August 11\\nmeeting by raising the βexit strategy,β she cannot show that the action was taken\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fbecause of protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice under the\\nMHRA.\\n\\n In addition to alleging unlawful reprisal, Harrell also claims that Handi Medical\\ndiscriminated against her based on her marital status. To prove this claim, Harrell\\nmust show that the company took an adverse action against her βon the basis of the\\nidentity, situation, actions, or beliefsβ of her spouse. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03, subd.\\n24; see also id. Β§ 363A.08; Doucette, 763 F.3d at 982. Because the record was fully\\ndeveloped on the motion for summary judgment, we consider the ultimate question\\nof discrimination vel non, Otto v. City of Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2012),\\nand we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to proceed on this claim.\\n\\n While Bailey raised the βexit strategyβ after Harrell complained about the\\ncompany using her husbandβs situation against her, the record does not support an\\ninference that the company suddenly decided to terminate Harrell based on her\\nmarital status. The company, after all, consistently had granted Harrell leave under\\nthe FMLA to care for her husbandβs needs. It was only when Harrell offended Bailey\\nby suggesting that he was unlawfully discriminating that the exit strategy was\\nbroached. Bailey did question why Harrell told her husband of the companyβs\\norganizational changes during the work day on August 5 when she understood that\\nthe news would upset him. But this comment was a critique of Harrellβs judgment,\\nnot a complaint about her husbandβs situation or actions. The companyβs generic\\nacknowledgment that both Harrell and βher familyβ were unhappy with recent events\\nis insufficient to show that the company acted against her because of her husbandβs\\nsituation rather than Harrellβs conduct and attitude. Even taking the evidence in the\\nlight most favorable to Harrell, we do not see a sound basis to conclude that the\\ndecision to arrange an βexit strategyβ was motivated by Harrellβs marital status.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385356/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608103/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tracy HARRELL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HANDI MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., Defendant - Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3349\n ___________________________\n\n Tracy Harrell,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n Handi Medical Supply, Inc.,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\n Filed: April 9, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Tracy Harrell brought this action against her former employer, Handi Medical\nSupply, Inc., alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and\nthe Family Medical and Leave Act (FMLA). The district court1 granted summary\n\n 1\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe District of Minnesota.\n\fjudgment in favor of Handi on all claims. Harrell appeals the dismissal of only two\nclaims under the MHRA. Without deciding whether the district courtβs rationale was\ncorrect, we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds.\n\n I.\n\n As the case was resolved on summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light\nmost favorable to Harrell. Handi Medical is a medical equipment company located\nin St. Paul, Minnesota. The company employed Harrell as a Lead Customer Service\nRepresentative from 2012 until 2015. In 2013, the company approved Harrell for\nintermittent leave under the FMLA, and she used the leave to support her husband,\nwho suffers from severe bipolar disorder.\n\n On August 5, 2015, Handi Medicalβs management called a meeting to\nannounce temporary changes to its customer service department. The changes\nrequired Harrell to accept a demotion in stature by assuming responsibilities of a\ncustomer service representative.\n\n Harrell left the meeting and returned to her desk. She sent an e-mail to her\nhusband that said, βI really need to talk to you, I am upset.β She then called her\nhusband; he became angry and threatened to come to the companyβs offices to talk\nto the chief executive officer about the changes.\n\n Harrell became worried about her husband and asked to take FMLA leave for\nthe afternoon. Human resources director Julie Peterson approved the request. Harrell\nthen returned to her desk, swung her identification badge around her hand, and threw\nthe badge in her purse. Co-workers reported that as Harrell prepared to leave, she\nsaid she βhas had it with this placeβ and cursed loudly within earshot of customers.\nWhen a co-worker asked Harrell a work-related question, Harrell responded, βYou\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fare going to need to talk to [another manager]. I am done. I got to go. I am done\nright now.β She then departed.\n\n Harrellβs co-workers reported her conduct to human resources director Peterson\nand the companyβs chief operating officer, Scott Learned. Learned interviewed two\nmore employees about the incident, and then reported it to chief executive officer\nMike Bailey. In response, Bailey prepared a written warning for Harrell, saying that\nthe reported behavior would not be tolerated, and that failure to observe workplace\nrules would result in further discipline, including termination.\n\n On August 11, Bailey summoned Harrell to meet with him and Learned, and\nBailey issued the written warning. He explained that he was taking the action in\nresponse to her conduct on August 5, and admonished her that it was unacceptable\nto curse and complain in front of customers and other employees. Harrell disputed\nthat she used profanity and refused to sign the document acknowledging the\ndiscussion. She explained that she left the office frantically on August 5 because she\nwas worried about her husband. Bailey responded that it always seemed like she had\nan excuse. Harrell then accused Bailey of using her husbandβs disability against her.\nBailey asked Harrell why she would tell her husband about the organizational\nchanges if she knew that the information would upset him.\n\n At this point, Peterson and another manager joined the meeting. Bailey\nallegedly βgot red-faced,β moved his chair toward Harrell, pointed at her, and asked\nwhether she was accusing him of using her husbandβs disability against her. Harrell\nresponded that she felt that way because Bailey was accusing her of acting\nunprofessionally after going home due to FMLA leave. Bailey then told her never to\naccuse him of discriminating against her because of her husbandβs condition.\n\n After more discussion, Bailey decided that if Harrell βtruly felt that way that\nshe was describing that she would be better off working elsewhere.β According to\n\n -3-\n\fHarrell, company officials observed that she and her family were unhappy, and said\nthat βmaybe we shouldβcan find an exit strategy when Scott [Learned] returns.β As\nHarrell left the meeting, she muttered Handiβs mottoββenriching livesββin a\ndisparaging way. Upon hearing that remark, Bailey called Harrell back into his office\nand terminated her employment immediately.\n\n Harrell sued Handi Medical, alleging four claims that the company\ndiscriminated against her in violation of the MHRA and FMLA. The only two claims\nat issue on this appeal arise under the MHRA. One alleges discrimination against\nHarrell based on her marital status. Under the MHRA, marital status includes\nβprotection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or\nbeliefs of a spouse.β Minn. Stat. Β§ 363A.03, subd. 24. The second claim asserts\nβreprisalβ against Harrell for opposing an unlawful employment practice. βReprisalβ\nunder the MHRA includes βintimidation, retaliation, or harassment,β and Harrell\nalleged that Handi Medical retaliated against her for opposing discrimination based\non marital status. Id. Β§ 363A.15. Harrell asserts that the companyβs declaration that\nshe would be subject to an βexit strategyβ was an adverse employment action taken\nbased on her marital status and her opposition to discrimination based on marital\nstatus.\n\n The district court determined that Harrell had established a prima facie case on\nthese claims, but rejected her argument that the discussion of an βexit strategyβ was\nan adverse employment action. The court concluded that the only adverse\nemployment action was the immediate termination that came in response to Harrellβs\ncomment about βenriching lives.β With that frame of reference, the court decided that\nHarrellβs insubordinate remark was a non-discriminatory reason for the termination,\nand that Harrell failed to present sufficient evidence that the reason was pretextual.\nThe court thus granted summary judgment in favor of Handi. We review the district\ncourtβs grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most\n\n\n\n -4-\n\ffavorable to Harrell. Thomas v. Heartland Empβt Servs. LLC, 797 F.3d 527, 529 (8th\nCir. 2015).\n\n II.\n\n Both of Harrellβs claims under the MHRA require her to establish that the\ncompany took an adverse employment action against her and that there was a causal\nconnection between her protected activity or status and the adverse action. See\nDoucette v. Morrison County, 763 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2014); Hoover v. Norwest\nPrivate Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn. 2001). One dispute on this\nappeal concerns when Handi Medical took adverse action against Harrell.\n\n Harrell contends that when company officials discussed arranging an βexit\nstrategyβ for Harrell, the company took an adverse employment action by setting in\nmotion a process to terminate her employment. The βexit strategyβ discussion\noccurred before Harrellβs insubordinate remark about the companyβs motto, so her\nsarcastic reference to βenriching livesβ could not have justified implementing the\nβexit strategy.β The district court concluded that the discussion of an exit strategy\nwas not an adverse employment action because βthere was no agreement that an βexit\nstrategyβ would actually happen or that Harrell would ultimately be terminated.β\nHarrell disputes this conclusion.\n\n We deem it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over the meaning of the βexit\nstrategyβ discussion. Assuming for purposes of analysis that the company took\nadverse action against Harrell during the meeting on August 11 when Bailey raised\nthe βexit strategy,β Handi Medical argues that there are alternative grounds on which\nto affirm the judgment. We conclude that these other grounds have merit.\n\n On the reprisal claim, Harrell must establish that she engaged in protected\nconduct, and that the company took adverse action against her because of that\n\n -5-\n\fconduct. A person engages in protected conduct when she βoppose[s] a practice\nforbiddenβ under the MHRA. But not every complaint about alleged unlawful\ndiscrimination is protected. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided whether\nthe complained-of conduct must actually be unlawful for a complaint to constitute\nprotected βopposition,β but at a minimum, Minnesota requires that the employee have\na good-faith reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed was a violation of the\nMHRA. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 81-82 (Minn. 2010).\n\n The alleged protected conduct in this case was Harrellβs complaint that Bailey,\nby issuing the written warning on August 11, was discriminating against her because\nof her marital statusβnamely, her husbandβs situation. It is undisputed, however,\nthat Bailey had received reports from company staff that Harrell caused a scene in the\noffice, made disparaging remarks about the company, and used profanity that could\nbe overheard by co-workers and customers. Harrell disputes that she cursed in the\noffice, but there is no dispute that Bailey acted on information from co-workers that\nshe had done so, and Baileyβs motivation is the relevant fact.\n\n That Harrellβs outburst may have been triggered in part by her husbandβs\nsituation did not support a reasonable belief that Bailey issued the written warning\nbecause of Harrellβs marital status. Harrell admitted that if the reports to Bailey were\naccurate, then her conduct would be cause for discipline, and there is no dispute that\nBailey acted on such reports. After Bailey issued the warning, Harrell did raise her\nhusbandβs situation as an excuse or explanation for her conduct. But Harrellβs marital\nstatus did not give her license to engage in unprofessional conduct that would be\nunacceptable from any other employee, so the companyβs unwillingness to withdraw\nthe discipline did not supply reasonable grounds to believe that the company was\ndiscriminating based on marital status. A baseless accusation that an employer\nviolated the MHRA is not protected opposition under the reprisal statute. We thus\nconclude that even if Bailey took adverse action against Harrell during the August 11\nmeeting by raising the βexit strategy,β she cannot show that the action was taken\n\n -6-\n\fbecause of protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice under the\nMHRA.\n\n In addition to alleging unlawful reprisal, Harrell also claims that Handi Medical\ndiscriminated against her based on her marital status. To prove this claim, Harrell\nmust show that the company took an adverse action against her βon the basis of the\nidentity, situation, actions, or beliefsβ of her spouse. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03, subd.\n24; see also id. Β§ 363A.08; Doucette, 763 F.3d at 982. Because the record was fully\ndeveloped on the motion for summary judgment, we consider the ultimate question\nof discrimination vel non, Otto v. City of Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2012),\nand we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to proceed on this claim.\n\n While Bailey raised the βexit strategyβ after Harrell complained about the\ncompany using her husbandβs situation against her, the record does not support an\ninference that the company suddenly decided to terminate Harrell based on her\nmarital status. The company, after all, consistently had granted Harrell leave under\nthe FMLA to care for her husbandβs needs. It was only when Harrell offended Bailey\nby suggesting that he was unlawfully discriminating that the exit strategy was\nbroached. Bailey did question why Harrell told her husband of the companyβs\norganizational changes during the work day on August 5 when she understood that\nthe news would upset him. But this comment was a critique of Harrellβs judgment,\nnot a complaint about her husbandβs situation or actions. The companyβs generic\nacknowledgment that both Harrell and βher familyβ were unhappy with recent events\nis insufficient to show that the company acted against her because of her husbandβs\nsituation rather than Harrellβs conduct and attitude. Even taking the evidence in the\nlight most favorable to Harrell, we do not see a sound basis to conclude that the\ndecision to arrange an βexit strategyβ was motivated by Harrellβs marital status.\n\n * * *\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tracy HARRELL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HANDI MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., Defendant - Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3349\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Tracy Harrell,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Handi Medical Supply, Inc.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Tracy Harrell brought this action against her former employer, Handi Medical\\nSupply, Inc., alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and\\nthe Family Medical and Leave Act (FMLA). The district court1 granted summary\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of Minnesota.\\n\\fjudgment in favor of Handi on all claims. Harrell appeals the dismissal of only two\\nclaims under the MHRA. Without deciding whether the district courtβs rationale was\\ncorrect, we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n As the case was resolved on summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light\\nmost favorable to Harrell. Handi Medical is a medical equipment company located\\nin St. Paul, Minnesota. The company employed Harrell as a Lead Customer Service\\nRepresentative from 2012 until 2015. In 2013, the company approved Harrell for\\nintermittent leave under the FMLA, and she used the leave to support her husband,\\nwho suffers from severe bipolar disorder.\\n\\n On August 5, 2015, Handi Medicalβs management called a meeting to\\nannounce temporary changes to its customer service department. The changes\\nrequired Harrell to accept a demotion in stature by assuming responsibilities of a\\ncustomer service representative.\\n\\n Harrell left the meeting and returned to her desk. She sent an e-mail to her\\nhusband that said, βI really need to talk to you, I am upset.β She then called her\\nhusband; he became angry and threatened to come to the companyβs offices to talk\\nto the chief executive officer about the changes.\\n\\n Harrell became worried about her husband and asked to take FMLA leave for\\nthe afternoon. Human resources director Julie Peterson approved the request. Harrell\\nthen returned to her desk, swung her identification badge around her hand, and threw\\nthe badge in her purse. Co-workers reported that as Harrell prepared to leave, she\\nsaid she βhas had it with this placeβ and cursed loudly within earshot of customers.\\nWhen a co-worker asked Harrell a work-related question, Harrell responded, βYou\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fare going to need to talk to [another manager]. I am done. I got to go. I am done\\nright now.β She then departed.\\n\\n Harrellβs co-workers reported her conduct to human resources director Peterson\\nand the companyβs chief operating officer, Scott Learned. Learned interviewed two\\nmore employees about the incident, and then reported it to chief executive officer\\nMike Bailey. In response, Bailey prepared a written warning for Harrell, saying that\\nthe reported behavior would not be tolerated, and that failure to observe workplace\\nrules would result in further discipline, including termination.\\n\\n On August 11, Bailey summoned Harrell to meet with him and Learned, and\\nBailey issued the written warning. He explained that he was taking the action in\\nresponse to her conduct on August 5, and admonished her that it was unacceptable\\nto curse and complain in front of customers and other employees. Harrell disputed\\nthat she used profanity and refused to sign the document acknowledging the\\ndiscussion. She explained that she left the office frantically on August 5 because she\\nwas worried about her husband. Bailey responded that it always seemed like she had\\nan excuse. Harrell then accused Bailey of using her husbandβs disability against her.\\nBailey asked Harrell why she would tell her husband about the organizational\\nchanges if she knew that the information would upset him.\\n\\n At this point, Peterson and another manager joined the meeting. Bailey\\nallegedly βgot red-faced,β moved his chair toward Harrell, pointed at her, and asked\\nwhether she was accusing him of using her husbandβs disability against her. Harrell\\nresponded that she felt that way because Bailey was accusing her of acting\\nunprofessionally after going home due to FMLA leave. Bailey then told her never to\\naccuse him of discriminating against her because of her husbandβs condition.\\n\\n After more discussion, Bailey decided that if Harrell βtruly felt that way that\\nshe was describing that she would be better off working elsewhere.β According to\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fHarrell, company officials observed that she and her family were unhappy, and said\\nthat βmaybe we shouldβcan find an exit strategy when Scott [Learned] returns.β As\\nHarrell left the meeting, she muttered Handiβs mottoββenriching livesββin a\\ndisparaging way. Upon hearing that remark, Bailey called Harrell back into his office\\nand terminated her employment immediately.\\n\\n Harrell sued Handi Medical, alleging four claims that the company\\ndiscriminated against her in violation of the MHRA and FMLA. The only two claims\\nat issue on this appeal arise under the MHRA. One alleges discrimination against\\nHarrell based on her marital status. Under the MHRA, marital status includes\\nβprotection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or\\nbeliefs of a spouse.β Minn. Stat. Β§ 363A.03, subd. 24. The second claim asserts\\nβreprisalβ against Harrell for opposing an unlawful employment practice. βReprisalβ\\nunder the MHRA includes βintimidation, retaliation, or harassment,β and Harrell\\nalleged that Handi Medical retaliated against her for opposing discrimination based\\non marital status. Id. Β§ 363A.15. Harrell asserts that the companyβs declaration that\\nshe would be subject to an βexit strategyβ was an adverse employment action taken\\nbased on her marital status and her opposition to discrimination based on marital\\nstatus.\\n\\n The district court determined that Harrell had established a prima facie case on\\nthese claims, but rejected her argument that the discussion of an βexit strategyβ was\\nan adverse employment action. The court concluded that the only adverse\\nemployment action was the immediate termination that came in response to Harrellβs\\ncomment about βenriching lives.β With that frame of reference, the court decided that\\nHarrellβs insubordinate remark was a non-discriminatory reason for the termination,\\nand that Harrell failed to present sufficient evidence that the reason was pretextual.\\nThe court thus granted summary judgment in favor of Handi. We review the district\\ncourtβs grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ffavorable to Harrell. Thomas v. Heartland Empβt Servs. LLC, 797 F.3d 527, 529 (8th\\nCir. 2015).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Both of Harrellβs claims under the MHRA require her to establish that the\\ncompany took an adverse employment action against her and that there was a causal\\nconnection between her protected activity or status and the adverse action. See\\nDoucette v. Morrison County, 763 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2014); Hoover v. Norwest\\nPrivate Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn. 2001). One dispute on this\\nappeal concerns when Handi Medical took adverse action against Harrell.\\n\\n Harrell contends that when company officials discussed arranging an βexit\\nstrategyβ for Harrell, the company took an adverse employment action by setting in\\nmotion a process to terminate her employment. The βexit strategyβ discussion\\noccurred before Harrellβs insubordinate remark about the companyβs motto, so her\\nsarcastic reference to βenriching livesβ could not have justified implementing the\\nβexit strategy.β The district court concluded that the discussion of an exit strategy\\nwas not an adverse employment action because βthere was no agreement that an βexit\\nstrategyβ would actually happen or that Harrell would ultimately be terminated.β\\nHarrell disputes this conclusion.\\n\\n We deem it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over the meaning of the βexit\\nstrategyβ discussion. Assuming for purposes of analysis that the company took\\nadverse action against Harrell during the meeting on August 11 when Bailey raised\\nthe βexit strategy,β Handi Medical argues that there are alternative grounds on which\\nto affirm the judgment. We conclude that these other grounds have merit.\\n\\n On the reprisal claim, Harrell must establish that she engaged in protected\\nconduct, and that the company took adverse action against her because of that\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fconduct. A person engages in protected conduct when she βoppose[s] a practice\\nforbiddenβ under the MHRA. But not every complaint about alleged unlawful\\ndiscrimination is protected. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided whether\\nthe complained-of conduct must actually be unlawful for a complaint to constitute\\nprotected βopposition,β but at a minimum, Minnesota requires that the employee have\\na good-faith reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed was a violation of the\\nMHRA. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 81-82 (Minn. 2010).\\n\\n The alleged protected conduct in this case was Harrellβs complaint that Bailey,\\nby issuing the written warning on August 11, was discriminating against her because\\nof her marital statusβnamely, her husbandβs situation. It is undisputed, however,\\nthat Bailey had received reports from company staff that Harrell caused a scene in the\\noffice, made disparaging remarks about the company, and used profanity that could\\nbe overheard by co-workers and customers. Harrell disputes that she cursed in the\\noffice, but there is no dispute that Bailey acted on information from co-workers that\\nshe had done so, and Baileyβs motivation is the relevant fact.\\n\\n That Harrellβs outburst may have been triggered in part by her husbandβs\\nsituation did not support a reasonable belief that Bailey issued the written warning\\nbecause of Harrellβs marital status. Harrell admitted that if the reports to Bailey were\\naccurate, then her conduct would be cause for discipline, and there is no dispute that\\nBailey acted on such reports. After Bailey issued the warning, Harrell did raise her\\nhusbandβs situation as an excuse or explanation for her conduct. But Harrellβs marital\\nstatus did not give her license to engage in unprofessional conduct that would be\\nunacceptable from any other employee, so the companyβs unwillingness to withdraw\\nthe discipline did not supply reasonable grounds to believe that the company was\\ndiscriminating based on marital status. A baseless accusation that an employer\\nviolated the MHRA is not protected opposition under the reprisal statute. We thus\\nconclude that even if Bailey took adverse action against Harrell during the August 11\\nmeeting by raising the βexit strategy,β she cannot show that the action was taken\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fbecause of protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice under the\\nMHRA.\\n\\n In addition to alleging unlawful reprisal, Harrell also claims that Handi Medical\\ndiscriminated against her based on her marital status. To prove this claim, Harrell\\nmust show that the company took an adverse action against her βon the basis of the\\nidentity, situation, actions, or beliefsβ of her spouse. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03, subd.\\n24; see also id. Β§ 363A.08; Doucette, 763 F.3d at 982. Because the record was fully\\ndeveloped on the motion for summary judgment, we consider the ultimate question\\nof discrimination vel non, Otto v. City of Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2012),\\nand we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to proceed on this claim.\\n\\n While Bailey raised the βexit strategyβ after Harrell complained about the\\ncompany using her husbandβs situation against her, the record does not support an\\ninference that the company suddenly decided to terminate Harrell based on her\\nmarital status. The company, after all, consistently had granted Harrell leave under\\nthe FMLA to care for her husbandβs needs. It was only when Harrell offended Bailey\\nby suggesting that he was unlawfully discriminating that the exit strategy was\\nbroached. Bailey did question why Harrell told her husband of the companyβs\\norganizational changes during the work day on August 5 when she understood that\\nthe news would upset him. But this comment was a critique of Harrellβs judgment,\\nnot a complaint about her husbandβs situation or actions. The companyβs generic\\nacknowledgment that both Harrell and βher familyβ were unhappy with recent events\\nis insufficient to show that the company acted against her because of her husbandβs\\nsituation rather than Harrellβs conduct and attitude. Even taking the evidence in the\\nlight most favorable to Harrell, we do not see a sound basis to conclude that the\\ndecision to arrange an βexit strategyβ was motivated by Harrellβs marital status.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1773,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608104,"string":"4,608,104"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jennifer FROST ; Jane Doe, Plaintiffs Kali Myers, Plaintiff - Appellant v. SIOUX CITY, IOWA, City Of; Robert Padmore, in His Official Capacity; Cindy Rarrat, in Her Official Capacity, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Kali Myers v. Sioux City, Iowa, City of"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2138"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2138\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jennifer Frost; Jane Doe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs\\n\\n Kali Myers\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSioux City, Iowa, City of; Robert Padmore, In his official capacity; Cindy Rarrat,\\n In her official capacity\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Kali Myers sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a Sioux City, Iowa\\nordinance banning certain dogs. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of\\nstanding. We affirm.\\n\\n Sioux City adopted an ordinance making it βunlawful for any person to own,\\npossess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport or sell within the City\\nof Sioux City, Iowa, any pit bull.β Sioux City, Ia., Code Β§ 7.10.030 (2009). Myers\\nresided in Sioux City in 2015 and 2016 when the city enforced the pit bull ban against\\nher dogs Tink and Radar.\\n\\n Myers, Jennifer Frost, and βJane Doeβ filed suit alleging that the pit bull ban\\nwas unconstitutional. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Frost and Doe when\\nthey moved outside Sioux City and therefore βno longer reasonably anticipate[d] that\\nthey or their dogs [would] face enforcement under the challenged ordinance.β Myers\\ncontinued as the plaintiff, seeking a declaration that the pit bull ban was facially\\nunconstitutional, an injunction against enforcing the pit bull ban in the future, costs\\nand attorneysβ fees based on 42 U.S.C Β§ 1988, and βall such other and further relief\\nas this Court deems just and proper.β\\n\\n In a deposition, Myers admitted that she does not currently own a dog because\\nshe and her fiancΓ© βwork full timeβ and βdonβt have time right now.β Myers then\\nstated in a declaration that she does not currently reside in Sioux City, Iowa, that she\\nintends to adopt a dog βin the near future,β and that βwhen [she] adopt[s] a dog, [she]\\nwill likely also take it to Sioux Cityβ to visit family, friends, and her veterinarian.\\nBased on these facts, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed all of Myersβs claims\\ndue to lack of standing. We review dismissal on the grounds of standing de novo.\\nWilkinson v. United States, 440 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2006). β[F]actual\\ndeterminations relating to standing must be upheld on appeal unless they are clearly\\nerroneous.β Nor-W. Cable Commcβns Pβship v. City of St. Paul, 924 F.2d 741, 746\\n(8th Cir. 1991).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f βArticle III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to\\ndeciding actual βCasesβ or βControversies.ββ Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,\\n704 (2013). Therefore, βany person invoking the power of a federal court must\\ndemonstrate standing to do so.β Id. Standing must βpersist throughout all stages of\\nlitigation.β Id. at 705. To show standing, Myers must have suffered an injury in fact,\\nmeaning βan invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and\\nparticularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Lujan\\nv. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nThat injury βhas to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.β\\nId. (internal quotation marks omitted). And βit must be likely, as opposed to merely\\nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.β Id. at 561\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Myers βbears the burden of showing that [she]\\nhas standing for each type of relief sought.β See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555\\nU.S. 488, 493 (2009).\\n\\n To the extent that Myers seeks βprospective relief against future conduct of\\ndefendants who caused injury in the pastββthe seizures of Tink and Radarβshe must\\nshow that she faces βa real and immediate threat that she would again suffer similar\\ninjury in the future.β See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). But\\nMyers does not own a dog and does not live in Sioux City. And her intention to\\nadopt a dog βin the near futureβ is uncertain as is her prediction that she will βlikelyβ\\ntake it into Sioux City. In short, the threat of future injury to Myers from the pit bull\\nban is βconjectural or hypotheticalβ and therefore insufficient to confer standing. See\\nCity of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). βSuch βsome dayβ\\nintentionsβwithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any\\nspecification of when the some day will beβdo not support a finding of the βactual\\nor imminentβ injury that our cases require.β Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.\\n\\n Moreover, Myersβs past injuries do not grant her standing because she fails to\\ndemonstrate how her proposed relief redresses them. An injunction is inherently\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fprospective and cannot redress past injuries. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo.,\\n197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999) (βThe mere fact that injurious activity took place\\nin the past does nothing to convey standing to seek injunctive relief against future\\nconstitutional violations.β). Myersβs requested declaratory relief must involve βan\\nadjudication of present right upon established facts.β See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of\\nHartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937). Myers does not show how\\nthe past seizure of Tink and Radar creates a βpresent rightβ let alone how her\\nrequested facial invalidation of the pit bull ban would redress it. βIn a case of this\\nsort, where the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, past injuries alone are\\ninsufficient to establish standing. Rather, [the plaintiff] must show he is suffering an\\nongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of injury.β Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d\\n499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006)\\n(βIn the context of a declaratory judgment action, allegations of past injury alone are\\nnot sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiff must allege and/or demonstrate actual\\npresent harm or a significant possibility of future harm.β (internal quotation marks\\nomitted)).\\n\\n Myers cites Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 595 (8th Cir. 1974), for the\\nproposition that a declaratory judgment alone can redress a past injury. But Schnarr\\nis no longer good law as to standing. We held that a father suffered an injury based\\non the police killing of his son. Schnarr, 502 F.2d at 593. We further held that this\\npast injury could be redressed by a declaration that certain Missouri statutes, which\\nallowed some arrests through deadly means, were unconstitutional. Id. at 595.\\nRegardless of whether the first holding is still good law, the Supreme Court abrogated\\nthe second, holding that the fatherβs past injury could not be redressed by a\\ndeclaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ was at stake. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431\\nU.S. 171, 172-73 (1977). Similarly, the past seizure of Tink and Radar cannot be\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fredressed by a declaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ related to those dogs\\nis at stake.1\\n\\n Myers also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant her an\\nevidentiary hearing prior to ruling sua sponte on standing. We review a district\\ncourtβs failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. 1998 BMW βIβ Convertible Vin No.\\nWBABJ8324WEM 20855, 235 F.3d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 2000) (βAs no statute or rule\\nprescribes a format for evidentiary hearings on jurisdiction, βany rational mode of\\ninquiry will do.ββ); see also United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.\\n2000) (βDefendants also appeal the district courtβs refusal to hold an evidentiary\\nhearing on the issue of standing . . . . We review the district courtβs action for abuse\\nof discretion.β) Myers alleges that βthere were disputed factual issues and witness\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In her reply brief, Myers argues that a declaratory judgment would redress her\\npast harm by opening up avenues of future litigation and encouraging public officials\\nto make policy changes. She also argues that her claim for costs, attorneysβ fees, and\\nβall such other and further relief as this Court deems just and properβ (which Myers\\nnow argues could include βnominal or even unrequested compensatory damagesβ)\\ndemonstrates her standing. βAs a general rule, we will not consider arguments raised\\nfor the first time in a reply brief.β Barham v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 441\\nF.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2006). Even were we to consider these arguments, they do\\nnot establish standing here. βWe do not think that the boilerplate remedies language\\nquoted above, broad and non-specific as it is, comports with the constitutional\\nrequirement of redressability . . . .β United Food & Commercial Workers Intβl Union,\\nLocal 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 50 F.3d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1995), revβd on other\\ngrounds, United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.,\\n517 U.S. 544 (1996). Also, Myers βcannot base standing on a claim for attorneysβ\\nfeesβ alone β[o]therwise the limitation of federal jurisdiction to cases and\\ncontroversies would be empty.β See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662,\\n665 (7th Cir. 2001). Finally, possible future litigation or policy changes are too\\nspeculative to involve βan adjudication of present right upon established facts.β See\\nAetna Life, 300 U.S. at 242.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcredibility determinations to be resolvedβ like in 1998 BMW. But 1998 BMW was not\\na βtypical caseβ and saw βa warring paper record consisting of conflicting affidavit\\nand deposition transcripts.β 1998 BMW, 235 F.3d at 399-400. Here, the record is\\nclear. The district court did not question Myersβs credibility, though it did conclude\\nthat her βargument [was] unconvincingβ as to standing. Myers argues she should\\nhave had the opportunity to provide additional detail about her intention to obtain a\\npit bull. But additional details are not disputed facts. The district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing prior to its sua sponte ruling in\\nthis case.\\n\\n For all these reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385357/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608104/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jennifer FROST ; Jane Doe, Plaintiffs Kali Myers, Plaintiff - Appellant v. SIOUX CITY, IOWA, City Of; Robert Padmore, in His Official Capacity; Cindy Rarrat, in Her Official Capacity, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2138\n ___________________________\n\n Jennifer Frost; Jane Doe\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs\n\n Kali Myers\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\nSioux City, Iowa, City of; Robert Padmore, In his official capacity; Cindy Rarrat,\n In her official capacity\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\n Filed: April 9, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\f Kali Myers sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a Sioux City, Iowa\nordinance banning certain dogs. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of\nstanding. We affirm.\n\n Sioux City adopted an ordinance making it βunlawful for any person to own,\npossess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport or sell within the City\nof Sioux City, Iowa, any pit bull.β Sioux City, Ia., Code Β§ 7.10.030 (2009). Myers\nresided in Sioux City in 2015 and 2016 when the city enforced the pit bull ban against\nher dogs Tink and Radar.\n\n Myers, Jennifer Frost, and βJane Doeβ filed suit alleging that the pit bull ban\nwas unconstitutional. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Frost and Doe when\nthey moved outside Sioux City and therefore βno longer reasonably anticipate[d] that\nthey or their dogs [would] face enforcement under the challenged ordinance.β Myers\ncontinued as the plaintiff, seeking a declaration that the pit bull ban was facially\nunconstitutional, an injunction against enforcing the pit bull ban in the future, costs\nand attorneysβ fees based on 42 U.S.C Β§ 1988, and βall such other and further relief\nas this Court deems just and proper.β\n\n In a deposition, Myers admitted that she does not currently own a dog because\nshe and her fiancΓ© βwork full timeβ and βdonβt have time right now.β Myers then\nstated in a declaration that she does not currently reside in Sioux City, Iowa, that she\nintends to adopt a dog βin the near future,β and that βwhen [she] adopt[s] a dog, [she]\nwill likely also take it to Sioux Cityβ to visit family, friends, and her veterinarian.\nBased on these facts, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed all of Myersβs claims\ndue to lack of standing. We review dismissal on the grounds of standing de novo.\nWilkinson v. United States, 440 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2006). β[F]actual\ndeterminations relating to standing must be upheld on appeal unless they are clearly\nerroneous.β Nor-W. Cable Commcβns Pβship v. City of St. Paul, 924 F.2d 741, 746\n(8th Cir. 1991).\n\n -2-\n\f βArticle III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to\ndeciding actual βCasesβ or βControversies.ββ Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,\n704 (2013). Therefore, βany person invoking the power of a federal court must\ndemonstrate standing to do so.β Id. Standing must βpersist throughout all stages of\nlitigation.β Id. at 705. To show standing, Myers must have suffered an injury in fact,\nmeaning βan invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and\nparticularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Lujan\nv. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThat injury βhas to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.β\nId. (internal quotation marks omitted). And βit must be likely, as opposed to merely\nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.β Id. at 561\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Myers βbears the burden of showing that [she]\nhas standing for each type of relief sought.β See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555\nU.S. 488, 493 (2009).\n\n To the extent that Myers seeks βprospective relief against future conduct of\ndefendants who caused injury in the pastββthe seizures of Tink and Radarβshe must\nshow that she faces βa real and immediate threat that she would again suffer similar\ninjury in the future.β See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). But\nMyers does not own a dog and does not live in Sioux City. And her intention to\nadopt a dog βin the near futureβ is uncertain as is her prediction that she will βlikelyβ\ntake it into Sioux City. In short, the threat of future injury to Myers from the pit bull\nban is βconjectural or hypotheticalβ and therefore insufficient to confer standing. See\nCity of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). βSuch βsome dayβ\nintentionsβwithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any\nspecification of when the some day will beβdo not support a finding of the βactual\nor imminentβ injury that our cases require.β Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.\n\n Moreover, Myersβs past injuries do not grant her standing because she fails to\ndemonstrate how her proposed relief redresses them. An injunction is inherently\n\n -3-\n\fprospective and cannot redress past injuries. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo.,\n197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999) (βThe mere fact that injurious activity took place\nin the past does nothing to convey standing to seek injunctive relief against future\nconstitutional violations.β). Myersβs requested declaratory relief must involve βan\nadjudication of present right upon established facts.β See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of\nHartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937). Myers does not show how\nthe past seizure of Tink and Radar creates a βpresent rightβ let alone how her\nrequested facial invalidation of the pit bull ban would redress it. βIn a case of this\nsort, where the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, past injuries alone are\ninsufficient to establish standing. Rather, [the plaintiff] must show he is suffering an\nongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of injury.β Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d\n499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006)\n(βIn the context of a declaratory judgment action, allegations of past injury alone are\nnot sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiff must allege and/or demonstrate actual\npresent harm or a significant possibility of future harm.β (internal quotation marks\nomitted)).\n\n Myers cites Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 595 (8th Cir. 1974), for the\nproposition that a declaratory judgment alone can redress a past injury. But Schnarr\nis no longer good law as to standing. We held that a father suffered an injury based\non the police killing of his son. Schnarr, 502 F.2d at 593. We further held that this\npast injury could be redressed by a declaration that certain Missouri statutes, which\nallowed some arrests through deadly means, were unconstitutional. Id. at 595.\nRegardless of whether the first holding is still good law, the Supreme Court abrogated\nthe second, holding that the fatherβs past injury could not be redressed by a\ndeclaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ was at stake. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431\nU.S. 171, 172-73 (1977). Similarly, the past seizure of Tink and Radar cannot be\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fredressed by a declaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ related to those dogs\nis at stake.1\n\n Myers also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant her an\nevidentiary hearing prior to ruling sua sponte on standing. We review a district\ncourtβs failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing for abuse of\ndiscretion. See United States v. 1998 BMW βIβ Convertible Vin No.\nWBABJ8324WEM 20855, 235 F.3d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 2000) (βAs no statute or rule\nprescribes a format for evidentiary hearings on jurisdiction, βany rational mode of\ninquiry will do.ββ); see also United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.\n2000) (βDefendants also appeal the district courtβs refusal to hold an evidentiary\nhearing on the issue of standing . . . . We review the district courtβs action for abuse\nof discretion.β) Myers alleges that βthere were disputed factual issues and witness\n\n\n 1\n In her reply brief, Myers argues that a declaratory judgment would redress her\npast harm by opening up avenues of future litigation and encouraging public officials\nto make policy changes. She also argues that her claim for costs, attorneysβ fees, and\nβall such other and further relief as this Court deems just and properβ (which Myers\nnow argues could include βnominal or even unrequested compensatory damagesβ)\ndemonstrates her standing. βAs a general rule, we will not consider arguments raised\nfor the first time in a reply brief.β Barham v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 441\nF.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2006). Even were we to consider these arguments, they do\nnot establish standing here. βWe do not think that the boilerplate remedies language\nquoted above, broad and non-specific as it is, comports with the constitutional\nrequirement of redressability . . . .β United Food & Commercial Workers Intβl Union,\nLocal 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 50 F.3d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1995), revβd on other\ngrounds, United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.,\n517 U.S. 544 (1996). Also, Myers βcannot base standing on a claim for attorneysβ\nfeesβ alone β[o]therwise the limitation of federal jurisdiction to cases and\ncontroversies would be empty.β See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662,\n665 (7th Cir. 2001). Finally, possible future litigation or policy changes are too\nspeculative to involve βan adjudication of present right upon established facts.β See\nAetna Life, 300 U.S. at 242.\n\n -5-\n\fcredibility determinations to be resolvedβ like in 1998 BMW. But 1998 BMW was not\na βtypical caseβ and saw βa warring paper record consisting of conflicting affidavit\nand deposition transcripts.β 1998 BMW, 235 F.3d at 399-400. Here, the record is\nclear. The district court did not question Myersβs credibility, though it did conclude\nthat her βargument [was] unconvincingβ as to standing. Myers argues she should\nhave had the opportunity to provide additional detail about her intention to obtain a\npit bull. But additional details are not disputed facts. The district court did not abuse\nits discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing prior to its sua sponte ruling in\nthis case.\n\n For all these reasons, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jennifer FROST ; Jane Doe, Plaintiffs Kali Myers, Plaintiff - Appellant v. SIOUX CITY, IOWA, City Of; Robert Padmore, in His Official Capacity; Cindy Rarrat, in Her Official Capacity, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2138\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jennifer Frost; Jane Doe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs\\n\\n Kali Myers\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSioux City, Iowa, City of; Robert Padmore, In his official capacity; Cindy Rarrat,\\n In her official capacity\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: April 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Kali Myers sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a Sioux City, Iowa\\nordinance banning certain dogs. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of\\nstanding. We affirm.\\n\\n Sioux City adopted an ordinance making it βunlawful for any person to own,\\npossess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport or sell within the City\\nof Sioux City, Iowa, any pit bull.β Sioux City, Ia., Code Β§ 7.10.030 (2009). Myers\\nresided in Sioux City in 2015 and 2016 when the city enforced the pit bull ban against\\nher dogs Tink and Radar.\\n\\n Myers, Jennifer Frost, and βJane Doeβ filed suit alleging that the pit bull ban\\nwas unconstitutional. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Frost and Doe when\\nthey moved outside Sioux City and therefore βno longer reasonably anticipate[d] that\\nthey or their dogs [would] face enforcement under the challenged ordinance.β Myers\\ncontinued as the plaintiff, seeking a declaration that the pit bull ban was facially\\nunconstitutional, an injunction against enforcing the pit bull ban in the future, costs\\nand attorneysβ fees based on 42 U.S.C Β§ 1988, and βall such other and further relief\\nas this Court deems just and proper.β\\n\\n In a deposition, Myers admitted that she does not currently own a dog because\\nshe and her fiancΓ© βwork full timeβ and βdonβt have time right now.β Myers then\\nstated in a declaration that she does not currently reside in Sioux City, Iowa, that she\\nintends to adopt a dog βin the near future,β and that βwhen [she] adopt[s] a dog, [she]\\nwill likely also take it to Sioux Cityβ to visit family, friends, and her veterinarian.\\nBased on these facts, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed all of Myersβs claims\\ndue to lack of standing. We review dismissal on the grounds of standing de novo.\\nWilkinson v. United States, 440 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2006). β[F]actual\\ndeterminations relating to standing must be upheld on appeal unless they are clearly\\nerroneous.β Nor-W. Cable Commcβns Pβship v. City of St. Paul, 924 F.2d 741, 746\\n(8th Cir. 1991).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f βArticle III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to\\ndeciding actual βCasesβ or βControversies.ββ Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,\\n704 (2013). Therefore, βany person invoking the power of a federal court must\\ndemonstrate standing to do so.β Id. Standing must βpersist throughout all stages of\\nlitigation.β Id. at 705. To show standing, Myers must have suffered an injury in fact,\\nmeaning βan invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and\\nparticularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Lujan\\nv. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nThat injury βhas to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.β\\nId. (internal quotation marks omitted). And βit must be likely, as opposed to merely\\nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.β Id. at 561\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Myers βbears the burden of showing that [she]\\nhas standing for each type of relief sought.β See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555\\nU.S. 488, 493 (2009).\\n\\n To the extent that Myers seeks βprospective relief against future conduct of\\ndefendants who caused injury in the pastββthe seizures of Tink and Radarβshe must\\nshow that she faces βa real and immediate threat that she would again suffer similar\\ninjury in the future.β See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). But\\nMyers does not own a dog and does not live in Sioux City. And her intention to\\nadopt a dog βin the near futureβ is uncertain as is her prediction that she will βlikelyβ\\ntake it into Sioux City. In short, the threat of future injury to Myers from the pit bull\\nban is βconjectural or hypotheticalβ and therefore insufficient to confer standing. See\\nCity of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). βSuch βsome dayβ\\nintentionsβwithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any\\nspecification of when the some day will beβdo not support a finding of the βactual\\nor imminentβ injury that our cases require.β Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.\\n\\n Moreover, Myersβs past injuries do not grant her standing because she fails to\\ndemonstrate how her proposed relief redresses them. An injunction is inherently\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fprospective and cannot redress past injuries. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo.,\\n197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999) (βThe mere fact that injurious activity took place\\nin the past does nothing to convey standing to seek injunctive relief against future\\nconstitutional violations.β). Myersβs requested declaratory relief must involve βan\\nadjudication of present right upon established facts.β See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of\\nHartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937). Myers does not show how\\nthe past seizure of Tink and Radar creates a βpresent rightβ let alone how her\\nrequested facial invalidation of the pit bull ban would redress it. βIn a case of this\\nsort, where the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, past injuries alone are\\ninsufficient to establish standing. Rather, [the plaintiff] must show he is suffering an\\nongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of injury.β Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d\\n499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006)\\n(βIn the context of a declaratory judgment action, allegations of past injury alone are\\nnot sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiff must allege and/or demonstrate actual\\npresent harm or a significant possibility of future harm.β (internal quotation marks\\nomitted)).\\n\\n Myers cites Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 595 (8th Cir. 1974), for the\\nproposition that a declaratory judgment alone can redress a past injury. But Schnarr\\nis no longer good law as to standing. We held that a father suffered an injury based\\non the police killing of his son. Schnarr, 502 F.2d at 593. We further held that this\\npast injury could be redressed by a declaration that certain Missouri statutes, which\\nallowed some arrests through deadly means, were unconstitutional. Id. at 595.\\nRegardless of whether the first holding is still good law, the Supreme Court abrogated\\nthe second, holding that the fatherβs past injury could not be redressed by a\\ndeclaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ was at stake. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431\\nU.S. 171, 172-73 (1977). Similarly, the past seizure of Tink and Radar cannot be\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fredressed by a declaratory judgment because no βpresent rightβ related to those dogs\\nis at stake.1\\n\\n Myers also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant her an\\nevidentiary hearing prior to ruling sua sponte on standing. We review a district\\ncourtβs failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. 1998 BMW βIβ Convertible Vin No.\\nWBABJ8324WEM 20855, 235 F.3d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 2000) (βAs no statute or rule\\nprescribes a format for evidentiary hearings on jurisdiction, βany rational mode of\\ninquiry will do.ββ); see also United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.\\n2000) (βDefendants also appeal the district courtβs refusal to hold an evidentiary\\nhearing on the issue of standing . . . . We review the district courtβs action for abuse\\nof discretion.β) Myers alleges that βthere were disputed factual issues and witness\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In her reply brief, Myers argues that a declaratory judgment would redress her\\npast harm by opening up avenues of future litigation and encouraging public officials\\nto make policy changes. She also argues that her claim for costs, attorneysβ fees, and\\nβall such other and further relief as this Court deems just and properβ (which Myers\\nnow argues could include βnominal or even unrequested compensatory damagesβ)\\ndemonstrates her standing. βAs a general rule, we will not consider arguments raised\\nfor the first time in a reply brief.β Barham v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 441\\nF.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2006). Even were we to consider these arguments, they do\\nnot establish standing here. βWe do not think that the boilerplate remedies language\\nquoted above, broad and non-specific as it is, comports with the constitutional\\nrequirement of redressability . . . .β United Food & Commercial Workers Intβl Union,\\nLocal 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 50 F.3d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1995), revβd on other\\ngrounds, United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.,\\n517 U.S. 544 (1996). Also, Myers βcannot base standing on a claim for attorneysβ\\nfeesβ alone β[o]therwise the limitation of federal jurisdiction to cases and\\ncontroversies would be empty.β See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662,\\n665 (7th Cir. 2001). Finally, possible future litigation or policy changes are too\\nspeculative to involve βan adjudication of present right upon established facts.β See\\nAetna Life, 300 U.S. at 242.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcredibility determinations to be resolvedβ like in 1998 BMW. But 1998 BMW was not\\na βtypical caseβ and saw βa warring paper record consisting of conflicting affidavit\\nand deposition transcripts.β 1998 BMW, 235 F.3d at 399-400. Here, the record is\\nclear. The district court did not question Myersβs credibility, though it did conclude\\nthat her βargument [was] unconvincingβ as to standing. Myers argues she should\\nhave had the opportunity to provide additional detail about her intention to obtain a\\npit bull. But additional details are not disputed facts. The district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing prior to its sua sponte ruling in\\nthis case.\\n\\n For all these reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1774,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608449,"string":"4,608,449"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Alvin Antonio HOUSTON Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Alvin Houston"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1516"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1516\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Alvin Antonio Houston\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\\n Filed: April 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Alvin Antonio Houston pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1\\napplied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\fanother felony and sentenced Houston to thirty-six monthsβ imprisonment. Houston\\nappeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the application of the\\nsentencing guidelinesβ enhancement. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on February 8, 2017, the Davenport Police Department\\ndispatched three officers in response to a neighborhood disturbance call. The\\nDavenport Police Department had recently responded to other neighborhood\\ndisturbance calls and shots-fired calls in the area. The neighborhood to which they\\nwere called was within a 20-block-by-6-block area that accounted for nearly one third\\nof confirmed shots-fired calls for the Davenport Police Department between January\\n2017 and September 2017.\\n\\n When the officers arrived, they spotted Houston with their flashlights. He\\nlooked at them and then ran. One officer commanded him to βwait,β but Houston kept\\nrunning. Another officer observed a black pistol in Houstonβs hand and told the\\nothers. The officers chased Houston to the backyard of his home, drew their weapons,\\nand again commanded him to stop. He eventually complied and was detained. One\\nofficer patted down Houston and felt something metallic in his pants pocket. Unsure\\nwhat it was, the officer reached into the pocket and removed a set of brass knuckles.\\nAt that point, the officers planned to arrest Houston for possession of brass knuckles\\nin violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1), which makes βgo[ing] armed with a\\ndangerous weapon concealed on or about the personβ an aggravated misdemeanor.\\nThe officers then removed other things from Houstonβs pockets such as a βrelatively\\nsmall knife,β a bottle of alcohol, and a cell phone.\\n\\n After Houston was detained and searched, the officers found a black pistol in\\na ravine just beyond the property line of Houstonβs residence. The pistol was the\\nsame size and color as the one the officer had observed in Houstonβs hand. The\\nofficers placed Houston in a patrol car, checked his criminal history, and discovered\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthat he had a prior felony conviction. Houston was indicted for being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm.\\n\\n Houston moved to suppress the pistol as well as the brass knuckles and other\\nitems taken from his pocket, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court denied the motion. Houston pleaded guilty but reserved the right to\\nappeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). At\\nsentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and imposed a four-\\nlevel enhancement because Houston β[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition\\nin connection with another felony offense.β The district court reasoned that Houston\\ncommitted both the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and the qualifying aggravated misdemeanor of carrying\\na dangerous weaponβthe pistolβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1).2\\n\\n II.\\n\\n βOn appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\\ncourtβs factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.β United\\nStates v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 892 (8th Cir. 2015). βWe affirm unless the denial\\nof the motion is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous\\ninterpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was\\nmade.β Id.\\n\\n Houston first contends that he was seized under the Fourth Amendment when\\nan officer commanded him to βwait.β This alleged seizure, he claims, violated the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Commentary to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) defines βanother felony\\noffenseβ as βany federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or firearms\\npossession or trafficking offense, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding\\none year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction\\nobtained.β In Iowa, an aggravated misdemeanor is βanother felony offenseβ because\\nit is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to two years. See Iowa Code\\nΒ§ 903.1(2); United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fFourth Amendment because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of\\ncriminal activity. But it is well established that βpolice pursuit in attempting to seize\\na person does not amount to a βseizureβ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.β United States v. Taylor, 462 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 2006); see also\\nCalifornia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (β[The Fourth Amendment] does\\nnot remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a policeman yelling βStop, in the name of the\\nlaw!β at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.β). Thus, because\\nHouston did not submit when the officer commanded him to βwait,β there was no\\nseizure, and the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629\\n(concluding that a defendant was seized when an officer tackled him after a pursuit,\\nnot when the officer first instructed him to halt); Taylor, 462 F.3d at 1026 (concluding\\nthat a defendant was not seized when he stopped his car and fled from officers on\\nfoot).\\n\\n Houston next argues that the seizure of items from his pockets after he was\\ndetained was unconstitutional. Under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may stop an individual\\nif the officer has reasonable suspicion that βcriminal activity may be afoot.β 392 U.S.\\n1, 30 (1968). A Terry stop is justified when a police officer is βable to point to\\nspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those\\nfacts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.β Id. at 21. βWe determine whether\\nreasonable suspicion exists based on the totality of the circumstances, in light of the\\nofficerβs experience.β United States v. Polite, 910 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Houstonβs flight from the officers in an area known for gun-related crime was\\nsufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Illinois v.\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (concluding that a suspectβs flight upon seeing\\npolice officers while in a high-crime area justified a Terry stop). That the\\nconfrontation occurred in the middle of the night and that one officer previously\\nobserved a pistol in Houstonβs hand further indicate that the officers had a reasonable\\nsuspicion of criminal activity and were justified in stopping Houston. See United\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fStates v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that β[f]actors that may\\nreasonably lead an experienced officer to investigate include time of day or nightβ);\\nUnited States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was\\nreasonable for officers to suspect that a defendant might use a firearm when he was\\nspotted with one in his hand nearby the scene of a recent altercation).\\n\\n After a suspect is lawfully stopped, an officer may conduct a pat-down search\\nfor weapons if that officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is\\narmed and dangerous. United States v. Trogdon, 789 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2015).\\nBecause one officer told the others that he saw Houston holding a pistol, the officers\\nhad a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Houston was armed and dangerous. Thus,\\nthey were entitled to conduct a pat-down search. While conducting the pat-down\\nsearch, one officer felt a hard, metallic object in Houstonβs front pocket and could not\\nrule out the possibility that it was a weapon. The removal of that objectβthe brass\\nknucklesβfrom Houstonβs pocket was therefore lawful. See United States v. Hanlon,\\n401 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a Terry frisk and subsequent retrieval\\nwhen an officer felt a small, hard object in the suspectβs pocket and testified he could\\nnot rule out the possibility it was a weapon).\\n\\n The district court determined that after the discovery of the brass knuckles, the\\nofficers had probable cause to arrest Houston for carrying a dangerous weaponβthe\\nbrass knucklesβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1). Based on this determination, the\\ndistrict court concluded that the seizure of other objects from Houstonβs pockets was\\nlawful as a search incident to arrest. On appeal, Houston claims that whether the brass\\nknuckles are a βdangerous weaponβ under Section 724.4(1) is an issue of fact for the\\ndistrict court to determine. See State v. Eaton, 868 N.W.2d 881(Iowa Ct. App. 2015)\\n(vacating a sentence imposed for violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1) β[b]ecause\\nnothing in the record shows the brass knuckles in question were capable of inflicting\\ndeath on a human beingβ). He seems to argue that because brass knuckles are not per\\nse dangerous weapons under section 724.4(1), the officers did not have probable cause\\nto arrest him for possessing brass knuckles. But the question whether the officers had\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fprobable cause to arrest Houston for possessing a potentially dangerous weapon is\\ndistinct from the question of whether those brass knuckles were sufficiently dangerous\\nto support a conviction under 724.4(1). Moreover, even if the district court erred by\\nfailing to suppress the objects found in Houstonβs pocket, that error was harmless\\nbecause none of those objects related to the crime for which he was ultimately\\nchargedβpossessing the pistol found in the ravine. See United States v. Martinez,\\n462 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (βAn error is harmless if it does not affect\\nsubstantial rights of the defendant, and did not influence or had only a slight influence\\non the verdict.β).\\n\\n Finally, Houston claims that the district court erred by not suppressing the pistol\\nfound in the ravine. The district court determined that Houston lacked standing to\\nchallenge the seizure of the pistol because he abandoned it by leaving it in the ravine.\\nOn appeal, Houston acknowledges that he does not have a protected privacy interest\\nin abandoned property, see United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir.\\n1997), but claims that the ravine constituted curtilage to his home and the officerβs\\nwarrantless search for the pistol was therefore unconstitutional. βIn assessing whether\\na particular area is curtilage, we determine whether the area in question is so\\nintimately tied to the home itself that we should extend the Fourth Amendmentβs\\nprotection to it.β United States v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). The district court found that the ravine was beyond the\\nproperty line of Houstonβs residence and that one officer had to walk into a wooded\\narea past a section of a fence bordering Houstonβs yard to retrieve the pistol. Based\\non these findings, which were not clearly erroneous, the ravine did not constitute\\ncurtilage to Houstonβs home. See United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1071 (8th\\nCir. 2014) (βA person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through\\nthe introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third personβs\\npremises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.β\\n(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978))). Thus, the officerβs search for\\nand ultimate seizure of the pistol did not implicate Houstonβs Fourth Amendment\\nrights, and the district court properly denied Houstonβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n βWe review the district courtβs construction and application of the sentencing\\nguidelines de novo, and we review its factual findings regarding enhancements for\\nclear error.β United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). Houston\\nchallenges the district courtβs application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which\\nprovides that β[i]f the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in\\nconnection with another felony offense . . . increase by 4 levels.β Houston argues that\\nthe qualifying offense of carrying a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section\\n724.4(1) is not βanother felonyβ under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he could\\nnot commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm without also\\ncommitting the Iowa offense. See United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 756 (8th\\nCir. 2005) (considering the application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and explaining that\\nβ[i]t would be unreasonable . . . to allow the βadditional felonyβ to be an offense that\\nthe defendant has to commit, in every case, in order to commit the underlying\\noffenseβ), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Steward, 598\\nF.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2010). But, as Houston concedes, we already considered\\nand rejected his argument with respect to section 724.4(1). See United States v.\\nWalker, 771 F.3d 449, 452-53 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the application of\\nU.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to a defendant whose possession of a firearm violated both\\nIowa Code section 724.4(1) and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g) βdoes not implicate the βdouble\\ncountingβ concerns underlying our decision in Lindquistβ), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 1538\\n(2015). Because Walker controls, we affirm the district courtβs application of the\\nfour-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Houstonβs motion to suppress\\nand the application of the sentencing guidelinesβ enhancement.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385702/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608449/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Alvin Antonio HOUSTON Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1516\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Alvin Antonio Houston\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\n Filed: April 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n Alvin Antonio Houston pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\nfirearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1\napplied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with\n\n 1\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\n\fanother felony and sentenced Houston to thirty-six monthsβ imprisonment. Houston\nappeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the application of the\nsentencing guidelinesβ enhancement. We affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on February 8, 2017, the Davenport Police Department\ndispatched three officers in response to a neighborhood disturbance call. The\nDavenport Police Department had recently responded to other neighborhood\ndisturbance calls and shots-fired calls in the area. The neighborhood to which they\nwere called was within a 20-block-by-6-block area that accounted for nearly one third\nof confirmed shots-fired calls for the Davenport Police Department between January\n2017 and September 2017.\n\n When the officers arrived, they spotted Houston with their flashlights. He\nlooked at them and then ran. One officer commanded him to βwait,β but Houston kept\nrunning. Another officer observed a black pistol in Houstonβs hand and told the\nothers. The officers chased Houston to the backyard of his home, drew their weapons,\nand again commanded him to stop. He eventually complied and was detained. One\nofficer patted down Houston and felt something metallic in his pants pocket. Unsure\nwhat it was, the officer reached into the pocket and removed a set of brass knuckles.\nAt that point, the officers planned to arrest Houston for possession of brass knuckles\nin violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1), which makes βgo[ing] armed with a\ndangerous weapon concealed on or about the personβ an aggravated misdemeanor.\nThe officers then removed other things from Houstonβs pockets such as a βrelatively\nsmall knife,β a bottle of alcohol, and a cell phone.\n\n After Houston was detained and searched, the officers found a black pistol in\na ravine just beyond the property line of Houstonβs residence. The pistol was the\nsame size and color as the one the officer had observed in Houstonβs hand. The\nofficers placed Houston in a patrol car, checked his criminal history, and discovered\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fthat he had a prior felony conviction. Houston was indicted for being a felon in\npossession of a firearm.\n\n Houston moved to suppress the pistol as well as the brass knuckles and other\nitems taken from his pocket, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment. The\ndistrict court denied the motion. Houston pleaded guilty but reserved the right to\nappeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). At\nsentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and imposed a four-\nlevel enhancement because Houston β[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition\nin connection with another felony offense.β The district court reasoned that Houston\ncommitted both the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and the qualifying aggravated misdemeanor of carrying\na dangerous weaponβthe pistolβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1).2\n\n II.\n\n βOn appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\ncourtβs factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.β United\nStates v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 892 (8th Cir. 2015). βWe affirm unless the denial\nof the motion is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous\ninterpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was\nmade.β Id.\n\n Houston first contends that he was seized under the Fourth Amendment when\nan officer commanded him to βwait.β This alleged seizure, he claims, violated the\n\n\n 2\n The Commentary to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) defines βanother felony\noffenseβ as βany federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or firearms\npossession or trafficking offense, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding\none year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction\nobtained.β In Iowa, an aggravated misdemeanor is βanother felony offenseβ because\nit is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to two years. See Iowa Code\nΒ§ 903.1(2); United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2003).\n\n -3-\n\fFourth Amendment because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of\ncriminal activity. But it is well established that βpolice pursuit in attempting to seize\na person does not amount to a βseizureβ within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment.β United States v. Taylor, 462 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 2006); see also\nCalifornia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (β[The Fourth Amendment] does\nnot remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a policeman yelling βStop, in the name of the\nlaw!β at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.β). Thus, because\nHouston did not submit when the officer commanded him to βwait,β there was no\nseizure, and the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629\n(concluding that a defendant was seized when an officer tackled him after a pursuit,\nnot when the officer first instructed him to halt); Taylor, 462 F.3d at 1026 (concluding\nthat a defendant was not seized when he stopped his car and fled from officers on\nfoot).\n\n Houston next argues that the seizure of items from his pockets after he was\ndetained was unconstitutional. Under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may stop an individual\nif the officer has reasonable suspicion that βcriminal activity may be afoot.β 392 U.S.\n1, 30 (1968). A Terry stop is justified when a police officer is βable to point to\nspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those\nfacts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.β Id. at 21. βWe determine whether\nreasonable suspicion exists based on the totality of the circumstances, in light of the\nofficerβs experience.β United States v. Polite, 910 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2018)\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n Houstonβs flight from the officers in an area known for gun-related crime was\nsufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Illinois v.\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (concluding that a suspectβs flight upon seeing\npolice officers while in a high-crime area justified a Terry stop). That the\nconfrontation occurred in the middle of the night and that one officer previously\nobserved a pistol in Houstonβs hand further indicate that the officers had a reasonable\nsuspicion of criminal activity and were justified in stopping Houston. See United\n\n -4-\n\fStates v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that β[f]actors that may\nreasonably lead an experienced officer to investigate include time of day or nightβ);\nUnited States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was\nreasonable for officers to suspect that a defendant might use a firearm when he was\nspotted with one in his hand nearby the scene of a recent altercation).\n\n After a suspect is lawfully stopped, an officer may conduct a pat-down search\nfor weapons if that officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is\narmed and dangerous. United States v. Trogdon, 789 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2015).\nBecause one officer told the others that he saw Houston holding a pistol, the officers\nhad a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Houston was armed and dangerous. Thus,\nthey were entitled to conduct a pat-down search. While conducting the pat-down\nsearch, one officer felt a hard, metallic object in Houstonβs front pocket and could not\nrule out the possibility that it was a weapon. The removal of that objectβthe brass\nknucklesβfrom Houstonβs pocket was therefore lawful. See United States v. Hanlon,\n401 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a Terry frisk and subsequent retrieval\nwhen an officer felt a small, hard object in the suspectβs pocket and testified he could\nnot rule out the possibility it was a weapon).\n\n The district court determined that after the discovery of the brass knuckles, the\nofficers had probable cause to arrest Houston for carrying a dangerous weaponβthe\nbrass knucklesβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1). Based on this determination, the\ndistrict court concluded that the seizure of other objects from Houstonβs pockets was\nlawful as a search incident to arrest. On appeal, Houston claims that whether the brass\nknuckles are a βdangerous weaponβ under Section 724.4(1) is an issue of fact for the\ndistrict court to determine. See State v. Eaton, 868 N.W.2d 881(Iowa Ct. App. 2015)\n(vacating a sentence imposed for violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1) β[b]ecause\nnothing in the record shows the brass knuckles in question were capable of inflicting\ndeath on a human beingβ). He seems to argue that because brass knuckles are not per\nse dangerous weapons under section 724.4(1), the officers did not have probable cause\nto arrest him for possessing brass knuckles. But the question whether the officers had\n\n -5-\n\fprobable cause to arrest Houston for possessing a potentially dangerous weapon is\ndistinct from the question of whether those brass knuckles were sufficiently dangerous\nto support a conviction under 724.4(1). Moreover, even if the district court erred by\nfailing to suppress the objects found in Houstonβs pocket, that error was harmless\nbecause none of those objects related to the crime for which he was ultimately\nchargedβpossessing the pistol found in the ravine. See United States v. Martinez,\n462 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (βAn error is harmless if it does not affect\nsubstantial rights of the defendant, and did not influence or had only a slight influence\non the verdict.β).\n\n Finally, Houston claims that the district court erred by not suppressing the pistol\nfound in the ravine. The district court determined that Houston lacked standing to\nchallenge the seizure of the pistol because he abandoned it by leaving it in the ravine.\nOn appeal, Houston acknowledges that he does not have a protected privacy interest\nin abandoned property, see United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir.\n1997), but claims that the ravine constituted curtilage to his home and the officerβs\nwarrantless search for the pistol was therefore unconstitutional. βIn assessing whether\na particular area is curtilage, we determine whether the area in question is so\nintimately tied to the home itself that we should extend the Fourth Amendmentβs\nprotection to it.β United States v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal\nquotation marks omitted). The district court found that the ravine was beyond the\nproperty line of Houstonβs residence and that one officer had to walk into a wooded\narea past a section of a fence bordering Houstonβs yard to retrieve the pistol. Based\non these findings, which were not clearly erroneous, the ravine did not constitute\ncurtilage to Houstonβs home. See United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1071 (8th\nCir. 2014) (βA person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through\nthe introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third personβs\npremises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.β\n(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978))). Thus, the officerβs search for\nand ultimate seizure of the pistol did not implicate Houstonβs Fourth Amendment\nrights, and the district court properly denied Houstonβs motion to suppress.\n\n -6-\n\f III.\n\n βWe review the district courtβs construction and application of the sentencing\nguidelines de novo, and we review its factual findings regarding enhancements for\nclear error.β United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). Houston\nchallenges the district courtβs application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which\nprovides that β[i]f the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in\nconnection with another felony offense . . . increase by 4 levels.β Houston argues that\nthe qualifying offense of carrying a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section\n724.4(1) is not βanother felonyβ under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he could\nnot commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm without also\ncommitting the Iowa offense. See United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 756 (8th\nCir. 2005) (considering the application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and explaining that\nβ[i]t would be unreasonable . . . to allow the βadditional felonyβ to be an offense that\nthe defendant has to commit, in every case, in order to commit the underlying\noffenseβ), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Steward, 598\nF.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2010). But, as Houston concedes, we already considered\nand rejected his argument with respect to section 724.4(1). See United States v.\nWalker, 771 F.3d 449, 452-53 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the application of\nU.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to a defendant whose possession of a firearm violated both\nIowa Code section 724.4(1) and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g) βdoes not implicate the βdouble\ncountingβ concerns underlying our decision in Lindquistβ), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 1538\n(2015). Because Walker controls, we affirm the district courtβs application of the\nfour-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).\n\n IV.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Houstonβs motion to suppress\nand the application of the sentencing guidelinesβ enhancement.\n\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Alvin Antonio HOUSTON Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1516\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Alvin Antonio Houston\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\\n Filed: April 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Alvin Antonio Houston pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1\\napplied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\fanother felony and sentenced Houston to thirty-six monthsβ imprisonment. Houston\\nappeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the application of the\\nsentencing guidelinesβ enhancement. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on February 8, 2017, the Davenport Police Department\\ndispatched three officers in response to a neighborhood disturbance call. The\\nDavenport Police Department had recently responded to other neighborhood\\ndisturbance calls and shots-fired calls in the area. The neighborhood to which they\\nwere called was within a 20-block-by-6-block area that accounted for nearly one third\\nof confirmed shots-fired calls for the Davenport Police Department between January\\n2017 and September 2017.\\n\\n When the officers arrived, they spotted Houston with their flashlights. He\\nlooked at them and then ran. One officer commanded him to βwait,β but Houston kept\\nrunning. Another officer observed a black pistol in Houstonβs hand and told the\\nothers. The officers chased Houston to the backyard of his home, drew their weapons,\\nand again commanded him to stop. He eventually complied and was detained. One\\nofficer patted down Houston and felt something metallic in his pants pocket. Unsure\\nwhat it was, the officer reached into the pocket and removed a set of brass knuckles.\\nAt that point, the officers planned to arrest Houston for possession of brass knuckles\\nin violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1), which makes βgo[ing] armed with a\\ndangerous weapon concealed on or about the personβ an aggravated misdemeanor.\\nThe officers then removed other things from Houstonβs pockets such as a βrelatively\\nsmall knife,β a bottle of alcohol, and a cell phone.\\n\\n After Houston was detained and searched, the officers found a black pistol in\\na ravine just beyond the property line of Houstonβs residence. The pistol was the\\nsame size and color as the one the officer had observed in Houstonβs hand. The\\nofficers placed Houston in a patrol car, checked his criminal history, and discovered\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthat he had a prior felony conviction. Houston was indicted for being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm.\\n\\n Houston moved to suppress the pistol as well as the brass knuckles and other\\nitems taken from his pocket, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court denied the motion. Houston pleaded guilty but reserved the right to\\nappeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). At\\nsentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and imposed a four-\\nlevel enhancement because Houston β[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition\\nin connection with another felony offense.β The district court reasoned that Houston\\ncommitted both the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and the qualifying aggravated misdemeanor of carrying\\na dangerous weaponβthe pistolβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1).2\\n\\n II.\\n\\n βOn appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\\ncourtβs factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.β United\\nStates v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 892 (8th Cir. 2015). βWe affirm unless the denial\\nof the motion is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous\\ninterpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was\\nmade.β Id.\\n\\n Houston first contends that he was seized under the Fourth Amendment when\\nan officer commanded him to βwait.β This alleged seizure, he claims, violated the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Commentary to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) defines βanother felony\\noffenseβ as βany federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or firearms\\npossession or trafficking offense, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding\\none year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction\\nobtained.β In Iowa, an aggravated misdemeanor is βanother felony offenseβ because\\nit is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to two years. See Iowa Code\\nΒ§ 903.1(2); United States v. Anderson, 339 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fFourth Amendment because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of\\ncriminal activity. But it is well established that βpolice pursuit in attempting to seize\\na person does not amount to a βseizureβ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.β United States v. Taylor, 462 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 2006); see also\\nCalifornia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (β[The Fourth Amendment] does\\nnot remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a policeman yelling βStop, in the name of the\\nlaw!β at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.β). Thus, because\\nHouston did not submit when the officer commanded him to βwait,β there was no\\nseizure, and the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629\\n(concluding that a defendant was seized when an officer tackled him after a pursuit,\\nnot when the officer first instructed him to halt); Taylor, 462 F.3d at 1026 (concluding\\nthat a defendant was not seized when he stopped his car and fled from officers on\\nfoot).\\n\\n Houston next argues that the seizure of items from his pockets after he was\\ndetained was unconstitutional. Under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may stop an individual\\nif the officer has reasonable suspicion that βcriminal activity may be afoot.β 392 U.S.\\n1, 30 (1968). A Terry stop is justified when a police officer is βable to point to\\nspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those\\nfacts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.β Id. at 21. βWe determine whether\\nreasonable suspicion exists based on the totality of the circumstances, in light of the\\nofficerβs experience.β United States v. Polite, 910 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Houstonβs flight from the officers in an area known for gun-related crime was\\nsufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Illinois v.\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (concluding that a suspectβs flight upon seeing\\npolice officers while in a high-crime area justified a Terry stop). That the\\nconfrontation occurred in the middle of the night and that one officer previously\\nobserved a pistol in Houstonβs hand further indicate that the officers had a reasonable\\nsuspicion of criminal activity and were justified in stopping Houston. See United\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fStates v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that β[f]actors that may\\nreasonably lead an experienced officer to investigate include time of day or nightβ);\\nUnited States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was\\nreasonable for officers to suspect that a defendant might use a firearm when he was\\nspotted with one in his hand nearby the scene of a recent altercation).\\n\\n After a suspect is lawfully stopped, an officer may conduct a pat-down search\\nfor weapons if that officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is\\narmed and dangerous. United States v. Trogdon, 789 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2015).\\nBecause one officer told the others that he saw Houston holding a pistol, the officers\\nhad a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Houston was armed and dangerous. Thus,\\nthey were entitled to conduct a pat-down search. While conducting the pat-down\\nsearch, one officer felt a hard, metallic object in Houstonβs front pocket and could not\\nrule out the possibility that it was a weapon. The removal of that objectβthe brass\\nknucklesβfrom Houstonβs pocket was therefore lawful. See United States v. Hanlon,\\n401 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a Terry frisk and subsequent retrieval\\nwhen an officer felt a small, hard object in the suspectβs pocket and testified he could\\nnot rule out the possibility it was a weapon).\\n\\n The district court determined that after the discovery of the brass knuckles, the\\nofficers had probable cause to arrest Houston for carrying a dangerous weaponβthe\\nbrass knucklesβunder Iowa Code section 724.4(1). Based on this determination, the\\ndistrict court concluded that the seizure of other objects from Houstonβs pockets was\\nlawful as a search incident to arrest. On appeal, Houston claims that whether the brass\\nknuckles are a βdangerous weaponβ under Section 724.4(1) is an issue of fact for the\\ndistrict court to determine. See State v. Eaton, 868 N.W.2d 881(Iowa Ct. App. 2015)\\n(vacating a sentence imposed for violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1) β[b]ecause\\nnothing in the record shows the brass knuckles in question were capable of inflicting\\ndeath on a human beingβ). He seems to argue that because brass knuckles are not per\\nse dangerous weapons under section 724.4(1), the officers did not have probable cause\\nto arrest him for possessing brass knuckles. But the question whether the officers had\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fprobable cause to arrest Houston for possessing a potentially dangerous weapon is\\ndistinct from the question of whether those brass knuckles were sufficiently dangerous\\nto support a conviction under 724.4(1). Moreover, even if the district court erred by\\nfailing to suppress the objects found in Houstonβs pocket, that error was harmless\\nbecause none of those objects related to the crime for which he was ultimately\\nchargedβpossessing the pistol found in the ravine. See United States v. Martinez,\\n462 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (βAn error is harmless if it does not affect\\nsubstantial rights of the defendant, and did not influence or had only a slight influence\\non the verdict.β).\\n\\n Finally, Houston claims that the district court erred by not suppressing the pistol\\nfound in the ravine. The district court determined that Houston lacked standing to\\nchallenge the seizure of the pistol because he abandoned it by leaving it in the ravine.\\nOn appeal, Houston acknowledges that he does not have a protected privacy interest\\nin abandoned property, see United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir.\\n1997), but claims that the ravine constituted curtilage to his home and the officerβs\\nwarrantless search for the pistol was therefore unconstitutional. βIn assessing whether\\na particular area is curtilage, we determine whether the area in question is so\\nintimately tied to the home itself that we should extend the Fourth Amendmentβs\\nprotection to it.β United States v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). The district court found that the ravine was beyond the\\nproperty line of Houstonβs residence and that one officer had to walk into a wooded\\narea past a section of a fence bordering Houstonβs yard to retrieve the pistol. Based\\non these findings, which were not clearly erroneous, the ravine did not constitute\\ncurtilage to Houstonβs home. See United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1071 (8th\\nCir. 2014) (βA person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through\\nthe introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third personβs\\npremises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.β\\n(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978))). Thus, the officerβs search for\\nand ultimate seizure of the pistol did not implicate Houstonβs Fourth Amendment\\nrights, and the district court properly denied Houstonβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n βWe review the district courtβs construction and application of the sentencing\\nguidelines de novo, and we review its factual findings regarding enhancements for\\nclear error.β United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). Houston\\nchallenges the district courtβs application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which\\nprovides that β[i]f the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in\\nconnection with another felony offense . . . increase by 4 levels.β Houston argues that\\nthe qualifying offense of carrying a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section\\n724.4(1) is not βanother felonyβ under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he could\\nnot commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm without also\\ncommitting the Iowa offense. See United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 756 (8th\\nCir. 2005) (considering the application of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and explaining that\\nβ[i]t would be unreasonable . . . to allow the βadditional felonyβ to be an offense that\\nthe defendant has to commit, in every case, in order to commit the underlying\\noffenseβ), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Steward, 598\\nF.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2010). But, as Houston concedes, we already considered\\nand rejected his argument with respect to section 724.4(1). See United States v.\\nWalker, 771 F.3d 449, 452-53 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the application of\\nU.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to a defendant whose possession of a firearm violated both\\nIowa Code section 724.4(1) and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g) βdoes not implicate the βdouble\\ncountingβ concerns underlying our decision in Lindquistβ), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 1538\\n(2015). Because Walker controls, we affirm the district courtβs application of the\\nfour-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Houstonβs motion to suppress\\nand the application of the sentencing guidelinesβ enhancement.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1775,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608450,"string":"4,608,450"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., Doing Business as CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GAS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 340, Affiliated With the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp. v. Gas Workers Union"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1322"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Murphy, Colloton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1322\\n ___________________________\\n\\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., doing business as CenterPoint Energy\\n Minnesota Gas,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340, affiliated with the United Association of\\n Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the\\n United States and Canada, AFL-CIO,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MURPHY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.*\\n ____________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n *\\n This opinion is filed by Chief Judge Smith and Judge Colloton under Eighth\\nCircuit Rule 47E.\\n\\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340 appeals the district courtβs order vacating\\nan arbitration award. The award reinstated a union member to his former position\\nwithout back pay after he was discharged by the company. Because the arbitrator was\\nat least arguably construing the contract between the parties in making the award, the\\narbitratorβs decision should not have been vacated, and we therefore reverse the\\njudgment of the district court.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation offers maintenance and repair\\nservices for furnaces, air conditioners, and appliances. Mark Ness was employed by\\nCenterPoint as a service technician. The Union is party to a collective bargaining\\nagreement with CenterPoint, and service technicians like Ness are part of the\\nbargaining unit represented by the Union.\\n\\n Service technicians are assigned to a geographic service area. They use laptops\\nequipped with a global positioning system (GPS) to receive work orders, to record\\nwhen they begin and complete a service call, and to input remarks about the work\\nperformed. Service technicians are required to keep accurate time records.\\n\\n In 2015, a supervisor questioned Ness about alleged discrepancies between\\nNessβs time sheet entries and CenterPointβs GPS records about where Ness was\\nlocated on four separate dates earlier in the year. CenterPoint ultimately terminated\\nNess in September 2015 for falsifying his time sheets and neglect of duty. The Union,\\non behalf of Ness, protested his discharge. After CenterPoint denied the Unionβs\\ngrievance, the Union appealed to arbitration in accordance with the collective\\nbargaining agreement.\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement, entitled βDiscipline and\\nDischarge,β provides:\\n\\n The Company has the right to employ or promote in accordance with the\\n provisions of this Agreement, to enforce discipline, to discharge\\n employees for cause, including failure to recognize authority . . . .\\n Without excluding other causes for discharge, the following shall\\n constitute absolute causes from which there shall be no appeal to\\n negotiation or arbitration between the Company and the Union (except\\n that the question of whether the employee has been guilty of the facts\\n constituting such absolute causes shall be a negotiable controversy)\\n namely:\\n\\n 1. Use of, or being under the influence of, alcohol or non-\\n medical drugs at any time during the work day.\\n 2. Dishonesty\\n 3. Neglect of Duty\\n 4. Abuse of Sick Leave.\\n\\n In the arbitration proceeding, the Union argued that the issue for the arbitrator\\nto decide was whether Ness was discharged for just cause, and if not, what should be\\nthe appropriate remedy. CenterPoint maintained that the first issue for the arbitrator\\nwas whether Ness was discharged for cause. CenterPoint framed this issue in two\\nparts: (a) whether Nessβs conduct on specific dates in 2015 constituted dishonesty or\\nneglect of duty as defined by the βabsolute causeβ provision in Article 26, and (b)\\nalternatively, whether Nessβs conduct constituted βjust causeβ as defined by Article\\n26. As a second issue for the arbitrator, CenterPoint asked what should be the remedy\\nif Ness was not discharged for cause.\\n\\n The arbitrator reviewed the language of the agreement and concluded that even\\nif the employee committed one of the four offenses listed in the βabsolute causeβ\\nprovision of Article 26, he had authority to determine whether the employee was\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fappropriately discharged. The arbitrator then found that although Ness acted\\ndishonestly and neglected his duty on some of the days cited by the company, βthe\\ndischarge penalty imposed on Mr. Ness was arbitrary and discriminatory and must be\\nmodified to comport with the seriousness, length and scope of his misconduct.β The\\narbitrator ordered Ness reinstated without back pay.\\n\\n CenterPoint filed this action in the district court, seeking to vacate the\\narbitratorβs decision to reinstate Ness. The district court concluded that the arbitrator\\nexceeded his authority and vacated the arbitration award. We review the district\\ncourtβs decision de novo. Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn, 729 F.3d 839,\\n841 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Actions to vacate arbitration awards arise under Section 301 of the Labor\\nManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Β§ 185. Courts have a βlimited roleβ in these\\ncases, because interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is a matter for the\\narbitrator. United Paperworkers Intβl Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).\\nβIt is the arbitratorβs construction which was bargained for; and so far as the\\narbitratorβs decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business\\noverruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.β\\nUnited Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).\\nβSo long as the arbitrator βis even arguably construing or applying the contract and\\nacting within the scope of his authority,β the arbitral decision must stand.β NFL\\nPlayers Assβn v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 993 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at\\n38). Even a βserious errorβ by the arbitrator in construing the contract is insufficient\\nreason to set aside the award. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. βOnly when an arbitrator issues\\nan award that does not βdraw its essence from the contract,β because it reflects instead\\nthe arbitratorβs βown notions of industrial justice,β may a court vacate an arbitratorβs\\ndecision.β Alcan Packaging Co., 729 F.3d at 841 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f The arbitrator here began his analysis of the evidence by quoting Article 26, the\\ncontractual provision on discipline and discharge. Based on the companyβs right\\nunder the first sentence of Article 26 to discipline or discharge employees βfor cause,β\\nthe arbitrator concluded that Article 26 βincludes a just cause standard for discipline\\nand discharge.β He then addressed the companyβs position, based on the βabsolute\\ncauseβ language of the second sentence, that he lacked authority to modify the\\ndiscipline if he found that Ness was guilty of dishonesty or neglect of duty at any\\ntime.\\n\\n The arbitrator reasoned that β[i]n reviewing the language of Article 26, it is\\nclear that the Parties did not intend that any employee found to have committed one\\nof the four listed offenses could be summarily discharged without regard to the factors\\narbitrators normally consider in determining whether there was just cause for\\ndischarge.β He believed that β[t]o interpret Article 26 in any other manner would\\nviolate all of the basic notions of fairness and due process firmly established in the\\nhistory of industrial relations and implicit in Article 26, which also includes a just\\ncause standard for discipline and discharge.β The decision concluded that because the\\nparties included a βjust causeβ standard in Article 26, βit seems unreasonable to think\\nthe Union would have agreed to language [that] gives the Company the unfettered\\nright to discharge for any act of neglect of duty, dishonesty, abuse of sick leave, or use\\nof alcohol or non-medical drugs.β\\n\\n The arbitrator expressed concern that βalmost every violation of Company\\npolicy could also be interpreted to constitute an act of neglect of duty or dishonesty.β\\nGiven the breadth of these terms defined as βabsolute cause,β he reasoned that\\naccepting CenterPointβs position would mean that βan employee guilty of almost any\\nviolation of Company policy, no matter how insignificant, could be subjected to\\nsummary discharge without the right to challenge the appropriateness of the penalty\\nbefore an arbitrator.β The arbitrator cited decisions of two other arbitrators who\\ninterpreted βneglect of dutyβ narrowly on a similar rationale.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The primary dispute between the parties on this appeal concerns whether the\\narbitrator acted outside the scope of his authority by βdisregardingβ or βignoringβ the\\nplain language of the contract. To be sure, the parties to a contract may limit the\\ndiscretion of an arbitrator, Misco, 484 U.S. at 41, but one issue in dispute before the\\narbitrator here was whether and to what extent the parties had agreed to limitations.\\nA party who disagrees with an arbitratorβs contractual interpretation can always\\ncharacterize the decision as βignoringβ language that favors that partyβs interpretation,\\nbut erroneous textual analysis is not a sufficient ground to vacate an award. Alcan\\nPackaging Co., 729 F.3d at 843. If the arbitrator attempts to construe the contract, but\\nmakes a serious error, the decision must stand, because the parties bargained for the\\narbitratorβs interpretation. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.\\n\\n To justify vacating the award, CenterPoint must establish that the arbitrator\\nbased his decision on βsome body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is\\noutside the contract.β Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 185\\n(7th Cir. 1985). The arbitratorβs disregard of the contract must be clear: that an\\nopinion includes an βambiguityβ that βpermits the inference that the arbitrator may\\nhave exceeded his authority is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.β Enter.\\nWheel, 363 U.S. at 598 (punctuation omitted).\\n\\n The company seizes on this arbitratorβs reference to βbasic notions of fairness\\nand due process firmly established in the history of industrial relationsβ as evidence\\nof extra-contractual motivation. The arbitrator, however, thought those notions were\\nβimplicit in Article 26,β i.e., part of the contract, and relied on the fact that Article 26\\nalso included a βjust causeβ standard as support for this view. So it is not clear that\\nthe arbitrator acted on his own notions of industrial justice rather than an effort to\\nconstrue the contract. The arbitrator here also relied heavily on the potential breadth\\nof the terms βneglect of dutyβ and βdishonesty,β and the arbitratorβs view that\\naccepting the companyβs position on βabsolute causeβ would effectively negate the\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fjust cause standard derived from the first sentence in Article 26. Right or wrong, this\\nis an interpretation of the contract.\\n\\n CenterPoint maintains that two prior decisions of this court dictate that the\\narbitratorβs award should be vacated. See St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis\\nTheatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Truck Drivers & Helpers\\nUnion Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). Both decisions\\nheld that an arbitrator exceeded his authority, but the reasoning in those cases is\\ndistinguishable. The court in St. Louis Theatrical relied on the fact that the\\narbitratorβs opinion expressly βreflected the arbitratorβs efforts to balance the equities\\nof the situation, rather than to interpret and apply the agreement.β 715 F.2d at 409.\\nIn other words, the arbitrator in that caseβunlike the arbitrator hereβdid not attempt\\nto interpret the contract or arguably apply the contract; he applied his personal view\\nof equity.\\n\\n In Ulry-Talbert, the only issue submitted to the arbitrator was the basis for an\\nemployeeβs discharge. 330 F.3d at 564. But after finding that the employee was\\nguilty of misconduct, the arbitrator went further and concluded that discharge of the\\nemployee was an excessive penalty for the misconduct. Id. This court held that the\\narbitrator exceeded his authority, because the unambiguous agreement between the\\nparties forbade the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the companyβs\\nmanagement on the question of an appropriate penalty. Id. at 564-65. In that case,\\nhowever, there was nothing in the arbitratorβs decision to suggest that he construed\\nthe contract to permit review of the penalty, id. at 563, and nothing in the text of the\\nagreement to suggest an interpretive route to that conclusion. Here, the arbitrator\\nexplained at length why he interpreted the contract to allow for review of the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdiscipline. Even if there was serious error in the analysis, the arbitrator was arguably\\nconstruing the contract.1\\n\\n CenterPoint last suggests that we affirm on an alternative ground that the\\narbitratorβs award nullifies the βabsolute causeβ language of the agreement. This\\ncontention, however, is simply another complaint that the arbitrator misread the\\ncontract. In any event, whether or not the arbitratorβs reading of the contract was\\ncorrect, it did not entirely nullify the absolute cause language. Under the arbitratorβs\\ndecision, the absolute cause provision establishes conduct for which the company has\\nan absolute right to impose discipline, even though it does not give the company\\nunfettered authority to select discharge as the appropriate penalty.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and\\nremand with directions to confirm the arbitration award.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n CenterPoint also relies on Reyco Granning LLC v. International Brotherhood\\nof Teamsters, Local Union No. 245, 735 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2013), but that decision\\nwas vacated, and the case eventually was resolved without precedential effect by an\\nequally divided en banc court.\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385703/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MURPHY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608450/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., Doing Business as CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GAS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 340, Affiliated With the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1322\n ___________________________\n\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., doing business as CenterPoint Energy\n Minnesota Gas,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340, affiliated with the United Association of\n Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the\n United States and Canada, AFL-CIO,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: February 14, 2018\n Filed: April 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MURPHY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.*\n ____________\n\n\n\n\n *\n This opinion is filed by Chief Judge Smith and Judge Colloton under Eighth\nCircuit Rule 47E.\n\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340 appeals the district courtβs order vacating\nan arbitration award. The award reinstated a union member to his former position\nwithout back pay after he was discharged by the company. Because the arbitrator was\nat least arguably construing the contract between the parties in making the award, the\narbitratorβs decision should not have been vacated, and we therefore reverse the\njudgment of the district court.\n\n I.\n\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation offers maintenance and repair\nservices for furnaces, air conditioners, and appliances. Mark Ness was employed by\nCenterPoint as a service technician. The Union is party to a collective bargaining\nagreement with CenterPoint, and service technicians like Ness are part of the\nbargaining unit represented by the Union.\n\n Service technicians are assigned to a geographic service area. They use laptops\nequipped with a global positioning system (GPS) to receive work orders, to record\nwhen they begin and complete a service call, and to input remarks about the work\nperformed. Service technicians are required to keep accurate time records.\n\n In 2015, a supervisor questioned Ness about alleged discrepancies between\nNessβs time sheet entries and CenterPointβs GPS records about where Ness was\nlocated on four separate dates earlier in the year. CenterPoint ultimately terminated\nNess in September 2015 for falsifying his time sheets and neglect of duty. The Union,\non behalf of Ness, protested his discharge. After CenterPoint denied the Unionβs\ngrievance, the Union appealed to arbitration in accordance with the collective\nbargaining agreement.\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f Article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement, entitled βDiscipline and\nDischarge,β provides:\n\n The Company has the right to employ or promote in accordance with the\n provisions of this Agreement, to enforce discipline, to discharge\n employees for cause, including failure to recognize authority . . . .\n Without excluding other causes for discharge, the following shall\n constitute absolute causes from which there shall be no appeal to\n negotiation or arbitration between the Company and the Union (except\n that the question of whether the employee has been guilty of the facts\n constituting such absolute causes shall be a negotiable controversy)\n namely:\n\n 1. Use of, or being under the influence of, alcohol or non-\n medical drugs at any time during the work day.\n 2. Dishonesty\n 3. Neglect of Duty\n 4. Abuse of Sick Leave.\n\n In the arbitration proceeding, the Union argued that the issue for the arbitrator\nto decide was whether Ness was discharged for just cause, and if not, what should be\nthe appropriate remedy. CenterPoint maintained that the first issue for the arbitrator\nwas whether Ness was discharged for cause. CenterPoint framed this issue in two\nparts: (a) whether Nessβs conduct on specific dates in 2015 constituted dishonesty or\nneglect of duty as defined by the βabsolute causeβ provision in Article 26, and (b)\nalternatively, whether Nessβs conduct constituted βjust causeβ as defined by Article\n26. As a second issue for the arbitrator, CenterPoint asked what should be the remedy\nif Ness was not discharged for cause.\n\n The arbitrator reviewed the language of the agreement and concluded that even\nif the employee committed one of the four offenses listed in the βabsolute causeβ\nprovision of Article 26, he had authority to determine whether the employee was\n\n\n -3-\n\fappropriately discharged. The arbitrator then found that although Ness acted\ndishonestly and neglected his duty on some of the days cited by the company, βthe\ndischarge penalty imposed on Mr. Ness was arbitrary and discriminatory and must be\nmodified to comport with the seriousness, length and scope of his misconduct.β The\narbitrator ordered Ness reinstated without back pay.\n\n CenterPoint filed this action in the district court, seeking to vacate the\narbitratorβs decision to reinstate Ness. The district court concluded that the arbitrator\nexceeded his authority and vacated the arbitration award. We review the district\ncourtβs decision de novo. Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn, 729 F.3d 839,\n841 (8th Cir. 2013).\n\n II.\n\n Actions to vacate arbitration awards arise under Section 301 of the Labor\nManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Β§ 185. Courts have a βlimited roleβ in these\ncases, because interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is a matter for the\narbitrator. United Paperworkers Intβl Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).\nβIt is the arbitratorβs construction which was bargained for; and so far as the\narbitratorβs decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business\noverruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.β\nUnited Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).\nβSo long as the arbitrator βis even arguably construing or applying the contract and\nacting within the scope of his authority,β the arbitral decision must stand.β NFL\nPlayers Assβn v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 993 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at\n38). Even a βserious errorβ by the arbitrator in construing the contract is insufficient\nreason to set aside the award. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. βOnly when an arbitrator issues\nan award that does not βdraw its essence from the contract,β because it reflects instead\nthe arbitratorβs βown notions of industrial justice,β may a court vacate an arbitratorβs\ndecision.β Alcan Packaging Co., 729 F.3d at 841 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).\n\n -4-\n\f The arbitrator here began his analysis of the evidence by quoting Article 26, the\ncontractual provision on discipline and discharge. Based on the companyβs right\nunder the first sentence of Article 26 to discipline or discharge employees βfor cause,β\nthe arbitrator concluded that Article 26 βincludes a just cause standard for discipline\nand discharge.β He then addressed the companyβs position, based on the βabsolute\ncauseβ language of the second sentence, that he lacked authority to modify the\ndiscipline if he found that Ness was guilty of dishonesty or neglect of duty at any\ntime.\n\n The arbitrator reasoned that β[i]n reviewing the language of Article 26, it is\nclear that the Parties did not intend that any employee found to have committed one\nof the four listed offenses could be summarily discharged without regard to the factors\narbitrators normally consider in determining whether there was just cause for\ndischarge.β He believed that β[t]o interpret Article 26 in any other manner would\nviolate all of the basic notions of fairness and due process firmly established in the\nhistory of industrial relations and implicit in Article 26, which also includes a just\ncause standard for discipline and discharge.β The decision concluded that because the\nparties included a βjust causeβ standard in Article 26, βit seems unreasonable to think\nthe Union would have agreed to language [that] gives the Company the unfettered\nright to discharge for any act of neglect of duty, dishonesty, abuse of sick leave, or use\nof alcohol or non-medical drugs.β\n\n The arbitrator expressed concern that βalmost every violation of Company\npolicy could also be interpreted to constitute an act of neglect of duty or dishonesty.β\nGiven the breadth of these terms defined as βabsolute cause,β he reasoned that\naccepting CenterPointβs position would mean that βan employee guilty of almost any\nviolation of Company policy, no matter how insignificant, could be subjected to\nsummary discharge without the right to challenge the appropriateness of the penalty\nbefore an arbitrator.β The arbitrator cited decisions of two other arbitrators who\ninterpreted βneglect of dutyβ narrowly on a similar rationale.\n\n -5-\n\f The primary dispute between the parties on this appeal concerns whether the\narbitrator acted outside the scope of his authority by βdisregardingβ or βignoringβ the\nplain language of the contract. To be sure, the parties to a contract may limit the\ndiscretion of an arbitrator, Misco, 484 U.S. at 41, but one issue in dispute before the\narbitrator here was whether and to what extent the parties had agreed to limitations.\nA party who disagrees with an arbitratorβs contractual interpretation can always\ncharacterize the decision as βignoringβ language that favors that partyβs interpretation,\nbut erroneous textual analysis is not a sufficient ground to vacate an award. Alcan\nPackaging Co., 729 F.3d at 843. If the arbitrator attempts to construe the contract, but\nmakes a serious error, the decision must stand, because the parties bargained for the\narbitratorβs interpretation. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.\n\n To justify vacating the award, CenterPoint must establish that the arbitrator\nbased his decision on βsome body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is\noutside the contract.β Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 185\n(7th Cir. 1985). The arbitratorβs disregard of the contract must be clear: that an\nopinion includes an βambiguityβ that βpermits the inference that the arbitrator may\nhave exceeded his authority is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.β Enter.\nWheel, 363 U.S. at 598 (punctuation omitted).\n\n The company seizes on this arbitratorβs reference to βbasic notions of fairness\nand due process firmly established in the history of industrial relationsβ as evidence\nof extra-contractual motivation. The arbitrator, however, thought those notions were\nβimplicit in Article 26,β i.e., part of the contract, and relied on the fact that Article 26\nalso included a βjust causeβ standard as support for this view. So it is not clear that\nthe arbitrator acted on his own notions of industrial justice rather than an effort to\nconstrue the contract. The arbitrator here also relied heavily on the potential breadth\nof the terms βneglect of dutyβ and βdishonesty,β and the arbitratorβs view that\naccepting the companyβs position on βabsolute causeβ would effectively negate the\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fjust cause standard derived from the first sentence in Article 26. Right or wrong, this\nis an interpretation of the contract.\n\n CenterPoint maintains that two prior decisions of this court dictate that the\narbitratorβs award should be vacated. See St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis\nTheatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Truck Drivers & Helpers\nUnion Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). Both decisions\nheld that an arbitrator exceeded his authority, but the reasoning in those cases is\ndistinguishable. The court in St. Louis Theatrical relied on the fact that the\narbitratorβs opinion expressly βreflected the arbitratorβs efforts to balance the equities\nof the situation, rather than to interpret and apply the agreement.β 715 F.2d at 409.\nIn other words, the arbitrator in that caseβunlike the arbitrator hereβdid not attempt\nto interpret the contract or arguably apply the contract; he applied his personal view\nof equity.\n\n In Ulry-Talbert, the only issue submitted to the arbitrator was the basis for an\nemployeeβs discharge. 330 F.3d at 564. But after finding that the employee was\nguilty of misconduct, the arbitrator went further and concluded that discharge of the\nemployee was an excessive penalty for the misconduct. Id. This court held that the\narbitrator exceeded his authority, because the unambiguous agreement between the\nparties forbade the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the companyβs\nmanagement on the question of an appropriate penalty. Id. at 564-65. In that case,\nhowever, there was nothing in the arbitratorβs decision to suggest that he construed\nthe contract to permit review of the penalty, id. at 563, and nothing in the text of the\nagreement to suggest an interpretive route to that conclusion. Here, the arbitrator\nexplained at length why he interpreted the contract to allow for review of the\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fdiscipline. Even if there was serious error in the analysis, the arbitrator was arguably\nconstruing the contract.1\n\n CenterPoint last suggests that we affirm on an alternative ground that the\narbitratorβs award nullifies the βabsolute causeβ language of the agreement. This\ncontention, however, is simply another complaint that the arbitrator misread the\ncontract. In any event, whether or not the arbitratorβs reading of the contract was\ncorrect, it did not entirely nullify the absolute cause language. Under the arbitratorβs\ndecision, the absolute cause provision establishes conduct for which the company has\nan absolute right to impose discipline, even though it does not give the company\nunfettered authority to select discharge as the appropriate penalty.\n\n * * *\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and\nremand with directions to confirm the arbitration award.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 1\n CenterPoint also relies on Reyco Granning LLC v. International Brotherhood\nof Teamsters, Local Union No. 245, 735 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2013), but that decision\nwas vacated, and the case eventually was resolved without precedential effect by an\nequally divided en banc court.\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., Doing Business as CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GAS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 340, Affiliated With the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1322\\n ___________________________\\n\\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., doing business as CenterPoint Energy\\n Minnesota Gas,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340, affiliated with the United Association of\\n Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the\\n United States and Canada, AFL-CIO,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MURPHY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.*\\n ____________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n *\\n This opinion is filed by Chief Judge Smith and Judge Colloton under Eighth\\nCircuit Rule 47E.\\n\\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Gas Workers Union, Local No. 340 appeals the district courtβs order vacating\\nan arbitration award. The award reinstated a union member to his former position\\nwithout back pay after he was discharged by the company. Because the arbitrator was\\nat least arguably construing the contract between the parties in making the award, the\\narbitratorβs decision should not have been vacated, and we therefore reverse the\\njudgment of the district court.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation offers maintenance and repair\\nservices for furnaces, air conditioners, and appliances. Mark Ness was employed by\\nCenterPoint as a service technician. The Union is party to a collective bargaining\\nagreement with CenterPoint, and service technicians like Ness are part of the\\nbargaining unit represented by the Union.\\n\\n Service technicians are assigned to a geographic service area. They use laptops\\nequipped with a global positioning system (GPS) to receive work orders, to record\\nwhen they begin and complete a service call, and to input remarks about the work\\nperformed. Service technicians are required to keep accurate time records.\\n\\n In 2015, a supervisor questioned Ness about alleged discrepancies between\\nNessβs time sheet entries and CenterPointβs GPS records about where Ness was\\nlocated on four separate dates earlier in the year. CenterPoint ultimately terminated\\nNess in September 2015 for falsifying his time sheets and neglect of duty. The Union,\\non behalf of Ness, protested his discharge. After CenterPoint denied the Unionβs\\ngrievance, the Union appealed to arbitration in accordance with the collective\\nbargaining agreement.\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement, entitled βDiscipline and\\nDischarge,β provides:\\n\\n The Company has the right to employ or promote in accordance with the\\n provisions of this Agreement, to enforce discipline, to discharge\\n employees for cause, including failure to recognize authority . . . .\\n Without excluding other causes for discharge, the following shall\\n constitute absolute causes from which there shall be no appeal to\\n negotiation or arbitration between the Company and the Union (except\\n that the question of whether the employee has been guilty of the facts\\n constituting such absolute causes shall be a negotiable controversy)\\n namely:\\n\\n 1. Use of, or being under the influence of, alcohol or non-\\n medical drugs at any time during the work day.\\n 2. Dishonesty\\n 3. Neglect of Duty\\n 4. Abuse of Sick Leave.\\n\\n In the arbitration proceeding, the Union argued that the issue for the arbitrator\\nto decide was whether Ness was discharged for just cause, and if not, what should be\\nthe appropriate remedy. CenterPoint maintained that the first issue for the arbitrator\\nwas whether Ness was discharged for cause. CenterPoint framed this issue in two\\nparts: (a) whether Nessβs conduct on specific dates in 2015 constituted dishonesty or\\nneglect of duty as defined by the βabsolute causeβ provision in Article 26, and (b)\\nalternatively, whether Nessβs conduct constituted βjust causeβ as defined by Article\\n26. As a second issue for the arbitrator, CenterPoint asked what should be the remedy\\nif Ness was not discharged for cause.\\n\\n The arbitrator reviewed the language of the agreement and concluded that even\\nif the employee committed one of the four offenses listed in the βabsolute causeβ\\nprovision of Article 26, he had authority to determine whether the employee was\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fappropriately discharged. The arbitrator then found that although Ness acted\\ndishonestly and neglected his duty on some of the days cited by the company, βthe\\ndischarge penalty imposed on Mr. Ness was arbitrary and discriminatory and must be\\nmodified to comport with the seriousness, length and scope of his misconduct.β The\\narbitrator ordered Ness reinstated without back pay.\\n\\n CenterPoint filed this action in the district court, seeking to vacate the\\narbitratorβs decision to reinstate Ness. The district court concluded that the arbitrator\\nexceeded his authority and vacated the arbitration award. We review the district\\ncourtβs decision de novo. Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn, 729 F.3d 839,\\n841 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Actions to vacate arbitration awards arise under Section 301 of the Labor\\nManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Β§ 185. Courts have a βlimited roleβ in these\\ncases, because interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is a matter for the\\narbitrator. United Paperworkers Intβl Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).\\nβIt is the arbitratorβs construction which was bargained for; and so far as the\\narbitratorβs decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business\\noverruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.β\\nUnited Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).\\nβSo long as the arbitrator βis even arguably construing or applying the contract and\\nacting within the scope of his authority,β the arbitral decision must stand.β NFL\\nPlayers Assβn v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 993 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at\\n38). Even a βserious errorβ by the arbitrator in construing the contract is insufficient\\nreason to set aside the award. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. βOnly when an arbitrator issues\\nan award that does not βdraw its essence from the contract,β because it reflects instead\\nthe arbitratorβs βown notions of industrial justice,β may a court vacate an arbitratorβs\\ndecision.β Alcan Packaging Co., 729 F.3d at 841 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f The arbitrator here began his analysis of the evidence by quoting Article 26, the\\ncontractual provision on discipline and discharge. Based on the companyβs right\\nunder the first sentence of Article 26 to discipline or discharge employees βfor cause,β\\nthe arbitrator concluded that Article 26 βincludes a just cause standard for discipline\\nand discharge.β He then addressed the companyβs position, based on the βabsolute\\ncauseβ language of the second sentence, that he lacked authority to modify the\\ndiscipline if he found that Ness was guilty of dishonesty or neglect of duty at any\\ntime.