text stringlengths 12 4.76M | timestamp stringlengths 26 26 | url stringlengths 32 32 |
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Q:
Play: how to append a list to an existing JSON variable?
Given the following json variable
var json: JsValue = JsObject(Seq(
"retcode" -> JsString("1")
))
and the following Writes object for a User class
implicit val w2 : Writes[User] = (
(JsPath \ "id").write[Int] and
(JsPath \ "userid").write[String] and
(JsPath \ "name").write[String]
) (unlift(User.unapply))
Assuming I have a list of users
var list : List[User] = ( some list )
How to append the list to the initial json var?
A:
Assuming you want to end up with something like this (the users list added as another key/value to your original object):
{
"retcode" : "1",
"users" : [ {
"id" : "1",
"userid" : "u1",
"name" : "Bob"
}, {
"id" : "2",
"userid" : "u2",
"name" : "Fred"
} ]
}
you can do:
val newJson = json.as[JsObject] + ("users" -> Json.toJson(list))
You can skip the .as[JsObject] if you declare json as a JsObject to start with, rather than a JsValue. (The as is potentially unsafe if you don't know your JSON definitely represents an object, as opposed to a list or a primitive. See using validation for a better way to handle that.)
| 2023-10-04T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1701 |
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| 2023-09-01T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4054 |
It’s time to sound the alarm bells on prospects for the Millennial Generation in three of the world’s most important advanced economies.
In the US, UK, and Japan, the generation of citizens aged 19-35 are the first in modern memory on course to be worse off than their parents. To take perhaps the most striking example, roughly half of Japanese Millennials aged 20 to 29 in 2015 reported still living with their parents.
In crucial recent votes in the US and UK as well, the 2016 presidential election and Brexit, Millennial turnout was significantly lower than for other generations, despite the fact that the young will experience proportionally greater impacts from each of these votes through the prime of their lives.
Where are the young leaders?
Let us be direct with the question that faces us today. Why are US, UK, and Japanese Millennials failing to realize their potential at just the moment we need fresh leadership on the global stage?
Millennials in these three countries, whose combined economies account for approximately one third of global GDP, are struggling to fulfill their potential due to structural economic constraints and a broadly shared perception that “the game is rigged.” They are also victims of circumstance. This is the generation that has come of age in the long shadow of the global financial crisis — a historically significant loss of global wealth and opportunity — and their problems have been compounded by the automation of many tasks.
In the US, Millennials’ greatest challenge is likely their daunting student debt obligations. A majority of US Millennials have student debt, and those Millennials who graduated in 2016 face the prospect of paying off an average per capita record-setting $37,712 in student loans. Such high debt prevents many Millennials from taking steps that are traditional markers of adulthood, such as purchasing homes and starting families. Millennial incomes have also fallen dramatically compared with previous generations. Millennials in 2013 had median earnings that were 43 percent lower than that of Generation Xers in 1995, when Gen X was at a similar point in its demographic development.
In addition, financial insecurity is making US Millennials less entrepreneurial than previous generations. Recent studies indicate that the share of people under 30 who own their own business is at its lowest in 24 years. Given such poor economic conditions, it is unsurprising that US Millennials have returned home, becoming the first generation in modern US history to primarily live in a multigenerational home.
In the UK, housing affordability and employment opportunities are the most pressing issues for Millennials. While student debt is also an issue, the rapid rise in home prices in the UK has proven to be far more serious. Millennials have found themselves priced out of starter homes, as housing costs outpace income growth. Median income for most Millennials aged 22-30, for instance, is 8 percent lower than it was before the global financial crisis. Unemployment and underemployment also remain high, despite recent economic improvements.
Japanese Millennials face likely the most dire economic circumstances of this trio. The country’s GDP growth has been largely stagnant for nearly two decades and Millennials face an inflexible labor market. Nearly 30 percent of those aged 25-34 in 2014 said that they settled for temporary work because they couldn’t find permanent employment. This economic hardship is reflected in Millennial attitudinal surveys. While global Millennials are generally optimistic about their future careers, fewer than 40 percent of Japanese Millennials are, and more than a third expect to have to work until they die, largely to support Japan’s outsized elderly population (the inverted demographic pyramid).
A student job seeker rides on an escalator inside a train station at a business district in Tokyo, Japan, March 31, 2016. Image: REUTERS/Yuya Shino
Mentorship is not enough
Even so, such outreach failed to translate into significant Millennial political turnout in the United States and United Kingdom. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, but if Millennials don’t vote, then politicians won’t reach out to engage with them, and if Millennials feel forgotten and only see the older generation in politics, they’ll disengage from politics and not vote.
Many businesses have also attempted to engage with and adapt to Millennials’ preferences to retain key talent, as evidenced by increasing flexibility and emphasis on work-life balance at major corporations in the UK and US. In addition, businesses such as GE and BAE Systems have developed mentorship programs to prepare Millennials for corporate leadership positions as Baby Boomers retire, incentivized by rapidly shifting labor market demographics.
Leadership, communication, and mentorship, though important, won’t be enough if structural problems continue to limit Millennials from reaching their full potential. To address this, policy leaders, need to act to level the playing field for Millennials to be as successful as the older generations. Most importantly, policy makers must tackle the thorny challenges of debt, specifically education debt, and housing affordability. | 2024-01-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6268 |
4 Ways To Put Your Life Vest On First
Submitted by bill on Tue, 2014-08-19 17:24
Take Care of You or You Won’t Be Able to Take Care of Others
Aug 19 2014
Nicole Black
I can’t lie. I used to be a classroom teacher and I completely, 100% burned myself out. I seriously broke down in a staff meeting and was hysterically having a tantrum over new English Language Learner paperwork. I lost it. And now as a parent of three kids under 7, I want to have tantrums nearly every day.
Life is hard. Being an educator is hard. Being a parent is hard. But we have to, we must, take care of ourselves; because if we’re in the fetal position or locking ourselves in the bathroom and counting that as “me time,” we are not able to fully serve the people in front of us: our students, our children, our spouses, our friends. And if we’re not firing on all cylinders, giving those that matter our very best, that’s when the good stuff falls between the cracks.
Here are 4 simple ways to take care of you so that you can still take care of others.
1. Plan Ahead: Don’t Leave Your Peace Of Mind To Chance
I get it. Your life is busy and you need to make use of every free moment you have. It could be recess, or your kid’s naptime, or the second your respite provider walks in the door. It’s your cue to automatically kick into gear and get as much done as humanly possible in as little time. But the stack of papers to grade and IEP paperwork to finish can wait. The mound of laundry and the sink full of dirty dishes can stay exactly where they are. Your sanity is on the line. It’s time to put the multi-tasking function on pause and mute the constant To Do List running through your mind.
Stop yourself. If this is your only time for you, take it. Unapologetically. Sit and read a gossip magazine. Call your best friend. Chat with a colleague about anything that is not related to school or your students. Reignite the love of an old hobby. Or just stare at the wall.
