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Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/04/21 Page 18 of 26IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH |
United States, |
Plaintiff, |
v. John Earle Sullivan, |
Defendant. RELEASE ORDER |
Case No. 2:21mj14-DAO |
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg |
The court orders John Earle Sullivan’s releas e in this case, based on a finding that the |
government did not establish a basi s to hold a detention hearing. Mr. Sullivan made his initial |
appearance at a transfer hearing, conducted pursuan t to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal |
Procedure. Mr. Sullivan has b een charged with federal offens es in Washington, D.C., and the |
Rule 5 hearing was held for purpos es of transferring him there. At this hearing, the government |
made a verbal motion for detention and asked the court to continue Mr. Sullivan’s detention hearing for three days, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). However, in this case, the |
government simply did not meet its burden of establishing any basis fo r a detention hearing. |
Because the court finds the threshold conditions under § 3142(f) have not been met, it cannot |
hold a detention hearing and, thus , cannot detain the defendant. Where the court cannot even |
hold a detention hearing, it ce rtainly cannot delay such hear ing on the government’s motion— |
detaining the defendant all the while. Case 2:21-mj-00014-DAO Document 8 Filed 01/15/21 PageID.36 Page 1 of 5 Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/04/21 Page 19 of 262 LEGAL STANDARDS |
The court can only hold a deten tion hearing (hence, can only de tain a defendant), in cases |
which qualify for such a hearing under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150. These |
cases are delineated in § 3142(f). As noted by the Third Circuit, in United States v. Himler , the |
§ 3142(f) “circumstances for invoking a detention hear ing in effect serve to limit the types of |
cases in which detention may be ordered prio r to trial.” 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986). |
“Congress did not intend to authorize preventive detention unless the judici al officer first finds |
that one of the § 3142(f) conditions for holding a detention hearing exists.” United States v. |
Ploof , 851 F.2d 7, 10 –11 (1st Cir. 1988). In other words, this is a “two-part inquiry.” United |
States v. Gerkin , 570 F. App’x 819, 820 (10th Cir. 2014) (un published). “At the first step, the |
judicial officer must decide whether there is any basis to hold a detenti on hearing.” Id. at 821. |
Only if the “government establis hes a basis for a detention heari ng,” does the court move to the |
second step, where the government must show “‘no condition or combination of conditions’ that |
‘will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other |
person and the community.’” Id. (quoting § 3142(f)). |
ANALYSIS |
In this case, the government did not establ ish a basis for the detention hearing. When |
asked at the hearing on what st atutory grounds the case qualified for a detention hearing, the |
government first began to argue dangerousness to the community—a factor the court cannot |
even consider unless it first fi nds the case qualifies for a detenti on hearing. The government then |
indicated the case qualified unde r § 3142(f)(2)(B). Under this provision, a case qualifies for a |
detention hearing if the government establishes “a serious risk that such person will obstruct or Case 2:21-mj-00014-DAO Document 8 Filed 01/15/21 PageID.37 Page 2 of 5 Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/04/21 Page 20 of 263 attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or atte... |
intimidate, a prospectiv e witness or juror.” Id. This is a forward-l ooking inquiry, requiring a |
showing of a serious risk the de fendant will obstruct justice in the future. Alt hough the standard |
of proof under this section is not well-develope d, some courts have dete rmined that where the |
government seeks detention under th is section, it must sustain its burden of proof by “clear and |
convincing evidence.” See United States v. Jones , No. 99-1682, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19916, |
*8 (1st Cir. Aug. 9, 1999) (unpublished); United States v. Dodge , 846 F. Supp. 181, 185 (D. |
Conn. 1994). Obstruction of justice contemplates interfer ence in the administration of justice. For |
instance, a common federal criminal statute prohib iting obstruction of justice requires proof that |
a person endeavored to influence a juror or officer of the court in the discharge of her duties |
through threats or force—or endeav ored to influence the due administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. |
§ 1503. Although the government obviously n eed not make any st atutory showing of |
obstruction, this overall concept of obstruction is instructive. |
In this case, the government made no atte mpt to argue there was a serious risk Mr. |
Sullivan would threaten, injure, or intimidate a prospective witness or juror—or attempt to do |
any of these things. Instead, th e government focused on the risk of obstruction. In support of its |
claim, the government pointed to Mr. Sullivan’s a lleged behavior at a riot in Utah, wherein he |
allegedly threatened to harm another person, whil e kicking her car door, and incited others to |
block public roadways. Mr. Sullivan was charged for participating in this riot in the state system |
in Utah in July 2020; these events are not char ged in the federal case. The government claimed |
Mr. Sullivan’s attempt to obstruct justice could be shown by the fact that he appeared at his Case 2:21-mj-00014-DAO Document 8 Filed 01/15/21 PageID.38 Page 3 of 5 Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/04/21 Page 21 of 264 hearing in this Utah state case via internet vi deo conference, while he was... |
the day before the conduct alleged in this federal case. Th e government argued this act showed |
“reckless disregard for the courts.” The government also argued Mr. Sullivan incited others to |
resist police officers’ orders to disperse in an entirely separate, unrelat ed, incident in Oregon. |
The government offered no da te for this Oregon event, only asse rting that it occurred “while he |
was facing” the riot-related char ges in Utah. The government indi cated it was stil l attempting to |
obtain footage related to th is alleged event. |
The government’s proffer simp ly fails to establish a serious risk Mr. Sullivan will |
obstruct justice or attempt to obstruct justice in th e future. The fact that Mr. Sullivan allegedly |
appeared in a Utah state cour t proceeding via internet vide o conference—while in Washington, |
D.C., just before becoming involved in the fede ral offense alleged—does not stand as evidence |
of an attempt or willingness to obstruct justice. As Mr. Sullivan ’s counsel pointed out, all recent |
hearings in the state court system in Utah have been held via in ternet video conference, due to |
the coronavirus pandemic. The allegation that Mr. Sullivan might have incited others to resist |
police officers in a separate Oregon event adds little to inquiry. These alle gations are insufficient |
to meet the government’s burden of establishing § 3142(f)(2)(B) a pplies in this case, even by a |
preponderance of the evidence, let alone by clea r and convincing evidence. And this was the |
only proffer made in support of th is threshold question. |
After the court declined to continue the detention hearing on the grounds that the |
government failed to first es tablish the case even qualified for a detention hearing, the |
government asked the court to de lay its threshold determination, but to detain Mr. Sullivan |
during this delay. The court in vited the government to provide any legal authority allowing the Case 2:21-mj-00014-DAO Document 8 Filed 01/15/21 PageID.39 Page 4 of 5 Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 6 Filed 02/04/21 Page 22 of 265 temporary detention of a defendant when the th reshold for holding a dete... |
been met. The government declined to do so. The government also asked the court to stay its |
release order. The court declin ed to do so, finding that where the government failed to even |
meet the threshold for a dete ntion hearing, it could not de tain Mr. Sullivan pending the |
government’s appeal. |
CONCLUSION |
Where the government failed to establish, as a threshold matter, that this case meets the |
preconditions in § 3142(f) for holding a detention hearing, the court must release Mr. Sullivan. |
The release conditions can be found in a separate or der. As stated at th e hearing, the government |
is invited to file a detention moti on in an attempt to meet its burden to establish the threshold for |
a detention hearing. In addition, defense c ounsel is invited to fi le any motion to amend |
conditions of release, if needed. DATED this 15 |
th day of January, 2021. |
BY THE COURT: |
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