\\n\\n The arbitrator reasoned that β[i]n reviewing the language of Article 26, it is\\nclear that the Parties did not intend that any employee found to have committed one\\nof the four listed offenses could be summarily discharged without regard to the factors\\narbitrators normally consider in determining whether there was just cause for\\ndischarge.β He believed that β[t]o interpret Article 26 in any other manner would\\nviolate all of the basic notions of fairness and due process firmly established in the\\nhistory of industrial relations and implicit in Article 26, which also includes a just\\ncause standard for discipline and discharge.β The decision concluded that because the\\nparties included a βjust causeβ standard in Article 26, βit seems unreasonable to think\\nthe Union would have agreed to language [that] gives the Company the unfettered\\nright to discharge for any act of neglect of duty, dishonesty, abuse of sick leave, or use\\nof alcohol or non-medical drugs.β\\n\\n The arbitrator expressed concern that βalmost every violation of Company\\npolicy could also be interpreted to constitute an act of neglect of duty or dishonesty.β\\nGiven the breadth of these terms defined as βabsolute cause,β he reasoned that\\naccepting CenterPointβs position would mean that βan employee guilty of almost any\\nviolation of Company policy, no matter how insignificant, could be subjected to\\nsummary discharge without the right to challenge the appropriateness of the penalty\\nbefore an arbitrator.β The arbitrator cited decisions of two other arbitrators who\\ninterpreted βneglect of dutyβ narrowly on a similar rationale.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The primary dispute between the parties on this appeal concerns whether the\\narbitrator acted outside the scope of his authority by βdisregardingβ or βignoringβ the\\nplain language of the contract. To be sure, the parties to a contract may limit the\\ndiscretion of an arbitrator, Misco, 484 U.S. at 41, but one issue in dispute before the\\narbitrator here was whether and to what extent the parties had agreed to limitations.\\nA party who disagrees with an arbitratorβs contractual interpretation can always\\ncharacterize the decision as βignoringβ language that favors that partyβs interpretation,\\nbut erroneous textual analysis is not a sufficient ground to vacate an award. Alcan\\nPackaging Co., 729 F.3d at 843. If the arbitrator attempts to construe the contract, but\\nmakes a serious error, the decision must stand, because the parties bargained for the\\narbitratorβs interpretation. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.\\n\\n To justify vacating the award, CenterPoint must establish that the arbitrator\\nbased his decision on βsome body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is\\noutside the contract.β Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 185\\n(7th Cir. 1985). The arbitratorβs disregard of the contract must be clear: that an\\nopinion includes an βambiguityβ that βpermits the inference that the arbitrator may\\nhave exceeded his authority is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.β Enter.\\nWheel, 363 U.S. at 598 (punctuation omitted).\\n\\n The company seizes on this arbitratorβs reference to βbasic notions of fairness\\nand due process firmly established in the history of industrial relationsβ as evidence\\nof extra-contractual motivation. The arbitrator, however, thought those notions were\\nβimplicit in Article 26,β i.e., part of the contract, and relied on the fact that Article 26\\nalso included a βjust causeβ standard as support for this view. So it is not clear that\\nthe arbitrator acted on his own notions of industrial justice rather than an effort to\\nconstrue the contract. The arbitrator here also relied heavily on the potential breadth\\nof the terms βneglect of dutyβ and βdishonesty,β and the arbitratorβs view that\\naccepting the companyβs position on βabsolute causeβ would effectively negate the\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fjust cause standard derived from the first sentence in Article 26. Right or wrong, this\\nis an interpretation of the contract.\\n\\n CenterPoint maintains that two prior decisions of this court dictate that the\\narbitratorβs award should be vacated. See St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis\\nTheatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Truck Drivers & Helpers\\nUnion Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). Both decisions\\nheld that an arbitrator exceeded his authority, but the reasoning in those cases is\\ndistinguishable. The court in St. Louis Theatrical relied on the fact that the\\narbitratorβs opinion expressly βreflected the arbitratorβs efforts to balance the equities\\nof the situation, rather than to interpret and apply the agreement.β 715 F.2d at 409.\\nIn other words, the arbitrator in that caseβunlike the arbitrator hereβdid not attempt\\nto interpret the contract or arguably apply the contract; he applied his personal view\\nof equity.\\n\\n In Ulry-Talbert, the only issue submitted to the arbitrator was the basis for an\\nemployeeβs discharge. 330 F.3d at 564. But after finding that the employee was\\nguilty of misconduct, the arbitrator went further and concluded that discharge of the\\nemployee was an excessive penalty for the misconduct. Id. This court held that the\\narbitrator exceeded his authority, because the unambiguous agreement between the\\nparties forbade the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the companyβs\\nmanagement on the question of an appropriate penalty. Id. at 564-65. In that case,\\nhowever, there was nothing in the arbitratorβs decision to suggest that he construed\\nthe contract to permit review of the penalty, id. at 563, and nothing in the text of the\\nagreement to suggest an interpretive route to that conclusion. Here, the arbitrator\\nexplained at length why he interpreted the contract to allow for review of the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdiscipline. Even if there was serious error in the analysis, the arbitrator was arguably\\nconstruing the contract.1\\n\\n CenterPoint last suggests that we affirm on an alternative ground that the\\narbitratorβs award nullifies the βabsolute causeβ language of the agreement. This\\ncontention, however, is simply another complaint that the arbitrator misread the\\ncontract. In any event, whether or not the arbitratorβs reading of the contract was\\ncorrect, it did not entirely nullify the absolute cause language. Under the arbitratorβs\\ndecision, the absolute cause provision establishes conduct for which the company has\\nan absolute right to impose discipline, even though it does not give the company\\nunfettered authority to select discharge as the appropriate penalty.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and\\nremand with directions to confirm the arbitration award.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n CenterPoint also relies on Reyco Granning LLC v. International Brotherhood\\nof Teamsters, Local Union No. 245, 735 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2013), but that decision\\nwas vacated, and the case eventually was resolved without precedential effect by an\\nequally divided en banc court.\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1776,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609050,"string":"4,609,050"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ryan John REIF, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Ryan Reif"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3729"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3729\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Ryan John Reif,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Ryan Reif distributed heroin to a nineteen-year-old woman, his girlfriend, who\\ningested the drug and died as a result. Reif pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin\\nto a person under the age of twenty-one. The offense carried a statutory penalty of\\none to forty yearsβ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 859, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). In\\n\\fthe plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss a more serious charge of\\ndistribution of heroin resulting in death. See id. Β§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).\\n\\n The advisory sentencing guideline range for Reifβs offense of conviction was\\n15-21 monthsβ imprisonment. The government moved for an upward departure under\\nthe guidelines and an upward variance from the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a),\\non the ground that Reifβs offense resulted in death. The district court1 observed that\\nReif had trafficked not only heroin, but also other drugs, and βbasically had a\\npharmacyβ from which he was βmaking available to others controlled substances.β\\nThe court explained that the offense of conviction was βan extremely serious crimeβ\\nthat required βa serious consequence,β that the guideline range did not take into\\naccount the victimβs death, and that Reifβs offense was βakin to an involuntary\\nmanslaughter case.β The court ultimately sentenced Reif to 96 monthsβ\\nimprisonment, concluding that it would reach βexactly the same sentenceβ under\\neither a guidelines departure or a variance from the guidelines.\\n\\n Reif appeals and contends that the district court abused its discretion in\\nfashioning the sentence. He does not challenge the district courtβs decision to\\nsentence above the advisory range, but he argues that the court failed to provide\\nadequate reasons for choosing a term of 96 months. We conclude that the sentence\\nis permissible as a departure under the guidelines and that it is not unreasonable with\\nregard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a).\\n\\n Under the guidelines, the court may depart upward if death resulted from the\\noffense of conviction, USSG Β§ 5K2.1, and to reflect the actual seriousness of the\\noffense based on conduct underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement,\\nid. Β§ 5K2.21. Both policy statements apply here, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of South Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdiscretion in selecting a 75-month upward departure. The policy statement on death\\nadvises the court to βgive consideration to matters that would normally distinguish\\namong levels of homicide.β Id. Β§ 5K2.1. Here, the district court found Reifβs conduct\\nmost akin to involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to the maximum\\npunishment available under the federal involuntary manslaughter statute. See 18\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1112(b). In considering the dismissed charge of drug distribution resulting\\nin death, the court recognized that the statutory minimum sentence for that offense\\nwould have been twenty yearsβ imprisonment, and that the advisory range of 15-21\\nmonthsβ imprisonment under-represented the actual seriousness of Reifβs offense\\nconduct. In arriving at an upward departure of 75 months, and a total guideline\\nsentence of 96 monthsβ imprisonment, the court thus considered the relevant factors\\nunder the applicable policy statements and fashioned a sentence that bore a\\nreasonable relationship to those factors. There was no abuse of discretion.\\n\\n Reif also argues that the sentence is unreasonable with regard to 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 3553(a). We review reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion\\nstandard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and because Reifβs sentence\\nwas consistent with the advisory guidelines (after a permissible guidelines departure),\\nwe presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Brave Bull, 828 F.3d 735, 741\\n(8th Cir. 2016). Reifβs principal complaint is that the district court here fixed a longer\\nterm of imprisonment than did the sentencing court in United States v. Nossan, 647\\nF.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2011), where a defendant who distributed heroin resulting in a\\ndeath was sentenced to 60 monthsβ imprisonment. Id. at 825. That a 60-month term\\nwas reasonable in Nossan, however, does not mean that 60 months is the only\\nreasonable term of imprisonment for a defendant whose distribution of heroin results\\nin death. District judges are permitted to sentence within a range of reasonableness,\\nand they are not required to conform to decisions of other sentencing judges in cases\\ninvolving allegedly similar offenders. When different judges arrive at different\\nreasonable sentences for similar offenders, there is no principled basis for an\\nappellate court to say that only one of the sentences is appropriate. See United States\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fv. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In this case, the district\\ncourt noted Reifβs youth and acknowledged the hardship of addiction during\\nadolescence, but reasonably concluded that other factors such as the seriousness of\\nthe offense and the need for deterrence warranted a longer sentence than what Reif\\nproposed.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386303/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609050/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ryan John REIF, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3729\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n Ryan John Reif,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Ryan Reif distributed heroin to a nineteen-year-old woman, his girlfriend, who\ningested the drug and died as a result. Reif pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin\nto a person under the age of twenty-one. The offense carried a statutory penalty of\none to forty yearsβ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 859, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). In\n\fthe plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss a more serious charge of\ndistribution of heroin resulting in death. See id. Β§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).\n\n The advisory sentencing guideline range for Reifβs offense of conviction was\n15-21 monthsβ imprisonment. The government moved for an upward departure under\nthe guidelines and an upward variance from the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a),\non the ground that Reifβs offense resulted in death. The district court1 observed that\nReif had trafficked not only heroin, but also other drugs, and βbasically had a\npharmacyβ from which he was βmaking available to others controlled substances.β\nThe court explained that the offense of conviction was βan extremely serious crimeβ\nthat required βa serious consequence,β that the guideline range did not take into\naccount the victimβs death, and that Reifβs offense was βakin to an involuntary\nmanslaughter case.β The court ultimately sentenced Reif to 96 monthsβ\nimprisonment, concluding that it would reach βexactly the same sentenceβ under\neither a guidelines departure or a variance from the guidelines.\n\n Reif appeals and contends that the district court abused its discretion in\nfashioning the sentence. He does not challenge the district courtβs decision to\nsentence above the advisory range, but he argues that the court failed to provide\nadequate reasons for choosing a term of 96 months. We conclude that the sentence\nis permissible as a departure under the guidelines and that it is not unreasonable with\nregard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a).\n\n Under the guidelines, the court may depart upward if death resulted from the\noffense of conviction, USSG Β§ 5K2.1, and to reflect the actual seriousness of the\noffense based on conduct underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement,\nid. Β§ 5K2.21. Both policy statements apply here, and the court did not abuse its\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe District of South Dakota.\n\n -2-\n\fdiscretion in selecting a 75-month upward departure. The policy statement on death\nadvises the court to βgive consideration to matters that would normally distinguish\namong levels of homicide.β Id. Β§ 5K2.1. Here, the district court found Reifβs conduct\nmost akin to involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to the maximum\npunishment available under the federal involuntary manslaughter statute. See 18\nU.S.C. Β§ 1112(b). In considering the dismissed charge of drug distribution resulting\nin death, the court recognized that the statutory minimum sentence for that offense\nwould have been twenty yearsβ imprisonment, and that the advisory range of 15-21\nmonthsβ imprisonment under-represented the actual seriousness of Reifβs offense\nconduct. In arriving at an upward departure of 75 months, and a total guideline\nsentence of 96 monthsβ imprisonment, the court thus considered the relevant factors\nunder the applicable policy statements and fashioned a sentence that bore a\nreasonable relationship to those factors. There was no abuse of discretion.\n\n Reif also argues that the sentence is unreasonable with regard to 18 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 3553(a). We review reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion\nstandard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and because Reifβs sentence\nwas consistent with the advisory guidelines (after a permissible guidelines departure),\nwe presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Brave Bull, 828 F.3d 735, 741\n(8th Cir. 2016). Reifβs principal complaint is that the district court here fixed a longer\nterm of imprisonment than did the sentencing court in United States v. Nossan, 647\nF.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2011), where a defendant who distributed heroin resulting in a\ndeath was sentenced to 60 monthsβ imprisonment. Id. at 825. That a 60-month term\nwas reasonable in Nossan, however, does not mean that 60 months is the only\nreasonable term of imprisonment for a defendant whose distribution of heroin results\nin death. District judges are permitted to sentence within a range of reasonableness,\nand they are not required to conform to decisions of other sentencing judges in cases\ninvolving allegedly similar offenders. When different judges arrive at different\nreasonable sentences for similar offenders, there is no principled basis for an\nappellate court to say that only one of the sentences is appropriate. See United States\n\n -3-\n\fv. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In this case, the district\ncourt noted Reifβs youth and acknowledged the hardship of addiction during\nadolescence, but reasonably concluded that other factors such as the seriousness of\nthe offense and the need for deterrence warranted a longer sentence than what Reif\nproposed.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ryan John REIF, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3729\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Ryan John Reif,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Ryan Reif distributed heroin to a nineteen-year-old woman, his girlfriend, who\\ningested the drug and died as a result. Reif pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin\\nto a person under the age of twenty-one. The offense carried a statutory penalty of\\none to forty yearsβ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 859, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). In\\n\\fthe plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss a more serious charge of\\ndistribution of heroin resulting in death. See id. Β§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).\\n\\n The advisory sentencing guideline range for Reifβs offense of conviction was\\n15-21 monthsβ imprisonment. The government moved for an upward departure under\\nthe guidelines and an upward variance from the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a),\\non the ground that Reifβs offense resulted in death. The district court1 observed that\\nReif had trafficked not only heroin, but also other drugs, and βbasically had a\\npharmacyβ from which he was βmaking available to others controlled substances.β\\nThe court explained that the offense of conviction was βan extremely serious crimeβ\\nthat required βa serious consequence,β that the guideline range did not take into\\naccount the victimβs death, and that Reifβs offense was βakin to an involuntary\\nmanslaughter case.β The court ultimately sentenced Reif to 96 monthsβ\\nimprisonment, concluding that it would reach βexactly the same sentenceβ under\\neither a guidelines departure or a variance from the guidelines.\\n\\n Reif appeals and contends that the district court abused its discretion in\\nfashioning the sentence. He does not challenge the district courtβs decision to\\nsentence above the advisory range, but he argues that the court failed to provide\\nadequate reasons for choosing a term of 96 months. We conclude that the sentence\\nis permissible as a departure under the guidelines and that it is not unreasonable with\\nregard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a).\\n\\n Under the guidelines, the court may depart upward if death resulted from the\\noffense of conviction, USSG Β§ 5K2.1, and to reflect the actual seriousness of the\\noffense based on conduct underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement,\\nid. Β§ 5K2.21. Both policy statements apply here, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of South Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdiscretion in selecting a 75-month upward departure. The policy statement on death\\nadvises the court to βgive consideration to matters that would normally distinguish\\namong levels of homicide.β Id. Β§ 5K2.1. Here, the district court found Reifβs conduct\\nmost akin to involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to the maximum\\npunishment available under the federal involuntary manslaughter statute. See 18\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1112(b). In considering the dismissed charge of drug distribution resulting\\nin death, the court recognized that the statutory minimum sentence for that offense\\nwould have been twenty yearsβ imprisonment, and that the advisory range of 15-21\\nmonthsβ imprisonment under-represented the actual seriousness of Reifβs offense\\nconduct. In arriving at an upward departure of 75 months, and a total guideline\\nsentence of 96 monthsβ imprisonment, the court thus considered the relevant factors\\nunder the applicable policy statements and fashioned a sentence that bore a\\nreasonable relationship to those factors. There was no abuse of discretion.\\n\\n Reif also argues that the sentence is unreasonable with regard to 18 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 3553(a). We review reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion\\nstandard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and because Reifβs sentence\\nwas consistent with the advisory guidelines (after a permissible guidelines departure),\\nwe presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Brave Bull, 828 F.3d 735, 741\\n(8th Cir. 2016). Reifβs principal complaint is that the district court here fixed a longer\\nterm of imprisonment than did the sentencing court in United States v. Nossan, 647\\nF.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2011), where a defendant who distributed heroin resulting in a\\ndeath was sentenced to 60 monthsβ imprisonment. Id. at 825. That a 60-month term\\nwas reasonable in Nossan, however, does not mean that 60 months is the only\\nreasonable term of imprisonment for a defendant whose distribution of heroin results\\nin death. District judges are permitted to sentence within a range of reasonableness,\\nand they are not required to conform to decisions of other sentencing judges in cases\\ninvolving allegedly similar offenders. When different judges arrive at different\\nreasonable sentences for similar offenders, there is no principled basis for an\\nappellate court to say that only one of the sentences is appropriate. See United States\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fv. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In this case, the district\\ncourt noted Reifβs youth and acknowledged the hardship of addiction during\\nadolescence, but reasonably concluded that other factors such as the seriousness of\\nthe offense and the need for deterrence warranted a longer sentence than what Reif\\nproposed.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1777,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609051,"string":"4,609,051"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lonnie Dale SPOTTED BEAR Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1008"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1008\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n A jury found Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear guilty of four counts of sexual abuse\\ninvolving three young female relatives. On appeal, he challenges the district courtβs 1\\ndecision to allow the government to play video recordings of their forensic\\ninterviews for the jury. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of North Dakota.\\n\\f N.H.E., S.H., and M.S. accused Spotted Bear of molesting them at his home.\\nAs part of the investigation into their accusations, a specially trained social worker\\nconducted a videotaped interview with each victim. After the investigation\\nconcluded, the government charged Spotted Bear with two counts of aggravated\\nsexual abuse of a child under 12, one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of\\na child under 12, and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child under 12. See\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5).\\n\\n Spotted Bearβs defense was that the three girls fabricated the allegations due\\nto an unrelated family disagreement and then embellished them in response to\\npressure and coaxing by investigators. During Spotted Bearβs trial, all three girls\\ntestified and described the abuse. To respond to the fabrication defense, the\\ngovernment played a portion of each girlβs forensic interview for the jury. Their\\nresponses during the interviews were generally consistent with their answers at trial.\\n\\n Spotted Bear never objected at trial to the portions of the recordings that the\\ngovernment played for the jury. Only now, on appeal, does he claim that they were\\ninadmissible because they contained hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. In the absence\\nof an objection, we review only for plain error, which requires Spotted Bear to show\\nthat the district court made a βclear or obviousβ error that affected his substantial\\nrights and that the error βseriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public\\nreputation of judicial proceedings.β United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082,\\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).\\n\\n We analyze N.H.E.βs interview first, because the circumstances leading to its\\nadmission are different than for the other recordings. From the outset, Spotted\\nBearβs theory was that N.H.E.βs trial testimony was an embellished version of what\\nshe had said during her forensic interview, which itself embellished upon her\\noriginal allegations. In his opening statement, for example, Spotted Bearβs counsel\\nclaimed that investigators encouraged N.H.E. βto say more stuff.β And later, while\\ncross-examining N.H.E., Spotted Bearβs counsel asked whether she had βadded\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fsome more things that [she] didnβt tell [the forensic interviewer].β He followed up\\nby inquiring whether, during the forensic interview, she had βadded to [her] story.β\\nN.H.E. answered yes to both questions but did not explain what she added. This line\\nof questioning, especially in light of Spotted Bearβs theory of witness manipulation,\\ncould have left the jury with the mistaken impression that N.H.E. had significantly\\nchanged her story.\\n\\n When a criminal defendant creates a false or misleading impression on an\\nissue, we have held the government may βclarify, rebut, or complete [the] issueβ\\nwith what would βotherwise [be] inadmissible evidence, including hearsay\\nstatements.β United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). The\\ngovernment played the recording to allow the jury to judge for itself whether N.H.E.\\nhad in fact changed her story since her forensic interview. Cf. United States v. Smith,\\n591 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant opened the door to the\\nplaying of a recording of a child-sex-abuse victimβs forensic interview by asking the\\ninterviewer about alleged inconsistencies between the victimβs trial testimony and\\nher interview). Having opened the door to this evidence, Spotted Bear cannot now\\ncomplain about its admission. 2 Accordingly, the district court did not err, much less\\nplainly err, when it allowed the government to play the recording of N.H.E.βs\\nforensic interview for the jury. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 801; United States v.\\nWomochil, 778 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1985).\\n\\n The remaining two recordings call for a different analysis because Spotted\\nBearβs counsel did not open the door to their admission through his questioning of\\nS.H. or M.S. Still, Spotted Bear failed to object to either recording, so he must\\n\\n\\n 2\\n After the government played part of N.H.E.βs interview for the jury, Spotted\\nBear asked the court to play an additional segment that he believed was particularly\\nfavorable to his defense. To the extent he now complains about the hearsay evidence\\nhe introduced, he invited the error and cannot challenge it. See United States v.\\nJewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Balfany, 965\\nF.2d 575, 583 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant cannot object to evidence\\nthat he directly βelicitedβ).\\n -3-\\n\\fsatisfy the plain-error test to receive any relief. For two reasons, he has not met his\\nburden of showing that the recordings affected his substantial rights. See United\\nStates v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (stating that courts must\\nβdemand[] strenuous exertionβ from defendants before granting relief on plain-error\\nreview).\\n\\n First, the recordings were largely βcumulative of other government evidence.β\\nUnited States v. Worman, 622 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir. 2010). S.H.βs sister, for\\nexample, testified at length about S.H.βs abuse, and N.H.E. separately told the jury\\nthat S.H. had confided in her about the abuse, even before either girl had told her\\nparents. The jury also learned about the specifics of M.S.βs abuse from two sources\\nother than the recording: M.S.βs own trial testimony as well as the testimony of her\\nmother. Her motherβs testimony, in particular, echoed M.S.βs forensic interview,\\nincluding the crucial fact that Spotted Bear molested her at his home on\\nThanksgiving. To be sure, some of this other evidence may also have been hearsay,\\nbut the fact that Spotted Bear does not challenge it means that we can consider it in\\nevaluating whether he was prejudiced. See United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882,\\n895 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Second, the evidence of Spotted Bearβs guilt was strong overall. See United\\nStates v. Gayekpar, 678 F.3d 629, 638 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v.\\nRamos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (βEspecially [when] there is\\nstrong evidence of guilt, some improper repetition of testimony . . . in a generalized\\neffort to bolster the witness[] matters little.β (brackets, internal quotation marks and\\ncitation omitted)). Specifically, the jury heard that Spotted Bear engaged in a\\nlengthy pattern of sexual abuse, that all three of his victims were female relatives\\nunder the age of 12, and that he molested them in a similar fashion. Cf. United States\\nv. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that βevidence\\nthat the defendant committed similar sexual assaults or child molestationsβ can be\\nused to prove guilt). In the end, the recordings were just βan extra helpingβ of what\\nthe jury had already heard and βadded nothing of substance to the governmentβs\\ncase.β Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d at 803β04 (citation omitted).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386304/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609051/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lonnie Dale SPOTTED BEAR Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1008\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n A jury found Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear guilty of four counts of sexual abuse\ninvolving three young female relatives. On appeal, he challenges the district courtβs 1\ndecision to allow the government to play video recordings of their forensic\ninterviews for the jury. We affirm.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the District of North Dakota.\n\f N.H.E., S.H., and M.S. accused Spotted Bear of molesting them at his home.\nAs part of the investigation into their accusations, a specially trained social worker\nconducted a videotaped interview with each victim. After the investigation\nconcluded, the government charged Spotted Bear with two counts of aggravated\nsexual abuse of a child under 12, one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of\na child under 12, and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child under 12. See\n18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5).\n\n Spotted Bearβs defense was that the three girls fabricated the allegations due\nto an unrelated family disagreement and then embellished them in response to\npressure and coaxing by investigators. During Spotted Bearβs trial, all three girls\ntestified and described the abuse. To respond to the fabrication defense, the\ngovernment played a portion of each girlβs forensic interview for the jury. Their\nresponses during the interviews were generally consistent with their answers at trial.\n\n Spotted Bear never objected at trial to the portions of the recordings that the\ngovernment played for the jury. Only now, on appeal, does he claim that they were\ninadmissible because they contained hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. In the absence\nof an objection, we review only for plain error, which requires Spotted Bear to show\nthat the district court made a βclear or obviousβ error that affected his substantial\nrights and that the error βseriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public\nreputation of judicial proceedings.β United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082,\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).\n\n We analyze N.H.E.βs interview first, because the circumstances leading to its\nadmission are different than for the other recordings. From the outset, Spotted\nBearβs theory was that N.H.E.βs trial testimony was an embellished version of what\nshe had said during her forensic interview, which itself embellished upon her\noriginal allegations. In his opening statement, for example, Spotted Bearβs counsel\nclaimed that investigators encouraged N.H.E. βto say more stuff.β And later, while\ncross-examining N.H.E., Spotted Bearβs counsel asked whether she had βadded\n\n -2-\n\fsome more things that [she] didnβt tell [the forensic interviewer].β He followed up\nby inquiring whether, during the forensic interview, she had βadded to [her] story.β\nN.H.E. answered yes to both questions but did not explain what she added. This line\nof questioning, especially in light of Spotted Bearβs theory of witness manipulation,\ncould have left the jury with the mistaken impression that N.H.E. had significantly\nchanged her story.\n\n When a criminal defendant creates a false or misleading impression on an\nissue, we have held the government may βclarify, rebut, or complete [the] issueβ\nwith what would βotherwise [be] inadmissible evidence, including hearsay\nstatements.β United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). The\ngovernment played the recording to allow the jury to judge for itself whether N.H.E.\nhad in fact changed her story since her forensic interview. Cf. United States v. Smith,\n591 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant opened the door to the\nplaying of a recording of a child-sex-abuse victimβs forensic interview by asking the\ninterviewer about alleged inconsistencies between the victimβs trial testimony and\nher interview). Having opened the door to this evidence, Spotted Bear cannot now\ncomplain about its admission. 2 Accordingly, the district court did not err, much less\nplainly err, when it allowed the government to play the recording of N.H.E.βs\nforensic interview for the jury. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 801; United States v.\nWomochil, 778 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1985).\n\n The remaining two recordings call for a different analysis because Spotted\nBearβs counsel did not open the door to their admission through his questioning of\nS.H. or M.S. Still, Spotted Bear failed to object to either recording, so he must\n\n\n 2\n After the government played part of N.H.E.βs interview for the jury, Spotted\nBear asked the court to play an additional segment that he believed was particularly\nfavorable to his defense. To the extent he now complains about the hearsay evidence\nhe introduced, he invited the error and cannot challenge it. See United States v.\nJewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Balfany, 965\nF.2d 575, 583 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant cannot object to evidence\nthat he directly βelicitedβ).\n -3-\n\fsatisfy the plain-error test to receive any relief. For two reasons, he has not met his\nburden of showing that the recordings affected his substantial rights. See United\nStates v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (stating that courts must\nβdemand[] strenuous exertionβ from defendants before granting relief on plain-error\nreview).\n\n First, the recordings were largely βcumulative of other government evidence.β\nUnited States v. Worman, 622 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir. 2010). S.H.βs sister, for\nexample, testified at length about S.H.βs abuse, and N.H.E. separately told the jury\nthat S.H. had confided in her about the abuse, even before either girl had told her\nparents. The jury also learned about the specifics of M.S.βs abuse from two sources\nother than the recording: M.S.βs own trial testimony as well as the testimony of her\nmother. Her motherβs testimony, in particular, echoed M.S.βs forensic interview,\nincluding the crucial fact that Spotted Bear molested her at his home on\nThanksgiving. To be sure, some of this other evidence may also have been hearsay,\nbut the fact that Spotted Bear does not challenge it means that we can consider it in\nevaluating whether he was prejudiced. See United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882,\n895 (8th Cir. 2005).\n\n Second, the evidence of Spotted Bearβs guilt was strong overall. See United\nStates v. Gayekpar, 678 F.3d 629, 638 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v.\nRamos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (βEspecially [when] there is\nstrong evidence of guilt, some improper repetition of testimony . . . in a generalized\neffort to bolster the witness[] matters little.β (brackets, internal quotation marks and\ncitation omitted)). Specifically, the jury heard that Spotted Bear engaged in a\nlengthy pattern of sexual abuse, that all three of his victims were female relatives\nunder the age of 12, and that he molested them in a similar fashion. Cf. United States\nv. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that βevidence\nthat the defendant committed similar sexual assaults or child molestationsβ can be\nused to prove guilt). In the end, the recordings were just βan extra helpingβ of what\nthe jury had already heard and βadded nothing of substance to the governmentβs\ncase.β Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d at 803β04 (citation omitted).\n\n -4-\n\fAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lonnie Dale SPOTTED BEAR Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1008\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n A jury found Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear guilty of four counts of sexual abuse\\ninvolving three young female relatives. On appeal, he challenges the district courtβs 1\\ndecision to allow the government to play video recordings of their forensic\\ninterviews for the jury. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of North Dakota.\\n\\f N.H.E., S.H., and M.S. accused Spotted Bear of molesting them at his home.\\nAs part of the investigation into their accusations, a specially trained social worker\\nconducted a videotaped interview with each victim. After the investigation\\nconcluded, the government charged Spotted Bear with two counts of aggravated\\nsexual abuse of a child under 12, one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of\\na child under 12, and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child under 12. See\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5).\\n\\n Spotted Bearβs defense was that the three girls fabricated the allegations due\\nto an unrelated family disagreement and then embellished them in response to\\npressure and coaxing by investigators. During Spotted Bearβs trial, all three girls\\ntestified and described the abuse. To respond to the fabrication defense, the\\ngovernment played a portion of each girlβs forensic interview for the jury. Their\\nresponses during the interviews were generally consistent with their answers at trial.\\n\\n Spotted Bear never objected at trial to the portions of the recordings that the\\ngovernment played for the jury. Only now, on appeal, does he claim that they were\\ninadmissible because they contained hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. In the absence\\nof an objection, we review only for plain error, which requires Spotted Bear to show\\nthat the district court made a βclear or obviousβ error that affected his substantial\\nrights and that the error βseriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public\\nreputation of judicial proceedings.β United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082,\\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).\\n\\n We analyze N.H.E.βs interview first, because the circumstances leading to its\\nadmission are different than for the other recordings. From the outset, Spotted\\nBearβs theory was that N.H.E.βs trial testimony was an embellished version of what\\nshe had said during her forensic interview, which itself embellished upon her\\noriginal allegations. In his opening statement, for example, Spotted Bearβs counsel\\nclaimed that investigators encouraged N.H.E. βto say more stuff.β And later, while\\ncross-examining N.H.E., Spotted Bearβs counsel asked whether she had βadded\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fsome more things that [she] didnβt tell [the forensic interviewer].β He followed up\\nby inquiring whether, during the forensic interview, she had βadded to [her] story.β\\nN.H.E. answered yes to both questions but did not explain what she added. This line\\nof questioning, especially in light of Spotted Bearβs theory of witness manipulation,\\ncould have left the jury with the mistaken impression that N.H.E. had significantly\\nchanged her story.\\n\\n When a criminal defendant creates a false or misleading impression on an\\nissue, we have held the government may βclarify, rebut, or complete [the] issueβ\\nwith what would βotherwise [be] inadmissible evidence, including hearsay\\nstatements.β United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). The\\ngovernment played the recording to allow the jury to judge for itself whether N.H.E.\\nhad in fact changed her story since her forensic interview. Cf. United States v. Smith,\\n591 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant opened the door to the\\nplaying of a recording of a child-sex-abuse victimβs forensic interview by asking the\\ninterviewer about alleged inconsistencies between the victimβs trial testimony and\\nher interview). Having opened the door to this evidence, Spotted Bear cannot now\\ncomplain about its admission. 2 Accordingly, the district court did not err, much less\\nplainly err, when it allowed the government to play the recording of N.H.E.βs\\nforensic interview for the jury. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 801; United States v.\\nWomochil, 778 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1985).\\n\\n The remaining two recordings call for a different analysis because Spotted\\nBearβs counsel did not open the door to their admission through his questioning of\\nS.H. or M.S. Still, Spotted Bear failed to object to either recording, so he must\\n\\n\\n 2\\n After the government played part of N.H.E.βs interview for the jury, Spotted\\nBear asked the court to play an additional segment that he believed was particularly\\nfavorable to his defense. To the extent he now complains about the hearsay evidence\\nhe introduced, he invited the error and cannot challenge it. See United States v.\\nJewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Balfany, 965\\nF.2d 575, 583 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant cannot object to evidence\\nthat he directly βelicitedβ).\\n -3-\\n\\fsatisfy the plain-error test to receive any relief. For two reasons, he has not met his\\nburden of showing that the recordings affected his substantial rights. See United\\nStates v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (stating that courts must\\nβdemand[] strenuous exertionβ from defendants before granting relief on plain-error\\nreview).\\n\\n First, the recordings were largely βcumulative of other government evidence.β\\nUnited States v. Worman, 622 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir. 2010). S.H.βs sister, for\\nexample, testified at length about S.H.βs abuse, and N.H.E. separately told the jury\\nthat S.H. had confided in her about the abuse, even before either girl had told her\\nparents. The jury also learned about the specifics of M.S.βs abuse from two sources\\nother than the recording: M.S.βs own trial testimony as well as the testimony of her\\nmother. Her motherβs testimony, in particular, echoed M.S.βs forensic interview,\\nincluding the crucial fact that Spotted Bear molested her at his home on\\nThanksgiving. To be sure, some of this other evidence may also have been hearsay,\\nbut the fact that Spotted Bear does not challenge it means that we can consider it in\\nevaluating whether he was prejudiced. See United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882,\\n895 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Second, the evidence of Spotted Bearβs guilt was strong overall. See United\\nStates v. Gayekpar, 678 F.3d 629, 638 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v.\\nRamos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (βEspecially [when] there is\\nstrong evidence of guilt, some improper repetition of testimony . . . in a generalized\\neffort to bolster the witness[] matters little.β (brackets, internal quotation marks and\\ncitation omitted)). Specifically, the jury heard that Spotted Bear engaged in a\\nlengthy pattern of sexual abuse, that all three of his victims were female relatives\\nunder the age of 12, and that he molested them in a similar fashion. Cf. United States\\nv. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that βevidence\\nthat the defendant committed similar sexual assaults or child molestationsβ can be\\nused to prove guilt). In the end, the recordings were just βan extra helpingβ of what\\nthe jury had already heard and βadded nothing of substance to the governmentβs\\ncase.β Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d at 803β04 (citation omitted).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1778,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609053,"string":"4,609,053"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. DICO, INC.; Titan Tire Corporation, Defendants - Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Dico, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3462"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3462\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dico, Inc.; Titan Tire Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dico and Titan appeal the district courtβs1 finding that they violated the\\nComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980\\n(CERCLA), that they are jointly and severally liable for response costs, and that Dico\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fis liable for punitive damages. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\\naffirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dico, Inc. owned several buildings in Des Moines contaminated with\\nPolychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in the insulation. In 1994, the Environmental\\nProtection Agency issued an administrative order that Dico remove some of the PCB\\ncontamination, encapsulate the remaining insulation, and submit a long-term\\nmaintenance plan for EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9606(a) (authorizing the EPA\\nto issue βsuch orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the\\nenvironmentβ). The order also required ongoing testing, annual reports to the EPA,\\nand immediate notification if changes in site conditions threatened further release of\\nPCBs. Without informing the EPA, Dicoβthrough its corporate affiliate Titan Tire\\nCorporationβsold the buildings to Southern Iowa Mechanical (SIM) in 2007. Titan\\ndid not tell SIM that the buildings were contaminated with PCBs and subject to an\\nEPA order. SIM tore down the buildings and stored them in an open field, where the\\nEPA later found PCBs.\\n\\n The EPA sued Dico to recover damages for its cleanup costs. It alleged Dico\\nviolated the CERCLA by arranging to dispose of a hazardous substance. See 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(a)(3) (establishing liability for those who βarrange[] for disposal . . .\\nof hazardous substancesβ). The EPA also alleged Dico violated the 1994 order by\\ncircumventing the long-term maintenance plan, failing to prevent the additional\\nrelease of PCBs, and failing to notify the EPA of changed site conditions. See 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9606(b)(1) (establishing liability for those who violate the terms and\\nconditions of an EPA order). The district court granted summary judgment, finding\\nCERCLA arranger liability and a violation of the 1994 order. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1163 (S.D. Iowa 2012). After a bench trial, it imposed\\ncivil penalties and punitive damages. United States v. Dico, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1047,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f1068 (S.D. Iowa 2014). This court affirmed summary judgment on Dicoβs violation\\nof the 1994 order and civil penalties, but held that questions of fact precluded\\nsummary judgment on arranger liability and punitive damages. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 808 F.3d 342, 354β355 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 902, 906 (S.D. Iowa 2017). It found that Dico and Titan\\narranged to dispose of a hazardous substance in violation of the CERCLA, and held\\nthem jointly and severally liable for $5,454,370 in response costs. Id. at 967, 970.\\nIt held Dico liable for the same amount in punitive damages, an amount equal to the\\ncosts incurred from Dicoβs violation of the 1994 order. Id. at 970β71. It also found\\nDico and Titan jointly and severally liable for all costs not yet reported, all future\\ncosts, all enforcement costs, and attorneyβs fees. Id. at 970. Dico and Titan appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The CERCLA imposes strict liability for environmental contamination upon\\nan entity that βarrange[s] for disposal . . . of hazardous substances.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 9607(a)(3). β[U]nder the plain language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an\\narranger under Β§ 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous\\nsubstance.β Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 611\\n(2009). Dico and Titan qualify as arrangers if they βentered into the sale . . . with the\\nintention that at least a portion of the product be disposed ofβ as a result of the\\ntransfer. Id. at 612.\\n\\n β[T]he determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive\\ninquiry.β Id. at 610. βAfter a bench trial, this court reviews the district courtβs\\nfindings of fact for clear error.β Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir.\\n2011). This court will affirm βthe district courtβs account of the evidenceβ if it is\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fβplausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.β Id., citing Anderson v. City\\nof Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573β74 (1985).\\n\\n Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave insufficient weight to evidence\\nthat the transaction was legitimate. For example, the terms of the 2007 sale mirror\\nthe terms of Dico and Titanβs 2004 sale of a Weld Shop to SIM. Dico and Titan\\nargue that because the 2004 sale was legitimate, the 2007 was legitimate too. The\\ndistrict court properly found that similarities in the transactions are βby no means\\nconclusive evidence that [Dico and Titanβs] intent regarding the former was the same\\nas their intent regarding the latter.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 966.\\n\\n Next, Dico and Titan argue the usefulness of part of the buildings is evidence\\nof a legitimate transaction. The district court found that the contaminated buildingsβ\\nstructural-steel beams were reusable if sampled and decontaminated. Dico, 265 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 957. An entity that βenter[s] into a transaction for the sole purpose of\\ndiscarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substanceβ is liable under the\\nCERCLA. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 610. But, βan entity could not be held liable\\nas an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that\\nproduct later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led\\nto contamination.β Id.\\n\\n SIMβs disposal of the contaminated insulation was not βunbeknownst to the\\nseller.β Id. The district court found that Dico and Titan Tire βknew the buildings\\nwould be dismantled once they were soldβ and βsold the buildings with the intention\\nthey would be dismantled and removed from the real property on which they were\\nlocated.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 954β55. Though βknowledge alone is insufficient\\nto proveβ arranger liability, βan entityβs knowledge that its product will be leaked,\\nspilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entityβs intent\\nto dispose of its hazardous wastes.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 612.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court erred by failing to presume that the\\nsale of useful products is a legitimate transaction. Even if there were a βpresumption\\nthat persons selling useful products do so for legitimate business purposes,β Team\\nEnterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2011), it is\\nnot determinative. β[T]he usefulness of a productβhowever definedβis an\\nimportant but not dispositive factor to consider in determining the sellerβs intent.β\\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Sellers of useful products may be liable as arrangers if they\\nintend to dispose of hazardous substances through the sale. See Burlington N., 556\\nU.S. at 612. Here, the district court found that the commercial usefulness of the\\nbeams βweigh slightly in favor of concluding Defendants did not intend to arrange\\nfor the disposal of hazardous substance by selling the contaminated buildings to\\nSIM.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 957. But, the district court found this factor\\noutweighed by evidence that Dico and Titan intended to dispose of the PCB\\ncontamination through the sale. See id. at 966β67.\\n\\n βA party may sell a still βusefulβ product . . . with the full intention to rid itself\\nof environmental liability rather than a legitimate sale, for example where the cost of\\ndisposal or contamination remediation would greatly exceed its purchase price.β\\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Here, the cost of disposal or contamination remediation\\ngreatly exceeded the contaminated buildingsβ purchase price. The district court found\\nthat the removal, disposal, and sampling costs Dico avoided from the sale exceeded\\nby ten times the value received from SIM in exchange. Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 963.\\nβConsequently, . . . the balance of the value Defendants received from SIM compared\\nto costs Dico avoided for proper disposal or remediation constitutes strong evidence\\nof Dicoβs intent to avoid environmental liability through the sale of the contaminated\\nbuildings to SIM.β Id. The district court found that the costs avoided were also\\nstrong evidence of Titanβs intent to assist Dico in avoiding environmental liability,\\nbecause Titan knew of the magnitude of the costs avoided by the sale, and Titan acted\\non behalf of Dico for environmental matters on the Dico site and the sale to SIM. See\\nid.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave too much weight to costs\\navoided, because the precise costs avoided are debatable, and there is no evidence\\nthat Dico and Titan actually calculated costs avoided before the sale. To calculate\\ncosts avoided, the district court relied on a feasibility studyβprepared for the\\nEPAβevaluating remedial alternatives at the contaminated Dico site. This 1996\\nstudy estimated that proper removal and disposal of the contaminated insulation in\\ntwo buildings would cost about $988,567. The district court found that the costs\\navoided by selling the three buildings far exceeds this estimate. According to the\\nfeasibility study, building removal/disposal would be more expensive than insulation\\nremoval/disposal. Further, the estimate covered two of the three buildings, but not\\nthe costs of source-layer removal/disposal or residual contamination. Regardless of\\nthe precision of the estimate, the record supports the finding that proper disposal or\\nremediation would have cost Dico hundreds of thousands of dollars, far exceeding the\\n$117,000 SIM paid for the buildings. These costs avoided are evidence of Dico and\\nTitanβs intent to arrange for the disposal of the contaminated buildings, even without\\nevidence they made the same calculations as the district court. The EPA gave the\\nfeasibility study to Dico and made it publicly available. Dico and Titan had access\\nto the estimates the district court relied on. And even if they did not review the\\ndetails of all these documents, the district court properly found they were aware of the\\ngeneral magnitude of the costs of complying with EPA regulations and that the sale\\nwould avoid significant costs.\\n\\n Substantial further evidence supports the district courtβs conclusion that Dico\\nand Titan intended to arrange for the disposal of a hazardous substance by selling the\\nbuildings to SIM. For example, the buildings were no longer commercially useful\\nand required costly repairs, upkeep, and compliance with the EPA order. Dico and\\nTitan did not have the buildings appraised, advertise their sale, or seek another buyer.\\nThey did not tell SIM the buildings were contaminated or subject to an EPA order.\\nThey had reason to believe SIM would not discover the contamination before\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fpurchasing the buildings. These findings are sufficient to conclude that Dico and\\nTitan arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of the CERCLA.\\n\\n The clear-error standard of review governs this appeal. Dico and Titan object\\nto the district courtβs weighing of the evidence, but ample evidence supports the\\ncourtβs findings of fact. βUnder the clear-error standard of review, this court may not\\nreverse the findings of the district court simply because it would have weighed the\\nevidence differently or decided the case differently if sitting as the trier of fact.β\\nSchaub, 638 F.3d at 920, citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. β[T]he district courtβs\\naccount of the evidence is plausible in light of the entire record,β and its findings are\\nnot clearly erroneous. Id. at 923.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Dico argues that the district court erred in awarding punitive damages. The\\nCERCLA authorizes punitive damages against βany person who is liable for a release\\nor threat of release of a hazardous substance [and who] fails without sufficient cause\\nto properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of the President.β 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3). The punitive damages award may be βat least equal to, and not\\nmore than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of\\nsuch failure to take proper action.β Id. β[P]unitive damages are available only if the\\nFund incurs costs cleaning up the damage caused by a release or threat of release of\\nhazardous substance.β Dico, 808 F.3d at 352, citing 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3).\\n\\n βIn this case, the Fund incurred cleanup costs at the SIM site . . . . from locating\\nthe Dico building debris at the SIM site, conducting sampling at the SIM site,\\noverseeing the SIM cleanup, and enforcing this action for cost recovery and penalties\\nat the SIM site.β Id. This court previously reversed an award of punitive damages\\nbecause it could not say as a matter of law that the sale precipitating these costs\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fviolated the CERCLA. Id. at 354. Now affirming the finding that the sale violated\\nthe CERCLA, this court also affirms the punitive damages award.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Dico and Titan argue in the alternative that this court should reduce the\\narranger liability award to exclude enforcement costs. They argue the CERCLA does\\nnot authorize the award of enforcement costs, and that Titan should not be liable for\\nenforcement costs incurred in the governmentβs claims against Dico. This court\\nrejects these arguments. The CERCLA provides that an arranger of the disposal of\\na hazardous substance is liable for βall costs of removal or remedial action incurred\\nby the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency\\nplan.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(a). Dico and Titan do not dispute that the governmentβs\\nresponse costs are consistent with the national contingency plan. The terms\\nβremovalβ and βremedial actionβ βinclude enforcement activities related thereto.β 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9601(25). The CERCLA βwas designed to promote the timely cleanup of\\nhazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne\\nby those responsible for the contamination.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 602. See\\nalso United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F.3d 864, 877 (8th Cir. 2001) (βCERCLA is a\\nremedial statute designed to make parties responsible for introducing hazardous waste\\ninto the environment pay for cleaning up the messes they have created.β). The\\nCERCLA authorizes the recovery of all enforcement costs, and βattorney fees are\\nrecoverable as response costs under CERCLA.β Id. at 878.\\n\\n The district court properly held Dico and Titan jointly and severally liable for\\nenforcement costs. ββ[W]here two or more persons cause a single and indivisible\\nharm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.ββ Burlington N., 556 U.S. at\\n614, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Β§ 875. βCERCLA defendants seeking\\nto avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis\\nfor apportionment exists.β Id. In a CERCLA case, once the government has\\n\\n -8-\\n\\festablished liability, the burden shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the harm\\nis divisible. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).\\nCarrying this burden is βvery difficult.β Id. The district court did not err in finding\\nthat Dico and Titan did not carry that burden.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386306/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609053/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. DICO, INC.; Titan Tire Corporation, Defendants - Appellants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3462\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Dico, Inc.; Titan Tire Corporation\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Dico and Titan appeal the district courtβs1 finding that they violated the\nComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980\n(CERCLA), that they are jointly and severally liable for response costs, and that Dico\n\n 1\n The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\fis liable for punitive damages. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\naffirms.\n\n I.\n\n Dico, Inc. owned several buildings in Des Moines contaminated with\nPolychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in the insulation. In 1994, the Environmental\nProtection Agency issued an administrative order that Dico remove some of the PCB\ncontamination, encapsulate the remaining insulation, and submit a long-term\nmaintenance plan for EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9606(a) (authorizing the EPA\nto issue βsuch orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the\nenvironmentβ). The order also required ongoing testing, annual reports to the EPA,\nand immediate notification if changes in site conditions threatened further release of\nPCBs. Without informing the EPA, Dicoβthrough its corporate affiliate Titan Tire\nCorporationβsold the buildings to Southern Iowa Mechanical (SIM) in 2007. Titan\ndid not tell SIM that the buildings were contaminated with PCBs and subject to an\nEPA order. SIM tore down the buildings and stored them in an open field, where the\nEPA later found PCBs.\n\n The EPA sued Dico to recover damages for its cleanup costs. It alleged Dico\nviolated the CERCLA by arranging to dispose of a hazardous substance. See 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(a)(3) (establishing liability for those who βarrange[] for disposal . . .\nof hazardous substancesβ). The EPA also alleged Dico violated the 1994 order by\ncircumventing the long-term maintenance plan, failing to prevent the additional\nrelease of PCBs, and failing to notify the EPA of changed site conditions. See 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 9606(b)(1) (establishing liability for those who violate the terms and\nconditions of an EPA order). The district court granted summary judgment, finding\nCERCLA arranger liability and a violation of the 1994 order. United States v. Dico,\nInc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1163 (S.D. Iowa 2012). After a bench trial, it imposed\ncivil penalties and punitive damages. United States v. Dico, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1047,\n\n -2-\n\f1068 (S.D. Iowa 2014). This court affirmed summary judgment on Dicoβs violation\nof the 1994 order and civil penalties, but held that questions of fact precluded\nsummary judgment on arranger liability and punitive damages. United States v. Dico,\nInc., 808 F.3d 342, 354β355 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial. United States v. Dico,\nInc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 902, 906 (S.D. Iowa 2017). It found that Dico and Titan\narranged to dispose of a hazardous substance in violation of the CERCLA, and held\nthem jointly and severally liable for $5,454,370 in response costs. Id. at 967, 970.\nIt held Dico liable for the same amount in punitive damages, an amount equal to the\ncosts incurred from Dicoβs violation of the 1994 order. Id. at 970β71. It also found\nDico and Titan jointly and severally liable for all costs not yet reported, all future\ncosts, all enforcement costs, and attorneyβs fees. Id. at 970. Dico and Titan appeal.\n\n II.\n\n The CERCLA imposes strict liability for environmental contamination upon\nan entity that βarrange[s] for disposal . . . of hazardous substances.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 9607(a)(3). β[U]nder the plain language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an\narranger under Β§ 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous\nsubstance.β Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 611\n(2009). Dico and Titan qualify as arrangers if they βentered into the sale . . . with the\nintention that at least a portion of the product be disposed ofβ as a result of the\ntransfer. Id. at 612.\n\n β[T]he determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive\ninquiry.β Id. at 610. βAfter a bench trial, this court reviews the district courtβs\nfindings of fact for clear error.β Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir.\n2011). This court will affirm βthe district courtβs account of the evidenceβ if it is\n\n\n -3-\n\fβplausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.β Id., citing Anderson v. City\nof Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573β74 (1985).\n\n Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave insufficient weight to evidence\nthat the transaction was legitimate. For example, the terms of the 2007 sale mirror\nthe terms of Dico and Titanβs 2004 sale of a Weld Shop to SIM. Dico and Titan\nargue that because the 2004 sale was legitimate, the 2007 was legitimate too. The\ndistrict court properly found that similarities in the transactions are βby no means\nconclusive evidence that [Dico and Titanβs] intent regarding the former was the same\nas their intent regarding the latter.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 966.\n\n Next, Dico and Titan argue the usefulness of part of the buildings is evidence\nof a legitimate transaction. The district court found that the contaminated buildingsβ\nstructural-steel beams were reusable if sampled and decontaminated. Dico, 265 F.\nSupp. 3d at 957. An entity that βenter[s] into a transaction for the sole purpose of\ndiscarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substanceβ is liable under the\nCERCLA. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 610. But, βan entity could not be held liable\nas an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that\nproduct later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led\nto contamination.β Id.\n\n SIMβs disposal of the contaminated insulation was not βunbeknownst to the\nseller.β Id. The district court found that Dico and Titan Tire βknew the buildings\nwould be dismantled once they were soldβ and βsold the buildings with the intention\nthey would be dismantled and removed from the real property on which they were\nlocated.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 954β55. Though βknowledge alone is insufficient\nto proveβ arranger liability, βan entityβs knowledge that its product will be leaked,\nspilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entityβs intent\nto dispose of its hazardous wastes.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 612.\n\n\n -4-\n\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court erred by failing to presume that the\nsale of useful products is a legitimate transaction. Even if there were a βpresumption\nthat persons selling useful products do so for legitimate business purposes,β Team\nEnterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2011), it is\nnot determinative. β[T]he usefulness of a productβhowever definedβis an\nimportant but not dispositive factor to consider in determining the sellerβs intent.β\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Sellers of useful products may be liable as arrangers if they\nintend to dispose of hazardous substances through the sale. See Burlington N., 556\nU.S. at 612. Here, the district court found that the commercial usefulness of the\nbeams βweigh slightly in favor of concluding Defendants did not intend to arrange\nfor the disposal of hazardous substance by selling the contaminated buildings to\nSIM.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 957. But, the district court found this factor\noutweighed by evidence that Dico and Titan intended to dispose of the PCB\ncontamination through the sale. See id. at 966β67.\n\n βA party may sell a still βusefulβ product . . . with the full intention to rid itself\nof environmental liability rather than a legitimate sale, for example where the cost of\ndisposal or contamination remediation would greatly exceed its purchase price.β\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Here, the cost of disposal or contamination remediation\ngreatly exceeded the contaminated buildingsβ purchase price. The district court found\nthat the removal, disposal, and sampling costs Dico avoided from the sale exceeded\nby ten times the value received from SIM in exchange. Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 963.\nβConsequently, . . . the balance of the value Defendants received from SIM compared\nto costs Dico avoided for proper disposal or remediation constitutes strong evidence\nof Dicoβs intent to avoid environmental liability through the sale of the contaminated\nbuildings to SIM.β Id. The district court found that the costs avoided were also\nstrong evidence of Titanβs intent to assist Dico in avoiding environmental liability,\nbecause Titan knew of the magnitude of the costs avoided by the sale, and Titan acted\non behalf of Dico for environmental matters on the Dico site and the sale to SIM. See\nid.\n\n -5-\n\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave too much weight to costs\navoided, because the precise costs avoided are debatable, and there is no evidence\nthat Dico and Titan actually calculated costs avoided before the sale. To calculate\ncosts avoided, the district court relied on a feasibility studyβprepared for the\nEPAβevaluating remedial alternatives at the contaminated Dico site. This 1996\nstudy estimated that proper removal and disposal of the contaminated insulation in\ntwo buildings would cost about $988,567. The district court found that the costs\navoided by selling the three buildings far exceeds this estimate. According to the\nfeasibility study, building removal/disposal would be more expensive than insulation\nremoval/disposal. Further, the estimate covered two of the three buildings, but not\nthe costs of source-layer removal/disposal or residual contamination. Regardless of\nthe precision of the estimate, the record supports the finding that proper disposal or\nremediation would have cost Dico hundreds of thousands of dollars, far exceeding the\n$117,000 SIM paid for the buildings. These costs avoided are evidence of Dico and\nTitanβs intent to arrange for the disposal of the contaminated buildings, even without\nevidence they made the same calculations as the district court. The EPA gave the\nfeasibility study to Dico and made it publicly available. Dico and Titan had access\nto the estimates the district court relied on. And even if they did not review the\ndetails of all these documents, the district court properly found they were aware of the\ngeneral magnitude of the costs of complying with EPA regulations and that the sale\nwould avoid significant costs.\n\n Substantial further evidence supports the district courtβs conclusion that Dico\nand Titan intended to arrange for the disposal of a hazardous substance by selling the\nbuildings to SIM. For example, the buildings were no longer commercially useful\nand required costly repairs, upkeep, and compliance with the EPA order. Dico and\nTitan did not have the buildings appraised, advertise their sale, or seek another buyer.\nThey did not tell SIM the buildings were contaminated or subject to an EPA order.\nThey had reason to believe SIM would not discover the contamination before\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fpurchasing the buildings. These findings are sufficient to conclude that Dico and\nTitan arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of the CERCLA.\n\n The clear-error standard of review governs this appeal. Dico and Titan object\nto the district courtβs weighing of the evidence, but ample evidence supports the\ncourtβs findings of fact. βUnder the clear-error standard of review, this court may not\nreverse the findings of the district court simply because it would have weighed the\nevidence differently or decided the case differently if sitting as the trier of fact.β\nSchaub, 638 F.3d at 920, citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. β[T]he district courtβs\naccount of the evidence is plausible in light of the entire record,β and its findings are\nnot clearly erroneous. Id. at 923.\n\n III.\n\n Dico argues that the district court erred in awarding punitive damages. The\nCERCLA authorizes punitive damages against βany person who is liable for a release\nor threat of release of a hazardous substance [and who] fails without sufficient cause\nto properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of the President.β 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3). The punitive damages award may be βat least equal to, and not\nmore than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of\nsuch failure to take proper action.β Id. β[P]unitive damages are available only if the\nFund incurs costs cleaning up the damage caused by a release or threat of release of\nhazardous substance.β Dico, 808 F.3d at 352, citing 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3).\n\n βIn this case, the Fund incurred cleanup costs at the SIM site . . . . from locating\nthe Dico building debris at the SIM site, conducting sampling at the SIM site,\noverseeing the SIM cleanup, and enforcing this action for cost recovery and penalties\nat the SIM site.β Id. This court previously reversed an award of punitive damages\nbecause it could not say as a matter of law that the sale precipitating these costs\n\n\n -7-\n\fviolated the CERCLA. Id. at 354. Now affirming the finding that the sale violated\nthe CERCLA, this court also affirms the punitive damages award.\n\n IV.\n\n Dico and Titan argue in the alternative that this court should reduce the\narranger liability award to exclude enforcement costs. They argue the CERCLA does\nnot authorize the award of enforcement costs, and that Titan should not be liable for\nenforcement costs incurred in the governmentβs claims against Dico. This court\nrejects these arguments. The CERCLA provides that an arranger of the disposal of\na hazardous substance is liable for βall costs of removal or remedial action incurred\nby the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency\nplan.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(a). Dico and Titan do not dispute that the governmentβs\nresponse costs are consistent with the national contingency plan. The terms\nβremovalβ and βremedial actionβ βinclude enforcement activities related thereto.β 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 9601(25). The CERCLA βwas designed to promote the timely cleanup of\nhazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne\nby those responsible for the contamination.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 602. See\nalso United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F.3d 864, 877 (8th Cir. 2001) (βCERCLA is a\nremedial statute designed to make parties responsible for introducing hazardous waste\ninto the environment pay for cleaning up the messes they have created.β). The\nCERCLA authorizes the recovery of all enforcement costs, and βattorney fees are\nrecoverable as response costs under CERCLA.β Id. at 878.\n\n The district court properly held Dico and Titan jointly and severally liable for\nenforcement costs. ββ[W]here two or more persons cause a single and indivisible\nharm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.ββ Burlington N., 556 U.S. at\n614, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Β§ 875. βCERCLA defendants seeking\nto avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis\nfor apportionment exists.β Id. In a CERCLA case, once the government has\n\n -8-\n\festablished liability, the burden shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the harm\nis divisible. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).\nCarrying this burden is βvery difficult.β Id. The district court did not err in finding\nthat Dico and Titan did not carry that burden.\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. DICO, INC.; Titan Tire Corporation, Defendants - Appellants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3462\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dico, Inc.; Titan Tire Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dico and Titan appeal the district courtβs1 finding that they violated the\\nComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980\\n(CERCLA), that they are jointly and severally liable for response costs, and that Dico\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fis liable for punitive damages. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\\naffirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dico, Inc. owned several buildings in Des Moines contaminated with\\nPolychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in the insulation. In 1994, the Environmental\\nProtection Agency issued an administrative order that Dico remove some of the PCB\\ncontamination, encapsulate the remaining insulation, and submit a long-term\\nmaintenance plan for EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9606(a) (authorizing the EPA\\nto issue βsuch orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the\\nenvironmentβ). The order also required ongoing testing, annual reports to the EPA,\\nand immediate notification if changes in site conditions threatened further release of\\nPCBs. Without informing the EPA, Dicoβthrough its corporate affiliate Titan Tire\\nCorporationβsold the buildings to Southern Iowa Mechanical (SIM) in 2007. Titan\\ndid not tell SIM that the buildings were contaminated with PCBs and subject to an\\nEPA order. SIM tore down the buildings and stored them in an open field, where the\\nEPA later found PCBs.\\n\\n The EPA sued Dico to recover damages for its cleanup costs. It alleged Dico\\nviolated the CERCLA by arranging to dispose of a hazardous substance. See 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(a)(3) (establishing liability for those who βarrange[] for disposal . . .\\nof hazardous substancesβ). The EPA also alleged Dico violated the 1994 order by\\ncircumventing the long-term maintenance plan, failing to prevent the additional\\nrelease of PCBs, and failing to notify the EPA of changed site conditions. See 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9606(b)(1) (establishing liability for those who violate the terms and\\nconditions of an EPA order). The district court granted summary judgment, finding\\nCERCLA arranger liability and a violation of the 1994 order. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1163 (S.D. Iowa 2012). After a bench trial, it imposed\\ncivil penalties and punitive damages. United States v. Dico, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1047,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f1068 (S.D. Iowa 2014). This court affirmed summary judgment on Dicoβs violation\\nof the 1994 order and civil penalties, but held that questions of fact precluded\\nsummary judgment on arranger liability and punitive damages. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 808 F.3d 342, 354β355 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial. United States v. Dico,\\nInc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 902, 906 (S.D. Iowa 2017). It found that Dico and Titan\\narranged to dispose of a hazardous substance in violation of the CERCLA, and held\\nthem jointly and severally liable for $5,454,370 in response costs. Id. at 967, 970.\\nIt held Dico liable for the same amount in punitive damages, an amount equal to the\\ncosts incurred from Dicoβs violation of the 1994 order. Id. at 970β71. It also found\\nDico and Titan jointly and severally liable for all costs not yet reported, all future\\ncosts, all enforcement costs, and attorneyβs fees. Id. at 970. Dico and Titan appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The CERCLA imposes strict liability for environmental contamination upon\\nan entity that βarrange[s] for disposal . . . of hazardous substances.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 9607(a)(3). β[U]nder the plain language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an\\narranger under Β§ 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous\\nsubstance.β Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 611\\n(2009). Dico and Titan qualify as arrangers if they βentered into the sale . . . with the\\nintention that at least a portion of the product be disposed ofβ as a result of the\\ntransfer. Id. at 612.\\n\\n β[T]he determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive\\ninquiry.β Id. at 610. βAfter a bench trial, this court reviews the district courtβs\\nfindings of fact for clear error.β Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir.\\n2011). This court will affirm βthe district courtβs account of the evidenceβ if it is\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fβplausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.β Id., citing Anderson v. City\\nof Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573β74 (1985).\\n\\n Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave insufficient weight to evidence\\nthat the transaction was legitimate. For example, the terms of the 2007 sale mirror\\nthe terms of Dico and Titanβs 2004 sale of a Weld Shop to SIM. Dico and Titan\\nargue that because the 2004 sale was legitimate, the 2007 was legitimate too. The\\ndistrict court properly found that similarities in the transactions are βby no means\\nconclusive evidence that [Dico and Titanβs] intent regarding the former was the same\\nas their intent regarding the latter.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 966.\\n\\n Next, Dico and Titan argue the usefulness of part of the buildings is evidence\\nof a legitimate transaction. The district court found that the contaminated buildingsβ\\nstructural-steel beams were reusable if sampled and decontaminated. Dico, 265 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 957. An entity that βenter[s] into a transaction for the sole purpose of\\ndiscarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substanceβ is liable under the\\nCERCLA. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 610. But, βan entity could not be held liable\\nas an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that\\nproduct later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led\\nto contamination.β Id.\\n\\n SIMβs disposal of the contaminated insulation was not βunbeknownst to the\\nseller.β Id. The district court found that Dico and Titan Tire βknew the buildings\\nwould be dismantled once they were soldβ and βsold the buildings with the intention\\nthey would be dismantled and removed from the real property on which they were\\nlocated.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 954β55. Though βknowledge alone is insufficient\\nto proveβ arranger liability, βan entityβs knowledge that its product will be leaked,\\nspilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entityβs intent\\nto dispose of its hazardous wastes.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 612.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court erred by failing to presume that the\\nsale of useful products is a legitimate transaction. Even if there were a βpresumption\\nthat persons selling useful products do so for legitimate business purposes,β Team\\nEnterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2011), it is\\nnot determinative. β[T]he usefulness of a productβhowever definedβis an\\nimportant but not dispositive factor to consider in determining the sellerβs intent.β\\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Sellers of useful products may be liable as arrangers if they\\nintend to dispose of hazardous substances through the sale. See Burlington N., 556\\nU.S. at 612. Here, the district court found that the commercial usefulness of the\\nbeams βweigh slightly in favor of concluding Defendants did not intend to arrange\\nfor the disposal of hazardous substance by selling the contaminated buildings to\\nSIM.β Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 957. But, the district court found this factor\\noutweighed by evidence that Dico and Titan intended to dispose of the PCB\\ncontamination through the sale. See id. at 966β67.\\n\\n βA party may sell a still βusefulβ product . . . with the full intention to rid itself\\nof environmental liability rather than a legitimate sale, for example where the cost of\\ndisposal or contamination remediation would greatly exceed its purchase price.β\\nDico, 808 F.3d at 349. Here, the cost of disposal or contamination remediation\\ngreatly exceeded the contaminated buildingsβ purchase price. The district court found\\nthat the removal, disposal, and sampling costs Dico avoided from the sale exceeded\\nby ten times the value received from SIM in exchange. Dico, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 963.\\nβConsequently, . . . the balance of the value Defendants received from SIM compared\\nto costs Dico avoided for proper disposal or remediation constitutes strong evidence\\nof Dicoβs intent to avoid environmental liability through the sale of the contaminated\\nbuildings to SIM.β Id. The district court found that the costs avoided were also\\nstrong evidence of Titanβs intent to assist Dico in avoiding environmental liability,\\nbecause Titan knew of the magnitude of the costs avoided by the sale, and Titan acted\\non behalf of Dico for environmental matters on the Dico site and the sale to SIM. See\\nid.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Dico and Titan argue that the district court gave too much weight to costs\\navoided, because the precise costs avoided are debatable, and there is no evidence\\nthat Dico and Titan actually calculated costs avoided before the sale. To calculate\\ncosts avoided, the district court relied on a feasibility studyβprepared for the\\nEPAβevaluating remedial alternatives at the contaminated Dico site. This 1996\\nstudy estimated that proper removal and disposal of the contaminated insulation in\\ntwo buildings would cost about $988,567. The district court found that the costs\\navoided by selling the three buildings far exceeds this estimate. According to the\\nfeasibility study, building removal/disposal would be more expensive than insulation\\nremoval/disposal. Further, the estimate covered two of the three buildings, but not\\nthe costs of source-layer removal/disposal or residual contamination. Regardless of\\nthe precision of the estimate, the record supports the finding that proper disposal or\\nremediation would have cost Dico hundreds of thousands of dollars, far exceeding the\\n$117,000 SIM paid for the buildings. These costs avoided are evidence of Dico and\\nTitanβs intent to arrange for the disposal of the contaminated buildings, even without\\nevidence they made the same calculations as the district court. The EPA gave the\\nfeasibility study to Dico and made it publicly available. Dico and Titan had access\\nto the estimates the district court relied on. And even if they did not review the\\ndetails of all these documents, the district court properly found they were aware of the\\ngeneral magnitude of the costs of complying with EPA regulations and that the sale\\nwould avoid significant costs.\\n\\n Substantial further evidence supports the district courtβs conclusion that Dico\\nand Titan intended to arrange for the disposal of a hazardous substance by selling the\\nbuildings to SIM. For example, the buildings were no longer commercially useful\\nand required costly repairs, upkeep, and compliance with the EPA order. Dico and\\nTitan did not have the buildings appraised, advertise their sale, or seek another buyer.\\nThey did not tell SIM the buildings were contaminated or subject to an EPA order.\\nThey had reason to believe SIM would not discover the contamination before\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fpurchasing the buildings. These findings are sufficient to conclude that Dico and\\nTitan arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of the CERCLA.\\n\\n The clear-error standard of review governs this appeal. Dico and Titan object\\nto the district courtβs weighing of the evidence, but ample evidence supports the\\ncourtβs findings of fact. βUnder the clear-error standard of review, this court may not\\nreverse the findings of the district court simply because it would have weighed the\\nevidence differently or decided the case differently if sitting as the trier of fact.β\\nSchaub, 638 F.3d at 920, citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. β[T]he district courtβs\\naccount of the evidence is plausible in light of the entire record,β and its findings are\\nnot clearly erroneous. Id. at 923.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Dico argues that the district court erred in awarding punitive damages. The\\nCERCLA authorizes punitive damages against βany person who is liable for a release\\nor threat of release of a hazardous substance [and who] fails without sufficient cause\\nto properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of the President.β 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3). The punitive damages award may be βat least equal to, and not\\nmore than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of\\nsuch failure to take proper action.β Id. β[P]unitive damages are available only if the\\nFund incurs costs cleaning up the damage caused by a release or threat of release of\\nhazardous substance.β Dico, 808 F.3d at 352, citing 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(c)(3).\\n\\n βIn this case, the Fund incurred cleanup costs at the SIM site . . . . from locating\\nthe Dico building debris at the SIM site, conducting sampling at the SIM site,\\noverseeing the SIM cleanup, and enforcing this action for cost recovery and penalties\\nat the SIM site.β Id. This court previously reversed an award of punitive damages\\nbecause it could not say as a matter of law that the sale precipitating these costs\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fviolated the CERCLA. Id. at 354. Now affirming the finding that the sale violated\\nthe CERCLA, this court also affirms the punitive damages award.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Dico and Titan argue in the alternative that this court should reduce the\\narranger liability award to exclude enforcement costs. They argue the CERCLA does\\nnot authorize the award of enforcement costs, and that Titan should not be liable for\\nenforcement costs incurred in the governmentβs claims against Dico. This court\\nrejects these arguments. The CERCLA provides that an arranger of the disposal of\\na hazardous substance is liable for βall costs of removal or remedial action incurred\\nby the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency\\nplan.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 9607(a). Dico and Titan do not dispute that the governmentβs\\nresponse costs are consistent with the national contingency plan. The terms\\nβremovalβ and βremedial actionβ βinclude enforcement activities related thereto.β 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 9601(25). The CERCLA βwas designed to promote the timely cleanup of\\nhazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne\\nby those responsible for the contamination.β Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 602. See\\nalso United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F.3d 864, 877 (8th Cir. 2001) (βCERCLA is a\\nremedial statute designed to make parties responsible for introducing hazardous waste\\ninto the environment pay for cleaning up the messes they have created.β). The\\nCERCLA authorizes the recovery of all enforcement costs, and βattorney fees are\\nrecoverable as response costs under CERCLA.β Id. at 878.\\n\\n The district court properly held Dico and Titan jointly and severally liable for\\nenforcement costs. ββ[W]here two or more persons cause a single and indivisible\\nharm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.ββ Burlington N., 556 U.S. at\\n614, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Β§ 875. βCERCLA defendants seeking\\nto avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis\\nfor apportionment exists.β Id. In a CERCLA case, once the government has\\n\\n -8-\\n\\festablished liability, the burden shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the harm\\nis divisible. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).\\nCarrying this burden is βvery difficult.β Id. The district court did not err in finding\\nthat Dico and Titan did not carry that burden.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1779,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609054,"string":"4,609,054"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. COMPANIES, INC.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant Management Registry, Inc., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Management Registry, Inc. v. A.W. Companies, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3675; 18-1154"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3675\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Management Registry, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n Eric Berg\\n\\n Defendant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1154\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Management Registry, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n Eric Berg\\n\\n Defendant\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This appeal arises out of a contentious business deal. Management Registry,\\nInc., a large Kentucky staffing company, acquired a family of smaller staffing\\ncompanies operating under the brand βAllStaff.β When negotiations grew sour\\nbetween some of the participants, twoβAllan and Wendy Brownβformed a rival\\ncompany. Management Registry sought a preliminary injunction and an injunction\\npending appeal to prevent this newly formed company from competing against it.\\nThe district court1 declined to grant either, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In an effort to expand its business, Management Registry entered into\\ndiscussions to acquire AllStaff companies. Following months of negotiations,\\nManagement Registry agreed to purchase the whole family of businesses, with their\\npresident, Allan, staying on to run them. There was also an understanding that\\nAllanβs wife, Wendy, would separately negotiate to purchase one of the AllStaff\\ncompanies back from Management Registry.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of Minnesota.\\n -2-\\n\\f At first, the deal proceeded as planned. But the negotiations between\\nManagement Registry and Wendy eventually fell apart, which led to Allanβs\\ndeparture and his decision to form a rival company with Wendy. The new company,\\nA.W. Companies, Inc., recruited Management Registry employees and allegedly\\nasked that they bring their computers, client files, and other proprietary information\\nwith them.\\n\\n Management Registry sued A.W., Allan, and Wendy in federal district court,\\nseeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction. Following briefing and a\\nhearing, the district court denied the motion due to both the presence of material\\nfactual disputes and the absence of evidence showing how Management Registry\\nwould be irreparably harmed without an injunction. Management Registry appeals\\nthe decision not to grant injunctive relief, arguing that it is likely to prevail on the\\nmerits and that, if it does not receive an injunction, it will continue to suffer\\nirreparable harm. 2 See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1292(a)(1) (granting appellate jurisdiction over\\nthe denial of an injunction).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, district courts\\nmust weigh four factors: β(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the\\nstate of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will\\ninflict on [the nonmovant]; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the\\nmerits; and (4) the public interest.β Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d\\n109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). As we have explained, β[a] preliminary\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Management Registry filed two notices of appeal, one right after the district\\ncourt denied the preliminary injunction and a second after the court refused to grant\\nan injunction pending appeal. These two appeals have been consolidated.\\nManagement Registry treats the denial of a preliminary injunction and the denial of\\nan injunction pending appeal as raising the same underlying issues, and so will we.\\nCf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Walker v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 68,\\n70 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).\\n -3-\\n\\finjunction is an extraordinary remedy,β and β[t]he party seeking injunctive relief\\nbears the burden of provingβ that these factors weigh in its favor. Watkins Inc. v.\\nLewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). We will reverse a decision to deny a\\npreliminary injunction only if the district court has abused its discretion, which\\nhappens if the decision rests βon clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\\nconclusions.β Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(citation omitted).\\n\\n The district court determined that Management Registry had not met its\\nburden of showing irreparable harm. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brownβs, LLC,\\n563 F.3d 312, 318β19 (8th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the βburden [is] on [the\\nmovant] to establish the threat of irreparable injuryβ). To receive a preliminary\\ninjunction, Management Registry had to establish that it had βno adequate remedy\\nat lawβ because βits injuries [could not] be fully compensated through an award of\\ndamages.β Id. at 319. It had a potentially viable theoryβit was continuing to lose\\ngoodwill with its employees and customersβbut not enough evidence or analysis to\\nsupport it. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining\\nthat a loss of goodwill can be an irreparable harm).\\n\\n In fact, Management Registry presented evidence suggesting the opposite:\\nthat an award of money damages would fully compensate it because its losses are\\nquantifiable. For example, Management Registry claimed that A.W.βs actions led\\nto the loss of three major accounts, which cut its revenues by $65,000 per week. To\\nbe sure, Management Registry claims to have lost other things too, such as customer\\nfiles and other intellectual property. But beyond just asking the district court to trust\\nits assessment that these harms are unquantifiable, it never persuasively explained\\nwhy money damages could not compensate it for these losses as well. With the\\nburden on Management Registry, it was not βerror for the district court to require\\n[more] evidenceβ than just a discussion of βgeneral business principlesβ and a series\\nof assurances that its business would be irreparably harmed if it did not receive an\\ninjunction. Gen. Motors, 563 F.3d at 319β20.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Although the failure to show irreparable harm was a sufficient reason to deny\\na preliminary injunction, see Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418\\n(8th Cir. 1987), Management Registry also failed to establish that it was likely to\\nsucceed on the merits, see Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113 (suggesting that if a movant\\ncannot make a strong showing of harm, it βfaces a heavy burdenβ of showing it will\\nultimately prevail). It alleged ten claims in its complaint, running the gamut from\\nequitable to contract- and tort-based claims. Yet rather than explaining why it was\\nlikely to prevail on the merits of those claims, it devoted most of its memorandum\\naccompanying its preliminary-injunction motion to chronicling the Brownsβ alleged\\nmisdeeds, regardless of their relevance to the motion. It was not up to the district\\ncourt to try to then connect the dots between Management Registryβs allegations and\\nits legal theories. Cf. Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.\\n2006) (noting that a court need not βmine a summary judgment record searching for\\nnuggets of factual disputes to gild a partyβs argumentsβ).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the denial of preliminary injunctive relief to\\nManagement Registry.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386307/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609054/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. COMPANIES, INC.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant Management Registry, Inc., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3675\n ___________________________\n\n Management Registry, Inc.\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n Eric Berg\n\n Defendant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1154\n ___________________________\n\n Management Registry, Inc.\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n Eric Berg\n\n Defendant\n ____________\n\f Appeals from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n This appeal arises out of a contentious business deal. Management Registry,\nInc., a large Kentucky staffing company, acquired a family of smaller staffing\ncompanies operating under the brand βAllStaff.β When negotiations grew sour\nbetween some of the participants, twoβAllan and Wendy Brownβformed a rival\ncompany. Management Registry sought a preliminary injunction and an injunction\npending appeal to prevent this newly formed company from competing against it.\nThe district court1 declined to grant either, and we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n In an effort to expand its business, Management Registry entered into\ndiscussions to acquire AllStaff companies. Following months of negotiations,\nManagement Registry agreed to purchase the whole family of businesses, with their\npresident, Allan, staying on to run them. There was also an understanding that\nAllanβs wife, Wendy, would separately negotiate to purchase one of the AllStaff\ncompanies back from Management Registry.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the District of Minnesota.\n -2-\n\f At first, the deal proceeded as planned. But the negotiations between\nManagement Registry and Wendy eventually fell apart, which led to Allanβs\ndeparture and his decision to form a rival company with Wendy. The new company,\nA.W. Companies, Inc., recruited Management Registry employees and allegedly\nasked that they bring their computers, client files, and other proprietary information\nwith them.\n\n Management Registry sued A.W., Allan, and Wendy in federal district court,\nseeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction. Following briefing and a\nhearing, the district court denied the motion due to both the presence of material\nfactual disputes and the absence of evidence showing how Management Registry\nwould be irreparably harmed without an injunction. Management Registry appeals\nthe decision not to grant injunctive relief, arguing that it is likely to prevail on the\nmerits and that, if it does not receive an injunction, it will continue to suffer\nirreparable harm. 2 See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1292(a)(1) (granting appellate jurisdiction over\nthe denial of an injunction).\n\n II.\n\n When determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, district courts\nmust weigh four factors: β(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the\nstate of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will\ninflict on [the nonmovant]; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the\nmerits; and (4) the public interest.β Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d\n109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). As we have explained, β[a] preliminary\n\n\n 2\n Management Registry filed two notices of appeal, one right after the district\ncourt denied the preliminary injunction and a second after the court refused to grant\nan injunction pending appeal. These two appeals have been consolidated.\nManagement Registry treats the denial of a preliminary injunction and the denial of\nan injunction pending appeal as raising the same underlying issues, and so will we.\nCf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Walker v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 68,\n70 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).\n -3-\n\finjunction is an extraordinary remedy,β and β[t]he party seeking injunctive relief\nbears the burden of provingβ that these factors weigh in its favor. Watkins Inc. v.\nLewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). We will reverse a decision to deny a\npreliminary injunction only if the district court has abused its discretion, which\nhappens if the decision rests βon clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\nconclusions.β Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013)\n(citation omitted).\n\n The district court determined that Management Registry had not met its\nburden of showing irreparable harm. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brownβs, LLC,\n563 F.3d 312, 318β19 (8th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the βburden [is] on [the\nmovant] to establish the threat of irreparable injuryβ). To receive a preliminary\ninjunction, Management Registry had to establish that it had βno adequate remedy\nat lawβ because βits injuries [could not] be fully compensated through an award of\ndamages.β Id. at 319. It had a potentially viable theoryβit was continuing to lose\ngoodwill with its employees and customersβbut not enough evidence or analysis to\nsupport it. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining\nthat a loss of goodwill can be an irreparable harm).\n\n In fact, Management Registry presented evidence suggesting the opposite:\nthat an award of money damages would fully compensate it because its losses are\nquantifiable. For example, Management Registry claimed that A.W.βs actions led\nto the loss of three major accounts, which cut its revenues by $65,000 per week. To\nbe sure, Management Registry claims to have lost other things too, such as customer\nfiles and other intellectual property. But beyond just asking the district court to trust\nits assessment that these harms are unquantifiable, it never persuasively explained\nwhy money damages could not compensate it for these losses as well. With the\nburden on Management Registry, it was not βerror for the district court to require\n[more] evidenceβ than just a discussion of βgeneral business principlesβ and a series\nof assurances that its business would be irreparably harmed if it did not receive an\ninjunction. Gen. Motors, 563 F.3d at 319β20.\n\n\n -4-\n\f Although the failure to show irreparable harm was a sufficient reason to deny\na preliminary injunction, see Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418\n(8th Cir. 1987), Management Registry also failed to establish that it was likely to\nsucceed on the merits, see Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113 (suggesting that if a movant\ncannot make a strong showing of harm, it βfaces a heavy burdenβ of showing it will\nultimately prevail). It alleged ten claims in its complaint, running the gamut from\nequitable to contract- and tort-based claims. Yet rather than explaining why it was\nlikely to prevail on the merits of those claims, it devoted most of its memorandum\naccompanying its preliminary-injunction motion to chronicling the Brownsβ alleged\nmisdeeds, regardless of their relevance to the motion. It was not up to the district\ncourt to try to then connect the dots between Management Registryβs allegations and\nits legal theories. Cf. Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.\n2006) (noting that a court need not βmine a summary judgment record searching for\nnuggets of factual disputes to gild a partyβs argumentsβ).\n\n III.\n\n Accordingly, we affirm the denial of preliminary injunctive relief to\nManagement Registry.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. COMPANIES, INC.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant Management Registry, Inc., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3675\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Management Registry, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n Eric Berg\\n\\n Defendant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1154\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Management Registry, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nA.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n Eric Berg\\n\\n Defendant\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This appeal arises out of a contentious business deal. Management Registry,\\nInc., a large Kentucky staffing company, acquired a family of smaller staffing\\ncompanies operating under the brand βAllStaff.β When negotiations grew sour\\nbetween some of the participants, twoβAllan and Wendy Brownβformed a rival\\ncompany. Management Registry sought a preliminary injunction and an injunction\\npending appeal to prevent this newly formed company from competing against it.\\nThe district court1 declined to grant either, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In an effort to expand its business, Management Registry entered into\\ndiscussions to acquire AllStaff companies. Following months of negotiations,\\nManagement Registry agreed to purchase the whole family of businesses, with their\\npresident, Allan, staying on to run them. There was also an understanding that\\nAllanβs wife, Wendy, would separately negotiate to purchase one of the AllStaff\\ncompanies back from Management Registry.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of Minnesota.\\n -2-\\n\\f At first, the deal proceeded as planned. But the negotiations between\\nManagement Registry and Wendy eventually fell apart, which led to Allanβs\\ndeparture and his decision to form a rival company with Wendy. The new company,\\nA.W. Companies, Inc., recruited Management Registry employees and allegedly\\nasked that they bring their computers, client files, and other proprietary information\\nwith them.\\n\\n Management Registry sued A.W., Allan, and Wendy in federal district court,\\nseeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction. Following briefing and a\\nhearing, the district court denied the motion due to both the presence of material\\nfactual disputes and the absence of evidence showing how Management Registry\\nwould be irreparably harmed without an injunction. Management Registry appeals\\nthe decision not to grant injunctive relief, arguing that it is likely to prevail on the\\nmerits and that, if it does not receive an injunction, it will continue to suffer\\nirreparable harm. 2 See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1292(a)(1) (granting appellate jurisdiction over\\nthe denial of an injunction).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, district courts\\nmust weigh four factors: β(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the\\nstate of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will\\ninflict on [the nonmovant]; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the\\nmerits; and (4) the public interest.β Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d\\n109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). As we have explained, β[a] preliminary\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Management Registry filed two notices of appeal, one right after the district\\ncourt denied the preliminary injunction and a second after the court refused to grant\\nan injunction pending appeal. These two appeals have been consolidated.\\nManagement Registry treats the denial of a preliminary injunction and the denial of\\nan injunction pending appeal as raising the same underlying issues, and so will we.\\nCf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Walker v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 68,\\n70 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).\\n -3-\\n\\finjunction is an extraordinary remedy,β and β[t]he party seeking injunctive relief\\nbears the burden of provingβ that these factors weigh in its favor. Watkins Inc. v.\\nLewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). We will reverse a decision to deny a\\npreliminary injunction only if the district court has abused its discretion, which\\nhappens if the decision rests βon clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\\nconclusions.β Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(citation omitted).\\n\\n The district court determined that Management Registry had not met its\\nburden of showing irreparable harm. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brownβs, LLC,\\n563 F.3d 312, 318β19 (8th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the βburden [is] on [the\\nmovant] to establish the threat of irreparable injuryβ). To receive a preliminary\\ninjunction, Management Registry had to establish that it had βno adequate remedy\\nat lawβ because βits injuries [could not] be fully compensated through an award of\\ndamages.β Id. at 319. It had a potentially viable theoryβit was continuing to lose\\ngoodwill with its employees and customersβbut not enough evidence or analysis to\\nsupport it. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining\\nthat a loss of goodwill can be an irreparable harm).\\n\\n In fact, Management Registry presented evidence suggesting the opposite:\\nthat an award of money damages would fully compensate it because its losses are\\nquantifiable. For example, Management Registry claimed that A.W.βs actions led\\nto the loss of three major accounts, which cut its revenues by $65,000 per week. To\\nbe sure, Management Registry claims to have lost other things too, such as customer\\nfiles and other intellectual property. But beyond just asking the district court to trust\\nits assessment that these harms are unquantifiable, it never persuasively explained\\nwhy money damages could not compensate it for these losses as well. With the\\nburden on Management Registry, it was not βerror for the district court to require\\n[more] evidenceβ than just a discussion of βgeneral business principlesβ and a series\\nof assurances that its business would be irreparably harmed if it did not receive an\\ninjunction. Gen. Motors, 563 F.3d at 319β20.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Although the failure to show irreparable harm was a sufficient reason to deny\\na preliminary injunction, see Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418\\n(8th Cir. 1987), Management Registry also failed to establish that it was likely to\\nsucceed on the merits, see Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113 (suggesting that if a movant\\ncannot make a strong showing of harm, it βfaces a heavy burdenβ of showing it will\\nultimately prevail). It alleged ten claims in its complaint, running the gamut from\\nequitable to contract- and tort-based claims. Yet rather than explaining why it was\\nlikely to prevail on the merits of those claims, it devoted most of its memorandum\\naccompanying its preliminary-injunction motion to chronicling the Brownsβ alleged\\nmisdeeds, regardless of their relevance to the motion. It was not up to the district\\ncourt to try to then connect the dots between Management Registryβs allegations and\\nits legal theories. Cf. Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.\\n2006) (noting that a court need not βmine a summary judgment record searching for\\nnuggets of factual disputes to gild a partyβs argumentsβ).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the denial of preliminary injunctive relief to\\nManagement Registry.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1780,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609055,"string":"4,609,055"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"James DOE, on Behalf of Himself and 77 Other Similarly Situated Individual Minors Next Friend John Doe Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORT ZUMWALT R-II SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant Matthew M. Hansen, in His Official Capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Mike Clemens, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official Capacity Only; Patty Corum, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; Jill Hutchenson, Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, Principals or Principal Designees in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only; Dan Hadfield, 5th Grade Teacher From Progress South Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, 5th Grade Teachers in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Doe v. Fort Zumwalt R-Ii Sch. Dist."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2093"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2093\\n ___________________________\\n\\nJames Doe, on behalf of himself and 77 other similarly situated individual minors\\n next friend John Doe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Fort Zumwalt R-II School District\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n Matthew M. Hansen, in his official capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Mike Clemens, Assistant\\n superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official capacity only; Patty\\nCorum, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official\\n capacity only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II\\n School District, Official capacity only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of\\n Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official capacity only; Jill Hutchenson,\\n Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane\\nDoe, Principals or principal designees in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River\\n summer camp, Official capacity only; Dan Hadfield, 5th grade teacher from\\nProgress South Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane Doe, 5th\\ngrade teachers in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River summer camp, Official\\n capacity only\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n On behalf of his minor son, John Doe represents a class of current and former\\nstudents of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District who were videotaped in the nude\\nby Matthew M. Hansen at the Districtβs overnight camp. Doe sued Hansen in his\\nindividual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for statutory and\\nconstitutional violations. He also brought Β§ 1983 claims against several District\\nadministrators, school principals, and teachers (the District Defendants) in their\\nofficial capacities for constitutional violations. The district court1 entered default\\njudgment against Hansen in his individual capacity, and summary judgment for the\\nDistrict Defendants. Doe v. Hansen, 2018 WL 2223679 (E.D. Mo. May 15, 2018).\\nDoe appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court affirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Hansen was a teacher in the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District. The District\\nsponsors an overnight outdoor camp for fifth graders that is staffed by District\\nemployees. It assigned one teacher to each cabin. It also assigned a teenage student\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fβcamp counselorβ to each cabin in order to assist the teacher and report improper\\nbehavior. Hansen staffed the camp as a teacher, assigned to a cabin. In 2013, he pled\\nguilty to child pornography-related charges. He admitted using a hidden camera to\\nvideotape fifth-grade students in the nude inside the cabins from 2007 to 2011.\\n\\n During this time, the Districtβs policies addressed Hansenβs conduct. They\\nprohibited teachers from β[e]ngaging in any conduct that violates Board policies . . .\\n[or] constitutes criminal behavior.β They required teachers to β[m]aintain courteous\\nand professional relationships with pupilsβ and prohibited them from βmak[ing]\\nadvances toward, or engag[ing] in any sexual relationship with a district student.β In\\n2008, the District adopted an βAudio and Visual Recordingβ policy explicitly\\nprohibiting the use of recording equipment βwhere the occupants would have a\\nreasonable expectation of privacy.β The District also conducted criminal background\\nchecks on employees, including Hansen. It did not have knowledge of Hansenβs\\nconduct until his arrest in 2012.\\n\\n In 2016, Doe sued on behalf of a class of current and former students whom\\nHansen videotaped. The class asserted claims against Hansen and the District under\\nthe Child Abuse Victims Rights Act of 1986 (CAVRA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, and 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983. The District filed an answer. Hansen did not. The district court\\nentered default judgment against Hansen for liability under CAVRA. Doe then filed\\ntwo amended complaints. The Second Amended Complaint asserts claims against\\nHansen in his individual and official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violations of\\nCAVRA and the constitutional right of privacy. It also includes Β§ 1983 claims for\\nfailure to supervise and train against seven current and former District employees\\n(and unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants) responsible for camp supervision (the\\nDistrict Defendants) in their official capacities. The District filed an answer.\\n\\n Doe dismissed the claims against Hansen in his individual capacity. Doe then\\nmoved to enforce against the District the default judgment against Hansen under\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fCAVRA for statutory damages. The district court denied the motion, clarifying that\\nthe default judgment against Hansen was in his individual capacity and is not\\nenforceable against the District (which responded to the claims against Hansen in his\\nofficial capacity).\\n\\n The District moved for summary judgment on all counts. Doe renewed his\\nmotion to enforce the default judgment against the District and, in the alternative,\\nmoved for summary judgment on the CAVRA count against Hansen. The district\\ncourt denied Doeβs motions and granted summary judgment to the District. Doe\\nappeals the grant of summary judgment only for the failure to train and supervise\\nunder Β§ 1983. He also appeals the denial of his motion for default judgment against\\nthe District.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence\\nmost favorably to the nonmoving party. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d\\n1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is proper if there is no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n βIt is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\\nprotects the liberty interest of a child in public school from sexual abuse.β P.H. v.\\nSchool Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 658 (8th Cir. 2001). Doe sued the District\\nDefendants in their official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violating the Due Process\\nClause by failing to adequately supervise and train staff and students. A suit against\\nthe District Defendants in their official capacity is a suit against the District. See\\nBrewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). A municipality like the\\nDistrict βcannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because\\nit employs a tortfeasorβ like Hansen. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385,\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f389 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658, 691 (1978). Where a municipal policy or custom βitself violates federal law, or\\ndirects an employee to do so, resolving [ ] issues of fault and causation is\\nstraightforward.β Board of Cty. Commβrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).\\nHowever, in cases like this, where the plaintiff claims that βmunicipal action lawful\\non its face caused an employee to inflict constitutional injury, βrigorous standards of\\nculpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held\\nliable solely for the actions of its employee.ββ S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581,\\n585 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.\\n\\n To hold the District liable under Β§ 1983, Doe must prove that the Districtβs\\nfailure to supervise and train βamounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of\\npersons with whom [Hansen came] into contact.β City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.\\n378, 388 (1989). Deliberate indifference is a βstringent standard of fault.β Brown,\\n520 U.S. at 410. This court applies an objective standard of deliberate indifference\\nto Doeβs claim against the District, which βpermit[s] liability to be premised on\\nobviousness or constructive notice.β Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).\\nSee S.M., 874 F.3d at 585; Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014).\\nβA pattern of similar constitutional violations . . . is βordinarily necessaryβ to\\ndemonstrate deliberate indifference . . . .β Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62\\n(2011), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. Alternatively, Doe may show that, in light\\nof Hansenβs duties, the need for more supervision or training was βso obvious, and\\nthe inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the\\npolicymakers of the [District] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately\\nindifferent to the need.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. See P.H., 265 F.3d at 660\\n(βNotice may be implied where the failure to train is so likely to result in a\\nconstitutional violation that the need for training is patently obvious . . . .β). The\\nDistrictβs failure to supervise or train must be βthe moving force [behind] the\\nconstitutional violation.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (alteration in original), quoting\\nPolk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Doe argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring\\nactual notice and behavior that βshocks the conscience.β This court need not address\\nthese arguments because, on de novo review, Doe has not presented sufficient\\nevidence to establish deliberate indifference.\\n\\n Doe has not shown that the District had reason to believe that its training and\\nsupervision were inadequate. He presented no evidence of a pattern of misconduct\\nthat would alert the District that its training and supervision were insufficient to\\nprevent Hansenβs conduct. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Instead, he contends that\\na 2004 Department of Education reportβestimating that at least 4.5 million K-12\\nstudents experienced sexual misconduct by a school employeeβprovided notice. The\\nreport addresses sexual misconduct generally, not child pornography. It is\\ninsufficient to give the District notice of Hansenβs particular misconduct or of the risk\\nhe would videotape students in the nude. Doe also argues the District had βactual\\nnoticeβ because it relied on teenage camp counselors to report inappropriate behavior.\\nIn 2006, for instance, a camp counselor observed Hansen in a bunk with a fifth\\ngrader. Seeing the counselor, Hansen jumped out of the bunk. The counselor did not,\\nhowever, report this incident until after Hansenβs arrest. There is no evidence the\\nDistrict was aware counselors were not reporting inappropriate behavior. Nor is there\\nevidence the District had any warning of Hansenβs misconduct before his arrest in\\n2012. Without notice, the Districtβs failure to provide more training or supervision\\nis not deliberately indifferent. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (βWithout notice that a\\ncourse of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be\\nsaid to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of\\nconstitutional rights.β); Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1217 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (βAbsent some form of notice, the city cannot be deliberately indifferent to the\\nrisk that its training or supervision . . . would result in βa violation of a particular\\nconstitutional or statutory right.ββ (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411)).\\n\\n This is also not a case where the risk was βso obviousβ that the Districtβs\\nfailure to provide more training or supervision constitutes deliberate indifference. Cf.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fMarsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2018) (β[T]his court has held that\\nthere is no patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault detainees\\nin light of the regular law enforcement duties of officers and the fact that β[a]n\\nobjectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to engage in such\\nbehavior.ββ (second alteration in original) (quoting Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 999\\n(8th Cir. 2010))). Doe claims the District created an βobvious riskβ by assigning only\\none teacher to each cabin and allowing teachers to bring recording equipment into the\\ncabin. However, the Districtβs policies prohibited Hansenβs conduct. Teachers could\\nnot use recording equipment where students had an expectation of privacy. Teachers\\nwere to maintain professional relationships and could not engage in any kind of\\nsexual relationship with students. The District relied on camp counselors to report\\nany inappropriate behavior. In light of these policies, Doe cannot prove that the risk\\nthat a teacher would engage in this kind of conduct was so obvious that it required\\nadditional training or supervision.\\n\\n Contrary to Doeβs claims, S.M. v. Lincoln County does not compel reversal\\nhere. There, a jury found deliberately indifferent a municipalityβs failure to supervise\\na lieutenant who sexually abused Drug Court participants. S.M., 874 F.3d at 583β84.\\nBecause the municipality did not object, this court could not review the jury\\ninstructions, which βarguably did not give the jury an accurate sense of how\\nrigorously the [deliberate indifference] standard must be applied.β Id. at 588. With\\na βdeferential standard[ ] for review,β this court upheld the juryβs determination\\nbecause there was at least some evidence of βmisconduct . . . that should have been\\nobviousβ to other Drug Court team members. Id. at 584, 588. Doe presented no such\\nevidence. Because S.M. is distinguishable, it does not control this case.\\n\\n Hansenβs behavior was unlawful and criminal. However, the Districtβs failure\\nto provide more supervision and training did not rise to the level of a constitutional\\nviolation. The district court properly granted summary judgment.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Doe appeals the denial of his motion to enforce against the District the default\\njudgment entered against Hansen under CAVRA.2 βThis court reviews decisions on\\ndefault judgments for abuse of discretion.β Weitz Co. LLC v. MacKenzie House,\\nLLC, 665 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2012). Doe contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)\\nmandates default judgment against Hansen in his official capacity. That Rule requires\\nthe clerk to enter default against a party who βhas failed to plead or otherwise\\ndefend.β He relies on Banks v. Slay, where this court enforced against the Board of\\nPolice Commissioners a default judgment against a police officer in his individual\\nand official capacities. Banks v. Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 879β81 (8th Cir. 2017). The\\nBoard in that case never filed a responsive pleading. Id. at 879.\\n\\n Unlike Banks, the district court here entered default judgment against Hansen\\nin his individual capacity. The District filed an answer in response to each of Doeβs\\ncomplaints, denying the allegations against Hansen to the extent they βcould be\\nconstrued to pertain to District Defendant.β The Districtβs answer is a responsive\\npleading on behalf of Hansen in his official capacity. See Brewington, 902 F.3d at\\n800 (explaining that a suit against government officials in their official capacities\\nβmust be treated as a suit against theβ entity itself). The district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in denying Doeβs renewed motion for judgment against the District. See\\nOberstar v. F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 1993) (βWe have frequently\\nendorsed the strong judicial policy against default judgments.β).\\n\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the District on Doeβs CAVRA\\nclaim against the District, reasoning that CAVRA is not a predicate statutory\\n\\n 2\\n On appeal, Doe includes (only) in his statement of issues that he is entitled to\\ndefault judgment on Count II, the constitutional right of privacy claim. This court\\nwill consider only the default judgment for CAVRA because Doe did not seek default\\njudgment in the district court for the privacy claim.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fviolation for a Β§ 1983 claim. βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed\\nwaived.β Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015). Because\\nDoe does not challenge on appeal the district courtβs rationale or the entry of\\nsummary judgment, this claim is waived.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386308/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609055/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James DOE, on Behalf of Himself and 77 Other Similarly Situated Individual Minors Next Friend John Doe Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORT ZUMWALT R-II SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant Matthew M. Hansen, in His Official Capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Mike Clemens, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official Capacity Only; Patty Corum, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; Jill Hutchenson, Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, Principals or Principal Designees in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only; Dan Hadfield, 5th Grade Teacher From Progress South Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, 5th Grade Teachers in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2093\n ___________________________\n\nJames Doe, on behalf of himself and 77 other similarly situated individual minors\n next friend John Doe\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Fort Zumwalt R-II School District\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\n\n Matthew M. Hansen, in his official capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort\n Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Mike Clemens, Assistant\n superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official capacity only; Patty\nCorum, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official\n capacity only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II\n School District, Official capacity only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of\n Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official capacity only; Jill Hutchenson,\n Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane\nDoe, Principals or principal designees in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River\n summer camp, Official capacity only; Dan Hadfield, 5th grade teacher from\nProgress South Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane Doe, 5th\ngrade teachers in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River summer camp, Official\n capacity only\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\f Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n On behalf of his minor son, John Doe represents a class of current and former\nstudents of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District who were videotaped in the nude\nby Matthew M. Hansen at the Districtβs overnight camp. Doe sued Hansen in his\nindividual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for statutory and\nconstitutional violations. He also brought Β§ 1983 claims against several District\nadministrators, school principals, and teachers (the District Defendants) in their\nofficial capacities for constitutional violations. The district court1 entered default\njudgment against Hansen in his individual capacity, and summary judgment for the\nDistrict Defendants. Doe v. Hansen, 2018 WL 2223679 (E.D. Mo. May 15, 2018).