It doesn’t matter what you decide on, as long as you pick something that’s just for you. Give yourself 5 minutes or give yourself a whole hour. It doesn’t matter. As long as you choose you.
And protect your “Me Time” by spending that time first, or else something will inevitably come up. It always does, right? Someone will need you, a nap will end early or a student will be hurt on the playground. And you’ll jump back in, feet first, and your time will be gone before it even started.
2. Anticipation: Give Yourself Something To Look Forward To
Life really is a mental game. It’s all in how you look at things and your perspective can make or break your day. Some days I laugh it off when half a box of cereal is dumped on my floor and some days I stomp and yell as I clean it up. Perspective. And on those stomp and yell days, sometimes an iced coffee really can turn my day around.
If you know you’re going to have a really hard day next Wednesday, plan something that gets you through the day. It could be lunch out at a restaurant, it could be meeting up with coworkers after work for mango margaritas, it could be watching your favorite movie that evening. A little sunshine at the end of the day to “reward” yourself is always a good thing.
Pick a day—or several days—that you don’t bring work home. Or pick days that you consciously ignore the dirty floor. Maybe Friday can be the “No picking up the dog poop day.”
During an IEP Meeting, treat yourself to that iced coffee. Or a Diet Coke. Or a double chocolate cupcake. Choose something that will make you really look forward to it. And. Then. Enjoy. It.
Plan a date with your significant other or with some friends. Hire a babysitter or swap babysitting duties with a friend if you can’t afford one. Take a “mental health day” and play hookey. Shhh. I won’t tell. But I will tell you that you deserve it.
And go for the big shebang if you can: plan a vacation away for yourself. It can be a girlfriend trip to a winery, a guys-only fishing trip or a romantic getaway. But only invite people that don’t suck. Surround yourself with people who will not make your life harder for that one trip. It can be a grand tour or you can escape to the hotel down the street. But you will come back more refreshed and ready to tackle your multitasking, crazy busy, overworked life. And, incidentally, whoever “covered” for you will have a newfound respect for all that you do. (This is especially effective for spouses)
3. Choose Your Environment Wisely: Go Somewhere That ‘Fills You Up’
Where you spend most of your awake time greatly influences your mood, and therefore your drained or cheerful attitude. Personally, fluorescent lights and stark beige walls, give me a headache. Create your classroom or office space to be a place that visually and emotionally pleases you, since you’re the one who’ll be there the most. Buy plants, hang up art, rearrange furniture. Personalize it. Do something. Anything. And while you’re at it, turn off those darn fluorescent lighs when you can.
My home is a different story. I feel like I have no control over it now that I birthed three hurricanes. They can destroy a room in 5 minutes flat. When it is clean, I take pictures as proof that we sometimes can see the floor.
So I’ve had to create my happy place. And everyone’s happy place will look different. For some, it’s a dark, quiet bedroom where little people are forbidden to enter. For others, it’s a big comfy bed with top of the line sheets. For me, it’s being outside, sitting in my swing. Whenever I’m feeling incredibly overwhelmed and like I just want to run away, I take my grandma’s old advice: I go outside and I “blow the stink off my tail.” Being outside, automatically makes me drop my shoulders, take a deep breath and smile.
Find your “go to” happy place in your home and/or at your school. Maybe it’s the school’s garden. Or maybe you were a jock as a kid and you love the sounds and smells of the gym. Or maybe you lock yourself in your car and blare your favorite music. No judgement. Physically move yourself somewhere that makes you feel more whole.
4. Be Grateful: Turn Inwards and Find What Makes You Happy
Some days are going to be better than others. That’s life. So on some days it’s harder to be grateful for the things and people in your life. But forcing yourself to find gratitude even on the hardest of days, will remind you how lucky you really are. That, in and of itself, is a good thing. But it will also take care of your soul. It will fill you up emotionally after those really hard days.
On those great win days, when your child reached a milestone that those ridiculous doctors predicted they would never reach, it’ll be easy to write what you’re thankful for. Or when the student who couldn’t hold their pencil was finally able to master it. Those are easy days to be grateful. It’s clear that you’re awesome, they’re awesome and the whole world is awesome.
Other days aren’t so easy. Like those days when your student pees on the rug and you sit in the exact same spot (I swear, this really happened to me). It’s times like those when it’s harder to find things to be grateful for. But this is when we have to try harder than ever. Because these are the moments that will define you.
On that fateful “pee on the rug day,” I was grateful there were no afterschool meetings so I could go home and change out of my pee-jeans. I was grateful to be reminded how embarrassed and uncomfortable kids feel when they have an accident. I was also grateful that it was just pee and not poop.
Sometimes you need to force yourself to remember all the good things. Because if you focus on the yuck, if you focus on the stuff that’s so hard it makes your teeth hurt, you won’t be able to function and tackle it. You won’t be of any help to anyone.
***
At the end of the day, self-preservation is one of the greatest acts of kindness you can do for the people in your life. Because as the old adage goes, it’s impossible to save others from drowning unless we put on our own life vest first. It is justified selfishness that not only gives us the emotional and physical strength to be the amazing person we were meant to be, but the courage to help those around us become who they were meant to become.
But it starts with you. Today. In this moment.
Go ahead and ask yourself this one simple question: what fills you up, brings you back to a place of calm and peace? Restores your spirit? Once you have your answer, put down your phone, your tablet or your computer and go do it. That’ll be your life vest and you need to wear it…every day.
Your sanity is counting on it.
Nicole Black is a credentialed elementary school teacher, tutor and substitute teacher. She is raising her 3 awesome kids, volunteering in their classrooms and is just trying to make it to bedtime. Her hobbies include attending IEP Meetings, sleeping in and searching Pinterest for inspiring recipes that she may or may not ever make. Oh, and she also likes to write. | 2024-05-24T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6291 |
Amazon.com Inc is planning to give more data on counterfeit goods to law enforcement in a further crackdown on fakes listed on its e-commerce sites, a person familiar with the program told Reuters.
The move comes as Amazon faces public scrutiny over how it polices counterfeits and allegedly unsafe products on its platform. Fakes have long frustrated top labels like Apple Inc. and Nike Inc., discouraging some from selling via Amazon at all.
In the past, the world’s largest online retailer has informed authorities of counterfeit peddlers when it thought it had enough information for police to pursue a culprit. Now, the company plans to disclose merchant information to European and U.S. federal authorities every time it confirms a counterfeit was sold to customers, increasing the frequency and volume of reporting to law enforcement, according to the person, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Why the new program was happening now was not immediately clear. Amazon struck a deal with Apple in 2018 in which it agreed to rid its site of products from merchants not authorized by the Cupertino, California-based technology company. It has sued peddlers of fakes and launched a counterfeit removal tool for brands, actions in tension with its aim to increase profit by offering more products for sale.