\nDoe appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court affirms.\n\n I.\n\n Hansen was a teacher in the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District. The District\nsponsors an overnight outdoor camp for fifth graders that is staffed by District\nemployees. It assigned one teacher to each cabin. It also assigned a teenage student\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\fβcamp counselorβ to each cabin in order to assist the teacher and report improper\nbehavior. Hansen staffed the camp as a teacher, assigned to a cabin. In 2013, he pled\nguilty to child pornography-related charges. He admitted using a hidden camera to\nvideotape fifth-grade students in the nude inside the cabins from 2007 to 2011.\n\n During this time, the Districtβs policies addressed Hansenβs conduct. They\nprohibited teachers from β[e]ngaging in any conduct that violates Board policies . . .\n[or] constitutes criminal behavior.β They required teachers to β[m]aintain courteous\nand professional relationships with pupilsβ and prohibited them from βmak[ing]\nadvances toward, or engag[ing] in any sexual relationship with a district student.β In\n2008, the District adopted an βAudio and Visual Recordingβ policy explicitly\nprohibiting the use of recording equipment βwhere the occupants would have a\nreasonable expectation of privacy.β The District also conducted criminal background\nchecks on employees, including Hansen. It did not have knowledge of Hansenβs\nconduct until his arrest in 2012.\n\n In 2016, Doe sued on behalf of a class of current and former students whom\nHansen videotaped. The class asserted claims against Hansen and the District under\nthe Child Abuse Victims Rights Act of 1986 (CAVRA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, and 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983. The District filed an answer. Hansen did not. The district court\nentered default judgment against Hansen for liability under CAVRA. Doe then filed\ntwo amended complaints. The Second Amended Complaint asserts claims against\nHansen in his individual and official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violations of\nCAVRA and the constitutional right of privacy. It also includes Β§ 1983 claims for\nfailure to supervise and train against seven current and former District employees\n(and unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants) responsible for camp supervision (the\nDistrict Defendants) in their official capacities. The District filed an answer.\n\n Doe dismissed the claims against Hansen in his individual capacity. Doe then\nmoved to enforce against the District the default judgment against Hansen under\n\n -3-\n\fCAVRA for statutory damages. The district court denied the motion, clarifying that\nthe default judgment against Hansen was in his individual capacity and is not\nenforceable against the District (which responded to the claims against Hansen in his\nofficial capacity).\n\n The District moved for summary judgment on all counts. Doe renewed his\nmotion to enforce the default judgment against the District and, in the alternative,\nmoved for summary judgment on the CAVRA count against Hansen. The district\ncourt denied Doeβs motions and granted summary judgment to the District. Doe\nappeals the grant of summary judgment only for the failure to train and supervise\nunder Β§ 1983. He also appeals the denial of his motion for default judgment against\nthe District.\n\n II.\n\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence\nmost favorably to the nonmoving party. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d\n1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is proper if there is no\ngenuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\nlaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\n\n βIt is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\nprotects the liberty interest of a child in public school from sexual abuse.β P.H. v.\nSchool Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 658 (8th Cir. 2001). Doe sued the District\nDefendants in their official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violating the Due Process\nClause by failing to adequately supervise and train staff and students. A suit against\nthe District Defendants in their official capacity is a suit against the District. See\nBrewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). A municipality like the\nDistrict βcannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because\nit employs a tortfeasorβ like Hansen. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385,\n\n -4-\n\f389 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\n658, 691 (1978). Where a municipal policy or custom βitself violates federal law, or\ndirects an employee to do so, resolving [ ] issues of fault and causation is\nstraightforward.β Board of Cty. Commβrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).\nHowever, in cases like this, where the plaintiff claims that βmunicipal action lawful\non its face caused an employee to inflict constitutional injury, βrigorous standards of\nculpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held\nliable solely for the actions of its employee.ββ S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581,\n585 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.\n\n To hold the District liable under Β§ 1983, Doe must prove that the Districtβs\nfailure to supervise and train βamounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of\npersons with whom [Hansen came] into contact.β City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.\n378, 388 (1989). Deliberate indifference is a βstringent standard of fault.β Brown,\n520 U.S. at 410. This court applies an objective standard of deliberate indifference\nto Doeβs claim against the District, which βpermit[s] liability to be premised on\nobviousness or constructive notice.β Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).\nSee S.M., 874 F.3d at 585; Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014).\nβA pattern of similar constitutional violations . . . is βordinarily necessaryβ to\ndemonstrate deliberate indifference . . . .β Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62\n(2011), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. Alternatively, Doe may show that, in light\nof Hansenβs duties, the need for more supervision or training was βso obvious, and\nthe inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the\npolicymakers of the [District] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately\nindifferent to the need.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. See P.H., 265 F.3d at 660\n(βNotice may be implied where the failure to train is so likely to result in a\nconstitutional violation that the need for training is patently obvious . . . .β). The\nDistrictβs failure to supervise or train must be βthe moving force [behind] the\nconstitutional violation.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (alteration in original), quoting\nPolk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.\n\n -5-\n\f Doe argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring\nactual notice and behavior that βshocks the conscience.β This court need not address\nthese arguments because, on de novo review, Doe has not presented sufficient\nevidence to establish deliberate indifference.\n\n Doe has not shown that the District had reason to believe that its training and\nsupervision were inadequate. He presented no evidence of a pattern of misconduct\nthat would alert the District that its training and supervision were insufficient to\nprevent Hansenβs conduct. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Instead, he contends that\na 2004 Department of Education reportβestimating that at least 4.5 million K-12\nstudents experienced sexual misconduct by a school employeeβprovided notice. The\nreport addresses sexual misconduct generally, not child pornography. It is\ninsufficient to give the District notice of Hansenβs particular misconduct or of the risk\nhe would videotape students in the nude. Doe also argues the District had βactual\nnoticeβ because it relied on teenage camp counselors to report inappropriate behavior.\nIn 2006, for instance, a camp counselor observed Hansen in a bunk with a fifth\ngrader. Seeing the counselor, Hansen jumped out of the bunk. The counselor did not,\nhowever, report this incident until after Hansenβs arrest. There is no evidence the\nDistrict was aware counselors were not reporting inappropriate behavior. Nor is there\nevidence the District had any warning of Hansenβs misconduct before his arrest in\n2012. Without notice, the Districtβs failure to provide more training or supervision\nis not deliberately indifferent. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (βWithout notice that a\ncourse of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be\nsaid to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of\nconstitutional rights.β); Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1217 (8th Cir.\n2013) (βAbsent some form of notice, the city cannot be deliberately indifferent to the\nrisk that its training or supervision . . . would result in βa violation of a particular\nconstitutional or statutory right.ββ (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411)).\n\n This is also not a case where the risk was βso obviousβ that the Districtβs\nfailure to provide more training or supervision constitutes deliberate indifference. Cf.\n\n -6-\n\fMarsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2018) (β[T]his court has held that\nthere is no patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault detainees\nin light of the regular law enforcement duties of officers and the fact that β[a]n\nobjectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to engage in such\nbehavior.ββ (second alteration in original) (quoting Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 999\n(8th Cir. 2010))). Doe claims the District created an βobvious riskβ by assigning only\none teacher to each cabin and allowing teachers to bring recording equipment into the\ncabin. However, the Districtβs policies prohibited Hansenβs conduct. Teachers could\nnot use recording equipment where students had an expectation of privacy. Teachers\nwere to maintain professional relationships and could not engage in any kind of\nsexual relationship with students. The District relied on camp counselors to report\nany inappropriate behavior. In light of these policies, Doe cannot prove that the risk\nthat a teacher would engage in this kind of conduct was so obvious that it required\nadditional training or supervision.\n\n Contrary to Doeβs claims, S.M. v. Lincoln County does not compel reversal\nhere. There, a jury found deliberately indifferent a municipalityβs failure to supervise\na lieutenant who sexually abused Drug Court participants. S.M., 874 F.3d at 583β84.\nBecause the municipality did not object, this court could not review the jury\ninstructions, which βarguably did not give the jury an accurate sense of how\nrigorously the [deliberate indifference] standard must be applied.β Id. at 588. With\na βdeferential standard[ ] for review,β this court upheld the juryβs determination\nbecause there was at least some evidence of βmisconduct . . . that should have been\nobviousβ to other Drug Court team members. Id. at 584, 588. Doe presented no such\nevidence. Because S.M. is distinguishable, it does not control this case.\n\n Hansenβs behavior was unlawful and criminal. However, the Districtβs failure\nto provide more supervision and training did not rise to the level of a constitutional\nviolation. The district court properly granted summary judgment.\n\n\n -7-\n\f III.\n\n Doe appeals the denial of his motion to enforce against the District the default\njudgment entered against Hansen under CAVRA.2 βThis court reviews decisions on\ndefault judgments for abuse of discretion.β Weitz Co. LLC v. MacKenzie House,\nLLC, 665 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2012). Doe contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)\nmandates default judgment against Hansen in his official capacity. That Rule requires\nthe clerk to enter default against a party who βhas failed to plead or otherwise\ndefend.β He relies on Banks v. Slay, where this court enforced against the Board of\nPolice Commissioners a default judgment against a police officer in his individual\nand official capacities. Banks v. Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 879β81 (8th Cir. 2017). The\nBoard in that case never filed a responsive pleading. Id. at 879.\n\n Unlike Banks, the district court here entered default judgment against Hansen\nin his individual capacity. The District filed an answer in response to each of Doeβs\ncomplaints, denying the allegations against Hansen to the extent they βcould be\nconstrued to pertain to District Defendant.β The Districtβs answer is a responsive\npleading on behalf of Hansen in his official capacity. See Brewington, 902 F.3d at\n800 (explaining that a suit against government officials in their official capacities\nβmust be treated as a suit against theβ entity itself). The district court did not abuse\nits discretion in denying Doeβs renewed motion for judgment against the District. See\nOberstar v. F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 1993) (βWe have frequently\nendorsed the strong judicial policy against default judgments.β).\n\n The district court granted summary judgment to the District on Doeβs CAVRA\nclaim against the District, reasoning that CAVRA is not a predicate statutory\n\n 2\n On appeal, Doe includes (only) in his statement of issues that he is entitled to\ndefault judgment on Count II, the constitutional right of privacy claim. This court\nwill consider only the default judgment for CAVRA because Doe did not seek default\njudgment in the district court for the privacy claim.\n\n -8-\n\fviolation for a Β§ 1983 claim. βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed\nwaived.β Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015). Because\nDoe does not challenge on appeal the district courtβs rationale or the entry of\nsummary judgment, this claim is waived.\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James DOE, on Behalf of Himself and 77 Other Similarly Situated Individual Minors Next Friend John Doe Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORT ZUMWALT R-II SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant Matthew M. Hansen, in His Official Capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Mike Clemens, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official Capacity Only; Patty Corum, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant Superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official Capacity Only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; Jill Hutchenson, Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, Principals or Principal Designees in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only; Dan Hadfield, 5th Grade Teacher From Progress South Elementary School, Official Capacity Only; John and Jane Doe, 5th Grade Teachers in Charge of Supervision at the Cuivre River Summer Camp, Official Capacity Only Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2093\\n ___________________________\\n\\nJames Doe, on behalf of himself and 77 other similarly situated individual minors\\n next friend John Doe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Fort Zumwalt R-II School District\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n Matthew M. Hansen, in his official capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Mike Clemens, Assistant\\n superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School, Official capacity only; Patty\\nCorum, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District, Official\\n capacity only; Jackie Floyd, Assistant superintendent of the Fort Zumwalt R-II\\n School District, Official capacity only; Greg Solomon, Employee of the Fort\\n Zumwalt R-II School District, Official capacity only; Nelda Wetzel, Principal of\\n Lewis & Clark Elementary School, Official capacity only; Jill Hutchenson,\\n Principal of Dardenne Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane\\nDoe, Principals or principal designees in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River\\n summer camp, Official capacity only; Dan Hadfield, 5th grade teacher from\\nProgress South Elementary School, Official capacity only; John and Jane Doe, 5th\\ngrade teachers in charge of supervision at the Cuivre River summer camp, Official\\n capacity only\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n On behalf of his minor son, John Doe represents a class of current and former\\nstudents of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District who were videotaped in the nude\\nby Matthew M. Hansen at the Districtβs overnight camp. Doe sued Hansen in his\\nindividual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for statutory and\\nconstitutional violations. He also brought Β§ 1983 claims against several District\\nadministrators, school principals, and teachers (the District Defendants) in their\\nofficial capacities for constitutional violations. The district court1 entered default\\njudgment against Hansen in his individual capacity, and summary judgment for the\\nDistrict Defendants. Doe v. Hansen, 2018 WL 2223679 (E.D. Mo. May 15, 2018).\\nDoe appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court affirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Hansen was a teacher in the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District. The District\\nsponsors an overnight outdoor camp for fifth graders that is staffed by District\\nemployees. It assigned one teacher to each cabin. It also assigned a teenage student\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fβcamp counselorβ to each cabin in order to assist the teacher and report improper\\nbehavior. Hansen staffed the camp as a teacher, assigned to a cabin. In 2013, he pled\\nguilty to child pornography-related charges. He admitted using a hidden camera to\\nvideotape fifth-grade students in the nude inside the cabins from 2007 to 2011.\\n\\n During this time, the Districtβs policies addressed Hansenβs conduct. They\\nprohibited teachers from β[e]ngaging in any conduct that violates Board policies . . .\\n[or] constitutes criminal behavior.β They required teachers to β[m]aintain courteous\\nand professional relationships with pupilsβ and prohibited them from βmak[ing]\\nadvances toward, or engag[ing] in any sexual relationship with a district student.β In\\n2008, the District adopted an βAudio and Visual Recordingβ policy explicitly\\nprohibiting the use of recording equipment βwhere the occupants would have a\\nreasonable expectation of privacy.β The District also conducted criminal background\\nchecks on employees, including Hansen. It did not have knowledge of Hansenβs\\nconduct until his arrest in 2012.\\n\\n In 2016, Doe sued on behalf of a class of current and former students whom\\nHansen videotaped. The class asserted claims against Hansen and the District under\\nthe Child Abuse Victims Rights Act of 1986 (CAVRA), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, and 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983. The District filed an answer. Hansen did not. The district court\\nentered default judgment against Hansen for liability under CAVRA. Doe then filed\\ntwo amended complaints. The Second Amended Complaint asserts claims against\\nHansen in his individual and official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violations of\\nCAVRA and the constitutional right of privacy. It also includes Β§ 1983 claims for\\nfailure to supervise and train against seven current and former District employees\\n(and unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants) responsible for camp supervision (the\\nDistrict Defendants) in their official capacities. The District filed an answer.\\n\\n Doe dismissed the claims against Hansen in his individual capacity. Doe then\\nmoved to enforce against the District the default judgment against Hansen under\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fCAVRA for statutory damages. The district court denied the motion, clarifying that\\nthe default judgment against Hansen was in his individual capacity and is not\\nenforceable against the District (which responded to the claims against Hansen in his\\nofficial capacity).\\n\\n The District moved for summary judgment on all counts. Doe renewed his\\nmotion to enforce the default judgment against the District and, in the alternative,\\nmoved for summary judgment on the CAVRA count against Hansen. The district\\ncourt denied Doeβs motions and granted summary judgment to the District. Doe\\nappeals the grant of summary judgment only for the failure to train and supervise\\nunder Β§ 1983. He also appeals the denial of his motion for default judgment against\\nthe District.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence\\nmost favorably to the nonmoving party. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d\\n1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is proper if there is no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n βIt is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\\nprotects the liberty interest of a child in public school from sexual abuse.β P.H. v.\\nSchool Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 658 (8th Cir. 2001). Doe sued the District\\nDefendants in their official capacities under Β§ 1983 for violating the Due Process\\nClause by failing to adequately supervise and train staff and students. A suit against\\nthe District Defendants in their official capacity is a suit against the District. See\\nBrewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). A municipality like the\\nDistrict βcannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because\\nit employs a tortfeasorβ like Hansen. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385,\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f389 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc), citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658, 691 (1978). Where a municipal policy or custom βitself violates federal law, or\\ndirects an employee to do so, resolving [ ] issues of fault and causation is\\nstraightforward.β Board of Cty. Commβrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).\\nHowever, in cases like this, where the plaintiff claims that βmunicipal action lawful\\non its face caused an employee to inflict constitutional injury, βrigorous standards of\\nculpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held\\nliable solely for the actions of its employee.ββ S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581,\\n585 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.\\n\\n To hold the District liable under Β§ 1983, Doe must prove that the Districtβs\\nfailure to supervise and train βamounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of\\npersons with whom [Hansen came] into contact.β City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.\\n378, 388 (1989). Deliberate indifference is a βstringent standard of fault.β Brown,\\n520 U.S. at 410. This court applies an objective standard of deliberate indifference\\nto Doeβs claim against the District, which βpermit[s] liability to be premised on\\nobviousness or constructive notice.β Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).\\nSee S.M., 874 F.3d at 585; Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014).\\nβA pattern of similar constitutional violations . . . is βordinarily necessaryβ to\\ndemonstrate deliberate indifference . . . .β Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62\\n(2011), quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. Alternatively, Doe may show that, in light\\nof Hansenβs duties, the need for more supervision or training was βso obvious, and\\nthe inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the\\npolicymakers of the [District] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately\\nindifferent to the need.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. See P.H., 265 F.3d at 660\\n(βNotice may be implied where the failure to train is so likely to result in a\\nconstitutional violation that the need for training is patently obvious . . . .β). The\\nDistrictβs failure to supervise or train must be βthe moving force [behind] the\\nconstitutional violation.β Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (alteration in original), quoting\\nPolk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Doe argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring\\nactual notice and behavior that βshocks the conscience.β This court need not address\\nthese arguments because, on de novo review, Doe has not presented sufficient\\nevidence to establish deliberate indifference.\\n\\n Doe has not shown that the District had reason to believe that its training and\\nsupervision were inadequate. He presented no evidence of a pattern of misconduct\\nthat would alert the District that its training and supervision were insufficient to\\nprevent Hansenβs conduct. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Instead, he contends that\\na 2004 Department of Education reportβestimating that at least 4.5 million K-12\\nstudents experienced sexual misconduct by a school employeeβprovided notice. The\\nreport addresses sexual misconduct generally, not child pornography. It is\\ninsufficient to give the District notice of Hansenβs particular misconduct or of the risk\\nhe would videotape students in the nude. Doe also argues the District had βactual\\nnoticeβ because it relied on teenage camp counselors to report inappropriate behavior.\\nIn 2006, for instance, a camp counselor observed Hansen in a bunk with a fifth\\ngrader. Seeing the counselor, Hansen jumped out of the bunk. The counselor did not,\\nhowever, report this incident until after Hansenβs arrest. There is no evidence the\\nDistrict was aware counselors were not reporting inappropriate behavior. Nor is there\\nevidence the District had any warning of Hansenβs misconduct before his arrest in\\n2012. Without notice, the Districtβs failure to provide more training or supervision\\nis not deliberately indifferent. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (βWithout notice that a\\ncourse of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be\\nsaid to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of\\nconstitutional rights.β); Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1217 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (βAbsent some form of notice, the city cannot be deliberately indifferent to the\\nrisk that its training or supervision . . . would result in βa violation of a particular\\nconstitutional or statutory right.ββ (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411)).\\n\\n This is also not a case where the risk was βso obviousβ that the Districtβs\\nfailure to provide more training or supervision constitutes deliberate indifference. Cf.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fMarsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2018) (β[T]his court has held that\\nthere is no patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault detainees\\nin light of the regular law enforcement duties of officers and the fact that β[a]n\\nobjectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to engage in such\\nbehavior.ββ (second alteration in original) (quoting Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 999\\n(8th Cir. 2010))). Doe claims the District created an βobvious riskβ by assigning only\\none teacher to each cabin and allowing teachers to bring recording equipment into the\\ncabin. However, the Districtβs policies prohibited Hansenβs conduct. Teachers could\\nnot use recording equipment where students had an expectation of privacy. Teachers\\nwere to maintain professional relationships and could not engage in any kind of\\nsexual relationship with students. The District relied on camp counselors to report\\nany inappropriate behavior. In light of these policies, Doe cannot prove that the risk\\nthat a teacher would engage in this kind of conduct was so obvious that it required\\nadditional training or supervision.\\n\\n Contrary to Doeβs claims, S.M. v. Lincoln County does not compel reversal\\nhere. There, a jury found deliberately indifferent a municipalityβs failure to supervise\\na lieutenant who sexually abused Drug Court participants. S.M., 874 F.3d at 583β84.\\nBecause the municipality did not object, this court could not review the jury\\ninstructions, which βarguably did not give the jury an accurate sense of how\\nrigorously the [deliberate indifference] standard must be applied.β Id. at 588. With\\na βdeferential standard[ ] for review,β this court upheld the juryβs determination\\nbecause there was at least some evidence of βmisconduct . . . that should have been\\nobviousβ to other Drug Court team members. Id. at 584, 588. Doe presented no such\\nevidence. Because S.M. is distinguishable, it does not control this case.\\n\\n Hansenβs behavior was unlawful and criminal. However, the Districtβs failure\\nto provide more supervision and training did not rise to the level of a constitutional\\nviolation. The district court properly granted summary judgment.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Doe appeals the denial of his motion to enforce against the District the default\\njudgment entered against Hansen under CAVRA.2 βThis court reviews decisions on\\ndefault judgments for abuse of discretion.β Weitz Co. LLC v. MacKenzie House,\\nLLC, 665 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2012). Doe contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)\\nmandates default judgment against Hansen in his official capacity. That Rule requires\\nthe clerk to enter default against a party who βhas failed to plead or otherwise\\ndefend.β He relies on Banks v. Slay, where this court enforced against the Board of\\nPolice Commissioners a default judgment against a police officer in his individual\\nand official capacities. Banks v. Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 879β81 (8th Cir. 2017). The\\nBoard in that case never filed a responsive pleading. Id. at 879.\\n\\n Unlike Banks, the district court here entered default judgment against Hansen\\nin his individual capacity. The District filed an answer in response to each of Doeβs\\ncomplaints, denying the allegations against Hansen to the extent they βcould be\\nconstrued to pertain to District Defendant.β The Districtβs answer is a responsive\\npleading on behalf of Hansen in his official capacity. See Brewington, 902 F.3d at\\n800 (explaining that a suit against government officials in their official capacities\\nβmust be treated as a suit against theβ entity itself). The district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in denying Doeβs renewed motion for judgment against the District. See\\nOberstar v. F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 1993) (βWe have frequently\\nendorsed the strong judicial policy against default judgments.β).\\n\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the District on Doeβs CAVRA\\nclaim against the District, reasoning that CAVRA is not a predicate statutory\\n\\n 2\\n On appeal, Doe includes (only) in his statement of issues that he is entitled to\\ndefault judgment on Count II, the constitutional right of privacy claim. This court\\nwill consider only the default judgment for CAVRA because Doe did not seek default\\njudgment in the district court for the privacy claim.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fviolation for a Β§ 1983 claim. βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed\\nwaived.β Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015). Because\\nDoe does not challenge on appeal the district courtβs rationale or the entry of\\nsummary judgment, this claim is waived.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1781,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609056,"string":"4,609,056"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Dilang DAT, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dilang Dat v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3652"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3652\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dilang Dat\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dilang Nhial Dat pled guilty to robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and\\n2. He moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\\nwas ineffective by misadvising him about the immigration consequences of his guilty\\nplea. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Dat\\n\\fappeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, this court reverses\\nand remands.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dat, a South Sudanese citizen, was born in 1993 at a refugee camp in Kenya\\nafter his parents fled Sudan. Admitted to the United States around 1994, he became\\na lawful permanent resident. For most of his life, he lived in Omaha, Nebraska with\\nhis parents and five younger siblings. His father is wheelchair-bound, and his mother,\\nthe familyβs sole provider, works in a factory.\\n\\n In 2014, Dat was indicted on two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, under 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2, and one count of brandishing a firearm during a robbery, under\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. He pled guilty to one robbery count. The other charges\\nwere dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 78 monthsβ imprisonment.\\n\\n In an affidavit, Dat asserts: Before pleading guilty, he asked his counsel about\\nthe possibility of deportation. His counsel spoke to an immigration specialist, then\\nadvised he would not be deported because he was a long-tenured lawful permanent\\nresident, not an βillegal immigrant.β After rejecting two plea agreements with strong\\ndeportation language, he accepted a plea acknowledging βthere are or may be\\ncollateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to immigration.β\\nHis acceptance was based on counselβs assurance his immigration status would be\\nunaffected. He learned, after his conviction, this immigration advice was incorrect,\\nwhen his motherβs attempt to renew his green card was denied.\\n\\n Dat moved to vacate his conviction under Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\\nmisadvised him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The district\\ncourt denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. In a brief order, the court\\nfound he was advised of the immigration consequences by his plea agreement,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fPetition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and colloquy with the court at his change-of-plea\\nhearing. Dat appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion and\\nabused its discretion by not holding a hearing.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews Β§ 2255-ineffective-assistance claims de novo, and the\\nunderlying factual findings for clear error. Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 534\\n(8th Cir. 2014). βA district courtβs denial of an evidentiary hearing on a Β§ 2255\\nmotion may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.β Id. To establish ineffective\\nassistance during plea negotiations, βa defendant must show that counselβs\\nrepresentation βfell below an objective standard of reasonablenessβ and that he was\\nprejudiced as a result.β Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017),\\nquoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). A Β§ 2255 petitioner\\nis entitled to an evidentiary hearing β[u]nless the motion and the files and records of\\nthe case conclusively show that the [petitioner] is entitled to no relief.β 28 U.S.C. Β§\\n2255(b). βA petitionerβs allegations must be accepted as true and a hearing should\\nbe held unless they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, merely\\nconclusions, or would not entitle the petitioner to relief.β Garcia v. United States,\\n679 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Establishing Strickland deficiency requires showing βthat counsel made errors\\nso serious that counsel was not functioning as the βcounselβ guaranteed the defendant\\nby the Sixth Amendment.β White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750, 752β53 (8th Cir. 2014),\\nquoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To provide constitutionally effective assistance,\\nβcriminal defense attorneys have a duty to inform clients about the possible\\nimmigration consequences of pleading guilty.β Barajas v. United States, 877 F.3d\\n378, 380 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Padilla v. United States, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice\\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.\\n\\n Dat asserts his counsel assured him he would not be deported. This would be\\ndeficient representation because his conviction subjects him to mandatory removal.\\nHobbs Act robbery (with a 78-month term of imprisonment) is clearly an aggravated\\nfelony. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1101 (43)(F) (βaggravated felonyβ means a crime of violence\\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 16 with a term of imprisonment of at least one year, which includes\\nβan offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical\\nforce against the person or property of anotherβ); Diaz v. United States, 863 F.3d 781,\\n783 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under\\nanalogous statute), citing United States v. House, 825 F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016);\\nUnited States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding Hobbs Act\\nrobbery βhas as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\\nagainst the person of anotherβ). The Immigration and Nationality Act is βsuccinct,\\nclear, and explicitβ about the removal consequence for aggravated felonies. Padilla,\\n559 U.S. at 368. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (βAny alien who is convicted of\\nan aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.β); 8 U.S.C. Β§\\n1229b(a)(3) (an alien βconvicted of any aggravated felonyβ is not eligible for\\ncancellation of removal); Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 (2013)\\n(aggravated felony conviction subjects a lawful permanent resident to βmandatory\\nremovalβ).\\n\\n Because the deportation consequence is clear, βthe duty to give correct advice\\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Taking Datβs assertions as true, his\\ncounsel provided βfalse assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal\\nfrom this country.β Id. at 368. Nothing in the record contradicts his factual\\nassertions about this advice. Like in Padilla, β[t]his is not a hard case in which to\\nfind deficiency: The consequences of [Datβs] plea could easily be determined from\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\freading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his\\ncounselβs advice was incorrect.β Id. at 368β69.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Prejudice is a closer question. Dat asserts he would have rejected the plea and\\ninsisted on trial but for his counselβs misadvice. If true, this shows prejudice. See\\nJae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (β[W]hen a defendant claims that his counselβs deficient\\nperformance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant\\ncan show prejudice by demonstrating a βreasonable probability that, but for counselβs\\nerrors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.ββ),\\nquoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). But, β[c]ourts should not upset a\\nplea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have\\npleaded but for his attorneyβs deficiencies. Judges should instead look to\\ncontemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendantβs expressed preferences.β Id.\\nat 1967. Though the record lacks evidence such as an affidavit from plea counsel or\\nthe allegedly rejected plea agreements, sufficient contemporaneous evidence\\nsubstantiates his claims.\\n\\n Datβs background supports his assertion that he was focused on remaining in\\nthe country, which the Government does not contest. Cf. Doe v. United States, 915\\nF.3d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 2019) (β[Defendantβs] history in the United States, his family\\ncircumstances, and his gainful employment all signal [his] strong connection to, and\\ndesire to remain in, the United States.β), citing Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At the\\ntime of his plea, he had lived in the United States with his family for two decades.\\nAt the change-of-plea hearing, his counsel noted his request for a prison placement\\nclose to his family, due to travel difficulties. There is no indication of ties to another\\ncountry. True, he faced around five more years in prison from a conviction on all\\ncounts at trial (if the two counts had not been dismissed per the plea agreement).\\nHowever, βdeportation is βa particularly severe penalty,β which may be of greater\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fconcern to a convicted alien than βany potential jail sentence.ββ Sessions v. Dimaya,\\n138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018), quoting Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At this stage,\\nsufficient evidence supports his assertions of prejudice. See Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at\\n1968β69 (defendant demonstrated prejudice from counselβs misadvice βhe would not\\nbe deported if he pleaded guiltyβ where βdeportation [was] the βdeterminative issueβ\\n. . . in plea discussions,β he βhad strong connections to this country and no other,β and\\nβthe consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than\\npleadingβ).\\n\\n The Government argues that contemporaneous evidence contradicts Datβs\\nassertion he would not have pled guilty if his lawyer had properly advised him. As\\nthe district court noted, he acknowledged in his plea agreement that βthere are or may\\nbe collateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to\\nimmigration.β In his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, he acknowledged that a guilty\\nplea in βmost federal felony casesβ results in permanent removal. And at his\\nchange-of-plea hearing, he affirmed he was aware his conviction βcould affectβ his\\nimmigration status and had discussed the matter with his attorney. However, his\\ncounselβs alleged misadvice specifically undermined these equivocal warnings. They\\ninformed Dat of a general possibility of immigration consequences. They do not\\nnecessarily contradict or correct his counselβs alleged misadvice he would not suffer\\nthose consequences in his case. Compare Doe, 915 F.3d at 913 (counselβs\\nmisadviceβthat deportation was not a mandatory result of the guilty pleaβnot\\nremedied where judge asked if defendant understood he βmay be deportedβ and did\\nnot inform him of the βmandatory consequencesβ of his plea to an aggravated felony),\\nand United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (βgeneral and\\nequivocal admonishmentβ that defendantβs plea βcould lead to deportationβ was\\nβinsufficient to correct counselβs affirmative misadvice that [defendantβs] crime was\\nnot categorically a deportable offenseβ), with United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421,\\n428 (3d Cir. 2015) (any error in counselβs failure to inform defendant his guilty plea\\nsubjected him to automatic deportation was cured by plea agreement and district\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fcourtβs βin-depth colloquy,β both of which βmade clear that [defendant] was willing\\nto plead guilty even if that plea would lead to automatic deportationβ). The record\\nhere is inconclusive whether the plea documents or district court remedied counselβs\\nmisadvice.\\n\\n The PSR noted Dat would be subject to βAdministrative Removal,β and\\nimmigration proceedings would commence upon his release. Dat accepted the PSR\\nwithout objection; his counsel affirmed she discussed it with him. In Abraham v.\\nUnited States, 699 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2012), the defendant could not show prejudice\\nwhen βthe PSR indicated a likelihood that [the defendant] would be deported if\\nconvicted; [the defendant] confirmed that he had read the PSR, discussed it with his\\ncounsel, and understood it; and [the defendant] never moved to withdraw his guilty\\nplea.β Abraham, 699 F.3d at 1053 (alterations in original). Abraham is\\ndistinguishable. There, the defendant claimed counsel failed to βadvise him that the\\noffense βvirtually ensuredβ deportation.β Id. Because the PSR remedied any failure\\nby βclearly indicat[ing] his offense rendered him deportable,β there was no reasonable\\nprobability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had\\nβadvised him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.β See id., citing\\nPadilla, 559 U.S. at 366. Here, Dat asserts counsel misadvised he would not be\\ndeported. The PSR does not necessarily remedy this affirmative misadvice. Relying\\non counselβs advice, Dat could have reasonably believed he would not be deported\\nin immigration proceedings. These assertions show an evidentiary hearing is\\nrequired. See Witthar v. United States, 793 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2015) (β[T]he\\ngeneral rule is that a hearing is necessary prior to the [Β§ 2255] motionβs disposition\\nif a factual dispute exists.β).\\n\\n At sentencing, counsel noted Dat had an immigration attorney and was dealing\\nwith immigration ramifications. The Government argues this shows he knew the\\ndeportation risk. In United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018),\\nan ineffective-assistance claim failed because the defendant βsurely knewβ\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdeportation was likely based on the district courtβs and counselβs advice at the\\nchange-of-plea hearing, β[c]ombined with what [the defendant] already knew from\\nhis ICE custody and prior dealings with immigration officials.β Ramirez-Jimenez,\\n907 F.3d at 1094. Dat, however, was not in ICE custody during this case. The scope\\nof his immigration attorneyβs representation is not in the record, let alone the advice,\\nif any. He asserts his plea counsel affirmatively misadvised him, and there is a factual\\ndispute whether that misadvice was remedied. Unlike in Ramirez-Jimenez, the record\\nhere is inconclusive whether Dat βsurely knewβ deportation was likely.\\n\\n The record does not conclusively show that Dat is entitled to no relief. The\\ndistrict court thus abused its discretion by denying relief without an evidentiary\\nhearing. This court remands for an evidentiary hearing on Datβs ineffective-\\nassistance claim.1\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Datβs motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386309/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609056/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dilang DAT, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3652\n ___________________________\n\n Dilang Dat\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Dilang Nhial Dat pled guilty to robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and\n2. He moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\nwas ineffective by misadvising him about the immigration consequences of his guilty\nplea. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Dat\n\fappeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, this court reverses\nand remands.\n\n I.\n\n Dat, a South Sudanese citizen, was born in 1993 at a refugee camp in Kenya\nafter his parents fled Sudan. Admitted to the United States around 1994, he became\na lawful permanent resident. For most of his life, he lived in Omaha, Nebraska with\nhis parents and five younger siblings. His father is wheelchair-bound, and his mother,\nthe familyβs sole provider, works in a factory.\n\n In 2014, Dat was indicted on two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, under 18\nU.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2, and one count of brandishing a firearm during a robbery, under\n18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. He pled guilty to one robbery count. The other charges\nwere dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 78 monthsβ imprisonment.\n\n In an affidavit, Dat asserts: Before pleading guilty, he asked his counsel about\nthe possibility of deportation. His counsel spoke to an immigration specialist, then\nadvised he would not be deported because he was a long-tenured lawful permanent\nresident, not an βillegal immigrant.β After rejecting two plea agreements with strong\ndeportation language, he accepted a plea acknowledging βthere are or may be\ncollateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to immigration.β\nHis acceptance was based on counselβs assurance his immigration status would be\nunaffected. He learned, after his conviction, this immigration advice was incorrect,\nwhen his motherβs attempt to renew his green card was denied.\n\n Dat moved to vacate his conviction under Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\nmisadvised him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The district\ncourt denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. In a brief order, the court\nfound he was advised of the immigration consequences by his plea agreement,\n\n -2-\n\fPetition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and colloquy with the court at his change-of-plea\nhearing. Dat appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion and\nabused its discretion by not holding a hearing.\n\n II.\n\n This court reviews Β§ 2255-ineffective-assistance claims de novo, and the\nunderlying factual findings for clear error. Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 534\n(8th Cir. 2014). βA district courtβs denial of an evidentiary hearing on a Β§ 2255\nmotion may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.β Id. To establish ineffective\nassistance during plea negotiations, βa defendant must show that counselβs\nrepresentation βfell below an objective standard of reasonablenessβ and that he was\nprejudiced as a result.β Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017),\nquoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). A Β§ 2255 petitioner\nis entitled to an evidentiary hearing β[u]nless the motion and the files and records of\nthe case conclusively show that the [petitioner] is entitled to no relief.β 28 U.S.C. Β§\n2255(b). βA petitionerβs allegations must be accepted as true and a hearing should\nbe held unless they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, merely\nconclusions, or would not entitle the petitioner to relief.β Garcia v. United States,\n679 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2012).\n\n A.\n\n Establishing Strickland deficiency requires showing βthat counsel made errors\nso serious that counsel was not functioning as the βcounselβ guaranteed the defendant\nby the Sixth Amendment.β White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750, 752β53 (8th Cir. 2014),\nquoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To provide constitutionally effective assistance,\nβcriminal defense attorneys have a duty to inform clients about the possible\nimmigration consequences of pleading guilty.β Barajas v. United States, 877 F.3d\n378, 380 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Padilla v. United States, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).\n\n -3-\n\f[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.\n\n Dat asserts his counsel assured him he would not be deported. This would be\ndeficient representation because his conviction subjects him to mandatory removal.\nHobbs Act robbery (with a 78-month term of imprisonment) is clearly an aggravated\nfelony. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1101 (43)(F) (βaggravated felonyβ means a crime of violence\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 16 with a term of imprisonment of at least one year, which includes\nβan offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical\nforce against the person or property of anotherβ); Diaz v. United States, 863 F.3d 781,\n783 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under\nanalogous statute), citing United States v. House, 825 F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016);\nUnited States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding Hobbs Act\nrobbery βhas as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\nagainst the person of anotherβ). The Immigration and Nationality Act is βsuccinct,\nclear, and explicitβ about the removal consequence for aggravated felonies. Padilla,\n559 U.S. at 368. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (βAny alien who is convicted of\nan aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.β); 8 U.S.C. Β§\n1229b(a)(3) (an alien βconvicted of any aggravated felonyβ is not eligible for\ncancellation of removal); Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 (2013)\n(aggravated felony conviction subjects a lawful permanent resident to βmandatory\nremovalβ).\n\n Because the deportation consequence is clear, βthe duty to give correct advice\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Taking Datβs assertions as true, his\ncounsel provided βfalse assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal\nfrom this country.β Id. at 368. Nothing in the record contradicts his factual\nassertions about this advice. Like in Padilla, β[t]his is not a hard case in which to\nfind deficiency: The consequences of [Datβs] plea could easily be determined from\n\n\n -4-\n\freading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his\ncounselβs advice was incorrect.β Id. at 368β69.\n\n B.\n\n Prejudice is a closer question. Dat asserts he would have rejected the plea and\ninsisted on trial but for his counselβs misadvice. If true, this shows prejudice. See\nJae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (β[W]hen a defendant claims that his counselβs deficient\nperformance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant\ncan show prejudice by demonstrating a βreasonable probability that, but for counselβs\nerrors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.ββ),\nquoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). But, β[c]ourts should not upset a\nplea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have\npleaded but for his attorneyβs deficiencies. Judges should instead look to\ncontemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendantβs expressed preferences.β Id.\nat 1967. Though the record lacks evidence such as an affidavit from plea counsel or\nthe allegedly rejected plea agreements, sufficient contemporaneous evidence\nsubstantiates his claims.\n\n Datβs background supports his assertion that he was focused on remaining in\nthe country, which the Government does not contest. Cf. Doe v. United States, 915\nF.3d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 2019) (β[Defendantβs] history in the United States, his family\ncircumstances, and his gainful employment all signal [his] strong connection to, and\ndesire to remain in, the United States.β), citing Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At the\ntime of his plea, he had lived in the United States with his family for two decades.\nAt the change-of-plea hearing, his counsel noted his request for a prison placement\nclose to his family, due to travel difficulties. There is no indication of ties to another\ncountry. True, he faced around five more years in prison from a conviction on all\ncounts at trial (if the two counts had not been dismissed per the plea agreement).\nHowever, βdeportation is βa particularly severe penalty,β which may be of greater\n\n -5-\n\fconcern to a convicted alien than βany potential jail sentence.ββ Sessions v. Dimaya,\n138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018), quoting Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At this stage,\nsufficient evidence supports his assertions of prejudice. See Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at\n1968β69 (defendant demonstrated prejudice from counselβs misadvice βhe would not\nbe deported if he pleaded guiltyβ where βdeportation [was] the βdeterminative issueβ\n. . . in plea discussions,β he βhad strong connections to this country and no other,β and\nβthe consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than\npleadingβ).\n\n The Government argues that contemporaneous evidence contradicts Datβs\nassertion he would not have pled guilty if his lawyer had properly advised him. As\nthe district court noted, he acknowledged in his plea agreement that βthere are or may\nbe collateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to\nimmigration.β In his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, he acknowledged that a guilty\nplea in βmost federal felony casesβ results in permanent removal. And at his\nchange-of-plea hearing, he affirmed he was aware his conviction βcould affectβ his\nimmigration status and had discussed the matter with his attorney. However, his\ncounselβs alleged misadvice specifically undermined these equivocal warnings. They\ninformed Dat of a general possibility of immigration consequences. They do not\nnecessarily contradict or correct his counselβs alleged misadvice he would not suffer\nthose consequences in his case. Compare Doe, 915 F.3d at 913 (counselβs\nmisadviceβthat deportation was not a mandatory result of the guilty pleaβnot\nremedied where judge asked if defendant understood he βmay be deportedβ and did\nnot inform him of the βmandatory consequencesβ of his plea to an aggravated felony),\nand United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (βgeneral and\nequivocal admonishmentβ that defendantβs plea βcould lead to deportationβ was\nβinsufficient to correct counselβs affirmative misadvice that [defendantβs] crime was\nnot categorically a deportable offenseβ), with United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421,\n428 (3d Cir. 2015) (any error in counselβs failure to inform defendant his guilty plea\nsubjected him to automatic deportation was cured by plea agreement and district\n\n -6-\n\fcourtβs βin-depth colloquy,β both of which βmade clear that [defendant] was willing\nto plead guilty even if that plea would lead to automatic deportationβ). The record\nhere is inconclusive whether the plea documents or district court remedied counselβs\nmisadvice.\n\n The PSR noted Dat would be subject to βAdministrative Removal,β and\nimmigration proceedings would commence upon his release. Dat accepted the PSR\nwithout objection; his counsel affirmed she discussed it with him. In Abraham v.\nUnited States, 699 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2012), the defendant could not show prejudice\nwhen βthe PSR indicated a likelihood that [the defendant] would be deported if\nconvicted; [the defendant] confirmed that he had read the PSR, discussed it with his\ncounsel, and understood it; and [the defendant] never moved to withdraw his guilty\nplea.β Abraham, 699 F.3d at 1053 (alterations in original). Abraham is\ndistinguishable. There, the defendant claimed counsel failed to βadvise him that the\noffense βvirtually ensuredβ deportation.β Id. Because the PSR remedied any failure\nby βclearly indicat[ing] his offense rendered him deportable,β there was no reasonable\nprobability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had\nβadvised him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.β See id., citing\nPadilla, 559 U.S. at 366. Here, Dat asserts counsel misadvised he would not be\ndeported. The PSR does not necessarily remedy this affirmative misadvice. Relying\non counselβs advice, Dat could have reasonably believed he would not be deported\nin immigration proceedings. These assertions show an evidentiary hearing is\nrequired. See Witthar v. United States, 793 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2015) (β[T]he\ngeneral rule is that a hearing is necessary prior to the [Β§ 2255] motionβs disposition\nif a factual dispute exists.β).\n\n At sentencing, counsel noted Dat had an immigration attorney and was dealing\nwith immigration ramifications. The Government argues this shows he knew the\ndeportation risk. In United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018),\nan ineffective-assistance claim failed because the defendant βsurely knewβ\n\n -7-\n\fdeportation was likely based on the district courtβs and counselβs advice at the\nchange-of-plea hearing, β[c]ombined with what [the defendant] already knew from\nhis ICE custody and prior dealings with immigration officials.β Ramirez-Jimenez,\n907 F.3d at 1094. Dat, however, was not in ICE custody during this case. The scope\nof his immigration attorneyβs representation is not in the record, let alone the advice,\nif any. He asserts his plea counsel affirmatively misadvised him, and there is a factual\ndispute whether that misadvice was remedied. Unlike in Ramirez-Jimenez, the record\nhere is inconclusive whether Dat βsurely knewβ deportation was likely.\n\n The record does not conclusively show that Dat is entitled to no relief. The\ndistrict court thus abused its discretion by denying relief without an evidentiary\nhearing. This court remands for an evidentiary hearing on Datβs ineffective-\nassistance claim.1\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Datβs motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dilang DAT, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3652\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dilang Dat\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dilang Nhial Dat pled guilty to robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and\\n2. He moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\\nwas ineffective by misadvising him about the immigration consequences of his guilty\\nplea. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Dat\\n\\fappeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, this court reverses\\nand remands.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dat, a South Sudanese citizen, was born in 1993 at a refugee camp in Kenya\\nafter his parents fled Sudan. Admitted to the United States around 1994, he became\\na lawful permanent resident. For most of his life, he lived in Omaha, Nebraska with\\nhis parents and five younger siblings. His father is wheelchair-bound, and his mother,\\nthe familyβs sole provider, works in a factory.\\n\\n In 2014, Dat was indicted on two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, under 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2, and one count of brandishing a firearm during a robbery, under\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. He pled guilty to one robbery count. The other charges\\nwere dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 78 monthsβ imprisonment.\\n\\n In an affidavit, Dat asserts: Before pleading guilty, he asked his counsel about\\nthe possibility of deportation. His counsel spoke to an immigration specialist, then\\nadvised he would not be deported because he was a long-tenured lawful permanent\\nresident, not an βillegal immigrant.β After rejecting two plea agreements with strong\\ndeportation language, he accepted a plea acknowledging βthere are or may be\\ncollateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to immigration.β\\nHis acceptance was based on counselβs assurance his immigration status would be\\nunaffected. He learned, after his conviction, this immigration advice was incorrect,\\nwhen his motherβs attempt to renew his green card was denied.\\n\\n Dat moved to vacate his conviction under Β§ 2255, claiming his counsel\\nmisadvised him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The district\\ncourt denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. In a brief order, the court\\nfound he was advised of the immigration consequences by his plea agreement,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fPetition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and colloquy with the court at his change-of-plea\\nhearing. Dat appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion and\\nabused its discretion by not holding a hearing.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews Β§ 2255-ineffective-assistance claims de novo, and the\\nunderlying factual findings for clear error. Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 530, 534\\n(8th Cir. 2014). βA district courtβs denial of an evidentiary hearing on a Β§ 2255\\nmotion may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.β Id. To establish ineffective\\nassistance during plea negotiations, βa defendant must show that counselβs\\nrepresentation βfell below an objective standard of reasonablenessβ and that he was\\nprejudiced as a result.β Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017),\\nquoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). A Β§ 2255 petitioner\\nis entitled to an evidentiary hearing β[u]nless the motion and the files and records of\\nthe case conclusively show that the [petitioner] is entitled to no relief.β 28 U.S.C. Β§\\n2255(b). βA petitionerβs allegations must be accepted as true and a hearing should\\nbe held unless they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, merely\\nconclusions, or would not entitle the petitioner to relief.β Garcia v. United States,\\n679 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Establishing Strickland deficiency requires showing βthat counsel made errors\\nso serious that counsel was not functioning as the βcounselβ guaranteed the defendant\\nby the Sixth Amendment.β White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750, 752β53 (8th Cir. 2014),\\nquoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To provide constitutionally effective assistance,\\nβcriminal defense attorneys have a duty to inform clients about the possible\\nimmigration consequences of pleading guilty.β Barajas v. United States, 877 F.3d\\n378, 380 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Padilla v. United States, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice\\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.\\n\\n Dat asserts his counsel assured him he would not be deported. This would be\\ndeficient representation because his conviction subjects him to mandatory removal.\\nHobbs Act robbery (with a 78-month term of imprisonment) is clearly an aggravated\\nfelony. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1101 (43)(F) (βaggravated felonyβ means a crime of violence\\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 16 with a term of imprisonment of at least one year, which includes\\nβan offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical\\nforce against the person or property of anotherβ); Diaz v. United States, 863 F.3d 781,\\n783 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under\\nanalogous statute), citing United States v. House, 825 F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016);\\nUnited States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding Hobbs Act\\nrobbery βhas as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\\nagainst the person of anotherβ). The Immigration and Nationality Act is βsuccinct,\\nclear, and explicitβ about the removal consequence for aggravated felonies. Padilla,\\n559 U.S. at 368. See 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (βAny alien who is convicted of\\nan aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.β); 8 U.S.C. Β§\\n1229b(a)(3) (an alien βconvicted of any aggravated felonyβ is not eligible for\\ncancellation of removal); Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 (2013)\\n(aggravated felony conviction subjects a lawful permanent resident to βmandatory\\nremovalβ).\\n\\n Because the deportation consequence is clear, βthe duty to give correct advice\\nis equally clear.β Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Taking Datβs assertions as true, his\\ncounsel provided βfalse assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal\\nfrom this country.β Id. at 368. Nothing in the record contradicts his factual\\nassertions about this advice. Like in Padilla, β[t]his is not a hard case in which to\\nfind deficiency: The consequences of [Datβs] plea could easily be determined from\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\freading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his\\ncounselβs advice was incorrect.β Id. at 368β69.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Prejudice is a closer question. Dat asserts he would have rejected the plea and\\ninsisted on trial but for his counselβs misadvice. If true, this shows prejudice. See\\nJae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (β[W]hen a defendant claims that his counselβs deficient\\nperformance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant\\ncan show prejudice by demonstrating a βreasonable probability that, but for counselβs\\nerrors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.ββ),\\nquoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). But, β[c]ourts should not upset a\\nplea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have\\npleaded but for his attorneyβs deficiencies. Judges should instead look to\\ncontemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendantβs expressed preferences.β Id.\\nat 1967. Though the record lacks evidence such as an affidavit from plea counsel or\\nthe allegedly rejected plea agreements, sufficient contemporaneous evidence\\nsubstantiates his claims.\\n\\n Datβs background supports his assertion that he was focused on remaining in\\nthe country, which the Government does not contest. Cf. Doe v. United States, 915\\nF.3d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 2019) (β[Defendantβs] history in the United States, his family\\ncircumstances, and his gainful employment all signal [his] strong connection to, and\\ndesire to remain in, the United States.β), citing Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At the\\ntime of his plea, he had lived in the United States with his family for two decades.\\nAt the change-of-plea hearing, his counsel noted his request for a prison placement\\nclose to his family, due to travel difficulties. There is no indication of ties to another\\ncountry. True, he faced around five more years in prison from a conviction on all\\ncounts at trial (if the two counts had not been dismissed per the plea agreement).\\nHowever, βdeportation is βa particularly severe penalty,β which may be of greater\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fconcern to a convicted alien than βany potential jail sentence.ββ Sessions v. Dimaya,\\n138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018), quoting Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. At this stage,\\nsufficient evidence supports his assertions of prejudice. See Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at\\n1968β69 (defendant demonstrated prejudice from counselβs misadvice βhe would not\\nbe deported if he pleaded guiltyβ where βdeportation [was] the βdeterminative issueβ\\n. . . in plea discussions,β he βhad strong connections to this country and no other,β and\\nβthe consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than\\npleadingβ).\\n\\n The Government argues that contemporaneous evidence contradicts Datβs\\nassertion he would not have pled guilty if his lawyer had properly advised him. As\\nthe district court noted, he acknowledged in his plea agreement that βthere are or may\\nbe collateral consequences to any conviction to include but not limited to\\nimmigration.β In his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, he acknowledged that a guilty\\nplea in βmost federal felony casesβ results in permanent removal. And at his\\nchange-of-plea hearing, he affirmed he was aware his conviction βcould affectβ his\\nimmigration status and had discussed the matter with his attorney. However, his\\ncounselβs alleged misadvice specifically undermined these equivocal warnings. They\\ninformed Dat of a general possibility of immigration consequences. They do not\\nnecessarily contradict or correct his counselβs alleged misadvice he would not suffer\\nthose consequences in his case. Compare Doe, 915 F.3d at 913 (counselβs\\nmisadviceβthat deportation was not a mandatory result of the guilty pleaβnot\\nremedied where judge asked if defendant understood he βmay be deportedβ and did\\nnot inform him of the βmandatory consequencesβ of his plea to an aggravated felony),\\nand United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (βgeneral and\\nequivocal admonishmentβ that defendantβs plea βcould lead to deportationβ was\\nβinsufficient to correct counselβs affirmative misadvice that [defendantβs] crime was\\nnot categorically a deportable offenseβ), with United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421,\\n428 (3d Cir. 2015) (any error in counselβs failure to inform defendant his guilty plea\\nsubjected him to automatic deportation was cured by plea agreement and district\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fcourtβs βin-depth colloquy,β both of which βmade clear that [defendant] was willing\\nto plead guilty even if that plea would lead to automatic deportationβ). The record\\nhere is inconclusive whether the plea documents or district court remedied counselβs\\nmisadvice.\\n\\n The PSR noted Dat would be subject to βAdministrative Removal,β and\\nimmigration proceedings would commence upon his release. Dat accepted the PSR\\nwithout objection; his counsel affirmed she discussed it with him. In Abraham v.\\nUnited States, 699 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2012), the defendant could not show prejudice\\nwhen βthe PSR indicated a likelihood that [the defendant] would be deported if\\nconvicted; [the defendant] confirmed that he had read the PSR, discussed it with his\\ncounsel, and understood it; and [the defendant] never moved to withdraw his guilty\\nplea.β Abraham, 699 F.3d at 1053 (alterations in original). Abraham is\\ndistinguishable. There, the defendant claimed counsel failed to βadvise him that the\\noffense βvirtually ensuredβ deportation.β Id. Because the PSR remedied any failure\\nby βclearly indicat[ing] his offense rendered him deportable,β there was no reasonable\\nprobability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had\\nβadvised him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.β See id., citing\\nPadilla, 559 U.S. at 366. Here, Dat asserts counsel misadvised he would not be\\ndeported. The PSR does not necessarily remedy this affirmative misadvice. Relying\\non counselβs advice, Dat could have reasonably believed he would not be deported\\nin immigration proceedings. These assertions show an evidentiary hearing is\\nrequired. See Witthar v. United States, 793 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2015) (β[T]he\\ngeneral rule is that a hearing is necessary prior to the [Β§ 2255] motionβs disposition\\nif a factual dispute exists.β).\\n\\n At sentencing, counsel noted Dat had an immigration attorney and was dealing\\nwith immigration ramifications. The Government argues this shows he knew the\\ndeportation risk. In United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018),\\nan ineffective-assistance claim failed because the defendant βsurely knewβ\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdeportation was likely based on the district courtβs and counselβs advice at the\\nchange-of-plea hearing, β[c]ombined with what [the defendant] already knew from\\nhis ICE custody and prior dealings with immigration officials.β Ramirez-Jimenez,\\n907 F.3d at 1094. Dat, however, was not in ICE custody during this case. The scope\\nof his immigration attorneyβs representation is not in the record, let alone the advice,\\nif any. He asserts his plea counsel affirmatively misadvised him, and there is a factual\\ndispute whether that misadvice was remedied. Unlike in Ramirez-Jimenez, the record\\nhere is inconclusive whether Dat βsurely knewβ deportation was likely.\\n\\n The record does not conclusively show that Dat is entitled to no relief. The\\ndistrict court thus abused its discretion by denying relief without an evidentiary\\nhearing. This court remands for an evidentiary hearing on Datβs ineffective-\\nassistance claim.1\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Datβs motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1782,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609057,"string":"4,609,057"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles WATERS; Anita Waters Plaintiffs - Appellants v. B. MADSON; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids Defendants - Appellees Menard, Inc. Defendant Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles Waters v. B. Madson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3827"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3827\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Charles Waters; Anita Waters\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n B. Madson; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n Menard, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2016, Charles Waters refused to allow Menards home supply store\\nemployees, pursuant to posted store policy, to search the trunk of his vehicle as he\\nexited a Menards lumberyard in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. Mr. Waters eventually\\ncalled the police, who responded to the scene. Based on this encounter, Mr. Waters\\nand his wife Anita filed a 19-count Amended Complaint in federal district court,1\\nalleging violations of both federal and state law against the City of Coon Rapids,\\nvarious Coon Rapids police officers, and Menard, Inc. The defendants filed a motion\\nto dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the\\ndistrict court granted. Mr. and Mrs. Waters now appeal. Having jurisdiction under\\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On March 27, 2016, Appellants visited a Menards store in Coon Rapids,\\nMinnesota, to exchange a saw Mr. Waters had previously purchased for a new saw\\nhe had purchased online. Mr. Waters video-recorded their visit through a sunglass\\ncamera clipped to his shirt.2 (He later posted excerpts of this video on his YouTube\\nchannel. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 16-1.) An employee inside the store directed Appellants\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n 2\\n Appellants attached a highly-edited version of Mr. Watersβs sunglass camera\\nrecording and the officersβ squad car recordings to their Amended Complaint.\\nAppellees produced the dashboard camera video from Officer Smithβs squad car in\\nsupport of their motion to dismiss. The district court determined that the videos were\\nβnecessarily embraced by the pleadingsβ and considered them, together with the\\npleadings, when ruling on Appelleesβ motion to dismiss. See Ashanti v. City of\\nGolden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012). Neither party objected to the\\ndistrict courtβs use of the videos in its determination.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto the online pickup location inside the Menards lumberyard. Mr. Waters drove into\\nthe lumberyard with Mrs. Waters in the passenger seat. While it is undisputed that\\nMenards had posted signs at the yardβs entrance and exit stating that vehicles leaving\\nthe lumberyard were subject to inspection, Appellants claim they did not see any such\\nsigns upon entry.\\n\\n After Appellants arrived in the lumberyard, a Menards employee loaded the\\nsaw into their vehicleβs trunk. Appellants then proceeded to the lumberyard exit,\\nwhere a Menards employee requested that they open their vehicleβs trunk for\\ninspection as per the signs. Mr. Waters refused, stating that he had no legal\\nobligation to do so. When the gate employee refused to open the exit gate and called\\nfor a manager, Mr. Waters called the police.\\n\\n Coon Rapids police officers Alyssa Smith3 and Emily Kirchner arrived in\\nresponse to Mr. Watersβs call. After being told by the Menards manager that posted\\nstore policy required Menards to verify Mr. Watersβs purchase before Appellants\\ncould leave the lumberyard and that Mr. Waters believed he was being unlawfully\\ndetained, Officer Smith approached Appellantsβ vehicle and told Mr. Waters to allow\\nthe Menards employees to verify his purchase. When Mr. Waters refused, Officer\\nSmith asked Mr. Waters for identification, which he refused to provide, stating that\\nhe was βnot currently drivingβ and did not have to βprovide ID until there [was] a\\nreasonable suspicion of a crime.β Officer Smith informed Mr. Waters that she had\\nreasonable suspicion he had committed a crime because he would not open the trunk.\\n\\n Officer Smith then asked Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle, and Officer\\nKirchner explained that, because Mr. Waters was noncompliant with Menards policy,\\nthe officers reasonably suspected he had something in his vehicleβs trunk that he was\\n\\n\\n 3\\n At the time of the incident, Officer Smithβs name was Alyssa Newbury. For\\nconsistency with the district court opinion, we refer to her as Officer Smith.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fnot supposed to have. The officers again told Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle.\\nMr. Waters, still video-recording, stated, βIβm being ordered out of my vehicle. Iβm\\nbeing placed under arrest,β to which Officer Smith calmly responded, βI didnβt say\\nyou were under arrest; I said you need to step out of the vehicle.β When Mr. Waters\\nasked if he was free to go, Officer Smith stated, βYou are not free to go.β Mr. Waters\\nreplied, βThen Iβm being detained. Under what reasonable suspicion of what crime?β\\nThe officers again told Mr. Waters to get out of his car and he repeated his question,\\nthen repeatedly asked the officers for their names and badge numbers. Officer\\nKirchner told Mr. Waters yet again to step out of his car and, when he failed to\\ncomply, told him he could go to jail.\\n\\n Mr. Waters eventually complied with orders to step out of his car. Officer\\nKirchner searched him for weapons and told him that the officers had βreasonable\\nsuspicion that [he] ha[d] something in the trunk,β stating, βYou came into a shipment\\nyard which has a policy that you are not supposed to leave without showing the\\nproduct that you have picked up, and you are not willing to do that.β Officer\\nKirchner then handcuffed Mr. Waters, who is significantly taller than either of the\\nfemale officers, and placed him in the back seat of a squad car. Officer Smith spoke\\nto the nearby Menards employees and asked them if they had ever dealt with\\nsovereign citizens, mentioning that Mr. Watersβs behavior resembled that exhibited\\nby sovereign citizens.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Sovereign citizens are a loosely-affiliated group who believe government in\\nthe United States operates illegitimately and outside the bounds of its jurisdiction.\\nFBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section, Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic\\nThreat to Law Enforcement, FBI L. Enforcement Bull., Sept. 2011, at 20, 21. The\\nFBI has labeled the sovereign citizens a domestic terrorist group. See Domestic\\nTerrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement, FBI (Apr. 13, 2010),\\nhttps://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_04131\\n0/domestic-terrorism-the-sovereign-citizen-movement.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Officer Smith then returned to Appellantsβ vehicle. When Officer Smith asked\\nif Mr. Waters was a sovereign citizen, Mrs. Waters replied that her husband βtakes\\nit all very seriously.β Officer Smith then told Mrs. Waters that Mr. Waters was\\ncreating more problems for himself. Mrs. Waters responded, βI know.β Officer\\nSmith asked Mrs. Waters to identify her husband, and Mrs. Waters did so.\\n\\n While Officer Smith was speaking with Mrs. Waters, Coon Rapids Police\\nSergeant Brady Madson arrived on scene. Officer Smith conferred with Sergeant\\nMadson. Officer Kirchner5 then approached Mrs. Waters and asked, βWould you be\\nwilling to open the trunk for these gentlemen? Because thatβs the only thing thatβs\\nholding us up here.β When Mrs. Waters explained that Appellants had come into the\\nlumberyard to pick up a saw, which a Menards employee placed in the trunk for them,\\nOfficer Kirchner stated, βItβd be doing us a huge favor if you could just bring that\\ninvoice and step out with these guys and pop the trunk for us. Weβll chalk it up to\\n[Mr. Waters] having a bad day.β Mrs. Waters did as Officer Kirchner requested. A\\nMenards employee and one of the officers looked into the trunk and verified the\\npurchase. The officers then released Mr. Waters, issuing a trespass warning that\\nprevented him from reentering the Coon Rapids Menards for a year.\\n\\n After receiving the trespass warning but before leaving the lumberyard, Mr.\\nWaters requested the officersβ names and badge numbers. He approached Sergeant\\nMadson to read the name and badge number off the sergeantβs uniform. When Mr.\\nWaters reached well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, the sergeant physically\\nturned Mr. Waters away from him and pushed him toward Appellantsβ vehicle.\\nAppellants then drove out of the lumberyard. The entire encounter with the officers\\nlasted less than twenty minutes.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The district courtβs Order misidentifies Officer Kirchner as Officer Smith\\nduring this interaction.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Following the incident, Mr. Waters emailed the Coon Rapids Police\\nDepartment, seeking to file a formal complaint against the officers involved. Captain\\nThomas Hawley initially refused to accept a written complaint through email, stating\\nthat Mr. Waters or his representative needed to communicate with the police\\ndepartment by telephone or in person. Although the record does not indicate that Mr.\\nWaters, personally or through a representative, further communicated with the\\ndepartment other than by email, Coon Rapids Chief of Police Brad Wise reviewed\\nMr. Watersβs complaint, determined the officers had acted lawfully, and formally\\nclosed the complaint.\\n\\n Appellants filed a 19-claim Amended Complaint in the United States District\\nCourt for the District of Minnesota, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Β§ 504 of the\\nRehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, as well as\\ncommon-law claims for false imprisonment, battery, defamation, trespass, invasion\\nof privacy, and negligence. They named Sergeant Madson, Officers Smith and\\nKirchner, and Captain Hawley, in their individual capacities; the City of Coon\\nRapids; and Menard, Inc. as defendants.\\n\\n Menards filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 12(b)(6), alleging that Menards is not a state actor and that Appellants consented\\nto the search of their vehicleβs trunk when they entered the lumberyard. The officers\\nand the City also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Appellants\\nfailed to plausibly allege their claims and raising the affirmative defenses of qualified,\\nofficial, and absolute immunity. All defendants moved in the alternative for summary\\njudgment.\\n\\n The district court found that, with the exception of their Fourth Amendment\\nclaim for unlawful search, Appellants failed to plausibly allege any violation of their\\nclearly-established constitutional rights, and that the officers were therefore entitled\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fto qualified immunity on all but one of Appellantsβ constitutional claims. While the\\ndistrict court determined that Appellants plausibly alleged a violation of their clearly-\\nestablished constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches, it also determined\\nthat they failed to allege, as required for a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983,\\nthat the violation caused any compensable injury. The district court further found that\\nAppellants failed to identify a City policy or custom that caused the alleged\\nconstitutional violations, that Appellants failed to plausibly allege their state law\\nclaims, and that Menards was not a state actor subject to Β§ 1983 claims. The district\\ncourt therefore granted the defendantsβ motions and dismissed all of Appellantsβ\\nclaims with prejudice.\\n\\n Appellants subsequently settled their claims against Menard, Inc. They now\\nappeal the district courtβs dismissal of their claims against the officers and the City\\nfor interference and retaliation under the First Amendment; unlawful arrest, excessive\\nforce, unlawful search, and unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and false\\nimprisonment, battery, and defamation under Minnesota common law; and their claim\\nagainst the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim\\nunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting as true all factual allegations in the light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818,\\n820 (8th Cir. 2008). The complaint βmust allege more than β[t]hreadbare recitals of\\nthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[;]β . . . [it\\nmust] allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, βstate a claim to relief that is plausible\\non its face.ββ K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017)\\n(first alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). We need not accept as true a plaintiffβs\\nconclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Hanten v. Sch.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fDist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999); Westcott v. City of\\nOmaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Nor need we adopt the plaintiffβs\\nversion of the facts if they are βblatantly contradict[ed]β by video evidence. Boude\\nv. City of Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017). βWe will not affirm a\\ndismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no\\nset of facts that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief.β Hanten, 183 F.3d at 805.\\n\\n Appellants brought a multitude of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 1983. Section 1983 provides a mechanism by which aggrieved plaintiffs may sue\\na state actor for violation of their constitutional rights. See Foster v. Wyrick, 823\\nF.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987). However, state actors, such as police officers, are\\nprotected from Β§ 1983 suits by the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See\\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640\\n(1980) (explaining that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense). Qualified\\nimmunity shields police officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable\\nofficers in the same position could have believed their conduct was βlawful, in light\\nof clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessedβ at the time.\\nAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).\\n\\n Because qualified immunity protects officers from suit, not merely from\\nliability, courts should βresolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in\\nlitigation.β Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). To overcome\\nqualified immunity, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of his statutory or\\nconstitutional rights, and (2) that βthe right at issue was βclearly establishedβ at the\\ntime of [the] defendantβs alleged misconduct.β Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,\\n232 (2009). βQualified immunity is appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could\\nanswer yes to both of these questions.β Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (citation omitted). Courts may analyze either of the qualified immunity prongs\\nfirst. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f The district court dismissed all of Appellantsβ constitutional claims on\\nqualified immunity grounds except the unlawful search claim, which it dismissed for\\nfailure to state a claim. Similarly, on each of Appellantsβ constitutional claims, we\\nwill first determine whether qualified immunity is applicable and, if not, whether\\nAppellants stated sufficient facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.\\n\\n Appellants also brought a number of tort claims under Minnesota common\\n 6\\nlaw. Police officers in Minnesota may avoid state tort actions through the\\napplication of another affirmative defenseβofficial immunity. Elwood v. Rice\\nCounty, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (en banc). βThe official immunity\\ndoctrine provides that βa public official charged by law with duties which call for the\\nexercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for\\ndamages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.ββ Id. (quoting Susla v.\\nState, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1976) (en banc)). While the officers in this case\\nasserted official immunity, the district court did not analyze whether immunity barred\\nAppellantsβ state tort claims. Rather, it dismissed those claims for failure to state a\\nclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because we dispose of each of Appellantsβ state\\nlaw claims on other grounds, we, too, find it unnecessary to examine the application\\nof official immunity in this case.\\n\\n We now address each of the eleven claims on appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n While a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over\\na state-law claim brought pendent to federal-question claims when the district court\\nβhas dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,β it is not required to\\ndo so if declining jurisdiction would run contrary to βjudicial economy, convenience,\\nfairness, and comity.β City of Chicago v. Intβl Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173\\n(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3). The\\ndistrict court here chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellantsβ state\\nlaw claims, and we may therefore review the district courtβs decision on those claims.\\nSee 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n -9-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Appellants brought four claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.\\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from βunreasonable searches\\nand seizures.β U.S. Const. amend. IV. Mr. Waters alleges unlawful arrest and\\nexcessive force, Mrs. Waters alleges unlawful seizure, and both Mr. and Mrs. Waters\\nallege unlawful search. We analyze each of these claims in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Count 3 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by detaining\\nor arresting him without probable cause. Police officers violate the Fourth\\nAmendment when they conduct an arrest without a warrant or probable cause.\\nBaribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).\\nHowever, in order to effect a temporary investigative detention, officers need only\\nreasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v.\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 744 (8th\\nCir. 2017). While β[r]easonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause,β\\nUnited States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2006), it requires βat least\\nsome minimal level of objective justification.β De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 744 (internal\\nquotation marks omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (defining\\nreasonable suspicion as something more than an βinchoate and unparticularized\\nsuspicion or βhunchββ).\\n\\n In determining whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct\\na temporary investigative detention, or βTerry stop,β courts look only at the\\ninformation the officer possessed at the time. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also\\nGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). βWhen evaluating whether reasonable\\nsuspicion for a Terry stop exists, βwe view the [officersβ] observations as a whole,\\n\\n -10-\\n\\frather than as discrete and disconnected occurrences.ββ United States v. Hightower,\\n716 F.3d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.\\nPoitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1987)). If we determine that an officer lacked\\nreasonable suspicion and thus conducted an unlawful Terry stop, she may nonetheless\\nbe entitled to qualified immunity if she had arguable reasonable suspicionβthat is,\\nif a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed she had reasonable\\nsuspicion. De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 745-46 (examining arguable reasonable suspicion\\nunder the βclearly establishedβ prong of qualified immunity).\\n\\n The district court dismissed the unlawful detention claim, finding that the\\nofficers had arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters and were thus\\nentitled to qualified immunity. Appellants argue that the officers did not have\\nreasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters.\\nAlternatively, Appellants contend that the officers needed arguable probable cause\\nbecause the temporary detention became a de facto arrest when the officers\\nhandcuffed Mr. Waters and detained him βin the squad car for twenty minutes.β\\nAppellantβs Br. 43.\\n\\n With respect to this claim, we need not discuss arguable reasonable suspicion\\nbecause, in fact, the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining Mr.\\nWaters. The videos attached to the pleadings show that Mr. Waters refused to open\\nhis vehicleβs trunk at the lumberyard exit, despite signs at the entrance and exit\\ninforming visitors that vehicles would be inspected as they left the lumberyard. The\\nrequirement was clearly part of Menardsβs customary protocol as customers exited\\nthe lumberyard after picking up merchandise in their vehicles. Officers Smith and\\nKirchner arrived at Menards in response to Mr. Watersβs 911 call and Mr. Waters\\nrefused to identify himself to the officers or to allow anyone to verify his purchase.\\nAt that point, Officer Smith and Officer Kirchner had βa particularized and objective\\nbasisβ to detain Mr. Waters. Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 2000)\\n(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Indeed, the officers told Mr. Waters at the time that he was being detained that\\nhis refusal to comply with Menardsβs clearly-posted policy afforded them reasonable\\nsuspicion that he had something incriminating in his vehicleβs trunk. Because\\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner possessed specific, articulable facts that led them to\\nsuspect Mr. Waters might be engaged in criminal activity, see Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.\\nDist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004), we find that, under the totality of the\\ncircumstances, Officers Smith and Kirchner actually had reasonable suspicion to\\ndetain Mr. Waters.\\n\\n Having concluded that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain\\nMr. Waters, we must next determine whether that detention became a de facto arrest.\\nβA Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, if the stop lasts for an\\nunreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.β United States v.\\nNewell, 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). While\\nofficers must use βthe least intrusive means of detention and investigation . . .\\nreasonably necessaryβ to conduct the stop, United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192\\nF.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999), they are permitted to βtake any measures that are\\nβreasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo\\nduring the course of the stop.ββ United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir.\\n2016) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.\\n2011)). Finding that no unreasonable delay or unreasonable force occurred in the\\ncourse of Mr. Watersβs detention, we also find that the officers did not arrest Mr.\\nWaters.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has held βthat a twenty-minute detention was reasonable\\nwhen the police acted diligently and defendant contributed to the delay.β United\\nStates v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (referencing United\\nStates v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 (1985)). Here, the video evidence shows that\\nAppellantsβ βentire encounter with law enforcement lasted about 20 minutes,β Waters\\nv. Madson, Civ. No. 17-935 (PAM/SER), 2017 WL 6403099, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f14, 2017), that the officers worked diligently to complete their investigation, and that\\nthe encounter only lasted as long as it did because Mr. Waters was argumentative and\\nrefused to cooperate with the police investigation by failing to obey legitimate\\nrequests to identify himself and step out of his vehicle. We thus find no unreasonable\\ndelay here.\\n\\n β[T]he use of handcuffs during a Terry stop . . . requires some reasonable belief\\nthat the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints are necessary for some\\nother legitimate purpose.β El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (citation omitted). In El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, we found that a police\\nofficer who used handcuffs to detain a man suspected of selling counterfeit watches\\nto a pawn shop did not have such a reasonable belief. Id. at 459. There, the officer\\nhandcuffed the individual immediately after arriving on the scene and before\\nconducting any investigation. Id. at 458. After actually investigating, the officer\\narrested El-Ghazzawy for theft by swindle; the charges were later dropped when the\\npawn shop determined the watches were genuine. Id. at 455-56.\\n\\n In determining that the officer in El-Ghazzawy acted unreasonably, we relied\\non five factors: (1) the officer had no indication that El-Ghazzawy was armed and\\ndangerous; (2) theft by swindle, the suspected crime, did not necessarily involve a\\nweapon; (3) El-Ghazzawy exhibited no suspicious behavior and cooperated with\\nofficers throughout the incident; (4) the officer failed to conduct any investigation\\nbefore handcuffing El-Ghazzawy; and (5) no exigent circumstances existed because\\nthe pawn shop already had possession of the allegedly counterfeit watches. Id. at\\n457-58.\\n\\n By contrast, when the officers here arrived on scene, they spoke to the Menards\\nemployees and Mr. Waters to determine the situation. They did not handcuff Mr.\\nWaters or detain him in the squad car until he disobeyed multiple commands to step\\nout of his vehicle. Mr. Waters exhibited suspicious behavior before the officers even\\n\\n -13-\\n\\farrived on the scene by failing to allow store employees to verify his purchase\\npursuant to a posted policy, and he continued to exhibit suspicious behavior by failing\\nto identify himself or comply with the officersβ instructions to step out of his vehicle.\\nSee United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that an officer,\\nin the course of a Terry stop involving a vehicle, may ask a suspect for identification,\\nβrequest that the driver step out of the vehicle,β and run computer searches to\\ndetermine if the driver has a criminal history or outstanding warrants). In addition,\\nthe video attached to the pleadings shows that Mr. Waters is significantly larger than\\neither Officer Smith or Officer Kirchner, which factors into the applicable\\ncircumstances. See El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59 (examining officerβs conduct\\nin the context of the surrounding circumstances).\\n\\n The officers did not know Mr. Watersβs background and witnessed his\\nargumentative, evasive, and uncooperative behavior. See United States v. Bailey, 417\\nF.3d 873, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that evasiveness contributes to βa reasonable\\nand particularized suspicion that criminal activity may be afootβ (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted)). They could reasonably conclude that Mr. Watersβs unpredictable\\nbehavior would continue to escalate and that handcuffing him and briefly placing him\\nin the squad car was the least intrusive means of maintaining the status quo and\\nprotecting Mr. Waters, themselves, and bystanders while the officers investigated.\\nSee United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that after a\\nsuspect, initially cooperative, became agitated and refused permission when an officer\\nasked to search his car, the officer could maintain the status quo by handcuffing the\\nsuspect and placing him in the back of a patrol car until a drug-sniffing dog arrived).\\n\\n We note that Mr. Watersβs unpredictability, evasiveness, argumentative\\ndemeanor, refusal to disobey legitimate officer commands, and the size difference\\nbetween Mr. Waters and the officers, each viewed in isolation, likely would not\\njustify the officersβ use of restraints in this case. However, viewed as a whole, these\\nfactors could cause Officers Smith and Kirchner to reasonably believe they needed\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fto handcuff Mr. Waters and place him in the squad car to preserve the status quo. See\\nid. at 1002 (βWe have repeatedly held that police officers may reasonably handcuff\\na suspect and place him in a squad car during the course of a Terry stop in order to\\nprotect their safety and maintain the status quo.β).\\n\\n Because we view the officersβ actions in the context of the totality of the\\ncircumstances, see El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59, we find that it was reasonable\\nfor the officers to briefly handcuff Mr. Waters and detain him in the squad car.\\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson are therefore entitled to qualified\\nimmunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment seizure\\nclaim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Count 6 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson seized Mrs. Waters in violation of the Fourth Amendment when\\nthey threatened to arrest her if she did not provide Mr. Watersβs identifying\\ninformation and allow officers to search the trunk of the Watersβs vehicle. The\\ndistrict court dismissed this claim because the officers detained Appellants pursuant\\nto arguable reasonable suspicion.\\n\\n It is well-settled law in this circuit that both a passenger and a driver are seized\\nduring a Terry stop of a vehicle. United States v. Oliver, 550 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir.\\n2008) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257-58 (2007); Maryland v.\\nWilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12\\n(1977)). If an officer acts lawfully in detaining the driver, he acts lawfully in\\nconcurrently detaining the passenger. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257-59. As we\\nconcluded above that the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining\\nMr. Waters, the vehicleβs driver, we conclude that they acted pursuant to reasonable\\nsuspicion in detaining Mrs. Waters, the passenger. The officers are entitled to\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fqualified immunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mrs. Watersβs Fourth Amendment\\nseizure claim.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Count 4 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officer Smith7 and Sergeant\\nMadson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force\\nagainst him. To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a\\nplaintiff must show that an officerβs use of force was βobjectively unreasonable, given\\nthe facts and circumstances of the particular case, as βjudged from the perspective of\\na reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.ββ\\nChambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490\\nU.S. at 396). β[A] claim must be based upon more than βa de minimis use of force.ββ\\nAtkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(emphasis omitted) (quoting Chambers, 641 F.3d at 906).\\n\\n The district court dismissed this claim because Appellants failed to plausibly\\nallege that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was objectively unreasonable, and because\\nMr. Waters failed to plead the requisite resulting injury from the handcuffing. While\\nAppellants argue on appeal that the district court improperly dismissed this claim, in\\ntheir opening brief they only discuss the district courtβs decision as it pertains to the\\nclaim against Sergeant Madson. They have therefore waived the right to appeal the\\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of their excessive force claim against Officer Smith. See\\nChavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n We find that Sergeant Madson used objectively reasonable force in redirecting\\nMr. Waters out of his personal space. The video attached to the pleadings shows Mr.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n Mr. Watersβs video shows, and Appellants concede on appeal, that Officer\\nKirchner, rather than Officer Smith, handcuffed Mr. Waters. See Appellantβs Br. 16.\\n -16-\\n\\fWaters approach well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, who was leaning on\\nthe squad car. Sergeant Madson then turned Mr. Waters away from him and gave him\\na light push in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. We find this to be a de minimis\\nuse of force, see Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.\\n2009) (finding that an officer used de minimis force when he kneed the compliant,\\nhandcuffed, 75-year-old arrestee in the back while placing him in a patrol car);\\nDurruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that an officer used\\nde minimis force in wrapping his arms around a news cameraman, dragging him to\\nthe ground, and handcuffing him), especially considering that Mr. Waters does not\\nallege any physical injuries as a result of Sergeant Madsonβs conduct. See Chambers,\\n641 F.3d at 906 (βThe degree of injury is . . . relevant insofar as it tends to show the\\namount and type of force used.β).\\n\\n Because a de minimis use of force cannot form the basis for a Fourth\\nAmendment excessive force claim, it cannot be objectively unreasonable in this\\ncontext. See id. (βThe appropriate inquiry is βwhether the force used to effect a\\nparticular seizure is βreasonable.ββ A de minimis use of force is insufficient to\\nsupport a claim . . . .β (emphasis omitted) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). We\\ntherefore find that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was reasonable under the\\ncircumstances, and we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of Mr. Watersβs excessive\\nforce claim.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Count 16 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson violated Appellantsβ Fourth Amendment rights by searching\\nAppellantsβ vehicle without lawful authority. While the Fourth Amendment generally\\nprohibits unreasonable searches, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, warrantless searches can\\nbe valid if conducted pursuant to probable cause or voluntary consent. See United\\nStates v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.\\n\\n -17-\\n\\fCt. 1663, 1669 (2018) (stating that βthe search of an automobile can be reasonable\\nwithout a warrantβ if officers have probable cause). The state actor has the burden\\nto prove that an individual consented to a search. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391\\nU.S. 543, 547 (1968); United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n Here, the officers contend that Mrs. Waters voluntarily consented to the search\\nof Appellantsβ vehicle, while Appellants argue that Mrs. Waters was coerced into\\nconsenting. The district court concluded that Appellants alleged sufficient facts to\\npreclude dismissal of this claim on voluntary consent grounds. However, the district\\ncourt also found that Appellants failed to allege any actual, compensable injury\\nstemming from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk and, thus, failed to state\\na claim for damages under Β§ 1983. A plaintiff seeking damages under Β§ 1983 for an\\nunreasonable search must allege (1) an unlawful search and (2) an βactual,\\ncompensable injury[,]β Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994), because\\nβthe abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for Β§ 1983\\ndamages.β Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).8\\n\\n Appellants argue on appeal that they supported their unlawful search claim by\\npleading over $75,000 in emotional distress damages. However, in their Amended\\n\\n\\n 8\\n This is the standard for compensatory and punitive damages under Β§ 1983.\\nSee Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306-08. The district court did not address the issue of\\nnominal damages for violations of a Fourth Amendment right. See Garrett v. Clarke,\\n147 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1998) (βIf [plaintiff] proves [his Fourth Amendment\\nsearch] claim, he is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages even if he\\ncannot prove actual damages.β). To the extent that Appellants might premise their\\nFourth Amendment search claim on the availability of nominal damages, they have\\nwaived that issue by failing to raise it on appeal. See Miller v. Albright, 657 F.3d\\n733, 737-38 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that nominal damages are not automatic in a\\nΒ§ 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation and that failure to timely request\\nthem results in waiver); Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8th Cir. 2008)\\n(βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.β).\\n -18-\\n\\fComplaint, Appellants tied these damages directly to their false imprisonment,\\nexcessive force, battery, and unlawful seizure claims. They did not allege any\\ndamages stemming specifically from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk. See\\nMiller v. Albright, 657 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2011) (βAlthough [plaintiff]\\nintroduced evidence of actual damages resulting from his excessive force claim, he\\ndid not introduce evidence of damages resulting from his unlawful entry claim. In\\nthat these two claims are separate and distinct, the damages resulting from the\\nexcessive force claim are not sufficient to show that [plaintiff] suffered damages as\\na result of the officersβ unlawful entry into his home.β). We therefore agree with the\\ndistrict court that Appellants failed to adequately plead a compensatory damages\\nclaim under Β§ 1983 arising from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk, and we\\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Appellants brought three claims under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for violations of Mr.\\nWatersβs First Amendment rights, two of which they appeal. Count 1 of the Amended\\nComplaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson interfered\\nwith Mr. Watersβs First Amendment rights to challenge the officersβ actions and to\\nrefuse to provide identification. Count 2 alleges that the three officers then retaliated\\nagainst Mr. Waters for challenging their actions and asking for their names and badge\\nnumbers. Because our analysis of the interference claim incorporates our analysis of\\nthe retaliation claim, we address the retaliation claim first.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In order to overcome qualified immunity and state a plausible claim for\\ninterference with his First Amendment rights under Β§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that\\na state actor impeded his ability to exercise a clearly-established constitutional right.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim\\n\\n -19-\\n\\funder Β§ 1983 may show that officers violated his constitutional rights if β(1) he\\nengaged in a protected activity, (2) [officers] took adverse action against him that\\nwould chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the\\nadverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.β\\nRevels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n We require a fourth element in retaliatory arrest cases: βlack of probable cause\\nor arguable probable cause.β Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664-65 (2012) (βThis Court has never\\nrecognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is\\nsupported by probable cause . . . .β). But see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138\\nS. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018) (allowing plaintiff to maintain a First Amendment\\nretaliatory arrest claim against a municipality without showing the absence of\\nprobable cause when the claim was premised on βa premeditated plan [by the\\nmunicipality and its legislators] to intimidate himβ). This is because probable cause\\nprovides sufficient grounds for an arrest, Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887-88\\n(8th Cir. 2015), and a plaintiff arrested pursuant to probable cause cannot show that\\nexercising his constitutional rights was the ββbut-forβ cause of [his] arrest.β Baribeau,\\n596 F.3d at 481; see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (β[A]ction\\ncolored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that\\naction would have been taken anyway.β).\\n\\n As discussed above, supra Part III.A, a temporary detention, unlike an arrest,\\nmay be premised on the less-stringent requirements of reasonable suspicion. See\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Therefore, to show that exercising his constitutional\\nrights was the βbut-forβ cause of a temporary detention, a plaintiff must show that the\\ndefendant officers lacked reasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion. See\\nAllen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that\\nofficer who stopped, detained, and handcuffed the plaintiff was entitled to qualified\\n\\n\\n\\n -20-\\n\\fimmunity on a First Amendment retaliation claim because he had reasonable\\nsuspicion to detain the plaintiff on βlegal, non-retaliatoryβ grounds).\\n\\n Appellants allege that the officers retaliated against Mr. Waters for challenging\\ntheir actions by βarresting him, using excessive and deliberately painful force,\\nhandcuffing [him], . . . and banning him from Coon Rapids Menards for one year.β\\nAm. Compl. 24, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. The district court dismissed Appellantsβ retaliation\\nclaim, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had\\narguable reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Mr. Waters. Appellants argue\\nthat the district court incorrectly required the officers to act pursuant to arguable\\nreasonable suspicion rather than the higher standard of probable cause. Appellantsβ\\narguments are premised on their construction of Mr. Watersβs detention as an arrest.\\nHowever, as we have determined that Mr. Waters was never arrested, we agree with\\nthe district court that the applicable standard is reasonable suspicion, not probable\\ncause. For the reasons stated above we find that the officers had reasonable suspicion\\nto briefly detain Mr. Waters. We therefore find that the officers did not\\nunconstitutionally retaliate against Mr. Waters because of his exercise of his First\\nAmendment rights. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the\\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Appellants further contend that the officers violated Mr. Watersβs First\\nAmendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and free association by βphysically\\nhandcuffing and arresting him to prevent him from monitoring their activity and\\nquestioning their actions.β Am. Compl. 23, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. However, as referenced\\nin the previous section, individuals do not have a recognized βFirst Amendment right\\nto be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause[,]β Reichle,\\n566 U.S. at 664-65; see also Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602, and, by extension, do not have\\na recognized First Amendment right to be free from investigative stops supported by\\n\\n -21-\\n\\freasonable suspicion. See Allen, 815 F.3d at 245-46. Thus, for the same reasons we\\ndetermined that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\\nretaliation claim, we find that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\\nFirst Amendment interference claim. We affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this\\nclaim.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n Count 7 of the Amended Complaint alleges that, under Β§ 1983 and Monell, 436\\nU.S. 658, the City is vicariously liable for the officersβ actions. Monell holds a\\nmunicipality liable for actions of its employees or agents that violate a plaintiffβs\\nconstitutional rights if the violation stemmed from an official municipal policy or\\ncustom. 436 U.S. at 694-95; Ulrich v. Pope County, 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.\\n2013). βThere must be a causal connection between the municipal policy or custom\\nand the alleged constitutional violation in order to state a valid claim under Β§ 1983.β\\nUlrich, 715 F.3d at 1061 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).\\n\\n Appellants assert the City violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth\\nAmendment rights because Chief Wiseβan official policymakerβratified the\\nofficersβ actions during the Menards incident when he determined the officers acted\\nlawfully and closed Mr. Watersβs formal complaint. The district court dismissed\\nAppellantsβ claim, finding that they failed to establish causation. We agree with the\\ndistrict court that Chief Wiseβs after-the-fact determination did not cause the alleged\\nviolations of Appellantsβ constitutional rights and that Appellants, therefore, cannot\\npremise a Monell claim on Chief Wiseβs actions. Because Appellants do not identify\\na causal link between an official municipal custom or policy and the alleged\\nconstitutional violations, they fail to state a Monell claim for municipal liability. We\\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -22-\\n\\f VI.\\n\\n Count 10 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner,\\nSergeant Madson, and the City falsely imprisoned Mr. Waters by failing to investigate\\nwhether he had shoplifted, physically restraining him without arresting him for failing\\nto produce identification, and placing him in the back seat of a squad car in\\nhandcuffs. Count 11 asserts that the officers falsely imprisoned Mrs. Waters. Under\\nMinnesota law, police officers falsely imprison a plaintiff if they arrest or detain him\\nβwithout proper legal authority.β Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Minn.\\n1974) (per curiam); see also Kleidon v. Glascock, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1943)\\n(βFalse imprisonment has been defined as any imprisonment which is not legally\\njustifiable.β (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have already found that the\\nofficers temporarily detained Appellants pursuant to reasonable suspicion, supra Part\\nIII.A, we find that they acted with proper legal authority. Appellants therefore do not\\nstate a false imprisonment claim under Minnesota law, and the district court properly\\ndismissed these claims.\\n\\n VII.\\n\\n Count 12 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Sergeant Madson committed\\nbattery against Mr. Waters when he physically turned Mr. Waters away from him and\\npushed Mr. Waters in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. βBattery is an intentional,\\nunpermitted offensive contact with another.β Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41\\n(Minn. 1990) (en banc). Under Minnesota law, βonly the use of excessive force by\\na police officer will constitute a battery.β Johnson v. Peterson, 358 N.W.2d 484, 485\\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152,\\n155 (Minn. 1980).\\n\\n The district court dismissed Appellantsβ battery claim because Appellants\\nfailed to plausibly allege that Sergeant Madson used objectively unreasonable force,\\n\\n -23-\\n\\fespecially in light of the Amended Complaintβs failure to allege that Mr. Waters\\nsuffered any injury. As with their Fourth Amendment excessive force claim,\\nAppellants present no argument that Sergeant Madson employed excessive force in\\nremoving Mr. Waters from his personal space and have therefore waived the right to\\nchallenge the district courtβs characterization of that force as reasonable. Indeed,\\nAppellants present no meaningful argument at all regarding this claim. See Cox v.\\nMortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 674 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that\\nthe appellants βwaived [an] issue by failing to provide a meaningful explanation of\\nthe argument and citation to relevant authority in their opening briefβ). We therefore\\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ battery claim.\\n\\n VIII.\\n\\n Count 13 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Smith committed\\ndefamation when she accused Mr. Waters, in front of third party bystanders, of acting\\nlike a sovereign citizen. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that Officer\\nSmithβs statement was a subjective opinion and, thus, not actionable, see Turkish\\nCoal. of Am., Inc. v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Geraci v.\\nEckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)), and that, alternatively, if\\nOfficer Smithβs statement was actionable, she and the City were shielded by absolute\\nimmunity. On appeal, Appellants do not challenge the district courtβs determination\\nthat Officer Smithβs statement was not actionable. They have therefore waived\\nargument on that dispositive issue. See Cox, 685 F.3d at 674. We affirm the district\\ncourtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ defamation claim.\\n\\n IX.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed in full.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -24-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386310/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609057/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Charles WATERS; Anita Waters Plaintiffs - Appellants v. B. MADSON; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids Defendants - Appellees Menard, Inc. Defendant Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3827\n ___________________________\n\n Charles Waters; Anita Waters\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n B. Madson; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n\n Menard, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\n\n Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\n Filed: April 11, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\fSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n In 2016, Charles Waters refused to allow Menards home supply store\nemployees, pursuant to posted store policy, to search the trunk of his vehicle as he\nexited a Menards lumberyard in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. Mr. Waters eventually\ncalled the police, who responded to the scene. Based on this encounter, Mr. Waters\nand his wife Anita filed a 19-count Amended Complaint in federal district court,1\nalleging violations of both federal and state law against the City of Coon Rapids,\nvarious Coon Rapids police officers, and Menard, Inc. The defendants filed a motion\nto dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the\ndistrict court granted. Mr. and Mrs. Waters now appeal. Having jurisdiction under\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n On March 27, 2016, Appellants visited a Menards store in Coon Rapids,\nMinnesota, to exchange a saw Mr. Waters had previously purchased for a new saw\nhe had purchased online. Mr. Waters video-recorded their visit through a sunglass\ncamera clipped to his shirt.2 (He later posted excerpts of this video on his YouTube\nchannel. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 16-1.) An employee inside the store directed Appellants\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota.\n 2\n Appellants attached a highly-edited version of Mr. Watersβs sunglass camera\nrecording and the officersβ squad car recordings to their Amended Complaint.\nAppellees produced the dashboard camera video from Officer Smithβs squad car in\nsupport of their motion to dismiss. The district court determined that the videos were\nβnecessarily embraced by the pleadingsβ and considered them, together with the\npleadings, when ruling on Appelleesβ motion to dismiss. See Ashanti v. City of\nGolden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012). Neither party objected to the\ndistrict courtβs use of the videos in its determination.\n\n -2-\n\fto the online pickup location inside the Menards lumberyard. Mr. Waters drove into\nthe lumberyard with Mrs. Waters in the passenger seat. While it is undisputed that\nMenards had posted signs at the yardβs entrance and exit stating that vehicles leaving\nthe lumberyard were subject to inspection, Appellants claim they did not see any such\nsigns upon entry.\n\n After Appellants arrived in the lumberyard, a Menards employee loaded the\nsaw into their vehicleβs trunk. Appellants then proceeded to the lumberyard exit,\nwhere a Menards employee requested that they open their vehicleβs trunk for\ninspection as per the signs. Mr. Waters refused, stating that he had no legal\nobligation to do so. When the gate employee refused to open the exit gate and called\nfor a manager, Mr. Waters called the police.\n\n Coon Rapids police officers Alyssa Smith3 and Emily Kirchner arrived in\nresponse to Mr. Watersβs call. After being told by the Menards manager that posted\nstore policy required Menards to verify Mr. Watersβs purchase before Appellants\ncould leave the lumberyard and that Mr. Waters believed he was being unlawfully\ndetained, Officer Smith approached Appellantsβ vehicle and told Mr. Waters to allow\nthe Menards employees to verify his purchase. When Mr. Waters refused, Officer\nSmith asked Mr. Waters for identification, which he refused to provide, stating that\nhe was βnot currently drivingβ and did not have to βprovide ID until there [was] a\nreasonable suspicion of a crime.β Officer Smith informed Mr. Waters that she had\nreasonable suspicion he had committed a crime because he would not open the trunk.\n\n Officer Smith then asked Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle, and Officer\nKirchner explained that, because Mr. Waters was noncompliant with Menards policy,\nthe officers reasonably suspected he had something in his vehicleβs trunk that he was\n\n\n 3\n At the time of the incident, Officer Smithβs name was Alyssa Newbury. For\nconsistency with the district court opinion, we refer to her as Officer Smith.\n\n -3-\n\fnot supposed to have. The officers again told Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle.\nMr. Waters, still video-recording, stated, βIβm being ordered out of my vehicle. Iβm\nbeing placed under arrest,β to which Officer Smith calmly responded, βI didnβt say\nyou were under arrest; I said you need to step out of the vehicle.β When Mr. Waters\nasked if he was free to go, Officer Smith stated, βYou are not free to go.β Mr. Waters\nreplied, βThen Iβm being detained. Under what reasonable suspicion of what crime?β\nThe officers again told Mr. Waters to get out of his car and he repeated his question,\nthen repeatedly asked the officers for their names and badge numbers. Officer\nKirchner told Mr. Waters yet again to step out of his car and, when he failed to\ncomply, told him he could go to jail.\n\n Mr. Waters eventually complied with orders to step out of his car. Officer\nKirchner searched him for weapons and told him that the officers had βreasonable\nsuspicion that [he] ha[d] something in the trunk,β stating, βYou came into a shipment\nyard which has a policy that you are not supposed to leave without showing the\nproduct that you have picked up, and you are not willing to do that.β Officer\nKirchner then handcuffed Mr. Waters, who is significantly taller than either of the\nfemale officers, and placed him in the back seat of a squad car. Officer Smith spoke\nto the nearby Menards employees and asked them if they had ever dealt with\nsovereign citizens, mentioning that Mr. Watersβs behavior resembled that exhibited\nby sovereign citizens.4\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Sovereign citizens are a loosely-affiliated group who believe government in\nthe United States operates illegitimately and outside the bounds of its jurisdiction.\nFBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section, Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic\nThreat to Law Enforcement, FBI L. Enforcement Bull., Sept. 2011, at 20, 21. The\nFBI has labeled the sovereign citizens a domestic terrorist group. See Domestic\nTerrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement, FBI (Apr. 13, 2010),\nhttps://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_04131\n0/domestic-terrorism-the-sovereign-citizen-movement.\n\n -4-\n\f Officer Smith then returned to Appellantsβ vehicle. When Officer Smith asked\nif Mr. Waters was a sovereign citizen, Mrs. Waters replied that her husband βtakes\nit all very seriously.β Officer Smith then told Mrs. Waters that Mr. Waters was\ncreating more problems for himself. Mrs. Waters responded, βI know.β Officer\nSmith asked Mrs. Waters to identify her husband, and Mrs. Waters did so.\n\n While Officer Smith was speaking with Mrs. Waters, Coon Rapids Police\nSergeant Brady Madson arrived on scene. Officer Smith conferred with Sergeant\nMadson. Officer Kirchner5 then approached Mrs. Waters and asked, βWould you be\nwilling to open the trunk for these gentlemen? Because thatβs the only thing thatβs\nholding us up here.β When Mrs. Waters explained that Appellants had come into the\nlumberyard to pick up a saw, which a Menards employee placed in the trunk for them,\nOfficer Kirchner stated, βItβd be doing us a huge favor if you could just bring that\ninvoice and step out with these guys and pop the trunk for us. Weβll chalk it up to\n[Mr. Waters] having a bad day.β Mrs. Waters did as Officer Kirchner requested. A\nMenards employee and one of the officers looked into the trunk and verified the\npurchase. The officers then released Mr. Waters, issuing a trespass warning that\nprevented him from reentering the Coon Rapids Menards for a year.\n\n After receiving the trespass warning but before leaving the lumberyard, Mr.\nWaters requested the officersβ names and badge numbers. He approached Sergeant\nMadson to read the name and badge number off the sergeantβs uniform. When Mr.\nWaters reached well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, the sergeant physically\nturned Mr. Waters away from him and pushed him toward Appellantsβ vehicle.\nAppellants then drove out of the lumberyard. The entire encounter with the officers\nlasted less than twenty minutes.\n\n\n\n 5\n The district courtβs Order misidentifies Officer Kirchner as Officer Smith\nduring this interaction.\n\n -5-\n\f Following the incident, Mr. Waters emailed the Coon Rapids Police\nDepartment, seeking to file a formal complaint against the officers involved. Captain\nThomas Hawley initially refused to accept a written complaint through email, stating\nthat Mr. Waters or his representative needed to communicate with the police\ndepartment by telephone or in person. Although the record does not indicate that Mr.\nWaters, personally or through a representative, further communicated with the\ndepartment other than by email, Coon Rapids Chief of Police Brad Wise reviewed\nMr. Watersβs complaint, determined the officers had acted lawfully, and formally\nclosed the complaint.\n\n Appellants filed a 19-claim Amended Complaint in the United States District\nCourt for the District of Minnesota, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and\nFourteenth Amendments, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Β§ 504 of the\nRehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, as well as\ncommon-law claims for false imprisonment, battery, defamation, trespass, invasion\nof privacy, and negligence. They named Sergeant Madson, Officers Smith and\nKirchner, and Captain Hawley, in their individual capacities; the City of Coon\nRapids; and Menard, Inc. as defendants.\n\n Menards filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 12(b)(6), alleging that Menards is not a state actor and that Appellants consented\nto the search of their vehicleβs trunk when they entered the lumberyard. The officers\nand the City also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Appellants\nfailed to plausibly allege their claims and raising the affirmative defenses of qualified,\nofficial, and absolute immunity. All defendants moved in the alternative for summary\njudgment.\n\n The district court found that, with the exception of their Fourth Amendment\nclaim for unlawful search, Appellants failed to plausibly allege any violation of their\nclearly-established constitutional rights, and that the officers were therefore entitled\n\n -6-\n\fto qualified immunity on all but one of Appellantsβ constitutional claims. While the\ndistrict court determined that Appellants plausibly alleged a violation of their clearly-\nestablished constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches, it also determined\nthat they failed to allege, as required for a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983,\nthat the violation caused any compensable injury. The district court further found that\nAppellants failed to identify a City policy or custom that caused the alleged\nconstitutional violations, that Appellants failed to plausibly allege their state law\nclaims, and that Menards was not a state actor subject to Β§ 1983 claims. The district\ncourt therefore granted the defendantsβ motions and dismissed all of Appellantsβ\nclaims with prejudice.\n\n Appellants subsequently settled their claims against Menard, Inc. They now\nappeal the district courtβs dismissal of their claims against the officers and the City\nfor interference and retaliation under the First Amendment; unlawful arrest, excessive\nforce, unlawful search, and unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and false\nimprisonment, battery, and defamation under Minnesota common law; and their claim\nagainst the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).\n\n II.\n\n We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim\nunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting as true all factual allegations in the light\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818,\n820 (8th Cir. 2008). The complaint βmust allege more than β[t]hreadbare recitals of\nthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[;]β . . . [it\nmust] allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, βstate a claim to relief that is plausible\non its face.ββ K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017)\n(first alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))\n(internal quotation marks omitted). We need not accept as true a plaintiffβs\nconclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Hanten v. Sch.\n\n -7-\n\fDist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999); Westcott v. City of\nOmaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Nor need we adopt the plaintiffβs\nversion of the facts if they are βblatantly contradict[ed]β by video evidence. Boude\nv. City of Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017). βWe will not affirm a\ndismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no\nset of facts that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief.β Hanten, 183 F.3d at 805.\n\n Appellants brought a multitude of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 1983. Section 1983 provides a mechanism by which aggrieved plaintiffs may sue\na state actor for violation of their constitutional rights. See Foster v. Wyrick, 823\nF.