In recent weeks, Amazon has held meetings with government authorities and related organizations to discuss its new counterfeit reporting strategy and how the company can further their enforcement efforts, the person said. The hope has been that Amazon’s coveted data will help law enforcement make connections about criminals.
According to the source, Amazon will report a merchant’s name, company name, product and contact information to authorities, after it confirms a business was selling fakes, closes the seller’s account, and the account holder does not make a successful appeal via Amazon’s typical processes.
In an April memo, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a crackdown on fakes sold via online marketplaces while the country was locked in trade talks with China, one source of counterfeits. The Trump administration also considered last year adding some Amazon websites to its “Notorious Markets” list for counterfeits, the Wall Street Journal on.wsj.com/2LtUZOR reported, though similar proposals in 2018 were discarded.
The value of global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods is half a trillion dollars per year, according to an estimate cited in the Trump memo. | 2023-10-14T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8094 |
Kaaya was one of Detroit’s final cuts this preseason, and they hoped he would go unclaimed so they could add him to their practice squad. However, the Panthers claimed him instead. He remained on Carolina’s roster until yesterday, when he was cut loose to sign some defensive help.
Related Articles
When Kaaya became available, the Lions pounced on the chance to claim him off waivers and add him to their 53-man roster.
The timing of this signing is what makes it interesting. Matthew Stafford suffered multiple injuries in the Lions’ loss two Sundays ago against the Panthers and was hit a lot this past Sunday as they fell in New Orleans. Stafford has been sacked 17 times in the last three games and looked like he could barely move by the end of that Saints game.
Was Kaaya’s signing simply because the Lions like him and wanted him back? Or did Matthew Stafford’s health necessitate the signing of another quarterback to back up Jake Rudock if Stafford is unable to play, and it was a happy coincidence that Kaaya became available?
I think the latter might be the case.
Why would this Lions team, that is riddled with injuries, waste a roster spot on a player that they don’t expect to even have a chance of playing? The spot could certainly be used to add depth to the beat-up defensive line. To make room for Kaaya – as well as DE Jacquies Smith and T Bryce Harris, who they also signed Wednesday – the Lions released DE Datone Jones, DE George Johnson and waived DT Caraun Reid. It is nice to get Harris’ help on the equally-depleted O-line, but one of those defenders could certainly help with Haloti Ngata out. Especially with Ziggy Ansah and Anthony Zettel both dinged-up and underperforming.
A DE or DT would definitely be more useful than a third quarterback that will be inactive every week. | 2024-06-15T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7438 |
Table of Contents
THE VIKING PORTABLE LIBRARY
Title Page
Copyright Page
Introduction
PROTAGORAS
SYMPOSIUM
PHAEDO
THE REPUBLIC
**THE VIKING PORTABLE LIBRARY**
**Plato**
Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.) stands with Socrates and Aristotle as one of the shapers of the whole intellectual tradition of the West. He came from a family that had long played a prominent part in Athenian politics, and it would have been natural for him to follow the same course. He declined to do so, however, disgusted by the violence and corruption of Athenian political life, and sickened especially by the execution in 399 of his friend and teacher, Socrates. Inspired by Socrates' inquiries into the nature of ethical standards, Plato sought a cure for the ills of society not in politics but in philosophy, and arrived at his fundamental and lasting conviction that those ills would never cease until philosophers became rulers or rulers philosophers. At an uncertain date in the early fourth century B.C. he founded in Athens the Academy, the first permanent institution devoted to philosophical research and teaching, and the prototype of all western universities. He travelled extensively, notably to Sicily as political adviser to Dionysius II, ruler of Syracuse.
Plato wrote over twenty philosophical dialogues, and there are also extant under his name thirteen letters, whose genuineness is keenly disputed. His literary activity extended over perhaps half a century; few other writers have exploited so effectively the grace and precision, the flexibility and power, of Greek prose.
Scott Milross Buchanan (1895-1968) taught philosophy and religion at the College of the City of New York, the University of Virginia, and Fisk University. During his nine years as dean of St. John's College at Annapolis, Maryland, he helped inaugurate and implement its "great books" curriculum. His books include _Possibility_ and _Poetry and Mathematics._
Each volume in The Viking Portable Library either presents a representative selection from the works of a single outstanding writer or offers a comprehensive anthology on a special subject. Averaging 700 pages in length and designed for compactness and readability, these books fill a need not met by other compilations. All are edited by distinguished authorities, who have written introductory essays and included much other helpful material.
PENGUIN BOOKS
Published by the Penguin Group
Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.
Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.)
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Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R ORL, England
First published in the United States of America
by The Viking Press, Inc., 1948
Reprinted 1957,1958,1959,1960,1961 (twice),
1962,1963,1964,1965,1966 (twice).
1967,1968,1969,1970,1971,1973 (twice), 1974, 1976
Published in Penguin Books 1977
Copyright 1948 by The Viking Press, Inc. Copyright @ renewed The Viking Press, Inc., 1976
All rights reserved
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING PUBLICATION DATA
Plato.
The portable Plato.
Bibliography: p. 41.
1. Philosophy—Collected works. I. Jowett, Benjamin,
1817-1893. 11. Title.
B358.j-54346
eISBN : 978-1-101-12749-0
The scanning, uploading and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any
other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law.
Please purchase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage
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**EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION**
**I** N THE year 1948 the reading of Plato's dialogues by a large number of people could make the difference between a century of folly and a century of wisdom for the world. Reading _The Republic_ has made that difference at various times of crisis in the past. A young American who reads Plato now may sympathize with the youthful Alexander who must have shuddered to see the chaotic world that he was fated to conquer. Tutored by one of Plato's pupils, Aristotle, Alexander read Plato. He gave a unique quality to the world that fell under his dominion: he was the first statesman in our tradition to see the world as one city. If there is a chance now of one political world without the dread necessity of conquest, it may come about partly because human virtue and political justice can still be seen in the mirror of Plato's writings. Alexander was a conqueror and something less than a philosopher-king, but he did have the elements of a liberal education.
For many people in the past the reading of Plato has been the beginning of their deep liberal education. Such education takes devious ways and it has many by-products, some good, some bad, all of them disturbing. The first and most obvious symptom that it is taking effect is an incorrigible urge to question things that have always been taken for granted. The second stage of the disturbance is a feeling of shame that such questions have never been asked before. Partial recovery from this blow to pride is achieved by a rally to the attack, the supposed enemy being conventional morality and opinion. The questions then come in Chinese puzzles, one inside the other, or in ranks, one behind the other in endless array. Apparently the conventions are easily routed, for they seem to melt away. Actually they have disguised themselves and changed sides, turning up everywhere as the assumptions behind the questions. The result at this point is panic, confusion, and paralysis.