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987). However, state actors, such as police officers, are\nprotected from Β§ 1983 suits by the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640\n(1980) (explaining that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense). Qualified\nimmunity shields police officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable\nofficers in the same position could have believed their conduct was βlawful, in light\nof clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessedβ at the time.\nAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).\n\n Because qualified immunity protects officers from suit, not merely from\nliability, courts should βresolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in\nlitigation.β Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). To overcome\nqualified immunity, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of his statutory or\nconstitutional rights, and (2) that βthe right at issue was βclearly establishedβ at the\ntime of [the] defendantβs alleged misconduct.β Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,\n232 (2009). βQualified immunity is appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could\nanswer yes to both of these questions.β Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.\n2013) (citation omitted). Courts may analyze either of the qualified immunity prongs\nfirst. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f The district court dismissed all of Appellantsβ constitutional claims on\nqualified immunity grounds except the unlawful search claim, which it dismissed for\nfailure to state a claim. Similarly, on each of Appellantsβ constitutional claims, we\nwill first determine whether qualified immunity is applicable and, if not, whether\nAppellants stated sufficient facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.\n\n Appellants also brought a number of tort claims under Minnesota common\n 6\nlaw. Police officers in Minnesota may avoid state tort actions through the\napplication of another affirmative defenseβofficial immunity. Elwood v. Rice\nCounty, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (en banc). βThe official immunity\ndoctrine provides that βa public official charged by law with duties which call for the\nexercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for\ndamages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.ββ Id. (quoting Susla v.\nState, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1976) (en banc)). While the officers in this case\nasserted official immunity, the district court did not analyze whether immunity barred\nAppellantsβ state tort claims. Rather, it dismissed those claims for failure to state a\nclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because we dispose of each of Appellantsβ state\nlaw claims on other grounds, we, too, find it unnecessary to examine the application\nof official immunity in this case.\n\n We now address each of the eleven claims on appeal.\n\n\n\n 6\n While a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over\na state-law claim brought pendent to federal-question claims when the district court\nβhas dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,β it is not required to\ndo so if declining jurisdiction would run contrary to βjudicial economy, convenience,\nfairness, and comity.β City of Chicago v. Intβl Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173\n(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3). The\ndistrict court here chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellantsβ state\nlaw claims, and we may therefore review the district courtβs decision on those claims.\nSee 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\n -9-\n\f III.\n\n Appellants brought four claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from βunreasonable searches\nand seizures.β U.S. Const. amend. IV. Mr. Waters alleges unlawful arrest and\nexcessive force, Mrs. Waters alleges unlawful seizure, and both Mr. and Mrs. Waters\nallege unlawful search. We analyze each of these claims in turn.\n\n A.\n\n Count 3 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\nand Sergeant Madson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by detaining\nor arresting him without probable cause. Police officers violate the Fourth\nAmendment when they conduct an arrest without a warrant or probable cause.\nBaribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).\nHowever, in order to effect a temporary investigative detention, officers need only\nreasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v.\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 744 (8th\nCir. 2017). While β[r]easonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause,β\nUnited States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2006), it requires βat least\nsome minimal level of objective justification.β De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 744 (internal\nquotation marks omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (defining\nreasonable suspicion as something more than an βinchoate and unparticularized\nsuspicion or βhunchββ).\n\n In determining whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct\na temporary investigative detention, or βTerry stop,β courts look only at the\ninformation the officer possessed at the time. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also\nGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). βWhen evaluating whether reasonable\nsuspicion for a Terry stop exists, βwe view the [officersβ] observations as a whole,\n\n -10-\n\frather than as discrete and disconnected occurrences.ββ United States v. Hightower,\n716 F.3d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.\nPoitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1987)). If we determine that an officer lacked\nreasonable suspicion and thus conducted an unlawful Terry stop, she may nonetheless\nbe entitled to qualified immunity if she had arguable reasonable suspicionβthat is,\nif a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed she had reasonable\nsuspicion. De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 745-46 (examining arguable reasonable suspicion\nunder the βclearly establishedβ prong of qualified immunity).\n\n The district court dismissed the unlawful detention claim, finding that the\nofficers had arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters and were thus\nentitled to qualified immunity. Appellants argue that the officers did not have\nreasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters.\nAlternatively, Appellants contend that the officers needed arguable probable cause\nbecause the temporary detention became a de facto arrest when the officers\nhandcuffed Mr. Waters and detained him βin the squad car for twenty minutes.β\nAppellantβs Br. 43.\n\n With respect to this claim, we need not discuss arguable reasonable suspicion\nbecause, in fact, the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining Mr.\nWaters. The videos attached to the pleadings show that Mr. Waters refused to open\nhis vehicleβs trunk at the lumberyard exit, despite signs at the entrance and exit\ninforming visitors that vehicles would be inspected as they left the lumberyard. The\nrequirement was clearly part of Menardsβs customary protocol as customers exited\nthe lumberyard after picking up merchandise in their vehicles. Officers Smith and\nKirchner arrived at Menards in response to Mr. Watersβs 911 call and Mr. Waters\nrefused to identify himself to the officers or to allow anyone to verify his purchase.\nAt that point, Officer Smith and Officer Kirchner had βa particularized and objective\nbasisβ to detain Mr. Waters. Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 2000)\n(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).\n\n -11-\n\f Indeed, the officers told Mr. Waters at the time that he was being detained that\nhis refusal to comply with Menardsβs clearly-posted policy afforded them reasonable\nsuspicion that he had something incriminating in his vehicleβs trunk. Because\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner possessed specific, articulable facts that led them to\nsuspect Mr. Waters might be engaged in criminal activity, see Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.\nDist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004), we find that, under the totality of the\ncircumstances, Officers Smith and Kirchner actually had reasonable suspicion to\ndetain Mr. Waters.\n\n Having concluded that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain\nMr. Waters, we must next determine whether that detention became a de facto arrest.\nβA Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, if the stop lasts for an\nunreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.β United States v.\nNewell, 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). While\nofficers must use βthe least intrusive means of detention and investigation . . .\nreasonably necessaryβ to conduct the stop, United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192\nF.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999), they are permitted to βtake any measures that are\nβreasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo\nduring the course of the stop.ββ United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir.\n2016) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.\n2011)). Finding that no unreasonable delay or unreasonable force occurred in the\ncourse of Mr. Watersβs detention, we also find that the officers did not arrest Mr.\nWaters.\n\n The Supreme Court has held βthat a twenty-minute detention was reasonable\nwhen the police acted diligently and defendant contributed to the delay.β United\nStates v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (referencing United\nStates v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 (1985)). Here, the video evidence shows that\nAppellantsβ βentire encounter with law enforcement lasted about 20 minutes,β Waters\nv. Madson, Civ. No. 17-935 (PAM/SER), 2017 WL 6403099, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec.\n\n -12-\n\f14, 2017), that the officers worked diligently to complete their investigation, and that\nthe encounter only lasted as long as it did because Mr. Waters was argumentative and\nrefused to cooperate with the police investigation by failing to obey legitimate\nrequests to identify himself and step out of his vehicle. We thus find no unreasonable\ndelay here.\n\n β[T]he use of handcuffs during a Terry stop . . . requires some reasonable belief\nthat the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints are necessary for some\nother legitimate purpose.β El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457 (8th Cir.\n2011) (citation omitted). In El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, we found that a police\nofficer who used handcuffs to detain a man suspected of selling counterfeit watches\nto a pawn shop did not have such a reasonable belief. Id. at 459. There, the officer\nhandcuffed the individual immediately after arriving on the scene and before\nconducting any investigation. Id. at 458. After actually investigating, the officer\narrested El-Ghazzawy for theft by swindle; the charges were later dropped when the\npawn shop determined the watches were genuine. Id. at 455-56.\n\n In determining that the officer in El-Ghazzawy acted unreasonably, we relied\non five factors: (1) the officer had no indication that El-Ghazzawy was armed and\ndangerous; (2) theft by swindle, the suspected crime, did not necessarily involve a\nweapon; (3) El-Ghazzawy exhibited no suspicious behavior and cooperated with\nofficers throughout the incident; (4) the officer failed to conduct any investigation\nbefore handcuffing El-Ghazzawy; and (5) no exigent circumstances existed because\nthe pawn shop already had possession of the allegedly counterfeit watches. Id. at\n457-58.\n\n By contrast, when the officers here arrived on scene, they spoke to the Menards\nemployees and Mr. Waters to determine the situation. They did not handcuff Mr.\nWaters or detain him in the squad car until he disobeyed multiple commands to step\nout of his vehicle. Mr. Waters exhibited suspicious behavior before the officers even\n\n -13-\n\farrived on the scene by failing to allow store employees to verify his purchase\npursuant to a posted policy, and he continued to exhibit suspicious behavior by failing\nto identify himself or comply with the officersβ instructions to step out of his vehicle.\nSee United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that an officer,\nin the course of a Terry stop involving a vehicle, may ask a suspect for identification,\nβrequest that the driver step out of the vehicle,β and run computer searches to\ndetermine if the driver has a criminal history or outstanding warrants). In addition,\nthe video attached to the pleadings shows that Mr. Waters is significantly larger than\neither Officer Smith or Officer Kirchner, which factors into the applicable\ncircumstances. See El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59 (examining officerβs conduct\nin the context of the surrounding circumstances).\n\n The officers did not know Mr. Watersβs background and witnessed his\nargumentative, evasive, and uncooperative behavior. See United States v. Bailey, 417\nF.3d 873, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that evasiveness contributes to βa reasonable\nand particularized suspicion that criminal activity may be afootβ (internal quotation\nmarks omitted)). They could reasonably conclude that Mr. Watersβs unpredictable\nbehavior would continue to escalate and that handcuffing him and briefly placing him\nin the squad car was the least intrusive means of maintaining the status quo and\nprotecting Mr. Waters, themselves, and bystanders while the officers investigated.\nSee United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that after a\nsuspect, initially cooperative, became agitated and refused permission when an officer\nasked to search his car, the officer could maintain the status quo by handcuffing the\nsuspect and placing him in the back of a patrol car until a drug-sniffing dog arrived).\n\n We note that Mr. Watersβs unpredictability, evasiveness, argumentative\ndemeanor, refusal to disobey legitimate officer commands, and the size difference\nbetween Mr. Waters and the officers, each viewed in isolation, likely would not\njustify the officersβ use of restraints in this case. However, viewed as a whole, these\nfactors could cause Officers Smith and Kirchner to reasonably believe they needed\n\n -14-\n\fto handcuff Mr. Waters and place him in the squad car to preserve the status quo. See\nid. at 1002 (βWe have repeatedly held that police officers may reasonably handcuff\na suspect and place him in a squad car during the course of a Terry stop in order to\nprotect their safety and maintain the status quo.β).\n\n Because we view the officersβ actions in the context of the totality of the\ncircumstances, see El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59, we find that it was reasonable\nfor the officers to briefly handcuff Mr. Waters and detain him in the squad car.\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson are therefore entitled to qualified\nimmunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment seizure\nclaim.\n\n B.\n\n Count 6 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\nand Sergeant Madson seized Mrs. Waters in violation of the Fourth Amendment when\nthey threatened to arrest her if she did not provide Mr. Watersβs identifying\ninformation and allow officers to search the trunk of the Watersβs vehicle. The\ndistrict court dismissed this claim because the officers detained Appellants pursuant\nto arguable reasonable suspicion.\n\n It is well-settled law in this circuit that both a passenger and a driver are seized\nduring a Terry stop of a vehicle. United States v. Oliver, 550 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir.\n2008) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257-58 (2007); Maryland v.\nWilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12\n(1977)). If an officer acts lawfully in detaining the driver, he acts lawfully in\nconcurrently detaining the passenger. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257-59. As we\nconcluded above that the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining\nMr. Waters, the vehicleβs driver, we conclude that they acted pursuant to reasonable\nsuspicion in detaining Mrs. Waters, the passenger. The officers are entitled to\n\n -15-\n\fqualified immunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mrs. Watersβs Fourth Amendment\nseizure claim.\n\n C.\n\n Count 4 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officer Smith7 and Sergeant\nMadson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force\nagainst him. To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a\nplaintiff must show that an officerβs use of force was βobjectively unreasonable, given\nthe facts and circumstances of the particular case, as βjudged from the perspective of\na reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.ββ\nChambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490\nU.S. at 396). β[A] claim must be based upon more than βa de minimis use of force.ββ\nAtkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 2013)\n(emphasis omitted) (quoting Chambers, 641 F.3d at 906).\n\n The district court dismissed this claim because Appellants failed to plausibly\nallege that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was objectively unreasonable, and because\nMr. Waters failed to plead the requisite resulting injury from the handcuffing. While\nAppellants argue on appeal that the district court improperly dismissed this claim, in\ntheir opening brief they only discuss the district courtβs decision as it pertains to the\nclaim against Sergeant Madson. They have therefore waived the right to appeal the\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of their excessive force claim against Officer Smith. See\nChavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n We find that Sergeant Madson used objectively reasonable force in redirecting\nMr. Waters out of his personal space. The video attached to the pleadings shows Mr.\n\n\n 7\n Mr. Watersβs video shows, and Appellants concede on appeal, that Officer\nKirchner, rather than Officer Smith, handcuffed Mr. Waters. See Appellantβs Br. 16.\n -16-\n\fWaters approach well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, who was leaning on\nthe squad car. Sergeant Madson then turned Mr. Waters away from him and gave him\na light push in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. We find this to be a de minimis\nuse of force, see Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.\n2009) (finding that an officer used de minimis force when he kneed the compliant,\nhandcuffed, 75-year-old arrestee in the back while placing him in a patrol car);\nDurruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that an officer used\nde minimis force in wrapping his arms around a news cameraman, dragging him to\nthe ground, and handcuffing him), especially considering that Mr. Waters does not\nallege any physical injuries as a result of Sergeant Madsonβs conduct. See Chambers,\n641 F.3d at 906 (βThe degree of injury is . . . relevant insofar as it tends to show the\namount and type of force used.β).\n\n Because a de minimis use of force cannot form the basis for a Fourth\nAmendment excessive force claim, it cannot be objectively unreasonable in this\ncontext. See id. (βThe appropriate inquiry is βwhether the force used to effect a\nparticular seizure is βreasonable.ββ A de minimis use of force is insufficient to\nsupport a claim . . . .β (emphasis omitted) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). We\ntherefore find that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was reasonable under the\ncircumstances, and we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of Mr. Watersβs excessive\nforce claim.\n\n D.\n\n Count 16 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officers Smith and Kirchner\nand Sergeant Madson violated Appellantsβ Fourth Amendment rights by searching\nAppellantsβ vehicle without lawful authority. While the Fourth Amendment generally\nprohibits unreasonable searches, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, warrantless searches can\nbe valid if conducted pursuant to probable cause or voluntary consent. See United\nStates v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.\n\n -17-\n\fCt. 1663, 1669 (2018) (stating that βthe search of an automobile can be reasonable\nwithout a warrantβ if officers have probable cause). The state actor has the burden\nto prove that an individual consented to a search. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391\nU.S. 543, 547 (1968); United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998).\n\n Here, the officers contend that Mrs. Waters voluntarily consented to the search\nof Appellantsβ vehicle, while Appellants argue that Mrs. Waters was coerced into\nconsenting. The district court concluded that Appellants alleged sufficient facts to\npreclude dismissal of this claim on voluntary consent grounds. However, the district\ncourt also found that Appellants failed to allege any actual, compensable injury\nstemming from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk and, thus, failed to state\na claim for damages under Β§ 1983. A plaintiff seeking damages under Β§ 1983 for an\nunreasonable search must allege (1) an unlawful search and (2) an βactual,\ncompensable injury[,]β Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994), because\nβthe abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for Β§ 1983\ndamages.β Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).8\n\n Appellants argue on appeal that they supported their unlawful search claim by\npleading over $75,000 in emotional distress damages. However, in their Amended\n\n\n 8\n This is the standard for compensatory and punitive damages under Β§ 1983.\nSee Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306-08. The district court did not address the issue of\nnominal damages for violations of a Fourth Amendment right. See Garrett v. Clarke,\n147 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1998) (βIf [plaintiff] proves [his Fourth Amendment\nsearch] claim, he is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages even if he\ncannot prove actual damages.β). To the extent that Appellants might premise their\nFourth Amendment search claim on the availability of nominal damages, they have\nwaived that issue by failing to raise it on appeal. See Miller v. Albright, 657 F.3d\n733, 737-38 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that nominal damages are not automatic in a\nΒ§ 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation and that failure to timely request\nthem results in waiver); Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8th Cir. 2008)\n(βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.β).\n -18-\n\fComplaint, Appellants tied these damages directly to their false imprisonment,\nexcessive force, battery, and unlawful seizure claims. They did not allege any\ndamages stemming specifically from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk. See\nMiller v. Albright, 657 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2011) (βAlthough [plaintiff]\nintroduced evidence of actual damages resulting from his excessive force claim, he\ndid not introduce evidence of damages resulting from his unlawful entry claim. In\nthat these two claims are separate and distinct, the damages resulting from the\nexcessive force claim are not sufficient to show that [plaintiff] suffered damages as\na result of the officersβ unlawful entry into his home.β). We therefore agree with the\ndistrict court that Appellants failed to adequately plead a compensatory damages\nclaim under Β§ 1983 arising from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk, and we\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\n\n IV.\n\n Appellants brought three claims under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for violations of Mr.\nWatersβs First Amendment rights, two of which they appeal. Count 1 of the Amended\nComplaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson interfered\nwith Mr. Watersβs First Amendment rights to challenge the officersβ actions and to\nrefuse to provide identification. Count 2 alleges that the three officers then retaliated\nagainst Mr. Waters for challenging their actions and asking for their names and badge\nnumbers. Because our analysis of the interference claim incorporates our analysis of\nthe retaliation claim, we address the retaliation claim first.\n\n A.\n\n In order to overcome qualified immunity and state a plausible claim for\ninterference with his First Amendment rights under Β§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that\na state actor impeded his ability to exercise a clearly-established constitutional right.\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim\n\n -19-\n\funder Β§ 1983 may show that officers violated his constitutional rights if β(1) he\nengaged in a protected activity, (2) [officers] took adverse action against him that\nwould chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the\nadverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.β\nRevels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004).\n\n We require a fourth element in retaliatory arrest cases: βlack of probable cause\nor arguable probable cause.β Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014);\nsee also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664-65 (2012) (βThis Court has never\nrecognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is\nsupported by probable cause . . . .β). But see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138\nS. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018) (allowing plaintiff to maintain a First Amendment\nretaliatory arrest claim against a municipality without showing the absence of\nprobable cause when the claim was premised on βa premeditated plan [by the\nmunicipality and its legislators] to intimidate himβ). This is because probable cause\nprovides sufficient grounds for an arrest, Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887-88\n(8th Cir. 2015), and a plaintiff arrested pursuant to probable cause cannot show that\nexercising his constitutional rights was the ββbut-forβ cause of [his] arrest.β Baribeau,\n596 F.3d at 481; see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (β[A]ction\ncolored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that\naction would have been taken anyway.β).\n\n As discussed above, supra Part III.A, a temporary detention, unlike an arrest,\nmay be premised on the less-stringent requirements of reasonable suspicion. See\nWardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Therefore, to show that exercising his constitutional\nrights was the βbut-forβ cause of a temporary detention, a plaintiff must show that the\ndefendant officers lacked reasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion. See\nAllen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that\nofficer who stopped, detained, and handcuffed the plaintiff was entitled to qualified\n\n\n\n -20-\n\fimmunity on a First Amendment retaliation claim because he had reasonable\nsuspicion to detain the plaintiff on βlegal, non-retaliatoryβ grounds).\n\n Appellants allege that the officers retaliated against Mr. Waters for challenging\ntheir actions by βarresting him, using excessive and deliberately painful force,\nhandcuffing [him], . . . and banning him from Coon Rapids Menards for one year.β\nAm. Compl. 24, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. The district court dismissed Appellantsβ retaliation\nclaim, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had\narguable reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Mr. Waters. Appellants argue\nthat the district court incorrectly required the officers to act pursuant to arguable\nreasonable suspicion rather than the higher standard of probable cause. Appellantsβ\narguments are premised on their construction of Mr. Watersβs detention as an arrest.\nHowever, as we have determined that Mr. Waters was never arrested, we agree with\nthe district court that the applicable standard is reasonable suspicion, not probable\ncause. For the reasons stated above we find that the officers had reasonable suspicion\nto briefly detain Mr. Waters. We therefore find that the officers did not\nunconstitutionally retaliate against Mr. Waters because of his exercise of his First\nAmendment rights. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ First Amendment retaliation claim.\n\n B.\n\n Appellants further contend that the officers violated Mr. Watersβs First\nAmendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and free association by βphysically\nhandcuffing and arresting him to prevent him from monitoring their activity and\nquestioning their actions.β Am. Compl. 23, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. However, as referenced\nin the previous section, individuals do not have a recognized βFirst Amendment right\nto be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause[,]β Reichle,\n566 U.S. at 664-65; see also Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602, and, by extension, do not have\na recognized First Amendment right to be free from investigative stops supported by\n\n -21-\n\freasonable suspicion. See Allen, 815 F.3d at 245-46. Thus, for the same reasons we\ndetermined that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\nretaliation claim, we find that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\nFirst Amendment interference claim. We affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this\nclaim.\n\n V.\n\n Count 7 of the Amended Complaint alleges that, under Β§ 1983 and Monell, 436\nU.S. 658, the City is vicariously liable for the officersβ actions. Monell holds a\nmunicipality liable for actions of its employees or agents that violate a plaintiffβs\nconstitutional rights if the violation stemmed from an official municipal policy or\ncustom. 436 U.S. at 694-95; Ulrich v. Pope County, 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.\n2013). βThere must be a causal connection between the municipal policy or custom\nand the alleged constitutional violation in order to state a valid claim under Β§ 1983.β\nUlrich, 715 F.3d at 1061 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).\n\n Appellants assert the City violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth\nAmendment rights because Chief Wiseβan official policymakerβratified the\nofficersβ actions during the Menards incident when he determined the officers acted\nlawfully and closed Mr. Watersβs formal complaint. The district court dismissed\nAppellantsβ claim, finding that they failed to establish causation. We agree with the\ndistrict court that Chief Wiseβs after-the-fact determination did not cause the alleged\nviolations of Appellantsβ constitutional rights and that Appellants, therefore, cannot\npremise a Monell claim on Chief Wiseβs actions. Because Appellants do not identify\na causal link between an official municipal custom or policy and the alleged\nconstitutional violations, they fail to state a Monell claim for municipal liability. We\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\n\n\n\n\n -22-\n\f VI.\n\n Count 10 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner,\nSergeant Madson, and the City falsely imprisoned Mr. Waters by failing to investigate\nwhether he had shoplifted, physically restraining him without arresting him for failing\nto produce identification, and placing him in the back seat of a squad car in\nhandcuffs. Count 11 asserts that the officers falsely imprisoned Mrs. Waters. Under\nMinnesota law, police officers falsely imprison a plaintiff if they arrest or detain him\nβwithout proper legal authority.β Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Minn.\n1974) (per curiam); see also Kleidon v. Glascock, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1943)\n(βFalse imprisonment has been defined as any imprisonment which is not legally\njustifiable.β (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have already found that the\nofficers temporarily detained Appellants pursuant to reasonable suspicion, supra Part\nIII.A, we find that they acted with proper legal authority. Appellants therefore do not\nstate a false imprisonment claim under Minnesota law, and the district court properly\ndismissed these claims.\n\n VII.\n\n Count 12 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Sergeant Madson committed\nbattery against Mr. Waters when he physically turned Mr. Waters away from him and\npushed Mr. Waters in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. βBattery is an intentional,\nunpermitted offensive contact with another.β Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41\n(Minn. 1990) (en banc). Under Minnesota law, βonly the use of excessive force by\na police officer will constitute a battery.β Johnson v. Peterson, 358 N.W.2d 484, 485\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152,\n155 (Minn. 1980).\n\n The district court dismissed Appellantsβ battery claim because Appellants\nfailed to plausibly allege that Sergeant Madson used objectively unreasonable force,\n\n -23-\n\fespecially in light of the Amended Complaintβs failure to allege that Mr. Waters\nsuffered any injury. As with their Fourth Amendment excessive force claim,\nAppellants present no argument that Sergeant Madson employed excessive force in\nremoving Mr. Waters from his personal space and have therefore waived the right to\nchallenge the district courtβs characterization of that force as reasonable. Indeed,\nAppellants present no meaningful argument at all regarding this claim. See Cox v.\nMortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 674 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that\nthe appellants βwaived [an] issue by failing to provide a meaningful explanation of\nthe argument and citation to relevant authority in their opening briefβ). We therefore\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ battery claim.\n\n VIII.\n\n Count 13 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Smith committed\ndefamation when she accused Mr. Waters, in front of third party bystanders, of acting\nlike a sovereign citizen. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that Officer\nSmithβs statement was a subjective opinion and, thus, not actionable, see Turkish\nCoal. of Am., Inc. v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Geraci v.\nEckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)), and that, alternatively, if\nOfficer Smithβs statement was actionable, she and the City were shielded by absolute\nimmunity. On appeal, Appellants do not challenge the district courtβs determination\nthat Officer Smithβs statement was not actionable. They have therefore waived\nargument on that dispositive issue. See Cox, 685 F.3d at 674. We affirm the district\ncourtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ defamation claim.\n\n IX.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed in full.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n -24-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Charles WATERS; Anita Waters Plaintiffs - Appellants v. B. MADSON; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids Defendants - Appellees Menard, Inc. Defendant Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3827\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Charles Waters; Anita Waters\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n B. Madson; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n Menard, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: April 11, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2016, Charles Waters refused to allow Menards home supply store\\nemployees, pursuant to posted store policy, to search the trunk of his vehicle as he\\nexited a Menards lumberyard in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. Mr. Waters eventually\\ncalled the police, who responded to the scene. Based on this encounter, Mr. Waters\\nand his wife Anita filed a 19-count Amended Complaint in federal district court,1\\nalleging violations of both federal and state law against the City of Coon Rapids,\\nvarious Coon Rapids police officers, and Menard, Inc. The defendants filed a motion\\nto dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the\\ndistrict court granted. Mr. and Mrs. Waters now appeal. Having jurisdiction under\\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On March 27, 2016, Appellants visited a Menards store in Coon Rapids,\\nMinnesota, to exchange a saw Mr. Waters had previously purchased for a new saw\\nhe had purchased online. Mr. Waters video-recorded their visit through a sunglass\\ncamera clipped to his shirt.2 (He later posted excerpts of this video on his YouTube\\nchannel. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 16-1.) An employee inside the store directed Appellants\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n 2\\n Appellants attached a highly-edited version of Mr. Watersβs sunglass camera\\nrecording and the officersβ squad car recordings to their Amended Complaint.\\nAppellees produced the dashboard camera video from Officer Smithβs squad car in\\nsupport of their motion to dismiss. The district court determined that the videos were\\nβnecessarily embraced by the pleadingsβ and considered them, together with the\\npleadings, when ruling on Appelleesβ motion to dismiss. See Ashanti v. City of\\nGolden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012). Neither party objected to the\\ndistrict courtβs use of the videos in its determination.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto the online pickup location inside the Menards lumberyard. Mr. Waters drove into\\nthe lumberyard with Mrs. Waters in the passenger seat. While it is undisputed that\\nMenards had posted signs at the yardβs entrance and exit stating that vehicles leaving\\nthe lumberyard were subject to inspection, Appellants claim they did not see any such\\nsigns upon entry.\\n\\n After Appellants arrived in the lumberyard, a Menards employee loaded the\\nsaw into their vehicleβs trunk. Appellants then proceeded to the lumberyard exit,\\nwhere a Menards employee requested that they open their vehicleβs trunk for\\ninspection as per the signs. Mr. Waters refused, stating that he had no legal\\nobligation to do so. When the gate employee refused to open the exit gate and called\\nfor a manager, Mr. Waters called the police.\\n\\n Coon Rapids police officers Alyssa Smith3 and Emily Kirchner arrived in\\nresponse to Mr. Watersβs call. After being told by the Menards manager that posted\\nstore policy required Menards to verify Mr. Watersβs purchase before Appellants\\ncould leave the lumberyard and that Mr. Waters believed he was being unlawfully\\ndetained, Officer Smith approached Appellantsβ vehicle and told Mr. Waters to allow\\nthe Menards employees to verify his purchase. When Mr. Waters refused, Officer\\nSmith asked Mr. Waters for identification, which he refused to provide, stating that\\nhe was βnot currently drivingβ and did not have to βprovide ID until there [was] a\\nreasonable suspicion of a crime.β Officer Smith informed Mr. Waters that she had\\nreasonable suspicion he had committed a crime because he would not open the trunk.\\n\\n Officer Smith then asked Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle, and Officer\\nKirchner explained that, because Mr. Waters was noncompliant with Menards policy,\\nthe officers reasonably suspected he had something in his vehicleβs trunk that he was\\n\\n\\n 3\\n At the time of the incident, Officer Smithβs name was Alyssa Newbury. For\\nconsistency with the district court opinion, we refer to her as Officer Smith.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fnot supposed to have. The officers again told Mr. Waters to step out of his vehicle.\\nMr. Waters, still video-recording, stated, βIβm being ordered out of my vehicle. Iβm\\nbeing placed under arrest,β to which Officer Smith calmly responded, βI didnβt say\\nyou were under arrest; I said you need to step out of the vehicle.β When Mr. Waters\\nasked if he was free to go, Officer Smith stated, βYou are not free to go.β Mr. Waters\\nreplied, βThen Iβm being detained. Under what reasonable suspicion of what crime?β\\nThe officers again told Mr. Waters to get out of his car and he repeated his question,\\nthen repeatedly asked the officers for their names and badge numbers. Officer\\nKirchner told Mr. Waters yet again to step out of his car and, when he failed to\\ncomply, told him he could go to jail.\\n\\n Mr. Waters eventually complied with orders to step out of his car. Officer\\nKirchner searched him for weapons and told him that the officers had βreasonable\\nsuspicion that [he] ha[d] something in the trunk,β stating, βYou came into a shipment\\nyard which has a policy that you are not supposed to leave without showing the\\nproduct that you have picked up, and you are not willing to do that.β Officer\\nKirchner then handcuffed Mr. Waters, who is significantly taller than either of the\\nfemale officers, and placed him in the back seat of a squad car. Officer Smith spoke\\nto the nearby Menards employees and asked them if they had ever dealt with\\nsovereign citizens, mentioning that Mr. Watersβs behavior resembled that exhibited\\nby sovereign citizens.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Sovereign citizens are a loosely-affiliated group who believe government in\\nthe United States operates illegitimately and outside the bounds of its jurisdiction.\\nFBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section, Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic\\nThreat to Law Enforcement, FBI L. Enforcement Bull., Sept. 2011, at 20, 21. The\\nFBI has labeled the sovereign citizens a domestic terrorist group. See Domestic\\nTerrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement, FBI (Apr. 13, 2010),\\nhttps://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_04131\\n0/domestic-terrorism-the-sovereign-citizen-movement.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Officer Smith then returned to Appellantsβ vehicle. When Officer Smith asked\\nif Mr. Waters was a sovereign citizen, Mrs. Waters replied that her husband βtakes\\nit all very seriously.β Officer Smith then told Mrs. Waters that Mr. Waters was\\ncreating more problems for himself. Mrs. Waters responded, βI know.β Officer\\nSmith asked Mrs. Waters to identify her husband, and Mrs. Waters did so.\\n\\n While Officer Smith was speaking with Mrs. Waters, Coon Rapids Police\\nSergeant Brady Madson arrived on scene. Officer Smith conferred with Sergeant\\nMadson. Officer Kirchner5 then approached Mrs. Waters and asked, βWould you be\\nwilling to open the trunk for these gentlemen? Because thatβs the only thing thatβs\\nholding us up here.β When Mrs. Waters explained that Appellants had come into the\\nlumberyard to pick up a saw, which a Menards employee placed in the trunk for them,\\nOfficer Kirchner stated, βItβd be doing us a huge favor if you could just bring that\\ninvoice and step out with these guys and pop the trunk for us. Weβll chalk it up to\\n[Mr. Waters] having a bad day.β Mrs. Waters did as Officer Kirchner requested. A\\nMenards employee and one of the officers looked into the trunk and verified the\\npurchase. The officers then released Mr. Waters, issuing a trespass warning that\\nprevented him from reentering the Coon Rapids Menards for a year.\\n\\n After receiving the trespass warning but before leaving the lumberyard, Mr.\\nWaters requested the officersβ names and badge numbers. He approached Sergeant\\nMadson to read the name and badge number off the sergeantβs uniform. When Mr.\\nWaters reached well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, the sergeant physically\\nturned Mr. Waters away from him and pushed him toward Appellantsβ vehicle.\\nAppellants then drove out of the lumberyard. The entire encounter with the officers\\nlasted less than twenty minutes.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The district courtβs Order misidentifies Officer Kirchner as Officer Smith\\nduring this interaction.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Following the incident, Mr. Waters emailed the Coon Rapids Police\\nDepartment, seeking to file a formal complaint against the officers involved. Captain\\nThomas Hawley initially refused to accept a written complaint through email, stating\\nthat Mr. Waters or his representative needed to communicate with the police\\ndepartment by telephone or in person. Although the record does not indicate that Mr.\\nWaters, personally or through a representative, further communicated with the\\ndepartment other than by email, Coon Rapids Chief of Police Brad Wise reviewed\\nMr. Watersβs complaint, determined the officers had acted lawfully, and formally\\nclosed the complaint.\\n\\n Appellants filed a 19-claim Amended Complaint in the United States District\\nCourt for the District of Minnesota, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Β§ 504 of the\\nRehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, as well as\\ncommon-law claims for false imprisonment, battery, defamation, trespass, invasion\\nof privacy, and negligence. They named Sergeant Madson, Officers Smith and\\nKirchner, and Captain Hawley, in their individual capacities; the City of Coon\\nRapids; and Menard, Inc. as defendants.\\n\\n Menards filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 12(b)(6), alleging that Menards is not a state actor and that Appellants consented\\nto the search of their vehicleβs trunk when they entered the lumberyard. The officers\\nand the City also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Appellants\\nfailed to plausibly allege their claims and raising the affirmative defenses of qualified,\\nofficial, and absolute immunity. All defendants moved in the alternative for summary\\njudgment.\\n\\n The district court found that, with the exception of their Fourth Amendment\\nclaim for unlawful search, Appellants failed to plausibly allege any violation of their\\nclearly-established constitutional rights, and that the officers were therefore entitled\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fto qualified immunity on all but one of Appellantsβ constitutional claims. While the\\ndistrict court determined that Appellants plausibly alleged a violation of their clearly-\\nestablished constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches, it also determined\\nthat they failed to allege, as required for a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983,\\nthat the violation caused any compensable injury. The district court further found that\\nAppellants failed to identify a City policy or custom that caused the alleged\\nconstitutional violations, that Appellants failed to plausibly allege their state law\\nclaims, and that Menards was not a state actor subject to Β§ 1983 claims. The district\\ncourt therefore granted the defendantsβ motions and dismissed all of Appellantsβ\\nclaims with prejudice.\\n\\n Appellants subsequently settled their claims against Menard, Inc. They now\\nappeal the district courtβs dismissal of their claims against the officers and the City\\nfor interference and retaliation under the First Amendment; unlawful arrest, excessive\\nforce, unlawful search, and unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and false\\nimprisonment, battery, and defamation under Minnesota common law; and their claim\\nagainst the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim\\nunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting as true all factual allegations in the light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818,\\n820 (8th Cir. 2008). The complaint βmust allege more than β[t]hreadbare recitals of\\nthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[;]β . . . [it\\nmust] allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, βstate a claim to relief that is plausible\\non its face.ββ K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017)\\n(first alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). We need not accept as true a plaintiffβs\\nconclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Hanten v. Sch.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fDist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999); Westcott v. City of\\nOmaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Nor need we adopt the plaintiffβs\\nversion of the facts if they are βblatantly contradict[ed]β by video evidence. Boude\\nv. City of Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017). βWe will not affirm a\\ndismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no\\nset of facts that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief.β Hanten, 183 F.3d at 805.\\n\\n Appellants brought a multitude of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 1983. Section 1983 provides a mechanism by which aggrieved plaintiffs may sue\\na state actor for violation of their constitutional rights. See Foster v. Wyrick, 823\\nF.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987). However, state actors, such as police officers, are\\nprotected from Β§ 1983 suits by the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See\\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640\\n(1980) (explaining that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense). Qualified\\nimmunity shields police officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable\\nofficers in the same position could have believed their conduct was βlawful, in light\\nof clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessedβ at the time.\\nAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).\\n\\n Because qualified immunity protects officers from suit, not merely from\\nliability, courts should βresolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in\\nlitigation.β Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). To overcome\\nqualified immunity, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of his statutory or\\nconstitutional rights, and (2) that βthe right at issue was βclearly establishedβ at the\\ntime of [the] defendantβs alleged misconduct.β Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,\\n232 (2009). βQualified immunity is appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could\\nanswer yes to both of these questions.β Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (citation omitted). Courts may analyze either of the qualified immunity prongs\\nfirst. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f The district court dismissed all of Appellantsβ constitutional claims on\\nqualified immunity grounds except the unlawful search claim, which it dismissed for\\nfailure to state a claim. Similarly, on each of Appellantsβ constitutional claims, we\\nwill first determine whether qualified immunity is applicable and, if not, whether\\nAppellants stated sufficient facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.\\n\\n Appellants also brought a number of tort claims under Minnesota common\\n 6\\nlaw. Police officers in Minnesota may avoid state tort actions through the\\napplication of another affirmative defenseβofficial immunity. Elwood v. Rice\\nCounty, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (en banc). βThe official immunity\\ndoctrine provides that βa public official charged by law with duties which call for the\\nexercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for\\ndamages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.ββ Id. (quoting Susla v.\\nState, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1976) (en banc)). While the officers in this case\\nasserted official immunity, the district court did not analyze whether immunity barred\\nAppellantsβ state tort claims. Rather, it dismissed those claims for failure to state a\\nclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because we dispose of each of Appellantsβ state\\nlaw claims on other grounds, we, too, find it unnecessary to examine the application\\nof official immunity in this case.\\n\\n We now address each of the eleven claims on appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n While a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over\\na state-law claim brought pendent to federal-question claims when the district court\\nβhas dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,β it is not required to\\ndo so if declining jurisdiction would run contrary to βjudicial economy, convenience,\\nfairness, and comity.β City of Chicago v. Intβl Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173\\n(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3). The\\ndistrict court here chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellantsβ state\\nlaw claims, and we may therefore review the district courtβs decision on those claims.\\nSee 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n -9-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Appellants brought four claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.\\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from βunreasonable searches\\nand seizures.β U.S. Const. amend. IV. Mr. Waters alleges unlawful arrest and\\nexcessive force, Mrs. Waters alleges unlawful seizure, and both Mr. and Mrs. Waters\\nallege unlawful search. We analyze each of these claims in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Count 3 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by detaining\\nor arresting him without probable cause. Police officers violate the Fourth\\nAmendment when they conduct an arrest without a warrant or probable cause.\\nBaribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).\\nHowever, in order to effect a temporary investigative detention, officers need only\\nreasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v.\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 744 (8th\\nCir. 2017). While β[r]easonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause,β\\nUnited States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2006), it requires βat least\\nsome minimal level of objective justification.β De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 744 (internal\\nquotation marks omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (defining\\nreasonable suspicion as something more than an βinchoate and unparticularized\\nsuspicion or βhunchββ).\\n\\n In determining whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct\\na temporary investigative detention, or βTerry stop,β courts look only at the\\ninformation the officer possessed at the time. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also\\nGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). βWhen evaluating whether reasonable\\nsuspicion for a Terry stop exists, βwe view the [officersβ] observations as a whole,\\n\\n -10-\\n\\frather than as discrete and disconnected occurrences.ββ United States v. Hightower,\\n716 F.3d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.\\nPoitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1987)). If we determine that an officer lacked\\nreasonable suspicion and thus conducted an unlawful Terry stop, she may nonetheless\\nbe entitled to qualified immunity if she had arguable reasonable suspicionβthat is,\\nif a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed she had reasonable\\nsuspicion. De La Rosa, 852 F.3d at 745-46 (examining arguable reasonable suspicion\\nunder the βclearly establishedβ prong of qualified immunity).\\n\\n The district court dismissed the unlawful detention claim, finding that the\\nofficers had arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters and were thus\\nentitled to qualified immunity. Appellants argue that the officers did not have\\nreasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Waters.\\nAlternatively, Appellants contend that the officers needed arguable probable cause\\nbecause the temporary detention became a de facto arrest when the officers\\nhandcuffed Mr. Waters and detained him βin the squad car for twenty minutes.β\\nAppellantβs Br. 43.\\n\\n With respect to this claim, we need not discuss arguable reasonable suspicion\\nbecause, in fact, the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining Mr.\\nWaters. The videos attached to the pleadings show that Mr. Waters refused to open\\nhis vehicleβs trunk at the lumberyard exit, despite signs at the entrance and exit\\ninforming visitors that vehicles would be inspected as they left the lumberyard. The\\nrequirement was clearly part of Menardsβs customary protocol as customers exited\\nthe lumberyard after picking up merchandise in their vehicles. Officers Smith and\\nKirchner arrived at Menards in response to Mr. Watersβs 911 call and Mr. Waters\\nrefused to identify himself to the officers or to allow anyone to verify his purchase.\\nAt that point, Officer Smith and Officer Kirchner had βa particularized and objective\\nbasisβ to detain Mr. Waters. Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 2000)\\n(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Indeed, the officers told Mr. Waters at the time that he was being detained that\\nhis refusal to comply with Menardsβs clearly-posted policy afforded them reasonable\\nsuspicion that he had something incriminating in his vehicleβs trunk. Because\\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner possessed specific, articulable facts that led them to\\nsuspect Mr. Waters might be engaged in criminal activity, see Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.\\nDist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004), we find that, under the totality of the\\ncircumstances, Officers Smith and Kirchner actually had reasonable suspicion to\\ndetain Mr. Waters.\\n\\n Having concluded that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain\\nMr. Waters, we must next determine whether that detention became a de facto arrest.\\nβA Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, if the stop lasts for an\\nunreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.β United States v.\\nNewell, 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). While\\nofficers must use βthe least intrusive means of detention and investigation . . .\\nreasonably necessaryβ to conduct the stop, United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192\\nF.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999), they are permitted to βtake any measures that are\\nβreasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo\\nduring the course of the stop.ββ United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir.\\n2016) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.\\n2011)). Finding that no unreasonable delay or unreasonable force occurred in the\\ncourse of Mr. Watersβs detention, we also find that the officers did not arrest Mr.\\nWaters.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has held βthat a twenty-minute detention was reasonable\\nwhen the police acted diligently and defendant contributed to the delay.β United\\nStates v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (referencing United\\nStates v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 (1985)). Here, the video evidence shows that\\nAppellantsβ βentire encounter with law enforcement lasted about 20 minutes,β Waters\\nv. Madson, Civ. No. 17-935 (PAM/SER), 2017 WL 6403099, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f14, 2017), that the officers worked diligently to complete their investigation, and that\\nthe encounter only lasted as long as it did because Mr. Waters was argumentative and\\nrefused to cooperate with the police investigation by failing to obey legitimate\\nrequests to identify himself and step out of his vehicle. We thus find no unreasonable\\ndelay here.\\n\\n β[T]he use of handcuffs during a Terry stop . . . requires some reasonable belief\\nthat the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints are necessary for some\\nother legitimate purpose.β El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (citation omitted). In El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, we found that a police\\nofficer who used handcuffs to detain a man suspected of selling counterfeit watches\\nto a pawn shop did not have such a reasonable belief. Id. at 459. There, the officer\\nhandcuffed the individual immediately after arriving on the scene and before\\nconducting any investigation. Id. at 458. After actually investigating, the officer\\narrested El-Ghazzawy for theft by swindle; the charges were later dropped when the\\npawn shop determined the watches were genuine. Id. at 455-56.\\n\\n In determining that the officer in El-Ghazzawy acted unreasonably, we relied\\non five factors: (1) the officer had no indication that El-Ghazzawy was armed and\\ndangerous; (2) theft by swindle, the suspected crime, did not necessarily involve a\\nweapon; (3) El-Ghazzawy exhibited no suspicious behavior and cooperated with\\nofficers throughout the incident; (4) the officer failed to conduct any investigation\\nbefore handcuffing El-Ghazzawy; and (5) no exigent circumstances existed because\\nthe pawn shop already had possession of the allegedly counterfeit watches. Id. at\\n457-58.\\n\\n By contrast, when the officers here arrived on scene, they spoke to the Menards\\nemployees and Mr. Waters to determine the situation. They did not handcuff Mr.\\nWaters or detain him in the squad car until he disobeyed multiple commands to step\\nout of his vehicle. Mr. Waters exhibited suspicious behavior before the officers even\\n\\n -13-\\n\\farrived on the scene by failing to allow store employees to verify his purchase\\npursuant to a posted policy, and he continued to exhibit suspicious behavior by failing\\nto identify himself or comply with the officersβ instructions to step out of his vehicle.\\nSee United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that an officer,\\nin the course of a Terry stop involving a vehicle, may ask a suspect for identification,\\nβrequest that the driver step out of the vehicle,β and run computer searches to\\ndetermine if the driver has a criminal history or outstanding warrants). In addition,\\nthe video attached to the pleadings shows that Mr. Waters is significantly larger than\\neither Officer Smith or Officer Kirchner, which factors into the applicable\\ncircumstances. See El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59 (examining officerβs conduct\\nin the context of the surrounding circumstances).\\n\\n The officers did not know Mr. Watersβs background and witnessed his\\nargumentative, evasive, and uncooperative behavior. See United States v. Bailey, 417\\nF.3d 873, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that evasiveness contributes to βa reasonable\\nand particularized suspicion that criminal activity may be afootβ (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted)). They could reasonably conclude that Mr. Watersβs unpredictable\\nbehavior would continue to escalate and that handcuffing him and briefly placing him\\nin the squad car was the least intrusive means of maintaining the status quo and\\nprotecting Mr. Waters, themselves, and bystanders while the officers investigated.\\nSee United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that after a\\nsuspect, initially cooperative, became agitated and refused permission when an officer\\nasked to search his car, the officer could maintain the status quo by handcuffing the\\nsuspect and placing him in the back of a patrol car until a drug-sniffing dog arrived).\\n\\n We note that Mr. Watersβs unpredictability, evasiveness, argumentative\\ndemeanor, refusal to disobey legitimate officer commands, and the size difference\\nbetween Mr. Waters and the officers, each viewed in isolation, likely would not\\njustify the officersβ use of restraints in this case. However, viewed as a whole, these\\nfactors could cause Officers Smith and Kirchner to reasonably believe they needed\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fto handcuff Mr. Waters and place him in the squad car to preserve the status quo. See\\nid. at 1002 (βWe have repeatedly held that police officers may reasonably handcuff\\na suspect and place him in a squad car during the course of a Terry stop in order to\\nprotect their safety and maintain the status quo.β).\\n\\n Because we view the officersβ actions in the context of the totality of the\\ncircumstances, see El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457-59, we find that it was reasonable\\nfor the officers to briefly handcuff Mr. Waters and detain him in the squad car.\\nOfficers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson are therefore entitled to qualified\\nimmunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment seizure\\nclaim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Count 6 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson seized Mrs. Waters in violation of the Fourth Amendment when\\nthey threatened to arrest her if she did not provide Mr. Watersβs identifying\\ninformation and allow officers to search the trunk of the Watersβs vehicle. The\\ndistrict court dismissed this claim because the officers detained Appellants pursuant\\nto arguable reasonable suspicion.\\n\\n It is well-settled law in this circuit that both a passenger and a driver are seized\\nduring a Terry stop of a vehicle. United States v. Oliver, 550 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir.\\n2008) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257-58 (2007); Maryland v.\\nWilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12\\n(1977)). If an officer acts lawfully in detaining the driver, he acts lawfully in\\nconcurrently detaining the passenger. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257-59. As we\\nconcluded above that the officers acted pursuant to reasonable suspicion in detaining\\nMr. Waters, the vehicleβs driver, we conclude that they acted pursuant to reasonable\\nsuspicion in detaining Mrs. Waters, the passenger. The officers are entitled to\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fqualified immunity, and we affirm the dismissal of Mrs. Watersβs Fourth Amendment\\nseizure claim.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Count 4 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officer Smith7 and Sergeant\\nMadson violated Mr. Watersβs Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force\\nagainst him. To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a\\nplaintiff must show that an officerβs use of force was βobjectively unreasonable, given\\nthe facts and circumstances of the particular case, as βjudged from the perspective of\\na reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.ββ\\nChambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490\\nU.S. at 396). β[A] claim must be based upon more than βa de minimis use of force.ββ\\nAtkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(emphasis omitted) (quoting Chambers, 641 F.3d at 906).\\n\\n The district court dismissed this claim because Appellants failed to plausibly\\nallege that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was objectively unreasonable, and because\\nMr. Waters failed to plead the requisite resulting injury from the handcuffing. While\\nAppellants argue on appeal that the district court improperly dismissed this claim, in\\ntheir opening brief they only discuss the district courtβs decision as it pertains to the\\nclaim against Sergeant Madson. They have therefore waived the right to appeal the\\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of their excessive force claim against Officer Smith. See\\nChavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n We find that Sergeant Madson used objectively reasonable force in redirecting\\nMr. Waters out of his personal space. The video attached to the pleadings shows Mr.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n Mr. Watersβs video shows, and Appellants concede on appeal, that Officer\\nKirchner, rather than Officer Smith, handcuffed Mr. Waters. See Appellantβs Br. 16.\\n -16-\\n\\fWaters approach well within armβs length of Sergeant Madson, who was leaning on\\nthe squad car. Sergeant Madson then turned Mr. Waters away from him and gave him\\na light push in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. We find this to be a de minimis\\nuse of force, see Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.\\n2009) (finding that an officer used de minimis force when he kneed the compliant,\\nhandcuffed, 75-year-old arrestee in the back while placing him in a patrol car);\\nDurruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that an officer used\\nde minimis force in wrapping his arms around a news cameraman, dragging him to\\nthe ground, and handcuffing him), especially considering that Mr. Waters does not\\nallege any physical injuries as a result of Sergeant Madsonβs conduct. See Chambers,\\n641 F.3d at 906 (βThe degree of injury is . . . relevant insofar as it tends to show the\\namount and type of force used.β).\\n\\n Because a de minimis use of force cannot form the basis for a Fourth\\nAmendment excessive force claim, it cannot be objectively unreasonable in this\\ncontext. See id. (βThe appropriate inquiry is βwhether the force used to effect a\\nparticular seizure is βreasonable.ββ A de minimis use of force is insufficient to\\nsupport a claim . . . .β (emphasis omitted) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). We\\ntherefore find that Sergeant Madsonβs use of force was reasonable under the\\ncircumstances, and we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of Mr. Watersβs excessive\\nforce claim.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Count 16 of the Amended Complaint asserts that Officers Smith and Kirchner\\nand Sergeant Madson violated Appellantsβ Fourth Amendment rights by searching\\nAppellantsβ vehicle without lawful authority. While the Fourth Amendment generally\\nprohibits unreasonable searches, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, warrantless searches can\\nbe valid if conducted pursuant to probable cause or voluntary consent. See United\\nStates v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.\\n\\n -17-\\n\\fCt. 1663, 1669 (2018) (stating that βthe search of an automobile can be reasonable\\nwithout a warrantβ if officers have probable cause). The state actor has the burden\\nto prove that an individual consented to a search. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391\\nU.S. 543, 547 (1968); United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n Here, the officers contend that Mrs. Waters voluntarily consented to the search\\nof Appellantsβ vehicle, while Appellants argue that Mrs. Waters was coerced into\\nconsenting. The district court concluded that Appellants alleged sufficient facts to\\npreclude dismissal of this claim on voluntary consent grounds. However, the district\\ncourt also found that Appellants failed to allege any actual, compensable injury\\nstemming from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk and, thus, failed to state\\na claim for damages under Β§ 1983. A plaintiff seeking damages under Β§ 1983 for an\\nunreasonable search must allege (1) an unlawful search and (2) an βactual,\\ncompensable injury[,]β Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994), because\\nβthe abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for Β§ 1983\\ndamages.β Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).8\\n\\n Appellants argue on appeal that they supported their unlawful search claim by\\npleading over $75,000 in emotional distress damages. However, in their Amended\\n\\n\\n 8\\n This is the standard for compensatory and punitive damages under Β§ 1983.\\nSee Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306-08. The district court did not address the issue of\\nnominal damages for violations of a Fourth Amendment right. See Garrett v. Clarke,\\n147 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1998) (βIf [plaintiff] proves [his Fourth Amendment\\nsearch] claim, he is entitled to a finding of liability and nominal damages even if he\\ncannot prove actual damages.β). To the extent that Appellants might premise their\\nFourth Amendment search claim on the availability of nominal damages, they have\\nwaived that issue by failing to raise it on appeal. See Miller v. Albright, 657 F.3d\\n733, 737-38 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that nominal damages are not automatic in a\\nΒ§ 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation and that failure to timely request\\nthem results in waiver); Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8th Cir. 2008)\\n(βClaims not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.β).\\n -18-\\n\\fComplaint, Appellants tied these damages directly to their false imprisonment,\\nexcessive force, battery, and unlawful seizure claims. They did not allege any\\ndamages stemming specifically from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk. See\\nMiller v. Albright, 657 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2011) (βAlthough [plaintiff]\\nintroduced evidence of actual damages resulting from his excessive force claim, he\\ndid not introduce evidence of damages resulting from his unlawful entry claim. In\\nthat these two claims are separate and distinct, the damages resulting from the\\nexcessive force claim are not sufficient to show that [plaintiff] suffered damages as\\na result of the officersβ unlawful entry into his home.β). We therefore agree with the\\ndistrict court that Appellants failed to adequately plead a compensatory damages\\nclaim under Β§ 1983 arising from the officersβ search of their vehicleβs trunk, and we\\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Appellants brought three claims under 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 for violations of Mr.\\nWatersβs First Amendment rights, two of which they appeal. Count 1 of the Amended\\nComplaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner and Sergeant Madson interfered\\nwith Mr. Watersβs First Amendment rights to challenge the officersβ actions and to\\nrefuse to provide identification. Count 2 alleges that the three officers then retaliated\\nagainst Mr. Waters for challenging their actions and asking for their names and badge\\nnumbers. Because our analysis of the interference claim incorporates our analysis of\\nthe retaliation claim, we address the retaliation claim first.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In order to overcome qualified immunity and state a plausible claim for\\ninterference with his First Amendment rights under Β§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that\\na state actor impeded his ability to exercise a clearly-established constitutional right.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim\\n\\n -19-\\n\\funder Β§ 1983 may show that officers violated his constitutional rights if β(1) he\\nengaged in a protected activity, (2) [officers] took adverse action against him that\\nwould chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the\\nadverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.β\\nRevels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n We require a fourth element in retaliatory arrest cases: βlack of probable cause\\nor arguable probable cause.β Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664-65 (2012) (βThis Court has never\\nrecognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is\\nsupported by probable cause . . . .β). But see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138\\nS. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018) (allowing plaintiff to maintain a First Amendment\\nretaliatory arrest claim against a municipality without showing the absence of\\nprobable cause when the claim was premised on βa premeditated plan [by the\\nmunicipality and its legislators] to intimidate himβ). This is because probable cause\\nprovides sufficient grounds for an arrest, Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887-88\\n(8th Cir. 2015), and a plaintiff arrested pursuant to probable cause cannot show that\\nexercising his constitutional rights was the ββbut-forβ cause of [his] arrest.β Baribeau,\\n596 F.3d at 481; see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (β[A]ction\\ncolored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that\\naction would have been taken anyway.β).\\n\\n As discussed above, supra Part III.A, a temporary detention, unlike an arrest,\\nmay be premised on the less-stringent requirements of reasonable suspicion. See\\nWardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Therefore, to show that exercising his constitutional\\nrights was the βbut-forβ cause of a temporary detention, a plaintiff must show that the\\ndefendant officers lacked reasonable suspicion or arguable reasonable suspicion. See\\nAllen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that\\nofficer who stopped, detained, and handcuffed the plaintiff was entitled to qualified\\n\\n\\n\\n -20-\\n\\fimmunity on a First Amendment retaliation claim because he had reasonable\\nsuspicion to detain the plaintiff on βlegal, non-retaliatoryβ grounds).\\n\\n Appellants allege that the officers retaliated against Mr. Waters for challenging\\ntheir actions by βarresting him, using excessive and deliberately painful force,\\nhandcuffing [him], . . . and banning him from Coon Rapids Menards for one year.β\\nAm. Compl. 24, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. The district court dismissed Appellantsβ retaliation\\nclaim, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had\\narguable reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Mr. Waters. Appellants argue\\nthat the district court incorrectly required the officers to act pursuant to arguable\\nreasonable suspicion rather than the higher standard of probable cause. Appellantsβ\\narguments are premised on their construction of Mr. Watersβs detention as an arrest.\\nHowever, as we have determined that Mr. Waters was never arrested, we agree with\\nthe district court that the applicable standard is reasonable suspicion, not probable\\ncause. For the reasons stated above we find that the officers had reasonable suspicion\\nto briefly detain Mr. Waters. We therefore find that the officers did not\\nunconstitutionally retaliate against Mr. Waters because of his exercise of his First\\nAmendment rights. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the\\ndistrict courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Appellants further contend that the officers violated Mr. Watersβs First\\nAmendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and free association by βphysically\\nhandcuffing and arresting him to prevent him from monitoring their activity and\\nquestioning their actions.β Am. Compl. 23, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28. However, as referenced\\nin the previous section, individuals do not have a recognized βFirst Amendment right\\nto be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause[,]β Reichle,\\n566 U.S. at 664-65; see also Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602, and, by extension, do not have\\na recognized First Amendment right to be free from investigative stops supported by\\n\\n -21-\\n\\freasonable suspicion. See Allen, 815 F.3d at 245-46. Thus, for the same reasons we\\ndetermined that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\\nretaliation claim, we find that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Appellantsβ\\nFirst Amendment interference claim. We affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this\\nclaim.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n Count 7 of the Amended Complaint alleges that, under Β§ 1983 and Monell, 436\\nU.S. 658, the City is vicariously liable for the officersβ actions. Monell holds a\\nmunicipality liable for actions of its employees or agents that violate a plaintiffβs\\nconstitutional rights if the violation stemmed from an official municipal policy or\\ncustom. 436 U.S. at 694-95; Ulrich v. Pope County, 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.\\n2013). βThere must be a causal connection between the municipal policy or custom\\nand the alleged constitutional violation in order to state a valid claim under Β§ 1983.β\\nUlrich, 715 F.3d at 1061 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).\\n\\n Appellants assert the City violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth\\nAmendment rights because Chief Wiseβan official policymakerβratified the\\nofficersβ actions during the Menards incident when he determined the officers acted\\nlawfully and closed Mr. Watersβs formal complaint. The district court dismissed\\nAppellantsβ claim, finding that they failed to establish causation. We agree with the\\ndistrict court that Chief Wiseβs after-the-fact determination did not cause the alleged\\nviolations of Appellantsβ constitutional rights and that Appellants, therefore, cannot\\npremise a Monell claim on Chief Wiseβs actions. Because Appellants do not identify\\na causal link between an official municipal custom or policy and the alleged\\nconstitutional violations, they fail to state a Monell claim for municipal liability. We\\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs dismissal of this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -22-\\n\\f VI.\\n\\n Count 10 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officers Smith and Kirchner,\\nSergeant Madson, and the City falsely imprisoned Mr. Waters by failing to investigate\\nwhether he had shoplifted, physically restraining him without arresting him for failing\\nto produce identification, and placing him in the back seat of a squad car in\\nhandcuffs. Count 11 asserts that the officers falsely imprisoned Mrs. Waters. Under\\nMinnesota law, police officers falsely imprison a plaintiff if they arrest or detain him\\nβwithout proper legal authority.β Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Minn.\\n1974) (per curiam); see also Kleidon v. Glascock, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1943)\\n(βFalse imprisonment has been defined as any imprisonment which is not legally\\njustifiable.β (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have already found that the\\nofficers temporarily detained Appellants pursuant to reasonable suspicion, supra Part\\nIII.A, we find that they acted with proper legal authority. Appellants therefore do not\\nstate a false imprisonment claim under Minnesota law, and the district court properly\\ndismissed these claims.\\n\\n VII.\\n\\n Count 12 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Sergeant Madson committed\\nbattery against Mr. Waters when he physically turned Mr. Waters away from him and\\npushed Mr. Waters in the direction of Appellantsβ vehicle. βBattery is an intentional,\\nunpermitted offensive contact with another.β Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41\\n(Minn. 1990) (en banc). Under Minnesota law, βonly the use of excessive force by\\na police officer will constitute a battery.β Johnson v. Peterson, 358 N.W.2d 484, 485\\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152,\\n155 (Minn. 1980).\\n\\n The district court dismissed Appellantsβ battery claim because Appellants\\nfailed to plausibly allege that Sergeant Madson used objectively unreasonable force,\\n\\n -23-\\n\\fespecially in light of the Amended Complaintβs failure to allege that Mr. Waters\\nsuffered any injury. As with their Fourth Amendment excessive force claim,\\nAppellants present no argument that Sergeant Madson employed excessive force in\\nremoving Mr. Waters from his personal space and have therefore waived the right to\\nchallenge the district courtβs characterization of that force as reasonable. Indeed,\\nAppellants present no meaningful argument at all regarding this claim. See Cox v.\\nMortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 674 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that\\nthe appellants βwaived [an] issue by failing to provide a meaningful explanation of\\nthe argument and citation to relevant authority in their opening briefβ). We therefore\\naffirm the district courtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ battery claim.\\n\\n VIII.\\n\\n Count 13 of the Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Smith committed\\ndefamation when she accused Mr. Waters, in front of third party bystanders, of acting\\nlike a sovereign citizen. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that Officer\\nSmithβs statement was a subjective opinion and, thus, not actionable, see Turkish\\nCoal. of Am., Inc. v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Geraci v.\\nEckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)), and that, alternatively, if\\nOfficer Smithβs statement was actionable, she and the City were shielded by absolute\\nimmunity. On appeal, Appellants do not challenge the district courtβs determination\\nthat Officer Smithβs statement was not actionable. They have therefore waived\\nargument on that dispositive issue. See Cox, 685 F.3d at 674. We affirm the district\\ncourtβs dismissal of Appellantsβ defamation claim.\\n\\n IX.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed in full.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -24-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1783,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609769,"string":"4,609,769"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Now Known as CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Doing Business as CenturyLink QCC, Third Party Plaintiff - Appellant v. FREE CONFERENCING CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, Third Party Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Qwest Communications Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3724"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Kelly, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888350/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888351/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3724\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Qwest Communications Corporation, a Delaware corporation, now known as\\n CenturyLink Communications, LLC, doing business as CenturyLink QCC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Free Conferencing Corporation, a Nevada corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\\n Filed: April 12, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following our prior remand, Qwest Communications Corp. v. Free\\nConferencing Corp., 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016), the district court1 reconsidered\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\nQwest Communicationsβ (Qwest) unjust-enrichment claim against Free Conferencing\\n(FC), which it had previously denied. The district court again denied Qwestβs claim,\\nalbeit for different reasons. The district court found that, although Qwest had shown\\nit conferred a benefit upon FC and FC accepted that benefit, it would not be\\ninequitable for FC to retain that benefit without paying Qwest. The district court\\nexplained that FC earned that benefit because it provided conference-calling services,\\n24-hour customer support, and access to a website in exchange for two cents per\\nminute for calls placed to FCβs conferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest\\npaid its own conference-calling vendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half\\ncents per minute. Qwest again appeals. Having jurisdiction pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, we review the district\\n courtβs factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error,\\n and its legal conclusions de novo. We will overturn a finding of fact\\n only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is based on an\\n erroneous view of the law, or we are left with a definite and firm\\n conviction that an error has been made.\\n\\nQwest, 837 F.3d at 895 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Qwest argues the district court erred when it found FC was not unjustly\\nenriched. βUnjust enrichment is an equitable remedy,β id. at 899 (citing Dowling\\nFamily Pβship v. Midland Farms, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 10, 865 N.W.2d 854, 860), βand we\\nreview a district courtβs decision to deny an equitable remedy for abuse of\\ndiscretion.β Id. (citing Olivares v. Brentwood Indus., 822 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\n2016)).2 βA district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor\\nthat should have been given significant weight, if it considers an improper or\\nirrelevant factor, or if it βcommits a clear error of judgment in the course of weighing\\nproper factors.ββ Id. (quoting Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir.\\n2004)); cf. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2\\n(2014) (βThe abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate courtβs\\ncorrection of a district courtβs legal or factual error: βA district court would\\nnecessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\\nor on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.ββ (quoting Cooter & Gell v.\\nHartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))).\\n\\n βTo establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove (1) it\\nconferred a benefit upon another; (2) the other accepted or acquiesced in that benefit;\\nand (3) it would be inequitable to allow the other to retain that benefit without\\npaying.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899 (citing Dowling, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 19, 865 N.W.2d\\nat 862). β[T]he fact that a benefit is retained, enjoyed, and profitably exploited by the\\nrecipient, all without compensation, does not necessarily mean that the recipient has\\nbeen unjustly enriched.β Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). βRather, the beneficiary must obtain the benefit in a manner that the law\\nregards as unjustified.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). β[T]he relevant\\ninquiry is whether the circumstances are such that equitably the beneficiary should\\nrestore to the benefactor the benefit or its value.β Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\\nHofeldt v. Mehling, 2003 S.D. 25, ΒΆ 18, 658 N.W.2d 783, 788); see also Mack v.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Our case law and South Dakota case law have used βunjust enrichmentβ and\\nβrestitutionβ synonymously. This use βhas become prevalent.β James J. Edelman,\\nUnjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1869, 1869 (2001). In\\nthis case, however, we will use βunjust enrichmentβ to refer to Qwestβs βclaimβ and\\nβrestitutionβ as the βequitable remedyβ available should liability be established.\\nSee Johnson v. Larson, 2010 S.D. 20, ΒΆΒΆ 8, 11, 779 N.W.2d 412, 416 (referring to\\nunjust enrichment as a βclaimβ and restitution as an βequitable remedyβ).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nMack, 2000 S.D. 92, ΒΆ 27, 613 N.W.2d 64, 69 (βWhen unjust enrichment is found, the\\nlaw implies a contract, which requires the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for\\nthe value of the benefit conferred.β).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Based on the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court\\nin its conclusion that it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit conferred\\nby Qwest. Ultimately, our decision is driven by the relevant standard of review.\\nβThe abuse-of-discretion standard means βthe court has a range of choice, and that its\\ndecision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not\\ninfluenced by any mistake of law.ββ Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d\\n885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th\\nCir. 1984)). βThe very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within\\nwhich the trial courts may go either way.β Id. at 895-96 (quoting Kern, 738 F.2d at\\n971). We are also βmindful that the district courts are closer to the facts and the\\nparties . . . .β Kern, 738 F.2d at 970.\\n\\n The district court explained that FC earned the benefit conferred by Qwest\\nbecause it provided conference-calling services, 24-hour customer support, and\\naccess to a website in exchange for two cents per minute for calls placed to FCβs\\nconferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest paid its own conference-calling\\nvendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half cents per minute. Upon review\\nof the record, we have not identified any relevant factors the district court failed to\\nconsider, nor any improper or irrelevant factors that it should not have considered,\\nnor any clear error of judgment on the part of the district court. Nor is the district\\ncourtβs decision legally erroneous, based on our reading of South Dakota law on\\nunjust enrichment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n While the dissent implies FC did not legally acquire the benefit it received from\\nQwest because it did so βthrough billing practices that βwere never legal,ββ Qwest,\\n837 F.3d at 899, and, therefore, it would be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit\\nconferred by Qwest, the dissent also concedes that we have previously concluded that\\nβFC was not itself acting illegally[.]β Id. at 900; cf. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank\\nv. Christensen, 535 N.W.2d 853, 858 (S.D. 1995) (βUnjust enrichment claims do not\\narise simply because the landlord benefits from the efforts of tenants; βunjustβ\\nenrichment implies illegal or inequitable behavior by the landlord in obtaining the\\nbenefits conferred by the tenant.β (emphasis added)). Moreover, FC was not βa party\\nto the FCC proceedingsβ nor did βthe FCC exercise[] . . . jurisdiction over FC [or]\\ncriticize the motives of FC in entering into the contract with Sancom . . . .β Qwest,\\n837 F.3d at 901 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).\\n\\n The dissent also asserts the district court failed to consider the access\\nstimulation scheme between FC and Sancom, but the district court, who has presided\\nover this case for over a decade, acknowledged this scheme on remand and in prior\\nproceedings. See Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\\n4:07-CV-04147-KES, 2017 WL 5198190, at *2 (D.S.D. Nov. 9, 2017) (βSancom and\\nFC split[] the access charges paid by [Qwest] on calls destined for FCβs conference\\nbridges.β); see also Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No. CIV.\\n07-4147-KES, 2015 WL 3603866, at *1 (D.S.D. June 5, 2015) (βDuring the time\\nperiod involved in the dispute between Sancom and Qwest, Sancom and FC engaged\\nin access stimulation.β); Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\\nCIV. 07-4147-KES, 2014 WL 5782543, at *17 (D.S.D. Nov. 6, 2014), affβd in part,\\nrevβd in part, remanded, 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016) (βOn referral, the FCC found\\nthat Sancom and FC engaged in an access stimulation scheme. The evidence at trial\\nshowed that FC knew it was taking advantage of Sancomβs tariffs by engaging in\\naccess stimulation with Sancom.β).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n Finally, the dissent asserts the district court βgave dispositive weight to an\\nimproper factor devised from inapposite South Dakota case law,β citing Parker v.\\nWestern Dakota Insurors, Inc., 2000 S.D. 14, 605 N.W.2d 181. However, the district\\ncourt was not influenced by Parker but rather by the fact that, based on the\\ncircumstances, it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit without paying\\nQwest. We left that merits determination to the district courtβs discretion βbased on\\nthe full record.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 900 & n.5 (β[E]ven though FC was not itself\\nacting illegally, its conduct might be characterized as inequitable . . . .β (emphasis\\nadded)).\\n\\n Accordingly, the district courtβs denial of Qwestβs unjust-enrichment claim was\\nnot an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387022/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.\\n\\n The abuse-of-discretion standard undoubtedly is deferential. But as the court\\nnotes, it βdoes not preclude an appellate courtβs correction of a district courtβs legal\\nor factual error.β Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563 n.2. βA district court abuses its\\ndiscretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have been given\\nsignificant weightβ or βif it considers an improper or irrelevant factor.β Qwest, 837\\nF.3d at 899. In my view, the district court both failed to consider a critical factor that\\nshould have been given significant weight, and, influenced by inapposite South\\nDakota case law, gave dispositive weight to an improper factor. Accordingly, I\\nrespectfully dissent.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\n It is important to note that on remand, the district court was not deciding the\\nissue of unjust enrichment on a blank slate. One of our conclusions in Qwest was that\\nFCβs traffic-pumping scheme, which allowed FC to receive from Qwest the βbenefitβ\\nat issue here, was illegal and had always been so. Id. at 899β900 (explaining that the\\nbilling practices under the Sancom-FC contract βwere never legalβ (emphasis added)).\\nAnd it was not a defense to Qwestβs unjust enrichment claim, we explained, that FC\\ndid not know this scheme was illegal at the time it implemented it with Sancom. Id.\\nat 900. β[E]ven though FC was not itself acting illegally, its conduct might\\n[nevertheless] be characterized as inequitable because it retained a benefit based on\\nSancomβs tariff violation, which it partly caused.β Id. Our view on this issue was one\\nreason that compelled us to remand.\\n\\n But on remand, no consideration was given to our discussion of the illegality\\nof FCβs traffic-pumping scheme. The district court did not consider that FC earned\\na benefitβone that Qwest did not know of, much less consent toβby inducing\\nSancom to engage in billing practices that were βnever legal.β Failure to consider this\\nfactor not only runs afoul of Qwest, but it also runs afoul of South Dakota law and\\ntherefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405 (βA district\\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view\\nof the law . . . .β). Under South Dakota law, β[a]n enrichment is unjust if it βlacks an\\nadequate legal basis; [i.e.,] it results from a transaction that . . . is nonconsensual.ββ\\nDowling, 865 N.W.2d at 864 (second alteration in original) (quoting Restatement\\n(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Β§ 1 cmt. b (2011)); see also Commercial\\nTr., 535 N.W.2d at 858 (ββ[U]njustβ enrichment implies illegal or inequitable behavior\\nby the [defendant] in obtaining the benefits conferred by the [plaintiff].β). As we\\nintimated in Qwest, and as Dowling makes clear, the district court should have\\nconsideredβin a claim seeking equitable reliefβthat FC only obtained the benefits\\nit received from Qwest through an illegal traffic-pumping scheme, a scheme that\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nQwest did not consent to, bargain for, or request.3 In my view, retaining the benefits\\nreceived from such a scheme amounts to unjust enrichment.\\n\\n In addition, the district court gave dispositive weight to an improper factor\\ndevised from inapposite South Dakota case law. The district court concluded that FC\\nβearnedβ the benefit it received from Qwest because βFC provided conference calling\\nservices, 24-hour customer support, and access to a website in exchange for 2 cents\\nper minute for calls placed to FCβs conferencing bridges at Sancom.β But critically,\\nFC provided those services for the sole purpose of driving increased traffic to its\\nconferencing bridges. Every minute of additional traffic simply resulted in more\\nmoney for FC at Qwestβs expense. It is difficult to see how FC equitably βearnedβ\\nthe benefit it received from Qwest by devising and implementing an illegal scheme\\nthat served no purpose except to βtak[e] advantage of legal uncertaintyβ for FCβs\\nbenefit. Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899.\\n\\n The district courtβs reliance on this factor seems to stem from Parker v.\\nWestern Dakota Insurors, Inc., the only case it discussed in its substantive analysis.\\nThe district court read this case as standing for the proposition that an unjust\\nenrichment claim cannot lie where βthe defendant paid for the benefitβ it received.\\nBut in my view, Parker has no application here for at least two reasons. First, the\\nplaintiff in that case did not confer the benefit on the defendant, and thus the plaintiff\\n\\n 3\\n The court emphasizes the statement in Qwest that βFC was not itself acting\\nillegally,β and suggests that such a recognition absolves FC from liability in this\\nunjust enrichment claim. Supra, at 5. But as we also recognized in Qwest, that a\\nparty might be acting lawfully is not dispositive on an equitable remedy. See Qwest,\\n837 F.3d at 899β900 (explaining that whether FCβs intent was benign would not be\\ndispositive βbecause unjust enrichment is appropriate where the beneficiary gains a\\nbenefit inequitably, even if the beneficiary does not intend to deprive the benefactor\\nof the benefitβ); see also Johnson, 779 N.W.2d at 417β18 (concluding that a party\\nwas liable for unjust enrichment under South Dakota law even where it was not a\\nβwrongdoer[]β and βhad no intent to depriveβ the plaintiff of his benefit).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nfailed even to establish the critical first element of an unjust enrichment claim.\\nParker, 605 N.W.2d at 187; see Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899 (explaining that the first\\nelement in an unjust enrichment claim is proof that the β[plaintiff] conferred a benefit\\nupon anotherβ). Here, in contrast, it is undisputed that Qwest conferred the benefit\\non FC. Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899β900. But second, and more fundamentally, Parker\\nfound that there was no unjust enrichment because the defendant in that case had paid\\nfor the benefit in question through a legitimate, negotiated transaction with the party\\nwho conferred the benefit (First American). See Parker, 605 N.W.2d at 187 (βFirst\\nAmerican conferred the benefit, which it had a right to do . . . .β). β[The defendant]\\nlegally acquired the [benefits] and paid valuable consideration [to First American] for\\nthem.β Id. at 186 (emphasis added). In contrast, as described above, under Qwest,\\nFC acquired the benefit it received from Qwest through billing practices that βwere\\nnever legal.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899. Parker, therefore, has limited application here.\\n\\n This case presents an unusual set of circumstances, particularly in light of the\\nparticipation of a third party (Sancom), making analysis of Qwestβs unjust enrichment\\nclaim rather challenging. But because I believe the district court abused its discretion\\nin how it analyzed that claim, I respectfully dissent.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387022/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609769/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Now Known as CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Doing Business as CenturyLink QCC, Third Party Plaintiff - Appellant v. FREE CONFERENCING CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, Third Party Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3724\n ___________________________\n\n Qwest Communications Corporation, a Delaware corporation, now known as\n CenturyLink Communications, LLC, doing business as CenturyLink QCC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Free Conferencing Corporation, a Nevada corporation\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\n Filed: April 12, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Following our prior remand, Qwest Communications Corp. v. Free\nConferencing Corp., 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016), the district court1 reconsidered\n\n 1\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\nof South Dakota.\n\nQwest Communicationsβ (Qwest) unjust-enrichment claim against Free Conferencing\n(FC), which it had previously denied. The district court again denied Qwestβs claim,\nalbeit for different reasons. The district court found that, although Qwest had shown\nit conferred a benefit upon FC and FC accepted that benefit, it would not be\ninequitable for FC to retain that benefit without paying Qwest. The district court\nexplained that FC earned that benefit because it provided conference-calling services,\n24-hour customer support, and access to a website in exchange for two cents per\nminute for calls placed to FCβs conferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest\npaid its own conference-calling vendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half\ncents per minute. Qwest again appeals. Having jurisdiction pursuant to\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n In reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, we review the district\n courtβs factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error,\n and its legal conclusions de novo. We will overturn a finding of fact\n only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is based on an\n erroneous view of the law, or we are left with a definite and firm\n conviction that an error has been made.\n\nQwest, 837 F.3d at 895 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\n\n Qwest argues the district court erred when it found FC was not unjustly\nenriched. βUnjust enrichment is an equitable remedy,β id. at 899 (citing Dowling\nFamily Pβship v. Midland Farms, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 10, 865 N.W.2d 854, 860), βand we\nreview a district courtβs decision to deny an equitable remedy for abuse of\ndiscretion.β Id. (citing Olivares v. Brentwood Indus., 822 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir.\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\n2016)).2 βA district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor\nthat should have been given significant weight, if it considers an improper or\nirrelevant factor, or if it βcommits a clear error of judgment in the course of weighing\nproper factors.ββ Id. (quoting Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir.\n2004)); cf. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2\n(2014) (βThe abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate courtβs\ncorrection of a district courtβs legal or factual error: βA district court would\nnecessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\nor on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.ββ (quoting Cooter & Gell v.\nHartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))).\n\n βTo establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove (1) it\nconferred a benefit upon another; (2) the other accepted or acquiesced in that benefit;\nand (3) it would be inequitable to allow the other to retain that benefit without\npaying.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899 (citing Dowling, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 19, 865 N.W.2d\nat 862). β[T]he fact that a benefit is retained, enjoyed, and profitably exploited by the\nrecipient, all without compensation, does not necessarily mean that the recipient has\nbeen unjustly enriched.β Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). βRather, the beneficiary must obtain the benefit in a manner that the law\nregards as unjustified.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). β[T]he relevant\ninquiry is whether the circumstances are such that equitably the beneficiary should\nrestore to the benefactor the benefit or its value.β Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\nHofeldt v. Mehling, 2003 S.D. 25, ΒΆ 18, 658 N.W.2d 783, 788); see also Mack v.\n\n\n 2\n Our case law and South Dakota case law have used βunjust enrichmentβ and\nβrestitutionβ synonymously. This use βhas become prevalent.β James J. Edelman,\nUnjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1869, 1869 (2001). In\nthis case, however, we will use βunjust enrichmentβ to refer to Qwestβs βclaimβ and\nβrestitutionβ as the βequitable remedyβ available should liability be established.\nSee Johnson v. Larson, 2010 S.D. 20, ΒΆΒΆ 8, 11, 779 N.W.2d 412, 416 (referring to\nunjust enrichment as a βclaimβ and restitution as an βequitable remedyβ).\n\n -3-\n\nMack, 2000 S.D. 92, ΒΆ 27, 613 N.W.2d 64, 69 (βWhen unjust enrichment is found, the\nlaw implies a contract, which requires the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for\nthe value of the benefit conferred.β).\n\n II.\n\n Based on the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court\nin its conclusion that it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit conferred\nby Qwest. Ultimately, our decision is driven by the relevant standard of review.\nβThe abuse-of-discretion standard means βthe court has a range of choice, and that its\ndecision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not\ninfluenced by any mistake of law.ββ Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d\n885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th\nCir. 1984)). βThe very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within\nwhich the trial courts may go either way.β Id. at 895-96 (quoting Kern, 738 F.2d at\n971). We are also βmindful that the district courts are closer to the facts and the\nparties . . . .β Kern, 738 F.2d at 970.\n\n The district court explained that FC earned the benefit conferred by Qwest\nbecause it provided conference-calling services, 24-hour customer support, and\naccess to a website in exchange for two cents per minute for calls placed to FCβs\nconferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest paid its own conference-calling\nvendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half cents per minute. Upon review\nof the record, we have not identified any relevant factors the district court failed to\nconsider, nor any improper or irrelevant factors that it should not have considered,\nnor any clear error of judgment on the part of the district court. Nor is the district\ncourtβs decision legally erroneous, based on our reading of South Dakota law on\nunjust enrichment.\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\n While the dissent implies FC did not legally acquire the benefit it received from\nQwest because it did so βthrough billing practices that βwere never legal,ββ Qwest,\n837 F.3d at 899, and, therefore, it would be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit\nconferred by Qwest, the dissent also concedes that we have previously concluded that\nβFC was not itself acting illegally[.]β Id. at 900; cf. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank\nv. Christensen, 535 N.W.2d 853, 858 (S.D. 1995) (βUnjust enrichment claims do not\narise simply because the landlord benefits from the efforts of tenants; βunjustβ\nenrichment implies illegal or inequitable behavior by the landlord in obtaining the\nbenefits conferred by the tenant.β (emphasis added)). Moreover, FC was not βa party\nto the FCC proceedingsβ nor did βthe FCC exercise[] . . . jurisdiction over FC [or]\ncriticize the motives of FC in entering into the contract with Sancom . . . .β Qwest,\n837 F.3d at 901 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).\n\n The dissent also asserts the district court failed to consider the access\nstimulation scheme between FC and Sancom, but the district court, who has presided\nover this case for over a decade, acknowledged this scheme on remand and in prior\nproceedings. See Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\n4:07-CV-04147-KES, 2017 WL 5198190, at *2 (D.S.D. Nov. 9, 2017) (βSancom and\nFC split[] the access charges paid by [Qwest] on calls destined for FCβs conference\nbridges.β); see also Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No. CIV.\n07-4147-KES, 2015 WL 3603866, at *1 (D.S.D. June 5, 2015) (βDuring the time\nperiod involved in the dispute between Sancom and Qwest, Sancom and FC engaged\nin access stimulation.β); Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\nCIV. 07-4147-KES, 2014 WL 5782543, at *17 (D.S.D. Nov. 6, 2014), affβd in part,\nrevβd in part, remanded, 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016) (βOn referral, the FCC found\nthat Sancom and FC engaged in an access stimulation scheme. The evidence at trial\nshowed that FC knew it was taking advantage of Sancomβs tariffs by engaging in\naccess stimulation with Sancom.β).\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\n Finally, the dissent asserts the district court βgave dispositive weight to an\nimproper factor devised from inapposite South Dakota case law,β citing Parker v.\nWestern Dakota Insurors, Inc., 2000 S.D. 14, 605 N.W.2d 181. However, the district\ncourt was not influenced by Parker but rather by the fact that, based on the\ncircumstances, it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit without paying\nQwest. We left that merits determination to the district courtβs discretion βbased on\nthe full record.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 900 & n.5 (β[E]ven though FC was not itself\nacting illegally, its conduct might be characterized as inequitable . . . .β (emphasis\nadded)).\n\n Accordingly, the district courtβs denial of Qwestβs unjust-enrichment claim was\nnot an abuse of discretion.\n\n III.\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Now Known as CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Doing Business as CenturyLink QCC, Third Party Plaintiff - Appellant v. FREE CONFERENCING CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, Third Party Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3724\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Qwest Communications Corporation, a Delaware corporation, now known as\\n CenturyLink Communications, LLC, doing business as CenturyLink QCC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Free Conferencing Corporation, a Nevada corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\\n Filed: April 12, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following our prior remand, Qwest Communications Corp. v. Free\\nConferencing Corp., 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016), the district court1 reconsidered\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\nQwest Communicationsβ (Qwest) unjust-enrichment claim against Free Conferencing\\n(FC), which it had previously denied. The district court again denied Qwestβs claim,\\nalbeit for different reasons. The district court found that, although Qwest had shown\\nit conferred a benefit upon FC and FC accepted that benefit, it would not be\\ninequitable for FC to retain that benefit without paying Qwest. The district court\\nexplained that FC earned that benefit because it provided conference-calling services,\\n24-hour customer support, and access to a website in exchange for two cents per\\nminute for calls placed to FCβs conferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest\\npaid its own conference-calling vendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half\\ncents per minute. Qwest again appeals. Having jurisdiction pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, we review the district\\n courtβs factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error,\\n and its legal conclusions de novo. We will overturn a finding of fact\\n only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is based on an\\n erroneous view of the law, or we are left with a definite and firm\\n conviction that an error has been made.\\n\\nQwest, 837 F.3d at 895 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Qwest argues the district court erred when it found FC was not unjustly\\nenriched. βUnjust enrichment is an equitable remedy,β id. at 899 (citing Dowling\\nFamily Pβship v. Midland Farms, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 10, 865 N.W.2d 854, 860), βand we\\nreview a district courtβs decision to deny an equitable remedy for abuse of\\ndiscretion.β Id. (citing Olivares v. Brentwood Indus., 822 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\n2016)).2 βA district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor\\nthat should have been given significant weight, if it considers an improper or\\nirrelevant factor, or if it βcommits a clear error of judgment in the course of weighing\\nproper factors.ββ Id. (quoting Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir.\\n2004)); cf. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2\\n(2014) (βThe abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate courtβs\\ncorrection of a district courtβs legal or factual error: βA district court would\\nnecessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\\nor on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.ββ (quoting Cooter & Gell v.\\nHartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))).\\n\\n βTo establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove (1) it\\nconferred a benefit upon another; (2) the other accepted or acquiesced in that benefit;\\nand (3) it would be inequitable to allow the other to retain that benefit without\\npaying.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 899 (citing Dowling, 2015 S.D. 50, ΒΆ 19, 865 N.W.2d\\nat 862). β[T]he fact that a benefit is retained, enjoyed, and profitably exploited by the\\nrecipient, all without compensation, does not necessarily mean that the recipient has\\nbeen unjustly enriched.β Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). βRather, the beneficiary must obtain the benefit in a manner that the law\\nregards as unjustified.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). β[T]he relevant\\ninquiry is whether the circumstances are such that equitably the beneficiary should\\nrestore to the benefactor the benefit or its value.β Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\\nHofeldt v. Mehling, 2003 S.D. 25, ΒΆ 18, 658 N.W.2d 783, 788); see also Mack v.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Our case law and South Dakota case law have used βunjust enrichmentβ and\\nβrestitutionβ synonymously. This use βhas become prevalent.β James J. Edelman,\\nUnjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1869, 1869 (2001). In\\nthis case, however, we will use βunjust enrichmentβ to refer to Qwestβs βclaimβ and\\nβrestitutionβ as the βequitable remedyβ available should liability be established.\\nSee Johnson v. Larson, 2010 S.D. 20, ΒΆΒΆ 8, 11, 779 N.W.2d 412, 416 (referring to\\nunjust enrichment as a βclaimβ and restitution as an βequitable remedyβ).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nMack, 2000 S.D. 92, ΒΆ 27, 613 N.W.2d 64, 69 (βWhen unjust enrichment is found, the\\nlaw implies a contract, which requires the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for\\nthe value of the benefit conferred.β).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Based on the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court\\nin its conclusion that it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit conferred\\nby Qwest. Ultimately, our decision is driven by the relevant standard of review.\\nβThe abuse-of-discretion standard means βthe court has a range of choice, and that its\\ndecision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not\\ninfluenced by any mistake of law.ββ Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d\\n885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th\\nCir. 1984)). βThe very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within\\nwhich the trial courts may go either way.β Id. at 895-96 (quoting Kern, 738 F.2d at\\n971). We are also βmindful that the district courts are closer to the facts and the\\nparties . . . .β Kern, 738 F.2d at 970.\\n\\n The district court explained that FC earned the benefit conferred by Qwest\\nbecause it provided conference-calling services, 24-hour customer support, and\\naccess to a website in exchange for two cents per minute for calls placed to FCβs\\nconferencing bridges at Sancom. Moreover, Qwest paid its own conference-calling\\nvendor, Genesys, between two and four-and-a-half cents per minute. Upon review\\nof the record, we have not identified any relevant factors the district court failed to\\nconsider, nor any improper or irrelevant factors that it should not have considered,\\nnor any clear error of judgment on the part of the district court. Nor is the district\\ncourtβs decision legally erroneous, based on our reading of South Dakota law on\\nunjust enrichment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n While the dissent implies FC did not legally acquire the benefit it received from\\nQwest because it did so βthrough billing practices that βwere never legal,ββ Qwest,\\n837 F.3d at 899, and, therefore, it would be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit\\nconferred by Qwest, the dissent also concedes that we have previously concluded that\\nβFC was not itself acting illegally[.]β Id. at 900; cf. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank\\nv. Christensen, 535 N.W.2d 853, 858 (S.D. 1995) (βUnjust enrichment claims do not\\narise simply because the landlord benefits from the efforts of tenants; βunjustβ\\nenrichment implies illegal or inequitable behavior by the landlord in obtaining the\\nbenefits conferred by the tenant.β (emphasis added)). Moreover, FC was not βa party\\nto the FCC proceedingsβ nor did βthe FCC exercise[] . . . jurisdiction over FC [or]\\ncriticize the motives of FC in entering into the contract with Sancom . . . .β Qwest,\\n837 F.3d at 901 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).\\n\\n The dissent also asserts the district court failed to consider the access\\nstimulation scheme between FC and Sancom, but the district court, who has presided\\nover this case for over a decade, acknowledged this scheme on remand and in prior\\nproceedings. See Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\\n4:07-CV-04147-KES, 2017 WL 5198190, at *2 (D.S.D. Nov. 9, 2017) (βSancom and\\nFC split[] the access charges paid by [Qwest] on calls destined for FCβs conference\\nbridges.β); see also Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No. CIV.\\n07-4147-KES, 2015 WL 3603866, at *1 (D.S.D. June 5, 2015) (βDuring the time\\nperiod involved in the dispute between Sancom and Qwest, Sancom and FC engaged\\nin access stimulation.β); Qwest Commcβns Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp., No.\\nCIV. 07-4147-KES, 2014 WL 5782543, at *17 (D.S.D. Nov. 6, 2014), affβd in part,\\nrevβd in part, remanded, 837 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2016) (βOn referral, the FCC found\\nthat Sancom and FC engaged in an access stimulation scheme. The evidence at trial\\nshowed that FC knew it was taking advantage of Sancomβs tariffs by engaging in\\naccess stimulation with Sancom.β).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n Finally, the dissent asserts the district court βgave dispositive weight to an\\nimproper factor devised from inapposite South Dakota case law,β citing Parker v.\\nWestern Dakota Insurors, Inc., 2000 S.D. 14, 605 N.W.2d 181. However, the district\\ncourt was not influenced by Parker but rather by the fact that, based on the\\ncircumstances, it would not be inequitable for FC to retain the benefit without paying\\nQwest. We left that merits determination to the district courtβs discretion βbased on\\nthe full record.β Qwest, 837 F.3d at 900 & n.5 (β[E]ven though FC was not itself\\nacting illegally, its conduct might be characterized as inequitable . . . .β (emphasis\\nadded)).\\n\\n Accordingly, the district courtβs denial of Qwestβs unjust-enrichment claim was\\nnot an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1784,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609770,"string":"4,609,770"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1455"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1455\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America for the use of Wesco Distribution, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Liberty Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n International Fidelity Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\\n Filed: April 12, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, MELLOY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This appeal is part of a complex dispute over costs that resulted from contractor\\ndefaults in completing a federal government construction project. After partial\\n\\fsummary judgment rulings and a bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment\\nagainst a subcontractorβs surety, International Fidelity Insurance Co. (βFidelityβ), and\\nin favor of the general contractorβs surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (βLibertyβ),\\nfor the full amount of Fidelityβs performance bond. Fidelity appeals. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background.\\n\\n In March 2012, Greenleaf Construction Co. (βGreenleafβ) entered into a Prime\\nContract with the United States to build an Army Reserve Center in Des Moines,\\nIowa. As required by the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. Β§ 3131(b), Greenleaf obtained a\\nperformance bond and a payment bond from Liberty naming Greenleaf as principal\\nand the United States as obligee. βA performance bond protects the owner, or\\nobligee, ensuring project completion if the general contractor defaults. A payment\\nbond ensures that laborers and material suppliers will be paid if the general contractor\\ndefaults.β Pa. Natβl Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 354 F.3d 945, 949 n.2\\n(8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In April, Greenleaf entered into a Subcontract in\\nwhich International Electric, Inc. (βElectricβ), agreed to perform defined electrical\\nand communications work on the project for $1,020,000. The Subcontract required\\nElectric to furnish performance and payment bonds in the amounts of $1,020,000 (the\\nbondsβ βpenal sumβ). Electric obtained the bonds from Fidelity, naming Electric as\\nprincipal and Greenleaf as obligee. The performance bond obligated Fidelity to\\nβpromptly remedyβ a default by Electric on the Subcontract or βarrange for the\\nperformance of [Electricβs] obligation under the subcontract.β\\n\\n In January 2014, Greenleaf, Liberty, and the United States entered into a\\nTakeover Agreement in which Greenleaf and the government βagreed to an\\nimmediate consensual termination and defaultβ of the Prime Contract. Liberty agreed\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto βcomplete the Contract in accordance with its termsβ and βreaffirm[ed] the validity\\nof [Libertyβs] Bonds to secure the obligations of its completion.β The Takeover\\nAgreement provided that Liberty βbecomes entitled to all rights, titles, and interests\\nof Greenleaf in and to the [Prime] Contract.β The government agreed to accept\\nVertex Companies, LLC (βVertexβ), as Libertyβs βcompletion contractor.β The\\ngovernment also agreed to work with Liberty βto agree on a schedule establishing a\\nnew construction completion date,β which had been October 12, 2013.\\n\\n On February 7, Liberty and Electric entered into a Subcontract Ratification\\nAgreement in which Liberty agreed to pay Electric $244,134 for work previously\\nperformed under the Subcontract but not paid by Greenleaf. Electric agreed to\\nβperform the balance of the work for [the unpaid balance of the $1,020,000\\nSubcontract amount, $347,612] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the\\nSubcontract, as modified by this Agreement.β Fidelity was not asked to -- and did not\\n-- bond the Ratification Agreement.\\n\\n A dispute soon arose between Electric and Vertex as completing general\\ncontractor, and Electric never returned to the project. Liberty terminated Electric for\\nits default in April 2014 and notified Fidelity. Fidelity refused to complete Electricβs\\nobligations under the Subcontract. Liberty hired an electrical subcontractor, ABC\\nElectric, to complete work under the Subcontract. ABC Electric concluded that much\\nof the work Electric had performed needed to be redone and ultimately charged\\nLiberty $1,657,745 to complete electrical and communications work on the project.\\n\\n This lawsuit began in August 2014 when the federal government sued\\nGreenleaf, Electric, Liberty, and Fidelity on behalf of an unpaid supplier. That claim\\nhas been resolved. Liberty filed a cross-claim against Fidelity and Electric for breach\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof the Subcontract and breach of Fidelityβs performance and payment bonds.2 Ruling\\non cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Liberty partial\\nsummary judgment, ruling that Liberty may assert claims against Fidelityβs\\nperformance bond, the bond was not discharged by replacement or material alteration,\\nand Fidelityβs obligations βwere triggered by the satisfaction of the bondβs conditions\\nprecedent.β After a bench trial on Libertyβs claims against the performance and\\npayment bonds, the court entered judgment against Fidelity for $1,020,000, the full\\namount of its performance bond. Fidelity has not appealed the $104,231 judgment\\nentered in favor of Liberty on its claims against Fidelityβs payment bond.\\n\\n Fidelity argues it is not liable to Liberty on the performance bond because (1)\\nLiberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ entitled to assert a claim on the bond; (2) the\\nRatification Agreement discharged Fidelityβs performance bond because it was either\\nan entirely new agreement or materially altered Electricβs Subcontract, and Fidelity\\ndid not bond the Ratification Agreement; and (3) Libertyβs claim did not meet\\nconditions precedent to the performance bondβs coverage.\\n\\n II. The Successor Issue.\\n\\n In holding that Liberty may assert a claim against Fidelityβs performance bond,\\nthe district court first ruled that, by satisfying Greenleafβs obligations under the Prime\\nContract and the Subcontract, Liberty became subrogated to Greenleafβs rights\\nthrough equitable subrogation. The court noted it is well-established βthat a surety\\nwho pays the debt of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to\\nenforce his right to be reimbursed,β Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-\\n37 (1962), and the Supreme Court of Iowa expansively views the rights of a subrogee\\nwho βsteps into the shoesβ of another, Iowa Depβt of Human Servs. v. Unisys Corp.,\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Electric subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court\\nlifted the automatic stay to permit Libertyβs claim against Fidelity to proceed.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f637 N.W.2d 142, 156 (Iowa 2001). Without challenging this general principle,\\nFidelity argues that Liberty as subrogee acquired no right to assert a claim against the\\nperformance bond because the bond provides, βNo right of action shall accrue on this\\nbond to or for the use of any . . . corporation other than [Greenleaf] or the heirs,\\nexecutors, administrators or successors of [Greenleaf].β Citing corporate law\\ndecisions, Fidelity argues that Liberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ under the\\nbond βbecause it never assumed generally Greenleafβs liabilities.β Like the district\\ncourt, we disagree.\\n\\n The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated that β[t]he exact meaning of the word\\nβsuccessorβ as applied to a contract must depend largely on the kind and character of\\nthe contract, its purposes and circumstances, and the context.β Sun Valley Iowa Lake\\nAssβn v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 640 (Iowa 1996) (quotation omitted). Applying\\nthis standard in the context of surety bonds, the district court agreed with decisions\\nfrom other jurisdictions concluding that a surety who has performed the contract\\nobligations of its principal βqualifies as a βsuccessor.ββ See Argonaut Ins. Co. v.\\nCommercial Std. Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. App. 1980), followed in\\nMenorah Nursing Home, Inc. v. Zukov, 548 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705-06 (App. Div. 1989).\\n\\n Though Fidelity urges us to adopt a narrower definition of successor that is\\nmore in tune with corporate law, we agree with the district courtβs interpretation of\\nthe word as used in Fidelityβs performance bond. Moreover, there is an additional\\nreason to adopt this interpretation. The performance bond Liberty issued to ensure\\ngeneral contractor Greenleafβs performance to the United States was a bond legally\\nmandated by the Miller Act. See generally Restatement (Third) of Suretyship &\\nGuaranty Β§ 71 (1996). Federal Acquisition Regulations expressly encourage\\ngovernment contracting officers to enter into a takeover agreement with a surety such\\nas Liberty who is willing to perform its defaulting principalβs obligations as\\ngovernment contractor. See 48 C.F.R. Β§ 49.404.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f When a general contractorβs surety takes over completion of a federal\\ngovernment construction project and βsteps in the shoesβ of its principal, the purposes\\nof the Miller Act and the FAR regulations to protect the government are served if the\\nsurety is subrogated to the principalβs contract rights vis-a-vis a subcontractor such\\nas Electric and, if the subcontractor defaults, its surety. Fidelity, in the business of\\nissuing performance and payment bonds, necessarily understands this reality. Thus,\\nwhen Fidelity has issued a performance bond for a subcontractor on a federal project,\\nand its principal has defaulted, we reject its contention that the ambiguous word\\nβsuccessorβ in the performance bond did not include as obligee a surety operating\\nunder a Takeover Agreement with the federal government.\\n\\n III. Bond Discharge Issues.\\n\\n Exalting form over substance and ignoring modern suretyship authorities,\\nFidelity next argues that its obligations under the performance bond were discharged\\nβbecause the Ratification Agreement either replaced or materially alteredβ the\\nSubcontract that Fidelity bonded. Fidelity first argues that β[t]he bonded Subcontract\\nended -- at the latest -- in January 2014 upon the execution of the Takeover\\nAgreement.β Fidelity cites no Subcontract provision or legal authority supporting\\nthis contention, instead asserting that βthe notion that the Subcontract continued\\ndespite Greenleaf leaving the job is nonsensical.β Of course, this ignores the legal\\nand contractual consequences of Liberty as surety stepping in the shoes of its\\nprincipal to complete the Prime Contract. Nothing in Greenleafβs Subcontract with\\nElectric provided that the contract terminates if Greenleaf ceases to be general\\ncontractor. Indeed, the Subcontract expressly prohibited Electric, but not Greenleaf,\\nfrom assigning or transferring its interest without consent. In the February 2014\\nRatification Agreement, Electric and Liberty expressly βratif[ied] and confirm[ed]\\nthat the Subcontract is in effect, and that [Electric] shall perform and complete the\\nSubcontract in accordance with the terms and provisions thereof at the direction of\\n[Liberty] and for the same consideration.β Thus, the Subcontract never βended.β\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Turning to a more difficult issue, Fidelity argues that the Ratification\\nAgreement discharged Fidelityβs bond because it was a βmaterial alterationβ of the\\nbonded Subcontract. Fidelity first urges us to adopt the βgeneral ruleβ that any\\ncontract change discharges the surety, even if to its benefit. See Holland v. Story\\nCty., 192 N.W. 402, 403 (Iowa 1923). The district court instead adopted the more\\nmodern rule that, to be discharged, the surety must show that an alteration enlarged\\nor added to the obligations or otherwise prejudiced the performance of the suretyβs\\nbonded principal. See Knapp v. Knapp, 99 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1959); Throp v.\\nChaloupka, 208 N.W. 299, 300 (Iowa 1926). The evolution of this rule reflected a\\nrecognition that the older strict rule βwas problematic when applied to secondary\\nobligors, such as surety companies, who were in the business of entering into\\nsecondary obligationsβ and received a windfall if their obligations were discharged\\nfor an alteration that caused no harm. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 37, cmt. a. Agreeing\\nwith this trend, the Restatement adopted, for most contract modifications, the rule that\\na surety βis discharged from any unperformed duties . . . if the modification . . .\\nimposes risks on the [surety] fundamentally different from those imposed . . . prior\\nto modification.β Β§ 41(b)(i). The Restatement rule and the rule the district court\\nderived from Knapp are essentially the same. We conclude the Supreme Court of\\nIowa would apply an equivalent rule governing discharge of a surety in this\\nconstruction contract situation. Fidelity cites no contrary authority.\\n\\n Applying this standard to the Ratification Agreement, the district court\\nconcluded that none of the alterations alleged by Fidelity βmaterially altered\\n[Electricβs] actual obligations under the Subcontract.β We agree. The Ratification\\nAgreement expressly left the Subcontractorβs performance obligations, time to\\ncomplete its work, and compensation unchanged. Fidelity primarily argues that\\nchanging the general contractor and bond obligee from Greenleaf to Liberty was\\nmaterial and prejudicial because βthe chief financial officers of Electric and Greenleaf\\nwere close personal friendsβ but Electric had no such relationship with Vertex. We\\nreject this argument because it would automatically discharge a subcontractor suretyβs\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fperformance bond whenever the general contractorβs surety operating under a\\nTakeover Agreement becomes a successor bond obligee.\\n\\n Fidelity further argues that the Ratification Agreement was a material alteration\\nbecause, as a result of changing the bond obligee, Fidelity βhas been ordered to pay\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars to redo work that the named obligee, Greenleaf,\\npreviously acceptedβ to complete a Subcontract that was valued at $347,612 in the\\nRatification Agreement. But the alleged causation is unfounded. As the district court\\nobserved, βthese increased costs occurred after the parties signed the Ratification\\nAgreement. The Ratification Agreement did not amend the Subcontract to increase\\nElectricβs obligation -- and thus increase the total cost of Electricβs work.β Moreover,\\nElectric was terminated before it performed additional work under the Ratification\\nAgreement. True, the increased costs to complete performance of the Subcontract\\nwere incurred after Electric was terminated. But they resulted from defective work\\nElectric performed before Liberty replaced Greenleaf under the Takeover Agreement.\\nThus, had there been no Ratification Agreement, Liberty as Greenleafβs successor\\nwould have had virtually the same claim against Fidelityβs performance bond.\\n\\n We agree with the district court that the many Subcontract changes in the\\nRatification Agreement cited by Fidelity did not as a matter of law, singly or in\\ncombination, so materially alter Electricβs obligations under the Subcontract that\\nFidelityβs performance bond was discharged. This ruling did not foreclose possible\\ndefenses to Libertyβs claim against the bond based on facts surrounding Libertyβs\\ntakeover and completion of Electricβs performance under the Subcontract as modified\\nby the Ratification Agreement. Cf. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 41(b)(ii). These\\ndefenses were thoroughly litigated in the bench trial. For example, in response to\\nFidelityβs contention that Liberty failed to mitigate its damages as successor obligee,\\nthe court found that Liberty acted reasonably in replacing Greenleaf with Vertex as\\ncompletion contractor and took appropriate measures to avoid escalating costs during\\nthe transition. Fidelity has not appealed these bench trial findings.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f IV. Condition Precedent Issues.\\n\\n The performance bond provided that Fidelityβs remedy obligations are\\ntriggered β[w]henever [Electric] shall be, and be declared by [Greenleaf] to be in\\ndefault under the subcontract, [Greenleaf] having performed [Greenleafβs] obligations\\nthereunder . . . .β Fidelity argues that Libertyβs claim against the performance bond\\nmust be rejected because it failed to meet these two conditions precedent.\\n\\n First, Fidelity argues that, at the time Liberty terminated Electric for its default\\nunder the Subcontract, βGreenleaf could not have been performing under the\\nSubcontract because Greenleaf defaulted on the Project three months earlier.β\\nSecond, Fidelity argues that βGreenleaf never declared Electric in default under the\\nSubcontract.β We agree with the district court that these contentions are without\\nmerit because they are inconsistent with Libertyβs right as successor obligee. First,\\nFidelity does not claim that Liberty had failed to perform the obligeeβs obligations\\nunder the Subcontract when the bond claim was made. At that time, Greenleafβs\\nSubcontract performance was irrelevant. Second, it is undisputed that Electric was\\nin default when the claim was made (Fidelity as surety later filed a claim in Electricβs\\nbankruptcy proceeding). We reject as frivolous the contention that the notice of\\ndefault to Electric was ineffective because it was sent by Vertex rather than Liberty.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387023/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"LOKEN\": \", Circuit\", \"MELLOY\": \", Circuit\", \"ERICKSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609770/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1455\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America for the use of Wesco Distribution, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\n\n v.\n\n Liberty Mutual Insurance Company\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n International Fidelity Insurance Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\n Filed: April 12, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, MELLOY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n This appeal is part of a complex dispute over costs that resulted from contractor\ndefaults in completing a federal government construction project. After partial\n\fsummary judgment rulings and a bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment\nagainst a subcontractorβs surety, International Fidelity Insurance Co. (βFidelityβ), and\nin favor of the general contractorβs surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (βLibertyβ),\nfor the full amount of Fidelityβs performance bond. Fidelity appeals. We affirm.\n\n I. Background.\n\n In March 2012, Greenleaf Construction Co. (βGreenleafβ) entered into a Prime\nContract with the United States to build an Army Reserve Center in Des Moines,\nIowa. As required by the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. Β§ 3131(b), Greenleaf obtained a\nperformance bond and a payment bond from Liberty naming Greenleaf as principal\nand the United States as obligee. βA performance bond protects the owner, or\nobligee, ensuring project completion if the general contractor defaults. A payment\nbond ensures that laborers and material suppliers will be paid if the general contractor\ndefaults.β Pa. Natβl Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 354 F.3d 945, 949 n.2\n(8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In April, Greenleaf entered into a Subcontract in\nwhich International Electric, Inc. (βElectricβ), agreed to perform defined electrical\nand communications work on the project for $1,020,000. The Subcontract required\nElectric to furnish performance and payment bonds in the amounts of $1,020,000 (the\nbondsβ βpenal sumβ). Electric obtained the bonds from Fidelity, naming Electric as\nprincipal and Greenleaf as obligee. The performance bond obligated Fidelity to\nβpromptly remedyβ a default by Electric on the Subcontract or βarrange for the\nperformance of [Electricβs] obligation under the subcontract.β\n\n In January 2014, Greenleaf, Liberty, and the United States entered into a\nTakeover Agreement in which Greenleaf and the government βagreed to an\nimmediate consensual termination and defaultβ of the Prime Contract. Liberty agreed\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\fto βcomplete the Contract in accordance with its termsβ and βreaffirm[ed] the validity\nof [Libertyβs] Bonds to secure the obligations of its completion.β The Takeover\nAgreement provided that Liberty βbecomes entitled to all rights, titles, and interests\nof Greenleaf in and to the [Prime] Contract.β The government agreed to accept\nVertex Companies, LLC (βVertexβ), as Libertyβs βcompletion contractor.β The\ngovernment also agreed to work with Liberty βto agree on a schedule establishing a\nnew construction completion date,β which had been October 12, 2013.\n\n On February 7, Liberty and Electric entered into a Subcontract Ratification\nAgreement in which Liberty agreed to pay Electric $244,134 for work previously\nperformed under the Subcontract but not paid by Greenleaf. Electric agreed to\nβperform the balance of the work for [the unpaid balance of the $1,020,000\nSubcontract amount, $347,612] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the\nSubcontract, as modified by this Agreement.β Fidelity was not asked to -- and did not\n-- bond the Ratification Agreement.\n\n A dispute soon arose between Electric and Vertex as completing general\ncontractor, and Electric never returned to the project. Liberty terminated Electric for\nits default in April 2014 and notified Fidelity. Fidelity refused to complete Electricβs\nobligations under the Subcontract. Liberty hired an electrical subcontractor, ABC\nElectric, to complete work under the Subcontract. ABC Electric concluded that much\nof the work Electric had performed needed to be redone and ultimately charged\nLiberty $1,657,745 to complete electrical and communications work on the project.\n\n This lawsuit began in August 2014 when the federal government sued\nGreenleaf, Electric, Liberty, and Fidelity on behalf of an unpaid supplier. That claim\nhas been resolved. Liberty filed a cross-claim against Fidelity and Electric for breach\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fof the Subcontract and breach of Fidelityβs performance and payment bonds.2 Ruling\non cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Liberty partial\nsummary judgment, ruling that Liberty may assert claims against Fidelityβs\nperformance bond, the bond was not discharged by replacement or material alteration,\nand Fidelityβs obligations βwere triggered by the satisfaction of the bondβs conditions\nprecedent.β After a bench trial on Libertyβs claims against the performance and\npayment bonds, the court entered judgment against Fidelity for $1,020,000, the full\namount of its performance bond. Fidelity has not appealed the $104,231 judgment\nentered in favor of Liberty on its claims against Fidelityβs payment bond.\n\n Fidelity argues it is not liable to Liberty on the performance bond because (1)\nLiberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ entitled to assert a claim on the bond; (2) the\nRatification Agreement discharged Fidelityβs performance bond because it was either\nan entirely new agreement or materially altered Electricβs Subcontract, and Fidelity\ndid not bond the Ratification Agreement; and (3) Libertyβs claim did not meet\nconditions precedent to the performance bondβs coverage.\n\n II. The Successor Issue.\n\n In holding that Liberty may assert a claim against Fidelityβs performance bond,\nthe district court first ruled that, by satisfying Greenleafβs obligations under the Prime\nContract and the Subcontract, Liberty became subrogated to Greenleafβs rights\nthrough equitable subrogation. The court noted it is well-established βthat a surety\nwho pays the debt of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to\nenforce his right to be reimbursed,β Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-\n37 (1962), and the Supreme Court of Iowa expansively views the rights of a subrogee\nwho βsteps into the shoesβ of another, Iowa Depβt of Human Servs. v. Unisys Corp.,\n\n\n 2\n Electric subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court\nlifted the automatic stay to permit Libertyβs claim against Fidelity to proceed.\n\n -4-\n\f637 N.W.2d 142, 156 (Iowa 2001). Without challenging this general principle,\nFidelity argues that Liberty as subrogee acquired no right to assert a claim against the\nperformance bond because the bond provides, βNo right of action shall accrue on this\nbond to or for the use of any . . . corporation other than [Greenleaf] or the heirs,\nexecutors, administrators or successors of [Greenleaf].β Citing corporate law\ndecisions, Fidelity argues that Liberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ under the\nbond βbecause it never assumed generally Greenleafβs liabilities.β Like the district\ncourt, we disagree.\n\n The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated that β[t]he exact meaning of the word\nβsuccessorβ as applied to a contract must depend largely on the kind and character of\nthe contract, its purposes and circumstances, and the context.β Sun Valley Iowa Lake\nAssβn v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 640 (Iowa 1996) (quotation omitted). Applying\nthis standard in the context of surety bonds, the district court agreed with decisions\nfrom other jurisdictions concluding that a surety who has performed the contract\nobligations of its principal βqualifies as a βsuccessor.ββ See Argonaut Ins. Co. v.\nCommercial Std. Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. App. 1980), followed in\nMenorah Nursing Home, Inc. v. Zukov, 548 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705-06 (App. Div. 1989).\n\n Though Fidelity urges us to adopt a narrower definition of successor that is\nmore in tune with corporate law, we agree with the district courtβs interpretation of\nthe word as used in Fidelityβs performance bond. Moreover, there is an additional\nreason to adopt this interpretation. The performance bond Liberty issued to ensure\ngeneral contractor Greenleafβs performance to the United States was a bond legally\nmandated by the Miller Act. See generally Restatement (Third) of Suretyship &\nGuaranty Β§ 71 (1996). Federal Acquisition Regulations expressly encourage\ngovernment contracting officers to enter into a takeover agreement with a surety such\nas Liberty who is willing to perform its defaulting principalβs obligations as\ngovernment contractor. See 48 C.F.R. Β§ 49.404.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f When a general contractorβs surety takes over completion of a federal\ngovernment construction project and βsteps in the shoesβ of its principal, the purposes\nof the Miller Act and the FAR regulations to protect the government are served if the\nsurety is subrogated to the principalβs contract rights vis-a-vis a subcontractor such\nas Electric and, if the subcontractor defaults, its surety. Fidelity, in the business of\nissuing performance and payment bonds, necessarily understands this reality. Thus,\nwhen Fidelity has issued a performance bond for a subcontractor on a federal project,\nand its principal has defaulted, we reject its contention that the ambiguous word\nβsuccessorβ in the performance bond did not include as obligee a surety operating\nunder a Takeover Agreement with the federal government.\n\n III. Bond Discharge Issues.\n\n Exalting form over substance and ignoring modern suretyship authorities,\nFidelity next argues that its obligations under the performance bond were discharged\nβbecause the Ratification Agreement either replaced or materially alteredβ the\nSubcontract that Fidelity bonded. Fidelity first argues that β[t]he bonded Subcontract\nended -- at the latest -- in January 2014 upon the execution of the Takeover\nAgreement.β Fidelity cites no Subcontract provision or legal authority supporting\nthis contention, instead asserting that βthe notion that the Subcontract continued\ndespite Greenleaf leaving the job is nonsensical.β Of course, this ignores the legal\nand contractual consequences of Liberty as surety stepping in the shoes of its\nprincipal to complete the Prime Contract. Nothing in Greenleafβs Subcontract with\nElectric provided that the contract terminates if Greenleaf ceases to be general\ncontractor. Indeed, the Subcontract expressly prohibited Electric, but not Greenleaf,\nfrom assigning or transferring its interest without consent. In the February 2014\nRatification Agreement, Electric and Liberty expressly βratif[ied] and confirm[ed]\nthat the Subcontract is in effect, and that [Electric] shall perform and complete the\nSubcontract in accordance with the terms and provisions thereof at the direction of\n[Liberty] and for the same consideration.β Thus, the Subcontract never βended.β\n\n -6-\n\f Turning to a more difficult issue, Fidelity argues that the Ratification\nAgreement discharged Fidelityβs bond because it was a βmaterial alterationβ of the\nbonded Subcontract. Fidelity first urges us to adopt the βgeneral ruleβ that any\ncontract change discharges the surety, even if to its benefit. See Holland v. Story\nCty., 192 N.W. 402, 403 (Iowa 1923). The district court instead adopted the more\nmodern rule that, to be discharged, the surety must show that an alteration enlarged\nor added to the obligations or otherwise prejudiced the performance of the suretyβs\nbonded principal. See Knapp v. Knapp, 99 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1959); Throp v.\nChaloupka, 208 N.W. 299, 300 (Iowa 1926). The evolution of this rule reflected a\nrecognition that the older strict rule βwas problematic when applied to secondary\nobligors, such as surety companies, who were in the business of entering into\nsecondary obligationsβ and received a windfall if their obligations were discharged\nfor an alteration that caused no harm. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 37, cmt. a. Agreeing\nwith this trend, the Restatement adopted, for most contract modifications, the rule that\na surety βis discharged from any unperformed duties . . . if the modification . . .\nimposes risks on the [surety] fundamentally different from those imposed . . . prior\nto modification.β Β§ 41(b)(i). The Restatement rule and the rule the district court\nderived from Knapp are essentially the same. We conclude the Supreme Court of\nIowa would apply an equivalent rule governing discharge of a surety in this\nconstruction contract situation. Fidelity cites no contrary authority.\n\n Applying this standard to the Ratification Agreement, the district court\nconcluded that none of the alterations alleged by Fidelity βmaterially altered\n[Electricβs] actual obligations under the Subcontract.β We agree. The Ratification\nAgreement expressly left the Subcontractorβs performance obligations, time to\ncomplete its work, and compensation unchanged. Fidelity primarily argues that\nchanging the general contractor and bond obligee from Greenleaf to Liberty was\nmaterial and prejudicial because βthe chief financial officers of Electric and Greenleaf\nwere close personal friendsβ but Electric had no such relationship with Vertex. We\nreject this argument because it would automatically discharge a subcontractor suretyβs\n\n -7-\n\fperformance bond whenever the general contractorβs surety operating under a\nTakeover Agreement becomes a successor bond obligee.\n\n Fidelity further argues that the Ratification Agreement was a material alteration\nbecause, as a result of changing the bond obligee, Fidelity βhas been ordered to pay\nhundreds of thousands of dollars to redo work that the named obligee, Greenleaf,\npreviously acceptedβ to complete a Subcontract that was valued at $347,612 in the\nRatification Agreement. But the alleged causation is unfounded. As the district court\nobserved, βthese increased costs occurred after the parties signed the Ratification\nAgreement. The Ratification Agreement did not amend the Subcontract to increase\nElectricβs obligation -- and thus increase the total cost of Electricβs work.β Moreover,\nElectric was terminated before it performed additional work under the Ratification\nAgreement. True, the increased costs to complete performance of the Subcontract\nwere incurred after Electric was terminated. But they resulted from defective work\nElectric performed before Liberty replaced Greenleaf under the Takeover Agreement.\nThus, had there been no Ratification Agreement, Liberty as Greenleafβs successor\nwould have had virtually the same claim against Fidelityβs performance bond.\n\n We agree with the district court that the many Subcontract changes in the\nRatification Agreement cited by Fidelity did not as a matter of law, singly or in\ncombination, so materially alter Electricβs obligations under the Subcontract that\nFidelityβs performance bond was discharged. This ruling did not foreclose possible\ndefenses to Libertyβs claim against the bond based on facts surrounding Libertyβs\ntakeover and completion of Electricβs performance under the Subcontract as modified\nby the Ratification Agreement. Cf. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 41(b)(ii). These\ndefenses were thoroughly litigated in the bench trial. For example, in response to\nFidelityβs contention that Liberty failed to mitigate its damages as successor obligee,\nthe court found that Liberty acted reasonably in replacing Greenleaf with Vertex as\ncompletion contractor and took appropriate measures to avoid escalating costs during\nthe transition. Fidelity has not appealed these bench trial findings.\n\n -8-\n\f IV. Condition Precedent Issues.\n\n The performance bond provided that Fidelityβs remedy obligations are\ntriggered β[w]henever [Electric] shall be, and be declared by [Greenleaf] to be in\ndefault under the subcontract, [Greenleaf] having performed [Greenleafβs] obligations\nthereunder . . . .β Fidelity argues that Libertyβs claim against the performance bond\nmust be rejected because it failed to meet these two conditions precedent.\n\n First, Fidelity argues that, at the time Liberty terminated Electric for its default\nunder the Subcontract, βGreenleaf could not have been performing under the\nSubcontract because Greenleaf defaulted on the Project three months earlier.β\nSecond, Fidelity argues that βGreenleaf never declared Electric in default under the\nSubcontract.β We agree with the district court that these contentions are without\nmerit because they are inconsistent with Libertyβs right as successor obligee. First,\nFidelity does not claim that Liberty had failed to perform the obligeeβs obligations\nunder the Subcontract when the bond claim was made. At that time, Greenleafβs\nSubcontract performance was irrelevant. Second, it is undisputed that Electric was\nin default when the claim was made (Fidelity as surety later filed a claim in Electricβs\nbankruptcy proceeding). We reject as frivolous the contention that the notice of\ndefault to Electric was ineffective because it was sent by Vertex rather than Liberty.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1455\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America for the use of Wesco Distribution, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Liberty Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n International Fidelity Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 11, 2018\\n Filed: April 12, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, MELLOY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This appeal is part of a complex dispute over costs that resulted from contractor\\ndefaults in completing a federal government construction project. After partial\\n\\fsummary judgment rulings and a bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment\\nagainst a subcontractorβs surety, International Fidelity Insurance Co. (βFidelityβ), and\\nin favor of the general contractorβs surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (βLibertyβ),\\nfor the full amount of Fidelityβs performance bond. Fidelity appeals. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background.\\n\\n In March 2012, Greenleaf Construction Co. (βGreenleafβ) entered into a Prime\\nContract with the United States to build an Army Reserve Center in Des Moines,\\nIowa. As required by the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. Β§ 3131(b), Greenleaf obtained a\\nperformance bond and a payment bond from Liberty naming Greenleaf as principal\\nand the United States as obligee. βA performance bond protects the owner, or\\nobligee, ensuring project completion if the general contractor defaults. A payment\\nbond ensures that laborers and material suppliers will be paid if the general contractor\\ndefaults.β Pa. Natβl Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 354 F.3d 945, 949 n.2\\n(8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In April, Greenleaf entered into a Subcontract in\\nwhich International Electric, Inc. (βElectricβ), agreed to perform defined electrical\\nand communications work on the project for $1,020,000. The Subcontract required\\nElectric to furnish performance and payment bonds in the amounts of $1,020,000 (the\\nbondsβ βpenal sumβ). Electric obtained the bonds from Fidelity, naming Electric as\\nprincipal and Greenleaf as obligee. The performance bond obligated Fidelity to\\nβpromptly remedyβ a default by Electric on the Subcontract or βarrange for the\\nperformance of [Electricβs] obligation under the subcontract.β\\n\\n In January 2014, Greenleaf, Liberty, and the United States entered into a\\nTakeover Agreement in which Greenleaf and the government βagreed to an\\nimmediate consensual termination and defaultβ of the Prime Contract. Liberty agreed\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto βcomplete the Contract in accordance with its termsβ and βreaffirm[ed] the validity\\nof [Libertyβs] Bonds to secure the obligations of its completion.β The Takeover\\nAgreement provided that Liberty βbecomes entitled to all rights, titles, and interests\\nof Greenleaf in and to the [Prime] Contract.β The government agreed to accept\\nVertex Companies, LLC (βVertexβ), as Libertyβs βcompletion contractor.β The\\ngovernment also agreed to work with Liberty βto agree on a schedule establishing a\\nnew construction completion date,β which had been October 12, 2013.\\n\\n On February 7, Liberty and Electric entered into a Subcontract Ratification\\nAgreement in which Liberty agreed to pay Electric $244,134 for work previously\\nperformed under the Subcontract but not paid by Greenleaf. Electric agreed to\\nβperform the balance of the work for [the unpaid balance of the $1,020,000\\nSubcontract amount, $347,612] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the\\nSubcontract, as modified by this Agreement.β Fidelity was not asked to -- and did not\\n-- bond the Ratification Agreement.\\n\\n A dispute soon arose between Electric and Vertex as completing general\\ncontractor, and Electric never returned to the project. Liberty terminated Electric for\\nits default in April 2014 and notified Fidelity. Fidelity refused to complete Electricβs\\nobligations under the Subcontract. Liberty hired an electrical subcontractor, ABC\\nElectric, to complete work under the Subcontract. ABC Electric concluded that much\\nof the work Electric had performed needed to be redone and ultimately charged\\nLiberty $1,657,745 to complete electrical and communications work on the project.\\n\\n This lawsuit began in August 2014 when the federal government sued\\nGreenleaf, Electric, Liberty, and Fidelity on behalf of an unpaid supplier. That claim\\nhas been resolved. Liberty filed a cross-claim against Fidelity and Electric for breach\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof the Subcontract and breach of Fidelityβs performance and payment bonds.2 Ruling\\non cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Liberty partial\\nsummary judgment, ruling that Liberty may assert claims against Fidelityβs\\nperformance bond, the bond was not discharged by replacement or material alteration,\\nand Fidelityβs obligations βwere triggered by the satisfaction of the bondβs conditions\\nprecedent.β After a bench trial on Libertyβs claims against the performance and\\npayment bonds, the court entered judgment against Fidelity for $1,020,000, the full\\namount of its performance bond. Fidelity has not appealed the $104,231 judgment\\nentered in favor of Liberty on its claims against Fidelityβs payment bond.\\n\\n Fidelity argues it is not liable to Liberty on the performance bond because (1)\\nLiberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ entitled to assert a claim on the bond; (2) the\\nRatification Agreement discharged Fidelityβs performance bond because it was either\\nan entirely new agreement or materially altered Electricβs Subcontract, and Fidelity\\ndid not bond the Ratification Agreement; and (3) Libertyβs claim did not meet\\nconditions precedent to the performance bondβs coverage.\\n\\n II. The Successor Issue.\\n\\n In holding that Liberty may assert a claim against Fidelityβs performance bond,\\nthe district court first ruled that, by satisfying Greenleafβs obligations under the Prime\\nContract and the Subcontract, Liberty became subrogated to Greenleafβs rights\\nthrough equitable subrogation. The court noted it is well-established βthat a surety\\nwho pays the debt of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to\\nenforce his right to be reimbursed,β Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-\\n37 (1962), and the Supreme Court of Iowa expansively views the rights of a subrogee\\nwho βsteps into the shoesβ of another, Iowa Depβt of Human Servs. v. Unisys Corp.,\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Electric subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court\\nlifted the automatic stay to permit Libertyβs claim against Fidelity to proceed.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f637 N.W.2d 142, 156 (Iowa 2001). Without challenging this general principle,\\nFidelity argues that Liberty as subrogee acquired no right to assert a claim against the\\nperformance bond because the bond provides, βNo right of action shall accrue on this\\nbond to or for the use of any . . . corporation other than [Greenleaf] or the heirs,\\nexecutors, administrators or successors of [Greenleaf].β Citing corporate law\\ndecisions, Fidelity argues that Liberty was not Greenleafβs βsuccessorβ under the\\nbond βbecause it never assumed generally Greenleafβs liabilities.β Like the district\\ncourt, we disagree.\\n\\n The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated that β[t]he exact meaning of the word\\nβsuccessorβ as applied to a contract must depend largely on the kind and character of\\nthe contract, its purposes and circumstances, and the context.β Sun Valley Iowa Lake\\nAssβn v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 640 (Iowa 1996) (quotation omitted). Applying\\nthis standard in the context of surety bonds, the district court agreed with decisions\\nfrom other jurisdictions concluding that a surety who has performed the contract\\nobligations of its principal βqualifies as a βsuccessor.ββ See Argonaut Ins. Co. v.\\nCommercial Std. Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. App. 1980), followed in\\nMenorah Nursing Home, Inc. v. Zukov, 548 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705-06 (App. Div. 1989).\\n\\n Though Fidelity urges us to adopt a narrower definition of successor that is\\nmore in tune with corporate law, we agree with the district courtβs interpretation of\\nthe word as used in Fidelityβs performance bond. Moreover, there is an additional\\nreason to adopt this interpretation. The performance bond Liberty issued to ensure\\ngeneral contractor Greenleafβs performance to the United States was a bond legally\\nmandated by the Miller Act. See generally Restatement (Third) of Suretyship &\\nGuaranty Β§ 71 (1996). Federal Acquisition Regulations expressly encourage\\ngovernment contracting officers to enter into a takeover agreement with a surety such\\nas Liberty who is willing to perform its defaulting principalβs obligations as\\ngovernment contractor. See 48 C.F.R. Β§ 49.404.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f When a general contractorβs surety takes over completion of a federal\\ngovernment construction project and βsteps in the shoesβ of its principal, the purposes\\nof the Miller Act and the FAR regulations to protect the government are served if the\\nsurety is subrogated to the principalβs contract rights vis-a-vis a subcontractor such\\nas Electric and, if the subcontractor defaults, its surety. Fidelity, in the business of\\nissuing performance and payment bonds, necessarily understands this reality. Thus,\\nwhen Fidelity has issued a performance bond for a subcontractor on a federal project,\\nand its principal has defaulted, we reject its contention that the ambiguous word\\nβsuccessorβ in the performance bond did not include as obligee a surety operating\\nunder a Takeover Agreement with the federal government.\\n\\n III. Bond Discharge Issues.\\n\\n Exalting form over substance and ignoring modern suretyship authorities,\\nFidelity next argues that its obligations under the performance bond were discharged\\nβbecause the Ratification Agreement either replaced or materially alteredβ the\\nSubcontract that Fidelity bonded. Fidelity first argues that β[t]he bonded Subcontract\\nended -- at the latest -- in January 2014 upon the execution of the Takeover\\nAgreement.β Fidelity cites no Subcontract provision or legal authority supporting\\nthis contention, instead asserting that βthe notion that the Subcontract continued\\ndespite Greenleaf leaving the job is nonsensical.β Of course, this ignores the legal\\nand contractual consequences of Liberty as surety stepping in the shoes of its\\nprincipal to complete the Prime Contract. Nothing in Greenleafβs Subcontract with\\nElectric provided that the contract terminates if Greenleaf ceases to be general\\ncontractor. Indeed, the Subcontract expressly prohibited Electric, but not Greenleaf,\\nfrom assigning or transferring its interest without consent. In the February 2014\\nRatification Agreement, Electric and Liberty expressly βratif[ied] and confirm[ed]\\nthat the Subcontract is in effect, and that [Electric] shall perform and complete the\\nSubcontract in accordance with the terms and provisions thereof at the direction of\\n[Liberty] and for the same consideration.β Thus, the Subcontract never βended.β\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Turning to a more difficult issue, Fidelity argues that the Ratification\\nAgreement discharged Fidelityβs bond because it was a βmaterial alterationβ of the\\nbonded Subcontract. Fidelity first urges us to adopt the βgeneral ruleβ that any\\ncontract change discharges the surety, even if to its benefit. See Holland v. Story\\nCty., 192 N.W. 402, 403 (Iowa 1923). The district court instead adopted the more\\nmodern rule that, to be discharged, the surety must show that an alteration enlarged\\nor added to the obligations or otherwise prejudiced the performance of the suretyβs\\nbonded principal. See Knapp v. Knapp, 99 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1959); Throp v.\\nChaloupka, 208 N.W. 299, 300 (Iowa 1926). The evolution of this rule reflected a\\nrecognition that the older strict rule βwas problematic when applied to secondary\\nobligors, such as surety companies, who were in the business of entering into\\nsecondary obligationsβ and received a windfall if their obligations were discharged\\nfor an alteration that caused no harm. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 37, cmt. a. Agreeing\\nwith this trend, the Restatement adopted, for most contract modifications, the rule that\\na surety βis discharged from any unperformed duties . . . if the modification . . .\\nimposes risks on the [surety] fundamentally different from those imposed . . . prior\\nto modification.β Β§ 41(b)(i). The Restatement rule and the rule the district court\\nderived from Knapp are essentially the same. We conclude the Supreme Court of\\nIowa would apply an equivalent rule governing discharge of a surety in this\\nconstruction contract situation. Fidelity cites no contrary authority.\\n\\n Applying this standard to the Ratification Agreement, the district court\\nconcluded that none of the alterations alleged by Fidelity βmaterially altered\\n[Electricβs] actual obligations under the Subcontract.β We agree. The Ratification\\nAgreement expressly left the Subcontractorβs performance obligations, time to\\ncomplete its work, and compensation unchanged. Fidelity primarily argues that\\nchanging the general contractor and bond obligee from Greenleaf to Liberty was\\nmaterial and prejudicial because βthe chief financial officers of Electric and Greenleaf\\nwere close personal friendsβ but Electric had no such relationship with Vertex. We\\nreject this argument because it would automatically discharge a subcontractor suretyβs\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fperformance bond whenever the general contractorβs surety operating under a\\nTakeover Agreement becomes a successor bond obligee.\\n\\n Fidelity further argues that the Ratification Agreement was a material alteration\\nbecause, as a result of changing the bond obligee, Fidelity βhas been ordered to pay\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars to redo work that the named obligee, Greenleaf,\\npreviously acceptedβ to complete a Subcontract that was valued at $347,612 in the\\nRatification Agreement. But the alleged causation is unfounded. As the district court\\nobserved, βthese increased costs occurred after the parties signed the Ratification\\nAgreement. The Ratification Agreement did not amend the Subcontract to increase\\nElectricβs obligation -- and thus increase the total cost of Electricβs work.β Moreover,\\nElectric was terminated before it performed additional work under the Ratification\\nAgreement. True, the increased costs to complete performance of the Subcontract\\nwere incurred after Electric was terminated. But they resulted from defective work\\nElectric performed before Liberty replaced Greenleaf under the Takeover Agreement.\\nThus, had there been no Ratification Agreement, Liberty as Greenleafβs successor\\nwould have had virtually the same claim against Fidelityβs performance bond.\\n\\n We agree with the district court that the many Subcontract changes in the\\nRatification Agreement cited by Fidelity did not as a matter of law, singly or in\\ncombination, so materially alter Electricβs obligations under the Subcontract that\\nFidelityβs performance bond was discharged. This ruling did not foreclose possible\\ndefenses to Libertyβs claim against the bond based on facts surrounding Libertyβs\\ntakeover and completion of Electricβs performance under the Subcontract as modified\\nby the Ratification Agreement. Cf. Restatement Suretyship Β§ 41(b)(ii). These\\ndefenses were thoroughly litigated in the bench trial. For example, in response to\\nFidelityβs contention that Liberty failed to mitigate its damages as successor obligee,\\nthe court found that Liberty acted reasonably in replacing Greenleaf with Vertex as\\ncompletion contractor and took appropriate measures to avoid escalating costs during\\nthe transition. Fidelity has not appealed these bench trial findings.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f IV. Condition Precedent Issues.\\n\\n The performance bond provided that Fidelityβs remedy obligations are\\ntriggered β[w]henever [Electric] shall be, and be declared by [Greenleaf] to be in\\ndefault under the subcontract, [Greenleaf] having performed [Greenleafβs] obligations\\nthereunder . . . .β Fidelity argues that Libertyβs claim against the performance bond\\nmust be rejected because it failed to meet these two conditions precedent.\\n\\n First, Fidelity argues that, at the time Liberty terminated Electric for its default\\nunder the Subcontract, βGreenleaf could not have been performing under the\\nSubcontract because Greenleaf defaulted on the Project three months earlier.β\\nSecond, Fidelity argues that βGreenleaf never declared Electric in default under the\\nSubcontract.β We agree with the district court that these contentions are without\\nmerit because they are inconsistent with Libertyβs right as successor obligee. First,\\nFidelity does not claim that Liberty had failed to perform the obligeeβs obligations\\nunder the Subcontract when the bond claim was made. At that time, Greenleafβs\\nSubcontract performance was irrelevant. Second, it is undisputed that Electric was\\nin default when the claim was made (Fidelity as surety later filed a claim in Electricβs\\nbankruptcy proceeding). We reject as frivolous the contention that the notice of\\ndefault to Electric was ineffective because it was sent by Vertex rather than Liberty.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1785,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443971,"string":"8,443,971"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America FOR the USE OF WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, - International Fidelity Insurance Company"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1455"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Erickson, Loken, Melloy\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415405/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443971/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America FOR the USE OF WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, - International Fidelity Insurance Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America FOR the USE OF WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, - International Fidelity Insurance Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1786,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610116,"string":"4,610,116"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Todd DeAngelo GOODSON, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Todd Goodson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1515"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1515\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson pleaded guilty to Count 1 of an Indictment charging\\nhim with being a felon in knowing possession of a .45 caliber Beretta Px4 Storm pistol\\nand a .223 AK47 pistol and 9 mm ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)\\n\\fand 924(a)(2). The district court1 sentenced Goodson to 111 months imprisonment,\\nnear the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. Goodson appeals the sentence,\\narguing the district court clearly erred in imposing a two-level increase for possession\\nof three firearms, USSG Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and in declining to award a two-level\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility, USSG Β§ 3E1.1, and abused its discretion\\nin declining to grant a downward variance. We affirm.\\n\\n After surveillance revealed Goodson engaging in hand-to-hand transactions\\noutside his residence in Waterloo, Iowa, Goodson drove away with a passenger and\\nofficers conducted a traffic stop because his driverβs license was suspended. Before\\nGoodson stopped, his passenger threw a baggie of marijuana out the window. After\\nthe stop, Goodson admitted having smoked marijuana and consented to a search of the\\nvehicle. Officers found a Glock model 26 9 mm pistol under the passenger seat;\\nGoodson denied knowledge it was there. Police then obtained and executed a warrant\\nto search Goodsonβs residence. Three children were in the residence when the officers\\narrived. They found cocaine, marijuana, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and two\\nfirearms -- a .223 AK47 Champion pistol in the kitchen where loose marijuana was\\nalso found, and a .45 caliber Beretta PX4 Storm, loose 9 mm ammunition, and\\nclothing linked to Goodson in a gym bag in the furnace room closet.\\n\\n Paragraph 12 of Goodsonβs Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) stated that\\nfollowing his arrest, Goodson consented to an interview that was video recorded. He\\nadmitted frequently using marijuana and cocaine and selling marijuana to support his\\nusage. He initially denied knowledge of the two firearms found in the warrant search,\\nthen admitted handling the Champion pistol but denied knowledge of the Beretta\\npistol. βGoodson also admitted that he had handled an unknown .25 caliber pearl-\\nhandled pistol approximately one month prior to the interview.β The PSR\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\frecommended a two-level increase under Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because he possessed these\\nthree firearms. Goodson timely objected to the statement in Paragraph 12 βthat he\\nhandled the .25 caliber firearm.β\\n\\n At sentencing, addressing this issue, defense counsel clarified that β[t]he crux\\nof [Goodsonβs] objection is that the pistol he supposedly handled was one and the\\nsame pistol to which he pled guilty.β Therefore, he unlawfully possessed only the two\\nfirearms found in the warrant search of his residence. The government introduced and\\nplayed for the court the portion of the recorded interview in which Goodson admitted\\nhandling a .25 caliber pearl-handled revolver. After the court observed that βYou\\nwouldnβt mistakeβ that firearm for a .223 AK47 Champion pistol or a .45 caliber\\nBeretta PX4 Storm, defense counsel argued:\\n\\n When Mr. Goodson pled, he pled to the PX4 Storm, which is a\\n subcompact .45-caliber handgun, and not an overly large semiautomatic\\n pistol. . . . Mr. Goodson in the 26-second video here talked about βI\\n think it was a .25.β It was an ambivalent statement. . . . And he came\\n forward and pled guilty to the PX4 Storm and took responsibility for the\\n AK-47. The comments on the tape were ambivalent at best, and we just\\n donβt think the government can get over that hoop to prove [that the .25-\\n caliber handgun was a third firearm].\\n\\nThe government then introduced photos of the two firearms seized in the warrant\\nsearch and photos of multiple firearms taken from Goodsonβs phone, one of which\\nwas the Glock found under the passenger seat when Goodson was arrested. At the\\ncourtβs request, the video was played again to confirm that Goodson said he handled\\na βpearl-handledβ firearm. The court then stated, βYes, he definitely described it as\\nβpearl-handledββ and noted the photos confirmed that the two other firearms did not\\nhave pearl handles. The court then ruled:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f I find Mr. Goodson is frivolously contesting relevant conduct,\\n specifically, disavowing a statement he made on a videotape a month\\n before [his arrest] that he had handled a .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol.\\n\\nAfter further argument and allocution, the court denied Goodson a two-level reduction\\nfor acceptance of responsibility:\\n\\n [T]he Court finds that Mr. Goodson through his attorney made a false\\n representation to this Court. He did not take the stand and testify to it,\\n but he misled his attorney, who then made the statement to the Court\\n concerning Paragraph 12, the .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol. This was\\n an intentional misrepresentation done, obviously with the hope of\\n reducing his sentence somewhat.\\n\\nBased on these findings, the court determined an advisory guidelines range of 110 to\\n120 months, the statutory maximum sentence. After extensively reviewing the\\nrelevant aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors, the court sentenced Goodson\\nto 111 months imprisonment. The court explained: βthere are so many aggravating\\nfactors here . . . that totally overshadow the mitigating circumstances, the Court\\nexercises its discretion not to vary downward,β but βI gave him some leniency for\\nentering a plea of guilty.β The court also stated, βif I have erred in not granting\\nacceptance of responsibility and in computing the advisory guidelines as to number\\nof firearms, my sentence would still be 111 months.β\\n\\n On appeal, Goodson first argues the district court erred in finding he possessed\\nthree firearms and imposing a two-level increase. βThe government did not establish\\nthat Goodsonβs mere handling of the firearm a month before amounted to unlawful\\npossession,β he argues, because possession βimplies control or intentβ and his\\ninterview comment does not establish βthe context in which the pearl handled 25 was\\nhandled.β When the issue is properly preserved, we review the three-firearm finding\\nfor clear error. United States v. Mahone, 688 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2012). This\\nparticular argument was not made to the district court, but the Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) issue\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fwas argued at length. Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, there was no\\nclear error. As the district court stated in framing the issue at sentencing, if you\\nhandle a firearm, βyou possess it, and you possess it maybe for a few minutes, but you\\npossess it.β As Goodson was a convicted felon when he handled the pearl-handled\\npistol, his possession was unlawful.\\n\\n Goodson next argues the district court clearly erred in denying an acceptance-\\nof-responsibility reduction: he accepted responsibility for the firearms to which he\\npleaded guilty, and he did not βfrivolously deny relevant conductβ because his βbrief\\nstatement in a 26 second video clipβ was not sufficient proof that he possessed a third\\nfirearm. We review the denial of acceptance of responsibility for clear error, giving\\nthe sentencing judgeβs determination βgreat deference.β United States v. Adetiloye,\\n716 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (2014). A defendant\\nwho βfalsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines\\nto be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.β\\nUSSG Β§ 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(A)). Here, the district court denied acceptance because\\nGoodson βdisavowed a statement he made on a videotape . . . that he had handled a\\n.25-caliber pearl-handled pistol,β which was βan intentional misrepresentation done,\\nobviously with the hope of reducing his sentence.β There was no clear error. See\\nMahone, 688 F.3d at 911.\\n\\n Finally, Goodson argues the district court abused its discretion by not properly\\nconsidering the relevant Β§ 3553(a) sentencing factors in denying his motion for a\\ndownward variance from the advisory guidelines sentencing range. The district court\\nthoroughly explained its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating sentencing\\nfactors. A within-range sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v.\\nHuston, 744 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2014). There was no abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387369/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610116/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Todd DeAngelo GOODSON, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1515\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\n Filed: April 15, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson pleaded guilty to Count 1 of an Indictment charging\nhim with being a felon in knowing possession of a .45 caliber Beretta Px4 Storm pistol\nand a .223 AK47 pistol and 9 mm ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)\n\fand 924(a)(2). The district court1 sentenced Goodson to 111 months imprisonment,\nnear the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. Goodson appeals the sentence,\narguing the district court clearly erred in imposing a two-level increase for possession\nof three firearms, USSG Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and in declining to award a two-level\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility, USSG Β§ 3E1.1, and abused its discretion\nin declining to grant a downward variance. We affirm.\n\n After surveillance revealed Goodson engaging in hand-to-hand transactions\noutside his residence in Waterloo, Iowa, Goodson drove away with a passenger and\nofficers conducted a traffic stop because his driverβs license was suspended. Before\nGoodson stopped, his passenger threw a baggie of marijuana out the window. After\nthe stop, Goodson admitted having smoked marijuana and consented to a search of the\nvehicle. Officers found a Glock model 26 9 mm pistol under the passenger seat;\nGoodson denied knowledge it was there. Police then obtained and executed a warrant\nto search Goodsonβs residence. Three children were in the residence when the officers\narrived. They found cocaine, marijuana, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and two\nfirearms -- a .223 AK47 Champion pistol in the kitchen where loose marijuana was\nalso found, and a .45 caliber Beretta PX4 Storm, loose 9 mm ammunition, and\nclothing linked to Goodson in a gym bag in the furnace room closet.\n\n Paragraph 12 of Goodsonβs Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) stated that\nfollowing his arrest, Goodson consented to an interview that was video recorded. He\nadmitted frequently using marijuana and cocaine and selling marijuana to support his\nusage. He initially denied knowledge of the two firearms found in the warrant search,\nthen admitted handling the Champion pistol but denied knowledge of the Beretta\npistol. βGoodson also admitted that he had handled an unknown .25 caliber pearl-\nhandled pistol approximately one month prior to the interview.β The PSR\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\frecommended a two-level increase under Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because he possessed these\nthree firearms. Goodson timely objected to the statement in Paragraph 12 βthat he\nhandled the .25 caliber firearm.β\n\n At sentencing, addressing this issue, defense counsel clarified that β[t]he crux\nof [Goodsonβs] objection is that the pistol he supposedly handled was one and the\nsame pistol to which he pled guilty.β Therefore, he unlawfully possessed only the two\nfirearms found in the warrant search of his residence. The government introduced and\nplayed for the court the portion of the recorded interview in which Goodson admitted\nhandling a .25 caliber pearl-handled revolver. After the court observed that βYou\nwouldnβt mistakeβ that firearm for a .223 AK47 Champion pistol or a .45 caliber\nBeretta PX4 Storm, defense counsel argued:\n\n When Mr. Goodson pled, he pled to the PX4 Storm, which is a\n subcompact .45-caliber handgun, and not an overly large semiautomatic\n pistol. . . . Mr. Goodson in the 26-second video here talked about βI\n think it was a .25.β It was an ambivalent statement. . . . And he came\n forward and pled guilty to the PX4 Storm and took responsibility for the\n AK-47. The comments on the tape were ambivalent at best, and we just\n donβt think the government can get over that hoop to prove [that the .25-\n caliber handgun was a third firearm].\n\nThe government then introduced photos of the two firearms seized in the warrant\nsearch and photos of multiple firearms taken from Goodsonβs phone, one of which\nwas the Glock found under the passenger seat when Goodson was arrested. At the\ncourtβs request, the video was played again to confirm that Goodson said he handled\na βpearl-handledβ firearm. The court then stated, βYes, he definitely described it as\nβpearl-handledββ and noted the photos confirmed that the two other firearms did not\nhave pearl handles. The court then ruled:\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f I find Mr. Goodson is frivolously contesting relevant conduct,\n specifically, disavowing a statement he made on a videotape a month\n before [his arrest] that he had handled a .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol.\n\nAfter further argument and allocution, the court denied Goodson a two-level reduction\nfor acceptance of responsibility:\n\n [T]he Court finds that Mr. Goodson through his attorney made a false\n representation to this Court. He did not take the stand and testify to it,\n but he misled his attorney, who then made the statement to the Court\n concerning Paragraph 12, the .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol. This was\n an intentional misrepresentation done, obviously with the hope of\n reducing his sentence somewhat.\n\nBased on these findings, the court determined an advisory guidelines range of 110 to\n120 months, the statutory maximum sentence. After extensively reviewing the\nrelevant aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors, the court sentenced Goodson\nto 111 months imprisonment. The court explained: βthere are so many aggravating\nfactors here . . . that totally overshadow the mitigating circumstances, the Court\nexercises its discretion not to vary downward,β but βI gave him some leniency for\nentering a plea of guilty.β The court also stated, βif I have erred in not granting\nacceptance of responsibility and in computing the advisory guidelines as to number\nof firearms, my sentence would still be 111 months.β\n\n On appeal, Goodson first argues the district court erred in finding he possessed\nthree firearms and imposing a two-level increase. βThe government did not establish\nthat Goodsonβs mere handling of the firearm a month before amounted to unlawful\npossession,β he argues, because possession βimplies control or intentβ and his\ninterview comment does not establish βthe context in which the pearl handled 25 was\nhandled.β When the issue is properly preserved, we review the three-firearm finding\nfor clear error. United States v. Mahone, 688 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2012). This\nparticular argument was not made to the district court, but the Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) issue\n\n -4-\n\fwas argued at length. Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, there was no\nclear error. As the district court stated in framing the issue at sentencing, if you\nhandle a firearm, βyou possess it, and you possess it maybe for a few minutes, but you\npossess it.β As Goodson was a convicted felon when he handled the pearl-handled\npistol, his possession was unlawful.\n\n Goodson next argues the district court clearly erred in denying an acceptance-\nof-responsibility reduction: he accepted responsibility for the firearms to which he\npleaded guilty, and he did not βfrivolously deny relevant conductβ because his βbrief\nstatement in a 26 second video clipβ was not sufficient proof that he possessed a third\nfirearm. We review the denial of acceptance of responsibility for clear error, giving\nthe sentencing judgeβs determination βgreat deference.β United States v. Adetiloye,\n716 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (2014). A defendant\nwho βfalsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines\nto be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.β\nUSSG Β§ 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(A)). Here, the district court denied acceptance because\nGoodson βdisavowed a statement he made on a videotape . . . that he had handled a\n.25-caliber pearl-handled pistol,β which was βan intentional misrepresentation done,\nobviously with the hope of reducing his sentence.β There was no clear error. See\nMahone, 688 F.3d at 911.\n\n Finally, Goodson argues the district court abused its discretion by not properly\nconsidering the relevant Β§ 3553(a) sentencing factors in denying his motion for a\ndownward variance from the advisory guidelines sentencing range. The district court\nthoroughly explained its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating sentencing\nfactors. A within-range sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v.\nHuston, 744 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2014). There was no abuse of discretion.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Todd DeAngelo GOODSON, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1515\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Todd DeAngelo Goodson pleaded guilty to Count 1 of an Indictment charging\\nhim with being a felon in knowing possession of a .45 caliber Beretta Px4 Storm pistol\\nand a .223 AK47 pistol and 9 mm ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)\\n\\fand 924(a)(2). The district court1 sentenced Goodson to 111 months imprisonment,\\nnear the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. Goodson appeals the sentence,\\narguing the district court clearly erred in imposing a two-level increase for possession\\nof three firearms, USSG Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and in declining to award a two-level\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility, USSG Β§ 3E1.1, and abused its discretion\\nin declining to grant a downward variance. We affirm.\\n\\n After surveillance revealed Goodson engaging in hand-to-hand transactions\\noutside his residence in Waterloo, Iowa, Goodson drove away with a passenger and\\nofficers conducted a traffic stop because his driverβs license was suspended. Before\\nGoodson stopped, his passenger threw a baggie of marijuana out the window. After\\nthe stop, Goodson admitted having smoked marijuana and consented to a search of the\\nvehicle. Officers found a Glock model 26 9 mm pistol under the passenger seat;\\nGoodson denied knowledge it was there. Police then obtained and executed a warrant\\nto search Goodsonβs residence. Three children were in the residence when the officers\\narrived. They found cocaine, marijuana, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and two\\nfirearms -- a .223 AK47 Champion pistol in the kitchen where loose marijuana was\\nalso found, and a .45 caliber Beretta PX4 Storm, loose 9 mm ammunition, and\\nclothing linked to Goodson in a gym bag in the furnace room closet.\\n\\n Paragraph 12 of Goodsonβs Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) stated that\\nfollowing his arrest, Goodson consented to an interview that was video recorded. He\\nadmitted frequently using marijuana and cocaine and selling marijuana to support his\\nusage. He initially denied knowledge of the two firearms found in the warrant search,\\nthen admitted handling the Champion pistol but denied knowledge of the Beretta\\npistol. βGoodson also admitted that he had handled an unknown .25 caliber pearl-\\nhandled pistol approximately one month prior to the interview.β The PSR\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\frecommended a two-level increase under Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because he possessed these\\nthree firearms. Goodson timely objected to the statement in Paragraph 12 βthat he\\nhandled the .25 caliber firearm.β\\n\\n At sentencing, addressing this issue, defense counsel clarified that β[t]he crux\\nof [Goodsonβs] objection is that the pistol he supposedly handled was one and the\\nsame pistol to which he pled guilty.β Therefore, he unlawfully possessed only the two\\nfirearms found in the warrant search of his residence. The government introduced and\\nplayed for the court the portion of the recorded interview in which Goodson admitted\\nhandling a .25 caliber pearl-handled revolver. After the court observed that βYou\\nwouldnβt mistakeβ that firearm for a .223 AK47 Champion pistol or a .45 caliber\\nBeretta PX4 Storm, defense counsel argued:\\n\\n When Mr. Goodson pled, he pled to the PX4 Storm, which is a\\n subcompact .45-caliber handgun, and not an overly large semiautomatic\\n pistol. . . . Mr. Goodson in the 26-second video here talked about βI\\n think it was a .25.β It was an ambivalent statement. . . . And he came\\n forward and pled guilty to the PX4 Storm and took responsibility for the\\n AK-47. The comments on the tape were ambivalent at best, and we just\\n donβt think the government can get over that hoop to prove [that the .25-\\n caliber handgun was a third firearm].\\n\\nThe government then introduced photos of the two firearms seized in the warrant\\nsearch and photos of multiple firearms taken from Goodsonβs phone, one of which\\nwas the Glock found under the passenger seat when Goodson was arrested. At the\\ncourtβs request, the video was played again to confirm that Goodson said he handled\\na βpearl-handledβ firearm. The court then stated, βYes, he definitely described it as\\nβpearl-handledββ and noted the photos confirmed that the two other firearms did not\\nhave pearl handles. The court then ruled:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f I find Mr. Goodson is frivolously contesting relevant conduct,\\n specifically, disavowing a statement he made on a videotape a month\\n before [his arrest] that he had handled a .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol.\\n\\nAfter further argument and allocution, the court denied Goodson a two-level reduction\\nfor acceptance of responsibility:\\n\\n [T]he Court finds that Mr. Goodson through his attorney made a false\\n representation to this Court. He did not take the stand and testify to it,\\n but he misled his attorney, who then made the statement to the Court\\n concerning Paragraph 12, the .25-caliber pearl-handled pistol. This was\\n an intentional misrepresentation done, obviously with the hope of\\n reducing his sentence somewhat.\\n\\nBased on these findings, the court determined an advisory guidelines range of 110 to\\n120 months, the statutory maximum sentence. After extensively reviewing the\\nrelevant aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors, the court sentenced Goodson\\nto 111 months imprisonment. The court explained: βthere are so many aggravating\\nfactors here . . . that totally overshadow the mitigating circumstances, the Court\\nexercises its discretion not to vary downward,β but βI gave him some leniency for\\nentering a plea of guilty.β The court also stated, βif I have erred in not granting\\nacceptance of responsibility and in computing the advisory guidelines as to number\\nof firearms, my sentence would still be 111 months.β\\n\\n On appeal, Goodson first argues the district court erred in finding he possessed\\nthree firearms and imposing a two-level increase. βThe government did not establish\\nthat Goodsonβs mere handling of the firearm a month before amounted to unlawful\\npossession,β he argues, because possession βimplies control or intentβ and his\\ninterview comment does not establish βthe context in which the pearl handled 25 was\\nhandled.β When the issue is properly preserved, we review the three-firearm finding\\nfor clear error. United States v. Mahone, 688 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2012). This\\nparticular argument was not made to the district court, but the Β§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) issue\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fwas argued at length. Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, there was no\\nclear error. As the district court stated in framing the issue at sentencing, if you\\nhandle a firearm, βyou possess it, and you possess it maybe for a few minutes, but you\\npossess it.β As Goodson was a convicted felon when he handled the pearl-handled\\npistol, his possession was unlawful.\\n\\n Goodson next argues the district court clearly erred in denying an acceptance-\\nof-responsibility reduction: he accepted responsibility for the firearms to which he\\npleaded guilty, and he did not βfrivolously deny relevant conductβ because his βbrief\\nstatement in a 26 second video clipβ was not sufficient proof that he possessed a third\\nfirearm. We review the denial of acceptance of responsibility for clear error, giving\\nthe sentencing judgeβs determination βgreat deference.β United States v. Adetiloye,\\n716 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (2014). A defendant\\nwho βfalsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines\\nto be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.β\\nUSSG Β§ 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(A)). Here, the district court denied acceptance because\\nGoodson βdisavowed a statement he made on a videotape . . . that he had handled a\\n.25-caliber pearl-handled pistol,β which was βan intentional misrepresentation done,\\nobviously with the hope of reducing his sentence.β There was no clear error. See\\nMahone, 688 F.3d at 911.\\n\\n Finally, Goodson argues the district court abused its discretion by not properly\\nconsidering the relevant Β§ 3553(a) sentencing factors in denying his motion for a\\ndownward variance from the advisory guidelines sentencing range. The district court\\nthoroughly explained its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating sentencing\\nfactors. A within-range sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v.\\nHuston, 744 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2014). There was no abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1787,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610118,"string":"4,610,118"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. John Henry EDMONDS, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. John Edmonds"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2726"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2726\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n John Henry Edmonds\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n John Henry Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distribution of a controlled\\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The district\\ncourt1 sentenced Edmonds to concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment on each\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\fcount. Edmonds appeals, arguing the district court erred when it departed and varied\\nupward from the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (βGuidelinesβ or\\nβUSSGβ) range. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distributing a controlled substance. Each\\noffense involved a controlled buy with the same confidential informant. The buys\\noccurred in July and August 2017. The controlled substance Edmonds sold consisted\\nof heroin with trace amounts of furanyl fentanyl, carfentanil, or both.\\n\\n When calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the district court determined\\nthe offenses involved a total amount of 5.929 grams of a fentanyl analogue, which\\ncorresponded under the Guidelines to a base offense level of 18. Edmonds received\\ncredit for accepting responsibility and timely notification of his intent to change his\\nplea, which resulted in a total offense level of 15. With 40 criminal history points,\\nEdmonds was in Criminal History Category VI, which yielded a sentencing range of\\n41 to 51 months. The government moved for an upward variance based on the\\npotency and dangerousness of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl as well as an upward\\ndeparture under USSG Β§ 4A1.3 based on Edmondsβ understated criminal history.\\n\\n The district court granted both motions. It found a 15-month upward departure\\nfrom the high end of the applicable Guidelines range was warranted due to Edmondsβ\\ncriminal history and an 18-month upward variance was warranted because of the\\npotency and societal impact of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl. The court reduced\\nthe sentence it would have otherwise imposed by three months for the βhard timeβ\\nEdmonds had served while these charges were pending and gave Edmonds credit for\\none month of time served in state custody. The court imposed an 80-month term of\\nimprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Edmonds timely appeals the\\nsentences imposed.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fII. Discussion\\n\\n Edmonds argues the district court improperly and unexpectedly doubled his\\nsentence when it granted motions for an upward variance and an upward departure.\\nAlthough Edmonds argued for a within-Guidelines sentence, he did not object after\\nthe court announced its findings regarding either the upward departure or the\\nvariance. Accordingly, we review for plain error.2 United States v. Mees, 640 F.3d\\n849, 854 (8th Cir. 2011). βTo establish plain error, [Edmonds] must show that there\\nwas error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights.β\\nId. An error affects substantial rights if there is βa βreasonable probability,β based on\\nthe appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more\\nfavorable sentence.β United States v. Linderman, 587 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2009)\\n(quoting United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n We find no error in the district courtβs sentencing decisions. When deciding\\nto depart upward due to Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, the court did not\\nconsider merely the number of prior convictions or the points calculated according\\nto the Guidelines. Instead, the court analyzed the seriousness of the crimes. In\\nparticular, the court noted the assault on an ex-girlfriend in 2011 that resulted in a no-\\ncontact order, which Edmonds violated 255 times within four months. The court also\\nnoted Edmondsβ inability to remain law-abiding while on supervised release.\\n\\n Our review of Edmondsβ criminal history convinces us that the district court\\ndid not err when it increased Edmondsβ sentence based on his lengthy and serious\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The result would be the same if we reviewed the Guidelines enhancements\\nunder the abuse-of-discretion standard. The district court considered the appropriate\\nfactors, committed no clear error of judgment in weighing the factors, and provided\\nan adequate explanation for its sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d\\n455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the factors in an abuse-of-discretion analysis).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fcriminal history. Edmonds was 35 years old. His adult criminal history included\\nmultiple convictions for assault, fleeing police officers, controlled substance offenses,\\ndriving under the influence as well as one burglary conviction. Edmonds also\\nroutinely violated the terms of probation or supervised release. We are satisfied the\\ndistrict court considered the appropriate factors and gave an adequate explanation for\\nits decision to impose a 15-month upward departure from the advisory Guidelines\\nrange.\\n\\n Turning to the upward variance, the court focused on the seriousness of the\\noffenses, a factor set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a). The heroin Edmonds sold to a\\nconfidential informant was laced with carfentanil, furanyl fentanyl, or both. The\\nPresentence Investigation Report (βPSIRβ) noted that between January and April,\\n2017 carfentanil had been attributed to 11 overdose deaths in the Minneapolis,\\nMinnesota, metropolitan area. While Edmonds contested whether he was responsible\\nfor any deaths, he did not object to this portion of the PSIR. Likewise, Edmonds did\\nnot object to the portion of the PSIR that estimated fentanyl is 50 to 100 times more\\npotent than morphine. By extrapolation, carfentanil is estimated to be 100 to 200\\ntimes more potent than fentanyl. The undisputed evidence established that Edmonds\\nsold heroin on multiple occasions that contained fentanyl analogs unsafe for human\\nconsumption.\\n\\n βThe district court has wide latitude to weigh the Β§ 3553(a) factors in each case\\nand [to] assign some factors greater weight than others.β United States v. Bridges,\\n569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009). Absent the consideration of whether to give\\nEdmonds credit for time spent in state custody and while being held in a state jail on\\nthese charges, the court explained that βanything less than 84 months will promote\\nmassive disrespectβ and βnot be a fair sentence.β Giving βdue deference to the\\ndistrict courtβs decision that the Β§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the\\nvariance,β Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), we conclude the court did\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot plainly error in imposing an 18-month upward variance from the advisory\\nGuidelines range.\\n\\n Finally, as to Edmonds general challenge to the length of his sentence, we\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively\\nunreasonable sentence. The concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment were\\nwithin the district courtβs discretion to impose and reasonable on this record that\\ncontained undisputed evidence of Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, his inability\\nto remain law-abiding, and the seriousness and great risk of death caused by the sale\\nof heroin laced with fentanyl or carfentanil.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387371/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KOBES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610118/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. John Henry EDMONDS, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2726\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n John Henry Edmonds\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\n Filed: April 15, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n John Henry Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distribution of a controlled\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The district\ncourt1 sentenced Edmonds to concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment on each\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota.\n\fcount. Edmonds appeals, arguing the district court erred when it departed and varied\nupward from the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (βGuidelinesβ or\nβUSSGβ) range. We affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distributing a controlled substance. Each\noffense involved a controlled buy with the same confidential informant. The buys\noccurred in July and August 2017. The controlled substance Edmonds sold consisted\nof heroin with trace amounts of furanyl fentanyl, carfentanil, or both.\n\n When calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the district court determined\nthe offenses involved a total amount of 5.929 grams of a fentanyl analogue, which\ncorresponded under the Guidelines to a base offense level of 18. Edmonds received\ncredit for accepting responsibility and timely notification of his intent to change his\nplea, which resulted in a total offense level of 15. With 40 criminal history points,\nEdmonds was in Criminal History Category VI, which yielded a sentencing range of\n41 to 51 months. The government moved for an upward variance based on the\npotency and dangerousness of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl as well as an upward\ndeparture under USSG Β§ 4A1.3 based on Edmondsβ understated criminal history.\n\n The district court granted both motions. It found a 15-month upward departure\nfrom the high end of the applicable Guidelines range was warranted due to Edmondsβ\ncriminal history and an 18-month upward variance was warranted because of the\npotency and societal impact of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl. The court reduced\nthe sentence it would have otherwise imposed by three months for the βhard timeβ\nEdmonds had served while these charges were pending and gave Edmonds credit for\none month of time served in state custody. The court imposed an 80-month term of\nimprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Edmonds timely appeals the\nsentences imposed.\n\n -2-\n\fII. Discussion\n\n Edmonds argues the district court improperly and unexpectedly doubled his\nsentence when it granted motions for an upward variance and an upward departure.\nAlthough Edmonds argued for a within-Guidelines sentence, he did not object after\nthe court announced its findings regarding either the upward departure or the\nvariance. Accordingly, we review for plain error.2 United States v. Mees, 640 F.3d\n849, 854 (8th Cir. 2011). βTo establish plain error, [Edmonds] must show that there\nwas error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights.β\nId. An error affects substantial rights if there is βa βreasonable probability,β based on\nthe appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more\nfavorable sentence.β United States v. Linderman, 587 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2009)\n(quoting United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 2005)).\n\n We find no error in the district courtβs sentencing decisions. When deciding\nto depart upward due to Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, the court did not\nconsider merely the number of prior convictions or the points calculated according\nto the Guidelines. Instead, the court analyzed the seriousness of the crimes. In\nparticular, the court noted the assault on an ex-girlfriend in 2011 that resulted in a no-\ncontact order, which Edmonds violated 255 times within four months. The court also\nnoted Edmondsβ inability to remain law-abiding while on supervised release.\n\n Our review of Edmondsβ criminal history convinces us that the district court\ndid not err when it increased Edmondsβ sentence based on his lengthy and serious\n\n\n 2\n The result would be the same if we reviewed the Guidelines enhancements\nunder the abuse-of-discretion standard. The district court considered the appropriate\nfactors, committed no clear error of judgment in weighing the factors, and provided\nan adequate explanation for its sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d\n455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the factors in an abuse-of-discretion analysis).\n\n -3-\n\fcriminal history. Edmonds was 35 years old. His adult criminal history included\nmultiple convictions for assault, fleeing police officers, controlled substance offenses,\ndriving under the influence as well as one burglary conviction. Edmonds also\nroutinely violated the terms of probation or supervised release. We are satisfied the\ndistrict court considered the appropriate factors and gave an adequate explanation for\nits decision to impose a 15-month upward departure from the advisory Guidelines\nrange.\n\n Turning to the upward variance, the court focused on the seriousness of the\noffenses, a factor set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a). The heroin Edmonds sold to a\nconfidential informant was laced with carfentanil, furanyl fentanyl, or both. The\nPresentence Investigation Report (βPSIRβ) noted that between January and April,\n2017 carfentanil had been attributed to 11 overdose deaths in the Minneapolis,\nMinnesota, metropolitan area. While Edmonds contested whether he was responsible\nfor any deaths, he did not object to this portion of the PSIR. Likewise, Edmonds did\nnot object to the portion of the PSIR that estimated fentanyl is 50 to 100 times more\npotent than morphine. By extrapolation, carfentanil is estimated to be 100 to 200\ntimes more potent than fentanyl. The undisputed evidence established that Edmonds\nsold heroin on multiple occasions that contained fentanyl analogs unsafe for human\nconsumption.\n\n βThe district court has wide latitude to weigh the Β§ 3553(a) factors in each case\nand [to] assign some factors greater weight than others.β United States v. Bridges,\n569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009). Absent the consideration of whether to give\nEdmonds credit for time spent in state custody and while being held in a state jail on\nthese charges, the court explained that βanything less than 84 months will promote\nmassive disrespectβ and βnot be a fair sentence.β Giving βdue deference to the\ndistrict courtβs decision that the Β§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the\nvariance,β Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), we conclude the court did\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fnot plainly error in imposing an 18-month upward variance from the advisory\nGuidelines range.\n\n Finally, as to Edmonds general challenge to the length of his sentence, we\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively\nunreasonable sentence. The concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment were\nwithin the district courtβs discretion to impose and reasonable on this record that\ncontained undisputed evidence of Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, his inability\nto remain law-abiding, and the seriousness and great risk of death caused by the sale\nof heroin laced with fentanyl or carfentanil.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. John Henry EDMONDS, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2726\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n John Henry Edmonds\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n John Henry Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distribution of a controlled\\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The district\\ncourt1 sentenced Edmonds to concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment on each\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\fcount. Edmonds appeals, arguing the district court erred when it departed and varied\\nupward from the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (βGuidelinesβ or\\nβUSSGβ) range. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n Edmonds pled guilty to five counts of distributing a controlled substance. Each\\noffense involved a controlled buy with the same confidential informant. The buys\\noccurred in July and August 2017. The controlled substance Edmonds sold consisted\\nof heroin with trace amounts of furanyl fentanyl, carfentanil, or both.\\n\\n When calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the district court determined\\nthe offenses involved a total amount of 5.929 grams of a fentanyl analogue, which\\ncorresponded under the Guidelines to a base offense level of 18. Edmonds received\\ncredit for accepting responsibility and timely notification of his intent to change his\\nplea, which resulted in a total offense level of 15. With 40 criminal history points,\\nEdmonds was in Criminal History Category VI, which yielded a sentencing range of\\n41 to 51 months. The government moved for an upward variance based on the\\npotency and dangerousness of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl as well as an upward\\ndeparture under USSG Β§ 4A1.3 based on Edmondsβ understated criminal history.\\n\\n The district court granted both motions. It found a 15-month upward departure\\nfrom the high end of the applicable Guidelines range was warranted due to Edmondsβ\\ncriminal history and an 18-month upward variance was warranted because of the\\npotency and societal impact of carfentanil and furanyl fentanyl. The court reduced\\nthe sentence it would have otherwise imposed by three months for the βhard timeβ\\nEdmonds had served while these charges were pending and gave Edmonds credit for\\none month of time served in state custody. The court imposed an 80-month term of\\nimprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Edmonds timely appeals the\\nsentences imposed.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fII. Discussion\\n\\n Edmonds argues the district court improperly and unexpectedly doubled his\\nsentence when it granted motions for an upward variance and an upward departure.\\nAlthough Edmonds argued for a within-Guidelines sentence, he did not object after\\nthe court announced its findings regarding either the upward departure or the\\nvariance. Accordingly, we review for plain error.2 United States v. Mees, 640 F.3d\\n849, 854 (8th Cir. 2011). βTo establish plain error, [Edmonds] must show that there\\nwas error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights.β\\nId. An error affects substantial rights if there is βa βreasonable probability,β based on\\nthe appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more\\nfavorable sentence.β United States v. Linderman, 587 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2009)\\n(quoting United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n We find no error in the district courtβs sentencing decisions. When deciding\\nto depart upward due to Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, the court did not\\nconsider merely the number of prior convictions or the points calculated according\\nto the Guidelines. Instead, the court analyzed the seriousness of the crimes. In\\nparticular, the court noted the assault on an ex-girlfriend in 2011 that resulted in a no-\\ncontact order, which Edmonds violated 255 times within four months. The court also\\nnoted Edmondsβ inability to remain law-abiding while on supervised release.\\n\\n Our review of Edmondsβ criminal history convinces us that the district court\\ndid not err when it increased Edmondsβ sentence based on his lengthy and serious\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The result would be the same if we reviewed the Guidelines enhancements\\nunder the abuse-of-discretion standard. The district court considered the appropriate\\nfactors, committed no clear error of judgment in weighing the factors, and provided\\nan adequate explanation for its sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d\\n455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the factors in an abuse-of-discretion analysis).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fcriminal history. Edmonds was 35 years old. His adult criminal history included\\nmultiple convictions for assault, fleeing police officers, controlled substance offenses,\\ndriving under the influence as well as one burglary conviction. Edmonds also\\nroutinely violated the terms of probation or supervised release. We are satisfied the\\ndistrict court considered the appropriate factors and gave an adequate explanation for\\nits decision to impose a 15-month upward departure from the advisory Guidelines\\nrange.\\n\\n Turning to the upward variance, the court focused on the seriousness of the\\noffenses, a factor set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3553(a). The heroin Edmonds sold to a\\nconfidential informant was laced with carfentanil, furanyl fentanyl, or both. The\\nPresentence Investigation Report (βPSIRβ) noted that between January and April,\\n2017 carfentanil had been attributed to 11 overdose deaths in the Minneapolis,\\nMinnesota, metropolitan area. While Edmonds contested whether he was responsible\\nfor any deaths, he did not object to this portion of the PSIR. Likewise, Edmonds did\\nnot object to the portion of the PSIR that estimated fentanyl is 50 to 100 times more\\npotent than morphine. By extrapolation, carfentanil is estimated to be 100 to 200\\ntimes more potent than fentanyl. The undisputed evidence established that Edmonds\\nsold heroin on multiple occasions that contained fentanyl analogs unsafe for human\\nconsumption.\\n\\n βThe district court has wide latitude to weigh the Β§ 3553(a) factors in each case\\nand [to] assign some factors greater weight than others.β United States v. Bridges,\\n569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009). Absent the consideration of whether to give\\nEdmonds credit for time spent in state custody and while being held in a state jail on\\nthese charges, the court explained that βanything less than 84 months will promote\\nmassive disrespectβ and βnot be a fair sentence.β Giving βdue deference to the\\ndistrict courtβs decision that the Β§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the\\nvariance,β Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), we conclude the court did\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot plainly error in imposing an 18-month upward variance from the advisory\\nGuidelines range.\\n\\n Finally, as to Edmonds general challenge to the length of his sentence, we\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively\\nunreasonable sentence. The concurrent terms of 80 monthsβ imprisonment were\\nwithin the district courtβs discretion to impose and reasonable on this record that\\ncontained undisputed evidence of Edmondsβ extensive criminal history, his inability\\nto remain law-abiding, and the seriousness and great risk of death caused by the sale\\nof heroin laced with fentanyl or carfentanil.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1788,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610119,"string":"4,610,119"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elba TORRES, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Elba Torres"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1245"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1245\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Elba Torres\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Elba Torres was convicted of charges related to the unlawful acquisition and\\nsale of identity documents. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(3), 1028A(a)(1). One of those\\nitems was a United States passport card, a wallet-sized document that permits\\nAmerican nationals to travel by land or sea between the United States and a limited\\nnumber of foreign countries. See 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). She argues that possession of\\n\\fa passport card did not justify enhancing her sentence for βfraudulently obtain[ing]\\nor us[ing] . . . a United States passport.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). Her theory is\\nthat the phrase βa United States passportβ refers only to a passport book. The district\\ncourt1 disagreed, and so do we.\\n\\n This case poses a seemingly straightforward question: is a passport card βa\\nUnited States passportβ under section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A)? To answer this question, we\\napply βbasic rulesβ of βstatutoryβ interpretation, including the ordinary-meaning\\nrule, which requires us to give undefined words and phrases their plain and ordinary\\nmeaning. United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n What makes this case unusual, however, is that the ordinary meaning of the\\nphrase βUnited States passportβ is intertwined with its technical legal meaning,\\nbecause a passport is itself a legal document. To quote one representative definition,\\na passport is an βofficial document issued by a governmentβ to prospective travelers.\\nThe American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1289 (5th ed. 2011);\\nsee also Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 1652 (2002) (explaining that\\na passport is βa formal document issued by a competent officer . . . of a countryβ).\\nSo a United States passport, then, must refer to any official document that the United\\nStates government has designated as a passport and issues to travelers.\\n\\n This includes passport cards. One federal regulation, for example, identifies\\npassport cards as one of five β[t]ypes of passportsβ and explains that they are βissued\\n. . . on the same basisβ as βregular passports.β 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). A related\\nregulation broadly defines a passport as βa travel document regardless of format\\nissued under the authority of the Secretary of State attesting to the identity and\\nnationality of the bearer.β Id. Β§ 51.1 (emphasis added). A passport card neatly fits\\nthis definition because it is inscribed with, among other things, a photograph of the\\nbearer, a statement of the bearerβs nationality, and the words βpassport cardβ and\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n -2-\\n\\fβUnited States Department of State.β See Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\\n(last visited April 8, 2019). In short, despite its different physical appearance, a\\npassport card is as much a βUnited States passportβ as its blue-covered counterpart.\\n\\n This conclusion should come as little surprise to anyone who has recently\\napplied for either a regular passport book or a passport card. The instructions to the\\nDepartment of Stateβs current application, which can be used to apply for either or\\nboth, explain that a βpassport card is a U.S. passport issued in card format.β U.S.\\nDepβt of State, U.S. Passport Application 3 (June 2016) (emphasis added), available\\nat https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11.pdf (last visited April 8, 2019). The\\ninstructions further state that a passport card, β[l]ike the traditional U.S. passport\\nbook . . . , reflects the bearerβs origin, identity, and nationality, and is subject to\\nexisting passport laws and regulations.β Id. And the Departmentβs publicly\\navailable website offers similar information, explaining that β[t]he passport book\\nand passport card are both U.S. passports.β Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\\n(last visited April 8, 2019).\\n\\n Torresβs arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She contends that the\\nGuidelines must exclude passport cards because they did not exist when the\\nSentencing Commission first implemented section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). The problem\\nwith this argument, however, is that nothing about the use of the phrase βa United\\nStates passportβ suggests a limited class of then-existing passports. In fact, adoption\\nof such a broad phrase suggests that it includes any form of passport that the\\nDepartment of State decides to issue on behalf of the United States.\\n\\n Torres also urges us to invoke the rule of lenity, but this canon applies only\\nwhen the relevant language is ambiguous and ordinary interpretive tools βreveal[]\\nno satisfactory construction.β Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016).\\nAs the Fifth Circuit recently explained when confronted with a near-identical\\nquestion, the phrase βUnited States passportβ βis not ambiguous and clearly includes\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fpassport cards.β United States v. Casillas-Casillas, 845 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir.\\n2017) (addressing the meaning of the same phrase as it appears in\\nsection 2L2.2(b)(3)(A) of the Guidelines). Our analysis leads us to the same\\nconclusion.\\n\\n We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387372/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610119/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elba TORRES, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1245\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Elba Torres\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\n Filed: April 15, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n Elba Torres was convicted of charges related to the unlawful acquisition and\nsale of identity documents. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(3), 1028A(a)(1). One of those\nitems was a United States passport card, a wallet-sized document that permits\nAmerican nationals to travel by land or sea between the United States and a limited\nnumber of foreign countries. See 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). She argues that possession of\n\fa passport card did not justify enhancing her sentence for βfraudulently obtain[ing]\nor us[ing] . . . a United States passport.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). Her theory is\nthat the phrase βa United States passportβ refers only to a passport book. The district\ncourt1 disagreed, and so do we.\n\n This case poses a seemingly straightforward question: is a passport card βa\nUnited States passportβ under section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A)? To answer this question, we\napply βbasic rulesβ of βstatutoryβ interpretation, including the ordinary-meaning\nrule, which requires us to give undefined words and phrases their plain and ordinary\nmeaning. United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 2011).\n\n What makes this case unusual, however, is that the ordinary meaning of the\nphrase βUnited States passportβ is intertwined with its technical legal meaning,\nbecause a passport is itself a legal document. To quote one representative definition,\na passport is an βofficial document issued by a governmentβ to prospective travelers.\nThe American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1289 (5th ed. 2011);\nsee also Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 1652 (2002) (explaining that\na passport is βa formal document issued by a competent officer . . . of a countryβ).\nSo a United States passport, then, must refer to any official document that the United\nStates government has designated as a passport and issues to travelers.\n\n This includes passport cards. One federal regulation, for example, identifies\npassport cards as one of five β[t]ypes of passportsβ and explains that they are βissued\n. . . on the same basisβ as βregular passports.β 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). A related\nregulation broadly defines a passport as βa travel document regardless of format\nissued under the authority of the Secretary of State attesting to the identity and\nnationality of the bearer.β Id. Β§ 51.1 (emphasis added). A passport card neatly fits\nthis definition because it is inscribed with, among other things, a photograph of the\nbearer, a statement of the bearerβs nationality, and the words βpassport cardβ and\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n -2-\n\fβUnited States Department of State.β See Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\n(last visited April 8, 2019). In short, despite its different physical appearance, a\npassport card is as much a βUnited States passportβ as its blue-covered counterpart.\n\n This conclusion should come as little surprise to anyone who has recently\napplied for either a regular passport book or a passport card. The instructions to the\nDepartment of Stateβs current application, which can be used to apply for either or\nboth, explain that a βpassport card is a U.S. passport issued in card format.β U.S.\nDepβt of State, U.S. Passport Application 3 (June 2016) (emphasis added), available\nat https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11.pdf (last visited April 8, 2019). The\ninstructions further state that a passport card, β[l]ike the traditional U.S. passport\nbook . . . , reflects the bearerβs origin, identity, and nationality, and is subject to\nexisting passport laws and regulations.β Id. And the Departmentβs publicly\navailable website offers similar information, explaining that β[t]he passport book\nand passport card are both U.S. passports.β Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\n(last visited April 8, 2019).\n\n Torresβs arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She contends that the\nGuidelines must exclude passport cards because they did not exist when the\nSentencing Commission first implemented section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). The problem\nwith this argument, however, is that nothing about the use of the phrase βa United\nStates passportβ suggests a limited class of then-existing passports. In fact, adoption\nof such a broad phrase suggests that it includes any form of passport that the\nDepartment of State decides to issue on behalf of the United States.\n\n Torres also urges us to invoke the rule of lenity, but this canon applies only\nwhen the relevant language is ambiguous and ordinary interpretive tools βreveal[]\nno satisfactory construction.β Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016).\nAs the Fifth Circuit recently explained when confronted with a near-identical\nquestion, the phrase βUnited States passportβ βis not ambiguous and clearly includes\n\n -3-\n\fpassport cards.β United States v. Casillas-Casillas, 845 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir.\n2017) (addressing the meaning of the same phrase as it appears in\nsection 2L2.2(b)(3)(A) of the Guidelines). Our analysis leads us to the same\nconclusion.\n\n We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elba TORRES, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1245\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Elba Torres\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 15, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Elba Torres was convicted of charges related to the unlawful acquisition and\\nsale of identity documents. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(3), 1028A(a)(1). One of those\\nitems was a United States passport card, a wallet-sized document that permits\\nAmerican nationals to travel by land or sea between the United States and a limited\\nnumber of foreign countries. See 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). She argues that possession of\\n\\fa passport card did not justify enhancing her sentence for βfraudulently obtain[ing]\\nor us[ing] . . . a United States passport.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). Her theory is\\nthat the phrase βa United States passportβ refers only to a passport book. The district\\ncourt1 disagreed, and so do we.\\n\\n This case poses a seemingly straightforward question: is a passport card βa\\nUnited States passportβ under section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A)? To answer this question, we\\napply βbasic rulesβ of βstatutoryβ interpretation, including the ordinary-meaning\\nrule, which requires us to give undefined words and phrases their plain and ordinary\\nmeaning. United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n What makes this case unusual, however, is that the ordinary meaning of the\\nphrase βUnited States passportβ is intertwined with its technical legal meaning,\\nbecause a passport is itself a legal document. To quote one representative definition,\\na passport is an βofficial document issued by a governmentβ to prospective travelers.\\nThe American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1289 (5th ed. 2011);\\nsee also Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 1652 (2002) (explaining that\\na passport is βa formal document issued by a competent officer . . . of a countryβ).\\nSo a United States passport, then, must refer to any official document that the United\\nStates government has designated as a passport and issues to travelers.\\n\\n This includes passport cards. One federal regulation, for example, identifies\\npassport cards as one of five β[t]ypes of passportsβ and explains that they are βissued\\n. . . on the same basisβ as βregular passports.β 22 C.F.R. Β§ 51.3(e). A related\\nregulation broadly defines a passport as βa travel document regardless of format\\nissued under the authority of the Secretary of State attesting to the identity and\\nnationality of the bearer.β Id. Β§ 51.1 (emphasis added). A passport card neatly fits\\nthis definition because it is inscribed with, among other things, a photograph of the\\nbearer, a statement of the bearerβs nationality, and the words βpassport cardβ and\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n -2-\\n\\fβUnited States Department of State.β See Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\\n(last visited April 8, 2019). In short, despite its different physical appearance, a\\npassport card is as much a βUnited States passportβ as its blue-covered counterpart.\\n\\n This conclusion should come as little surprise to anyone who has recently\\napplied for either a regular passport book or a passport card. The instructions to the\\nDepartment of Stateβs current application, which can be used to apply for either or\\nboth, explain that a βpassport card is a U.S. passport issued in card format.β U.S.\\nDepβt of State, U.S. Passport Application 3 (June 2016) (emphasis added), available\\nat https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11.pdf (last visited April 8, 2019). The\\ninstructions further state that a passport card, β[l]ike the traditional U.S. passport\\nbook . . . , reflects the bearerβs origin, identity, and nationality, and is subject to\\nexisting passport laws and regulations.β Id. And the Departmentβs publicly\\navailable website offers similar information, explaining that β[t]he passport book\\nand passport card are both U.S. passports.β Passport Card, Travel.State.Gov,\\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/card.html\\n(last visited April 8, 2019).\\n\\n Torresβs arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She contends that the\\nGuidelines must exclude passport cards because they did not exist when the\\nSentencing Commission first implemented section 2L2.1(b)(5)(A). The problem\\nwith this argument, however, is that nothing about the use of the phrase βa United\\nStates passportβ suggests a limited class of then-existing passports. In fact, adoption\\nof such a broad phrase suggests that it includes any form of passport that the\\nDepartment of State decides to issue on behalf of the United States.\\n\\n Torres also urges us to invoke the rule of lenity, but this canon applies only\\nwhen the relevant language is ambiguous and ordinary interpretive tools βreveal[]\\nno satisfactory construction.β Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016).\\nAs the Fifth Circuit recently explained when confronted with a near-identical\\nquestion, the phrase βUnited States passportβ βis not ambiguous and clearly includes\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fpassport cards.β United States v. Casillas-Casillas, 845 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir.\\n2017) (addressing the meaning of the same phrase as it appears in\\nsection 2L2.2(b)(3)(A) of the Guidelines). Our analysis leads us to the same\\nconclusion.\\n\\n We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1789,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443954,"string":"8,443,954"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Michael D. LOOS v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, - American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) Michael D. Loos v. BNSF Railway Company, - United States of America, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Loos v. BNSF Ry. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No: 15-3355; No: 16-1123"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Affirming, Arnold, Award, Bnsf, Certiorari, Cir, Claim, Company, Consideration, Consistent, From, Grant, Gruender, Its, Loos, Lost, Now, Original, Our, Portion, Remanded, Request, Stated, Summary, Supreme, Wollman, Writ\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415386/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"AWARD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443954/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Michael D. LOOS v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, - American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) Michael D. Loos v. BNSF Railway Company, - United States of America, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Michael D. LOOS v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, - American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) Michael D. Loos v. BNSF Railway Company, - United States of America, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1790,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610463,"string":"4,610,463"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Zachary Scott REED, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Zachary Reed"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1852"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Benton, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1852\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Zachary Scott Reed\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 13, 2019\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Zachary Scott Reed conditionally pled guilty to possessing equipment having\\nreasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance,\\nin violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(a)(6) and (d)(2). He reserved the right to appeal the\\n\\fdistrict courtβs1 denial of his motion to suppress. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 1291, this court affirms.\\n I.\\n\\n Around 6:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Patrick Boatman went to Reedβs residence\\nwith an arrest warrant for Reed for unlawful use of a weapon. Reedβs house has two\\nentrances. Boatman testified he was βuncertainβ which was the primary entrance.\\nBetween the driveway and house, Boatman saw several empty bottles of Heet fuel\\nadditive, a Coleman fuel can, and plastic tubing. Boatman had received information\\nfrom βconcerned citizensβ that Reed was involved in producing methamphetamine.\\nHe recognized the items on Reedβs property as precursors to manufacturing meth.\\nBoatman knocked on the front door. No one answered. He left.\\n\\n After midnight, he returned to try to execute the arrest warrant. This time, he\\nwent up a set of stairs leading to a deck and back door, instead of trying the front\\ndoor. There were no barriers or fences blocking the path to the deck and back door.\\nOnce on the deck, he saw a glass beaker with a small amount of liquid. Based on his\\ntraining, he believed the beaker suggested meth manufacturing. He texted a\\nphotograph of it to Narcotics Task Force Officer Scott G. Parish. No one answered\\nthe back door. Boatman left the residence.\\n\\n The next morning, the Sheriff directed Deputy Vince Vanderfeltz to execute\\nthe arrest warrant. He told Vanderfeltz, βDeputy Boatman had gone out [to Reedβs\\nresidence] earlier that same morning, and the night before, to execute that warrant,\\nand that he had seen some items [and] that he wanted [Vanderfeltz] to return to\\nReedβs residence to try to execute the warrant and also to secure the premises.β He\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Steven R. Bough, District Judge for the Western District of\\nMissouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Matt J.\\nWhitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\falso told Vanderfeltz to βlook for specific items of interestβ and βto see if there were\\nstill some items out there.β Like Boatman, Vanderfeltz had received information that\\nReed was manufacturing meth.\\n\\n Arriving at Reedβs residence, Vanderfeltz saw a pickup truck in the driveway\\nnear the back door. Walking to the front door, he noticed the empty Heet bottles, the\\nfuel can, and plastic tubing. No one answered the front door. He walked around to\\nthe back deck and knocked on the back door. No one responded. Vanderfeltz saw\\nthe glass beaker on the back deck. Believing the items he saw were consistent with\\nmeth production, he contacted Parish.\\n\\n When Parish arrived, he knocked on the front and back doors. He saw the\\nsame items Boatman and Vanderfeltz had seen, including the glass beaker. Believing\\nthe beaker contained meth, he swabbed it with a field test. It tested positive for meth.\\nParish left to apply for a search warrant. Reed then walked out of the house and was\\narrested.\\n\\n Parish had been investigating Reed for about a month. Members of the\\nSheriffβs Officeβincluding Deputies Boatman and Vanderfeltzβtold him Reed was\\nmanufacturing meth. He received a similar tip from an anonymous citizen. Applying\\nfor the warrant, Parish swore:\\n\\n This investigation surrounds Zachary S. Reed . . . . Reed has been under\\n investigation by the Lake Area Narcotics Enforcement Group for several\\n months for manufacturing methamphetamine. During that time, I have\\n received information pertaining to Reed has been [sic] manufacturing\\n methamphetamine at his residence . . . from several members of the\\n Osage County Sheriffβs Office and a concerned citizen of Osage County,\\n who wishes to remain anonymous.\\n\\n I was contacted by members of the Osage County Sheriffβs Office\\n advising me that during the course of their duties attempting to serve an\\n outstanding warrant on Reed at his residence, items commonly used in\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f the production of methamphetamine were discarded near and around the\\n residence in plain view. These items included; numerous bottles of\\n HEET, camp fuel, and a chemistry glassware beaker, which field tested\\n positive for the presence of methamphetamine.\\n\\n The state judge issued the search warrant. Police recovered numerous items\\ncommonly used to manufacture meth. Reed pled guilty to possessing equipment\\nhaving reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled\\nsubstance. However, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to\\nsuppress.\\n\\n Reed moved to suppress the evidence found at his residence and requested a\\nFranks hearing. The magistrate judge denied a Franks hearing and recommended\\ndenying the suppression motion, reasoning that Boatman and Vanderfeltz did not\\nviolate the Fourth Amendment and, even if they did, the good-faith exception applied.\\nUnited States v. Reed, 2017 WL 4401647 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2017). Adopting the\\nreport and recommendation, the district court denied the motions to suppress. United\\nStates v. Reed, 2017 WL 4399278 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2017). Reed appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Reed argues the warrant application contained information obtained in\\nviolation of the Fourth Amendment and omitted relevant information in reckless\\ndisregard of the truth. He claims that without this information, the warrant lacks\\nprobable cause. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews\\nthe district courtβs factual findings for clear error and application of law de novo.\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez, 834 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Reed claims that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against\\nunreasonable searches by going onto his back deck. He contends that because the\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fglass beaker was obtained illegally, it should be excluded from the warrant\\napplication. βWhen an otherwise valid search warrant is based upon evidence\\nobtained in a prior warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment, it is the\\nexclusionary rule that prohibits use of this derivative evidence to establish the\\nprobable cause needed to obtain a valid warrant.β United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d\\n901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984); and\\nSegura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813β15 (1984).\\n\\n The officers did not have a search warrant when they saw the glass beaker. The\\ndistrict court applied the plain-view exception, which βallows law enforcement\\nofficers to seize evidence without a warrant when the initial intrusion is lawful, the\\ndiscovery of the evidence is inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the evidence\\nis immediately apparent.β United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir.\\n2001). Reed only challenges the first requirement. He does not challenge the\\nswabbing of the beaker. The issue is whether the officers were lawfully present on\\nthe back deck when they saw the beaker.\\n\\n The prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to the curtilage of a\\nhouse. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). This can include\\nbackyards and decks. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 677β79 (8th\\nCir. 2011). Officers executing an arrest warrant, however, may βenter the residence\\nof the person named in the warrantβ if they βhave a reasonable belief that the suspect\\nresides at and is currently present at the dwelling.β United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d\\n948, 952 (8th Cir. 2005), citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602β03 (1980).\\nβWhether the officers had reasonable belief is based upon the totality of the\\ncircumstances known to the officers prior to entry.β United States v. Ford, 888 F.3d\\n922, 926 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Reed argues Boatmanβs second visit was invalid because he did not try the\\nfront door and had no reasonable belief anyone was inside the house. There were no\\n\\n -5-\\n\\flights or other indicators anyone was home. The record is silent whether Reedβs truck\\nwas in the driveway. Assuming, without deciding, that Boatmanβs second visit\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the glass beaker need not be excluded from the\\nsearch warrant.\\n\\n βEvidence should not be excluded . . . based on a constitutional violation unless\\nthe illegality is at least a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.β United States v.\\nOlivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547\\nU.S. 586, 592 (2006); and Segura, 468 U.S. at 815. Reed βbears the initial burden\\nof establishing the factual nexus between the constitutional violation and the\\nchallenged evidence.β United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1079 (8th Cir.\\n2011).\\n\\n Vanderfeltz went to Reedβs residence to execute an arrest warrant. He testified\\nit was βcustomaryβ for officers to try the front and back door when executing an\\narrest warrant. Thus, regardless of Boatmanβs second visit, Vanderfeltz would have\\ngone to the back deck and seen the beaker. Boatmanβs entry did not lead to\\nVanderfeltzβs discovery of the beaker and was not a but-for cause of obtaining the\\nevidence and using it in the warrant application. See Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d at\\n511 (illegal detention not a but-for cause of finding drugs because dog sniff βwould\\nhave occurred with or without theβ illegal detention).\\n\\n At oral argument, Reedβs counsel stressed that Vanderfeltzβs search was\\nβtaintedβ by Boatmanβs illegal entry. Boatman never told Vanderfeltz what he saw\\non Reedβs property. The Sheriff told Vanderfeltz only that Boatman βhad seen some\\nitems.β He did not tell Vanderfeltz about the beaker, or instruct him to go to the back\\ndeck. Because there is no evidence Vanderfeltz knew about the beaker, his search\\nwas not tainted by Boatmanβs earlier entry. Boatmanβs acts do not require exclusion\\nof the beaker from the warrant application. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 815\\n(βSuppression is not justified unless βthe challenged evidence is in some sense the\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fproduct of illegal governmental activity.ββ (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.\\n463, 471 (1980))).\\n\\n Vanderfeltz was lawfully present on the back deck when he saw the beaker.\\nWhen he arrived to execute the arrest warrant early in the morning, Reedβs truck was\\nin the driveway. By the totality of circumstances, he had a reasonable belief Reed\\nresided there and was inside the home. See United States v. Powell, 379 F.3d 520,\\n524 (8th Cir. 2004) (βIt was not unreasonable for the officers to believe that [the\\nsuspect] would be at home during the early morning hours.β); Raines, 243 F.3d at 421\\n(officers had a reasonable belief occupants were in the backyard because it was a\\nβpleasant summer eveningβ and there were several cars parked in the driveway). See\\nalso United States v. Gonzalez, 441 Fed. Appx. 404, 407 (8th Cir. 2011) (sufficient\\nindication someone was home where two cars were parked in the driveway).\\nVanderfeltzβs presence on Reedβs back deck was lawful. The plain-view exception\\napplies. See Raines, 243 F.3d at 422. The district court did not err in finding the\\nglass beaker could be used in the warrant affidavit.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Reed contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion\\nbecause the warrant affidavit omitted, in reckless disregard of the truth, information\\nabout the unnamed individualsβ hearsay statements and the presence of other auto-\\nrepair items in Reedβs yard. To prevail on a challenge to a warrant affidavit under\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), for omissions of fact, Reed must show:\\nβ(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of\\nwhether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if\\nsupplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable\\ncause.β United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015). Reckless\\ndisregard requires showing that the officer βmust have entertained serious doubts as\\nto the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\finformation.β Id. Recklessness can be inferred from the omission βwhen the material\\nomitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.β Id.\\n\\n Reed has not satisfied his burden under Franks. The affidavit said that officers\\nfrom the Sheriffβs Office and an anonymous citizen passed along information that\\nReed was manufacturing meth. It did not say how they learned this or give details\\nabout the citizenβs identity or reliability. An affiant like Parish, however, can rely on\\nstatements from other officers and informants to establish probable cause, particularly\\nbecause here, that information was corroborated by the items at Reedβs house. See\\nUnited States v. Ortega, 854 F.3d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 2017) (β[A]n affiant officer can\\nrely on information from another officer to establish probable cause in an affidavit.β);\\nUnited States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 562 (8th Cir. 2009) (an informant can be\\nreliable βif the information he or she supplies is at least partially corroborated by\\nother sourcesβ). Nothing in the record indicates Parish entertained serious doubts or\\nhad obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of these statements. See Conant, 799 F.3d\\nat 1200. Similarly, the omission of other auto-repair items was not in reckless\\ndisregard of the truth. That Reed had other items in his yard is not βclearly criticalβ\\nto the finding of probable cause due to the other evidence in the warrant application,\\nlike the beaker. Because Reed has not shown that Parish omitted information in\\nreckless disregard of the truth, the district court properly found no Franks violation.\\n\\n The district court also properly rejected Reedβs argument that Parish falsely\\nstated that the beaker was in plain view. Vanderfeltz and Parish were lawfully on\\nReedβs back deck when they saw the beaker. Even if Boatman lacked a reasonable\\nbelief Reed was inside the house, nothing in the record indicates Parish had any\\ninformation suggesting Boatman illegally entered the back deck.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Reed argues the warrant lacked probable cause. Reviewing a probable cause\\nfinding, this court accords βsubstantial deference to the finding of an issuing judicial\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fofficer.β Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 561. Probable cause exists when, viewing the\\ntotality of the circumstances, βthere is a fair probability that contraband or evidence\\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.β Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230,\\n238 (1983).\\n\\n In the warrant application, Parish stated he had received information from other\\nofficers and an anonymous citizen that Reed was manufacturing meth. His affidavit\\ndoes not provide the basis for these allegations. However, informants may be\\nconsidered reliable when they supply information that is (at least) partly corroborated\\nby other sources. Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 562. The information here was\\ncorroborated by the Heet cans, Coleman fuel can, and beaker on Reedβs property.\\nBecause the information provided was sufficiently corroborative, it was reliable. By\\nthe totality of circumstances, the warrant application had sufficient information to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n\\n Since there is no basis to exclude the evidence that the officers obtained by the\\nsearch warrant, this court need not reach the district courtβs application of the good-\\nfaith exception.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387716/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610463/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Zachary Scott REED, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1852\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Zachary Scott Reed\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: February 13, 2019\n Filed: April 16, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Zachary Scott Reed conditionally pled guilty to possessing equipment having\nreasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance,\nin violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(a)(6) and (d)(2). He reserved the right to appeal the\n\fdistrict courtβs1 denial of his motion to suppress. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 1291, this court affirms.\n I.\n\n Around 6:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Patrick Boatman went to Reedβs residence\nwith an arrest warrant for Reed for unlawful use of a weapon. Reedβs house has two\nentrances. Boatman testified he was βuncertainβ which was the primary entrance.\nBetween the driveway and house, Boatman saw several empty bottles of Heet fuel\nadditive, a Coleman fuel can, and plastic tubing. Boatman had received information\nfrom βconcerned citizensβ that Reed was involved in producing methamphetamine.\nHe recognized the items on Reedβs property as precursors to manufacturing meth.\nBoatman knocked on the front door. No one answered. He left.\n\n After midnight, he returned to try to execute the arrest warrant. This time, he\nwent up a set of stairs leading to a deck and back door, instead of trying the front\ndoor. There were no barriers or fences blocking the path to the deck and back door.\nOnce on the deck, he saw a glass beaker with a small amount of liquid. Based on his\ntraining, he believed the beaker suggested meth manufacturing. He texted a\nphotograph of it to Narcotics Task Force Officer Scott G. Parish. No one answered\nthe back door. Boatman left the residence.\n\n The next morning, the Sheriff directed Deputy Vince Vanderfeltz to execute\nthe arrest warrant. He told Vanderfeltz, βDeputy Boatman had gone out [to Reedβs\nresidence] earlier that same morning, and the night before, to execute that warrant,\nand that he had seen some items [and] that he wanted [Vanderfeltz] to return to\nReedβs residence to try to execute the warrant and also to secure the premises.β He\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Steven R. Bough, District Judge for the Western District of\nMissouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Matt J.\nWhitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\falso told Vanderfeltz to βlook for specific items of interestβ and βto see if there were\nstill some items out there.β Like Boatman, Vanderfeltz had received information that\nReed was manufacturing meth.\n\n Arriving at Reedβs residence, Vanderfeltz saw a pickup truck in the driveway\nnear the back door. Walking to the front door, he noticed the empty Heet bottles, the\nfuel can, and plastic tubing. No one answered the front door. He walked around to\nthe back deck and knocked on the back door. No one responded. Vanderfeltz saw\nthe glass beaker on the back deck. Believing the items he saw were consistent with\nmeth production, he contacted Parish.\n\n When Parish arrived, he knocked on the front and back doors. He saw the\nsame items Boatman and Vanderfeltz had seen, including the glass beaker. Believing\nthe beaker contained meth, he swabbed it with a field test. It tested positive for meth.\nParish left to apply for a search warrant. Reed then walked out of the house and was\narrested.\n\n Parish had been investigating Reed for about a month. Members of the\nSheriffβs Officeβincluding Deputies Boatman and Vanderfeltzβtold him Reed was\nmanufacturing meth. He received a similar tip from an anonymous citizen. Applying\nfor the warrant, Parish swore:\n\n This investigation surrounds Zachary S. Reed . . . . Reed has been under\n investigation by the Lake Area Narcotics Enforcement Group for several\n months for manufacturing methamphetamine. During that time, I have\n received information pertaining to Reed has been [sic] manufacturing\n methamphetamine at his residence . . . from several members of the\n Osage County Sheriffβs Office and a concerned citizen of Osage County,\n who wishes to remain anonymous.\n\n I was contacted by members of the Osage County Sheriffβs Office\n advising me that during the course of their duties attempting to serve an\n outstanding warrant on Reed at his residence, items commonly used in\n\n -3-\n\f the production of methamphetamine were discarded near and around the\n residence in plain view. These items included; numerous bottles of\n HEET, camp fuel, and a chemistry glassware beaker, which field tested\n positive for the presence of methamphetamine.\n\n The state judge issued the search warrant. Police recovered numerous items\ncommonly used to manufacture meth. Reed pled guilty to possessing equipment\nhaving reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled\nsubstance. However, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to\nsuppress.\n\n Reed moved to suppress the evidence found at his residence and requested a\nFranks hearing. The magistrate judge denied a Franks hearing and recommended\ndenying the suppression motion, reasoning that Boatman and Vanderfeltz did not\nviolate the Fourth Amendment and, even if they did, the good-faith exception applied.\nUnited States v. Reed, 2017 WL 4401647 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2017). Adopting the\nreport and recommendation, the district court denied the motions to suppress. United\nStates v. Reed, 2017 WL 4399278 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2017). Reed appeals.\n\n II.\n\n Reed argues the warrant application contained information obtained in\nviolation of the Fourth Amendment and omitted relevant information in reckless\ndisregard of the truth. He claims that without this information, the warrant lacks\nprobable cause. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews\nthe district courtβs factual findings for clear error and application of law de novo.\nUnited States v. Rodriguez, 834 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2016).\n\n A.\n\n Reed claims that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against\nunreasonable searches by going onto his back deck. He contends that because the\n\n -4-\n\fglass beaker was obtained illegally, it should be excluded from the warrant\napplication. βWhen an otherwise valid search warrant is based upon evidence\nobtained in a prior warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment, it is the\nexclusionary rule that prohibits use of this derivative evidence to establish the\nprobable cause needed to obtain a valid warrant.β United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d\n901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984); and\nSegura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813β15 (1984).\n\n The officers did not have a search warrant when they saw the glass beaker. The\ndistrict court applied the plain-view exception, which βallows law enforcement\nofficers to seize evidence without a warrant when the initial intrusion is lawful, the\ndiscovery of the evidence is inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the evidence\nis immediately apparent.β United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir.\n2001). Reed only challenges the first requirement. He does not challenge the\nswabbing of the beaker. The issue is whether the officers were lawfully present on\nthe back deck when they saw the beaker.\n\n The prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to the curtilage of a\nhouse. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). This can include\nbackyards and decks. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 677β79 (8th\nCir. 2011). Officers executing an arrest warrant, however, may βenter the residence\nof the person named in the warrantβ if they βhave a reasonable belief that the suspect\nresides at and is currently present at the dwelling.β United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d\n948, 952 (8th Cir. 2005), citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602β03 (1980).\nβWhether the officers had reasonable belief is based upon the totality of the\ncircumstances known to the officers prior to entry.β United States v. Ford, 888 F.3d\n922, 926 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n Reed argues Boatmanβs second visit was invalid because he did not try the\nfront door and had no reasonable belief anyone was inside the house. There were no\n\n -5-\n\flights or other indicators anyone was home. The record is silent whether Reedβs truck\nwas in the driveway. Assuming, without deciding, that Boatmanβs second visit\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the glass beaker need not be excluded from the\nsearch warrant.\n\n βEvidence should not be excluded . . . based on a constitutional violation unless\nthe illegality is at least a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.β United States v.\nOlivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547\nU.S. 586, 592 (2006); and Segura, 468 U.S. at 815. Reed βbears the initial burden\nof establishing the factual nexus between the constitutional violation and the\nchallenged evidence.β United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1079 (8th Cir.\n2011).\n\n Vanderfeltz went to Reedβs residence to execute an arrest warrant. He testified\nit was βcustomaryβ for officers to try the front and back door when executing an\narrest warrant. Thus, regardless of Boatmanβs second visit, Vanderfeltz would have\ngone to the back deck and seen the beaker. Boatmanβs entry did not lead to\nVanderfeltzβs discovery of the beaker and was not a but-for cause of obtaining the\nevidence and using it in the warrant application. See Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d at\n511 (illegal detention not a but-for cause of finding drugs because dog sniff βwould\nhave occurred with or without theβ illegal detention).\n\n At oral argument, Reedβs counsel stressed that Vanderfeltzβs search was\nβtaintedβ by Boatmanβs illegal entry. Boatman never told Vanderfeltz what he saw\non Reedβs property. The Sheriff told Vanderfeltz only that Boatman βhad seen some\nitems.β He did not tell Vanderfeltz about the beaker, or instruct him to go to the back\ndeck. Because there is no evidence Vanderfeltz knew about the beaker, his search\nwas not tainted by Boatmanβs earlier entry. Boatmanβs acts do not require exclusion\nof the beaker from the warrant application. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 815\n(βSuppression is not justified unless βthe challenged evidence is in some sense the\n\n\n -6-\n\fproduct of illegal governmental activity.ββ (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.\n463, 471 (1980))).\n\n Vanderfeltz was lawfully present on the back deck when he saw the beaker.\nWhen he arrived to execute the arrest warrant early in the morning, Reedβs truck was\nin the driveway. By the totality of circumstances, he had a reasonable belief Reed\nresided there and was inside the home. See United States v. Powell, 379 F.3d 520,\n524 (8th Cir. 2004) (βIt was not unreasonable for the officers to believe that [the\nsuspect] would be at home during the early morning hours.β); Raines, 243 F.3d at 421\n(officers had a reasonable belief occupants were in the backyard because it was a\nβpleasant summer eveningβ and there were several cars parked in the driveway). See\nalso United States v. Gonzalez, 441 Fed. Appx. 404, 407 (8th Cir. 2011) (sufficient\nindication someone was home where two cars were parked in the driveway).\nVanderfeltzβs presence on Reedβs back deck was lawful. The plain-view exception\napplies. See Raines, 243 F.3d at 422. The district court did not err in finding the\nglass beaker could be used in the warrant affidavit.\n\n B.\n\n Reed contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion\nbecause the warrant affidavit omitted, in reckless disregard of the truth, information\nabout the unnamed individualsβ hearsay statements and the presence of other auto-\nrepair items in Reedβs yard. To prevail on a challenge to a warrant affidavit under\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), for omissions of fact, Reed must show:\nβ(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of\nwhether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if\nsupplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable\ncause.β United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015). Reckless\ndisregard requires showing that the officer βmust have entertained serious doubts as\nto the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the\n\n\n -7-\n\finformation.β Id. Recklessness can be inferred from the omission βwhen the material\nomitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.β Id.\n\n Reed has not satisfied his burden under Franks. The affidavit said that officers\nfrom the Sheriffβs Office and an anonymous citizen passed along information that\nReed was manufacturing meth. It did not say how they learned this or give details\nabout the citizenβs identity or reliability. An affiant like Parish, however, can rely on\nstatements from other officers and informants to establish probable cause, particularly\nbecause here, that information was corroborated by the items at Reedβs house. See\nUnited States v. Ortega, 854 F.3d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 2017) (β[A]n affiant officer can\nrely on information from another officer to establish probable cause in an affidavit.β);\nUnited States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 562 (8th Cir. 2009) (an informant can be\nreliable βif the information he or she supplies is at least partially corroborated by\nother sourcesβ). Nothing in the record indicates Parish entertained serious doubts or\nhad obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of these statements. See Conant, 799 F.3d\nat 1200. Similarly, the omission of other auto-repair items was not in reckless\ndisregard of the truth. That Reed had other items in his yard is not βclearly criticalβ\nto the finding of probable cause due to the other evidence in the warrant application,\nlike the beaker. Because Reed has not shown that Parish omitted information in\nreckless disregard of the truth, the district court properly found no Franks violation.\n\n The district court also properly rejected Reedβs argument that Parish falsely\nstated that the beaker was in plain view. Vanderfeltz and Parish were lawfully on\nReedβs back deck when they saw the beaker. Even if Boatman lacked a reasonable\nbelief Reed was inside the house, nothing in the record indicates Parish had any\ninformation suggesting Boatman illegally entered the back deck.\n\n C.\n\n Reed argues the warrant lacked probable cause. Reviewing a probable cause\nfinding, this court accords βsubstantial deference to the finding of an issuing judicial\n\n -8-\n\fofficer.β Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 561. Probable cause exists when, viewing the\ntotality of the circumstances, βthere is a fair probability that contraband or evidence\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.β Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230,\n238 (1983).\n\n In the warrant application, Parish stated he had received information from other\nofficers and an anonymous citizen that Reed was manufacturing meth. His affidavit\ndoes not provide the basis for these allegations. However, informants may be\nconsidered reliable when they supply information that is (at least) partly corroborated\nby other sources. Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 562. The information here was\ncorroborated by the Heet cans, Coleman fuel can, and beaker on Reedβs property.\nBecause the information provided was sufficiently corroborative, it was reliable. By\nthe totality of circumstances, the warrant application had sufficient information to\nestablish probable cause.\n\n Since there is no basis to exclude the evidence that the officers obtained by the\nsearch warrant, this court need not reach the district courtβs application of the good-\nfaith exception.\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Zachary Scott REED, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1852\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Zachary Scott Reed\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 13, 2019\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Zachary Scott Reed conditionally pled guilty to possessing equipment having\\nreasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance,\\nin violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(a)(6) and (d)(2). He reserved the right to appeal the\\n\\fdistrict courtβs1 denial of his motion to suppress. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 1291, this court affirms.\\n I.\\n\\n Around 6:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Patrick Boatman went to Reedβs residence\\nwith an arrest warrant for Reed for unlawful use of a weapon. Reedβs house has two\\nentrances. Boatman testified he was βuncertainβ which was the primary entrance.\\nBetween the driveway and house, Boatman saw several empty bottles of Heet fuel\\nadditive, a Coleman fuel can, and plastic tubing. Boatman had received information\\nfrom βconcerned citizensβ that Reed was involved in producing methamphetamine.\\nHe recognized the items on Reedβs property as precursors to manufacturing meth.\\nBoatman knocked on the front door. No one answered. He left.\\n\\n After midnight, he returned to try to execute the arrest warrant. This time, he\\nwent up a set of stairs leading to a deck and back door, instead of trying the front\\ndoor. There were no barriers or fences blocking the path to the deck and back door.\\nOnce on the deck, he saw a glass beaker with a small amount of liquid. Based on his\\ntraining, he believed the beaker suggested meth manufacturing. He texted a\\nphotograph of it to Narcotics Task Force Officer Scott G. Parish. No one answered\\nthe back door. Boatman left the residence.\\n\\n The next morning, the Sheriff directed Deputy Vince Vanderfeltz to execute\\nthe arrest warrant. He told Vanderfeltz, βDeputy Boatman had gone out [to Reedβs\\nresidence] earlier that same morning, and the night before, to execute that warrant,\\nand that he had seen some items [and] that he wanted [Vanderfeltz] to return to\\nReedβs residence to try to execute the warrant and also to secure the premises.