Bright boys in college blame their teachers and protest in anger when this happens to them. Only later do they know that a splinter of Socratic irony has lodged in their souls for which they will always be grateful. In a similar mood Mens, a grown man, reports his pain thus:
"O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician."
And the Socratic response to the protest is not altogether comforting:
As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry."
So the reader of Plato joins Socrates in inquiry, as Sancho Panza joined Don Quixote, for adventures of the mind. And although there is a deep consent, like a fire kindled deep in the mind, there is always a tension between the squire and the knight-errant, the little man with proverbs for wisdom riding on a donkey and the knight with the piercing eye riding on a horse, those two parts of each human soul. The intellectual destiny that each of us has depends upon who gets the upper hand, knight or squire.
Too often it is the squire that masters the knight and drags him off the unbeaten track. The record shows that readers of Plato become Platonists and ride donkeys. Seeing the battle with the conventions as the rivalry of opinions, they choose what seems to be the winner, call it the truth, and spend the rest of their lives in defense, challenging all comers. This was already happening before Socrates died. Some, noting the argument, recorded in the _Protagoras,_ to show that pleasure is the good, set up the Cyrenaic School of philosophy which later combined with the atomism of Democritus to make the doctrine of Epicureanism. Others noted the opposing doctrine that the good is virtue, and virtue is knowledge, and became Cynics and later Stoics. It is true that these riders of Platonic donkeys have ruled islands, as the leaders of these schools did, and some of them ruled empires, as the Roman Stoics did, but the shock of reading Plato and touching Socrates has, as a piece of education, proved abortive in them. It may be that some of these caught the vision of the idea and, feeling its power, rode a horse, but they allowed the donkey to lead them down familiar roads where convention puts vision to sleep.
There are, of course, those whose minds took fire from the inquiry concerning the immortality of the soul in the _Phaedo,_ from the intellectual pursuit of love in the _Symposium,_ or from the exploration of utopia in The Republic. These set out on adventures, tilted with illusions, and identified new realities. Such are Plotinus, Aristotle, Augustine, Dante, the builders of the Church, and the founders of the Italian city republics. These were followers of Plato, to be sure, but they were not Platonists. They found insights, not doctrines, in Plato. They built large worlds which they understood but did not try to rule.
But there is great danger in reading Plato through the mediums that these Platonists and these followers of Plato contributed to the tradition. For the modem mind doctrine and influence suggest heroes and cults. Any persistent opinion gets traced back to a personal origin, and we depend upon history to explode or inflate the myth that results. Most of Plato, both influence and origin, has thus been reduced to a cloud, sometimes luminous and sometimes dark. The origins of his ideas are lost in pre-history; his influence in our civilization is at once weak and all-pervasive, as we now see it in the modem fog.
It hardly need be said that Plato is a very eloquent writer, but this very fact should be a warning to the reader. Almost any current doctrine or movement of the day will begin to resonate with a Platonism as the _Dialogues_ are read. It is all too easy to identify a character in a dialogue, or, worse, Plato himself, with one of these fragments of contemporary history, and it is often an effective device in teaching Plato to use temporarily such an aid to the student, but the equation should be erased before it becomes a label or a cliché. Plato the Anglo-Catholic, the mathematical physicist, the totalitarian, the rationalistic atheist; these are the impostures of the last generation of Plato readers, all of them plausible, all of them deeply misleading, and, worst, all making the simple direct reading of the dialogues impossible. A recently arrived European scholar, teaching a freshman class in Plato, reported in a kind of ecstasy that the boys thought Plato was talking to them. This, he added, would be impossible in Europe, where Plato may still be the inspirer of an ideology or even the revered leader of a party.
One of the banes of our time, as it was of Plato's time, is party scholarship, which splinters subject-matters and grinds texts into dust. The profession of philosophy is particularly susceptible to the party spirit. The cure for it is the rebirth of wonder in a man's mind. One of the means to such rebirth is the direct, simple, rapid reading of Plato. It seems likely that Aristotle was thinking of Plato when he said that philosophy begins in wonder.
I would therefore advise the present reader to stop reading this introduction at this point and turn to the dialogues. I promise him that the rest will wait for him until he comes back with the confused curiosity that the wonder of the dialogues themselves engenders. I would add only one suggestion, similar to the museum guide's direction where to stand as one views the pictures: Plato is the craftsman of a very superior dramatic art; the play is the thing.
The secret of the power of these dialogues, the _Protagoras,_ the _Phaedo,_ the _Symposium,_ and The _Republic,_ is their dramatic wholeness. This is true of all the dialogues, but these have most often been chosen for their dramatic verve, and also because they contain most of Plato. The naming of the persons of the drama is a suggestion that the dialogues are dramas, and there is a further recognition of it in the theory that Plato was imitating the mimes, or short dramatic sketches, of Sophron. But this would lead one to suppose that Plato was sugar-coating high and difficult doctrine. This is not the case. His mind is always on the story, the narrative account of things done, the plot that is the soul of the conversation. It is not an accident that the highest philosophic teaching that Plato offers is not doctrine, but dialectic, a conversation in which ideas animate persons in search of wisdom. A dialogue, which is the practice of dialectic, is a historic event in which men with bodies, senses, passions, and thoughts live and move with purposes and willful intentions that involve even the reader in the highest and most serious human concerns. No thought is expressed except by a character, and no act is done without revealing an intention. This dramatic principle is realized throughout a dialogue and in the finest detail. There are no first acts where things are done and said merely to introduce a strange person; there are no interludes of humor merely to relieve the suspense; there are no episodes merely to summarize and to provide a spectacular end. There is nothing left unprocessed by dramatic workmanship. No poet except Shakespeare has more fully made people intelligible to themselves and to us.
There is nothing that more powerfully threatens to destroy the dramatic imagination than an idea; it is often said that Shakespeare's sure and integral dramatic touch is due to his ignorance of ideas and his exclusive attention to people. Of course this is utterly false unless it means that he was the master of that learned ignorance that is identical with wisdom. The thought in Shakespeare is as high and as low as men go, and the same thing Can be said of Plato. Nevertheless, the threat of ideas in drama is real, and it is only the master who successfully copes with them as his essential materials.
Aside from what may be attributed to native genius, Plato had great aids to confirm his dramatic bent. No people had a more dramatic common life than the Greeks, which is as much as to say that the Greeks as a people had a dramatic sense of life. This sense is most impressively expressed in the two great historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, who report the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, respectively. Herodotus, who brings almost all of the religious ideas of his world to bear on his narrative of events, often skeptically and humorously, builds a towering and broad-based structure out of all the materials in the known world, and the secret of the structure is the Greek tragic view of life. Not only is the great arching pattern the tragedy of the Persian Empire, but every constituent episode is a small tragedy with its parts welded together with choral lyrics and comments. The amazing thing is that there is little evidence that this was his literary intention. He moves freely in the medium of popular thought, and at times seems to be merely the loquacious compiler of everyday stories. He merely records the sights that people had of themselves. Thucydides, in a much less richly imagined recollection, rises to greater tragic heights in a more tightly and powerfully reasoned plot in his account of the Peloponnesian War, of which Athens herself is the hero. In this dramatic pattern Thucydides seems to know, as we now know both from him and others, that the Peloponnesian War is the prototype and presiding spirit of all crises in Western culture. It has never been repeated, but every great incident has been an imitation of it. Thucydides did not write colloquially and facilely, as Herodotus did, but he speaks in full confidence that he will be understood by people acquainted with the style and principles of the great plays.
Plato as a youth must have heard both Herodotus and Thucydides recited in public, but he also lived in a community that continued to move and think in the mediums that the historians used. There is evidence to make us suppose that Plato conceived his philosophic assignment as the attempt to understand the mysteries that the tragic history of Greece presented. The assignment to himself of this problem was a far greater aid than the ton or so of pre-Socratic philosophic treatises of which we have only the fragments.
The other great aids to dramatic imagination are perhaps more incisive and germane, the poems of Homer and the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes. The wholeness of Homer's world and the integrity of his characters are miracles of poetic conception even for us. They were for the Greeks, of course, a bible, a manual carried in memory or in a tunic pocket everywhere and always. In Plato's own lifetime a Homeric quotation was proverbial and aphoristic wisdom, like Spanish proverbs from the time of Cervantes until now. There is internal evidence that it was this use and wont in the Greek familiarity with Homer that set one of the basic loci of Plato's thought. In the _Meno,_ one of the so-called Socratic dialogues, Socrates is made to say in one of his most emphatic speeches that, although he is uncertain about most things, there is one thing that he will fight for as long as he lives, and that is that there is a valid distinction with a difference between opinion and knowledge. This distinction is both a problem and the first step in method for Plato throughout the dialogues, and one of his favorite devices is to have Socrates lay down a Homeric quotation as a touchstone beside any expression of opinion by a character in the dialogue. Opinion is somewhere between ignorance and knowledge; it is belief held when one does not know, but a belief within which there may be hidden some clarifiable and certain knowledge. Homer as quoted is the measure of such a matter of knowledge. There is no doubt here of the original wisdom of Homer or of the common man, but the mere second-hand expression, the myth, the unexamined meaning of it in the mouth of an Athenian, is the typical run of current Greek popular thought. So it gets extended to the so-called empirical wisdom of the artisan, the craftsman, the property owner, the soldier, the priest, the lawyer, and the political leader. As one must analyze the Homeric quotation, so must one analyze and criticize the common sense of every man, to get rid of the ambiguity, to eliminate the ignorance, and to save the spark of knowing that is in it. The common man and the poet utter oracles, and it is the pious man's duty to inquire what of reality is being expressed. Socrates is a midwife who helps the pregnant common man to deliver his ideas. As Homer speaks for all men, so all men speak like Homer, and it is the business of Socrates to thrash and winnow the grains of truth from the perennial harvests of opinion in the market place.
That there is knowledge in poetry is not an original discovery of Plato, nor should it be news to us; practically all the philosophers before Plato wrote in verse, and we still have so-called philosophical poets. But only the mind of a playwright would find both wisdom and poetry in the talk of the ordinary man, and for the proper winning of such wisdom a character like Socrates would have had to be invented if he had not existed.
There are many other lesser poets with whom Plato was familiar, some that he quotes, criticizes, and even makes fun of, but it is the great tragic and comic poets that possess and move his mind. As Homer supplies the raw material of his craft, so Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes set the aim and the method of the dialogues.
Tragedy has a misty and perhaps a mystical origin. The anthropologists tell a story of prehistoric rituals connected with plant,. animal, and human fertility in which the god Dionysus is killed in the autumn, his flesh scattered on the fields as a kind of divine manure, and he is reborn in the spring as a child. He is both the prototype of the tragic hero and the god to whom sacrifices were made when the imitative plays were performed in the Greek theatrical festivals of Plato's time. There is some evidence that the plays were popular presentations of both the Orphic and the Eleusinian mysteries, to which only the select few belonged as to rival state churches. There is heavy evidence that they were the canonical forms for theological speculation, in that they were serious attempts, only partially successful, to justify the ways of the gods to men. These may be heavy afterthoughts of modem scholarship to explain the simple spontaneous power that the tragedies still have even for us, but there is no doubt that their effects are not exaggerated in such estimates of their origins. Whether it was religious faith, common opinion, or just wonder at human affairs, the Greek mind found the tragic ordeal an effective purge of mystery and a savior of wonder.
The story or myth ran to a type. A good man is possessed by an idea, a plan, and a purpose. In his steps to carry it out, he becomes entangled in circumstance until there comes a step, difficult and ominous, but necessary if he is to be true to himself. Actually the step contains a destructive contradiction that he does not fully see. He hesitates to take it, but feels and thinks that he can choose no other; it is a choice that is not a choice. The step leads to the failure of his purpose, the crushing of his character, often of his person. But in this catastrophe and calamity he loses the blindness of his resolved action and sees himself and the world in a new light. Plays with such master-plots were written in trilogies in which the first play set the situation for the second and the second for the third, and the three were finally followed by a so-called satyr-play which gave a comic allegorical version of the three preceding episodes. The stories chosen for this treatment were usually familiar legends, though sometimes original constructions. They were reminiscences leading to recognitions.
The most illustrious example of these probing myths is the story of Oedipus, the prehistoric King of Thebes, as it is presented in Sophocles' play, Oedipus the King. The first recording of the story in writing is in Homer, Odysseus reciting:
"And I saw the mother of Oedipodes, fair Epicaste, who wrought the monstrous deed in ignorance of mind, in that she wedded her own son, and he, when he had slain his father, wedded her, and straightway the gods made these things known among men. Howbeit he abode as lord of the Cadmeans in lovely Thebe, suffering woes through the baneful counsels of the gods, but she went down to the house of Hades, the strong warder. She made fast a noose on high from a lofty beam, overpowered by her sorrow, but for him she left behind woes full many, even all that the Avengers of a mother bring to pass."
This and other things like it are seen by Odysseus as if mirrored in a sacrificial pool of blood when he visits the shades in Hades: a Homeric opinion.