β He\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Steven R. Bough, District Judge for the Western District of\\nMissouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Matt J.\\nWhitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\falso told Vanderfeltz to βlook for specific items of interestβ and βto see if there were\\nstill some items out there.β Like Boatman, Vanderfeltz had received information that\\nReed was manufacturing meth.\\n\\n Arriving at Reedβs residence, Vanderfeltz saw a pickup truck in the driveway\\nnear the back door. Walking to the front door, he noticed the empty Heet bottles, the\\nfuel can, and plastic tubing. No one answered the front door. He walked around to\\nthe back deck and knocked on the back door. No one responded. Vanderfeltz saw\\nthe glass beaker on the back deck. Believing the items he saw were consistent with\\nmeth production, he contacted Parish.\\n\\n When Parish arrived, he knocked on the front and back doors. He saw the\\nsame items Boatman and Vanderfeltz had seen, including the glass beaker. Believing\\nthe beaker contained meth, he swabbed it with a field test. It tested positive for meth.\\nParish left to apply for a search warrant. Reed then walked out of the house and was\\narrested.\\n\\n Parish had been investigating Reed for about a month. Members of the\\nSheriffβs Officeβincluding Deputies Boatman and Vanderfeltzβtold him Reed was\\nmanufacturing meth. He received a similar tip from an anonymous citizen. Applying\\nfor the warrant, Parish swore:\\n\\n This investigation surrounds Zachary S. Reed . . . . Reed has been under\\n investigation by the Lake Area Narcotics Enforcement Group for several\\n months for manufacturing methamphetamine. During that time, I have\\n received information pertaining to Reed has been [sic] manufacturing\\n methamphetamine at his residence . . . from several members of the\\n Osage County Sheriffβs Office and a concerned citizen of Osage County,\\n who wishes to remain anonymous.\\n\\n I was contacted by members of the Osage County Sheriffβs Office\\n advising me that during the course of their duties attempting to serve an\\n outstanding warrant on Reed at his residence, items commonly used in\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f the production of methamphetamine were discarded near and around the\\n residence in plain view. These items included; numerous bottles of\\n HEET, camp fuel, and a chemistry glassware beaker, which field tested\\n positive for the presence of methamphetamine.\\n\\n The state judge issued the search warrant. Police recovered numerous items\\ncommonly used to manufacture meth. Reed pled guilty to possessing equipment\\nhaving reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture a controlled\\nsubstance. However, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to\\nsuppress.\\n\\n Reed moved to suppress the evidence found at his residence and requested a\\nFranks hearing. The magistrate judge denied a Franks hearing and recommended\\ndenying the suppression motion, reasoning that Boatman and Vanderfeltz did not\\nviolate the Fourth Amendment and, even if they did, the good-faith exception applied.\\nUnited States v. Reed, 2017 WL 4401647 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2017). Adopting the\\nreport and recommendation, the district court denied the motions to suppress. United\\nStates v. Reed, 2017 WL 4399278 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2017). Reed appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Reed argues the warrant application contained information obtained in\\nviolation of the Fourth Amendment and omitted relevant information in reckless\\ndisregard of the truth. He claims that without this information, the warrant lacks\\nprobable cause. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews\\nthe district courtβs factual findings for clear error and application of law de novo.\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez, 834 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Reed claims that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against\\nunreasonable searches by going onto his back deck. He contends that because the\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fglass beaker was obtained illegally, it should be excluded from the warrant\\napplication. βWhen an otherwise valid search warrant is based upon evidence\\nobtained in a prior warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment, it is the\\nexclusionary rule that prohibits use of this derivative evidence to establish the\\nprobable cause needed to obtain a valid warrant.β United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d\\n901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984); and\\nSegura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813β15 (1984).\\n\\n The officers did not have a search warrant when they saw the glass beaker. The\\ndistrict court applied the plain-view exception, which βallows law enforcement\\nofficers to seize evidence without a warrant when the initial intrusion is lawful, the\\ndiscovery of the evidence is inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the evidence\\nis immediately apparent.β United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir.\\n2001). Reed only challenges the first requirement. He does not challenge the\\nswabbing of the beaker. The issue is whether the officers were lawfully present on\\nthe back deck when they saw the beaker.\\n\\n The prohibition against unreasonable searches extends to the curtilage of a\\nhouse. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). This can include\\nbackyards and decks. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 677β79 (8th\\nCir. 2011). Officers executing an arrest warrant, however, may βenter the residence\\nof the person named in the warrantβ if they βhave a reasonable belief that the suspect\\nresides at and is currently present at the dwelling.β United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d\\n948, 952 (8th Cir. 2005), citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602β03 (1980).\\nβWhether the officers had reasonable belief is based upon the totality of the\\ncircumstances known to the officers prior to entry.β United States v. Ford, 888 F.3d\\n922, 926 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Reed argues Boatmanβs second visit was invalid because he did not try the\\nfront door and had no reasonable belief anyone was inside the house. There were no\\n\\n -5-\\n\\flights or other indicators anyone was home. The record is silent whether Reedβs truck\\nwas in the driveway. Assuming, without deciding, that Boatmanβs second visit\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the glass beaker need not be excluded from the\\nsearch warrant.\\n\\n βEvidence should not be excluded . . . based on a constitutional violation unless\\nthe illegality is at least a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.β United States v.\\nOlivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547\\nU.S. 586, 592 (2006); and Segura, 468 U.S. at 815. Reed βbears the initial burden\\nof establishing the factual nexus between the constitutional violation and the\\nchallenged evidence.β United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1079 (8th Cir.\\n2011).\\n\\n Vanderfeltz went to Reedβs residence to execute an arrest warrant. He testified\\nit was βcustomaryβ for officers to try the front and back door when executing an\\narrest warrant. Thus, regardless of Boatmanβs second visit, Vanderfeltz would have\\ngone to the back deck and seen the beaker. Boatmanβs entry did not lead to\\nVanderfeltzβs discovery of the beaker and was not a but-for cause of obtaining the\\nevidence and using it in the warrant application. See Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d at\\n511 (illegal detention not a but-for cause of finding drugs because dog sniff βwould\\nhave occurred with or without theβ illegal detention).\\n\\n At oral argument, Reedβs counsel stressed that Vanderfeltzβs search was\\nβtaintedβ by Boatmanβs illegal entry. Boatman never told Vanderfeltz what he saw\\non Reedβs property. The Sheriff told Vanderfeltz only that Boatman βhad seen some\\nitems.β He did not tell Vanderfeltz about the beaker, or instruct him to go to the back\\ndeck. Because there is no evidence Vanderfeltz knew about the beaker, his search\\nwas not tainted by Boatmanβs earlier entry. Boatmanβs acts do not require exclusion\\nof the beaker from the warrant application. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 815\\n(βSuppression is not justified unless βthe challenged evidence is in some sense the\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fproduct of illegal governmental activity.ββ (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.\\n463, 471 (1980))).\\n\\n Vanderfeltz was lawfully present on the back deck when he saw the beaker.\\nWhen he arrived to execute the arrest warrant early in the morning, Reedβs truck was\\nin the driveway. By the totality of circumstances, he had a reasonable belief Reed\\nresided there and was inside the home. See United States v. Powell, 379 F.3d 520,\\n524 (8th Cir. 2004) (βIt was not unreasonable for the officers to believe that [the\\nsuspect] would be at home during the early morning hours.β); Raines, 243 F.3d at 421\\n(officers had a reasonable belief occupants were in the backyard because it was a\\nβpleasant summer eveningβ and there were several cars parked in the driveway). See\\nalso United States v. Gonzalez, 441 Fed. Appx. 404, 407 (8th Cir. 2011) (sufficient\\nindication someone was home where two cars were parked in the driveway).\\nVanderfeltzβs presence on Reedβs back deck was lawful. The plain-view exception\\napplies. See Raines, 243 F.3d at 422. The district court did not err in finding the\\nglass beaker could be used in the warrant affidavit.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Reed contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion\\nbecause the warrant affidavit omitted, in reckless disregard of the truth, information\\nabout the unnamed individualsβ hearsay statements and the presence of other auto-\\nrepair items in Reedβs yard. To prevail on a challenge to a warrant affidavit under\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), for omissions of fact, Reed must show:\\nβ(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of\\nwhether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if\\nsupplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable\\ncause.β United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015). Reckless\\ndisregard requires showing that the officer βmust have entertained serious doubts as\\nto the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\finformation.β Id. Recklessness can be inferred from the omission βwhen the material\\nomitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.β Id.\\n\\n Reed has not satisfied his burden under Franks. The affidavit said that officers\\nfrom the Sheriffβs Office and an anonymous citizen passed along information that\\nReed was manufacturing meth. It did not say how they learned this or give details\\nabout the citizenβs identity or reliability. An affiant like Parish, however, can rely on\\nstatements from other officers and informants to establish probable cause, particularly\\nbecause here, that information was corroborated by the items at Reedβs house. See\\nUnited States v. Ortega, 854 F.3d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 2017) (β[A]n affiant officer can\\nrely on information from another officer to establish probable cause in an affidavit.β);\\nUnited States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 562 (8th Cir. 2009) (an informant can be\\nreliable βif the information he or she supplies is at least partially corroborated by\\nother sourcesβ). Nothing in the record indicates Parish entertained serious doubts or\\nhad obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of these statements. See Conant, 799 F.3d\\nat 1200. Similarly, the omission of other auto-repair items was not in reckless\\ndisregard of the truth. That Reed had other items in his yard is not βclearly criticalβ\\nto the finding of probable cause due to the other evidence in the warrant application,\\nlike the beaker. Because Reed has not shown that Parish omitted information in\\nreckless disregard of the truth, the district court properly found no Franks violation.\\n\\n The district court also properly rejected Reedβs argument that Parish falsely\\nstated that the beaker was in plain view. Vanderfeltz and Parish were lawfully on\\nReedβs back deck when they saw the beaker. Even if Boatman lacked a reasonable\\nbelief Reed was inside the house, nothing in the record indicates Parish had any\\ninformation suggesting Boatman illegally entered the back deck.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Reed argues the warrant lacked probable cause. Reviewing a probable cause\\nfinding, this court accords βsubstantial deference to the finding of an issuing judicial\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fofficer.β Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 561. Probable cause exists when, viewing the\\ntotality of the circumstances, βthere is a fair probability that contraband or evidence\\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.β Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230,\\n238 (1983).\\n\\n In the warrant application, Parish stated he had received information from other\\nofficers and an anonymous citizen that Reed was manufacturing meth. His affidavit\\ndoes not provide the basis for these allegations. However, informants may be\\nconsidered reliable when they supply information that is (at least) partly corroborated\\nby other sources. Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 562. The information here was\\ncorroborated by the Heet cans, Coleman fuel can, and beaker on Reedβs property.\\nBecause the information provided was sufficiently corroborative, it was reliable. By\\nthe totality of circumstances, the warrant application had sufficient information to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n\\n Since there is no basis to exclude the evidence that the officers obtained by the\\nsearch warrant, this court need not reach the district courtβs application of the good-\\nfaith exception.\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1791,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610467,"string":"4,610,467"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Noel J. MICHAUD, Formerly Known as Noel J. Ketola, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Sarah E. DAVIDSON, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Noel Michaud v. Sarah Davidson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3472"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Kelly, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888362/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888363/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3472\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Noel J. Michaud, formerly known as Noel J. Ketola\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sarah E. Davidson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After suing Sarah Davidson for injuries arising out of a car accident, Noel\\nMichaud attempted to serve Davidson by having a local sheriffβs deputy leave a\\ncopy of the summons and complaint with Davidsonβs father, who then handed\\nthem to Davidson just hours later. The magistrate judge, acting by consent of the\\nparties, dismissed Michaudβs lawsuit on the theory that Minnesota does not\\nrecognize βsecondhand service.β See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). We reverse.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Michaudβs lawsuit arose out of an injury she suffered in a 2010 car accident\\nwith Davidson. At the time, Davidson was a student at the University of\\nMinnesota-Duluth, but she has since graduated and returned to Illinois, where her\\nparents live.\\n\\n Just days before the six-year statute of limitations was set to expire, Michaud\\nsued Davidson in Minnesota state court. Michaud delivered the summons and\\ncomplaint to the sheriffβs office in the county where Davidsonβs parents lived and\\nrequested that it serve Davidson with the papers.\\n\\n Davidsonβs father was at home when a deputy sheriff appeared at his door.\\nWhen the deputy inquired whether Davidson βlivedβ there, her father responded\\nthat she would βbe here tonight.β Taking this statement to mean that Davidson\\nlived with her parents, the deputy said that he had a summons and complaint and\\nasked him to give them to her. Before leaving, the deputy handed the papers to\\nDavidsonβs father, who then gave them to his daughter a short time later. What\\nMichaud and the deputy did not know, however, was that Davidson no longer lived\\nat her parentsβ house. Several months before Michaud filed her lawsuit, Davidson\\nmoved into a rented room to be closer to work.\\n\\n Davidson removed the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.\\nAfter doing so, she argued that the case had to be dismissed because she was never\\nserved under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a).\\n\\n The court agreed. It first found that Davidsonβs βusual place of abodeβ was\\nnot her parentsβ house, so the deputy could not serve her by leaving a copy of the\\npapers there. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (stating that an individual may be served\\nβby leaving a copy at the individualβs usual place of abode with some person of\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nsuitable age and discretion then residing thereinβ); see also Jaeger v. Palladium\\nHoldings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 604β05 (Minn. 2016) (describing substitute\\nservice). It also concluded that Minnesota does not recognize βsecondhand\\nservice,β which is personal delivery by someone who received the papers from the\\noriginal process server. Because Michaud did not properly serve Davidson before\\nthe statute of limitations had expired, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). We review de novo the question presented by this\\ncase, which is whether Michaud properly served Davidson under the Minnesota\\nRules of Civil Procedure. See Barner v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 796 F.3d 897,\\n900 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Michaudβs attempt to serve Davidson occurred before the case was removed\\nto federal court, so Minnesota law determines whether the service was effective.\\nSee id. As relevant here, there are two ways to serve an individual like Davidson\\nunder the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure: either βby delivering a copy [of the\\nsummons] to [her] personally,β which is called βpersonal serviceβ; or βby leaving a\\ncopy at [her] usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion\\nthen residing therein,β which is called βsubstitute service.β Minn. R. Civ.\\nP. 4.03(a); Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 604β05; see also Minn. Stat. Β§ 543.19, subdiv. 2\\n(extending this rule to out-of-state defendants).\\n\\n In Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota\\nSupreme Court elaborated on the requirements for personal service. In addition to\\npersonally delivering the summons, a would-be process server must βknow that a\\nsummons is being served and intend to serve it.β Id. at 864. Applying those\\nrequirements, Melillo held that a mail carrier who handed the defendant a\\nsummons had not personally served him because βthere [was] nothing in the record\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nto show that the mail carrier had any idea what was in the envelope . . . .β1 Id. at\\n864β65.\\n\\n This case is different. In contrast to Melillo, Davidsonβs father has admitted\\nthat the deputy told him what the papers were before giving them to him, so there\\nis no question that he knew he was delivering a summons and complaint to his\\ndaughter.\\n\\n Whether he had the intent to serve his daughter is less clear, primarily\\nbecause no Minnesota court has expanded upon this requirement. Even so, we\\nhave every reason to believe that it has been satisfied here. In our view, a simple\\nintent to deliver the document to the intended recipient is all that is required,\\nespecially because the would-be process server must also know that a summons is\\nbeing served. See id. If an intent to serve requires something more, such as\\nknowledge of the legal consequences of delivery, then we would have expected a\\nMinnesota court to have at least hinted so.\\n\\n Davidsonβs father, the eventual process server in this case, intentionally\\ndelivered the papers to his daughter with knowledge of their contents. The papers\\nwere not accidentally delivered, such as being placed in a stack of mail handed to\\nDavidson or found on her parentsβ kitchen table. Rather, her father hand-delivered\\nthe papers to her, completing the service according to Rule 4.03(a) and Melillo.\\n\\n Davidson insists, however, that Minnesota has not adopted a rule that service\\ncan be made secondhand, βby serving the wrong person who then ultimately\\n 1\\n To be sure, Melillo also held in the alternative that a mail carrier categorically\\ncould not personally serve process. 880 N.W.2d at 863. But this holding was based\\non the fact thatβat the timeβMinnesota had a separate rule for βService by Mail.β\\nId. at 864 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 (2017) (superseded 2018)). This case, by\\ncontrast, involves neither a mail carrier nor service by mail, so Melilloβs alternate\\nholding has no application here.\\n -4-\\n\\ndelivers the [s]ummons and [c]omplaint to the intended [d]efendant.β It is true that\\nthe Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly announced such a rule, but it\\ncame pretty close in Melillo, and there is nothing in the text of Rule 4.03(a) that\\nprohibits it. The rule says that a copy of the summons must be βdeliver[ed] . . . to\\nthe individual personally,β but it does not say that the first person who handles it\\nmust deliver it. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a); see also id. 4.02 (stating that βthe\\nsheriff or any other person not less than 18 years of age and not a party to the\\naction[] may make service of a summons or other processβ (emphasis added)). Nor\\ndoes it say that the first person who tries to βdeliverβ it must succeed. All that\\nmust happen is that an adult with the requisite knowledge and intent personally\\nplace the summons in the defendantβs hands, which is what Davidsonβs father did\\nin this case. See Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864β65.\\n\\n To be sure, language in several older decisions appears, at first glance, to\\ncast doubt on the viability of secondhand service. Cf. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d\\n580, 584 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the defendant did not receive sufficient\\nservice of process when the process server left the summons with the defendantβs\\nsecretary at his office); Murtha v. Olson, 21 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Minn. 1946)\\n(assuming that a defendant would not have been properly served β[e]ven if\\ndefendant [had] received the papersβ from the man to whom they had erroneously\\nbeen given); Berryhill v. Sepp, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (Minn. 1909) (βIf, for example,\\na summons were in fact served on the wrong person, and that person handed it to\\nthe proper defendant, there would be no service.β). But those decisions addressed\\nsubstitute service, not personal service. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584; Murtha,\\n21 N.W.2d at 610β11; Berryhill, 119 N.W. at 404β05. And none involved the\\nprecise situation here in which knowledge and intent were both present at the time\\nof delivery. Besides, all three decisions predate Melillo, which is about personal\\nservice and leaves open the possibility of secondhand service in an appropriate\\ncase. This is that case.\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings\\nconsistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387720/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.\\n\\n The majority opinion, in recognizing second-hand service for personal\\nservice of process, adopts a rule of law that I believe the Minnesota Supreme Court\\nhas repeatedly indicated it would not adopt. Because the majorityβs conclusion is\\ninconsistent with our role and duty as a Court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, I\\nrespectfully dissent.\\n\\n As a federal court sitting in diversity, our role is to interpret state law,\\n not to fashion it. This Courtβs task with respect to an unsettled issue\\n of state law is to predict how the highest court in the state would rule\\n on the issue. A federal court must follow the announced state law in a\\n diversity action unless there are very persuasive grounds for believing\\n the stateβs highest court would no longer adhere to it.\\n\\nWilliamson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 716 F.3d 1151, 1154 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\\n\\n Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has never addressed this precise\\nissueβthe sufficiency of second-hand service in the context of personal serviceβit\\nhas expressly rejected second-hand service for substitute service of process. See\\nThiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988); Murtha v. Olson, 21 N.W.2d\\n607, 610 (Minn. 1946); Berryhill v. Sepp, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (Minn. 1909). The\\nmajority acknowledges this case law, but concludes that it is not the best evidence\\nof how the Minnesota Supreme Court would resolve the issue currently before us.\\nI disagree. The Minnesota Supreme Courtβs rejection of second-hand service for\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nsubstitute service leads me to conclude that it would be similarly unwilling to\\nrecognize the rule that the majority adopts here.\\n\\n I also note the practical implications of the majorityβs ruling. In adopting\\nthe rule that personal service can be accomplished through second-hand service,\\nthe majority sanctions, in effect, the deputizing of neighbors, friends, or even near-\\nstrangers as process servers, so long as these individuals were aware that they had\\na summons and complaint and intended to provide it to the proper party. Given\\nthat the Minnesota Supreme Court has long held that Minnesota service of process\\nrules demand strict compliance, see Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884\\nN.W.2d 601, 609 (Minn. 2016) (Stras, J.); Berryhill, 119 N.W. at 404 (Minn.\\n1909), I would not adopt a reading of Minnesota law that would yield such a result.\\n\\n Following βthe announced state law,β and given that I do not see βvery\\npersuasive groundsβ for believing that the Minnesota Supreme Court would change\\ncourse from its earlier precedent, Williamson, 716 F.3d at 1154, I cannot conclude\\nthat the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt second-hand service for personal\\nservice of process. I would affirm the order of the district court dismissing the\\ncomplaint for insufficient service of process. I respectfully dissent.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387720/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610467/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Noel J. MICHAUD, Formerly Known as Noel J. Ketola, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Sarah E. DAVIDSON, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3472\n ___________________________\n\n Noel J. Michaud, formerly known as Noel J. Ketola\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Sarah E. Davidson\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\n Filed: April 16, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n After suing Sarah Davidson for injuries arising out of a car accident, Noel\nMichaud attempted to serve Davidson by having a local sheriffβs deputy leave a\ncopy of the summons and complaint with Davidsonβs father, who then handed\nthem to Davidson just hours later. The magistrate judge, acting by consent of the\nparties, dismissed Michaudβs lawsuit on the theory that Minnesota does not\nrecognize βsecondhand service.β See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). We reverse.\n\n I.\n\n Michaudβs lawsuit arose out of an injury she suffered in a 2010 car accident\nwith Davidson. At the time, Davidson was a student at the University of\nMinnesota-Duluth, but she has since graduated and returned to Illinois, where her\nparents live.\n\n Just days before the six-year statute of limitations was set to expire, Michaud\nsued Davidson in Minnesota state court. Michaud delivered the summons and\ncomplaint to the sheriffβs office in the county where Davidsonβs parents lived and\nrequested that it serve Davidson with the papers.\n\n Davidsonβs father was at home when a deputy sheriff appeared at his door.\nWhen the deputy inquired whether Davidson βlivedβ there, her father responded\nthat she would βbe here tonight.β Taking this statement to mean that Davidson\nlived with her parents, the deputy said that he had a summons and complaint and\nasked him to give them to her. Before leaving, the deputy handed the papers to\nDavidsonβs father, who then gave them to his daughter a short time later. What\nMichaud and the deputy did not know, however, was that Davidson no longer lived\nat her parentsβ house. Several months before Michaud filed her lawsuit, Davidson\nmoved into a rented room to be closer to work.\n\n Davidson removed the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.\nAfter doing so, she argued that the case had to be dismissed because she was never\nserved under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a).\n\n The court agreed. It first found that Davidsonβs βusual place of abodeβ was\nnot her parentsβ house, so the deputy could not serve her by leaving a copy of the\npapers there. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (stating that an individual may be served\nβby leaving a copy at the individualβs usual place of abode with some person of\n\n -2-\n\nsuitable age and discretion then residing thereinβ); see also Jaeger v. Palladium\nHoldings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 604β05 (Minn. 2016) (describing substitute\nservice). It also concluded that Minnesota does not recognize βsecondhand\nservice,β which is personal delivery by someone who received the papers from the\noriginal process server. Because Michaud did not properly serve Davidson before\nthe statute of limitations had expired, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). We review de novo the question presented by this\ncase, which is whether Michaud properly served Davidson under the Minnesota\nRules of Civil Procedure. See Barner v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 796 F.3d 897,\n900 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n II.\n\n Michaudβs attempt to serve Davidson occurred before the case was removed\nto federal court, so Minnesota law determines whether the service was effective.\nSee id. As relevant here, there are two ways to serve an individual like Davidson\nunder the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure: either βby delivering a copy [of the\nsummons] to [her] personally,β which is called βpersonal serviceβ; or βby leaving a\ncopy at [her] usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion\nthen residing therein,β which is called βsubstitute service.β Minn. R. Civ.\nP. 4.03(a); Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 604β05; see also Minn. Stat. Β§ 543.19, subdiv. 2\n(extending this rule to out-of-state defendants).\n\n In Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota\nSupreme Court elaborated on the requirements for personal service. In addition to\npersonally delivering the summons, a would-be process server must βknow that a\nsummons is being served and intend to serve it.β Id. at 864. Applying those\nrequirements, Melillo held that a mail carrier who handed the defendant a\nsummons had not personally served him because βthere [was] nothing in the record\n\n\n -3-\n\nto show that the mail carrier had any idea what was in the envelope . . . .β1 Id. at\n864β65.\n\n This case is different. In contrast to Melillo, Davidsonβs father has admitted\nthat the deputy told him what the papers were before giving them to him, so there\nis no question that he knew he was delivering a summons and complaint to his\ndaughter.\n\n Whether he had the intent to serve his daughter is less clear, primarily\nbecause no Minnesota court has expanded upon this requirement. Even so, we\nhave every reason to believe that it has been satisfied here. In our view, a simple\nintent to deliver the document to the intended recipient is all that is required,\nespecially because the would-be process server must also know that a summons is\nbeing served. See id. If an intent to serve requires something more, such as\nknowledge of the legal consequences of delivery, then we would have expected a\nMinnesota court to have at least hinted so.\n\n Davidsonβs father, the eventual process server in this case, intentionally\ndelivered the papers to his daughter with knowledge of their contents. The papers\nwere not accidentally delivered, such as being placed in a stack of mail handed to\nDavidson or found on her parentsβ kitchen table. Rather, her father hand-delivered\nthe papers to her, completing the service according to Rule 4.03(a) and Melillo.\n\n Davidson insists, however, that Minnesota has not adopted a rule that service\ncan be made secondhand, βby serving the wrong person who then ultimately\n 1\n To be sure, Melillo also held in the alternative that a mail carrier categorically\ncould not personally serve process. 880 N.W.2d at 863. But this holding was based\non the fact thatβat the timeβMinnesota had a separate rule for βService by Mail.β\nId. at 864 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 (2017) (superseded 2018)). This case, by\ncontrast, involves neither a mail carrier nor service by mail, so Melilloβs alternate\nholding has no application here.\n -4-\n\ndelivers the [s]ummons and [c]omplaint to the intended [d]efendant.β It is true that\nthe Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly announced such a rule, but it\ncame pretty close in Melillo, and there is nothing in the text of Rule 4.03(a) that\nprohibits it. The rule says that a copy of the summons must be βdeliver[ed] . . . to\nthe individual personally,β but it does not say that the first person who handles it\nmust deliver it. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a); see also id. 4.02 (stating that βthe\nsheriff or any other person not less than 18 years of age and not a party to the\naction[] may make service of a summons or other processβ (emphasis added)). Nor\ndoes it say that the first person who tries to βdeliverβ it must succeed. All that\nmust happen is that an adult with the requisite knowledge and intent personally\nplace the summons in the defendantβs hands, which is what Davidsonβs father did\nin this case. See Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864β65.\n\n To be sure, language in several older decisions appears, at first glance, to\ncast doubt on the viability of secondhand service. Cf. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d\n580, 584 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the defendant did not receive sufficient\nservice of process when the process server left the summons with the defendantβs\nsecretary at his office); Murtha v. Olson, 21 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Minn. 1946)\n(assuming that a defendant would not have been properly served β[e]ven if\ndefendant [had] received the papersβ from the man to whom they had erroneously\nbeen given); Berryhill v. Sepp, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (Minn. 1909) (βIf, for example,\na summons were in fact served on the wrong person, and that person handed it to\nthe proper defendant, there would be no service.β). But those decisions addressed\nsubstitute service, not personal service. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584; Murtha,\n21 N.W.2d at 610β11; Berryhill, 119 N.W. at 404β05. And none involved the\nprecise situation here in which knowledge and intent were both present at the time\nof delivery. Besides, all three decisions predate Melillo, which is about personal\nservice and leaves open the possibility of secondhand service in an appropriate\ncase. This is that case.\n\n\n -5-\n\n III.\n\n We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings\nconsistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Noel J. MICHAUD, Formerly Known as Noel J. Ketola, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Sarah E. DAVIDSON, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3472\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Noel J. Michaud, formerly known as Noel J. Ketola\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sarah E. Davidson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 18, 2018\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After suing Sarah Davidson for injuries arising out of a car accident, Noel\\nMichaud attempted to serve Davidson by having a local sheriffβs deputy leave a\\ncopy of the summons and complaint with Davidsonβs father, who then handed\\nthem to Davidson just hours later. The magistrate judge, acting by consent of the\\nparties, dismissed Michaudβs lawsuit on the theory that Minnesota does not\\nrecognize βsecondhand service.β See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). We reverse.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Michaudβs lawsuit arose out of an injury she suffered in a 2010 car accident\\nwith Davidson. At the time, Davidson was a student at the University of\\nMinnesota-Duluth, but she has since graduated and returned to Illinois, where her\\nparents live.\\n\\n Just days before the six-year statute of limitations was set to expire, Michaud\\nsued Davidson in Minnesota state court. Michaud delivered the summons and\\ncomplaint to the sheriffβs office in the county where Davidsonβs parents lived and\\nrequested that it serve Davidson with the papers.\\n\\n Davidsonβs father was at home when a deputy sheriff appeared at his door.\\nWhen the deputy inquired whether Davidson βlivedβ there, her father responded\\nthat she would βbe here tonight.β Taking this statement to mean that Davidson\\nlived with her parents, the deputy said that he had a summons and complaint and\\nasked him to give them to her. Before leaving, the deputy handed the papers to\\nDavidsonβs father, who then gave them to his daughter a short time later. What\\nMichaud and the deputy did not know, however, was that Davidson no longer lived\\nat her parentsβ house. Several months before Michaud filed her lawsuit, Davidson\\nmoved into a rented room to be closer to work.\\n\\n Davidson removed the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.\\nAfter doing so, she argued that the case had to be dismissed because she was never\\nserved under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a).\\n\\n The court agreed. It first found that Davidsonβs βusual place of abodeβ was\\nnot her parentsβ house, so the deputy could not serve her by leaving a copy of the\\npapers there. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (stating that an individual may be served\\nβby leaving a copy at the individualβs usual place of abode with some person of\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nsuitable age and discretion then residing thereinβ); see also Jaeger v. Palladium\\nHoldings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 604β05 (Minn. 2016) (describing substitute\\nservice). It also concluded that Minnesota does not recognize βsecondhand\\nservice,β which is personal delivery by someone who received the papers from the\\noriginal process server. Because Michaud did not properly serve Davidson before\\nthe statute of limitations had expired, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). We review de novo the question presented by this\\ncase, which is whether Michaud properly served Davidson under the Minnesota\\nRules of Civil Procedure. See Barner v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 796 F.3d 897,\\n900 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Michaudβs attempt to serve Davidson occurred before the case was removed\\nto federal court, so Minnesota law determines whether the service was effective.\\nSee id. As relevant here, there are two ways to serve an individual like Davidson\\nunder the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure: either βby delivering a copy [of the\\nsummons] to [her] personally,β which is called βpersonal serviceβ; or βby leaving a\\ncopy at [her] usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion\\nthen residing therein,β which is called βsubstitute service.β Minn. R. Civ.\\nP. 4.03(a); Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 604β05; see also Minn. Stat. Β§ 543.19, subdiv. 2\\n(extending this rule to out-of-state defendants).\\n\\n In Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota\\nSupreme Court elaborated on the requirements for personal service. In addition to\\npersonally delivering the summons, a would-be process server must βknow that a\\nsummons is being served and intend to serve it.β Id. at 864. Applying those\\nrequirements, Melillo held that a mail carrier who handed the defendant a\\nsummons had not personally served him because βthere [was] nothing in the record\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nto show that the mail carrier had any idea what was in the envelope . . . .β1 Id. at\\n864β65.\\n\\n This case is different. In contrast to Melillo, Davidsonβs father has admitted\\nthat the deputy told him what the papers were before giving them to him, so there\\nis no question that he knew he was delivering a summons and complaint to his\\ndaughter.\\n\\n Whether he had the intent to serve his daughter is less clear, primarily\\nbecause no Minnesota court has expanded upon this requirement. Even so, we\\nhave every reason to believe that it has been satisfied here. In our view, a simple\\nintent to deliver the document to the intended recipient is all that is required,\\nespecially because the would-be process server must also know that a summons is\\nbeing served. See id. If an intent to serve requires something more, such as\\nknowledge of the legal consequences of delivery, then we would have expected a\\nMinnesota court to have at least hinted so.\\n\\n Davidsonβs father, the eventual process server in this case, intentionally\\ndelivered the papers to his daughter with knowledge of their contents. The papers\\nwere not accidentally delivered, such as being placed in a stack of mail handed to\\nDavidson or found on her parentsβ kitchen table. Rather, her father hand-delivered\\nthe papers to her, completing the service according to Rule 4.03(a) and Melillo.\\n\\n Davidson insists, however, that Minnesota has not adopted a rule that service\\ncan be made secondhand, βby serving the wrong person who then ultimately\\n 1\\n To be sure, Melillo also held in the alternative that a mail carrier categorically\\ncould not personally serve process. 880 N.W.2d at 863. But this holding was based\\non the fact thatβat the timeβMinnesota had a separate rule for βService by Mail.β\\nId. at 864 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 (2017) (superseded 2018)). This case, by\\ncontrast, involves neither a mail carrier nor service by mail, so Melilloβs alternate\\nholding has no application here.\\n -4-\\n\\ndelivers the [s]ummons and [c]omplaint to the intended [d]efendant.β It is true that\\nthe Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly announced such a rule, but it\\ncame pretty close in Melillo, and there is nothing in the text of Rule 4.03(a) that\\nprohibits it. The rule says that a copy of the summons must be βdeliver[ed] . . . to\\nthe individual personally,β but it does not say that the first person who handles it\\nmust deliver it. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a); see also id. 4.02 (stating that βthe\\nsheriff or any other person not less than 18 years of age and not a party to the\\naction[] may make service of a summons or other processβ (emphasis added)). Nor\\ndoes it say that the first person who tries to βdeliverβ it must succeed. All that\\nmust happen is that an adult with the requisite knowledge and intent personally\\nplace the summons in the defendantβs hands, which is what Davidsonβs father did\\nin this case. See Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864β65.\\n\\n To be sure, language in several older decisions appears, at first glance, to\\ncast doubt on the viability of secondhand service. Cf. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d\\n580, 584 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the defendant did not receive sufficient\\nservice of process when the process server left the summons with the defendantβs\\nsecretary at his office); Murtha v. Olson, 21 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Minn. 1946)\\n(assuming that a defendant would not have been properly served β[e]ven if\\ndefendant [had] received the papersβ from the man to whom they had erroneously\\nbeen given); Berryhill v. Sepp, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (Minn. 1909) (βIf, for example,\\na summons were in fact served on the wrong person, and that person handed it to\\nthe proper defendant, there would be no service.β). But those decisions addressed\\nsubstitute service, not personal service. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584; Murtha,\\n21 N.W.2d at 610β11; Berryhill, 119 N.W. at 404β05. And none involved the\\nprecise situation here in which knowledge and intent were both present at the time\\nof delivery. Besides, all three decisions predate Melillo, which is about personal\\nservice and leaves open the possibility of secondhand service in an appropriate\\ncase. This is that case.\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings\\nconsistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1792,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610468,"string":"4,610,468"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Farass Ali v. Joel Brott"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1244"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 19-1244\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Farass Ali\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joel L. Brott, Sheriff, Sherburne County\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellant\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General; Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary, Department of\\n Homeland Security; Ronald Vitiello, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs\\n Enforcement; Peter B. Berg, Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration and\\n Customs Enforcement\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondents\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Farass Ali, who immigrated to the United States in 2014, has been held in\\ncustody under 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) since May 2017 while he litigates the issue of\\nwhether he is a removable alien. The district court granted relief on Aliβs petition for\\na writ of habeas corpus after interpreting Β§ 1226(a) to permit detention of an alien\\nonly for a βperiod reasonably necessary to receive a removal decisionβ and\\nconcluding Aliβs time in detention was not reasonable. Sherburne County Sheriff\\nJoel Brott appeals,1 arguing the district court wrongly applied a βreasonablenessβ\\nstandard not included in the text of the statute. We agree with Sheriff Brott and\\ntherefore reverse the order granting Aliβs petition and remand for the district court to\\nconsider Aliβs constitutional arguments.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Ali is a native and citizen of Iraq. In January 2014, Ali entered the United\\nStates as a refugee. His immigration status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident\\nin 2015.\\n\\n In November 2016, Ali was arrested in Minnesota for violation of Minnesota\\nlaws. The arrest caused federal investigators to review Aliβs immigration status. The\\nDepartment of Homeland Security claims to have found significant inconsistencies\\namong Aliβs application for refugee status, his statements to officers who interviewed\\nhim on that application, and his application for adjustment of status to lawful\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The district court dismissed certain federal officials as respondents after noting\\nonly Sheriff Brott was a proper respondent to Aliβs petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla,\\n542 U.S. 426, 434β35 (2003) (recognizing the proper respondent to a habeas petition\\nis βthe person who has custody over [the petitioner] . . . . not the Attorney General or\\nsome other remote supervisory officialβ) (alteration in original).\\n -2-\\n\\fpermanent resident. Federal investigators also examined Aliβs social media platform\\nand found posts related to and purportedly in support of a terrorist organization.\\n\\n In May 2017, FBI Special Agents interviewed Ali and questioned him\\nregarding his use of social media and his familial lineage. Agents asked for his\\nconsent to search the electronic devices he used to access social media. Ali consented\\nonly to a search of his laptop. The day after the interview, federal immigration agents\\ntook Ali into custody pursuant to an administrative warrant. Ali was served with a\\nNotice to Appear and charged with being a removable alien who, at the time of entry\\nor adjustment, procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful\\nmisrepresentation, and as an alien who, at the time of entry or adjustment, was\\ninadmissible because he was not in possession of valid travel documents.\\n\\n In June 2017, Ali was transferred to state custody for purposes of his pending\\nstate charges. Shortly after, the FBI notified immigration officials Ali would be\\nconsidered a threat to national security if he was released from immigration custody.\\nIn July 2017, Aliβs state criminal charges were dismissed and he was transferred back\\nto federal immigration custody.\\n\\n Between July 2017 and August 2018, an Immigration Judge (βIJβ) presided\\nover a series of hearings on the merits of the removal charges and other matters. The\\nIJ granted multiple continuances, almost all of which were at Aliβs request. During\\nthis time, on September 19, 2017, the IJ presided over a bond hearing. Ali called two\\nwitnesses and both parties submitted evidence. The IJ denied Aliβs request to be\\nreleased on bond, concluding Ali had failed to show he was not a danger to the\\ncommunity. Ali did not appeal the IJβs bond determination and has not sought a new\\nbond hearing.\\n\\n On September 7, 2018, Ali filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2241, seeking release from federal immigration custody pending resolution of his\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fimmigration proceedings. Ali argued his continued detention was not authorized by\\nΒ§ 1226(a), violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and was an\\nunauthorized seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The government argued Aliβs\\ncontinued detention was constitutional and that Ali was permitted to seek relief\\nthrough administrative procedures. The government also suggested Ali was the cause\\nof any undue delay in his removal proceedings.\\n\\n The district court entered an order on January 7, 2019, granting Aliβs petition\\nand ordering Brott to release Ali from custody within thirty days. The district court\\nexplained that Ali was subject to pre-removal detention under Β§ 1226(a) and observed\\nthe statute did not explicitly limit the length of an alienβs pre-removal detention\\nperiod. The district court compared the situation to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678\\n(2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court analyzed 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6), which\\ngoverns post-removal order detention, and employed the doctrine of constitutional\\navoidance to read a βreasonableness limitationβ into the length of time an alien could\\nbe detained after he was ordered removed. 533 U.S. at 689β90. Applying the\\nrationale of Zadvydas to the facts of Aliβs case, the district court concluded that pre-\\nremoval order detention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably\\nnecessary to receive a removal decision.β The district court then determined Aliβs\\ntime in detention had exceeded this limitation and therefore ordered him released\\nwithin thirty days.\\n\\n After the district court denied his motion for reconsideration,2 Sheriff Brott\\nappealed and sought an emergency motion to stay the district court order pending\\n\\n 2\\n The basis for Sheriff Brottβs motion for reconsideration was the fact that\\nduring the time period between when Ali filed his petition for habeas corpus and\\nwhen the district court issued its order granting Aliβs petition, the IJ had issued an\\norder of removal ordering Aliβs deportation to Iraq. The district court denied Sheriff\\nBrottβs motion because the IJβs order was provisional and not final until affirmed by\\nthe Board of Immigration Appeals. The district court ordered Ali released within\\nthirty days from the date of the district courtβs original grant of Aliβs petition.\\n -4-\\n\\fappeal. We granted a temporary stay until further order of the court, directed the\\nparties to file simultaneous briefs on the merits, and set the case for oral argument.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n Whether we can affirm the district courtβs grant of Aliβs habeas petition turns\\non the language of 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) and application of the Due Process Clause of\\nthe Fifth Amendment in the context of the statute. For the reasons set forth below,\\nwe vacate the order of the district court directing release of Ali and remand for further\\nproceedings.\\n\\n We begin by reference to the applicable federal statute, which first provides,\\nβan alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to\\nbe removed from the United States.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a). The statute goes on to\\nβgenerally give[] the Secretary [of Homeland Security] the discretion either to detain\\nthe alien or to release him on bond or parole.β Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959\\n(2019). βIf the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at\\nthe Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both\\nexercising power delegated by the Secretary).β Id. at 959β60 (citing 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)(1)).\\n\\n At issue here is whether, in order to avoid due process concerns, this court must\\nconstrue the statute as containing an implied βreasonablenessβ limit on pre-order\\ndetention similar to that found by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691,\\n699, with respect to the post-detention statute, 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6).\\n\\n Application of the canon of constitutional avoidance to imply terms in a statute\\nthat do not exist in its text is necessarily a serious matter implicating the proper role\\nof the judiciary. Although a matter of first impression in this circuit, we do not\\napproach this question with a blank slate. The Supreme Court recently re-\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\femphasized, in a case discussing the same statutory framework, that a court may not\\nresort to constitutional avoidance unless certain criteria are met. First, the canon\\nshould only be used β[w]hen βa serious doubtβ is raised about the constitutionality of\\nan act of Congress.β Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 971 (alteration in original) (quoting\\nJennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018)). Even then, a court may not resort\\nto constitutional avoidance unless it first concludes the statute is βsusceptible of more\\nthan one construction.β Id. at 972 (quoting same). βThe canon βhas no applicationβ\\nabsent βambiguity.ββ Id. (quoting Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014)).\\n\\n To begin with, we are skeptical of Aliβs argument that his detention pending\\na decision on whether he is to be removed under Β§ 1226(a) is unconstitutional\\nconsidering he was given a bond hearing and still has available procedural avenues\\nto seek relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The Supreme\\nCourt has never indicated the bond hearing process set forth in the statute and\\naccompanying regulations is constitutionally deficient. To the contrary, Supreme\\nCourt precedent indicates such a framework is constitutionally permissible. See\\nDemore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (explaining βthis Court has recognized\\ndetention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the\\ndeportation processβ); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 755 (1987)\\n(holding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not facially violate the Due Process Clause\\nof the Fifth Amendment and, noting in support of its conclusion, it had previously\\nβfound no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous\\nresident aliens pending deportation proceedingsβ). Indeed, we find it noteworthy that\\naliens challenging the constitutionality of their detentions in Jennings and Demore\\nsought, as a remedy, a bond hearing similar to what Ali was given. See Jennings, 138\\nS. Ct. at 839; Demore, 538 U.S. at 517, 528.\\n\\n Regardless, even if we assume that despite the safeguard of a bond hearing\\nthere is a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of detention under Β§ 1226(a), the\\ncanon of constitutional avoidance is not proper here because the statute is not\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fsusceptible to more than one construction as to the length of detention. In contrast\\nto the statute analyzed in Zadvydas, Β§ 1226(a) limits the period of detention to the\\nperiod βpending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United\\nStates.β While this is not subject to precise calculation, it is, nonetheless, a defined\\nperiod that does have an end. Cf. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (reasoning Β§ 1226(c)\\nis not ambiguous or even silent regarding the length of detention because it mandates\\ndetention pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the country);\\nDemore, 538 U.S. at 528β29 (noting that unlike the detention at issue in Zadvydas,\\nwhich was indefinite and potentially permanent, detention under Β§ 1226(c) has a\\nβdefinite termination pointβ and is of a βshorter durationβ).\\n\\n It is significant the Supreme Court has found unambiguous the language of\\nΒ§ 1226(c), which requires mandatory detention until a decision regarding removal is\\nreached, and therefore has refused to use constitutional avoidance to read an extra-\\ntextual βreasonablenessβ limitation into the statute. We see no principled basis for\\nviewing Β§ 1226(a)βs text regarding the length of detention any differently. The\\nprimary difference between the two subsections of the statute is the availability of a\\nbond hearing for aliens held under subsection (a). And this difference, which gives\\naliens like Ali more protection against prolonged detention than aliens detained under\\nΒ§ 1226(c), militates against reading a reasonableness limitation into Β§ 1226(a)\\nbecause it makes the statute less likely to violate their due process rights.\\n\\n In light of this precedent, we hold Β§ 1226(a) is not susceptible of more than one\\nconstruction. As a result, the constitutional avoidance doctrine has no application\\nhere. The district court therefore erred when it concluded pre-removal order\\ndetention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably necessary to receive\\na removal decision.β We reverse the district courtβs order on this basis.\\n\\n The analysis does not end here, however. In his petition, Ali argued his\\ncontinued detention violated not only Β§ 1226(a), but his constitutional rights under\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fthe Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As in Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851, we conclude\\nthis matter should be remanded to the district court to further consider Aliβs\\nconstitutional arguments consistent with this decision and relevant Supreme Court\\nprecedent.3\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Sheriff Brott filed a Motion to Strike Aliβs Rule 28(j) filing on the ground it\\nimproperly provides argument and analysis rather than merely setting forth pertinent\\nand significant authorities which came to his attention after his brief was filed. Fed.\\nR. App. P. 28(j). Because our analysis made it unnecessary to consider the arguments\\nadvanced in Aliβs filing, we deny the motion as moot.\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4387721/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"GRUENDER\": \", Circuit\", \"BENTON\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610468/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Farass Ali v. Joel Brott\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 19-1244\n ___________________________\n\n Farass Ali\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Joel L. Brott, Sheriff, Sherburne County\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellant\n\n William P. Barr, Attorney General; Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary, Department of\n Homeland Security; Ronald Vitiello, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs\n Enforcement; Peter B. Berg, Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration and\n Customs Enforcement\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondents\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\n Filed: April 16, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\fGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Farass Ali, who immigrated to the United States in 2014, has been held in\ncustody under 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) since May 2017 while he litigates the issue of\nwhether he is a removable alien. The district court granted relief on Aliβs petition for\na writ of habeas corpus after interpreting Β§ 1226(a) to permit detention of an alien\nonly for a βperiod reasonably necessary to receive a removal decisionβ and\nconcluding Aliβs time in detention was not reasonable. Sherburne County Sheriff\nJoel Brott appeals,1 arguing the district court wrongly applied a βreasonablenessβ\nstandard not included in the text of the statute. We agree with Sheriff Brott and\ntherefore reverse the order granting Aliβs petition and remand for the district court to\nconsider Aliβs constitutional arguments.\n\n I. Background\n\n Ali is a native and citizen of Iraq. In January 2014, Ali entered the United\nStates as a refugee. His immigration status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident\nin 2015.\n\n In November 2016, Ali was arrested in Minnesota for violation of Minnesota\nlaws. The arrest caused federal investigators to review Aliβs immigration status. The\nDepartment of Homeland Security claims to have found significant inconsistencies\namong Aliβs application for refugee status, his statements to officers who interviewed\nhim on that application, and his application for adjustment of status to lawful\n\n\n\n 1\n The district court dismissed certain federal officials as respondents after noting\nonly Sheriff Brott was a proper respondent to Aliβs petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla,\n542 U.S. 426, 434β35 (2003) (recognizing the proper respondent to a habeas petition\nis βthe person who has custody over [the petitioner] . . . . not the Attorney General or\nsome other remote supervisory officialβ) (alteration in original).\n -2-\n\fpermanent resident. Federal investigators also examined Aliβs social media platform\nand found posts related to and purportedly in support of a terrorist organization.\n\n In May 2017, FBI Special Agents interviewed Ali and questioned him\nregarding his use of social media and his familial lineage. Agents asked for his\nconsent to search the electronic devices he used to access social media. Ali consented\nonly to a search of his laptop. The day after the interview, federal immigration agents\ntook Ali into custody pursuant to an administrative warrant. Ali was served with a\nNotice to Appear and charged with being a removable alien who, at the time of entry\nor adjustment, procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful\nmisrepresentation, and as an alien who, at the time of entry or adjustment, was\ninadmissible because he was not in possession of valid travel documents.\n\n In June 2017, Ali was transferred to state custody for purposes of his pending\nstate charges. Shortly after, the FBI notified immigration officials Ali would be\nconsidered a threat to national security if he was released from immigration custody.\nIn July 2017, Aliβs state criminal charges were dismissed and he was transferred back\nto federal immigration custody.\n\n Between July 2017 and August 2018, an Immigration Judge (βIJβ) presided\nover a series of hearings on the merits of the removal charges and other matters. The\nIJ granted multiple continuances, almost all of which were at Aliβs request. During\nthis time, on September 19, 2017, the IJ presided over a bond hearing. Ali called two\nwitnesses and both parties submitted evidence. The IJ denied Aliβs request to be\nreleased on bond, concluding Ali had failed to show he was not a danger to the\ncommunity. Ali did not appeal the IJβs bond determination and has not sought a new\nbond hearing.\n\n On September 7, 2018, Ali filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 2241, seeking release from federal immigration custody pending resolution of his\n\n -3-\n\fimmigration proceedings. Ali argued his continued detention was not authorized by\nΒ§ 1226(a), violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and was an\nunauthorized seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The government argued Aliβs\ncontinued detention was constitutional and that Ali was permitted to seek relief\nthrough administrative procedures. The government also suggested Ali was the cause\nof any undue delay in his removal proceedings.\n\n The district court entered an order on January 7, 2019, granting Aliβs petition\nand ordering Brott to release Ali from custody within thirty days. The district court\nexplained that Ali was subject to pre-removal detention under Β§ 1226(a) and observed\nthe statute did not explicitly limit the length of an alienβs pre-removal detention\nperiod. The district court compared the situation to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678\n(2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court analyzed 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6), which\ngoverns post-removal order detention, and employed the doctrine of constitutional\navoidance to read a βreasonableness limitationβ into the length of time an alien could\nbe detained after he was ordered removed. 533 U.S. at 689β90. Applying the\nrationale of Zadvydas to the facts of Aliβs case, the district court concluded that pre-\nremoval order detention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably\nnecessary to receive a removal decision.β The district court then determined Aliβs\ntime in detention had exceeded this limitation and therefore ordered him released\nwithin thirty days.\n\n After the district court denied his motion for reconsideration,2 Sheriff Brott\nappealed and sought an emergency motion to stay the district court order pending\n\n 2\n The basis for Sheriff Brottβs motion for reconsideration was the fact that\nduring the time period between when Ali filed his petition for habeas corpus and\nwhen the district court issued its order granting Aliβs petition, the IJ had issued an\norder of removal ordering Aliβs deportation to Iraq. The district court denied Sheriff\nBrottβs motion because the IJβs order was provisional and not final until affirmed by\nthe Board of Immigration Appeals. The district court ordered Ali released within\nthirty days from the date of the district courtβs original grant of Aliβs petition.\n -4-\n\fappeal. We granted a temporary stay until further order of the court, directed the\nparties to file simultaneous briefs on the merits, and set the case for oral argument.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n Whether we can affirm the district courtβs grant of Aliβs habeas petition turns\non the language of 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) and application of the Due Process Clause of\nthe Fifth Amendment in the context of the statute. For the reasons set forth below,\nwe vacate the order of the district court directing release of Ali and remand for further\nproceedings.\n\n We begin by reference to the applicable federal statute, which first provides,\nβan alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to\nbe removed from the United States.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a). The statute goes on to\nβgenerally give[] the Secretary [of Homeland Security] the discretion either to detain\nthe alien or to release him on bond or parole.β Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959\n(2019). βIf the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at\nthe Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both\nexercising power delegated by the Secretary).β Id. at 959β60 (citing 8 C.F.R.\n§§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)(1)).\n\n At issue here is whether, in order to avoid due process concerns, this court must\nconstrue the statute as containing an implied βreasonablenessβ limit on pre-order\ndetention similar to that found by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691,\n699, with respect to the post-detention statute, 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6).\n\n Application of the canon of constitutional avoidance to imply terms in a statute\nthat do not exist in its text is necessarily a serious matter implicating the proper role\nof the judiciary. Although a matter of first impression in this circuit, we do not\napproach this question with a blank slate. The Supreme Court recently re-\n\n\n -5-\n\femphasized, in a case discussing the same statutory framework, that a court may not\nresort to constitutional avoidance unless certain criteria are met. First, the canon\nshould only be used β[w]hen βa serious doubtβ is raised about the constitutionality of\nan act of Congress.β Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 971 (alteration in original) (quoting\nJennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018)). Even then, a court may not resort\nto constitutional avoidance unless it first concludes the statute is βsusceptible of more\nthan one construction.β Id. at 972 (quoting same). βThe canon βhas no applicationβ\nabsent βambiguity.ββ Id. (quoting Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014)).\n\n To begin with, we are skeptical of Aliβs argument that his detention pending\na decision on whether he is to be removed under Β§ 1226(a) is unconstitutional\nconsidering he was given a bond hearing and still has available procedural avenues\nto seek relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The Supreme\nCourt has never indicated the bond hearing process set forth in the statute and\naccompanying regulations is constitutionally deficient. To the contrary, Supreme\nCourt precedent indicates such a framework is constitutionally permissible. See\nDemore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (explaining βthis Court has recognized\ndetention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the\ndeportation processβ); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 755 (1987)\n(holding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not facially violate the Due Process Clause\nof the Fifth Amendment and, noting in support of its conclusion, it had previously\nβfound no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous\nresident aliens pending deportation proceedingsβ). Indeed, we find it noteworthy that\naliens challenging the constitutionality of their detentions in Jennings and Demore\nsought, as a remedy, a bond hearing similar to what Ali was given. See Jennings, 138\nS. Ct. at 839; Demore, 538 U.S. at 517, 528.\n\n Regardless, even if we assume that despite the safeguard of a bond hearing\nthere is a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of detention under Β§ 1226(a), the\ncanon of constitutional avoidance is not proper here because the statute is not\n\n\n -6-\n\fsusceptible to more than one construction as to the length of detention. In contrast\nto the statute analyzed in Zadvydas, Β§ 1226(a) limits the period of detention to the\nperiod βpending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United\nStates.β While this is not subject to precise calculation, it is, nonetheless, a defined\nperiod that does have an end. Cf. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (reasoning Β§ 1226(c)\nis not ambiguous or even silent regarding the length of detention because it mandates\ndetention pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the country);\nDemore, 538 U.S. at 528β29 (noting that unlike the detention at issue in Zadvydas,\nwhich was indefinite and potentially permanent, detention under Β§ 1226(c) has a\nβdefinite termination pointβ and is of a βshorter durationβ).\n\n It is significant the Supreme Court has found unambiguous the language of\nΒ§ 1226(c), which requires mandatory detention until a decision regarding removal is\nreached, and therefore has refused to use constitutional avoidance to read an extra-\ntextual βreasonablenessβ limitation into the statute. We see no principled basis for\nviewing Β§ 1226(a)βs text regarding the length of detention any differently. The\nprimary difference between the two subsections of the statute is the availability of a\nbond hearing for aliens held under subsection (a). And this difference, which gives\naliens like Ali more protection against prolonged detention than aliens detained under\nΒ§ 1226(c), militates against reading a reasonableness limitation into Β§ 1226(a)\nbecause it makes the statute less likely to violate their due process rights.\n\n In light of this precedent, we hold Β§ 1226(a) is not susceptible of more than one\nconstruction. As a result, the constitutional avoidance doctrine has no application\nhere. The district court therefore erred when it concluded pre-removal order\ndetention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably necessary to receive\na removal decision.β We reverse the district courtβs order on this basis.\n\n The analysis does not end here, however. In his petition, Ali argued his\ncontinued detention violated not only Β§ 1226(a), but his constitutional rights under\n\n\n -7-\n\fthe Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As in Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851, we conclude\nthis matter should be remanded to the district court to further consider Aliβs\nconstitutional arguments consistent with this decision and relevant Supreme Court\nprecedent.3\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Sheriff Brott filed a Motion to Strike Aliβs Rule 28(j) filing on the ground it\nimproperly provides argument and analysis rather than merely setting forth pertinent\nand significant authorities which came to his attention after his brief was filed. Fed.\nR. App. P. 28(j). Because our analysis made it unnecessary to consider the arguments\nadvanced in Aliβs filing, we deny the motion as moot.\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Farass Ali v. Joel Brott\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 19-1244\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Farass Ali\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joel L. Brott, Sheriff, Sherburne County\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellant\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General; Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary, Department of\\n Homeland Security; Ronald Vitiello, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs\\n Enforcement; Peter B. Berg, Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration and\\n Customs Enforcement\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondents\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: April 16, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Farass Ali, who immigrated to the United States in 2014, has been held in\\ncustody under 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) since May 2017 while he litigates the issue of\\nwhether he is a removable alien. The district court granted relief on Aliβs petition for\\na writ of habeas corpus after interpreting Β§ 1226(a) to permit detention of an alien\\nonly for a βperiod reasonably necessary to receive a removal decisionβ and\\nconcluding Aliβs time in detention was not reasonable. Sherburne County Sheriff\\nJoel Brott appeals,1 arguing the district court wrongly applied a βreasonablenessβ\\nstandard not included in the text of the statute. We agree with Sheriff Brott and\\ntherefore reverse the order granting Aliβs petition and remand for the district court to\\nconsider Aliβs constitutional arguments.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Ali is a native and citizen of Iraq. In January 2014, Ali entered the United\\nStates as a refugee. His immigration status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident\\nin 2015.\\n\\n In November 2016, Ali was arrested in Minnesota for violation of Minnesota\\nlaws. The arrest caused federal investigators to review Aliβs immigration status. The\\nDepartment of Homeland Security claims to have found significant inconsistencies\\namong Aliβs application for refugee status, his statements to officers who interviewed\\nhim on that application, and his application for adjustment of status to lawful\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The district court dismissed certain federal officials as respondents after noting\\nonly Sheriff Brott was a proper respondent to Aliβs petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla,\\n542 U.S. 426, 434β35 (2003) (recognizing the proper respondent to a habeas petition\\nis βthe person who has custody over [the petitioner] . . . . not the Attorney General or\\nsome other remote supervisory officialβ) (alteration in original).\\n -2-\\n\\fpermanent resident. Federal investigators also examined Aliβs social media platform\\nand found posts related to and purportedly in support of a terrorist organization.\\n\\n In May 2017, FBI Special Agents interviewed Ali and questioned him\\nregarding his use of social media and his familial lineage. Agents asked for his\\nconsent to search the electronic devices he used to access social media. Ali consented\\nonly to a search of his laptop. The day after the interview, federal immigration agents\\ntook Ali into custody pursuant to an administrative warrant. Ali was served with a\\nNotice to Appear and charged with being a removable alien who, at the time of entry\\nor adjustment, procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful\\nmisrepresentation, and as an alien who, at the time of entry or adjustment, was\\ninadmissible because he was not in possession of valid travel documents.\\n\\n In June 2017, Ali was transferred to state custody for purposes of his pending\\nstate charges. Shortly after, the FBI notified immigration officials Ali would be\\nconsidered a threat to national security if he was released from immigration custody.\\nIn July 2017, Aliβs state criminal charges were dismissed and he was transferred back\\nto federal immigration custody.\\n\\n Between July 2017 and August 2018, an Immigration Judge (βIJβ) presided\\nover a series of hearings on the merits of the removal charges and other matters. The\\nIJ granted multiple continuances, almost all of which were at Aliβs request. During\\nthis time, on September 19, 2017, the IJ presided over a bond hearing. Ali called two\\nwitnesses and both parties submitted evidence. The IJ denied Aliβs request to be\\nreleased on bond, concluding Ali had failed to show he was not a danger to the\\ncommunity. Ali did not appeal the IJβs bond determination and has not sought a new\\nbond hearing.\\n\\n On September 7, 2018, Ali filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2241, seeking release from federal immigration custody pending resolution of his\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fimmigration proceedings. Ali argued his continued detention was not authorized by\\nΒ§ 1226(a), violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and was an\\nunauthorized seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The government argued Aliβs\\ncontinued detention was constitutional and that Ali was permitted to seek relief\\nthrough administrative procedures. The government also suggested Ali was the cause\\nof any undue delay in his removal proceedings.\\n\\n The district court entered an order on January 7, 2019, granting Aliβs petition\\nand ordering Brott to release Ali from custody within thirty days. The district court\\nexplained that Ali was subject to pre-removal detention under Β§ 1226(a) and observed\\nthe statute did not explicitly limit the length of an alienβs pre-removal detention\\nperiod. The district court compared the situation to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678\\n(2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court analyzed 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6), which\\ngoverns post-removal order detention, and employed the doctrine of constitutional\\navoidance to read a βreasonableness limitationβ into the length of time an alien could\\nbe detained after he was ordered removed. 533 U.S. at 689β90. Applying the\\nrationale of Zadvydas to the facts of Aliβs case, the district court concluded that pre-\\nremoval order detention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably\\nnecessary to receive a removal decision.β The district court then determined Aliβs\\ntime in detention had exceeded this limitation and therefore ordered him released\\nwithin thirty days.\\n\\n After the district court denied his motion for reconsideration,2 Sheriff Brott\\nappealed and sought an emergency motion to stay the district court order pending\\n\\n 2\\n The basis for Sheriff Brottβs motion for reconsideration was the fact that\\nduring the time period between when Ali filed his petition for habeas corpus and\\nwhen the district court issued its order granting Aliβs petition, the IJ had issued an\\norder of removal ordering Aliβs deportation to Iraq. The district court denied Sheriff\\nBrottβs motion because the IJβs order was provisional and not final until affirmed by\\nthe Board of Immigration Appeals. The district court ordered Ali released within\\nthirty days from the date of the district courtβs original grant of Aliβs petition.\\n -4-\\n\\fappeal. We granted a temporary stay until further order of the court, directed the\\nparties to file simultaneous briefs on the merits, and set the case for oral argument.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n Whether we can affirm the district courtβs grant of Aliβs habeas petition turns\\non the language of 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a) and application of the Due Process Clause of\\nthe Fifth Amendment in the context of the statute. For the reasons set forth below,\\nwe vacate the order of the district court directing release of Ali and remand for further\\nproceedings.\\n\\n We begin by reference to the applicable federal statute, which first provides,\\nβan alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to\\nbe removed from the United States.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1226(a). The statute goes on to\\nβgenerally give[] the Secretary [of Homeland Security] the discretion either to detain\\nthe alien or to release him on bond or parole.β Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959\\n(2019). βIf the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at\\nthe Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both\\nexercising power delegated by the Secretary).β Id. at 959β60 (citing 8 C.F.R.\\n§§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)(1)).\\n\\n At issue here is whether, in order to avoid due process concerns, this court must\\nconstrue the statute as containing an implied βreasonablenessβ limit on pre-order\\ndetention similar to that found by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691,\\n699, with respect to the post-detention statute, 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1231(a)(6).\\n\\n Application of the canon of constitutional avoidance to imply terms in a statute\\nthat do not exist in its text is necessarily a serious matter implicating the proper role\\nof the judiciary. Although a matter of first impression in this circuit, we do not\\napproach this question with a blank slate. The Supreme Court recently re-\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\femphasized, in a case discussing the same statutory framework, that a court may not\\nresort to constitutional avoidance unless certain criteria are met. First, the canon\\nshould only be used β[w]hen βa serious doubtβ is raised about the constitutionality of\\nan act of Congress.β Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 971 (alteration in original) (quoting\\nJennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018)). Even then, a court may not resort\\nto constitutional avoidance unless it first concludes the statute is βsusceptible of more\\nthan one construction.β Id. at 972 (quoting same). βThe canon βhas no applicationβ\\nabsent βambiguity.ββ Id. (quoting Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014)).\\n\\n To begin with, we are skeptical of Aliβs argument that his detention pending\\na decision on whether he is to be removed under Β§ 1226(a) is unconstitutional\\nconsidering he was given a bond hearing and still has available procedural avenues\\nto seek relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The Supreme\\nCourt has never indicated the bond hearing process set forth in the statute and\\naccompanying regulations is constitutionally deficient. To the contrary, Supreme\\nCourt precedent indicates such a framework is constitutionally permissible. See\\nDemore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (explaining βthis Court has recognized\\ndetention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the\\ndeportation processβ); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 755 (1987)\\n(holding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not facially violate the Due Process Clause\\nof the Fifth Amendment and, noting in support of its conclusion, it had previously\\nβfound no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous\\nresident aliens pending deportation proceedingsβ). Indeed, we find it noteworthy that\\naliens challenging the constitutionality of their detentions in Jennings and Demore\\nsought, as a remedy, a bond hearing similar to what Ali was given. See Jennings, 138\\nS. Ct. at 839; Demore, 538 U.S. at 517, 528.\\n\\n Regardless, even if we assume that despite the safeguard of a bond hearing\\nthere is a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of detention under Β§ 1226(a), the\\ncanon of constitutional avoidance is not proper here because the statute is not\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fsusceptible to more than one construction as to the length of detention. In contrast\\nto the statute analyzed in Zadvydas, Β§ 1226(a) limits the period of detention to the\\nperiod βpending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United\\nStates.β While this is not subject to precise calculation, it is, nonetheless, a defined\\nperiod that does have an end. Cf. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (reasoning Β§ 1226(c)\\nis not ambiguous or even silent regarding the length of detention because it mandates\\ndetention pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the country);\\nDemore, 538 U.S. at 528β29 (noting that unlike the detention at issue in Zadvydas,\\nwhich was indefinite and potentially permanent, detention under Β§ 1226(c) has a\\nβdefinite termination pointβ and is of a βshorter durationβ).\\n\\n It is significant the Supreme Court has found unambiguous the language of\\nΒ§ 1226(c), which requires mandatory detention until a decision regarding removal is\\nreached, and therefore has refused to use constitutional avoidance to read an extra-\\ntextual βreasonablenessβ limitation into the statute. We see no principled basis for\\nviewing Β§ 1226(a)βs text regarding the length of detention any differently. The\\nprimary difference between the two subsections of the statute is the availability of a\\nbond hearing for aliens held under subsection (a). And this difference, which gives\\naliens like Ali more protection against prolonged detention than aliens detained under\\nΒ§ 1226(c), militates against reading a reasonableness limitation into Β§ 1226(a)\\nbecause it makes the statute less likely to violate their due process rights.\\n\\n In light of this precedent, we hold Β§ 1226(a) is not susceptible of more than one\\nconstruction. As a result, the constitutional avoidance doctrine has no application\\nhere. The district court therefore erred when it concluded pre-removal order\\ndetention under Β§ 1226(a) is limited to βthe period reasonably necessary to receive\\na removal decision.β We reverse the district courtβs order on this basis.\\n\\n The analysis does not end here, however. In his petition, Ali argued his\\ncontinued detention violated not only Β§ 1226(a), but his constitutional rights under\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fthe Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As in Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851, we conclude\\nthis matter should be remanded to the district court to further consider Aliβs\\nconstitutional arguments consistent with this decision and relevant Supreme Court\\nprecedent.3\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Sheriff Brott filed a Motion to Strike Aliβs Rule 28(j) filing on the ground it\\nimproperly provides argument and analysis rather than merely setting forth pertinent\\nand significant authorities which came to his attention after his brief was filed. Fed.\\nR. App. P. 28(j). Because our analysis made it unnecessary to consider the arguments\\nadvanced in Aliβs filing, we deny the motion as moot.\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1793,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4611415,"string":"4,611,415"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Octavious Tajuan STOVALL, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Octavious Stovall"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2298"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2298\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Octavious Tajuan Stovall\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\\n Filed: April 18, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Octavious T. Stovall pled guilty to distribution of methamphetamine, in\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). The district court1 sentenced him as a career\\noffender to 120 monthsβ imprisonment. He appeals the career offender determination\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\funder U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\\naffirms.\\n\\n The Sentencing Guidelines enhance a defendantβs base level if the defendant\\nhas βat least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1(a). Stovall concedes he has one conviction\\nfor a controlled substance offense. However, he maintains his Arkansas convictions\\nfor aggravated assault and robbery are not crimes of violence. This court reviews the\\nissue de novo. See United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a βcrime of violenceβ is any offense βunder\\nfederal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that\\n. . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\\nagainst the person of another,β or is one of a list of enumerated offenses (including\\nrobbery). U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a).2 Determining whether Arkansas robbery is a crime\\nof violence, this court focuses on the elements of the crime, considering whether βthe\\nstate statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic\\nfederal definition of a corresponding crime of violence.β United States v. Kosmes,\\n792 F.3d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 2015). The ββgenericβ federal definition of a crime of\\nviolence . . . mean[s] the sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes\\nof most States.β Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Taylor v. United\\nStates, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (considering the βgeneric, contemporary meaningβ\\nof a crime).\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Before the 2016 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\\nrobbery was not an enumerated offense in the guidelines. However, the 2016\\nU.S.S.G. Manual amended the guidelines, listing robbery as one of the enumerated\\noffenses under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovall was sentenced on June 11, 2018. The\\nPresentence Investigation Report indicates that his sentence was computed using the\\n2016 edition of the U.S.S.G. Manual.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f βTo determine whether a crime falls within the enumerated-offenses clause,β\\nthis court begins βby identifying the elements of the generic enumerated offense.β\\nUnited States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2018). β[T]he\\nenumerated-offenses clause and its accompanying commentary do not define most of\\nthe generic offenses.β Id. But, β[t]he Supreme Court has explained that how βthe\\ncriminal codes of most Statesβ define an offense provides strong evidence of its\\ngeneric meaning.β Id. quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. In United States v. House,\\n825 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 2016), this court defined βgeneric robberyβ as βaggravated\\nlarceny, or the misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate\\ndanger to a person.β House, 825 F.3d at 387. See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d\\n1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (β[T]he generic form of robbery may be thought of as\\naggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property\\nunder circumstances involving [immediate] danger to the person.β) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted); United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th\\nCir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541\\n(5th Cir. 2013) (βAlthough the precise state definitions vary, the generic form of\\nrobbery βmay be thought of as aggravated larceny,β containing at least the elements\\nof βmisappropriation of property under circumstances involving [immediate] danger\\nto the person.ββ), quoting W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law Β§ 20.3(e) intro.,\\n(d)(2) (2d ed. 2003).\\n\\n At the time of Stovallβs conviction, Arkansas Code Annotated Β§ 5-12-102 said:\\n\\n (a) A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a\\n felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately\\n thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\\n upon another.\\n\\nBased on the plain language of the statute, Arkansas robbery has the same elements\\nas the generic definition of robbery.\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Arkansas case law confirms this. According to the Arkansas Supreme Court,\\nβin adopting the criminal code in 1975,β Arkansas changed the primary emphasis in\\nrobbery βfrom the taking of property to the threat of physical harm to the victim.β\\nMcElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Under Ark. Code Ann. Β§ 5-12-102, βthe gravamen of the crime of robbery\\nis the injury or threat of injury to the victim.β Richard v. State, 691 S.W. 2d 872, 874\\n(Ark. 1985). See McElyea, 200 S.W.3d at 883 (βWhat makes theft robbery is the use\\nof force.β).\\n\\n Relying on United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2016), Stovall\\nasserts his conviction does not meet the generic federal definition of robbery because\\nβimmediate danger to another person is not a necessary element of Arkansasβs\\nrobbery statute.β But Eason considered a different question than presented here.\\nThere, the court considered whether Arkansas robbery was a violent felony under the\\nforce clause of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e). Because the Arkansas Supreme Court previously\\nhad upheld a robbery conviction βwhere there was no threat of force and no actual\\ninjury,β this court held that βthe degree of physical force required to commit robbery\\nin Arkansasβ does not rise βto the level of physical force required to establish a crime\\nof violence for ACCA purposes.β Eason, 829 F.3d at 641-42.\\n\\n Eason does not control the analysis here where the question concerns the\\nenumerated clause of Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovallβs reasoning conflates the issues of (1)\\nwhether a conviction is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e), with (2) whether\\na conviction is an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2. The inquiry here is\\nnot whether the conviction involved the threat or use of βviolent force,β but rather\\nwhether the conviction is one for theft involving βimmediate danger.β The terms\\nβviolent forceβ and βimmediate dangerβ are not synonymous. While Stovall cites\\nArkansas cases that potentially involve actions insufficient to constitute βviolent\\nforceβ under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)βjerking a victimβs hand, blocking a victimβs exit,\\ncornering a victim, and grabbing a victimβs dressβthe actions are sufficient to\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fconstitute βimmediate danger.β See Parker v. State, 529 S.W. 2d 860, 863 (Ark.\\n1975) (β[T]he mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\\ntake it.β).\\n\\n Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction βfits within the generic federal\\ndefinition ofβ robbery. Kosmes, 792 F.3d at 975. See United States v. Farris, 312\\nFed. Appx. 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that Arkansas aggravated robbery is a\\ncrime of violence because βthe Arkansas aggravated robbery statute, like the\\nArkansas robbery statute, corresponds to the generic, contemporary meaning of\\nrobbery as it involves misappropriation of property under circumstances involving\\ndanger to another personβ). The district court did not err in determining it was a\\ncrime of violence.3 See United States v. Jones, 384 Fed. Appx. 542, 542 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (affirming the career offender enhancement based on an Arkansas robbery\\nconviction because βa robbery specifically enumerated in Β§ 4B1.2 is a crime of\\nviolence for career offender purposesβ). See also Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244-45\\n(holding that Florida robberyβdefined as βthe taking of money or other property\\nwhich may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the\\nintent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the\\nmoney or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force,\\nviolence, assault, or putting in fearββmeets the generic federal definition of robbery).\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Because Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction is a crime of violence, this\\ncourt need not consider his Arkansas assault conviction.\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4388668/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611415/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Octavious Tajuan STOVALL, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2298\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Octavious Tajuan Stovall\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\n Filed: April 18, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Octavious T. Stovall pled guilty to distribution of methamphetamine, in\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). The district court1 sentenced him as a career\noffender to 120 monthsβ imprisonment. He appeals the career offender determination\n\n 1\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Arkansas.\n\funder U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\naffirms.\n\n The Sentencing Guidelines enhance a defendantβs base level if the defendant\nhas βat least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1(a). Stovall concedes he has one conviction\nfor a controlled substance offense. However, he maintains his Arkansas convictions\nfor aggravated assault and robbery are not crimes of violence. This court reviews the\nissue de novo. See United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 2017).\n\n Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a βcrime of violenceβ is any offense βunder\nfederal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that\n. . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\nagainst the person of another,β or is one of a list of enumerated offenses (including\nrobbery). U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a).2 Determining whether Arkansas robbery is a crime\nof violence, this court focuses on the elements of the crime, considering whether βthe\nstate statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic\nfederal definition of a corresponding crime of violence.β United States v. Kosmes,\n792 F.3d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 2015). The ββgenericβ federal definition of a crime of\nviolence . . . mean[s] the sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes\nof most States.β Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Taylor v. United\nStates, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (considering the βgeneric, contemporary meaningβ\nof a crime).\n\n\n\n 2\n Before the 2016 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\nrobbery was not an enumerated offense in the guidelines. However, the 2016\nU.S.S.G. Manual amended the guidelines, listing robbery as one of the enumerated\noffenses under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovall was sentenced on June 11, 2018. The\nPresentence Investigation Report indicates that his sentence was computed using the\n2016 edition of the U.S.S.G. Manual.\n\n -2-\n\f βTo determine whether a crime falls within the enumerated-offenses clause,β\nthis court begins βby identifying the elements of the generic enumerated offense.β\nUnited States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2018). β[T]he\nenumerated-offenses clause and its accompanying commentary do not define most of\nthe generic offenses.β Id. But, β[t]he Supreme Court has explained that how βthe\ncriminal codes of most Statesβ define an offense provides strong evidence of its\ngeneric meaning.β Id. quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. In United States v. House,\n825 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 2016), this court defined βgeneric robberyβ as βaggravated\nlarceny, or the misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate\ndanger to a person.β House, 825 F.3d at 387. See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d\n1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (β[T]he generic form of robbery may be thought of as\naggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property\nunder circumstances involving [immediate] danger to the person.β) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted); United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th\nCir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541\n(5th Cir. 2013) (βAlthough the precise state definitions vary, the generic form of\nrobbery βmay be thought of as aggravated larceny,β containing at least the elements\nof βmisappropriation of property under circumstances involving [immediate] danger\nto the person.ββ), quoting W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law Β§ 20.3(e) intro.,\n(d)(2) (2d ed. 2003).\n\n At the time of Stovallβs conviction, Arkansas Code Annotated Β§ 5-12-102 said:\n\n (a) A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a\n felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately\n thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\n upon another.\n\nBased on the plain language of the statute, Arkansas robbery has the same elements\nas the generic definition of robbery.\n\n\n -3-\n\f Arkansas case law confirms this. According to the Arkansas Supreme Court,\nβin adopting the criminal code in 1975,β Arkansas changed the primary emphasis in\nrobbery βfrom the taking of property to the threat of physical harm to the victim.β\nMcElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). Under Ark. Code Ann. Β§ 5-12-102, βthe gravamen of the crime of robbery\nis the injury or threat of injury to the victim.β Richard v. State, 691 S.W. 2d 872, 874\n(Ark. 1985). See McElyea, 200 S.W.3d at 883 (βWhat makes theft robbery is the use\nof force.β).\n\n Relying on United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2016), Stovall\nasserts his conviction does not meet the generic federal definition of robbery because\nβimmediate danger to another person is not a necessary element of Arkansasβs\nrobbery statute.β But Eason considered a different question than presented here.\nThere, the court considered whether Arkansas robbery was a violent felony under the\nforce clause of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e). Because the Arkansas Supreme Court previously\nhad upheld a robbery conviction βwhere there was no threat of force and no actual\ninjury,β this court held that βthe degree of physical force required to commit robbery\nin Arkansasβ does not rise βto the level of physical force required to establish a crime\nof violence for ACCA purposes.β Eason, 829 F.3d at 641-42.\n\n Eason does not control the analysis here where the question concerns the\nenumerated clause of Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovallβs reasoning conflates the issues of (1)\nwhether a conviction is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e), with (2) whether\na conviction is an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2. The inquiry here is\nnot whether the conviction involved the threat or use of βviolent force,β but rather\nwhether the conviction is one for theft involving βimmediate danger.β The terms\nβviolent forceβ and βimmediate dangerβ are not synonymous. While Stovall cites\nArkansas cases that potentially involve actions insufficient to constitute βviolent\nforceβ under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)βjerking a victimβs hand, blocking a victimβs exit,\ncornering a victim, and grabbing a victimβs dressβthe actions are sufficient to\n\n -4-\n\fconstitute βimmediate danger.β See Parker v. State, 529 S.W. 2d 860, 863 (Ark.\n1975) (β[T]he mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\ntake it.β).\n\n Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction βfits within the generic federal\ndefinition ofβ robbery. Kosmes, 792 F.3d at 975. See United States v. Farris, 312\nFed. Appx. 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that Arkansas aggravated robbery is a\ncrime of violence because βthe Arkansas aggravated robbery statute, like the\nArkansas robbery statute, corresponds to the generic, contemporary meaning of\nrobbery as it involves misappropriation of property under circumstances involving\ndanger to another personβ). The district court did not err in determining it was a\ncrime of violence.3 See United States v. Jones, 384 Fed. Appx. 542, 542 (8th Cir.\n2010) (affirming the career offender enhancement based on an Arkansas robbery\nconviction because βa robbery specifically enumerated in Β§ 4B1.2 is a crime of\nviolence for career offender purposesβ). See also Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244-45\n(holding that Florida robberyβdefined as βthe taking of money or other property\nwhich may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the\nintent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the\nmoney or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force,\nviolence, assault, or putting in fearββmeets the generic federal definition of robbery).\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n 3\n Because Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction is a crime of violence, this\ncourt need not consider his Arkansas assault conviction.\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Octavious Tajuan STOVALL, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2298\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Octavious Tajuan Stovall\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 18, 2019\\n Filed: April 18, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Octavious T. Stovall pled guilty to distribution of methamphetamine, in\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1). The district court1 sentenced him as a career\\noffender to 120 monthsβ imprisonment. He appeals the career offender determination\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\funder U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291, this court\\naffirms.\\n\\n The Sentencing Guidelines enhance a defendantβs base level if the defendant\\nhas βat least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.1(a). Stovall concedes he has one conviction\\nfor a controlled substance offense. However, he maintains his Arkansas convictions\\nfor aggravated assault and robbery are not crimes of violence. This court reviews the\\nissue de novo. See United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a βcrime of violenceβ is any offense βunder\\nfederal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that\\n. . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\\nagainst the person of another,β or is one of a list of enumerated offenses (including\\nrobbery). U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a).2 Determining whether Arkansas robbery is a crime\\nof violence, this court focuses on the elements of the crime, considering whether βthe\\nstate statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic\\nfederal definition of a corresponding crime of violence.β United States v. Kosmes,\\n792 F.3d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 2015). The ββgenericβ federal definition of a crime of\\nviolence . . . mean[s] the sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes\\nof most States.β Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Taylor v. United\\nStates, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (considering the βgeneric, contemporary meaningβ\\nof a crime).\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Before the 2016 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual,\\nrobbery was not an enumerated offense in the guidelines. However, the 2016\\nU.S.S.G. Manual amended the guidelines, listing robbery as one of the enumerated\\noffenses under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovall was sentenced on June 11, 2018. The\\nPresentence Investigation Report indicates that his sentence was computed using the\\n2016 edition of the U.S.S.G. Manual.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f βTo determine whether a crime falls within the enumerated-offenses clause,β\\nthis court begins βby identifying the elements of the generic enumerated offense.β\\nUnited States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2018). β[T]he\\nenumerated-offenses clause and its accompanying commentary do not define most of\\nthe generic offenses.β Id. But, β[t]he Supreme Court has explained that how βthe\\ncriminal codes of most Statesβ define an offense provides strong evidence of its\\ngeneric meaning.β Id. quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. In United States v. House,\\n825 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 2016), this court defined βgeneric robberyβ as βaggravated\\nlarceny, or the misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate\\ndanger to a person.β House, 825 F.3d at 387. See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d\\n1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (β[T]he generic form of robbery may be thought of as\\naggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property\\nunder circumstances involving [immediate] danger to the person.β) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted); United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th\\nCir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541\\n(5th Cir. 2013) (βAlthough the precise state definitions vary, the generic form of\\nrobbery βmay be thought of as aggravated larceny,β containing at least the elements\\nof βmisappropriation of property under circumstances involving [immediate] danger\\nto the person.ββ), quoting W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law Β§ 20.3(e) intro.,\\n(d)(2) (2d ed. 2003).\\n\\n At the time of Stovallβs conviction, Arkansas Code Annotated Β§ 5-12-102 said:\\n\\n (a) A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a\\n felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately\\n thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\\n upon another.\\n\\nBased on the plain language of the statute, Arkansas robbery has the same elements\\nas the generic definition of robbery.\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Arkansas case law confirms this. According to the Arkansas Supreme Court,\\nβin adopting the criminal code in 1975,β Arkansas changed the primary emphasis in\\nrobbery βfrom the taking of property to the threat of physical harm to the victim.β\\nMcElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Under Ark. Code Ann. Β§ 5-12-102, βthe gravamen of the crime of robbery\\nis the injury or threat of injury to the victim.β Richard v. State, 691 S.W. 2d 872, 874\\n(Ark. 1985). See McElyea, 200 S.W.3d at 883 (βWhat makes theft robbery is the use\\nof force.β).\\n\\n Relying on United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2016), Stovall\\nasserts his conviction does not meet the generic federal definition of robbery because\\nβimmediate danger to another person is not a necessary element of Arkansasβs\\nrobbery statute.β But Eason considered a different question than presented here.\\nThere, the court considered whether Arkansas robbery was a violent felony under the\\nforce clause of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e). Because the Arkansas Supreme Court previously\\nhad upheld a robbery conviction βwhere there was no threat of force and no actual\\ninjury,β this court held that βthe degree of physical force required to commit robbery\\nin Arkansasβ does not rise βto the level of physical force required to establish a crime\\nof violence for ACCA purposes.β Eason, 829 F.3d at 641-42.\\n\\n Eason does not control the analysis here where the question concerns the\\nenumerated clause of Β§ 4B1.2(a). Stovallβs reasoning conflates the issues of (1)\\nwhether a conviction is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e), with (2) whether\\na conviction is an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. Β§ 4B1.2. The inquiry here is\\nnot whether the conviction involved the threat or use of βviolent force,β but rather\\nwhether the conviction is one for theft involving βimmediate danger.β The terms\\nβviolent forceβ and βimmediate dangerβ are not synonymous. While Stovall cites\\nArkansas cases that potentially involve actions insufficient to constitute βviolent\\nforceβ under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e)βjerking a victimβs hand, blocking a victimβs exit,\\ncornering a victim, and grabbing a victimβs dressβthe actions are sufficient to\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fconstitute βimmediate danger.β See Parker v. State, 529 S.W. 2d 860, 863 (Ark.\\n1975) (β[T]he mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\\ntake it.β).\\n\\n Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction βfits within the generic federal\\ndefinition ofβ robbery. Kosmes, 792 F.3d at 975. See United States v. Farris, 312\\nFed. Appx. 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that Arkansas aggravated robbery is a\\ncrime of violence because βthe Arkansas aggravated robbery statute, like the\\nArkansas robbery statute, corresponds to the generic, contemporary meaning of\\nrobbery as it involves misappropriation of property under circumstances involving\\ndanger to another personβ). The district court did not err in determining it was a\\ncrime of violence.3 See United States v. Jones, 384 Fed. Appx. 542, 542 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (affirming the career offender enhancement based on an Arkansas robbery\\nconviction because βa robbery specifically enumerated in Β§ 4B1.2 is a crime of\\nviolence for career offender purposesβ). See also Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244-45\\n(holding that Florida robberyβdefined as βthe taking of money or other property\\nwhich may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the\\nintent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the\\nmoney or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force,\\nviolence, assault, or putting in fearββmeets the generic federal definition of robbery).\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Because Stovallβs Arkansas robbery conviction is a crime of violence, this\\ncourt need not consider his Arkansas assault conviction.\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1794,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4611416,"string":"4,611,416"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"NATIONAL ELEVATOR BARGAINING ASSOCIATION; Kone, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS; Local Union No. 33, Defendants - Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Nat'l Elevator Bargaining Ass'n v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1584"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1584\\n ___________________________\\n\\n National Elevator Bargaining Association; Kone, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n International Union of Elevator Constructors; Local Union No. 33\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: April 18, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The International Union of Elevator Constructors (βIUECβ) appeals the order\\nof the district court vacating an arbitration award originally in favor of the IUEC.\\nBecause the arbitration award drew its essence from the contract, we reverse.\\n\\fI. Background\\n\\n The IUEC is a union of workers who install, repair and maintain elevators,\\nescalators and related equipment throughout the United States and Canada. The\\nIUEC and the National Elevator Bargaining Association (βNEBAβ) are parties to a\\nnationwide multi-employer collective bargaining agreement (βCBAβ); Kone, Inc. a\\nmajor elevator company that belongs to the NEBA, is a party to the CBA. The CBA\\ngoverns many aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including hiring and\\nthe payment of travel expenses.\\n\\n The CBA provides for an arrangement known as a βhiring hallβ which enables\\nemployment on an intermittent, job-by-job basis on projects that are frequently\\nseparated in location and time. Under the CBA, Kone must use the hiring hall\\nprocedure for both experienced and inexperienced (βApprenticeβ) job applicants. The\\nApprentice list consists of applicants evaluated and ranked in accordance with the\\nselection procedures of the local Joint Apprentice Committee (βJACβ), which is made\\nup of representatives of both labor and management. Apprentices are ranked in\\nnumerical order, and upon request of an employer, the union must sendβand the\\nemployer must acceptβthe next applicant on the list. Local 33 covers a large area\\nencompassing Western Illinois, Iowa, South Dakota and parts of Nebraska. Given\\nthis geographic footprint it is not unusual that employee applicants are from time to\\ntime required to travel long distances from their homes to the assigned employer.\\n\\n Alex Thompson, of Rapid City, South Dakota, was the highest-ranked\\nApprentice applicant on the JACβs list when Koneβs supervisor in Des Moines called\\nLocal 33 and requested an Apprentice for a job. Koneβs supervisor originally\\nquestioned Thompsonβs distance from the jobsite but ultimately accepted him.\\nDuring a telephone conversation on Friday, August 16, 2013, Thompson was told to\\npresent himself at Koneβs Des Moines office at 7 a.m. the following Monday.\\nThompson made the 615-mile trip in 10 hours and spent Sunday night at a motel, in\\n\\n -2-\\n\\forder to present himself at the Kone office as instructed. At the office he was given\\na drug test and spent time watching orientation videos before beginning work as an\\nApprentice. Thompson submitted a claim for reimbursement including claims for\\n$295.35 for overtime travel and $386.46 for mileage; Kone refused to pay the claims.\\nLocal 33 grieved the issue but Kone held fast in its refusal on the ground that\\nThompson was not an employee at the time of travel and not entitled to\\nreimbursement of travel expenses. When the parties were unable to resolve the\\ndispute it was submitted to arbitration.\\n\\n Following a four-day hearing the arbitrator determined that Kone was required\\nto pay the travel expenses. The arbitrator considered Art. XIII of the CBA, which\\nreads in part: βWhen Elevator Constructors are sent outside the primary jurisdiction,\\nbut within the zoned area of the secondary, travel time and travel expense shall be\\npaid in accordance with the Local Expense Agreement.β He turned next to the\\nquestion of whether Thompson, as an Apprentice, fell under the definition of\\nβElevator Constructor.β To answer that question, he turned to Art. II, Par. 1 of the\\nCBA (βRecognition Clauseβ), which provides:\\n\\n The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive Section 9(a)\\n bargaining representative for all Elevator Constructor Mechanics,\\n Elevator Constructor Helpers, Elevator Constructor Apprentices\\n and Elevator Constructor Assistant Mechanics (hereinafter referred\\n to sometimes as βMechanics, Helpers, Apprentices and Assistant\\n Mechanicsβ or collectively as βElevator Constructor(s)β) in the\\n employ of the Employers engaged in the installation, repair,\\n modernization, maintenance and servicing of all equipment referred to\\n in Article IV, Par. 2 and Article IV (A).\\n\\n(emphasis added). Based on the emphasized language, the arbitrator concluded that\\nthe term βElevator Constructor,β as used in Art. XIII, included an Apprentice who is\\ndispatched to a new job location pursuant to the CBAβs hiring hall procedure.\\nAccording to the arbitrator:\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f [U]nder Article XIII it does not matter for what purpose the Company\\n directed Mr. Thompson to undertake that 615 mile trip travel, i.e., it is\\n enough that Kone managers ordered, directed or βsentβ this Elevator\\n Constructor to travel outside of his primary jurisdiction but within the\\n zoned area of his secondary. Article XIII posits no difference\\n whatsoever between being ordered to undertake such travel time and\\n expenses to report to a job site or to report to Company offices for\\n pre-employment drug testing, personnel processing, orientation or job\\n briefing.\\n\\n Kone appealed, and the district court vacated the award, determining that the\\narbitrator had failed to consider the βin the employ of Employersβ key contractual\\nlanguage. The district court concluded that the arbitrator in quoting Art. II, Par. 1 of\\nthe CBA for the definition of Elevator Constructor had failed to consider the βthe\\nemploy of the Employersβ limitation. The district court found the omission highly\\nrelevant, stating:\\n\\n The arbitrator entirely omitted the qualification that βElevator\\n Constructorsβ be βin the employ of the Employers.β The arbitrator did\\n not indicate his omission with ellipses, did not discuss the phrase during\\n any part of his analysis, and did not explain why he omitted it. βIn the\\n employ of the Employersβ is a limitation in Article II, Paragraph 1 the\\n parties bargained for. In order for an award to draw its essence from the\\n partiesβ agreements, the arbitrator must consider the entirety of the\\n partiesβ agreementsβincluding the phrase βin the employ of the\\n Employers.β\\n\\nThe union appeals seeking the reinstatement of the arbitratorβs award.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n This court reviews the district courtβs order vacating an arbitral award de novo.\\nPSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fIndus. & Serv. Workers Intβl Union, Local No. 11-770, 763 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (quoting Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn Conference, Intβl Bhd. of\\nTeamsters & Local Union No. 77βP, 729 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 2013)). Review of\\nan arbitratorβs award is highly deferential; it may be set aside only where the\\narbitratorβs decision does not βdraw[] its essence from the collective bargaining\\nagreement.β United Paperworkers Intβl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)\\n(quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597\\n(1960)). βWe will not βreconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may\\nallege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.ββ\\nBureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Commcβn Intβl Union, Local 1B, 284 F.3d 821,\\n824 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36). βIndeed, we must confirm the\\naward even if we are convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, so βlong\\nas the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting\\nwithin the scope of his authority.ββ Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus.,\\nChem. & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir.\\n2002) (quoting Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824).\\n\\n Applying Boise Cascade and George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food &\\nCommercial Workers, 879 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1989), the district court held that the\\narbitrator ignored clear and unambiguous language by excluding the modifying\\nphrase βin the employ of the Employer,β which the district court found to be a\\nmaterial omission of critical contract terminology. We disagree.\\n\\n Boise Cascade involved a dispute over the companyβs Last Chance Agreement,\\nwhich placed special conditions on employees who had previously violated company\\nrules. The dispute centered around whether an employee could be fired only for\\nviolating the companyβs published rules, or whether violations of unwritten rules\\nwere also grounds for termination. The contract stated: β[Y]ou must understand that\\nit is your responsibility and obligation to follow all published policies and\\nprocedures. Further violation of any mill rules and/or failure to comply with the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fTerms and Conditions of this Letter could result in your immediate termination . . . .β\\nId. at 1078 (emphases added). The arbitrator in Boise Cascade found that the phrase\\nβany mill rulesβ in the second sentence referred only to published rules. While we\\nconcluded that this may have been a plausible interpretation, we held that the\\narbitratorβs interpretation did not draw its essence from the agreement because he\\nfailed to βdiscuss the language concerning βany mill rules,β did not recognize its\\nambiguity, and consequently did not consider other evidence of the partiesβ intent.β\\nId. at 1084. βHad he done so, yet still reached the same result, his decision would\\nhave rested on a legitimate interpretation of the partiesβ agreement.β Id.\\n\\n The type of ambiguity that rendered the Boise Cascade award subject to\\nvacation is not present here. The plain language of Art. II, Par. 1 reveals that it is not\\nprimarily a definitional provision as the District Court viewed it, but rather a\\nRecognition Clause. Simply stated it is a standard term in the CBA that defines the\\ngroup represented by the Union for bargaining purposes. Under federal law the group\\nmay only be made up of employees, because the union may not represent people who\\nare not employees within the bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. Β§ 159 (1959). In specifying\\nthat the union is the bargaining representative only for Elevator Constructors βin the\\nemploy of the Employer,β the CBA represents the unambiguous intent of the parties\\nto define the bargaining unit and to exclude those employed by other entitiesβfor\\nexample, any contractors employed by the entity that hires Kone to effectuate the\\nelevator repairs.\\n\\n This is not to say that only Elevator Constructors who are employees can\\nreceive benefits from the agreement; CBAs often provide benefits for individuals who\\nare not currently in the bargaining unit, such as retired employees. See, e.g., Maytag\\nCorp. v. Intβl Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 687 F.3d\\n1076 (8th Cir. 2012). Or, as in this case, CBAs provide procedures for qualifying and\\nhiring future employees. See, e.g., Intβl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545\\nv. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2004). Even though Alex Thompson\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwas not a member of the bargaining unit when he was instructed by Kone to travel\\nfrom Rapid City to Des Moines, he is entitled to travel pay. That determination is\\ngoverned by Art. XIII, which covers all Elevator Constructors, not just those that are\\ncurrent Kone employees.\\n\\n Hormel dealt with a dispute with regard to whether the CBA required that all\\nhog slaughtering in a plant leased by the employer to another company be performed\\nby bargaining unit members. 879 F.2d at 348-49. The arbitrator in Hormel failed to\\ndiscuss a section of the CBA that precisely addressed leasing rights, and instead\\nrelied solely on the CBAβs Recognition Clause in making its determination. Id. at\\n351. The Recognition Clause in Hormel, on its own, seemed to indicate that the\\nemployer retained exclusive rights to subcontract, and therefore was not required to\\nhire bargaining unit members at leased plants. Id. at 349-350. However, we\\nconcluded that the language in the section unaddressed by the arbitratorβwhen read\\ntogether with the Recognition Clauseβcreated an ambiguity with regard to whether\\nor not the employer, in fact, had an absolute right to subcontract work done in leased\\nfacilities. Id. at 351. We therefore vacated the arbitration award in Hormel because\\nthe arbitrator βfail[ed] to discuss a probative contract term and at the same time\\noffer[ed] no clear basis for how he construed the contract to reach his decision\\nwithout such consideration.β Id.\\n\\n Here, the Recognition Clause was not intended to limit conferred benefits\\nsolely to the bargaining unit. The arbitrator appropriately considered the relevant\\nlanguage of the Recognition Clause, even though it did not quote the Recognition\\nClause in its entirety. Comparing the relevant section of the Recognition Clause with\\nArt. XIII creates no inconsistency or ambiguity with regard to who should receive\\ncompensation for travel expenses.\\n\\n Kone presented several other arguments below that the district court found\\nunnecessary to consider. On appeal, Kone repeats these claims as alternative grounds\\n\\n -7-\\n\\ffor affirmance. Each of these alternative grounds are unavailing as all require us to\\nreconsider the merits of the arbitration award, which we are not authorized to do. See\\nsupra Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824. Each of the alternative grounds involves\\nclaims that the arbitrator issued an award that failed to draw its essence from the\\ncontract and rests on the arbitratorβs own notions of industrial justice. A close review\\nof the claims reveals the falsity of this argument. Each of the provisions as construed\\nby the arbitrator were interpreted in the light of the CBA and were firmly rooted in\\nthe essence of the contract.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling by the district court and\\nremand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4388669/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611416/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: NATIONAL ELEVATOR BARGAINING ASSOCIATION; Kone, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS; Local Union No. 33, Defendants - Appellants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1584\n ___________________________\n\n National Elevator Bargaining Association; Kone, Inc.\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n International Union of Elevator Constructors; Local Union No. 33\n\n Defendants - Appellants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: April 18, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n The International Union of Elevator Constructors (βIUECβ) appeals the order\nof the district court vacating an arbitration award originally in favor of the IUEC.\nBecause the arbitration award drew its essence from the contract, we reverse.\n\fI. Background\n\n The IUEC is a union of workers who install, repair and maintain elevators,\nescalators and related equipment throughout the United States and Canada. The\nIUEC and the National Elevator Bargaining Association (βNEBAβ) are parties to a\nnationwide multi-employer collective bargaining agreement (βCBAβ); Kone, Inc. a\nmajor elevator company that belongs to the NEBA, is a party to the CBA. The CBA\ngoverns many aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including hiring and\nthe payment of travel expenses.\n\n The CBA provides for an arrangement known as a βhiring hallβ which enables\nemployment on an intermittent, job-by-job basis on projects that are frequently\nseparated in location and time. Under the CBA, Kone must use the hiring hall\nprocedure for both experienced and inexperienced (βApprenticeβ) job applicants. The\nApprentice list consists of applicants evaluated and ranked in accordance with the\nselection procedures of the local Joint Apprentice Committee (βJACβ), which is made\nup of representatives of both labor and management. Apprentices are ranked in\nnumerical order, and upon request of an employer, the union must sendβand the\nemployer must acceptβthe next applicant on the list. Local 33 covers a large area\nencompassing Western Illinois, Iowa, South Dakota and parts of Nebraska. Given\nthis geographic footprint it is not unusual that employee applicants are from time to\ntime required to travel long distances from their homes to the assigned employer.\n\n Alex Thompson, of Rapid City, South Dakota, was the highest-ranked\nApprentice applicant on the JACβs list when Koneβs supervisor in Des Moines called\nLocal 33 and requested an Apprentice for a job. Koneβs supervisor originally\nquestioned Thompsonβs distance from the jobsite but ultimately accepted him.\nDuring a telephone conversation on Friday, August 16, 2013, Thompson was told to\npresent himself at Koneβs Des Moines office at 7 a.m. the following Monday.\nThompson made the 615-mile trip in 10 hours and spent Sunday night at a motel, in\n\n -2-\n\forder to present himself at the Kone office as instructed. At the office he was given\na drug test and spent time watching orientation videos before beginning work as an\nApprentice. Thompson submitted a claim for reimbursement including claims for\n$295.35 for overtime travel and $386.46 for mileage; Kone refused to pay the claims.\nLocal 33 grieved the issue but Kone held fast in its refusal on the ground that\nThompson was not an employee at the time of travel and not entitled to\nreimbursement of travel expenses. When the parties were unable to resolve the\ndispute it was submitted to arbitration.\n\n Following a four-day hearing the arbitrator determined that Kone was required\nto pay the travel expenses. The arbitrator considered Art. XIII of the CBA, which\nreads in part: βWhen Elevator Constructors are sent outside the primary jurisdiction,\nbut within the zoned area of the secondary, travel time and travel expense shall be\npaid in accordance with the Local Expense Agreement.β He turned next to the\nquestion of whether Thompson, as an Apprentice, fell under the definition of\nβElevator Constructor.β To answer that question, he turned to Art. II, Par. 1 of the\nCBA (βRecognition Clauseβ), which provides:\n\n The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive Section 9(a)\n bargaining representative for all Elevator Constructor Mechanics,\n Elevator Constructor Helpers, Elevator Constructor Apprentices\n and Elevator Constructor Assistant Mechanics (hereinafter referred\n to sometimes as βMechanics, Helpers, Apprentices and Assistant\n Mechanicsβ or collectively as βElevator Constructor(s)β) in the\n employ of the Employers engaged in the installation, repair,\n modernization, maintenance and servicing of all equipment referred to\n in Article IV, Par. 2 and Article IV (A).\n\n(emphasis added). Based on the emphasized language, the arbitrator concluded that\nthe term βElevator Constructor,β as used in Art. XIII, included an Apprentice who is\ndispatched to a new job location pursuant to the CBAβs hiring hall procedure.\nAccording to the arbitrator:\n\n -3-\n\f [U]nder Article XIII it does not matter for what purpose the Company\n directed Mr. Thompson to undertake that 615 mile trip travel, i.e., it is\n enough that Kone managers ordered, directed or βsentβ this Elevator\n Constructor to travel outside of his primary jurisdiction but within the\n zoned area of his secondary. Article XIII posits no difference\n whatsoever between being ordered to undertake such travel time and\n expenses to report to a job site or to report to Company offices for\n pre-employment drug testing, personnel processing, orientation or job\n briefing.\n\n Kone appealed, and the district court vacated the award, determining that the\narbitrator had failed to consider the βin the employ of Employersβ key contractual\nlanguage. The district court concluded that the arbitrator in quoting Art. II, Par. 1 of\nthe CBA for the definition of Elevator Constructor had failed to consider the βthe\nemploy of the Employersβ limitation. The district court found the omission highly\nrelevant, stating:\n\n The arbitrator entirely omitted the qualification that βElevator\n Constructorsβ be βin the employ of the Employers.β The arbitrator did\n not indicate his omission with ellipses, did not discuss the phrase during\n any part of his analysis, and did not explain why he omitted it. βIn the\n employ of the Employersβ is a limitation in Article II, Paragraph 1 the\n parties bargained for. In order for an award to draw its essence from the\n partiesβ agreements, the arbitrator must consider the entirety of the\n partiesβ agreementsβincluding the phrase βin the employ of the\n Employers.β\n\nThe union appeals seeking the reinstatement of the arbitratorβs award.\n\nII. Discussion\n\n This court reviews the district courtβs order vacating an arbitral award de novo.\nPSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied\n\n\n -4-\n\fIndus. & Serv. Workers Intβl Union, Local No. 11-770, 763 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.\n2014) (quoting Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn Conference, Intβl Bhd. of\nTeamsters & Local Union No. 77βP, 729 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 2013)). Review of\nan arbitratorβs award is highly deferential; it may be set aside only where the\narbitratorβs decision does not βdraw[] its essence from the collective bargaining\nagreement.β United Paperworkers Intβl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)\n(quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597\n(1960)). βWe will not βreconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may\nallege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.ββ\nBureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Commcβn Intβl Union, Local 1B, 284 F.3d 821,\n824 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36). βIndeed, we must confirm the\naward even if we are convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, so βlong\nas the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting\nwithin the scope of his authority.