Sophocles makes Oedipus the protagonist and hero and uses the circumstance and sophistication of the folk tradition to focus and magnify the tragic essence of the folk tale. Upon the birth of Oedipus Laius, his father is warned by the Delphic oracle that he will be slain by his son. Oedipus is therefore exposed to die, but the shepherd in charge of the exposure passes him on to the king of Corinth who brings him up as his son. Rumors of his real origin disturb him and he goes to Delphi where he is told that he will kill his father and marry his mother. In horror he avoids Corinth, and on the lonely road to Thebes he quarrels with and kills an old man. On, reaching Thebes he answers the riddle of the Sphinx, who dies in defeat. This brings him to court, where he marries the queen, and becomes king. After they have had four children, there is a plague in Thebes, and the oracle's word is that there is a pollution in the city causing the plague. Oedipus orders a search and pronounces punishment by exile for the unknown agent of the unknown crime. He conducts the search with passion, honesty, and persistence. Final suspicion of both himself and of his courtiers pushes him to the desperate end in which it is demonstrated that he is the criminal and cause of the pestilence. Jocasta, the queen, mother, and wife, hangs herself; Oedipus, the king, son, and husband, blinds and exiles himself.
Sophocles' play presents only the final action, the pestilence in the city and the search and discovery of its cause. The plot follows closely the machinery of judicial process, with Oedipus playing the parts of detective, prosecutor, judge, and finally guilty defendant. The tragic plot is complete, the action articulate and detailed. The final insight flows from complete collection and recollection of evidence. Catastrophe, the reversal of roles, and calamity, the destructive consequence, are completely reasoned and willed. The end is purgation of passion and clarification of mystery. The name Oedipus is usually accepted to mean "swollen-foot," indicating the wound-scar that resulted from the manner of the infant's exposure and that serves as mark of recognition of personal identity in the play, but it could equally mean "He who learned his roots," the man who knew himself.
The story in this form presents a thoroughly Greek man who devoted himself to honesty with himself and justice for all, a king of men. There is the persistence and subtlety of Odysseus combined with a passionate acceptance of the burden of civilized justice. Sophocles puts his sure finger on the deep mystery and still deeper contradiction that genuine just government contains. The man sins and knows it and takes responsibility for it at last. One is reminded of the king-plays of Shakespeare where the study of this paradox is encyclopedic.
It is not by chance that Plato in the Apology and the _Crito_ casts Socrates as an Oedipus, a master of life as his name indicates, who reasonably and willingly accepts his condemnation to death. Socrates, the hero-protagonist of the dramatic demonstration of justice in The Republic, uses his own trial, as he has used his whole life, to inquire and to find the answer to the riddle of the Delphic Oracle which had said that he was the wisest man in Greece; has killed his father, the city, by charming the youth away from conventional citizenship to the higher aims of the state; and married his mother, the laws, which have nourished and protected him in his mission. There is a different content in the Platonic riddle of Socrates, and tragedy has worked for a different end on a higher level, but the character and plot are the same. The end of the reminiscence is purgation and insight for all.
Aristotle says that _Oedipus the King_ is the perfect tragedy, and for Aristotle this means that it is the most thorough realization of the potentiality that lies in the tragic pattern. One reason that it is so good is that the story of Oedipus is one of the best stories in the world; it is still fermenting, not only in the Oedipus complex of Freudian psychology, but in the moral patterns that enable the literary artist to see life steadily and whole. As Freud suggests, it is the hidden story of every man, no matter what the degree of sublimity or sublimation its articulation and purgation achieve. Another reason that it is a good tragedy is that Sophocles was a good work man. He had inherited from Aeschylus the dramatic tools for probing mystery and paradox, the notions of necessity, or fate, the hybris or arrogance of men that incurs the jealousy of the gods, the strict rigor of plot that binds action and thought into a chain of rational choices by the hero, and the inevitability of catastrophe in the kind of human goodness that learns from experience. Sophocles had turned tragedy into a powerful engine of inquiry which must have heightened the sense of spiritual adventure in every Greek's mind. Socrates is quoting Sophocles when he says in the Apology that the unexamined life is no life at all for a man. Plato learned most of what he knew about dialectic from Sophocles.
Plato learned a great deal from the other tragic poets. The relation of reason to necessity in Aeschylus's sea of troubles becomes cosmology in the _Timaeus._ The diabolic anarchy of man living merely under natural law, as it is presented in the Orestes trilogy, gives tragic power to the account of the rise and fall of civil government in the eighth book of The _Republic._ But perhaps the most characteristic lesson that Plato learned from these poets was the distinction between natural things in the fleeing shadow of time and the world of unchanging ideas. The tragic hero is the type of all things in nature; he comes into being and he passes away. His career is an embodiment of unchanging qualities, the realization of eternal and therefore incessantly recurring ends and goods. His growth is a blind and perhaps mad transmigration into the world of ideas, and his passage is a fall and a forgetting of the things that prevented understanding. Out of the loss and the suffering, wisdom. It is said that Socrates collaborated with Euripides; if so, Euripides studied the suffering, and Socrates chiseled out the wisdom. The Euripidean plays, as they reflected the religious, moral, and political breakdown of Athens, passed on the tragically worked material of the time to Plato for his new dramaturgy, for which Socrates was needed as the foil.
There is a legend that before Plato met Socrates he was a comic poet, imitating and rivaling Aristophanes in the theater. There is strong historical presumption that this is not the fact, but like most legends about Plato there is light in it for the kind of curiosity that wants to know the ingredients of the dialogues. Plato was certainly a comic poet in the dialogues, and this is true not merely of the surface gaiety and the teasing results, but also of the deep vision into his human and ideal material. No matter how serious and apparently tragic the data are, there always is the penetration of love and irony. These two ubiquitous qualities in the dialogues are the great comic virtues. For the best view of this quality of comedy in Plato, see the speech that Plato has Aristophanes make on love in the Symposium. Aristophanes himself could have done no better, and yet Plato must have hated him for the fatal effects his Clouds had on the life of Socrates. There are signs even where this matter is directly discussed that Plato belongs with Aristophanes to the charmed circle of those who have achieved comic wisdom. The ironist is understood best when he is being misunderstood; he understands misunderstanding. In this comic way Plato and Aristophanes are rival poets.
The purpose or end of tragedy was the purgation of pity and terror, as Aristotle said in his _Poetics,_ not just any pity and terror, but that special blend of the two great passions that accompany heroic action. The hero of Homeric times and of later Greek poetry was the inspired lover of great deeds and fame. His discernment of the necessity of great deeds and the virtues that gave him courage to face them were evidence of divinity in the man, and the moment of decision, when the hero plunged into a "sea of troubles," was the high point of tragic narrative. The Greeks had a word for it —hybris. It names a quality of pride, arrogance, defiance, and madness, and the resulting great deeds were admired, feared, and pitied because they obviously incurred the jealousy of the gods. Audiences sat transfixed by the stubborn blindness and the fateful irony of the hero's inevitable choice. The hero's equally courageous and willing acceptance of reversal, of calamity, and of the judgment of gods and fate, that events seemed to pronounce, purged and enlightened both hero and audience. Such dramatic instruction was the invigorating education of the Greeks. After a century of such education they were ready for the advanced studies that comedy provided. In Aristophanes another Muse is managing the stage.
It is as if the tragic hero had split into two persons. In a tragedy he was both protagonist and antagonist; he gave himself wholly to his vision, and then at the height of his blind commitment had to accept destructive and transforming light. In comedy this agony is carried by two persons, the hero and the villain, often with the aid of seconds. The heavy darkness of tragedy gives way to lightness and light, and the machinery of the mystery works and plays before all eyes. This is not to say that the burden of pity, fear, and sin is dumped, but rather that laughter and tears are added to it. The magic by which this takes place is the sophistication which tragedy has made possible. In place of the blind pride of the demigod-hero, there is pretense, ironic pretense on the part of the hero, and mischievous or diabolic pretense on the part of the villain or villains. The two pretenses brought together in the action accomplish a purgation, sometimes with more thoroughness and light than in any tragedy.
Aristophanes discovered the full range of pretense and, in a variety of roles, filled his stage with impostors: the bragging soldier, the learned or pedantic doctor, the magician cook, the flattering parasite, the aged politician, the retired business man, the foolishly wise young man, the lascivious old woman, and the treacherous slave. Most of these claim to know or to do more than they are able, but one, and sometimes more, claims to know less and do less than he actually does. This is the comic mixture, buffoonery and irony lighting and burning each other up.
There is the theory that comedy arises from the same rites of fertility for man, beast, and crop from which tragedy arises. It is supposed that a god is born, dies, and is resurrected. There is a mother at the birth, a bride at the resurrection, and a struggle with an antagonist at the death, perhaps a medicine-man at both death and resurrection, and these explain the categories of impostorship. There is the theory that the ritual in this case is concerned with the exorcism of devils. Be this as it may, it does not in itself determine the depth and brilliance of the ordeal by laughter, which can reach down to slapstick or up to theology.
As tragedy seems to have to move on high ground with creatures like men occasionally being transfigured into deities, as the closing episodes of the trilogies sometimes show them, comedy seems to have complete freedom of situation, material, and style. It is, for instance, very easy to turn a tragedy into a comedy; delivery in a slightly mocking tone of voice can do it with even the best specimens. Inspired madness seems to have a quick affinity with bombast, as the schoolboy translator of Aeschylus well knows. There are consequently comic parodies of tragedies and melodramas. But there can be vulgar comedies dealing in pornography and petty violence, backyard quarrels between housewives, intrigue between gossipy old men, satires on historical and current heroes, battles of giants and political ideologies such as we have today without a much-needed author. This range of versatility, set beside the rather narrow dignity of tragedy, should not confuse us; their dramatic ends are the same, and their successes mutually dependent. Tragedy impregnates and delivers; comedy lets the brood of offspring live.
The level on which a comedy moves is determined essentially by the powers that can be planted in the hero. To his audience he must appear part fool; in himself he must have either the confidence of a very energetic ignorance, or great restraint in the exercise of his intelligence. Simple naivete and omnivorous curiosity make the best ironic buffoon. The hero undertakes some trivial or commonplace project, is beset by imposture and illusion. By irony, or inquiry, as the Greek word _eironeia_ indicates, he moves or transforms the illusions progressively until they disappear. Either curiosity or wit will accomplish the puncture. Magic or just imagination may suffice, and laughter is the sign of success. The original project may never be accomplished, or others may successively or endlessly take its place, but the pure gold of comic wisdom and charity precipitates almost unnoticed. There is a tradition of folk comedy that is said to keep us sane. It has familiar figures in it, such as Punch and Judy, Pulcinella, Pierrot, Harlequin, and Domino, the clowns in the circus, the faces on playing cards, and the now stock figures of Hollywood movies. We attend the sideshows at country fairs, go to the circus and opera, play bridge, and do our daily comics or our weekly movies, not because we are patrons of the arts but because we need the shadowy repetition of the ancient ritual to renew our lives.
But the catalyst in this human alchemy is the ironic hero who holds the secret for all the other characters in the play and for his audience. He has somehow received the sign, as Socrates did from the Delphic oracle, that he is wise, he has taken it as a riddle, and has looked for the answer. The answer is that he will be wise if he learns that he knows nothing. These are stage directions for the comic actor; he is to play the fool. So much will make a comedy provided he does not completely discount the truth or probability of his folly. If, as Socrates did, he lends his folly an ever-deepening truth, he will raise the comedy as far as his learning ignorance will go with him. This is the secret of the writing and the reading of the Platonic dialogues. They are comedies, and Socrates is the archetypal comic hero of all time.
The key to the comic character and the ironic role of Socrates in the dialogues is in the inscription borrowed by Socrates from the temple of Apollo at Delphi and appropriated by him as the ruling principle of his life: Know thyself. He coupled this with a hypothesis, also provided by the Delphic oracle, that he was the wisest man in Greece. He reported these two facts to his judges in the _Apology,_ and interpreted them to mean what he had discovered for himself: he was wise because he knew that he did not know. "I know that I do not know" contains a pun as it is pronounced in Greek. As it is written with a choice of accents, spacing and emphasis, it can mean three things:
1. I know that I do not know.
2. I know what I do not know.
3. I know whatever I do not know.
It can even mean "I know because I do not know." It suggests that the study of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.
The punning proverb is a powerful formula if it is taken, as Socrates took it, as a hypothesis to be verified by a life of inquiry. It is also a powerful piece of ironic thought to be put to use in comic drama. In the early dialogues it is tried on professional poets, priests, military men, and politicians, whose opinions blossom quickly into a pretense of knowledge. It is tried on professional wise men, the sophists who are the professors of the day, and whose scholarship, as always, pretends both knowledge and humble ignorance. It is tried on starry-eyed young men who, like sophomores, underestimate the difficulty and cost of the quest for wisdom. In the later dialogues it is tried on seasoned, if not wise, men who shed their protective pretense before competent questions. The test for competent questions is of course: Does the questioner know the ignorance that his question expresses?
There is a great variety in these trials by irony. With bombast Socrates was irritatingly humble and gentle; with the clever irresponsible sophist he outdid the sophistry; with the evil stupid man he was patient and diabolic; with the stupid good man he was gentle and mock-respectful; with the practical man he was playful with the commonplace; with the young man he was devastatingly critical and eloquently imaginative; with the honest man he was unremittingly explorative. There is pretense in all these roles that Socrates takes, but the pretenses, amounting often to outrageous deception and absurdity, are measured and matched to willful ignorance and bad temper in the opponent impostor. Socrates is always good-tempered, understands his opponent's bad temper, and has his eye on the argument and where it leads.