ββ Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus.,\nChem. & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir.\n2002) (quoting Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824).\n\n Applying Boise Cascade and George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food &\nCommercial Workers, 879 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1989), the district court held that the\narbitrator ignored clear and unambiguous language by excluding the modifying\nphrase βin the employ of the Employer,β which the district court found to be a\nmaterial omission of critical contract terminology. We disagree.\n\n Boise Cascade involved a dispute over the companyβs Last Chance Agreement,\nwhich placed special conditions on employees who had previously violated company\nrules. The dispute centered around whether an employee could be fired only for\nviolating the companyβs published rules, or whether violations of unwritten rules\nwere also grounds for termination. The contract stated: β[Y]ou must understand that\nit is your responsibility and obligation to follow all published policies and\nprocedures. Further violation of any mill rules and/or failure to comply with the\n\n -5-\n\fTerms and Conditions of this Letter could result in your immediate termination . . . .β\nId. at 1078 (emphases added). The arbitrator in Boise Cascade found that the phrase\nβany mill rulesβ in the second sentence referred only to published rules. While we\nconcluded that this may have been a plausible interpretation, we held that the\narbitratorβs interpretation did not draw its essence from the agreement because he\nfailed to βdiscuss the language concerning βany mill rules,β did not recognize its\nambiguity, and consequently did not consider other evidence of the partiesβ intent.β\nId. at 1084. βHad he done so, yet still reached the same result, his decision would\nhave rested on a legitimate interpretation of the partiesβ agreement.β Id.\n\n The type of ambiguity that rendered the Boise Cascade award subject to\nvacation is not present here. The plain language of Art. II, Par. 1 reveals that it is not\nprimarily a definitional provision as the District Court viewed it, but rather a\nRecognition Clause. Simply stated it is a standard term in the CBA that defines the\ngroup represented by the Union for bargaining purposes. Under federal law the group\nmay only be made up of employees, because the union may not represent people who\nare not employees within the bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. Β§ 159 (1959). In specifying\nthat the union is the bargaining representative only for Elevator Constructors βin the\nemploy of the Employer,β the CBA represents the unambiguous intent of the parties\nto define the bargaining unit and to exclude those employed by other entitiesβfor\nexample, any contractors employed by the entity that hires Kone to effectuate the\nelevator repairs.\n\n This is not to say that only Elevator Constructors who are employees can\nreceive benefits from the agreement; CBAs often provide benefits for individuals who\nare not currently in the bargaining unit, such as retired employees. See, e.g., Maytag\nCorp. v. Intβl Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 687 F.3d\n1076 (8th Cir. 2012). Or, as in this case, CBAs provide procedures for qualifying and\nhiring future employees. See, e.g., Intβl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545\nv. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2004). Even though Alex Thompson\n\n -6-\n\fwas not a member of the bargaining unit when he was instructed by Kone to travel\nfrom Rapid City to Des Moines, he is entitled to travel pay. That determination is\ngoverned by Art. XIII, which covers all Elevator Constructors, not just those that are\ncurrent Kone employees.\n\n Hormel dealt with a dispute with regard to whether the CBA required that all\nhog slaughtering in a plant leased by the employer to another company be performed\nby bargaining unit members. 879 F.2d at 348-49. The arbitrator in Hormel failed to\ndiscuss a section of the CBA that precisely addressed leasing rights, and instead\nrelied solely on the CBAβs Recognition Clause in making its determination. Id. at\n351. The Recognition Clause in Hormel, on its own, seemed to indicate that the\nemployer retained exclusive rights to subcontract, and therefore was not required to\nhire bargaining unit members at leased plants. Id. at 349-350. However, we\nconcluded that the language in the section unaddressed by the arbitratorβwhen read\ntogether with the Recognition Clauseβcreated an ambiguity with regard to whether\nor not the employer, in fact, had an absolute right to subcontract work done in leased\nfacilities. Id. at 351. We therefore vacated the arbitration award in Hormel because\nthe arbitrator βfail[ed] to discuss a probative contract term and at the same time\noffer[ed] no clear basis for how he construed the contract to reach his decision\nwithout such consideration.β Id.\n\n Here, the Recognition Clause was not intended to limit conferred benefits\nsolely to the bargaining unit. The arbitrator appropriately considered the relevant\nlanguage of the Recognition Clause, even though it did not quote the Recognition\nClause in its entirety. Comparing the relevant section of the Recognition Clause with\nArt. XIII creates no inconsistency or ambiguity with regard to who should receive\ncompensation for travel expenses.\n\n Kone presented several other arguments below that the district court found\nunnecessary to consider. On appeal, Kone repeats these claims as alternative grounds\n\n -7-\n\ffor affirmance. Each of these alternative grounds are unavailing as all require us to\nreconsider the merits of the arbitration award, which we are not authorized to do. See\nsupra Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824. Each of the alternative grounds involves\nclaims that the arbitrator issued an award that failed to draw its essence from the\ncontract and rests on the arbitratorβs own notions of industrial justice. A close review\nof the claims reveals the falsity of this argument. Each of the provisions as construed\nby the arbitrator were interpreted in the light of the CBA and were firmly rooted in\nthe essence of the contract.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling by the district court and\nremand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: NATIONAL ELEVATOR BARGAINING ASSOCIATION; Kone, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS; Local Union No. 33, Defendants - Appellants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1584\\n ___________________________\\n\\n National Elevator Bargaining Association; Kone, Inc.\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n International Union of Elevator Constructors; Local Union No. 33\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: April 18, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The International Union of Elevator Constructors (βIUECβ) appeals the order\\nof the district court vacating an arbitration award originally in favor of the IUEC.\\nBecause the arbitration award drew its essence from the contract, we reverse.\\n\\fI. Background\\n\\n The IUEC is a union of workers who install, repair and maintain elevators,\\nescalators and related equipment throughout the United States and Canada. The\\nIUEC and the National Elevator Bargaining Association (βNEBAβ) are parties to a\\nnationwide multi-employer collective bargaining agreement (βCBAβ); Kone, Inc. a\\nmajor elevator company that belongs to the NEBA, is a party to the CBA. The CBA\\ngoverns many aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including hiring and\\nthe payment of travel expenses.\\n\\n The CBA provides for an arrangement known as a βhiring hallβ which enables\\nemployment on an intermittent, job-by-job basis on projects that are frequently\\nseparated in location and time. Under the CBA, Kone must use the hiring hall\\nprocedure for both experienced and inexperienced (βApprenticeβ) job applicants. The\\nApprentice list consists of applicants evaluated and ranked in accordance with the\\nselection procedures of the local Joint Apprentice Committee (βJACβ), which is made\\nup of representatives of both labor and management. Apprentices are ranked in\\nnumerical order, and upon request of an employer, the union must sendβand the\\nemployer must acceptβthe next applicant on the list. Local 33 covers a large area\\nencompassing Western Illinois, Iowa, South Dakota and parts of Nebraska. Given\\nthis geographic footprint it is not unusual that employee applicants are from time to\\ntime required to travel long distances from their homes to the assigned employer.\\n\\n Alex Thompson, of Rapid City, South Dakota, was the highest-ranked\\nApprentice applicant on the JACβs list when Koneβs supervisor in Des Moines called\\nLocal 33 and requested an Apprentice for a job. Koneβs supervisor originally\\nquestioned Thompsonβs distance from the jobsite but ultimately accepted him.\\nDuring a telephone conversation on Friday, August 16, 2013, Thompson was told to\\npresent himself at Koneβs Des Moines office at 7 a.m. the following Monday.\\nThompson made the 615-mile trip in 10 hours and spent Sunday night at a motel, in\\n\\n -2-\\n\\forder to present himself at the Kone office as instructed. At the office he was given\\na drug test and spent time watching orientation videos before beginning work as an\\nApprentice. Thompson submitted a claim for reimbursement including claims for\\n$295.35 for overtime travel and $386.46 for mileage; Kone refused to pay the claims.\\nLocal 33 grieved the issue but Kone held fast in its refusal on the ground that\\nThompson was not an employee at the time of travel and not entitled to\\nreimbursement of travel expenses. When the parties were unable to resolve the\\ndispute it was submitted to arbitration.\\n\\n Following a four-day hearing the arbitrator determined that Kone was required\\nto pay the travel expenses. The arbitrator considered Art. XIII of the CBA, which\\nreads in part: βWhen Elevator Constructors are sent outside the primary jurisdiction,\\nbut within the zoned area of the secondary, travel time and travel expense shall be\\npaid in accordance with the Local Expense Agreement.β He turned next to the\\nquestion of whether Thompson, as an Apprentice, fell under the definition of\\nβElevator Constructor.β To answer that question, he turned to Art. II, Par. 1 of the\\nCBA (βRecognition Clauseβ), which provides:\\n\\n The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive Section 9(a)\\n bargaining representative for all Elevator Constructor Mechanics,\\n Elevator Constructor Helpers, Elevator Constructor Apprentices\\n and Elevator Constructor Assistant Mechanics (hereinafter referred\\n to sometimes as βMechanics, Helpers, Apprentices and Assistant\\n Mechanicsβ or collectively as βElevator Constructor(s)β) in the\\n employ of the Employers engaged in the installation, repair,\\n modernization, maintenance and servicing of all equipment referred to\\n in Article IV, Par. 2 and Article IV (A).\\n\\n(emphasis added). Based on the emphasized language, the arbitrator concluded that\\nthe term βElevator Constructor,β as used in Art. XIII, included an Apprentice who is\\ndispatched to a new job location pursuant to the CBAβs hiring hall procedure.\\nAccording to the arbitrator:\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f [U]nder Article XIII it does not matter for what purpose the Company\\n directed Mr. Thompson to undertake that 615 mile trip travel, i.e., it is\\n enough that Kone managers ordered, directed or βsentβ this Elevator\\n Constructor to travel outside of his primary jurisdiction but within the\\n zoned area of his secondary. Article XIII posits no difference\\n whatsoever between being ordered to undertake such travel time and\\n expenses to report to a job site or to report to Company offices for\\n pre-employment drug testing, personnel processing, orientation or job\\n briefing.\\n\\n Kone appealed, and the district court vacated the award, determining that the\\narbitrator had failed to consider the βin the employ of Employersβ key contractual\\nlanguage. The district court concluded that the arbitrator in quoting Art. II, Par. 1 of\\nthe CBA for the definition of Elevator Constructor had failed to consider the βthe\\nemploy of the Employersβ limitation. The district court found the omission highly\\nrelevant, stating:\\n\\n The arbitrator entirely omitted the qualification that βElevator\\n Constructorsβ be βin the employ of the Employers.β The arbitrator did\\n not indicate his omission with ellipses, did not discuss the phrase during\\n any part of his analysis, and did not explain why he omitted it. βIn the\\n employ of the Employersβ is a limitation in Article II, Paragraph 1 the\\n parties bargained for. In order for an award to draw its essence from the\\n partiesβ agreements, the arbitrator must consider the entirety of the\\n partiesβ agreementsβincluding the phrase βin the employ of the\\n Employers.β\\n\\nThe union appeals seeking the reinstatement of the arbitratorβs award.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n This court reviews the district courtβs order vacating an arbitral award de novo.\\nPSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fIndus. & Serv. Workers Intβl Union, Local No. 11-770, 763 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (quoting Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Commcβn Conference, Intβl Bhd. of\\nTeamsters & Local Union No. 77βP, 729 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 2013)). Review of\\nan arbitratorβs award is highly deferential; it may be set aside only where the\\narbitratorβs decision does not βdraw[] its essence from the collective bargaining\\nagreement.β United Paperworkers Intβl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)\\n(quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597\\n(1960)). βWe will not βreconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may\\nallege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.ββ\\nBureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Commcβn Intβl Union, Local 1B, 284 F.3d 821,\\n824 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36). βIndeed, we must confirm the\\naward even if we are convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, so βlong\\nas the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting\\nwithin the scope of his authority.ββ Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus.,\\nChem. & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir.\\n2002) (quoting Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824).\\n\\n Applying Boise Cascade and George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food &\\nCommercial Workers, 879 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1989), the district court held that the\\narbitrator ignored clear and unambiguous language by excluding the modifying\\nphrase βin the employ of the Employer,β which the district court found to be a\\nmaterial omission of critical contract terminology. We disagree.\\n\\n Boise Cascade involved a dispute over the companyβs Last Chance Agreement,\\nwhich placed special conditions on employees who had previously violated company\\nrules. The dispute centered around whether an employee could be fired only for\\nviolating the companyβs published rules, or whether violations of unwritten rules\\nwere also grounds for termination. The contract stated: β[Y]ou must understand that\\nit is your responsibility and obligation to follow all published policies and\\nprocedures. Further violation of any mill rules and/or failure to comply with the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fTerms and Conditions of this Letter could result in your immediate termination . . . .β\\nId. at 1078 (emphases added). The arbitrator in Boise Cascade found that the phrase\\nβany mill rulesβ in the second sentence referred only to published rules. While we\\nconcluded that this may have been a plausible interpretation, we held that the\\narbitratorβs interpretation did not draw its essence from the agreement because he\\nfailed to βdiscuss the language concerning βany mill rules,β did not recognize its\\nambiguity, and consequently did not consider other evidence of the partiesβ intent.β\\nId. at 1084. βHad he done so, yet still reached the same result, his decision would\\nhave rested on a legitimate interpretation of the partiesβ agreement.β Id.\\n\\n The type of ambiguity that rendered the Boise Cascade award subject to\\nvacation is not present here. The plain language of Art. II, Par. 1 reveals that it is not\\nprimarily a definitional provision as the District Court viewed it, but rather a\\nRecognition Clause. Simply stated it is a standard term in the CBA that defines the\\ngroup represented by the Union for bargaining purposes. Under federal law the group\\nmay only be made up of employees, because the union may not represent people who\\nare not employees within the bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. Β§ 159 (1959). In specifying\\nthat the union is the bargaining representative only for Elevator Constructors βin the\\nemploy of the Employer,β the CBA represents the unambiguous intent of the parties\\nto define the bargaining unit and to exclude those employed by other entitiesβfor\\nexample, any contractors employed by the entity that hires Kone to effectuate the\\nelevator repairs.\\n\\n This is not to say that only Elevator Constructors who are employees can\\nreceive benefits from the agreement; CBAs often provide benefits for individuals who\\nare not currently in the bargaining unit, such as retired employees. See, e.g., Maytag\\nCorp. v. Intβl Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 687 F.3d\\n1076 (8th Cir. 2012). Or, as in this case, CBAs provide procedures for qualifying and\\nhiring future employees. See, e.g., Intβl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545\\nv. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2004). Even though Alex Thompson\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwas not a member of the bargaining unit when he was instructed by Kone to travel\\nfrom Rapid City to Des Moines, he is entitled to travel pay. That determination is\\ngoverned by Art. XIII, which covers all Elevator Constructors, not just those that are\\ncurrent Kone employees.\\n\\n Hormel dealt with a dispute with regard to whether the CBA required that all\\nhog slaughtering in a plant leased by the employer to another company be performed\\nby bargaining unit members. 879 F.2d at 348-49. The arbitrator in Hormel failed to\\ndiscuss a section of the CBA that precisely addressed leasing rights, and instead\\nrelied solely on the CBAβs Recognition Clause in making its determination. Id. at\\n351. The Recognition Clause in Hormel, on its own, seemed to indicate that the\\nemployer retained exclusive rights to subcontract, and therefore was not required to\\nhire bargaining unit members at leased plants. Id. at 349-350. However, we\\nconcluded that the language in the section unaddressed by the arbitratorβwhen read\\ntogether with the Recognition Clauseβcreated an ambiguity with regard to whether\\nor not the employer, in fact, had an absolute right to subcontract work done in leased\\nfacilities. Id. at 351. We therefore vacated the arbitration award in Hormel because\\nthe arbitrator βfail[ed] to discuss a probative contract term and at the same time\\noffer[ed] no clear basis for how he construed the contract to reach his decision\\nwithout such consideration.β Id.\\n\\n Here, the Recognition Clause was not intended to limit conferred benefits\\nsolely to the bargaining unit. The arbitrator appropriately considered the relevant\\nlanguage of the Recognition Clause, even though it did not quote the Recognition\\nClause in its entirety. Comparing the relevant section of the Recognition Clause with\\nArt. XIII creates no inconsistency or ambiguity with regard to who should receive\\ncompensation for travel expenses.\\n\\n Kone presented several other arguments below that the district court found\\nunnecessary to consider. On appeal, Kone repeats these claims as alternative grounds\\n\\n -7-\\n\\ffor affirmance. Each of these alternative grounds are unavailing as all require us to\\nreconsider the merits of the arbitration award, which we are not authorized to do. See\\nsupra Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824. Each of the alternative grounds involves\\nclaims that the arbitrator issued an award that failed to draw its essence from the\\ncontract and rests on the arbitratorβs own notions of industrial justice. A close review\\nof the claims reveals the falsity of this argument. Each of the provisions as construed\\nby the arbitrator were interpreted in the light of the CBA and were firmly rooted in\\nthe essence of the contract.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling by the district court and\\nremand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1795,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4612125,"string":"4,612,125"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Dina KLEIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CREDICO INC., Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dina Klein v. Credico Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2776"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Benton, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2776\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dina Klein\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Credico Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 22, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Credico, Inc., which is licensed and does business in Minnesota as Credit\\nCollections Bureau, sent Dina Klein a debt collection letter under the business name\\nβCredit Collections Bureauβ in March 2017. Klein filed a lawsuit, arguing that the\\ncontent of the letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (βFDCPAβ). 15\\n\\fU.S.C. Β§ 1692. The district court1 granted Credicoβs motion to dismiss, see Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 12(b)(6), and Klein appeals. We affirm.\\n\\n Credicoβs letter included the words βCREDIT-COLLECTIONS-BUREAUβ in\\nthe top right corner. Several lines below the letter included the words\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORS.β The letter also said that if Kleinβs debt\\nwas not paid and if it was necessary to file a lawsuit to collect the debt, βit could\\nresult in a judgment . . . and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β\\nThe letter was sent to Klein in Minnesota and signed by three people, including Kathy\\nMitchell, who was not registered to collect debts in Minnesota. Below the signatures,\\nthe letter stated, βPay on-line or correspond with CCB at www.payccb.com.β\\n\\n The district court determined that the use of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ was not false or misleading when viewed through the\\neyes of an unsophisticated consumer, and it further determined that the use was\\nnevertheless immaterial. The district court also held that Mitchellβs signature and the\\nstatement that Credico could seek pre-judgment interest did not violate the FDCPA.\\nKlein appeals the district courtβs rulings on each of these aspects of the letter.\\n\\n βWe review a grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.β Keating v. Neb. Pub.\\nPower Dist., 562 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2009). βTo survive a motion to dismiss, a\\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to\\nrelief that is plausible on its face.β Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible βwhen the plaintiff\\npleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the\\ndefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.β Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Klein first argues that Credico violated the FDCPA by including\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ in the top right hand corner of the letter\\nand by including the statement that Klein could β[p]ay on-line or correspond with\\nCCB at www.payccb.comβ at the bottom of the letter. The FDCPA provides that β[a]\\ndebt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means\\nin connection with the collection of any debt.β Β§ 1692e. This includes β[t]he use of\\nany business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt\\ncollectorβs business, company, or organization.β Β§ 1692e(14). Klein argues that the\\nuse of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and the acronym βCCBβ violated\\nΒ§ 1692e(14) because they are organization names other than Credicoβs true name.\\n\\n When βevaluating whether a debt collection letter is false, misleading, or\\ndeceptive in violation of Β§ 1692e, the letter must be viewed through the eyes of an\\nunsophisticated consumer.β Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055\\n(8th Cir. 2002). The district court correctly determined that an unsophisticated\\nconsumer would not think that including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ\\nand βCCBβ in the letter is false or misleading. An unsophisticated consumer would\\nunderstand that βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ respectively\\ndescribe and reference Credico. We agree with Credico that CCB is a commonsense\\nabbreviation of Credit Collections Bureau, Credicoβs other registered name and the\\nname it used in its letter to Klein, not a different company. And we agree that\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ clearly describes what Credit Collections\\nBureau is. Further, Credicoβs letter provided Klein with a correct registered name,\\nits phone number, its website, the balance due, and a name and phone number for her\\nassigned collector.\\n\\n Though Klein argues the district court βerred in dismissing [her] case at the\\npleading stage based on the courtβs conjecture as to how an unsophisticated consumer\\nwould interpret a collection letter,β the unsophisticated consumer test contains an\\nβobjective element of reasonablenessβ that βprevents liability for bizarre or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fidiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.β Id. at 1055-56 (concluding βas\\na matter of lawβ that there was no violation of Β§ 1692e). The district courtβs\\ndetermination was not based on conjecture. Rather, it was based on the correct\\nobjective determination that an unsophisticated consumer would not have viewed\\nCredicoβs statements as false, deceptive, or misleading. See id. at 1056\\n(β[S]tatements that are merely βsusceptible of an ingenious misreadingβ do not violate\\nthe FDCPA.β). Thus, Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a\\nplausible claim that Credico violated Β§ 1692e by including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ in its letter to Klein.2\\n\\n Second, Klein argues that Credicoβs letter violated the FDCPA because the\\nletter was signed by Mitchell, βwho [was] not licensed by the Minnesota Department\\nof Commerce to engage in debt collection activities in Minnesota.β See Minn. Stat.\\nΒ§ 332.33. The FDCPA stipulates that β[a] debt collector may not use unfair or\\nunconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.β Β§ 1692f. The statute\\nlists conduct that it considers βunfair or unconscionable,β and Klein argues that\\nMitchellβs signature violates Β§ 1692f(1), which prohibits β[t]he collection of any\\namount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the\\ndebt or permitted by lawβ because βMinnesota law requires all individual debt\\ncollectors to obtain licenses as a prerequisite to collecting consumer debts in\\nMinnesota.β\\n\\n But the FDCPA βwas not meant to convert every violation of a state debt\\ncollection law into a federal violation.β Carlson v. First Revenue Assur., 359 F.3d\\n1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the relevant signature was one of three signatures\\n\\n 2\\n Klein also argues that the district court should not have imported a materiality\\nstandard into Β§ 1692e. We need not address this argument because Credicoβs\\nstatements were not false, deceptive, or misleading. But see Hill v. Accounts\\nReceivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018) (joining the Third, Fourth,\\nSixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in adopting a materiality standard for Β§ 1692e).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fon the letter, and the other two signatories were both registered to collect debts in\\nMinnesota. Further, Credico, doing business as Credit Collections Bureau, is licensed\\nto collect debts in Minnesota, so it could legally collect the debt, and Mitchellβs\\nsignature was not an unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt. Cf.\\nGoetze v. CRA Collections, Inc., No. 15-3169, 2017 WL 5891693 at *3 (D. Minn.\\nNov. 28, 2017) (finding that the collection agency violated the FDCPA by engaging\\nin collection activities βwithout first being licensedβ). Thus, we agree with the\\ndistrict court that Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible\\nclaim that Credico violated Β§1692f(1) by having Mitchell be one of the signatories\\nto the letter.\\n\\n Finally, Klein argues that Credico improperly attempted βto collect\\nprejudgment interestβ because Minnesota Statute section 549.09 does not allow the\\nrecovery of pre-judgment interest here. She claims this attempt also violated\\nΒ§ 1692f(1). Credicoβs letter said, βWhen suit is filed, it could result in a judgment\\nagainst you and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β Credico\\nagrees that it could not have collected pre-judgment interest under section 549.09.\\nInstead, Credico says it could seek pre-judgment interest pursuant to Minnesota\\nStatute section 334.01.\\n\\n The district court properly concluded that Minnesota law does not prohibit\\nCredico from seeking pre-judgment interest. We observed in Hill v. Accounts\\nReceivable Servs., LLC that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided\\nwhether section 334.01 allows for the recovery of pre-judgment interest in a case such\\nas this. 888 F.3d at 346. We also determined that βthe text of Β§ 334.01 does not\\nprohibitβ recovering pre-judgment interest. Id. Thus, because it was not false to\\nsuggest that Credico could collect pre-judgment interest, we conclude that Klein has\\nnot pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that Credico violated\\nΒ§ 1692f(1).\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4389378/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612125/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dina KLEIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CREDICO INC., Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2776\n ___________________________\n\n Dina Klein\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Credico Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 14, 2019\n Filed: April 22, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n Credico, Inc., which is licensed and does business in Minnesota as Credit\nCollections Bureau, sent Dina Klein a debt collection letter under the business name\nβCredit Collections Bureauβ in March 2017. Klein filed a lawsuit, arguing that the\ncontent of the letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (βFDCPAβ). 15\n\fU.S.C. Β§ 1692. The district court1 granted Credicoβs motion to dismiss, see Fed. R.\nCiv. P. 12(b)(6), and Klein appeals. We affirm.\n\n Credicoβs letter included the words βCREDIT-COLLECTIONS-BUREAUβ in\nthe top right corner. Several lines below the letter included the words\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORS.β The letter also said that if Kleinβs debt\nwas not paid and if it was necessary to file a lawsuit to collect the debt, βit could\nresult in a judgment . . . and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β\nThe letter was sent to Klein in Minnesota and signed by three people, including Kathy\nMitchell, who was not registered to collect debts in Minnesota. Below the signatures,\nthe letter stated, βPay on-line or correspond with CCB at www.payccb.com.β\n\n The district court determined that the use of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ was not false or misleading when viewed through the\neyes of an unsophisticated consumer, and it further determined that the use was\nnevertheless immaterial. The district court also held that Mitchellβs signature and the\nstatement that Credico could seek pre-judgment interest did not violate the FDCPA.\nKlein appeals the district courtβs rulings on each of these aspects of the letter.\n\n βWe review a grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.β Keating v. Neb. Pub.\nPower Dist., 562 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2009). βTo survive a motion to dismiss, a\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to\nrelief that is plausible on its face.β Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\n(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible βwhen the plaintiff\npleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the\ndefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.β Id.\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\nMinnesota.\n\n -2-\n\f Klein first argues that Credico violated the FDCPA by including\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ in the top right hand corner of the letter\nand by including the statement that Klein could β[p]ay on-line or correspond with\nCCB at www.payccb.comβ at the bottom of the letter. The FDCPA provides that β[a]\ndebt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means\nin connection with the collection of any debt.β Β§ 1692e. This includes β[t]he use of\nany business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt\ncollectorβs business, company, or organization.β Β§ 1692e(14). Klein argues that the\nuse of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and the acronym βCCBβ violated\nΒ§ 1692e(14) because they are organization names other than Credicoβs true name.\n\n When βevaluating whether a debt collection letter is false, misleading, or\ndeceptive in violation of Β§ 1692e, the letter must be viewed through the eyes of an\nunsophisticated consumer.β Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055\n(8th Cir. 2002). The district court correctly determined that an unsophisticated\nconsumer would not think that including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ\nand βCCBβ in the letter is false or misleading. An unsophisticated consumer would\nunderstand that βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ respectively\ndescribe and reference Credico. We agree with Credico that CCB is a commonsense\nabbreviation of Credit Collections Bureau, Credicoβs other registered name and the\nname it used in its letter to Klein, not a different company. And we agree that\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ clearly describes what Credit Collections\nBureau is. Further, Credicoβs letter provided Klein with a correct registered name,\nits phone number, its website, the balance due, and a name and phone number for her\nassigned collector.\n\n Though Klein argues the district court βerred in dismissing [her] case at the\npleading stage based on the courtβs conjecture as to how an unsophisticated consumer\nwould interpret a collection letter,β the unsophisticated consumer test contains an\nβobjective element of reasonablenessβ that βprevents liability for bizarre or\n\n -3-\n\fidiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.β Id. at 1055-56 (concluding βas\na matter of lawβ that there was no violation of Β§ 1692e). The district courtβs\ndetermination was not based on conjecture. Rather, it was based on the correct\nobjective determination that an unsophisticated consumer would not have viewed\nCredicoβs statements as false, deceptive, or misleading. See id. at 1056\n(β[S]tatements that are merely βsusceptible of an ingenious misreadingβ do not violate\nthe FDCPA.β). Thus, Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a\nplausible claim that Credico violated Β§ 1692e by including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ in its letter to Klein.2\n\n Second, Klein argues that Credicoβs letter violated the FDCPA because the\nletter was signed by Mitchell, βwho [was] not licensed by the Minnesota Department\nof Commerce to engage in debt collection activities in Minnesota.β See Minn. Stat.\nΒ§ 332.33. The FDCPA stipulates that β[a] debt collector may not use unfair or\nunconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.β Β§ 1692f. The statute\nlists conduct that it considers βunfair or unconscionable,β and Klein argues that\nMitchellβs signature violates Β§ 1692f(1), which prohibits β[t]he collection of any\namount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the\ndebt or permitted by lawβ because βMinnesota law requires all individual debt\ncollectors to obtain licenses as a prerequisite to collecting consumer debts in\nMinnesota.β\n\n But the FDCPA βwas not meant to convert every violation of a state debt\ncollection law into a federal violation.β Carlson v. First Revenue Assur., 359 F.3d\n1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the relevant signature was one of three signatures\n\n 2\n Klein also argues that the district court should not have imported a materiality\nstandard into Β§ 1692e. We need not address this argument because Credicoβs\nstatements were not false, deceptive, or misleading. But see Hill v. Accounts\nReceivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018) (joining the Third, Fourth,\nSixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in adopting a materiality standard for Β§ 1692e).\n\n -4-\n\fon the letter, and the other two signatories were both registered to collect debts in\nMinnesota. Further, Credico, doing business as Credit Collections Bureau, is licensed\nto collect debts in Minnesota, so it could legally collect the debt, and Mitchellβs\nsignature was not an unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt. Cf.\nGoetze v. CRA Collections, Inc., No. 15-3169, 2017 WL 5891693 at *3 (D. Minn.\nNov. 28, 2017) (finding that the collection agency violated the FDCPA by engaging\nin collection activities βwithout first being licensedβ). Thus, we agree with the\ndistrict court that Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible\nclaim that Credico violated Β§1692f(1) by having Mitchell be one of the signatories\nto the letter.\n\n Finally, Klein argues that Credico improperly attempted βto collect\nprejudgment interestβ because Minnesota Statute section 549.09 does not allow the\nrecovery of pre-judgment interest here. She claims this attempt also violated\nΒ§ 1692f(1). Credicoβs letter said, βWhen suit is filed, it could result in a judgment\nagainst you and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β Credico\nagrees that it could not have collected pre-judgment interest under section 549.09.\nInstead, Credico says it could seek pre-judgment interest pursuant to Minnesota\nStatute section 334.01.\n\n The district court properly concluded that Minnesota law does not prohibit\nCredico from seeking pre-judgment interest. We observed in Hill v. Accounts\nReceivable Servs., LLC that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided\nwhether section 334.01 allows for the recovery of pre-judgment interest in a case such\nas this. 888 F.3d at 346. We also determined that βthe text of Β§ 334.01 does not\nprohibitβ recovering pre-judgment interest. Id. Thus, because it was not false to\nsuggest that Credico could collect pre-judgment interest, we conclude that Klein has\nnot pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that Credico violated\nΒ§ 1692f(1).\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal.\n ______________________________\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dina KLEIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CREDICO INC., Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2776\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dina Klein\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Credico Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 14, 2019\\n Filed: April 22, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Credico, Inc., which is licensed and does business in Minnesota as Credit\\nCollections Bureau, sent Dina Klein a debt collection letter under the business name\\nβCredit Collections Bureauβ in March 2017. Klein filed a lawsuit, arguing that the\\ncontent of the letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (βFDCPAβ). 15\\n\\fU.S.C. Β§ 1692. The district court1 granted Credicoβs motion to dismiss, see Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 12(b)(6), and Klein appeals. We affirm.\\n\\n Credicoβs letter included the words βCREDIT-COLLECTIONS-BUREAUβ in\\nthe top right corner. Several lines below the letter included the words\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORS.β The letter also said that if Kleinβs debt\\nwas not paid and if it was necessary to file a lawsuit to collect the debt, βit could\\nresult in a judgment . . . and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β\\nThe letter was sent to Klein in Minnesota and signed by three people, including Kathy\\nMitchell, who was not registered to collect debts in Minnesota. Below the signatures,\\nthe letter stated, βPay on-line or correspond with CCB at www.payccb.com.β\\n\\n The district court determined that the use of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ was not false or misleading when viewed through the\\neyes of an unsophisticated consumer, and it further determined that the use was\\nnevertheless immaterial. The district court also held that Mitchellβs signature and the\\nstatement that Credico could seek pre-judgment interest did not violate the FDCPA.\\nKlein appeals the district courtβs rulings on each of these aspects of the letter.\\n\\n βWe review a grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.β Keating v. Neb. Pub.\\nPower Dist., 562 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2009). βTo survive a motion to dismiss, a\\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to\\nrelief that is plausible on its face.β Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible βwhen the plaintiff\\npleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the\\ndefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.β Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Klein first argues that Credico violated the FDCPA by including\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ in the top right hand corner of the letter\\nand by including the statement that Klein could β[p]ay on-line or correspond with\\nCCB at www.payccb.comβ at the bottom of the letter. The FDCPA provides that β[a]\\ndebt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means\\nin connection with the collection of any debt.β Β§ 1692e. This includes β[t]he use of\\nany business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt\\ncollectorβs business, company, or organization.β Β§ 1692e(14). Klein argues that the\\nuse of βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and the acronym βCCBβ violated\\nΒ§ 1692e(14) because they are organization names other than Credicoβs true name.\\n\\n When βevaluating whether a debt collection letter is false, misleading, or\\ndeceptive in violation of Β§ 1692e, the letter must be viewed through the eyes of an\\nunsophisticated consumer.β Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055\\n(8th Cir. 2002). The district court correctly determined that an unsophisticated\\nconsumer would not think that including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ\\nand βCCBβ in the letter is false or misleading. An unsophisticated consumer would\\nunderstand that βPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ respectively\\ndescribe and reference Credico. We agree with Credico that CCB is a commonsense\\nabbreviation of Credit Collections Bureau, Credicoβs other registered name and the\\nname it used in its letter to Klein, not a different company. And we agree that\\nβPROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTORSβ clearly describes what Credit Collections\\nBureau is. Further, Credicoβs letter provided Klein with a correct registered name,\\nits phone number, its website, the balance due, and a name and phone number for her\\nassigned collector.\\n\\n Though Klein argues the district court βerred in dismissing [her] case at the\\npleading stage based on the courtβs conjecture as to how an unsophisticated consumer\\nwould interpret a collection letter,β the unsophisticated consumer test contains an\\nβobjective element of reasonablenessβ that βprevents liability for bizarre or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fidiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.β Id. at 1055-56 (concluding βas\\na matter of lawβ that there was no violation of Β§ 1692e). The district courtβs\\ndetermination was not based on conjecture. Rather, it was based on the correct\\nobjective determination that an unsophisticated consumer would not have viewed\\nCredicoβs statements as false, deceptive, or misleading. See id. at 1056\\n(β[S]tatements that are merely βsusceptible of an ingenious misreadingβ do not violate\\nthe FDCPA.β). Thus, Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a\\nplausible claim that Credico violated Β§ 1692e by including βPROFESSIONAL DEBT\\nCOLLECTORSβ and βCCBβ in its letter to Klein.2\\n\\n Second, Klein argues that Credicoβs letter violated the FDCPA because the\\nletter was signed by Mitchell, βwho [was] not licensed by the Minnesota Department\\nof Commerce to engage in debt collection activities in Minnesota.β See Minn. Stat.\\nΒ§ 332.33. The FDCPA stipulates that β[a] debt collector may not use unfair or\\nunconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.β Β§ 1692f. The statute\\nlists conduct that it considers βunfair or unconscionable,β and Klein argues that\\nMitchellβs signature violates Β§ 1692f(1), which prohibits β[t]he collection of any\\namount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the\\ndebt or permitted by lawβ because βMinnesota law requires all individual debt\\ncollectors to obtain licenses as a prerequisite to collecting consumer debts in\\nMinnesota.β\\n\\n But the FDCPA βwas not meant to convert every violation of a state debt\\ncollection law into a federal violation.β Carlson v. First Revenue Assur., 359 F.3d\\n1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the relevant signature was one of three signatures\\n\\n 2\\n Klein also argues that the district court should not have imported a materiality\\nstandard into Β§ 1692e. We need not address this argument because Credicoβs\\nstatements were not false, deceptive, or misleading. But see Hill v. Accounts\\nReceivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018) (joining the Third, Fourth,\\nSixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in adopting a materiality standard for Β§ 1692e).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fon the letter, and the other two signatories were both registered to collect debts in\\nMinnesota. Further, Credico, doing business as Credit Collections Bureau, is licensed\\nto collect debts in Minnesota, so it could legally collect the debt, and Mitchellβs\\nsignature was not an unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt. Cf.\\nGoetze v. CRA Collections, Inc., No. 15-3169, 2017 WL 5891693 at *3 (D. Minn.\\nNov. 28, 2017) (finding that the collection agency violated the FDCPA by engaging\\nin collection activities βwithout first being licensedβ). Thus, we agree with the\\ndistrict court that Klein has not pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible\\nclaim that Credico violated Β§1692f(1) by having Mitchell be one of the signatories\\nto the letter.\\n\\n Finally, Klein argues that Credico improperly attempted βto collect\\nprejudgment interestβ because Minnesota Statute section 549.09 does not allow the\\nrecovery of pre-judgment interest here. She claims this attempt also violated\\nΒ§ 1692f(1). Credicoβs letter said, βWhen suit is filed, it could result in a judgment\\nagainst you and that judgment could include . . . pre-judgment interest.β Credico\\nagrees that it could not have collected pre-judgment interest under section 549.09.\\nInstead, Credico says it could seek pre-judgment interest pursuant to Minnesota\\nStatute section 334.01.\\n\\n The district court properly concluded that Minnesota law does not prohibit\\nCredico from seeking pre-judgment interest. We observed in Hill v. Accounts\\nReceivable Servs., LLC that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided\\nwhether section 334.01 allows for the recovery of pre-judgment interest in a case such\\nas this. 888 F.3d at 346. We also determined that βthe text of Β§ 334.01 does not\\nprohibitβ recovering pre-judgment interest. Id. Thus, because it was not false to\\nsuggest that Credico could collect pre-judgment interest, we conclude that Klein has\\nnot pleaded sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that Credico violated\\nΒ§ 1692f(1).\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1796,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4612428,"string":"4,612,428"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Connie Smith v. SEECO, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3636"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3636\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith was the named plaintiff in a class action suit against\\nSouthwestern Energy Company (βSouthwesternβ) and three of its subsidiaries\\nalleging underpayment of gas royalties. The defendants prevailed at trial. Smith now\\n\\fappeals, arguing that a new trial is warranted because of the district courtβs1 erroneous\\nevidentiary and trial management rulings. Smith also requests certification of certain\\nquestions of state law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. We deny the motion to certify\\nand affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n SEECO, a subsidiary of Southwestern, began developing the Fayetteville Shale\\nformation in 2004. DeSoto Gathering Company (βDeSotoβ), a separate Southwestern\\nsubsidiary, was created to act as the gathering company for SEECOβs operations.\\nDeSoto accepted business as a gathering company for other producers as well. SES,\\nanother Southwestern subsidiary, marketed and sold SEECOβs gas. SEECO and\\nDeSoto entered into a Dedicated Field Services Agreement (βAgreementβ) to govern\\nthe terms of DeSotoβs gathering, compression, and treatment services.\\n\\n As part of its operations SEECO entered into leases with landowners to obtain\\ngas from their land. The typical lease provided a one-eighth royalty interest in the\\nproceeds derived from the sale of gas captured from the leasehold. Connie Jean\\nSmith leased acreage to SEECO under the standard one-eighth royalty lease. The\\nterms of Smithβs lease permitted deductions from the royalty for βall reasonable\\ngathering, transportation, treatment, compression, processing, and marketing costs\\nthat are incurred by [SEECO] in connection with the saleβ of the gas. Consistent with\\nthe lease, SEECO deducted certain costs paid to its fellow Southwestern subsidiary\\nDeSoto for its βgas gatheringβ services.\\n\\n Smith sued on behalf of a class claiming that SEECO underpaid royalties\\nbecause it had engaged in self-dealing when it reduced the royalty payment to reflect\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe amounts it paid to DeSoto for gathering. Specifically, Smith alleged that\\nSouthwestern engaged in self-dealing by instructing DeSoto to charge inflated rates\\nto SEECO for the costs of DeSotoβs services. Smith also contended that each of\\nSouthwesternβs three subsidiaries were shells established and used by Southwestern\\nto secure greater profits at the expense of landowners. Smith claimed that the\\nimproper cost deductions allowed Southwestern to gain nearly $100 million in profits\\nbetween 2006 to the present. Smith sued on theories of breach of contract, fraud and\\ndeceit, unjust enrichment, violations of various Arkansas statutes, and civil\\nconspiracy.\\n\\n In pretrial motions, the district court was asked to decide whether the amounts\\nDeSoto charged SEECO qualified as gathering, treatment, and compression costs\\nincurred in connection with the sale of the gas under the lease. Smith had argued that\\nbecause those costs were paid by a third Southwestern subsidiary, SES, they were not\\ncosts βincurredβ by SEECO. SEECO countered that SES acted as its agent and that\\nin return for paying SEECOβs costs, the amount of the costs were later deducted from\\nwhat SES owed SEECO. The district court agreed with SEECO that SEECO\\nβincurredβ those costs βwhen it became liable to pay for DeSotoβs services.β In\\nmaking its partial grant of summary judgment, the district court reserved for the jury\\nthe issue of whether the costs were reasonable. The district court granted a motion\\nin limine prohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment.\\n\\n During the trial, SEECO sought to establish the reasonableness of its costs by\\ncomparing the rate it paid DeSoto to the rates other producers in the Fayetteville\\nShale region paid for gathering. Part of SEECOβs offered evidence related to the\\npost-production costs of BHP, another operator that sent royalty statements to Smith.\\nSEECO offered the BHP statements which reflected specific post-production costs\\nthat were higher per unit of gas than those SEECO had deducted. Smith objected,\\nclaiming the statements were inadmissable hearsay and that they were unduly\\nprejudicial and irrelevant. The district court overruled the objections, holding that the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fstatements were covered by the business records exception to the hearsay rule and\\nwould aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of DeSotoβs rates.\\n\\n SEECO also sought to introduce evidence of a term sheet from 2005 between\\nSEECO and DeSoto for the purpose of showing that their agreements were\\nβarms-length.β Smith objected claiming the 2005 term sheet was not timely disclosed\\nand had only been produced 25 days before trial. The district court sustained Smithβs\\nobjection as to the admission of the term sheet, but allowed questions related to any\\nwitnessβs personal knowledge of the term sheet. In making this ruling, the court\\nfound that the evidence was relevant to rebut Smithβs claim that the contract\\nnegotiations were a sham.\\n\\n John Thaeler, the former head of SEECO, and Gene Hammons, the former head\\nof DeSoto, were among the witnesses who testified about the term sheet. Their\\ntestimony laid in significant details about the term sheet, including how the term sheet\\nwas first created and what it was designed to cover. Smith did not object when this\\ntestimony was received. Smith later renewed her overall objections concerning the\\nterm sheet when questions were asked of DeSoto employee Josh Weber. The district\\ncourt overruled the objections and allowed Weber to testify about his personal\\nknowledge of the term sheet.\\n\\n Southwestern briefly questioned Smith about the pre-suit notice provision in\\nher lease. Because such provisions are inapplicable to breach-of-contract suits in\\nArkansas as a matter of law,2 the district court gave a curative instruction directing\\nthe jury to ignore that paragraph of the contract when deciding whether Smith\\ncomplied with the contract.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Ark. 1985)\\n(citing Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f During the trial, SEECOβs counsel made several comments in the presence of\\nthe jury which implied that the action was actually on behalf of Smithβs lawyers,\\nrather than Smith. For example, in closing argument SEECOβs counsel stated βIβm\\nnot going to focus on Dr. Smith. I donβt think this lawsuit is her idea. The arguments\\nthat these lawyers are making make no sense for anybodyβ¦.β The district court twice\\nsustained objections to SEECOβs suggestion that the suit was driven by her lawyers.\\n\\n In SEECOβs closing argument, counsel briefly stated that they βhad not heardβ\\nfrom any other royalty owners complaining about DeSotoβs practices. The district\\ncourt responded with a curative instruction:\\n\\n [T]here was a concern brought to my attention that I want to\\n address with you. Understand that this is a class action. And we talked\\n about it when we got started. And the plaintiff, Connie Jean Smith, is\\n the class representative who represents the class. So whatever position\\n she takes in this courtroom is the position of the class. And to the extent\\n that you have heard anything or you in any way think that her position\\n may not be the same as other class members in any way, you have to\\n disregard that because herβshe is the class representative and her\\n position is the position of everybody who has opted into this lawsuit or\\n declined to opt out.\\n\\n SEECO asked the district court to give a jury instruction substantially\\nmirroring the district courtβs grant of partial summary judgment that the costs\\nincurred by SEECO were costs incurred as gathering and compression costs under the\\ncontract. The jury instruction provided by the court only stated that SEECO βwas\\nallowed to deduct all reasonable gathering, transportation, treatment, compression,\\nprocessing, and marketing costs that [we]re incurred by SEECO in connection with\\nthe sale of gas.β The court allowed both sides to argue their interpretation to the jury.\\n\\n At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned a full defense verdict,\\nfinding that the deducted costs were both incurred and reasonable. Smith filed a\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fmotion for a new trial, or in the alternative, relief from the judgment. The district\\ncourt denied the motions. Smith now appeals.\\n\\n Additionally, Smith has moved to certify two questions of law to the Arkansas\\nSupreme Court: (1) Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs as a matter of Arkansas law\\nunder its arrangement with DeSoto and SES, and (2) whether, under Arkansas law,\\npayment for βcosts incurredβ may include rates of payment under which DeSoto (the\\ngathering company) makes a profit, or whether they must be limited to actual costs.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Partial Grant of Summary Judgment\\n\\n We review the district courtβs partial grant of summary judgment de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barry v.\\nBarry, 78 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Michalski v. Bank of America Ariz.,\\n66 F.3d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1995)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,\\nβ[w]e will consider only evidentiary materials that were before the trial court at the\\ntime the summary judgment ruling was made.β Id. (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(a);\\nAmerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1489β90 (8th Cir. 1992)). βWe review\\nthe denial of a motion for a new trial for a βclearβ abuse of discretion, with the key\\nquestion being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.β\\nDindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 421 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hallmark\\nCards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n Smith claims that the evidence available to the district court was insufficient\\nto support a grant of partial summary judgment on the question of whether or not\\nSEECO βincurredβ costs in its relationship with DeSoto where SES actually paid\\nDeSoto. Smith argues that this error necessitates a new trial. We doubt that the\\ndistrict court erred by concluding that SEECO had βincurredβ costs when the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fevidence before it established the existence of a legal obligation held by SEECO to\\nensure that DeSoto was paid. See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 520 (2012)\\n(β[T]he ordinary meaning of βincurβ [is] bringing a liability upon oneself.β). We need\\nnot definitively resolve that question, since the instructions provided to the jury did\\nnot include the legal ruling and Smith was allowed to argue for her favored position.\\nCf. Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that\\nβany error in granting [partial] summary judgment . . . was harmlessβ in light of the\\ntrial record). The district courtβs actions following the grant of summary judgment\\ntended to favor Smith, rather than SEECO, ranging from granting a motion in limine\\nprohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment to denying SEECOβs\\nrequest for a jury instruction that βSEECOβs incurred costs are the fees DeSoto\\ncharged for its services to SEECO.β Any error in granting the motion was harmless\\nin light of the district courtβs management of the issue during the trial.\\n\\n B. Motion to Certify Questions of State Law\\n\\n As part of her arguments over whether or not SEECO βincurredβ certain costs,\\nSmith requests that we certify two questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court:\\n\\n 1. Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs for gathering and treatment\\n under the express and implied covenants of its form oil and gas\\n lease, as a matter of Arkansas law, where (a) the services were\\n performed by one affiliate, DeSoto, (b) billed to and βclearedβ by\\n another affiliate, SES, and (c) all three of these entities are\\n subsidiaries of their common parent, SWN; and\\n 2. Whether the express and implied covenants in the lease, as a\\n matter of Arkansas law, allow SEECO to deduct from royalty\\n payments as βcosts incurredβ fees for gathering and treatment at\\n rates that provide profit to SEECOβs affiliate, DeSoto, over and\\n above the costs actually incurred by DeSoto.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f βAbsent a close question and lack of state sources enabling a nonconjectural\\ndetermination, a federal court should not avoid its responsibility to determine all\\nissues before it.β Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Minn.,\\n771 F.2d 1153, 1157 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). We accept the\\nbasic principle that federal courts βshould be slow to honor a request for certification\\nfrom a party who chose to invoke federal jurisdiction.β 17A Charles Alan Wright,\\nArthur R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. Β§ 4248 (3d ed. 2017 update)\\n(collecting cases). We are also mindful of Arkansasβs standards for accepting\\nrequests for certification, which require βall facts material to the question of law to\\nbe determinedβ to be βundisputedβ plus the existence of βspecial and important\\nreasonsβ such as conflicting decisions in the courts or βan unsettled issue of the\\nconstitutionality or construction of a statute of this State.β Longview Prod. Co. v.\\nDubberly, 99 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Ark. 2003).\\n\\n In light of these principles, certification of the proposed questions would be\\nimproper. Whether SEECO incurred certain costs is an ordinary question of contract\\ninterpretation which federal courts are well-equipped to answer. Cf. Torti v. Hoag,\\n868 F.3d 666, 671β72 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying Arkansas law to a breach-of-contract\\nclaim). Smith chose to bring her case in a federal forum and, having received an\\nunfavorable outcome, now seeks a second bite of the apple. Because the questions\\nshe raises are not the type of βclose questionsβ that might be aided by certification to\\nthe Arkansas Supreme Court, we decline the invitation to certify them.\\n\\n C. BHPβs Royalty Statements\\n\\n Smith argues that BHPβs royalty statements should have been excluded on both\\nrelevance and hearsay grounds. βA district courtβs decision to admit or exclude\\ntestimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.β Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d\\n1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir.\\n2010)). βA district court enjoys wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fproffered evidence, and evidentiary rulings should only be overturned if there was a\\nclear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.β Id. (quoting Quigley, 598 F.2d at 946).\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements. The\\nstatements were relevant because they aided the jurors in determining whether the\\ncosts incurred by SEECO were reasonable. Cf. Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Standard\\nTransp. Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 529, 537β38 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming interstate\\ncarrierβs rates as βreasonableβ in light of βan extensive comparison of rates between\\n[appellee] and other . . . carriers that offered the same or similar services in the same\\nterritory during the same time periodβ). Admission under the business records\\nexception to the Hearsay Rule was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6),\\nwhich βexcepts, under certain circumstances, records of regularly conducted business\\nactivities from the hearsay rule.β In re King Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d 73, 77 (8th\\nCir. 1982). Under that rule, a βrecord created by a third party and integrated into\\nanother entityβs records is admissible as the record of the custodian entity, so long as\\nthe custodian entity relied upon the accuracy of the record and the other requirements\\nof Rule 803(6) are satisfied.β Brawner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 591 F.3d 984, 987 (8th\\nCir. 2010). Smith identified the evidence as a statement that she got directly from\\nBHP in the ordinary course of receiving royalty payments. The district court had\\nβdiscretion to admit the evidence if [it] found it to be sufficiently trustworthy.β In re\\nKing Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d at 77 (citing United States v. Goins, 593 F.3d 88,\\n91β92) (8th Cir. 1979)).\\n\\n D. Questioning Regarding the 2005 Term Sheet\\n\\n Smith also contends the district court erred by permitting SEECO to question\\nwitnesses about the existence of a 2005 term sheet even though it denied admission\\nof the term sheet itself. Since the term sheet was produced before trial but after the\\ndiscovery window had closed, we consider this argument as a challenge to the district\\ncourtβs imposition of discovery sanctions. Essentially Smith argues that the sanction\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fwas insufficient to address the harm. We review the district courtβs sanctions\\nconcerning discovery violations for abuse of discretion. Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil\\nCo., 559 F.3d 888, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). βOur scope of review\\nregarding discovery matters is very narrow . . . [and] we are unlikely to fault the\\ndistrict courtβs judgment on discovery matters absent a gross abuse of discretion\\nresulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.β Davis v. Am. Jet\\nLeasing, Inc., 864 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up) (quoting Prow v.\\nMedtronic, Inc., 770 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n The issue presented to the district court was how to handle a document\\nproduced 25 days prior to trial but admittedly outside the discovery period. Neither\\nparty disputes that the term sheet was highly relevant to the issues at trial. Despite\\nthe late disclosure and the apparent relevance of the evidence, Smith took no\\naffirmative step to respond to the disclosure such as moving in limine to suppress the\\nterm sheet or, in the alternative, for a continuance so she could depose the witnesses\\non the new evidence. Instead Smith waited until the time that the evidence was about\\nto be offered to seek its exclusion. Ordinarily the district court has broad authority\\nto impose a wide range of sanctions for discovery violations. By waiting to raise the\\nobjection, Smith circumscribed the sanctions practically available to the district court.\\nThis was a tactical decision apparently designed to increase the likelihood that the\\nevidence would be suppressed. The district court appropriately exercised its\\ndiscretion to impose a more moderate sanction that limited SEECOβs ability to\\nintroduce the actual document but which allowed it to ask witnesses about their\\npersonal knowledge of the statement. If Smith suffered any prejudice when witness\\ntestimony contradicted Smithβs argument that no such term sheet existed, that\\nprejudice was a direct result of Smithβs tactical decision and not the district courtβs\\nruling.\\n\\n It appears that Smith may also be arguing that the term sheet testimony went\\nbeyond the district courtβs sanction for the untimely disclosure. To the extent this\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fcontention is raised, Smith forfeited her argument by failing to object when the first\\ntwo witnesses discussed their knowledge of the document. Day v. Toman, 266 F.3d\\n831, 837 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Powell v. Burns, 763 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir.\\n1985)). Further, Smith has not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating plain error.\\nBy the time Smith objected, during the testimony of Josh Weber, the evidence was\\ncumulative and any error was harmless. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637,\\n644 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 132\\n(8th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n E. Questioning Regarding the Pre-suit Notice Provision\\n\\n βWe normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard\\ninadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an βoverwhelming\\nprobabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the courtβs instructions.β Greer v.\\nMiller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,\\n208 (1987)). Smith has not shown the requisite overwhelming probability. The\\ndistrict courtβs instruction was a correct statement of the law and properly informed\\nthe jury that it was not to consider the provision when evaluating Smithβs claims. The\\ndistrict courtβs conclusion that βany resulting prejudice caused to plaintiffs by this\\ntestimony was minimal and certainly not a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial\\nunder Rule 59β was not erroneous.\\n\\n F. Statements by SEECOβs Counsel Suggesting Inadequacy of Class\\n Representation and Maligning Opposing Counsel\\n\\n Smith argues that she is entitled to a new trial because comments made by\\nSEECOβs counsel insinuated that Smith was represented by βplaintiff lawyersβ whose\\narguments did not make βsense for anybody.β We consider three factors in\\ndetermining whether a lawyerβs comments warrant a new trial: (1) the extensiveness\\nof the improper remarks; (2) the absence of any meaningful curative instruction; and\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f(3) whether any damage award was exorbitant. Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007,\\n1011β12 (8th Cir. 2014). The district court sustained Smithβs objections and\\ninstructed the jury to disregard the statements. No new trial is warranted given the\\ncourtβs curative instruction and the limited nature of the remarks.\\n\\n Smith also claims that comments by SEECOβs counsel may have\\ninappropriately suggested to the jury that Smith was not an adequate class\\nrepresentative. The district court responded by giving a lengthy curative instruction\\nthat included telling the jury βto the extent that you have heard anything or you in any\\nway think that [Smithβs] position may not be the same as other class members in any\\nway, you have to disregard that.β Given our presumption that βa jury will follow an\\ninstruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless\\nthere is an βoverwhelming probabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the\\ncourtβs instructions,β the district court appropriately denied Smithβs motion for a new\\ntrial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8 (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We deny Smithβs motion to certify questions of law to the Arkansas Supreme\\nCourt and affirm the district courtβs judgment.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4389681/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612428/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3636\n ___________________________\n\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\n Southwestern Energy Company\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\n Filed: April 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Connie Jean Smith was the named plaintiff in a class action suit against\nSouthwestern Energy Company (βSouthwesternβ) and three of its subsidiaries\nalleging underpayment of gas royalties. The defendants prevailed at trial. Smith now\n\fappeals, arguing that a new trial is warranted because of the district courtβs1 erroneous\nevidentiary and trial management rulings. Smith also requests certification of certain\nquestions of state law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. We deny the motion to certify\nand affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n SEECO, a subsidiary of Southwestern, began developing the Fayetteville Shale\nformation in 2004. DeSoto Gathering Company (βDeSotoβ), a separate Southwestern\nsubsidiary, was created to act as the gathering company for SEECOβs operations.\nDeSoto accepted business as a gathering company for other producers as well. SES,\nanother Southwestern subsidiary, marketed and sold SEECOβs gas. SEECO and\nDeSoto entered into a Dedicated Field Services Agreement (βAgreementβ) to govern\nthe terms of DeSotoβs gathering, compression, and treatment services.\n\n As part of its operations SEECO entered into leases with landowners to obtain\ngas from their land. The typical lease provided a one-eighth royalty interest in the\nproceeds derived from the sale of gas captured from the leasehold. Connie Jean\nSmith leased acreage to SEECO under the standard one-eighth royalty lease. The\nterms of Smithβs lease permitted deductions from the royalty for βall reasonable\ngathering, transportation, treatment, compression, processing, and marketing costs\nthat are incurred by [SEECO] in connection with the saleβ of the gas. Consistent with\nthe lease, SEECO deducted certain costs paid to its fellow Southwestern subsidiary\nDeSoto for its βgas gatheringβ services.\n\n Smith sued on behalf of a class claiming that SEECO underpaid royalties\nbecause it had engaged in self-dealing when it reduced the royalty payment to reflect\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fthe amounts it paid to DeSoto for gathering. Specifically, Smith alleged that\nSouthwestern engaged in self-dealing by instructing DeSoto to charge inflated rates\nto SEECO for the costs of DeSotoβs services. Smith also contended that each of\nSouthwesternβs three subsidiaries were shells established and used by Southwestern\nto secure greater profits at the expense of landowners. Smith claimed that the\nimproper cost deductions allowed Southwestern to gain nearly $100 million in profits\nbetween 2006 to the present. Smith sued on theories of breach of contract, fraud and\ndeceit, unjust enrichment, violations of various Arkansas statutes, and civil\nconspiracy.\n\n In pretrial motions, the district court was asked to decide whether the amounts\nDeSoto charged SEECO qualified as gathering, treatment, and compression costs\nincurred in connection with the sale of the gas under the lease. Smith had argued that\nbecause those costs were paid by a third Southwestern subsidiary, SES, they were not\ncosts βincurredβ by SEECO. SEECO countered that SES acted as its agent and that\nin return for paying SEECOβs costs, the amount of the costs were later deducted from\nwhat SES owed SEECO. The district court agreed with SEECO that SEECO\nβincurredβ those costs βwhen it became liable to pay for DeSotoβs services.β In\nmaking its partial grant of summary judgment, the district court reserved for the jury\nthe issue of whether the costs were reasonable. The district court granted a motion\nin limine prohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment.\n\n During the trial, SEECO sought to establish the reasonableness of its costs by\ncomparing the rate it paid DeSoto to the rates other producers in the Fayetteville\nShale region paid for gathering. Part of SEECOβs offered evidence related to the\npost-production costs of BHP, another operator that sent royalty statements to Smith.\nSEECO offered the BHP statements which reflected specific post-production costs\nthat were higher per unit of gas than those SEECO had deducted. Smith objected,\nclaiming the statements were inadmissable hearsay and that they were unduly\nprejudicial and irrelevant. The district court overruled the objections, holding that the\n\n -3-\n\fstatements were covered by the business records exception to the hearsay rule and\nwould aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of DeSotoβs rates.\n\n SEECO also sought to introduce evidence of a term sheet from 2005 between\nSEECO and DeSoto for the purpose of showing that their agreements were\nβarms-length.β Smith objected claiming the 2005 term sheet was not timely disclosed\nand had only been produced 25 days before trial. The district court sustained Smithβs\nobjection as to the admission of the term sheet, but allowed questions related to any\nwitnessβs personal knowledge of the term sheet. In making this ruling, the court\nfound that the evidence was relevant to rebut Smithβs claim that the contract\nnegotiations were a sham.\n\n John Thaeler, the former head of SEECO, and Gene Hammons, the former head\nof DeSoto, were among the witnesses who testified about the term sheet. Their\ntestimony laid in significant details about the term sheet, including how the term sheet\nwas first created and what it was designed to cover. Smith did not object when this\ntestimony was received. Smith later renewed her overall objections concerning the\nterm sheet when questions were asked of DeSoto employee Josh Weber. The district\ncourt overruled the objections and allowed Weber to testify about his personal\nknowledge of the term sheet.\n\n Southwestern briefly questioned Smith about the pre-suit notice provision in\nher lease. Because such provisions are inapplicable to breach-of-contract suits in\nArkansas as a matter of law,2 the district court gave a curative instruction directing\nthe jury to ignore that paragraph of the contract when deciding whether Smith\ncomplied with the contract.\n\n\n\n 2\n TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Ark. 1985)\n(citing Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)).\n\n -4-\n\f During the trial, SEECOβs counsel made several comments in the presence of\nthe jury which implied that the action was actually on behalf of Smithβs lawyers,\nrather than Smith. For example, in closing argument SEECOβs counsel stated βIβm\nnot going to focus on Dr. Smith. I donβt think this lawsuit is her idea. The arguments\nthat these lawyers are making make no sense for anybodyβ¦.β The district court twice\nsustained objections to SEECOβs suggestion that the suit was driven by her lawyers.\n\n In SEECOβs closing argument, counsel briefly stated that they βhad not heardβ\nfrom any other royalty owners complaining about DeSotoβs practices. The district\ncourt responded with a curative instruction:\n\n [T]here was a concern brought to my attention that I want to\n address with you. Understand that this is a class action. And we talked\n about it when we got started. And the plaintiff, Connie Jean Smith, is\n the class representative who represents the class. So whatever position\n she takes in this courtroom is the position of the class. And to the extent\n that you have heard anything or you in any way think that her position\n may not be the same as other class members in any way, you have to\n disregard that because herβshe is the class representative and her\n position is the position of everybody who has opted into this lawsuit or\n declined to opt out.\n\n SEECO asked the district court to give a jury instruction substantially\nmirroring the district courtβs grant of partial summary judgment that the costs\nincurred by SEECO were costs incurred as gathering and compression costs under the\ncontract. The jury instruction provided by the court only stated that SEECO βwas\nallowed to deduct all reasonable gathering, transportation, treatment, compression,\nprocessing, and marketing costs that [we]re incurred by SEECO in connection with\nthe sale of gas.β The court allowed both sides to argue their interpretation to the jury.\n\n At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned a full defense verdict,\nfinding that the deducted costs were both incurred and reasonable. Smith filed a\n\n -5-\n\fmotion for a new trial, or in the alternative, relief from the judgment. The district\ncourt denied the motions. Smith now appeals.\n\n Additionally, Smith has moved to certify two questions of law to the Arkansas\nSupreme Court: (1) Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs as a matter of Arkansas law\nunder its arrangement with DeSoto and SES, and (2) whether, under Arkansas law,\npayment for βcosts incurredβ may include rates of payment under which DeSoto (the\ngathering company) makes a profit, or whether they must be limited to actual costs.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n A. Partial Grant of Summary Judgment\n\n We review the district courtβs partial grant of summary judgment de novo,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barry v.\nBarry, 78 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Michalski v. Bank of America Ariz.,\n66 F.3d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1995)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,\nβ[w]e will consider only evidentiary materials that were before the trial court at the\ntime the summary judgment ruling was made.β Id. (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(a);\nAmerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1489β90 (8th Cir. 1992)). βWe review\nthe denial of a motion for a new trial for a βclearβ abuse of discretion, with the key\nquestion being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.β\nDindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 421 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hallmark\nCards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013)).\n\n Smith claims that the evidence available to the district court was insufficient\nto support a grant of partial summary judgment on the question of whether or not\nSEECO βincurredβ costs in its relationship with DeSoto where SES actually paid\nDeSoto. Smith argues that this error necessitates a new trial. We doubt that the\ndistrict court erred by concluding that SEECO had βincurredβ costs when the\n\n -6-\n\fevidence before it established the existence of a legal obligation held by SEECO to\nensure that DeSoto was paid. See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 520 (2012)\n(β[T]he ordinary meaning of βincurβ [is] bringing a liability upon oneself.β). We need\nnot definitively resolve that question, since the instructions provided to the jury did\nnot include the legal ruling and Smith was allowed to argue for her favored position.\nCf. Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that\nβany error in granting [partial] summary judgment . . . was harmlessβ in light of the\ntrial record). The district courtβs actions following the grant of summary judgment\ntended to favor Smith, rather than SEECO, ranging from granting a motion in limine\nprohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment to denying SEECOβs\nrequest for a jury instruction that βSEECOβs incurred costs are the fees DeSoto\ncharged for its services to SEECO.β Any error in granting the motion was harmless\nin light of the district courtβs management of the issue during the trial.\n\n B. Motion to Certify Questions of State Law\n\n As part of her arguments over whether or not SEECO βincurredβ certain costs,\nSmith requests that we certify two questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court:\n\n 1. Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs for gathering and treatment\n under the express and implied covenants of its form oil and gas\n lease, as a matter of Arkansas law, where (a) the services were\n performed by one affiliate, DeSoto, (b) billed to and βclearedβ by\n another affiliate, SES, and (c) all three of these entities are\n subsidiaries of their common parent, SWN; and\n 2. Whether the express and implied covenants in the lease, as a\n matter of Arkansas law, allow SEECO to deduct from royalty\n payments as βcosts incurredβ fees for gathering and treatment at\n rates that provide profit to SEECOβs affiliate, DeSoto, over and\n above the costs actually incurred by DeSoto.\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f βAbsent a close question and lack of state sources enabling a nonconjectural\ndetermination, a federal court should not avoid its responsibility to determine all\nissues before it.β Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Minn.,\n771 F.2d 1153, 1157 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). We accept the\nbasic principle that federal courts βshould be slow to honor a request for certification\nfrom a party who chose to invoke federal jurisdiction.β 17A Charles Alan Wright,\nArthur R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. Β§ 4248 (3d ed. 2017 update)\n(collecting cases). We are also mindful of Arkansasβs standards for accepting\nrequests for certification, which require βall facts material to the question of law to\nbe determinedβ to be βundisputedβ plus the existence of βspecial and important\nreasonsβ such as conflicting decisions in the courts or βan unsettled issue of the\nconstitutionality or construction of a statute of this State.β Longview Prod. Co. v.\nDubberly, 99 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Ark. 2003).\n\n In light of these principles, certification of the proposed questions would be\nimproper. Whether SEECO incurred certain costs is an ordinary question of contract\ninterpretation which federal courts are well-equipped to answer. Cf. Torti v. Hoag,\n868 F.3d 666, 671β72 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying Arkansas law to a breach-of-contract\nclaim). Smith chose to bring her case in a federal forum and, having received an\nunfavorable outcome, now seeks a second bite of the apple. Because the questions\nshe raises are not the type of βclose questionsβ that might be aided by certification to\nthe Arkansas Supreme Court, we decline the invitation to certify them.\n\n C. BHPβs Royalty Statements\n\n Smith argues that BHPβs royalty statements should have been excluded on both\nrelevance and hearsay grounds. βA district courtβs decision to admit or exclude\ntestimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.β Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d\n1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir.\n2010)). βA district court enjoys wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of\n\n -8-\n\fproffered evidence, and evidentiary rulings should only be overturned if there was a\nclear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.β Id. (quoting Quigley, 598 F.2d at 946).\n\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements. The\nstatements were relevant because they aided the jurors in determining whether the\ncosts incurred by SEECO were reasonable. Cf. Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Standard\nTransp. Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 529, 537β38 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming interstate\ncarrierβs rates as βreasonableβ in light of βan extensive comparison of rates between\n[appellee] and other . . . carriers that offered the same or similar services in the same\nterritory during the same time periodβ). Admission under the business records\nexception to the Hearsay Rule was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6),\nwhich βexcepts, under certain circumstances, records of regularly conducted business\nactivities from the hearsay rule.β In re King Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d 73, 77 (8th\nCir. 1982). Under that rule, a βrecord created by a third party and integrated into\nanother entityβs records is admissible as the record of the custodian entity, so long as\nthe custodian entity relied upon the accuracy of the record and the other requirements\nof Rule 803(6) are satisfied.β Brawner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 591 F.3d 984, 987 (8th\nCir. 2010). Smith identified the evidence as a statement that she got directly from\nBHP in the ordinary course of receiving royalty payments. The district court had\nβdiscretion to admit the evidence if [it] found it to be sufficiently trustworthy.β In re\nKing Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d at 77 (citing United States v. Goins, 593 F.3d 88,\n91β92) (8th Cir. 1979)).\n\n D. Questioning Regarding the 2005 Term Sheet\n\n Smith also contends the district court erred by permitting SEECO to question\nwitnesses about the existence of a 2005 term sheet even though it denied admission\nof the term sheet itself. Since the term sheet was produced before trial but after the\ndiscovery window had closed, we consider this argument as a challenge to the district\ncourtβs imposition of discovery sanctions. Essentially Smith argues that the sanction\n\n -9-\n\fwas insufficient to address the harm. We review the district courtβs sanctions\nconcerning discovery violations for abuse of discretion. Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil\nCo., 559 F.3d 888, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). βOur scope of review\nregarding discovery matters is very narrow . . . [and] we are unlikely to fault the\ndistrict courtβs judgment on discovery matters absent a gross abuse of discretion\nresulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.β Davis v. Am. Jet\nLeasing, Inc., 864 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up) (quoting Prow v.\nMedtronic, Inc., 770 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1985)).\n\n The issue presented to the district court was how to handle a document\nproduced 25 days prior to trial but admittedly outside the discovery period. Neither\nparty disputes that the term sheet was highly relevant to the issues at trial. Despite\nthe late disclosure and the apparent relevance of the evidence, Smith took no\naffirmative step to respond to the disclosure such as moving in limine to suppress the\nterm sheet or, in the alternative, for a continuance so she could depose the witnesses\non the new evidence. Instead Smith waited until the time that the evidence was about\nto be offered to seek its exclusion. Ordinarily the district court has broad authority\nto impose a wide range of sanctions for discovery violations. By waiting to raise the\nobjection, Smith circumscribed the sanctions practically available to the district court.\nThis was a tactical decision apparently designed to increase the likelihood that the\nevidence would be suppressed. The district court appropriately exercised its\ndiscretion to impose a more moderate sanction that limited SEECOβs ability to\nintroduce the actual document but which allowed it to ask witnesses about their\npersonal knowledge of the statement. If Smith suffered any prejudice when witness\ntestimony contradicted Smithβs argument that no such term sheet existed, that\nprejudice was a direct result of Smithβs tactical decision and not the district courtβs\nruling.\n\n It appears that Smith may also be arguing that the term sheet testimony went\nbeyond the district courtβs sanction for the untimely disclosure. To the extent this\n\n -10-\n\fcontention is raised, Smith forfeited her argument by failing to object when the first\ntwo witnesses discussed their knowledge of the document. Day v. Toman, 266 F.3d\n831, 837 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Powell v. Burns, 763 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir.\n1985)). Further, Smith has not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating plain error.\nBy the time Smith objected, during the testimony of Josh Weber, the evidence was\ncumulative and any error was harmless. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637,\n644 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 132\n(8th Cir. 1985)).\n\n E. Questioning Regarding the Pre-suit Notice Provision\n\n βWe normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard\ninadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an βoverwhelming\nprobabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the courtβs instructions.β Greer v.\nMiller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,\n208 (1987)). Smith has not shown the requisite overwhelming probability. The\ndistrict courtβs instruction was a correct statement of the law and properly informed\nthe jury that it was not to consider the provision when evaluating Smithβs claims. The\ndistrict courtβs conclusion that βany resulting prejudice caused to plaintiffs by this\ntestimony was minimal and certainly not a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial\nunder Rule 59β was not erroneous.\n\n F. Statements by SEECOβs Counsel Suggesting Inadequacy of Class\n Representation and Maligning Opposing Counsel\n\n Smith argues that she is entitled to a new trial because comments made by\nSEECOβs counsel insinuated that Smith was represented by βplaintiff lawyersβ whose\narguments did not make βsense for anybody.β We consider three factors in\ndetermining whether a lawyerβs comments warrant a new trial: (1) the extensiveness\nof the improper remarks; (2) the absence of any meaningful curative instruction; and\n\n\n -11-\n\f(3) whether any damage award was exorbitant. Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007,\n1011β12 (8th Cir. 2014). The district court sustained Smithβs objections and\ninstructed the jury to disregard the statements. No new trial is warranted given the\ncourtβs curative instruction and the limited nature of the remarks.\n\n Smith also claims that comments by SEECOβs counsel may have\ninappropriately suggested to the jury that Smith was not an adequate class\nrepresentative. The district court responded by giving a lengthy curative instruction\nthat included telling the jury βto the extent that you have heard anything or you in any\nway think that [Smithβs] position may not be the same as other class members in any\nway, you have to disregard that.β Given our presumption that βa jury will follow an\ninstruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless\nthere is an βoverwhelming probabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the\ncourtβs instructions,β the district court appropriately denied Smithβs motion for a new\ntrial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8 (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208).\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n We deny Smithβs motion to certify questions of law to the Arkansas Supreme\nCourt and affirm the district courtβs judgment.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3636\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith was the named plaintiff in a class action suit against\\nSouthwestern Energy Company (βSouthwesternβ) and three of its subsidiaries\\nalleging underpayment of gas royalties. The defendants prevailed at trial. Smith now\\n\\fappeals, arguing that a new trial is warranted because of the district courtβs1 erroneous\\nevidentiary and trial management rulings. Smith also requests certification of certain\\nquestions of state law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. We deny the motion to certify\\nand affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n SEECO, a subsidiary of Southwestern, began developing the Fayetteville Shale\\nformation in 2004. DeSoto Gathering Company (βDeSotoβ), a separate Southwestern\\nsubsidiary, was created to act as the gathering company for SEECOβs operations.\\nDeSoto accepted business as a gathering company for other producers as well. SES,\\nanother Southwestern subsidiary, marketed and sold SEECOβs gas. SEECO and\\nDeSoto entered into a Dedicated Field Services Agreement (βAgreementβ) to govern\\nthe terms of DeSotoβs gathering, compression, and treatment services.\\n\\n As part of its operations SEECO entered into leases with landowners to obtain\\ngas from their land. The typical lease provided a one-eighth royalty interest in the\\nproceeds derived from the sale of gas captured from the leasehold. Connie Jean\\nSmith leased acreage to SEECO under the standard one-eighth royalty lease. The\\nterms of Smithβs lease permitted deductions from the royalty for βall reasonable\\ngathering, transportation, treatment, compression, processing, and marketing costs\\nthat are incurred by [SEECO] in connection with the saleβ of the gas. Consistent with\\nthe lease, SEECO deducted certain costs paid to its fellow Southwestern subsidiary\\nDeSoto for its βgas gatheringβ services.\\n\\n Smith sued on behalf of a class claiming that SEECO underpaid royalties\\nbecause it had engaged in self-dealing when it reduced the royalty payment to reflect\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe amounts it paid to DeSoto for gathering. Specifically, Smith alleged that\\nSouthwestern engaged in self-dealing by instructing DeSoto to charge inflated rates\\nto SEECO for the costs of DeSotoβs services. Smith also contended that each of\\nSouthwesternβs three subsidiaries were shells established and used by Southwestern\\nto secure greater profits at the expense of landowners. Smith claimed that the\\nimproper cost deductions allowed Southwestern to gain nearly $100 million in profits\\nbetween 2006 to the present. Smith sued on theories of breach of contract, fraud and\\ndeceit, unjust enrichment, violations of various Arkansas statutes, and civil\\nconspiracy.\\n\\n In pretrial motions, the district court was asked to decide whether the amounts\\nDeSoto charged SEECO qualified as gathering, treatment, and compression costs\\nincurred in connection with the sale of the gas under the lease. Smith had argued that\\nbecause those costs were paid by a third Southwestern subsidiary, SES, they were not\\ncosts βincurredβ by SEECO. SEECO countered that SES acted as its agent and that\\nin return for paying SEECOβs costs, the amount of the costs were later deducted from\\nwhat SES owed SEECO. The district court agreed with SEECO that SEECO\\nβincurredβ those costs βwhen it became liable to pay for DeSotoβs services.β In\\nmaking its partial grant of summary judgment, the district court reserved for the jury\\nthe issue of whether the costs were reasonable. The district court granted a motion\\nin limine prohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment.\\n\\n During the trial, SEECO sought to establish the reasonableness of its costs by\\ncomparing the rate it paid DeSoto to the rates other producers in the Fayetteville\\nShale region paid for gathering. Part of SEECOβs offered evidence related to the\\npost-production costs of BHP, another operator that sent royalty statements to Smith.\\nSEECO offered the BHP statements which reflected specific post-production costs\\nthat were higher per unit of gas than those SEECO had deducted. Smith objected,\\nclaiming the statements were inadmissable hearsay and that they were unduly\\nprejudicial and irrelevant. The district court overruled the objections, holding that the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fstatements were covered by the business records exception to the hearsay rule and\\nwould aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of DeSotoβs rates.\\n\\n SEECO also sought to introduce evidence of a term sheet from 2005 between\\nSEECO and DeSoto for the purpose of showing that their agreements were\\nβarms-length.β Smith objected claiming the 2005 term sheet was not timely disclosed\\nand had only been produced 25 days before trial. The district court sustained Smithβs\\nobjection as to the admission of the term sheet, but allowed questions related to any\\nwitnessβs personal knowledge of the term sheet. In making this ruling, the court\\nfound that the evidence was relevant to rebut Smithβs claim that the contract\\nnegotiations were a sham.\\n\\n John Thaeler, the former head of SEECO, and Gene Hammons, the former head\\nof DeSoto, were among the witnesses who testified about the term sheet. Their\\ntestimony laid in significant details about the term sheet, including how the term sheet\\nwas first created and what it was designed to cover. Smith did not object when this\\ntestimony was received. Smith later renewed her overall objections concerning the\\nterm sheet when questions were asked of DeSoto employee Josh Weber. The district\\ncourt overruled the objections and allowed Weber to testify about his personal\\nknowledge of the term sheet.\\n\\n Southwestern briefly questioned Smith about the pre-suit notice provision in\\nher lease. Because such provisions are inapplicable to breach-of-contract suits in\\nArkansas as a matter of law,2 the district court gave a curative instruction directing\\nthe jury to ignore that paragraph of the contract when deciding whether Smith\\ncomplied with the contract.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Ark. 1985)\\n(citing Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f During the trial, SEECOβs counsel made several comments in the presence of\\nthe jury which implied that the action was actually on behalf of Smithβs lawyers,\\nrather than Smith. For example, in closing argument SEECOβs counsel stated βIβm\\nnot going to focus on Dr. Smith. I donβt think this lawsuit is her idea. The arguments\\nthat these lawyers are making make no sense for anybodyβ¦.β The district court twice\\nsustained objections to SEECOβs suggestion that the suit was driven by her lawyers.\\n\\n In SEECOβs closing argument, counsel briefly stated that they βhad not heardβ\\nfrom any other royalty owners complaining about DeSotoβs practices. The district\\ncourt responded with a curative instruction:\\n\\n [T]here was a concern brought to my attention that I want to\\n address with you. Understand that this is a class action. And we talked\\n about it when we got started. And the plaintiff, Connie Jean Smith, is\\n the class representative who represents the class. So whatever position\\n she takes in this courtroom is the position of the class. And to the extent\\n that you have heard anything or you in any way think that her position\\n may not be the same as other class members in any way, you have to\\n disregard that because herβshe is the class representative and her\\n position is the position of everybody who has opted into this lawsuit or\\n declined to opt out.\\n\\n SEECO asked the district court to give a jury instruction substantially\\nmirroring the district courtβs grant of partial summary judgment that the costs\\nincurred by SEECO were costs incurred as gathering and compression costs under the\\ncontract. The jury instruction provided by the court only stated that SEECO βwas\\nallowed to deduct all reasonable gathering, transportation, treatment, compression,\\nprocessing, and marketing costs that [we]re incurred by SEECO in connection with\\nthe sale of gas.β The court allowed both sides to argue their interpretation to the jury.\\n\\n At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned a full defense verdict,\\nfinding that the deducted costs were both incurred and reasonable. Smith filed a\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fmotion for a new trial, or in the alternative, relief from the judgment. The district\\ncourt denied the motions. Smith now appeals.\\n\\n Additionally, Smith has moved to certify two questions of law to the Arkansas\\nSupreme Court: (1) Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs as a matter of Arkansas law\\nunder its arrangement with DeSoto and SES, and (2) whether, under Arkansas law,\\npayment for βcosts incurredβ may include rates of payment under which DeSoto (the\\ngathering company) makes a profit, or whether they must be limited to actual costs.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Partial Grant of Summary Judgment\\n\\n We review the district courtβs partial grant of summary judgment de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barry v.\\nBarry, 78 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Michalski v. Bank of America Ariz.,\\n66 F.3d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1995)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,\\nβ[w]e will consider only evidentiary materials that were before the trial court at the\\ntime the summary judgment ruling was made.β Id. (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(a);\\nAmerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1489β90 (8th Cir. 1992)). βWe review\\nthe denial of a motion for a new trial for a βclearβ abuse of discretion, with the key\\nquestion being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.β\\nDindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 421 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hallmark\\nCards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n Smith claims that the evidence available to the district court was insufficient\\nto support a grant of partial summary judgment on the question of whether or not\\nSEECO βincurredβ costs in its relationship with DeSoto where SES actually paid\\nDeSoto. Smith argues that this error necessitates a new trial. We doubt that the\\ndistrict court erred by concluding that SEECO had βincurredβ costs when the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fevidence before it established the existence of a legal obligation held by SEECO to\\nensure that DeSoto was paid. See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 520 (2012)\\n(β[T]he ordinary meaning of βincurβ [is] bringing a liability upon oneself.β). We need\\nnot definitively resolve that question, since the instructions provided to the jury did\\nnot include the legal ruling and Smith was allowed to argue for her favored position.\\nCf. Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that\\nβany error in granting [partial] summary judgment . . . was harmlessβ in light of the\\ntrial record). The district courtβs actions following the grant of summary judgment\\ntended to favor Smith, rather than SEECO, ranging from granting a motion in limine\\nprohibiting references to the partial grant of summary judgment to denying SEECOβs\\nrequest for a jury instruction that βSEECOβs incurred costs are the fees DeSoto\\ncharged for its services to SEECO.β Any error in granting the motion was harmless\\nin light of the district courtβs management of the issue during the trial.\\n\\n B. Motion to Certify Questions of State Law\\n\\n As part of her arguments over whether or not SEECO βincurredβ certain costs,\\nSmith requests that we certify two questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court:\\n\\n 1. Whether SEECO βincurredβ costs for gathering and treatment\\n under the express and implied covenants of its form oil and gas\\n lease, as a matter of Arkansas law, where (a) the services were\\n performed by one affiliate, DeSoto, (b) billed to and βclearedβ by\\n another affiliate, SES, and (c) all three of these entities are\\n subsidiaries of their common parent, SWN; and\\n 2. Whether the express and implied covenants in the lease, as a\\n matter of Arkansas law, allow SEECO to deduct from royalty\\n payments as βcosts incurredβ fees for gathering and treatment at\\n rates that provide profit to SEECOβs affiliate, DeSoto, over and\\n above the costs actually incurred by DeSoto.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f βAbsent a close question and lack of state sources enabling a nonconjectural\\ndetermination, a federal court should not avoid its responsibility to determine all\\nissues before it.β Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Minn.,\\n771 F.2d 1153, 1157 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). We accept the\\nbasic principle that federal courts βshould be slow to honor a request for certification\\nfrom a party who chose to invoke federal jurisdiction.β 17A Charles Alan Wright,\\nArthur R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. Β§ 4248 (3d ed. 2017 update)\\n(collecting cases). We are also mindful of Arkansasβs standards for accepting\\nrequests for certification, which require βall facts material to the question of law to\\nbe determinedβ to be βundisputedβ plus the existence of βspecial and important\\nreasonsβ such as conflicting decisions in the courts or βan unsettled issue of the\\nconstitutionality or construction of a statute of this State.β Longview Prod. Co. v.\\nDubberly, 99 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Ark. 2003).\\n\\n In light of these principles, certification of the proposed questions would be\\nimproper. Whether SEECO incurred certain costs is an ordinary question of contract\\ninterpretation which federal courts are well-equipped to answer. Cf. Torti v. Hoag,\\n868 F.3d 666, 671β72 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying Arkansas law to a breach-of-contract\\nclaim). Smith chose to bring her case in a federal forum and, having received an\\nunfavorable outcome, now seeks a second bite of the apple. Because the questions\\nshe raises are not the type of βclose questionsβ that might be aided by certification to\\nthe Arkansas Supreme Court, we decline the invitation to certify them.\\n\\n C. BHPβs Royalty Statements\\n\\n Smith argues that BHPβs royalty statements should have been excluded on both\\nrelevance and hearsay grounds. βA district courtβs decision to admit or exclude\\ntestimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.β Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d\\n1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir.\\n2010)). βA district court enjoys wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fproffered evidence, and evidentiary rulings should only be overturned if there was a\\nclear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.β Id. (quoting Quigley, 598 F.2d at 946).\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements. The\\nstatements were relevant because they aided the jurors in determining whether the\\ncosts incurred by SEECO were reasonable. Cf. Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Standard\\nTransp. Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 529, 537β38 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming interstate\\ncarrierβs rates as βreasonableβ in light of βan extensive comparison of rates between\\n[appellee] and other . . . carriers that offered the same or similar services in the same\\nterritory during the same time periodβ). Admission under the business records\\nexception to the Hearsay Rule was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6),\\nwhich βexcepts, under certain circumstances, records of regularly conducted business\\nactivities from the hearsay rule.β In re King Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d 73, 77 (8th\\nCir. 1982). Under that rule, a βrecord created by a third party and integrated into\\nanother entityβs records is admissible as the record of the custodian entity, so long as\\nthe custodian entity relied upon the accuracy of the record and the other requirements\\nof Rule 803(6) are satisfied.β Brawner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 591 F.3d 984, 987 (8th\\nCir. 2010). Smith identified the evidence as a statement that she got directly from\\nBHP in the ordinary course of receiving royalty payments. The district court had\\nβdiscretion to admit the evidence if [it] found it to be sufficiently trustworthy.β In re\\nKing Enterprises, Inc., 678 F.2d at 77 (citing United States v. Goins, 593 F.3d 88,\\n91β92) (8th Cir. 1979)).\\n\\n D. Questioning Regarding the 2005 Term Sheet\\n\\n Smith also contends the district court erred by permitting SEECO to question\\nwitnesses about the existence of a 2005 term sheet even though it denied admission\\nof the term sheet itself. Since the term sheet was produced before trial but after the\\ndiscovery window had closed, we consider this argument as a challenge to the district\\ncourtβs imposition of discovery sanctions. Essentially Smith argues that the sanction\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fwas insufficient to address the harm. We review the district courtβs sanctions\\nconcerning discovery violations for abuse of discretion. Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil\\nCo., 559 F.3d 888, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). βOur scope of review\\nregarding discovery matters is very narrow . . . [and] we are unlikely to fault the\\ndistrict courtβs judgment on discovery matters absent a gross abuse of discretion\\nresulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.β Davis v. Am. Jet\\nLeasing, Inc., 864 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up) (quoting Prow v.\\nMedtronic, Inc., 770 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n The issue presented to the district court was how to handle a document\\nproduced 25 days prior to trial but admittedly outside the discovery period. Neither\\nparty disputes that the term sheet was highly relevant to the issues at trial. Despite\\nthe late disclosure and the apparent relevance of the evidence, Smith took no\\naffirmative step to respond to the disclosure such as moving in limine to suppress the\\nterm sheet or, in the alternative, for a continuance so she could depose the witnesses\\non the new evidence. Instead Smith waited until the time that the evidence was about\\nto be offered to seek its exclusion. Ordinarily the district court has broad authority\\nto impose a wide range of sanctions for discovery violations. By waiting to raise the\\nobjection, Smith circumscribed the sanctions practically available to the district court.\\nThis was a tactical decision apparently designed to increase the likelihood that the\\nevidence would be suppressed. The district court appropriately exercised its\\ndiscretion to impose a more moderate sanction that limited SEECOβs ability to\\nintroduce the actual document but which allowed it to ask witnesses about their\\npersonal knowledge of the statement. If Smith suffered any prejudice when witness\\ntestimony contradicted Smithβs argument that no such term sheet existed, that\\nprejudice was a direct result of Smithβs tactical decision and not the district courtβs\\nruling.\\n\\n It appears that Smith may also be arguing that the term sheet testimony went\\nbeyond the district courtβs sanction for the untimely disclosure. To the extent this\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fcontention is raised, Smith forfeited her argument by failing to object when the first\\ntwo witnesses discussed their knowledge of the document. Day v. Toman, 266 F.3d\\n831, 837 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Powell v. Burns, 763 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir.\\n1985)). Further, Smith has not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating plain error.\\nBy the time Smith objected, during the testimony of Josh Weber, the evidence was\\ncumulative and any error was harmless. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637,\\n644 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 132\\n(8th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n E. Questioning Regarding the Pre-suit Notice Provision\\n\\n βWe normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard\\ninadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an βoverwhelming\\nprobabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the courtβs instructions.β Greer v.\\nMiller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,\\n208 (1987)). Smith has not shown the requisite overwhelming probability. The\\ndistrict courtβs instruction was a correct statement of the law and properly informed\\nthe jury that it was not to consider the provision when evaluating Smithβs claims. The\\ndistrict courtβs conclusion that βany resulting prejudice caused to plaintiffs by this\\ntestimony was minimal and certainly not a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial\\nunder Rule 59β was not erroneous.\\n\\n F. Statements by SEECOβs Counsel Suggesting Inadequacy of Class\\n Representation and Maligning Opposing Counsel\\n\\n Smith argues that she is entitled to a new trial because comments made by\\nSEECOβs counsel insinuated that Smith was represented by βplaintiff lawyersβ whose\\narguments did not make βsense for anybody.β We consider three factors in\\ndetermining whether a lawyerβs comments warrant a new trial: (1) the extensiveness\\nof the improper remarks; (2) the absence of any meaningful curative instruction; and\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f(3) whether any damage award was exorbitant. Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007,\\n1011β12 (8th Cir. 2014). The district court sustained Smithβs objections and\\ninstructed the jury to disregard the statements. No new trial is warranted given the\\ncourtβs curative instruction and the limited nature of the remarks.\\n\\n Smith also claims that comments by SEECOβs counsel may have\\ninappropriately suggested to the jury that Smith was not an adequate class\\nrepresentative. The district court responded by giving a lengthy curative instruction\\nthat included telling the jury βto the extent that you have heard anything or you in any\\nway think that [Smithβs] position may not be the same as other class members in any\\nway, you have to disregard that.β Given our presumption that βa jury will follow an\\ninstruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless\\nthere is an βoverwhelming probabilityβ that the jury will be unable to follow the\\ncourtβs instructions,β the district court appropriately denied Smithβs motion for a new\\ntrial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8 (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We deny Smithβs motion to certify questions of law to the Arkansas Supreme\\nCourt and affirm the district courtβs judgment.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1797,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4612429,"string":"4,612,429"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Charter Land Co., LLC, Movant - Appellant Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust; Brents Holding Company, LLC ; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B. Dunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable Trust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith; Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady; Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker ; Julia Walker ; Brinda Williams; Steven English; Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison ; Mary Harrison ; Carol Howell ; Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore ; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock ; Eric Rice ; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael Wood, Individually and as Trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as Representative of Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher; Pamela C. Harmon, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston ; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Connie Smith v. Connie Arnett"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2378; 17-2607; 17-2610; 17-3443"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2378\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\nConnie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant;\\n Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry\\n Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle\\nGottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James\\n Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell;\\nSherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard;\\n Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey;\\n Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen\\n Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2607\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\f Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Charter Land Co., LLC\\n\\n Movant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2610\\n ___________________________\\n\\nConnie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust;\\nBrents Holding Company, LLC; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fDunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas\\n Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable\\nTrust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith;\\n Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady;\\n Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker; Julia Walker; Brinda Williams; Steven English;\\n Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison; Mary Harrison; Carol Howell;\\n Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock;\\n Eric Rice; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael\\n Wood, Individually and as trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren\\n Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as representative of\\n Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher;\\n Pamela C. Harmon\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3443\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth;\\n David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell;\\nSally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John\\nGottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray;\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fRobert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom;\\n Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer;\\n Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams;\\n Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone;\\nJames Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In this appeal four groups of prospective intervenorsβthe Arnett I, Arnett II,\\nCharter Land Co. LLC, and Wyborny appellantsβchallenge the district courtβs1\\ndenials of their motions to intervene in a class action lawsuit by named plaintiff\\nConnie Jean Smith against SEECO, Inc., et al.2 They also challenge the district\\ncourtβs procedures for opting-out from the class. We affirm the district courtβs ruling\\nthat Charter Landβs motion to intervene was untimely, and dismiss the remaining\\nappeals for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n 2\\n Arnett I is comprised of forty-three individuals, while Arnett II is comprised\\nof those forty-three individuals plus an additional three individuals.\\n -4-\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith filed a putative class action lawsuit against SEECO, Inc.,\\net al., alleging underpayment of gas royalties.3 The claims related to the rate of\\npayment that SEECO and its subsidiaries had offered interest-holders in oil wells in\\nthe Fayetteville Shale formation. When Smith filed her lawsuit, two class actions on\\nrelated claims were already pending in state court (referred to as βSnowβ and\\nβStewmonβ). The district court certified a class of all of SEECOβs royalty owners\\n(including owners within and outside of Arkansas) with leases containing the relevant\\nlease language. The Smith class by definition covered all of the related state actions.\\n\\n The district court formulated a class-notice plan with specific opt-out\\nprocedures. To opt-out, a royalty owner had to send a letter to the class administrator\\npostmarked within sixty days of the notice date stating the ownerβs desire to be\\nexcluded from the class. The court-approved opt-out plan required the letter to: (1)\\nstate the owner number, name, and address of the person or entity requesting\\nexclusion, (2) identify by property name/number the well or wells in which the owner\\nheld a royalty for which they were requesting exclusion, and (3) contain a notarized\\nsignature by the individual or an officer of the entity requesting exclusion. Two\\nhundred forty-eight royalty owners moved to intervene to challenge the courtβs\\nopt-out procedures, including the Arnett appellants. The district court declined to\\nrule on the motions until the class members had an opportunity to comply with the\\nrequirements in full. Most of the owners who signed the intervention motion chose\\nto submit opt-out requests.\\n\\n On January 18, 2017, the district court denied the motions to intervene and to\\nmodify the opt-out procedures. The key concern underlying the district courtβs ruling\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The facts of the merits dispute in this case are recounted in full in Connie Jean\\nSmith v. SEECO, Inc., et al, No. 17-3636.\\n -5-\\n\\fon the opt-out procedures was a fear βthat lawyers, rather than the class members\\nthemselves, may be making decisions, and extra protections must be in place to\\nensure the class members made the opt-out decision.β This concern was bolstered by\\nlater experience. For example, the court received opt-out requests from different\\ngroups of lawyers purporting to represent the same royalty owner and interest.\\nAdditionally, the fact that some individuals owned multiple wells and some wells had\\nmultiple owners meant that the court felt the opt-out needed to require βowners to\\nspecify which properties/wells they wished excluded, rather than merely provide their\\nname and/or only provide the well number.β After all opt-out requests had been\\nsubmitted, the court concluded that βthe opt-out procedures were not overly\\nburdensome, and . . . in the aggregate, the process worked as expected.β As relevant\\nto this appeal, forty-five of the forty-six Arnett appellants (the forty-three appellants\\nin Arnett I and two of the three additional appellants in Arnett II) failed to comply\\nwith the opt-out requirements and therefore remained in the class.\\n\\n The Arnett appellants asked this court for mandamus relief from the January\\n18, 2017, order. We denied the request on February 15, 2017. On March 30, 2017,\\nthe Arnett appellants filed a second motion to intervene. On May 24, 2017, the\\ndistrict court denied this second, duplicative motion.\\n\\n On May 18, 2017, the state court handling the Snow litigation approved a\\nglobal settlement class covering all of the members of the Smith class. The state\\ncourt preliminarily approved the settlement. At the time of the settlement the Smith\\ncase was fast approaching a firm trial date. The settlement provided that if the Smith\\ntrial began the settlement would be terminable. SEECO asked the district court to\\ncontinue Smithβs trial so that the settlement in Snow could be finalized. The district\\ncourt denied the motion.\\n\\n Before trial began, Snow disclosed to the state court a fee-sharing agreement\\nbetween Snow and Smith class counsel. Under the agreement Smith class counsel\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwould receive only roughly one-third of the attorneyβs fees from any global\\nsettlement (with the other two-thirds going to Snow class counsel), but Smith counsel\\nwould keep all of the attorneyβs fees awarded after a successful trial. Snow counsel\\nclaimed the agreement was still in effect, creating a potential counsel-adequacy\\nproblem under Rule 23. Smith counsel asserted that the agreement was no longer in\\neffect. As a result of the dispute, SEECO asked the federal district court to decertify\\nthe Smith class and remove class counsel.\\n\\n The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that class counselβs\\nperformance to that point had been βnothing short of impressiveβ and found that the\\nevidence indicated that the fee-sharing agreement terminated long before the Smith\\nclass was certified. SEECO asked us for mandamus relief and a stay, seeking to\\nprotect the Snow settlement. We denied their request.\\n\\n As relevant to this appeal, the Wyborny appellants filed a similar motion\\nechoing SEECOβs class-adequacy concerns. The district court denied the motions.\\nSimilar arguments were made at trial, and again rejected. At the close of evidence,\\nthe district court noted that β[t]his was a well-tried caseβ and told Smith that her\\ncounsel βdid a great job.β Nevertheless, SEECO prevailed.\\n\\n After the jury had returned its verdict and the day before the district court\\nentered judgment, another royalty owner, Charter Land Company, moved to intervene\\nfor the purpose of challenging class counselβs adequacy. Charter Landβs motion\\nraised substantially the same arguments that SEECO and the Wyborny appellants had\\nraised before trial. The district court denied the motion as untimely, explaining that\\nCharter Land was not permitted to wait to see how the trial turned out, then seek to\\nundermine class adequacy.\\n\\n The attempted-intervenors now appeal, claiming the district court abused its\\ndiscretion in denying their motions to intervene and in fashioning the opt-out\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fprocedures. SEECO asserts we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appeal and both\\nArnett appeals, as they filed their notices of appeal well past the 30-day deadline\\nfollowing the denial of their motions to intervene. SEECO also asks us to affirm the\\ndistrict courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as untimely\\ngamesmanship.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal\\n\\n The statutory notice-of-appeal deadline is jurisdictional. See Bowles v.\\nRussell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (β[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil\\ncase is a jurisdictional requirement.β); EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d\\n1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Commβn, 865\\nF.2d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1989)) (β[A]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely\\nappeal . . . .β). βWe must resolve outstanding questions of jurisdiction before\\nproceeding to analyze the merits.β Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir.\\n2001) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envβt, 523 U.S. 83, 94β95 (1998))\\n(holding that we must consider the statutory notice-of-appeal timeliness requirement\\nbefore addressing the merits of a case).\\n\\n βIt is well-settled that an order denying a motion to intervene as of right is a\\nfinal appealable order.β City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted).\\nIn order for an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over the attempted-intervenorsβ\\nappeals, the attempted-intervenors must have appealed within 30 days after the denial\\nof their motions to intervene.\\n\\n We lack jurisdiction over the Arnett I appellants because their appeals were not\\nfiled within 30 days of the district courtβs order denying intervention. The Arnett I\\nappellants had 30 days from the denial of their motion to intervene on January 18,\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f2017, to file their notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2107(a). They instead asked this\\ncourt for mandamus relief (denied February 15, 2017) then refiled a second motion\\nto intervene on March 30, 2017. Their second motion, like the first, contained\\narguments regarding why the appellants should not have to comply with the district\\ncourtβs opt-out procedures. On May 24, 2017, the district court denied their second,\\nduplicative motion. The denial of a second motion to intervene covering the same\\ngrounds as the first motion to intervene does not reset the clock for purposes of an\\nappeal; holding otherwise would defeat the statutory timeliness requirement. That\\ntheir eventual notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the denial of their second\\nmotion does not preserve our jurisdiction, as the Arnett I appellants have not\\nidentified a material way in which the second motion was distinguishable from the\\nfirst. See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (explaining that βchanged\\ncircumstancesβ would allow an appeal from a second motion to intervene); cf. Smith\\nv. SEECO, Inc., 865 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2017) (βNothing in our decision\\nallows a putative intervenor to bring successive appeals from successive denials when\\na single motion to intervene could have raised all of the putative intervenorβs interests\\nat one time without delay.β).\\n\\n We likewise lack jurisdiction over the Arnett II appellants. Their notice of\\nappealβfiled on November 6, 2017βindicated that they were appealing the district\\ncourtβs January 18, 2017, order. Because βan order denying a motion to intervene as\\nof right is a final appealable order,β the Arnett II appellants were not allowed to wait\\nto bring their appeal.4 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401.\\n\\n The Arnett II appellants argue against this conclusion by suggesting that the\\nexception identified by the Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1\\n\\n 4\\n One of the Arnett II appellants, Kathy Johnston, appears to have had her opt-\\nout request accepted by the district court. As a result, she was excluded from the\\nclass. We therefore would also dismiss her claims on grounds of Article III standing\\nbecause she was not negatively affected by the district courtβs rulings.\\n -9-\\n\\f(2002), allows for their appeal. In Devlin the Supreme Court held that βnonnamed\\nclass members . . . who have objected in a timely manner to approval of [a] settlement\\nat the fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening,β\\ndespite the ordinary rule that only parties to a lawsuit are able to appeal an adverse\\njudgment. Id. at 14. We have previously suggested that Devlinβs rule is limited to\\nthe circumstances at issue in that case. See Huyer v. Van de Voorde, 847 F.3d 983,\\n986 n.3 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig.,\\n302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002)) (explaining that we have expressed doubt that\\nDevlin βapplies to an opt-out class actionβ at all); P.A.C.E. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas\\nCity, 312 F.3d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Devlin was βnot on pointβ when\\nreviewing denial of motion to decertify a class since Devlin involved a final order\\napproving settlement of a case). Devlinβs holding has no application where, as here,\\nthe attempted-intervenors received a final (and therefore immediately appealable)\\norder denying their motion to intervene.\\n\\n Finally, we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appellants. The Wyborny\\nappellantsβ notice of appeal identified orders entered on βJune 2, 2017, January 18,\\n2017, and March 21, 2017.β The Wyborny appellants did not file their notice of\\nappeal until July 21, 2017βwell after the date to appeal even the June 2, 2017, order.\\nTo the extent that the Wyborny appellants attempt to rely on Devlin to support the\\ntimeliness of their motion, they are unsuccessful for the same reasons as the Arnett\\nII appellants. We therefore dismiss the Arnett and Wyborny appeals for having failed\\nto comply with the jurisdictional requirement that they be filed within 30 days of a\\nfinal appealable order.\\n\\n B. Timeliness\\n\\n βWhen a district court denies a motion to intervene based on untimeliness\\n. . . we review that decision for abuse of discretion.β In re Uponor, Inc., F1807\\nPlumbing Fittings Prod. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011)). A\\ncourt βabuses its discretion when it βrests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual\\nfindings or erroneous legal conclusions.ββ Id. (quoting Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C&W\\nEnters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 2008)). If timely, however, we evaluate\\nwhether a party is entitled to intervene as a matter of right de novo. Id. (citing Mille\\nLacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1993)).\\n\\n βTo determine whether a motion to intervene is timely, we have instructed\\ndistrict courts to consider β(1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of\\nthe motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenorβs knowledge of the litigation;\\n(3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in\\nseeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.ββ Id. (citing ACLU of Minn.,\\n643 F.3d at 1094). βMotions to intervene should be construed βliberally ... in favor\\nof the proposed intervenors,β but β[a]t the same time, a district courtβs exercise of\\ndiscretion under the rule should not lightly be overturned.ββ Id. at 1065β66\\n(alterations in original) (citing United States v. Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd., 620\\nF.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in\\nconcluding that Charter Land filed an untimely appeal where it merely repeated\\narguments already advanced by other attempted intervenors after the class was\\nunsuccessful at trial. While Charter Land insists that it acted diligently upon learning\\nof the purported fee-sharing agreement, similarly situated prospective intervenors\\nwere able to file motions to intervene before the conclusion of the trial. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Charter Land offered no good\\nreason for its delay and denying the motion.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We dismiss each appeal besides that of Charter Land for lack of jurisdiction.\\nWe affirm the district courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as\\nuntimely.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4389682/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612429/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Charter Land Co., LLC, Movant - Appellant Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust; Brents Holding Company, LLC ; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B. Dunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable Trust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith; Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady; Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker ; Julia Walker ; Brinda Williams; Steven English; Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison ; Mary Harrison ; Carol Howell ; Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore ; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock ; Eric Rice ; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael Wood, Individually and as Trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as Representative of Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher; Pamela C. Harmon, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston ; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2378\n ___________________________\n\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\n Southwestern Energy Company\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n v.\n\nConnie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant;\n Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry\n Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle\nGottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James\n Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell;\nSherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard;\n Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey;\n Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen\n Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\n\n Movants - Appellants\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2607\n ___________________________\n\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\n\f Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\n Southwestern Energy Company\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Charter Land Co., LLC\n\n Movant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2610\n ___________________________\n\nConnie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\n Southwestern Energy Company\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust;\nBrents Holding Company, LLC; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B.\n\n -2-\n\fDunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas\n Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable\nTrust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith;\n Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady;\n Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker; Julia Walker; Brinda Williams; Steven English;\n Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison; Mary Harrison; Carol Howell;\n Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock;\n Eric Rice; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael\n Wood, Individually and as trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren\n Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as representative of\n Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher;\n Pamela C. Harmon\n\n Movants - Appellants\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3443\n ___________________________\n\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\n Southwestern Energy Company\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth;\n David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell;\nSally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John\nGottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray;\n\n -3-\n\fRobert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom;\n Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer;\n Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams;\n Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone;\nJames Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\n\n Movants - Appellants\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\n Filed: April 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n In this appeal four groups of prospective intervenorsβthe Arnett I, Arnett II,\nCharter Land Co. LLC, and Wyborny appellantsβchallenge the district courtβs1\ndenials of their motions to intervene in a class action lawsuit by named plaintiff\nConnie Jean Smith against SEECO, Inc., et al.2 They also challenge the district\ncourtβs procedures for opting-out from the class. We affirm the district courtβs ruling\nthat Charter Landβs motion to intervene was untimely, and dismiss the remaining\nappeals for lack of jurisdiction.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\n 2\n Arnett I is comprised of forty-three individuals, while Arnett II is comprised\nof those forty-three individuals plus an additional three individuals.\n -4-\n\f I. Background\n\n Connie Jean Smith filed a putative class action lawsuit against SEECO, Inc.,\net al., alleging underpayment of gas royalties.3 The claims related to the rate of\npayment that SEECO and its subsidiaries had offered interest-holders in oil wells in\nthe Fayetteville Shale formation. When Smith filed her lawsuit, two class actions on\nrelated claims were already pending in state court (referred to as βSnowβ and\nβStewmonβ). The district court certified a class of all of SEECOβs royalty owners\n(including owners within and outside of Arkansas) with leases containing the relevant\nlease language. The Smith class by definition covered all of the related state actions.\n\n The district court formulated a class-notice plan with specific opt-out\nprocedures. To opt-out, a royalty owner had to send a letter to the class administrator\npostmarked within sixty days of the notice date stating the ownerβs desire to be\nexcluded from the class. The court-approved opt-out plan required the letter to: (1)\nstate the owner number, name, and address of the person or entity requesting\nexclusion, (2) identify by property name/number the well or wells in which the owner\nheld a royalty for which they were requesting exclusion, and (3) contain a notarized\nsignature by the individual or an officer of the entity requesting exclusion. Two\nhundred forty-eight royalty owners moved to intervene to challenge the courtβs\nopt-out procedures, including the Arnett appellants. The district court declined to\nrule on the motions until the class members had an opportunity to comply with the\nrequirements in full. Most of the owners who signed the intervention motion chose\nto submit opt-out requests.\n\n On January 18, 2017, the district court denied the motions to intervene and to\nmodify the opt-out procedures. The key concern underlying the district courtβs ruling\n\n\n 3\n The facts of the merits dispute in this case are recounted in full in Connie Jean\nSmith v. SEECO, Inc., et al, No. 17-3636.\n -5-\n\fon the opt-out procedures was a fear βthat lawyers, rather than the class members\nthemselves, may be making decisions, and extra protections must be in place to\nensure the class members made the opt-out decision.β This concern was bolstered by\nlater experience. For example, the court received opt-out requests from different\ngroups of lawyers purporting to represent the same royalty owner and interest.\nAdditionally, the fact that some individuals owned multiple wells and some wells had\nmultiple owners meant that the court felt the opt-out needed to require βowners to\nspecify which properties/wells they wished excluded, rather than merely provide their\nname and/or only provide the well number.β After all opt-out requests had been\nsubmitted, the court concluded that βthe opt-out procedures were not overly\nburdensome, and . . . in the aggregate, the process worked as expected.β As relevant\nto this appeal, forty-five of the forty-six Arnett appellants (the forty-three appellants\nin Arnett I and two of the three additional appellants in Arnett II) failed to comply\nwith the opt-out requirements and therefore remained in the class.\n\n The Arnett appellants asked this court for mandamus relief from the January\n18, 2017, order. We denied the request on February 15, 2017. On March 30, 2017,\nthe Arnett appellants filed a second motion to intervene. On May 24, 2017, the\ndistrict court denied this second, duplicative motion.\n\n On May 18, 2017, the state court handling the Snow litigation approved a\nglobal settlement class covering all of the members of the Smith class. The state\ncourt preliminarily approved the settlement. At the time of the settlement the Smith\ncase was fast approaching a firm trial date. The settlement provided that if the Smith\ntrial began the settlement would be terminable. SEECO asked the district court to\ncontinue Smithβs trial so that the settlement in Snow could be finalized. The district\ncourt denied the motion.\n\n Before trial began, Snow disclosed to the state court a fee-sharing agreement\nbetween Snow and Smith class counsel. Under the agreement Smith class counsel\n\n -6-\n\fwould receive only roughly one-third of the attorneyβs fees from any global\nsettlement (with the other two-thirds going to Snow class counsel), but Smith counsel\nwould keep all of the attorneyβs fees awarded after a successful trial. Snow counsel\nclaimed the agreement was still in effect, creating a potential counsel-adequacy\nproblem under Rule 23. Smith counsel asserted that the agreement was no longer in\neffect. As a result of the dispute, SEECO asked the federal district court to decertify\nthe Smith class and remove class counsel.\n\n The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that class counselβs\nperformance to that point had been βnothing short of impressiveβ and found that the\nevidence indicated that the fee-sharing agreement terminated long before the Smith\nclass was certified. SEECO asked us for mandamus relief and a stay, seeking to\nprotect the Snow settlement. We denied their request.\n\n As relevant to this appeal, the Wyborny appellants filed a similar motion\nechoing SEECOβs class-adequacy concerns. The district court denied the motions.\nSimilar arguments were made at trial, and again rejected. At the close of evidence,\nthe district court noted that β[t]his was a well-tried caseβ and told Smith that her\ncounsel βdid a great job.β Nevertheless, SEECO prevailed.\n\n After the jury had returned its verdict and the day before the district court\nentered judgment, another royalty owner, Charter Land Company, moved to intervene\nfor the purpose of challenging class counselβs adequacy. Charter Landβs motion\nraised substantially the same arguments that SEECO and the Wyborny appellants had\nraised before trial. The district court denied the motion as untimely, explaining that\nCharter Land was not permitted to wait to see how the trial turned out, then seek to\nundermine class adequacy.\n\n The attempted-intervenors now appeal, claiming the district court abused its\ndiscretion in denying their motions to intervene and in fashioning the opt-out\n\n -7-\n\fprocedures. SEECO asserts we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appeal and both\nArnett appeals, as they filed their notices of appeal well past the 30-day deadline\nfollowing the denial of their motions to intervene. SEECO also asks us to affirm the\ndistrict courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as untimely\ngamesmanship.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n A. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal\n\n The statutory notice-of-appeal deadline is jurisdictional. See Bowles v.\nRussell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (β[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil\ncase is a jurisdictional requirement.β); EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d\n1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Commβn, 865\nF.2d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1989)) (β[A]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely\nappeal . . . .β). βWe must resolve outstanding questions of jurisdiction before\nproceeding to analyze the merits.β Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir.\n2001) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envβt, 523 U.S. 83, 94β95 (1998))\n(holding that we must consider the statutory notice-of-appeal timeliness requirement\nbefore addressing the merits of a case).\n\n βIt is well-settled that an order denying a motion to intervene as of right is a\nfinal appealable order.β City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted).\nIn order for an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over the attempted-intervenorsβ\nappeals, the attempted-intervenors must have appealed within 30 days after the denial\nof their motions to intervene.\n\n We lack jurisdiction over the Arnett I appellants because their appeals were not\nfiled within 30 days of the district courtβs order denying intervention. The Arnett I\nappellants had 30 days from the denial of their motion to intervene on January 18,\n\n -8-\n\f2017, to file their notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2107(a). They instead asked this\ncourt for mandamus relief (denied February 15, 2017) then refiled a second motion\nto intervene on March 30, 2017. Their second motion, like the first, contained\narguments regarding why the appellants should not have to comply with the district\ncourtβs opt-out procedures. On May 24, 2017, the district court denied their second,\nduplicative motion. The denial of a second motion to intervene covering the same\ngrounds as the first motion to intervene does not reset the clock for purposes of an\nappeal; holding otherwise would defeat the statutory timeliness requirement. That\ntheir eventual notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the denial of their second\nmotion does not preserve our jurisdiction, as the Arnett I appellants have not\nidentified a material way in which the second motion was distinguishable from the\nfirst. See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (explaining that βchanged\ncircumstancesβ would allow an appeal from a second motion to intervene); cf. Smith\nv. SEECO, Inc., 865 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2017) (βNothing in our decision\nallows a putative intervenor to bring successive appeals from successive denials when\na single motion to intervene could have raised all of the putative intervenorβs interests\nat one time without delay.β).\n\n We likewise lack jurisdiction over the Arnett II appellants. Their notice of\nappealβfiled on November 6, 2017βindicated that they were appealing the district\ncourtβs January 18, 2017, order. Because βan order denying a motion to intervene as\nof right is a final appealable order,β the Arnett II appellants were not allowed to wait\nto bring their appeal.4 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401.\n\n The Arnett II appellants argue against this conclusion by suggesting that the\nexception identified by the Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1\n\n 4\n One of the Arnett II appellants, Kathy Johnston, appears to have had her opt-\nout request accepted by the district court. As a result, she was excluded from the\nclass. We therefore would also dismiss her claims on grounds of Article III standing\nbecause she was not negatively affected by the district courtβs rulings.\n -9-\n\f(2002), allows for their appeal. In Devlin the Supreme Court held that βnonnamed\nclass members . . . who have objected in a timely manner to approval of [a] settlement\nat the fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening,β\ndespite the ordinary rule that only parties to a lawsuit are able to appeal an adverse\njudgment. Id. at 14. We have previously suggested that Devlinβs rule is limited to\nthe circumstances at issue in that case. See Huyer v. Van de Voorde, 847 F.3d 983,\n986 n.3 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig.,\n302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002)) (explaining that we have expressed doubt that\nDevlin βapplies to an opt-out class actionβ at all); P.A.C.E. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas\nCity, 312 F.3d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Devlin was βnot on pointβ when\nreviewing denial of motion to decertify a class since Devlin involved a final order\napproving settlement of a case). Devlinβs holding has no application where, as here,\nthe attempted-intervenors received a final (and therefore immediately appealable)\norder denying their motion to intervene.\n\n Finally, we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appellants. The Wyborny\nappellantsβ notice of appeal identified orders entered on βJune 2, 2017, January 18,\n2017, and March 21, 2017.β The Wyborny appellants did not file their notice of\nappeal until July 21, 2017βwell after the date to appeal even the June 2, 2017, order.\nTo the extent that the Wyborny appellants attempt to rely on Devlin to support the\ntimeliness of their motion, they are unsuccessful for the same reasons as the Arnett\nII appellants. We therefore dismiss the Arnett and Wyborny appeals for having failed\nto comply with the jurisdictional requirement that they be filed within 30 days of a\nfinal appealable order.\n\n B. Timeliness\n\n βWhen a district court denies a motion to intervene based on untimeliness\n. . . we review that decision for abuse of discretion.β In re Uponor, Inc., F1807\nPlumbing Fittings Prod. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing\n\n -10-\n\fACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011)). A\ncourt βabuses its discretion when it βrests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual\nfindings or erroneous legal conclusions.ββ Id. (quoting Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C&W\nEnters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 2008)). If timely, however, we evaluate\nwhether a party is entitled to intervene as a matter of right de novo. Id. (citing Mille\nLacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1993)).\n\n βTo determine whether a motion to intervene is timely, we have instructed\ndistrict courts to consider β(1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of\nthe motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenorβs knowledge of the litigation;\n(3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in\nseeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.ββ Id. (citing ACLU of Minn.,\n643 F.3d at 1094). βMotions to intervene should be construed βliberally ... in favor\nof the proposed intervenors,β but β[a]t the same time, a district courtβs exercise of\ndiscretion under the rule should not lightly be overturned.ββ Id. at 1065β66\n(alterations in original) (citing United States v. Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd., 620\nF.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in\nconcluding that Charter Land filed an untimely appeal where it merely repeated\narguments already advanced by other attempted intervenors after the class was\nunsuccessful at trial. While Charter Land insists that it acted diligently upon learning\nof the purported fee-sharing agreement, similarly situated prospective intervenors\nwere able to file motions to intervene before the conclusion of the trial. The district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Charter Land offered no good\nreason for its delay and denying the motion.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n We dismiss each appeal besides that of Charter Land for lack of jurisdiction.\nWe affirm the district courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as\nuntimely.\n ______________________________\n\n -11-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Charter Land Co., LLC, Movant - Appellant Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust; Brents Holding Company, LLC ; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B. Dunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable Trust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith; Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady; Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker ; Julia Walker ; Brinda Williams; Steven English; Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison ; Mary Harrison ; Carol Howell ; Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore ; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock ; Eric Rice ; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael Wood, Individually and as Trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as Representative of Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher; Pamela C. Harmon, Movants - Appellants Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, Inc., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth; David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John Gottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray; Robert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston ; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey ; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell ; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes, Movants - Appellants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2378\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\nConnie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; David Brown; Edward Bryant;\\n Roy Bryant; Rob Cassell; Sally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry\\n Donahue; James Duncan; Kim Carrell Gifford; John Gottsponer; Myrtle\\nGottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karrie Gray; Robert Hall; James\\n Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom; Floyd Jerrell;\\nSherry Jerrell; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer; Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard;\\n Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams; Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey;\\n Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone; James Throneberry; Karen\\n Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2607\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\f Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Charter Land Co., LLC\\n\\n Movant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2610\\n ___________________________\\n\\nConnie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kimberly Wyborny; David Bird; Laurel Bird; Kenneth Brents Family Trust;\\nBrents Holding Company, LLC; Dunaway Brothers Properties, LLC; Betty B.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fDunaway Rev. Trust; Arthur Dunaway Rev Trust; Lonnie Wayne Harris; Thomas\\n Hart; Hart of Arkansas Minerals, LLC; Paula Barton; Paula Barton Revocable\\nTrust; Dorr B. Moore; Barbara Moore; Dorr B. Moore Jr. Trust; Barbara J. Smith;\\n Ruth Ann Needels; Ruth Ann Needels Living Trust; Gary Goff; Verdain Grady;\\n Glyva Jo Grady; Dana Walker; Julia Walker; Brinda Williams; Steven English;\\n Thane Fleming; Nancy Fleming; Rex Harrison; Mary Harrison; Carol Howell;\\n Gailon Howell; Marilynn Moore; Robert Owens; Faye Owens; Joseph Peacock;\\n Eric Rice; William Rice; Theresa Tubbs; Jeannine Hill Thomas; David Michael\\n Wood, Individually and as trustee of the Dickson/Wood Land Trust; Warren\\n Christopher; Georgene Christopher; Warren Christopher, as representative of\\n Mountain Aire East, Inc.; MWI, LLC; Melissa Ruth Christopher;\\n Pamela C. Harmon\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3443\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto\\n Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company;\\n Southwestern Energy Company\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; Cecil Barnes, III; James Booth; Lori Booth;\\n David Brown; Edward Bryant; Roy Bryant; Kim Carrell Gifford; Roby Cassell;\\nSally Cassell; Patricia Cates; Isaac Criswell; Jerry Donahue; James Duncan; John\\nGottsponer; Myrtle Gottsponer; Clemens Gottsponer; Thomas Gray; Karri Gray;\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fRobert Hall; James Harrison; John Hart; Kevin Holland; Hubert Isom; Joyce Isom;\\n Floyd Jerrell; Sherry Jerrell; Kathy Johnston; Brenda Sue Kay; Bennie Latimer;\\n Junior Latimer; Megan Lockard; Dana Love; James Williams; Lucretia Williams;\\n Dennis Cossey; Sandra Cossey; Michelle Gifford; Robert Lee; Juanita Boone;\\nJames Throneberry; Karen Throneberry; Wanda Liddell; Norma Bryant; Charles Noakes\\n\\n Movants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: April 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In this appeal four groups of prospective intervenorsβthe Arnett I, Arnett II,\\nCharter Land Co. LLC, and Wyborny appellantsβchallenge the district courtβs1\\ndenials of their motions to intervene in a class action lawsuit by named plaintiff\\nConnie Jean Smith against SEECO, Inc., et al.2 They also challenge the district\\ncourtβs procedures for opting-out from the class. We affirm the district courtβs ruling\\nthat Charter Landβs motion to intervene was untimely, and dismiss the remaining\\nappeals for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n 2\\n Arnett I is comprised of forty-three individuals, while Arnett II is comprised\\nof those forty-three individuals plus an additional three individuals.\\n -4-\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Connie Jean Smith filed a putative class action lawsuit against SEECO, Inc.,\\net al., alleging underpayment of gas royalties.3 The claims related to the rate of\\npayment that SEECO and its subsidiaries had offered interest-holders in oil wells in\\nthe Fayetteville Shale formation. When Smith filed her lawsuit, two class actions on\\nrelated claims were already pending in state court (referred to as βSnowβ and\\nβStewmonβ). The district court certified a class of all of SEECOβs royalty owners\\n(including owners within and outside of Arkansas) with leases containing the relevant\\nlease language. The Smith class by definition covered all of the related state actions.\\n\\n The district court formulated a class-notice plan with specific opt-out\\nprocedures. To opt-out, a royalty owner had to send a letter to the class administrator\\npostmarked within sixty days of the notice date stating the ownerβs desire to be\\nexcluded from the class. The court-approved opt-out plan required the letter to: (1)\\nstate the owner number, name, and address of the person or entity requesting\\nexclusion, (2) identify by property name/number the well or wells in which the owner\\nheld a royalty for which they were requesting exclusion, and (3) contain a notarized\\nsignature by the individual or an officer of the entity requesting exclusion. Two\\nhundred forty-eight royalty owners moved to intervene to challenge the courtβs\\nopt-out procedures, including the Arnett appellants. The district court declined to\\nrule on the motions until the class members had an opportunity to comply with the\\nrequirements in full. Most of the owners who signed the intervention motion chose\\nto submit opt-out requests.\\n\\n On January 18, 2017, the district court denied the motions to intervene and to\\nmodify the opt-out procedures. The key concern underlying the district courtβs ruling\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The facts of the merits dispute in this case are recounted in full in Connie Jean\\nSmith v. SEECO, Inc., et al, No. 17-3636.\\n -5-\\n\\fon the opt-out procedures was a fear βthat lawyers, rather than the class members\\nthemselves, may be making decisions, and extra protections must be in place to\\nensure the class members made the opt-out decision.β This concern was bolstered by\\nlater experience. For example, the court received opt-out requests from different\\ngroups of lawyers purporting to represent the same royalty owner and interest.\\nAdditionally, the fact that some individuals owned multiple wells and some wells had\\nmultiple owners meant that the court felt the opt-out needed to require βowners to\\nspecify which properties/wells they wished excluded, rather than merely provide their\\nname and/or only provide the well number.β After all opt-out requests had been\\nsubmitted, the court concluded that βthe opt-out procedures were not overly\\nburdensome, and . . . in the aggregate, the process worked as expected.β As relevant\\nto this appeal, forty-five of the forty-six Arnett appellants (the forty-three appellants\\nin Arnett I and two of the three additional appellants in Arnett II) failed to comply\\nwith the opt-out requirements and therefore remained in the class.\\n\\n The Arnett appellants asked this court for mandamus relief from the January\\n18, 2017, order. We denied the request on February 15, 2017. On March 30, 2017,\\nthe Arnett appellants filed a second motion to intervene. On May 24, 2017, the\\ndistrict court denied this second, duplicative motion.\\n\\n On May 18, 2017, the state court handling the Snow litigation approved a\\nglobal settlement class covering all of the members of the Smith class. The state\\ncourt preliminarily approved the settlement. At the time of the settlement the Smith\\ncase was fast approaching a firm trial date. The settlement provided that if the Smith\\ntrial began the settlement would be terminable. SEECO asked the district court to\\ncontinue Smithβs trial so that the settlement in Snow could be finalized. The district\\ncourt denied the motion.\\n\\n Before trial began, Snow disclosed to the state court a fee-sharing agreement\\nbetween Snow and Smith class counsel. Under the agreement Smith class counsel\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwould receive only roughly one-third of the attorneyβs fees from any global\\nsettlement (with the other two-thirds going to Snow class counsel), but Smith counsel\\nwould keep all of the attorneyβs fees awarded after a successful trial. Snow counsel\\nclaimed the agreement was still in effect, creating a potential counsel-adequacy\\nproblem under Rule 23. Smith counsel asserted that the agreement was no longer in\\neffect. As a result of the dispute, SEECO asked the federal district court to decertify\\nthe Smith class and remove class counsel.\\n\\n The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that class counselβs\\nperformance to that point had been βnothing short of impressiveβ and found that the\\nevidence indicated that the fee-sharing agreement terminated long before the Smith\\nclass was certified. SEECO asked us for mandamus relief and a stay, seeking to\\nprotect the Snow settlement. We denied their request.\\n\\n As relevant to this appeal, the Wyborny appellants filed a similar motion\\nechoing SEECOβs class-adequacy concerns. The district court denied the motions.\\nSimilar arguments were made at trial, and again rejected. At the close of evidence,\\nthe district court noted that β[t]his was a well-tried caseβ and told Smith that her\\ncounsel βdid a great job.β Nevertheless, SEECO prevailed.\\n\\n After the jury had returned its verdict and the day before the district court\\nentered judgment, another royalty owner, Charter Land Company, moved to intervene\\nfor the purpose of challenging class counselβs adequacy. Charter Landβs motion\\nraised substantially the same arguments that SEECO and the Wyborny appellants had\\nraised before trial. The district court denied the motion as untimely, explaining that\\nCharter Land was not permitted to wait to see how the trial turned out, then seek to\\nundermine class adequacy.\\n\\n The attempted-intervenors now appeal, claiming the district court abused its\\ndiscretion in denying their motions to intervene and in fashioning the opt-out\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fprocedures. SEECO asserts we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appeal and both\\nArnett appeals, as they filed their notices of appeal well past the 30-day deadline\\nfollowing the denial of their motions to intervene. SEECO also asks us to affirm the\\ndistrict courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as untimely\\ngamesmanship.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal\\n\\n The statutory notice-of-appeal deadline is jurisdictional. See Bowles v.\\nRussell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (β[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil\\ncase is a jurisdictional requirement.β); EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d\\n1394, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Commβn, 865\\nF.2d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1989)) (β[A]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely\\nappeal . . . .β). βWe must resolve outstanding questions of jurisdiction before\\nproceeding to analyze the merits.β Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir.\\n2001) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envβt, 523 U.S. 83, 94β95 (1998))\\n(holding that we must consider the statutory notice-of-appeal timeliness requirement\\nbefore addressing the merits of a case).\\n\\n βIt is well-settled that an order denying a motion to intervene as of right is a\\nfinal appealable order.β City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted).\\nIn order for an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over the attempted-intervenorsβ\\nappeals, the attempted-intervenors must have appealed within 30 days after the denial\\nof their motions to intervene.\\n\\n We lack jurisdiction over the Arnett I appellants because their appeals were not\\nfiled within 30 days of the district courtβs order denying intervention. The Arnett I\\nappellants had 30 days from the denial of their motion to intervene on January 18,\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f2017, to file their notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2107(a). They instead asked this\\ncourt for mandamus relief (denied February 15, 2017) then refiled a second motion\\nto intervene on March 30, 2017. Their second motion, like the first, contained\\narguments regarding why the appellants should not have to comply with the district\\ncourtβs opt-out procedures. On May 24, 2017, the district court denied their second,\\nduplicative motion. The denial of a second motion to intervene covering the same\\ngrounds as the first motion to intervene does not reset the clock for purposes of an\\nappeal; holding otherwise would defeat the statutory timeliness requirement. That\\ntheir eventual notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the denial of their second\\nmotion does not preserve our jurisdiction, as the Arnett I appellants have not\\nidentified a material way in which the second motion was distinguishable from the\\nfirst. See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401 (explaining that βchanged\\ncircumstancesβ would allow an appeal from a second motion to intervene); cf. Smith\\nv. SEECO, Inc., 865 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2017) (βNothing in our decision\\nallows a putative intervenor to bring successive appeals from successive denials when\\na single motion to intervene could have raised all of the putative intervenorβs interests\\nat one time without delay.β).\\n\\n We likewise lack jurisdiction over the Arnett II appellants. Their notice of\\nappealβfiled on November 6, 2017βindicated that they were appealing the district\\ncourtβs January 18, 2017, order. Because βan order denying a motion to intervene as\\nof right is a final appealable order,β the Arnett II appellants were not allowed to wait\\nto bring their appeal.4 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1401.\\n\\n The Arnett II appellants argue against this conclusion by suggesting that the\\nexception identified by the Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1\\n\\n 4\\n One of the Arnett II appellants, Kathy Johnston, appears to have had her opt-\\nout request accepted by the district court. As a result, she was excluded from the\\nclass. We therefore would also dismiss her claims on grounds of Article III standing\\nbecause she was not negatively affected by the district courtβs rulings.\\n -9-\\n\\f(2002), allows for their appeal. In Devlin the Supreme Court held that βnonnamed\\nclass members . . . who have objected in a timely manner to approval of [a] settlement\\nat the fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening,β\\ndespite the ordinary rule that only parties to a lawsuit are able to appeal an adverse\\njudgment. Id. at 14. We have previously suggested that Devlinβs rule is limited to\\nthe circumstances at issue in that case. See Huyer v. Van de Voorde, 847 F.3d 983,\\n986 n.3 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig.,\\n302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002)) (explaining that we have expressed doubt that\\nDevlin βapplies to an opt-out class actionβ at all); P.A.C.E. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas\\nCity, 312 F.3d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Devlin was βnot on pointβ when\\nreviewing denial of motion to decertify a class since Devlin involved a final order\\napproving settlement of a case). Devlinβs holding has no application where, as here,\\nthe attempted-intervenors received a final (and therefore immediately appealable)\\norder denying their motion to intervene.\\n\\n Finally, we lack jurisdiction over the Wyborny appellants. The Wyborny\\nappellantsβ notice of appeal identified orders entered on βJune 2, 2017, January 18,\\n2017, and March 21, 2017.β The Wyborny appellants did not file their notice of\\nappeal until July 21, 2017βwell after the date to appeal even the June 2, 2017, order.\\nTo the extent that the Wyborny appellants attempt to rely on Devlin to support the\\ntimeliness of their motion, they are unsuccessful for the same reasons as the Arnett\\nII appellants. We therefore dismiss the Arnett and Wyborny appeals for having failed\\nto comply with the jurisdictional requirement that they be filed within 30 days of a\\nfinal appealable order.\\n\\n B. Timeliness\\n\\n βWhen a district court denies a motion to intervene based on untimeliness\\n. . . we review that decision for abuse of discretion.β In re Uponor, Inc., F1807\\nPlumbing Fittings Prod. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011)). A\\ncourt βabuses its discretion when it βrests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual\\nfindings or erroneous legal conclusions.ββ Id. (quoting Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C&W\\nEnters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 2008)). If timely, however, we evaluate\\nwhether a party is entitled to intervene as a matter of right de novo. Id. (citing Mille\\nLacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1993)).\\n\\n βTo determine whether a motion to intervene is timely, we have instructed\\ndistrict courts to consider β(1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of\\nthe motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenorβs knowledge of the litigation;\\n(3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in\\nseeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.ββ Id. (citing ACLU of Minn.,\\n643 F.3d at 1094). βMotions to intervene should be construed βliberally ... in favor\\nof the proposed intervenors,β but β[a]t the same time, a district courtβs exercise of\\ndiscretion under the rule should not lightly be overturned.ββ Id. at 1065β66\\n(alterations in original) (citing United States v. Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd., 620\\nF.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in\\nconcluding that Charter Land filed an untimely appeal where it merely repeated\\narguments already advanced by other attempted intervenors after the class was\\nunsuccessful at trial. While Charter Land insists that it acted diligently upon learning\\nof the purported fee-sharing agreement, similarly situated prospective intervenors\\nwere able to file motions to intervene before the conclusion of the trial. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Charter Land offered no good\\nreason for its delay and denying the motion.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We dismiss each appeal besides that of Charter Land for lack of jurisdiction.\\nWe affirm the district courtβs denial of Charter Landβs motion to intervene as\\nuntimely.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -11-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1798,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614422,"string":"4,614,422"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"RESTAURANT RECYCLING, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant, New Fashion Pork, LLP, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYER MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Doing Business as EMC Insurance Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants - Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Restaurant Recycling, LLC v. Employer Mutual Casualty Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2792"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2792\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n New Fashion Pork, LLP,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiff,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Employer Mutual Casualty Company, doing business as EMC Insurance\\n Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling for delivering defective\\nshipments of recycled fat, which New Fashion Pork uses as an ingredient in its swine\\n\\ffeed. Restaurant Recycling, in turn, sued Employer Mutual Casualty Company,\\nseeking a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify\\nRestaurant Recycling. Employer Mutual moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing\\na total pollution exclusion in its policy that limited coverage in the case of property\\ndamage arising from dispersal of pollutants. The district court1 granted the motion,\\nand Restaurant Recycling appeals. We conclude that the total pollution exclusion\\napplies and affirm the judgment.\\n\\n Disputes over an insurerβs duty to defend are determined by reference to the\\ncomplaint in the underlying action, so we recite the facts as alleged by New Fashion\\nPork. Restaurant Recycling purchases used fat products, like waste cooking oil from\\nrestaurants, and then processes and resells the substances to livestock producers for\\nblending with other ingredients in their animal feed. From July to September 2014,\\nRestaurant Recycling delivered several loads of its blended fats to New Fashion Pork.\\nThese fat products were contaminated with two substancesβlasalocid and lascadoil.\\nLasalocid, a chemical agent, βis not generally recognized as safe and is known to\\ncause deaths in horses, turkeys, and swine.β Lascadoil, a byproduct in the\\nmanufacture of lasalocid, βis not approved for consumption in humans or in animals\\nand is not generally recognized as safe.β Lascadoil is an industrial waste product\\nwhose only approved use is as biofuel.\\n\\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling in Minnesota state court, seeking\\nreimbursement of its payment for the fat product and damages for the harm to its\\nswine caused by the contaminated feed. The complaint alleged breach of contract,\\nbreach of implied warranties, negligence, strict liability, and fraud. New Fashion\\nPork asserted that consumption of the contaminated fat caused serious health issues\\nfor its swine, including that nursery pigs at several facilities βhad difficulty starting\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ffeeding and experienced measurably reduced feed consumption.β Sows that\\nconsumed the contaminated fat βexperienced feed refusal, irregular returns, and a\\nreduced conception rate.β And the feed allegedly caused an increase in the\\noccurrence of nursery pigs dying suddenly.\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling sought a declaratory judgment that Employer Mutual was\\nobligated to defend and indemnify the company against New Fashion Porkβs lawsuit.\\nEmployer Mutual acknowledged that it issued a commercial general liability policy\\nto Restaurant Recycling, but claimed that the damages alleged by New Fashion Pork\\nfell within the policyβs total pollution exclusion. The district court agreed and\\ngranted Employer Mutualβs motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review the\\ndistrict courtβs interpretation of the insurance policy de novo and apply Minnesota\\nsubstantive law. Thach v. Tiger Corp., 609 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, we interpret insurance policies according to the general\\nprinciples of contract law. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d\\n628, 636 (Minn. 2013). βProvisions in an insurance policy are to be interpreted\\naccording to both plain, ordinary sense and what a reasonable person in the position\\nof the insured would have understood the words to mean.β Farmers Home Mut. Ins.\\nCo. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWhen interpreting pollution exclusions, Minnesota follows βa non-technical, plain-\\nmeaning approach.β Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn.\\nCt. App. 1999). An insured party bears the initial burden of demonstrating coverage,\\nand the insurer then bears the burden of establishing an applicable exclusion.\\nMidwest Family, 831 N.W.2d at 636. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to\\nindemnify, and covers βthose claims that arguably fall within the scope of the policy.β\\nMeadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1997). In\\ndetermining the scope of the duty, βa court will compare the allegations in the\\ncomplaint in the underlying action with the relevant language in the insurance\\npolicy.β Id. (emphases omitted).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Restaurant Recyclingβs policy provides that Employer Mutual has no duty to\\ndefend or indemnify in cases of ββ[b]odily injuryβ or βproperty damageβ which would\\nnot have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,\\ndispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of βpollutantsβ at any time.β\\nRestaurant Recycling concedes that lascadoil is a βpollutantβ under the policy, but\\nargues that the district court erred in concluding that lasalocid so qualifies.\\n\\n We need not address the district courtβs rationale, because Restaurant\\nRecyclingβs concession that lascadoil is a pollutant makes consideration of lasalocidβs\\nstatus unnecessary. Although the district court did not address whether lascadoil\\nalone sufficed to trigger the pollution exclusion, Employer Mutual presented the\\nargument below, and we may affirm on any ground raised in the district court.\\nTranscon. Ins. Co. v. W.G. Samuels Co., 370 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n New Fashion Pork alleged in its complaint that both lascadoil and lasalocid\\nwere βnot generally recognized as safe,β that lascadoil contains lasalocid, and that the\\nfat product delivered by Restaurant Recycling was contaminated with both lasalocid\\nand lascadoil. Each of the claims alleged that consumption of the contaminated fat\\ncaused damage to swine. The policy excludes property damage that βwould not have\\noccurred in whole or part but forβ dispersal of a pollutant. Even if lasalocid were not\\na pollutant, the complaint did not allege that lasalocid by itself caused or would have\\ncaused all of the damage; to the contrary, New Fashion Pork alleged that both\\nlasalocid and lascadoil were unsafe for consumption by animals, and that fat product\\ncontaminated with both substances caused serious health issues for its swine. (One\\ncount, alleging fraud, is based entirely on the undisclosed presence of lascadoil, the\\nβindustrial waste product.β) The allegations that lascadoil caused some measure of\\ndamage suffice to place New Fashion Porkβs claims within the pollution exclusion if\\nthe damage was caused by βdispersalβ of the pollutant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f The policy does not define the term βdispersal,β so under Minnesotaβs non-\\ntechnical, plain-meaning approach to pollution exclusions, we use the ordinary\\nmeaning of βdisperseββi.e., βto cause to break up and go in different waysβ or βto\\ncause to become spread widely.β Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 653\\n(2002); see also The American Heritage Dictionary 520 (5th ed. 2016) (defining\\nβdisperseβ as β[t]o drive off or scatter in different directionsβ or β[t]o strew or\\ndistribute widelyβ); The New Oxford American Dictionary 492 (2001) (defining\\nβdispersalβ as βthe action or process of distributing things or people over a wide\\nareaβ).\\n\\n In its complaint, New Fashion Pork alleged that Restaurant Recycling βcollects\\nwaste cooking oilβ and βprocesses that waste oil into fat productsβ for use in animal\\nfeed. New Fashion Pork βblendedβ the contaminated fat into its feed and transported\\nthe feed to its swine facilities in Indiana and Illinois. These actions by Restaurant\\nRecycling and New Fashion Pork qualify as βdispersingβ the lascadoil, for they\\ninvolve the breaking up and distributing of the lascadoil throughout the processed fat\\nproduct and New Fashion Porkβs swine feed.\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling posits that dispersal must be an intentional act, and\\nargues that the company never intended to spread lascadoil through its fat product\\ndeliveries. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1215-18 (Cal. 2003).\\nRestaurant Recycling argues that the βplain meaningβ of dispersal implies\\nintentionality. Failing that, the company also points to the fact that the policy covers\\nonly property damage caused by an βoccurrence,β which is defined as βan accident.β\\nThe company argues that because an intentional act of dispersing pollutants would\\nnot be a covered accident or occurrence, the exclusion is logically limited to\\nintentional acts.\\n\\n We are not convinced by the plain-meaning argument. For one thing, the\\npolicy is phrased in the passive voice (excluding damage resulting from the βdispersal\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f. . . of βpollutantsββ) and does not even specify that the insured must cause the\\nβdispersal,β intentionally or otherwise. The ordinary meaning of dispersal, moreover,\\nis not limited to intentional acts. In Hanson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals\\nconcluded that the unintentional chipping of lead paint through opening and closing\\na window counted as dispersal. 588 N.W.2d at 781; see also The New Oxford\\nAmerican Dictionary 492 (2001) (noting that βstorms can disperse seeds via high\\naltitudesβ). Likewise, the processing of the lascadoil into the fat product, and the\\nblending of the fat product into the swine feed, constitutes a βdispersalβ of lascadoil,\\neven if Restaurant Recycling and New Fashion Pork were unaware of its presence.\\n\\n That the insurance policy provides coverage for property damage caused by\\nβoccurrences,β or accidents, does not mean logically that the exclusion is limited to\\nintentional acts. Where a policy generally grants coverage for damage caused by\\naccidents, the insurer naturally has reason to exclude certain types of accidents.\\nRestaurant Recyclingβs interpretation, by contrast, would render the βdispersalβ\\naspect of the exclusion superfluous. If the company is correct that an intentional act\\nwould never be a covered occurrence under the insurance policy, then there would be\\nno need to exclude damages arising from intentional dispersals.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391675/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614422/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: RESTAURANT RECYCLING, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant, New Fashion Pork, LLP, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYER MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Doing Business as EMC Insurance Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants - Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2792\n ___________________________\n\n Restaurant Recycling, LLC,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\n\n New Fashion Pork, LLP,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiff,\n\n v.\n\n Employer Mutual Casualty Company, doing business as EMC Insurance\n Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\n Filed: April 29, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling for delivering defective\nshipments of recycled fat, which New Fashion Pork uses as an ingredient in its swine\n\ffeed. Restaurant Recycling, in turn, sued Employer Mutual Casualty Company,\nseeking a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify\nRestaurant Recycling. Employer Mutual moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing\na total pollution exclusion in its policy that limited coverage in the case of property\ndamage arising from dispersal of pollutants. The district court1 granted the motion,\nand Restaurant Recycling appeals. We conclude that the total pollution exclusion\napplies and affirm the judgment.\n\n Disputes over an insurerβs duty to defend are determined by reference to the\ncomplaint in the underlying action, so we recite the facts as alleged by New Fashion\nPork. Restaurant Recycling purchases used fat products, like waste cooking oil from\nrestaurants, and then processes and resells the substances to livestock producers for\nblending with other ingredients in their animal feed. From July to September 2014,\nRestaurant Recycling delivered several loads of its blended fats to New Fashion Pork.\nThese fat products were contaminated with two substancesβlasalocid and lascadoil.\nLasalocid, a chemical agent, βis not generally recognized as safe and is known to\ncause deaths in horses, turkeys, and swine.β Lascadoil, a byproduct in the\nmanufacture of lasalocid, βis not approved for consumption in humans or in animals\nand is not generally recognized as safe.β Lascadoil is an industrial waste product\nwhose only approved use is as biofuel.\n\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling in Minnesota state court, seeking\nreimbursement of its payment for the fat product and damages for the harm to its\nswine caused by the contaminated feed. The complaint alleged breach of contract,\nbreach of implied warranties, negligence, strict liability, and fraud. New Fashion\nPork asserted that consumption of the contaminated fat caused serious health issues\nfor its swine, including that nursery pigs at several facilities βhad difficulty starting\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\nMinnesota.\n\n -2-\n\ffeeding and experienced measurably reduced feed consumption.β Sows that\nconsumed the contaminated fat βexperienced feed refusal, irregular returns, and a\nreduced conception rate.β And the feed allegedly caused an increase in the\noccurrence of nursery pigs dying suddenly.\n\n Restaurant Recycling sought a declaratory judgment that Employer Mutual was\nobligated to defend and indemnify the company against New Fashion Porkβs lawsuit.\nEmployer Mutual acknowledged that it issued a commercial general liability policy\nto Restaurant Recycling, but claimed that the damages alleged by New Fashion Pork\nfell within the policyβs total pollution exclusion. The district court agreed and\ngranted Employer Mutualβs motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review the\ndistrict courtβs interpretation of the insurance policy de novo and apply Minnesota\nsubstantive law. Thach v. Tiger Corp., 609 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2010).\n\n Under Minnesota law, we interpret insurance policies according to the general\nprinciples of contract law. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d\n628, 636 (Minn. 2013). βProvisions in an insurance policy are to be interpreted\naccording to both plain, ordinary sense and what a reasonable person in the position\nof the insured would have understood the words to mean.β Farmers Home Mut. Ins.\nCo. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nWhen interpreting pollution exclusions, Minnesota follows βa non-technical, plain-\nmeaning approach.β Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn.\nCt. App. 1999). An insured party bears the initial burden of demonstrating coverage,\nand the insurer then bears the burden of establishing an applicable exclusion.\nMidwest Family, 831 N.W.2d at 636. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to\nindemnify, and covers βthose claims that arguably fall within the scope of the policy.β\nMeadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1997). In\ndetermining the scope of the duty, βa court will compare the allegations in the\ncomplaint in the underlying action with the relevant language in the insurance\npolicy.β Id. (emphases omitted).\n\n -3-\n\f Restaurant Recyclingβs policy provides that Employer Mutual has no duty to\ndefend or indemnify in cases of ββ[b]odily injuryβ or βproperty damageβ which would\nnot have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,\ndispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of βpollutantsβ at any time.β\nRestaurant Recycling concedes that lascadoil is a βpollutantβ under the policy, but\nargues that the district court erred in concluding that lasalocid so qualifies.\n\n We need not address the district courtβs rationale, because Restaurant\nRecyclingβs concession that lascadoil is a pollutant makes consideration of lasalocidβs\nstatus unnecessary. Although the district court did not address whether lascadoil\nalone sufficed to trigger the pollution exclusion, Employer Mutual presented the\nargument below, and we may affirm on any ground raised in the district court.\nTranscon. Ins. Co. v. W.G. Samuels Co., 370 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2004).\n\n New Fashion Pork alleged in its complaint that both lascadoil and lasalocid\nwere βnot generally recognized as safe,β that lascadoil contains lasalocid, and that the\nfat product delivered by Restaurant Recycling was contaminated with both lasalocid\nand lascadoil. Each of the claims alleged that consumption of the contaminated fat\ncaused damage to swine. The policy excludes property damage that βwould not have\noccurred in whole or part but forβ dispersal of a pollutant. Even if lasalocid were not\na pollutant, the complaint did not allege that lasalocid by itself caused or would have\ncaused all of the damage; to the contrary, New Fashion Pork alleged that both\nlasalocid and lascadoil were unsafe for consumption by animals, and that fat product\ncontaminated with both substances caused serious health issues for its swine. (One\ncount, alleging fraud, is based entirely on the undisclosed presence of lascadoil, the\nβindustrial waste product.β) The allegations that lascadoil caused some measure of\ndamage suffice to place New Fashion Porkβs claims within the pollution exclusion if\nthe damage was caused by βdispersalβ of the pollutant.\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f The policy does not define the term βdispersal,β so under Minnesotaβs non-\ntechnical, plain-meaning approach to pollution exclusions, we use the ordinary\nmeaning of βdisperseββi.e., βto cause to break up and go in different waysβ or βto\ncause to become spread widely.β Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 653\n(2002); see also The American Heritage Dictionary 520 (5th ed. 2016) (defining\nβdisperseβ as β[t]o drive off or scatter in different directionsβ or β[t]o strew or\ndistribute widelyβ); The New Oxford American Dictionary 492 (2001) (defining\nβdispersalβ as βthe action or process of distributing things or people over a wide\nareaβ).\n\n In its complaint, New Fashion Pork alleged that Restaurant Recycling βcollects\nwaste cooking oilβ and βprocesses that waste oil into fat productsβ for use in animal\nfeed. New Fashion Pork βblendedβ the contaminated fat into its feed and transported\nthe feed to its swine facilities in Indiana and Illinois. These actions by Restaurant\nRecycling and New Fashion Pork qualify as βdispersingβ the lascadoil, for they\ninvolve the breaking up and distributing of the lascadoil throughout the processed fat\nproduct and New Fashion Porkβs swine feed.\n\n Restaurant Recycling posits that dispersal must be an intentional act, and\nargues that the company never intended to spread lascadoil through its fat product\ndeliveries. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1215-18 (Cal. 2003).\nRestaurant Recycling argues that the βplain meaningβ of dispersal implies\nintentionality. Failing that, the company also points to the fact that the policy covers\nonly property damage caused by an βoccurrence,β which is defined as βan accident.β\nThe company argues that because an intentional act of dispersing pollutants would\nnot be a covered accident or occurrence, the exclusion is logically limited to\nintentional acts.\n\n We are not convinced by the plain-meaning argument. For one thing, the\npolicy is phrased in the passive voice (excluding damage resulting from the βdispersal\n\n -5-\n\f. . . of βpollutantsββ) and does not even specify that the insured must cause the\nβdispersal,β intentionally or otherwise. The ordinary meaning of dispersal, moreover,\nis not limited to intentional acts. In Hanson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals\nconcluded that the unintentional chipping of lead paint through opening and closing\na window counted as dispersal. 588 N.W.2d at 781; see also The New Oxford\nAmerican Dictionary 492 (2001) (noting that βstorms can disperse seeds via high\naltitudesβ). Likewise, the processing of the lascadoil into the fat product, and the\nblending of the fat product into the swine feed, constitutes a βdispersalβ of lascadoil,\neven if Restaurant Recycling and New Fashion Pork were unaware of its presence.\n\n That the insurance policy provides coverage for property damage caused by\nβoccurrences,β or accidents, does not mean logically that the exclusion is limited to\nintentional acts. Where a policy generally grants coverage for damage caused by\naccidents, the insurer naturally has reason to exclude certain types of accidents.\nRestaurant Recyclingβs interpretation, by contrast, would render the βdispersalβ\naspect of the exclusion superfluous. If the company is correct that an intentional act\nwould never be a covered occurrence under the insurance policy, then there would be\nno need to exclude damages arising from intentional dispersals.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: RESTAURANT RECYCLING, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant, New Fashion Pork, LLP, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYER MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Doing Business as EMC Insurance Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants - Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2792\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n New Fashion Pork, LLP,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiff,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Employer Mutual Casualty Company, doing business as EMC Insurance\\n Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: April 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling for delivering defective\\nshipments of recycled fat, which New Fashion Pork uses as an ingredient in its swine\\n\\ffeed. Restaurant Recycling, in turn, sued Employer Mutual Casualty Company,\\nseeking a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify\\nRestaurant Recycling. Employer Mutual moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing\\na total pollution exclusion in its policy that limited coverage in the case of property\\ndamage arising from dispersal of pollutants. The district court1 granted the motion,\\nand Restaurant Recycling appeals. We conclude that the total pollution exclusion\\napplies and affirm the judgment.\\n\\n Disputes over an insurerβs duty to defend are determined by reference to the\\ncomplaint in the underlying action, so we recite the facts as alleged by New Fashion\\nPork. Restaurant Recycling purchases used fat products, like waste cooking oil from\\nrestaurants, and then processes and resells the substances to livestock producers for\\nblending with other ingredients in their animal feed. From July to September 2014,\\nRestaurant Recycling delivered several loads of its blended fats to New Fashion Pork.\\nThese fat products were contaminated with two substancesβlasalocid and lascadoil.\\nLasalocid, a chemical agent, βis not generally recognized as safe and is known to\\ncause deaths in horses, turkeys, and swine.β Lascadoil, a byproduct in the\\nmanufacture of lasalocid, βis not approved for consumption in humans or in animals\\nand is not generally recognized as safe.β Lascadoil is an industrial waste product\\nwhose only approved use is as biofuel.\\n\\n New Fashion Pork sued Restaurant Recycling in Minnesota state court, seeking\\nreimbursement of its payment for the fat product and damages for the harm to its\\nswine caused by the contaminated feed. The complaint alleged breach of contract,\\nbreach of implied warranties, negligence, strict liability, and fraud. New Fashion\\nPork asserted that consumption of the contaminated fat caused serious health issues\\nfor its swine, including that nursery pigs at several facilities βhad difficulty starting\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ffeeding and experienced measurably reduced feed consumption.β Sows that\\nconsumed the contaminated fat βexperienced feed refusal, irregular returns, and a\\nreduced conception rate.β And the feed allegedly caused an increase in the\\noccurrence of nursery pigs dying suddenly.\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling sought a declaratory judgment that Employer Mutual was\\nobligated to defend and indemnify the company against New Fashion Porkβs lawsuit.\\nEmployer Mutual acknowledged that it issued a commercial general liability policy\\nto Restaurant Recycling, but claimed that the damages alleged by New Fashion Pork\\nfell within the policyβs total pollution exclusion. The district court agreed and\\ngranted Employer Mutualβs motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review the\\ndistrict courtβs interpretation of the insurance policy de novo and apply Minnesota\\nsubstantive law. Thach v. Tiger Corp., 609 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, we interpret insurance policies according to the general\\nprinciples of contract law. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d\\n628, 636 (Minn. 2013). βProvisions in an insurance policy are to be interpreted\\naccording to both plain, ordinary sense and what a reasonable person in the position\\nof the insured would have understood the words to mean.β Farmers Home Mut. Ins.\\nCo. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWhen interpreting pollution exclusions, Minnesota follows βa non-technical, plain-\\nmeaning approach.β Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn.\\nCt. App. 1999). An insured party bears the initial burden of demonstrating coverage,\\nand the insurer then bears the burden of establishing an applicable exclusion.\\nMidwest Family, 831 N.W.2d at 636. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to\\nindemnify, and covers βthose claims that arguably fall within the scope of the policy.β\\nMeadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1997). In\\ndetermining the scope of the duty, βa court will compare the allegations in the\\ncomplaint in the underlying action with the relevant language in the insurance\\npolicy.β Id. (emphases omitted).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Restaurant Recyclingβs policy provides that Employer Mutual has no duty to\\ndefend or indemnify in cases of ββ[b]odily injuryβ or βproperty damageβ which would\\nnot have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,\\ndispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of βpollutantsβ at any time.β\\nRestaurant Recycling concedes that lascadoil is a βpollutantβ under the policy, but\\nargues that the district court erred in concluding that lasalocid so qualifies.\\n\\n We need not address the district courtβs rationale, because Restaurant\\nRecyclingβs concession that lascadoil is a pollutant makes consideration of lasalocidβs\\nstatus unnecessary. Although the district court did not address whether lascadoil\\nalone sufficed to trigger the pollution exclusion, Employer Mutual presented the\\nargument below, and we may affirm on any ground raised in the district court.\\nTranscon. Ins. Co. v. W.G. Samuels Co., 370 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n New Fashion Pork alleged in its complaint that both lascadoil and lasalocid\\nwere βnot generally recognized as safe,β that lascadoil contains lasalocid, and that the\\nfat product delivered by Restaurant Recycling was contaminated with both lasalocid\\nand lascadoil. Each of the claims alleged that consumption of the contaminated fat\\ncaused damage to swine. The policy excludes property damage that βwould not have\\noccurred in whole or part but forβ dispersal of a pollutant. Even if lasalocid were not\\na pollutant, the complaint did not allege that lasalocid by itself caused or would have\\ncaused all of the damage; to the contrary, New Fashion Pork alleged that both\\nlasalocid and lascadoil were unsafe for consumption by animals, and that fat product\\ncontaminated with both substances caused serious health issues for its swine. (One\\ncount, alleging fraud, is based entirely on the undisclosed presence of lascadoil, the\\nβindustrial waste product.β) The allegations that lascadoil caused some measure of\\ndamage suffice to place New Fashion Porkβs claims within the pollution exclusion if\\nthe damage was caused by βdispersalβ of the pollutant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f The policy does not define the term βdispersal,β so under Minnesotaβs non-\\ntechnical, plain-meaning approach to pollution exclusions, we use the ordinary\\nmeaning of βdisperseββi.e., βto cause to break up and go in different waysβ or βto\\ncause to become spread widely.β Websterβs Third New International Dictionary 653\\n(2002); see also The American Heritage Dictionary 520 (5th ed. 2016) (defining\\nβdisperseβ as β[t]o drive off or scatter in different directionsβ or β[t]o strew or\\ndistribute widelyβ); The New Oxford American Dictionary 492 (2001) (defining\\nβdispersalβ as βthe action or process of distributing things or people over a wide\\nareaβ).\\n\\n In its complaint, New Fashion Pork alleged that Restaurant Recycling βcollects\\nwaste cooking oilβ and βprocesses that waste oil into fat productsβ for use in animal\\nfeed. New Fashion Pork βblendedβ the contaminated fat into its feed and transported\\nthe feed to its swine facilities in Indiana and Illinois. These actions by Restaurant\\nRecycling and New Fashion Pork qualify as βdispersingβ the lascadoil, for they\\ninvolve the breaking up and distributing of the lascadoil throughout the processed fat\\nproduct and New Fashion Porkβs swine feed.\\n\\n Restaurant Recycling posits that dispersal must be an intentional act, and\\nargues that the company never intended to spread lascadoil through its fat product\\ndeliveries. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1215-18 (Cal. 2003).\\nRestaurant Recycling argues that the βplain meaningβ of dispersal implies\\nintentionality. Failing that, the company also points to the fact that the policy covers\\nonly property damage caused by an βoccurrence,β which is defined as βan accident.β\\nThe company argues that because an intentional act of dispersing pollutants would\\nnot be a covered accident or occurrence, the exclusion is logically limited to\\nintentional acts.\\n\\n We are not convinced by the plain-meaning argument. For one thing, the\\npolicy is phrased in the passive voice (excluding damage resulting from the βdispersal\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f. . . of βpollutantsββ) and does not even specify that the insured must cause the\\nβdispersal,β intentionally or otherwise. The ordinary meaning of dispersal, moreover,\\nis not limited to intentional acts. In Hanson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals\\nconcluded that the unintentional chipping of lead paint through opening and closing\\na window counted as dispersal. 588 N.W.2d at 781; see also The New Oxford\\nAmerican Dictionary 492 (2001) (noting that βstorms can disperse seeds via high\\naltitudesβ). Likewise, the processing of the lascadoil into the fat product, and the\\nblending of the fat product into the swine feed, constitutes a βdispersalβ of lascadoil,\\neven if Restaurant Recycling and New Fashion Pork were unaware of its presence.\\n\\n That the insurance policy provides coverage for property damage caused by\\nβoccurrences,β or accidents, does not mean logically that the exclusion is limited to\\nintentional acts. Where a policy generally grants coverage for damage caused by\\naccidents, the insurer naturally has reason to exclude certain types of accidents.\\nRestaurant Recyclingβs interpretation, by contrast, would render the βdispersalβ\\naspect of the exclusion superfluous. If the company is correct that an intentional act\\nwould never be a covered occurrence under the insurance policy, then there would be\\nno need to exclude damages arising from intentional dispersals.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1799,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614423,"string":"4,614,423"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Melanie DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MORRIS-WALKER, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC, Defendants - Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Melanie Davis v. Morris-Walker, LTD"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3774"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3774\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Melanie Davis,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Morris-Walker, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: April 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Melanie Davis sued the owner of a restaurant and the owner of real property\\nwhere the restaurant is located, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities\\nAct (βADAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12101 et seq. Davis uses a wheelchair and claims that\\ndeficiencies in the restaurant parking lot deprived her of full and equal enjoyment of\\n\\fthe restaurant. After the owners made changes to the lot, the district court1 dismissed\\nDavisβs complaint as moot and denied her motion for leave to amend the complaint.\\nDavis appeals, and we affirm the decision, although we clarify that the dismissal for\\nlack of jurisdiction is without prejudice.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Davis claims that on both May 3, 2016, and March 4, 2017, she attempted to\\npatronize Emma Krumbeeβs, a restaurant in Belle Plaine, Minnesota. Her complaint\\nalleged that the defendants failed to comply with the ADA, because β[t]he βEmma\\nKrumbeeβsβ customer parking lot had approximately 130 total parking spaces, but had\\nonly 3 spaces reserved as accessible parking spaces, rather than the required 5.β The\\nthree reserved spaces were also deficient, she asserted, because one lacked an\\naccessibility sign and the signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough\\nabove the ground. One of the three spaces allegedly did not have an adjacent access\\naisle. Finally, the complaint asserted that the accessible route from the three reserved\\nparking spaces to the restaurant traversed broken asphalt and required travel through\\na vehicular way rather than a sidewalk.\\n\\n Davis sued the owner of Emma Krumbeeβs and the owner of the real property.\\nHer complaint alleged that the parking lot deficiencies violated the ADA and the\\nMinnesota Human Rights Act, and she sought an injunction directing the owners to\\nremedy those problems. The owners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of\\njurisdiction, arguing that they had remedied the alleged deficiencies and that the case\\nwas therefore moot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Davis moved for summary judgment and claimed that the parking lot still did\\nnot have enough accessible spaces. Even with the improvements, Davis argued, the\\nlot had only four accessible spaces, but her complaint had alleged that five were\\nrequired. Davis also moved to amend her complaint to add allegations of deficiencies\\ninside the Emma Krumbeeβs restaurant.\\n\\n The district court dismissed Davisβs ADA claim as moot and declined to\\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claim. Because the owners\\nraised a factual attack on the district courtβs subject matter jurisdiction, the court was\\npermitted to resolve factual disputes and was not required to accept as true every\\nallegation in the pleadings. See Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th\\nCir. 2016).\\n\\n Although Davis alleged that the customer parking lot included approximately\\n130 spaces, the district court found that it included only eighty-eight. The court\\nexplained that Davis, to arrive at a total of 130 spaces, had counted spaces from an\\nadjacent overflow lot. The court determined, however, that the overflow lot was a\\nseparate βfacilityβ under the relevant ADA regulations, see 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app.\\nB Β§ 208.2, and that any claim regarding the overflow lot was not properly before the\\ncourt.\\n\\n Because ADA regulations require four accessible parking spaces for a facility\\nwith 76 to 100 spaces, the court concluded the owners had now provided βa sufficient\\nnumber of accessible parking spaces for the Restaurant,β denied Davisβs motion for\\nsummary judgment, and dismissed the complaint as moot. The court also denied\\nDavisβs motion to amend her complaint as futile, because Davis had never entered the\\nrestaurant and thus lacked standing to litigate alleged ADA violations occurring\\ninside. We review the district courtβs legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings\\nfor clear error, and its denial of the motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fSee Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2015);\\nEnervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n βA case becomes mootβand therefore no longer a βCaseβ or βControversyβ for\\npurposes of Article IIIβwhen the issues presented are no longer βliveβ or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.β Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568\\nU.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendantβs voluntary\\ncompliance with a plaintiffβs demands will moot a case if the defendant shows that βit\\nis absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected\\nto recur.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of the ADA, we have\\nheld that a defendantβs permanent physical improvementsβsuch as the installation of\\nparking spaces, ramps, pull and grab bars, and chair liftsβare sufficient to eliminate\\na case or controversy if they provide the requested relief. See Hillesheim v. Holiday\\nStationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2018); Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886\\nF.3d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2018); Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.\\n1998).\\n\\n Davis does not contest the permanence of the changes to the Emma Krumbeeβs\\nparking lot, but argues that there is still a live dispute about whether the defendants\\nare required to designate more parking spaces as accessible. She complains that the\\ndistrict court essentially rejected her claim on the merits while mistakenly\\ncharacterizing the decision as jurisdictional.\\n\\n As the case comes to us on appeal, the parties agree that there are two separate\\nparking facilities at Emma Krumbeeβsβa restaurant lot with eighty-eight spaces for\\ncustomer parking, and an overflow lot with forty-three spaces. Davis contends that\\nthe ADA requires four accessible spaces in the restaurant lot and two accessible\\nspaces in the overflow lot. Her claim regarding the restaurant lot is moot; that lot now\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fincludes the four permanent spaces that Davis sought. Davis argues, however, that\\nthere is still a live dispute over her allegation that the overflow lot should include two\\naccessible spaces.\\n\\n We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for lack\\nof jurisdiction, because Davis lacks standing to sue over alleged deficiencies in the\\noverflow lot. A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that she has\\nsuffered an injury in fact, that a causal connection exists between that injury and the\\ndefendantβs conduct, and that her injury is likely redressable by a favorable decision.\\nLujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The injury must be βconcrete\\nand particularized,β and βactual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Id. at\\n560 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Davisβs complaint does not allege that she was injured by defects in the\\noverflow parking lot. She never claims that she entered the overflow lot or sought to\\npark there. The complaint focuses instead on alleged problems in the restaurant\\nparking lot: one of the three accessible spaces in that lot was missing the appropriate\\nsign, signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough off the ground, and\\none space lacked an adjacent access aisle. The accessible route about which Davis\\ncomplained led from the restaurant parking lot to the restaurant. The three exhibits\\nattached to the complaint are photographs of the restaurant parking lot. The only\\narguable reference to the overflow lot is Davisβs allegation that the βcustomer parking\\nlotβ included a total of approximately 130 parking spaces, but Davis now concedes\\nthat the spaces are allocated between two separate facilities, and she never claims to\\nhave visited the second.\\n\\n Davisβs standing to sue over deficiencies in the restaurant parking lot does not\\nextend to the overflow lot. To be sure, this court held in Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228\\nF.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000), that a plaintiff who encountered certain ADA violations in\\na particular building had standing to seek relief for other related ADA violations in\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fthe same building, even though he had not encountered them. Id. at 894. But a\\nplaintiffβs ability to sue over violations in a single building does not extend to\\nviolations in separate facilities. A plaintiff who encounters an alleged ADA violation\\nin a parking lot outside a building does not have standing to sue over violations inside\\nthe building. Davis, 886 F.3d at 678. A plaintiff who encounters a violation in one\\nbuilding cannot sue over violations in a neighboring building that she never entered.\\nAnd a plaintiff like Davis, who encountered ADA violations in one parking facility,\\nlacks standing to sue over alleged violations in a separate parking facility that she\\nnever visited. We thus conclude that the district court properly dismissed Davisβs\\ncomplaint and did not err in denying her motion for summary judgment.\\n\\n We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\ndenying Davisβs motion for leave to amend her complaint. The proposed amendment\\nwould have added allegations of ADA violations inside the Emma Krumbeeβs\\nrestaurant. But the amended complaint does not allege that Davis encountered a\\nviolation inside the building. As we held in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis cannot use\\nthe violations encountered in the parking lot βto expand her standing to sue for\\nunencountered violations inside the [restaurant] that never injured her.β Id.\\n\\n Davis responds that Davis v. Anthony, Inc. should not control here, because she\\nhas detailed knowledge of ADA violations inside Emma Krumbeeβs, and she intends\\nto return to the restaurant. Our prior decision, however, was not premised on the\\nplaintiffβs level of knowledge about alleged violations or her interest in making a\\nfuture entry; it turned on whether the plaintiff had suffered injury by encountering a\\nviolation inside the restaurant. As in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis seeks to sue over\\nviolations inside a building that she never entered, and we conclude that she lacks\\nstanding to do so. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nDavisβs motion to amend as futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f * * *\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the action,\\nbut as the decision was based on lack of jurisdiction, we modify the judgment to\\ndismiss Davisβs ADA claims without prejudice. See County of Mille Lacs v.\\nBenjamin, 361 F.3d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391676/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614423/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Melanie DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MORRIS-WALKER, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC, Defendants - Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3774\n ___________________________\n\n Melanie Davis,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n Morris-Walker, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\n Filed: April 29, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Melanie Davis sued the owner of a restaurant and the owner of real property\nwhere the restaurant is located, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities\nAct (βADAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12101 et seq. Davis uses a wheelchair and claims that\ndeficiencies in the restaurant parking lot deprived her of full and equal enjoyment of\n\fthe restaurant. After the owners made changes to the lot, the district court1 dismissed\nDavisβs complaint as moot and denied her motion for leave to amend the complaint.\nDavis appeals, and we affirm the decision, although we clarify that the dismissal for\nlack of jurisdiction is without prejudice.\n\n I.\n\n Davis claims that on both May 3, 2016, and March 4, 2017, she attempted to\npatronize Emma Krumbeeβs, a restaurant in Belle Plaine, Minnesota. Her complaint\nalleged that the defendants failed to comply with the ADA, because β[t]he βEmma\nKrumbeeβsβ customer parking lot had approximately 130 total parking spaces, but had\nonly 3 spaces reserved as accessible parking spaces, rather than the required 5.β The\nthree reserved spaces were also deficient, she asserted, because one lacked an\naccessibility sign and the signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough\nabove the ground. One of the three spaces allegedly did not have an adjacent access\naisle. Finally, the complaint asserted that the accessible route from the three reserved\nparking spaces to the restaurant traversed broken asphalt and required travel through\na vehicular way rather than a sidewalk.\n\n Davis sued the owner of Emma Krumbeeβs and the owner of the real property.\nHer complaint alleged that the parking lot deficiencies violated the ADA and the\nMinnesota Human Rights Act, and she sought an injunction directing the owners to\nremedy those problems. The owners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of\njurisdiction, arguing that they had remedied the alleged deficiencies and that the case\nwas therefore moot.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\nMinnesota.\n\n -2-\n\f Davis moved for summary judgment and claimed that the parking lot still did\nnot have enough accessible spaces. Even with the improvements, Davis argued, the\nlot had only four accessible spaces, but her complaint had alleged that five were\nrequired. Davis also moved to amend her complaint to add allegations of deficiencies\ninside the Emma Krumbeeβs restaurant.\n\n The district court dismissed Davisβs ADA claim as moot and declined to\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claim. Because the owners\nraised a factual attack on the district courtβs subject matter jurisdiction, the court was\npermitted to resolve factual disputes and was not required to accept as true every\nallegation in the pleadings. See Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th\nCir. 2016).\n\n Although Davis alleged that the customer parking lot included approximately\n130 spaces, the district court found that it included only eighty-eight. The court\nexplained that Davis, to arrive at a total of 130 spaces, had counted spaces from an\nadjacent overflow lot. The court determined, however, that the overflow lot was a\nseparate βfacilityβ under the relevant ADA regulations, see 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app.\nB Β§ 208.2, and that any claim regarding the overflow lot was not properly before the\ncourt.\n\n Because ADA regulations require four accessible parking spaces for a facility\nwith 76 to 100 spaces, the court concluded the owners had now provided βa sufficient\nnumber of accessible parking spaces for the Restaurant,β denied Davisβs motion for\nsummary judgment, and dismissed the complaint as moot. The court also denied\nDavisβs motion to amend her complaint as futile, because Davis had never entered the\nrestaurant and thus lacked standing to litigate alleged ADA violations occurring\ninside. We review the district courtβs legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings\nfor clear error, and its denial of the motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion.\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fSee Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2015);\nEnervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2004).\n\n II.\n\n βA case becomes mootβand therefore no longer a βCaseβ or βControversyβ for\npurposes of Article IIIβwhen the issues presented are no longer βliveβ or the parties\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.β Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568\nU.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendantβs voluntary\ncompliance with a plaintiffβs demands will moot a case if the defendant shows that βit\nis absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected\nto recur.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of the ADA, we have\nheld that a defendantβs permanent physical improvementsβsuch as the installation of\nparking spaces, ramps, pull and grab bars, and chair liftsβare sufficient to eliminate\na case or controversy if they provide the requested relief. See Hillesheim v. Holiday\nStationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2018); Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886\nF.3d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2018); Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.\n1998).\n\n Davis does not contest the permanence of the changes to the Emma Krumbeeβs\nparking lot, but argues that there is still a live dispute about whether the defendants\nare required to designate more parking spaces as accessible. She complains that the\ndistrict court essentially rejected her claim on the merits while mistakenly\ncharacterizing the decision as jurisdictional.\n\n As the case comes to us on appeal, the parties agree that there are two separate\nparking facilities at Emma Krumbeeβsβa restaurant lot with eighty-eight spaces for\ncustomer parking, and an overflow lot with forty-three spaces. Davis contends that\nthe ADA requires four accessible spaces in the restaurant lot and two accessible\nspaces in the overflow lot. Her claim regarding the restaurant lot is moot; that lot now\n\n -4-\n\fincludes the four permanent spaces that Davis sought. Davis argues, however, that\nthere is still a live dispute over her allegation that the overflow lot should include two\naccessible spaces.\n\n We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for lack\nof jurisdiction, because Davis lacks standing to sue over alleged deficiencies in the\noverflow lot. A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that she has\nsuffered an injury in fact, that a causal connection exists between that injury and the\ndefendantβs conduct, and that her injury is likely redressable by a favorable decision.\nLujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The injury must be βconcrete\nand particularized,β and βactual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Id. at\n560 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n Davisβs complaint does not allege that she was injured by defects in the\noverflow parking lot. She never claims that she entered the overflow lot or sought to\npark there. The complaint focuses instead on alleged problems in the restaurant\nparking lot: one of the three accessible spaces in that lot was missing the appropriate\nsign, signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough off the ground, and\none space lacked an adjacent access aisle. The accessible route about which Davis\ncomplained led from the restaurant parking lot to the restaurant. The three exhibits\nattached to the complaint are photographs of the restaurant parking lot. The only\narguable reference to the overflow lot is Davisβs allegation that the βcustomer parking\nlotβ included a total of approximately 130 parking spaces, but Davis now concedes\nthat the spaces are allocated between two separate facilities, and she never claims to\nhave visited the second.\n\n Davisβs standing to sue over deficiencies in the restaurant parking lot does not\nextend to the overflow lot. To be sure, this court held in Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228\nF.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000), that a plaintiff who encountered certain ADA violations in\na particular building had standing to seek relief for other related ADA violations in\n\n -5-\n\fthe same building, even though he had not encountered them. Id. at 894. But a\nplaintiffβs ability to sue over violations in a single building does not extend to\nviolations in separate facilities. A plaintiff who encounters an alleged ADA violation\nin a parking lot outside a building does not have standing to sue over violations inside\nthe building. Davis, 886 F.3d at 678. A plaintiff who encounters a violation in one\nbuilding cannot sue over violations in a neighboring building that she never entered.\nAnd a plaintiff like Davis, who encountered ADA violations in one parking facility,\nlacks standing to sue over alleged violations in a separate parking facility that she\nnever visited. We thus conclude that the district court properly dismissed Davisβs\ncomplaint and did not err in denying her motion for summary judgment.\n\n We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\ndenying Davisβs motion for leave to amend her complaint. The proposed amendment\nwould have added allegations of ADA violations inside the Emma Krumbeeβs\nrestaurant. But the amended complaint does not allege that Davis encountered a\nviolation inside the building. As we held in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis cannot use\nthe violations encountered in the parking lot βto expand her standing to sue for\nunencountered violations inside the [restaurant] that never injured her.β Id.\n\n Davis responds that Davis v. Anthony, Inc. should not control here, because she\nhas detailed knowledge of ADA violations inside Emma Krumbeeβs, and she intends\nto return to the restaurant. Our prior decision, however, was not premised on the\nplaintiffβs level of knowledge about alleged violations or her interest in making a\nfuture entry; it turned on whether the plaintiff had suffered injury by encountering a\nviolation inside the restaurant. As in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis seeks to sue over\nviolations inside a building that she never entered, and we conclude that she lacks\nstanding to do so. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\nDavisβs motion to amend as futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f * * *\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the action,\nbut as the decision was based on lack of jurisdiction, we modify the judgment to\ndismiss Davisβs ADA claims without prejudice. See County of Mille Lacs v.\nBenjamin, 361 F.3d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004).\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Melanie DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MORRIS-WALKER, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC, Defendants - Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3774\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Melanie Davis,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Morris-Walker, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: April 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Melanie Davis sued the owner of a restaurant and the owner of real property\\nwhere the restaurant is located, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities\\nAct (βADAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12101 et seq. Davis uses a wheelchair and claims that\\ndeficiencies in the restaurant parking lot deprived her of full and equal enjoyment of\\n\\fthe restaurant. After the owners made changes to the lot, the district court1 dismissed\\nDavisβs complaint as moot and denied her motion for leave to amend the complaint.\\nDavis appeals, and we affirm the decision, although we clarify that the dismissal for\\nlack of jurisdiction is without prejudice.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Davis claims that on both May 3, 2016, and March 4, 2017, she attempted to\\npatronize Emma Krumbeeβs, a restaurant in Belle Plaine, Minnesota. Her complaint\\nalleged that the defendants failed to comply with the ADA, because β[t]he βEmma\\nKrumbeeβsβ customer parking lot had approximately 130 total parking spaces, but had\\nonly 3 spaces reserved as accessible parking spaces, rather than the required 5.β The\\nthree reserved spaces were also deficient, she asserted, because one lacked an\\naccessibility sign and the signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough\\nabove the ground. One of the three spaces allegedly did not have an adjacent access\\naisle. Finally, the complaint asserted that the accessible route from the three reserved\\nparking spaces to the restaurant traversed broken asphalt and required travel through\\na vehicular way rather than a sidewalk.\\n\\n Davis sued the owner of Emma Krumbeeβs and the owner of the real property.\\nHer complaint alleged that the parking lot deficiencies violated the ADA and the\\nMinnesota Human Rights Act, and she sought an injunction directing the owners to\\nremedy those problems. The owners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of\\njurisdiction, arguing that they had remedied the alleged deficiencies and that the case\\nwas therefore moot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Davis moved for summary judgment and claimed that the parking lot still did\\nnot have enough accessible spaces. Even with the improvements, Davis argued, the\\nlot had only four accessible spaces, but her complaint had alleged that five were\\nrequired. Davis also moved to amend her complaint to add allegations of deficiencies\\ninside the Emma Krumbeeβs restaurant.\\n\\n The district court dismissed Davisβs ADA claim as moot and declined to\\nexercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claim. Because the owners\\nraised a factual attack on the district courtβs subject matter jurisdiction, the court was\\npermitted to resolve factual disputes and was not required to accept as true every\\nallegation in the pleadings. See Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th\\nCir. 2016).\\n\\n Although Davis alleged that the customer parking lot included approximately\\n130 spaces, the district court found that it included only eighty-eight. The court\\nexplained that Davis, to arrive at a total of 130 spaces, had counted spaces from an\\nadjacent overflow lot. The court determined, however, that the overflow lot was a\\nseparate βfacilityβ under the relevant ADA regulations, see 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app.\\nB Β§ 208.2, and that any claim regarding the overflow lot was not properly before the\\ncourt.\\n\\n Because ADA regulations require four accessible parking spaces for a facility\\nwith 76 to 100 spaces, the court concluded the owners had now provided βa sufficient\\nnumber of accessible parking spaces for the Restaurant,β denied Davisβs motion for\\nsummary judgment, and dismissed the complaint as moot. The court also denied\\nDavisβs motion to amend her complaint as futile, because Davis had never entered the\\nrestaurant and thus lacked standing to litigate alleged ADA violations occurring\\ninside. We review the district courtβs legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings\\nfor clear error, and its denial of the motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fSee Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2015);\\nEnervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n βA case becomes mootβand therefore no longer a βCaseβ or βControversyβ for\\npurposes of Article IIIβwhen the issues presented are no longer βliveβ or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.β Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568\\nU.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendantβs voluntary\\ncompliance with a plaintiffβs demands will moot a case if the defendant shows that βit\\nis absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected\\nto recur.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of the ADA, we have\\nheld that a defendantβs permanent physical improvementsβsuch as the installation of\\nparking spaces, ramps, pull and grab bars, and chair liftsβare sufficient to eliminate\\na case or controversy if they provide the requested relief. See Hillesheim v. Holiday\\nStationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2018); Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886\\nF.3d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2018); Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.\\n1998).\\n\\n Davis does not contest the permanence of the changes to the Emma Krumbeeβs\\nparking lot, but argues that there is still a live dispute about whether the defendants\\nare required to designate more parking spaces as accessible. She complains that the\\ndistrict court essentially rejected her claim on the merits while mistakenly\\ncharacterizing the decision as jurisdictional.\\n\\n As the case comes to us on appeal, the parties agree that there are two separate\\nparking facilities at Emma Krumbeeβsβa restaurant lot with eighty-eight spaces for\\ncustomer parking, and an overflow lot with forty-three spaces. Davis contends that\\nthe ADA requires four accessible spaces in the restaurant lot and two accessible\\nspaces in the overflow lot. Her claim regarding the restaurant lot is moot; that lot now\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fincludes the four permanent spaces that Davis sought. Davis argues, however, that\\nthere is still a live dispute over her allegation that the overflow lot should include two\\naccessible spaces.\\n\\n We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for lack\\nof jurisdiction, because Davis lacks standing to sue over alleged deficiencies in the\\noverflow lot. A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that she has\\nsuffered an injury in fact, that a causal connection exists between that injury and the\\ndefendantβs conduct, and that her injury is likely redressable by a favorable decision.\\nLujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The injury must be βconcrete\\nand particularized,β and βactual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.β Id. at\\n560 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Davisβs complaint does not allege that she was injured by defects in the\\noverflow parking lot. She never claims that she entered the overflow lot or sought to\\npark there. The complaint focuses instead on alleged problems in the restaurant\\nparking lot: one of the three accessible spaces in that lot was missing the appropriate\\nsign, signs for the other two spaces were not posted high enough off the ground, and\\none space lacked an adjacent access aisle. The accessible route about which Davis\\ncomplained led from the restaurant parking lot to the restaurant. The three exhibits\\nattached to the complaint are photographs of the restaurant parking lot. The only\\narguable reference to the overflow lot is Davisβs allegation that the βcustomer parking\\nlotβ included a total of approximately 130 parking spaces, but Davis now concedes\\nthat the spaces are allocated between two separate facilities, and she never claims to\\nhave visited the second.\\n\\n Davisβs standing to sue over deficiencies in the restaurant parking lot does not\\nextend to the overflow lot. To be sure, this court held in Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228\\nF.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000), that a plaintiff who encountered certain ADA violations in\\na particular building had standing to seek relief for other related ADA violations in\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fthe same building, even though he had not encountered them. Id. at 894. But a\\nplaintiffβs ability to sue over violations in a single building does not extend to\\nviolations in separate facilities. A plaintiff who encounters an alleged ADA violation\\nin a parking lot outside a building does not have standing to sue over violations inside\\nthe building. Davis, 886 F.3d at 678. A plaintiff who encounters a violation in one\\nbuilding cannot sue over violations in a neighboring building that she never entered.\\nAnd a plaintiff like Davis, who encountered ADA violations in one parking facility,\\nlacks standing to sue over alleged violations in a separate parking facility that she\\nnever visited. We thus conclude that the district court properly dismissed Davisβs\\ncomplaint and did not err in denying her motion for summary judgment.\\n\\n We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\ndenying Davisβs motion for leave to amend her complaint. The proposed amendment\\nwould have added allegations of ADA violations inside the Emma Krumbeeβs\\nrestaurant. But the amended complaint does not allege that Davis encountered a\\nviolation inside the building. As we held in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis cannot use\\nthe violations encountered in the parking lot βto expand her standing to sue for\\nunencountered violations inside the [restaurant] that never injured her.β Id.\\n\\n Davis responds that Davis v. Anthony, Inc. should not control here, because she\\nhas detailed knowledge of ADA violations inside Emma Krumbeeβs, and she intends\\nto return to the restaurant. Our prior decision, however, was not premised on the\\nplaintiffβs level of knowledge about alleged violations or her interest in making a\\nfuture entry; it turned on whether the plaintiff had suffered injury by encountering a\\nviolation inside the restaurant. As in Davis v. Anthony, Inc., Davis seeks to sue over\\nviolations inside a building that she never entered, and we conclude that she lacks\\nstanding to do so. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nDavisβs motion to amend as futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f * * *\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the action,\\nbut as the decision was based on lack of jurisdiction, we modify the judgment to\\ndismiss Davisβs ADA claims without prejudice. See County of Mille Lacs v.\\nBenjamin, 361 F.3d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":17,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":1700,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODc5ODc3OSwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg4MDIzNzksImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.E53XYxnKag0-3W76-lGO-4Za1QIssLDD_Hi4fVdm415NciU1yQJ3mxcAIyzCvaZE1E-t9dRCtlXQTxVxr_CEBA","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
8,443,953 | SANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. WALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC | Sanchelima Int'l, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equip. Co. | 2019-04-10 | No. 18-1823 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Brennan, Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415385/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BAUER | BRENNAN | KANNE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443953/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,535 | Kevin W. CULP, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kwame RAOUL, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Kevin Culp v. Kwame Raoul | 2019-04-12 | 17-2998 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Manion, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888346/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/... | MANION | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609535/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,717 | Kevin Culp v. Kwame Raoul | 2019-04-12 | 17-2998 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "The district judge emphasized that the State has an important", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n _______... | MANION | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609717/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,141 | L.D.R., a Minor BY His Mother and Guardian, Roshonda R. WAGNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. | L.D.R. by WAGNER v. Berryhill | 2019-04-15 | 18-1763 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Rovner, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1763\nL.D.R., a minor by his mother and\nguardia... | BAUER | ROVNER | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610141/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,338 | L.D.R. v. Nancy Berryhill | 2019-04-15 | 18-1763 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1763\nL.D.R., a mino... | BAUER | ROVNER | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610338/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,491 | United States v. Nikesh A. Patel | 2019-04-16 | 18-1685 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β1685Β \nUNIT... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610491/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,668 | United States v. Nikesh A. Patel | 2019-04-16 | 18-1685 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β1685Β \nUNIT... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610668/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,669 | Rafaela ALDACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RENTGROW, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Rafaela Aldaco v. Rentgrow, Inc. | 2019-04-16 | 18-1932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1932\nRAFAELA ALDACO,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610669/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,670 | Juan Carlos GARCIA-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Juan Garcia-Martinez v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-16 | 18-1797 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Sykes, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1797\nJUAN CARLOS GARCIA-MARTINEZ,\n ... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610670/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,713 | Rafaela Aldaco v. Rentgrow, Inc. | 2019-04-16 | 18-1932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo.... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610713/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,714 | Juan Garcia-Martinez v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-16 | 18-1797 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1797\nJUAN ... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610714/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,968 | United States v. Nikesh A. PATEL | United States v. Patel | 2019-04-16 | No. 18-1685 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Sykes, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415402/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | SYKES | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443968/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,955 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernard L. CHERRY, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Bernard Cherry | 2019-04-17 | 18-1157 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Hamilton, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1157\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610955/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,088 | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-04-17 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge PAMELA PEPPER, District Judge* No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CITY OF CHICAGO, James B. Zagel, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | DAVID F HAMILTON | PAMELA PEPPER | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "PAMELA PEPPER": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611088/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,129 | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-04-17 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge PAMELA PEPPER, District Judge* No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CITY OF CHICAGO, James B. Zagel, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | DAVID F HAMILTON | PAMELA PEPPER | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "PAMELA PEPPER": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611129/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,457 | CITY OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW WEST, L.P., and New Bluff, L.P., Defendants-Appellants. | City of Joliet, Illinois v. New West, L.P. | 2019-04-18 | 18-1787 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1787\nCITY ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611457/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,537 | United States v. Z Investment Properties, LLC | 2019-04-18 | 18-1915 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo.Β 18β1915\n\nUNITEDΒ STATESΒ OFΒ AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611537/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,538 | City of Joliet v. New West | 2019-04-18 | 18-1787 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1787\nCITY ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611538/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,631 | United States v. Z Investment Properties, LLC | 2019-04-18 | 18-1915 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo.Β 18β1915\n\nUNITEDΒ STATESΒ OFΒ AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,969 | United States v. Z INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC and Chicago Title Land Trust Company | United States v. Z Inv. Properties, LLC | 2019-04-18 | No. 18-1915 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Brennan, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415403/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443969/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,251 | United States v. Tom Smith, III | 2019-04-22 | 18-2905 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2905Β \n... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612251/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,612,252 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laurance H. FREED, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Laurance Freed | 2019-04-22 | 17-2816 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2816\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612252/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,254 | Tai MATLIN and James Waring, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPIN MASTER CORP., Spin Master Ltd., and Swimways Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. | Tai Matlin v. Spin Master Corp. | 2019-04-22 | 18-2868 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Sykes, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2868\nTAI MATLIN and\nJAMES WARING,\n ... | KANNE | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612254/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,310 | United States v. Tom Smith, III | 2019-04-22 | 18-2905 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2905Β \n... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612310/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,612,311 | United States v. Laurance Freed | 2019-04-22 | 17-2816 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2816\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-A... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612311/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,612,312 | Tai Matlin v. Spin Master Corp. | 2019-04-22 | 18-2868 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2868\nTAI MATLIN and\... | KANNE | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612312/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,970 | United States v. Tom SMITH, III, also known as Thomas Smith, III | United States v. Smith | 2019-04-22 | No. 18-2905 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Sykes, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415404/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | SYKES | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443970/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,419 | United States v. Rachel Kopp | 2019-04-23 | 18-3172 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β3172Β \nUNITEDΒ STATES... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612419/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,612,566 | United States v. Rachel Kopp | 2019-04-23 | 18-3172 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β3172Β \nUNITEDΒ STATES... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612566/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,976 | United States v. Rachel L. KOPP | United States v. Kopp | 2019-04-23 | No. 18-3172 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Flaum, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415410/", "author_raw": ""}]} | EASTERBROOK | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443976/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,079 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Myshawn BONDS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Myshawn Bonds | 2019-04-24 | 18-2670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2670\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613079/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,202 | United States v. Myshawn Bonds | 2019-04-24 | 18-2670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-26... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613202/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,273 | United States v. Myshawn Bonds | 2019-04-24 | 18-2670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-26... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613273/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,274 | Mauricio GONZALEZ RUANO, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Mauricio Gonzalez Ruano v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-24 | 18-2337 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Hamilton, Barrett, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2337\nMAURICIO GONZALEZ RUANO,\n ... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613274/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,301 | Mauricio Gonzalez Ruano v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-24 | 18-2337 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2337\nMAURICIO GONZA... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613301/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,711 | Surgery Center at 900 North Mi v. American Physicians Assurance | 2019-04-25 | 18-2622 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2622Β \nSURGERYΒ CENT... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613711/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,712 | BUILDERS NAB LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. | Builders Nab LLC v. F.D.I.C. | 2019-04-25 | 18-2799 & 18-2804 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Easterbrook, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 18-2799 & 18-2804\nBUILDERS NAB LLC,\n ... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613712/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,745 | Surgery Center at 900 North Mi v. American Physicians Assurance | 2019-04-25 | 18-2622 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2622Β \nSURGERYΒ CENT... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613745/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,746 | Donald Lacy v. Keith Butts | 2019-04-25 | 17-3256 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 17β3256Β \nDON... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613746/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,747 | Builders Bank v. FDIC | 2019-04-25 | 18-2804 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 18-2799 & 18-2804\... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613747/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,784 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria MORENO, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Maria Moreno | 2019-04-25 | 17-3435 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3435\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613784/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,785 | GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield | 2019-04-25 | 18-3236 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β3236Β \nGEFTΒ OUTDOORS,Β LL... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613785/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,786 | Donald Lacy v. Keith Butts | 2019-04-25 | 17-3256 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 17β3256Β \nDON... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613786/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,845 | United States v. Maria Moreno | 2019-04-25 | 17-3435 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3435\nUNITED STATES OF AME... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613845/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,846 | GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield | 2019-04-25 | 18-3236 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β3236Β \nGEFTΒ OUTDOORS,Β LL... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613846/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,008 | United States v. Maria Moreno | 2019-04-25 | 17-3435 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3435\nUNITED STATES OF AME... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614008/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,977 | GEFT OUTDOORS, LLC v. CITY OF WESTFIELD, Hamilton County, Indiana | Geft Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield | 2019-04-25 | No. 18-3236 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415411/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443977/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,978 | Donald LACY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Keith BUTTS, Warden | Lacy v. Butts | 2019-04-25 | No. 17-3256 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Scudder, Sykes, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415412/", "author_raw": ""}]} | SCUDDER | SYKES | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443978/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,983 | SURGERY CENTER AT 900 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE, LLC v. AMERICAN PHYSICIANS ASSURANCE CORPORATION, INC. | Surgery Ctr. At 900 N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp. | 2019-04-25 | No. 18-2622 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Flaum, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415417/", "author_raw": ""}]} | EASTERBROOK | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443983/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,581 | Rodolfo Deiby Burgos NOELLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jason WOJDYLO, Acting United States Marshal for the Northern District of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee. | Rodolfo Burgos Noeller v. Wojdylo, Jason | 2019-04-29 | 18-2723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2723\nRODOLFO DEIBY BURGOS NOELLER,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614581/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,618 | Rodolfo Burgos Noeller v. Wojdylo, Jason | 2019-04-29 | 18-2723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2723\nRODOLFO DEIBY ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614618/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,619 | Mehdi ABDOLLAHZADEH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANDARICH LAW GROUP, LLP, Defendant-Appellee. | Mehdi Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP | 2019-04-29 | 18-1904 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1904\nMEHDI ABDOLLAHZADEH,\n ... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614619/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,631 | Rodolfo Burgos Noeller v. Wojdylo, Jason | 2019-04-29 | 18-2723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2723\nRODOLFO DEIBY ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,632 | Mehdi Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP | 2019-04-29 | 18-1904 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1904\nMEHDI ABDO... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614632/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,633 | Letran TRAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. | LeTran Tran v. Minnesota Life Insurance Comp | 2019-04-29 | 18-1723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888425/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614633/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,648 | Mehdi Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP | 2019-04-29 | 18-1904 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1904\nMEHDI ABDO... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614648/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,649 | LeTran Tran v. Minnesota Life Insurance Comp | 2019-04-29 | 18-1723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1723\nLETRAN TRAN,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614649/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,129 | STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of WISCONSIN; Tony Evers, Governor of Wisconsin; And Ho-Chunk Nation, Defendants-Appellees. | Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. State of Wisconsin | 2019-04-30 | 18-1449 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Rovner, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1449\nSTOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | 0 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615129/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,135 | Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. State of Wisconsin | 2019-04-30 | 18-1449 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1449\nSTO... | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615135/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,136 | Pearl Carter v. City of Alton, Illinois | 2019-04-30 | 18-2636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT,Β CircuitΒ Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2636Β \nPEARL... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615136/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,214 | Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. State of Wisconsin | 2019-04-30 | 18-1449 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-1449\nSTO... | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615214/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,215 | Pearl Carter v. City of Alton, Illinois | 2019-04-30 | 18-2636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT,Β CircuitΒ Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________Β \nNo.Β 18β2636Β \nPEARL... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615215/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,984 | Pearl CARTER v. CITY OF ALTON, Michael Morelli, and Jeffrey Henderson | Carter v. City of Alton | 2019-04-30 | No. 18-2636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Eve, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415418/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443984/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,640 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Nicholas Gilbert BEATTIE, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Nicholas Beattie | 2019-04-01 | 18-2197 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888269/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605640/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,385 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Brian Arthur BARTHMAN, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Brian Barthman | 2019-04-03 | 18-1279 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606385/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,386 | Russell J. FENSTERMAKER Petitioner - Appellant v. Kathy HALVORSON, Warden, MCF-Faribault Respondent - Appellee | Russell Fenstermaker v. Kathy Halvorson | 2019-04-03 | 17-3378 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Loken, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3378\n... | SMITH | LOKEN | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606386/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,387 | Carlos CABALLERO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent Carlos Caballero-Martinez, Petitioner v. William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent | Carlos Caballero-Martinez v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-03 | 17-2044; 18-1198 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2044\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606387/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,930 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Douglas DRUGER, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Douglas Druger | 2019-04-04 | 18-1381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1381\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606930/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,931 | RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES EIGHTEEN, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dr. Matthew Jerome CONCANNON, Defendant - Appellant | Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon | 2019-04-04 | 17-3447 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3447\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606931/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,932 | CMI ROADBUILDING, INC. ; CMI Roadbuilding, Ltd., Plaintiffs - Appellants v. IOWA PARTS, INC., Defendant - Appellee | CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc. | 2019-04-04 | 18-1075 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Beam, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BEAM, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1075\n ... | BENTON | BEAM | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606932/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,381 | William Anthony LOFTON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee | William Lofton v. United States | 2019-04-05 | 17-2847 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Wollman, Arnold, Benton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-284... | WOLLMAN | ARNOLD | BENTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607381/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,102 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eric Cortez SALLIS, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Eric Sallis | 2019-04-09 | 18-1662 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Beam, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BEAM, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1662\n ... | BENTON | BEAM | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608102/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,103 | Tracy HARRELL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HANDI MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., Defendant - Appellee. | Tracy Harrell v. Handi Medical Supply, Inc. | 2019-04-09 | 17-3349 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Wollman, Colloton, Benton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-334... | WOLLMAN | COLLOTON | BENTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608103/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,104 | Jennifer FROST ; Jane Doe, Plaintiffs Kali Myers, Plaintiff - Appellant v. SIOUX CITY, IOWA, City Of; Robert Padmore, in His Official Capacity; Cindy Rarrat, in Her Official Capacity, Defendants - Appellees | Kali Myers v. Sioux City, Iowa, City of | 2019-04-09 | 18-2138 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2138... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608104/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,449 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Alvin Antonio HOUSTON Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Alvin Houston | 2019-04-10 | 18-1516 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608449/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,450 | CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., Doing Business as CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GAS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 340, Affiliated With the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Defendant - Appellant... | Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp. v. Gas Workers Union | 2019-04-10 | 17-1322 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Murphy, Colloton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1322\... | SMITH | MURPHY | COLLOTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608450/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,050 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ryan John REIF, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Ryan Reif | 2019-04-11 | 17-3729 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609050/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,051 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lonnie Dale SPOTTED BEAR Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Lonnie Dale Spotted Bear | 2019-04-11 | 18-1008 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-100... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609051/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,053 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. DICO, INC.; Titan Tire Corporation, Defendants - Appellants | United States v. Dico, Inc. | 2019-04-11 | 17-3462 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3462\n... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609053/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,054 | MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. COMPANIES, INC.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant Management Registry, Inc., Plaintiff - Appellant v. A.W. Companies, Inc.; Allan K. Brown; Wendy Brown, Defendants - Appellees Eric Berg, Defendant | Management Registry, Inc. v. A.W. Companies, Inc. | 2019-04-11 | 17-3675; 18-1154 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3675\n ___________________________\n\n ... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609054/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,055 | James DOE, on Behalf of Himself and 77 Other Similarly Situated Individual Minors Next Friend John Doe Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORT ZUMWALT R-II SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant Matthew M. Hansen, in His Official Capacity as a Former Teacher of the Fort Zumwalt R-II School District; Bernard Dubray, Superintendent of the For... | Doe v. Fort Zumwalt R-Ii Sch. Dist. | 2019-04-11 | 18-2093 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2093\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609055/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,056 | Dilang DAT, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee | Dilang Dat v. United States | 2019-04-11 | 17-3652 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3652\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609056/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,057 | Charles WATERS; Anita Waters Plaintiffs - Appellants v. B. MADSON; Alyssa Newbury; City of Coon Rapids Defendants - Appellees Menard, Inc. Defendant Tom Hawley; Emily Kirchner Defendants - Appellees | Charles Waters v. B. Madson | 2019-04-11 | 17-3827 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3827\n ... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609057/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,769 | QWEST COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Now Known as CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Doing Business as CenturyLink QCC, Third Party Plaintiff - Appellant v. FREE CONFERENCING CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, Third Party Defendant - Appellee | Qwest Communications Corp. v. Free Conferencing Corp. | 2019-04-12 | 17-3724 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Kelly, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888350/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | SHEPHERD | KELLY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609769/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,770 | Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co | 2019-04-12 | 18-1455 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | LOKEN | MELLOY | ERICKSON | 1 | {"LOKEN": ", Circuit", "MELLOY": ", Circuit", "ERICKSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609770/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,971 | UNITED STATES of America FOR the USE OF WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, - International Fidelity Insurance Company | United States v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. | 2019-04-12 | No. 18-1455 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Erickson, Loken, Melloy", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415405/", "author_raw": ""}]} | ERICKSON | LOKEN | MELLOY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443971/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,116 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Todd DeAngelo GOODSON, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Todd Goodson | 2019-04-15 | 18-1515 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1515\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610116/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,118 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. John Henry EDMONDS, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. John Edmonds | 2019-04-15 | 18-2726 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-272... | SHEPHERD | ERICKSON | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610118/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,119 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elba TORRES, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Elba Torres | 2019-04-15 | 18-1245 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1245\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610119/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,954 | Michael D. LOOS v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, - American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) Michael D. Loos v. BNSF Railway Company, - United States of America, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) American Association for Justice, Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s) | Loos v. BNSF Ry. Co. | 2019-04-15 | No: 15-3355; No: 16-1123 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Affirming, Arnold, Award, Bnsf, Certiorari, Cir, Claim, Company, Consideration, Consistent, From, Grant, Gruender, Its, Loos, Lost, Now, Original, Our, Portion, Remanded, Request, Stated, Summary, Supreme, Wollman, Writ", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_ur... | ARNOLD | AWARD | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443954/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,463 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Zachary Scott REED, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Zachary Reed | 2019-04-16 | 18-1852 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1852\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610463/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,467 | Noel J. MICHAUD, Formerly Known as Noel J. Ketola, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Sarah E. DAVIDSON, Defendant - Appellee | Noel Michaud v. Sarah Davidson | 2019-04-16 | 17-3472 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Kelly, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888362/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | SHEPHERD | KELLY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610467/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,468 | Farass Ali v. Joel Brott | 2019-04-16 | 19-1244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {"GRUENDER": ", Circuit", "BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610468/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,415 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Octavious Tajuan STOVALL, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Octavious Stovall | 2019-04-18 | 18-2298 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2298\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611415/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,416 | NATIONAL ELEVATOR BARGAINING ASSOCIATION; Kone, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS; Local Union No. 33, Defendants - Appellants | Nat'l Elevator Bargaining Ass'n v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors | 2019-04-18 | 18-1584 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-158... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611416/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,125 | Dina KLEIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CREDICO INC., Defendant - Appellee | Dina Klein v. Credico Inc. | 2019-04-22 | 18-2776 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2776\... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612125/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,428 | Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants-Appellees | Connie Smith v. SEECO, Inc. | 2019-04-23 | 17-3636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-363... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612428/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,429 | Connie Jean SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SEECO, INC., Now Known as SWN Production (Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern Energy Services Company; Southwestern Energy Company, Defendants - Appellees v. Connie Arnett; Cecil Barnes, Jr.; ... | Connie Smith v. Connie Arnett | 2019-04-23 | 17-2378; 17-2607; 17-2610; 17-3443 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2378\n... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612429/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,422 | RESTAURANT RECYCLING, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant, New Fashion Pork, LLP, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYER MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Doing Business as EMC Insurance Companies; Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants - Appellees. | Restaurant Recycling, LLC v. Employer Mutual Casualty Co. | 2019-04-29 | 17-2792 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-279... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614422/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,423 | Melanie DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MORRIS-WALKER, LTD; Orchard Park, LLC, Defendants - Appellees. | Melanie Davis v. Morris-Walker, LTD | 2019-04-29 | 17-3774 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614423/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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