The beginning reader of the dialogues is often irritated and repelled by the behavior of Socrates and his conduct of the argument, and often this is not cured by repeated reading. This is partly because one cannot help but identify one's own opinions and sometimes one's deepest convictions with the apparently sincere beliefs of one or another of the impostors. The dialogues, like psychoanalytic procedures, set up resistance in the reader. On the other hand the beginning reader sometimes falls in love with Socrates and leaves his critical guard down, believing everything that Socrates says, and fighting everything that his opponent says. Again there is a psychological transference that blinds the reader to the dramatic truth. To the seasoned reader of Plato there is a great variety of result to be noted and weighed. One of the formulated rules of scholarship is to note first what is said in a dialogue, and then quite separately to note what is done; these are called, respectively, the logos and the _ergon._ The method gets results in penetration, and therefore is a good rule for stalled beginners, but it has a fatal flaw in that it cuts the drama in two, and does not accommodate the two views. Paul Shorey's rule, exemplified in his book What _Plato_ Said, to collect sayings of various characters to make a unified Platonic doctrine, is worse, although it has been the scholar's temptation always and has filled the tradition with straw Platonisms. Plato himself says he has no doctrine, and he makes Socrates say the same for himself over and over again—with irony. One should remember Bernard Shaw, spending most of his waking life that is not spent in writing, telling the world in his inveterate comic way that he has no doctrine. It was noticeable, on the occasion of the recent Shaw revival, that dramatic critics have begun to catch up and laugh with Shaw at the doctrine of the life force and the superman.
But there is always a serious question left to the reader and the spectator of comedy. Characters and perhaps ideas have been presented in a kind of contest for survival, but they have undergone a sea-change, sometimes disintegration, other times thorough transfiguration. Their disappearance or their survival seems to prove nothing, except perhaps that thought and laughter are irresponsible and frivolous. Such is the case with much in the reading of Plato: all men, including Socrates, prove to be sophists; all ideas, including ideas about ideas, can be refuted or discredited.
Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about; but evermore
Came out by the same door where in I went.
These lines were written by a man who could, and probably did, understand Plato, for he was a mathematician, and Plato when he was not a poet was a mathematician. Undoubtedly Omar also understood the powerful corroding skepticism of Socrates—and knew the comic force of his rule of life.
There is no doubt that the great theme of both tragedy and comedy is death. The original event from which the theory of the origin of tragedy and comedy is drawn seems to have been a human sacrifice, sometimes reinterpreted to symbolize the death of a god. But the ritual and the dramas always present a resurrection, sometimes in tragedy the deification of the hero, sometimes in comedy the marriage of the hero to a god. The deeper and more comprehensive theme is rejuvenation, redemption, and transfiguration.
The deeper plot can be found in Plato, more tightly woven and more subtle in its development. Men, like Homeric heroes, burst into the conversation with convictions, with causes, and with ideas to sell. They are led to the sacrificial altar by Socrates. They are stripped of their opinions and slaughtered by questions. This happens to Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias in the _Protagoras,_ and to Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus in The Republic. But if the argument is followed closely, the refuted opinions return as rediscoveries and recognitions later in the conversation. They have become ideas understood rather than opinions held, and they can be built into a steady vision. The vision in the _Protagoras_ discovers the deep connection between knowledge and virtue, and The _Republic_ places justice as an eye in the soul. These discoveries are not doctrines; they can be refuted if they are entertained is propositions. They are principles, or, in the Greek sense, beginnings, to which thought returns again and again as it explores their embodiments.
The popularly known doctrines of Plato, the theory of ideas, the myths of transmigration, reminiscence, and the immortality of the soul, Platonic love, and the philosopher-king, were not original discoveries of his. They were current ideas, or dug up from the past. His moral doctrines, his theological speculations, his atoms, and his mathematical physics and astronomy, these were current controversies. Even his own original myths are put in the mouths of soothsayers or Egyptian priests. All of them, without exception, are thrown into the dialectical hopper and processed without mercy. But they are saved and transformed into ideas through which human beings have seen the world for two thousand years. It was through them that he saw his own Greek world. A glance at it may help to see him and ourselves better.
The great Persian army under Xerxes retreated from Greece in abject defeat at the battle of Salamis in 479 B.C. Up to the time of the Persian War what we call Greece was a scattering of island and coastal cities around the Aegean Sea, with an important outpost in southern Italy and Sicily. All but southern Italy and Sicily had rallied to repel the Persians, first early in the war at Marathon and then at Thermopylae and at Salamis. It was a victory for liberty against tyranny, as Herodotus told the Greeks in his history, and as they had vaguely understood it as they fought. For the following fifty years the little city-states flourished, most of them under amazingly free democracies with all that that meant in the free development of skills, the growth of trade, and the disciplines by which men learn to take responsibility for themselves and for each other. Many of the tragedies written during these years celebrated the struggle and heroism that went into the Greek discovery of government and polity; it was these men who made, and have taught us, the momentous distinction between government by laws and government by men.
But during this time a complication was weaving itself into the lives of these men and these cities. Athens was becoming the center of trade, the controller of the market, the crossroads for the transportation of goods between east and west and between north and south. The protection of these routes from pirates justified the collection of tribute from the other cities, first in ships and then in money. Athens became the banker and the military power. The responsibilities and the powers of empire were being forced upon her. The constitution of Athens was good, the delegation of strong powers to representatives who were responsible to the people. Good men became better with these responsibilities, and their responsiveness extended to their lesser sister cities. Athens became the market place of ideas and the school of all Hellas, as Pericles, the Archon, later reminded his fellow-citizens.
But the complications became more elaborate and the weights in the deliberations became heavier. The issues between Athens and the allies sharpened until it became necessary to play the Athenian populace against the sister cities. A city, sensitized to the quality of hybris in the theater, began to feel it in the government. There was talk of the failure of democracy to meet the day's problems, and the plutocrats and the knights talked of oligarchy, a government by a few who could manage great power. The other cities became suspicious of sharp dealing and of less justice in the alliances. They too talked of oligarchy. Corinth and Sparta particularly became jealous of Athenian power and wealth.
In 432 B.C. formal war was declared by Sparta at the instigation of Corinth on the occasion of an oligarchic revolt in Corcyra, an out-of-the-way colony in the Adriatic. Neither side wanted war, although Corinth thought it inevitable and wished to make it preventive of complete domination by Athens. Sparta was only half convinced; Athens temporized. The two large cities angled for allies among the smaller cities, then grabbed, and then conquered. There were very few head-on clashes in full-dress battle, and when the battles came they were indecisive. There were many mischievous raids. There were attempts at truces looking to permanent peace. Athens suffered early in the war from a plague that weakened all its resources and especially its manpower.
After twelve years of this worsening situation with no decision, Athens, both from boredom and desperation, decided on a great military and naval expedition to gain the great city of Syracuse as ally. Ships were built and equipped, men were put aboard, and troops were mustered under the leadership of Nicias, who had grave doubts of the enterprise. Alcibiades, the favorite pupil of Socrates, who himself had been with Alcibiades in two of the larger battles of the war, and had saved Alcibiades' life in one of them, was the leading spirit in the enterprise. But just before the expedition started Alcibiades was accused, probably politically and falsely, of defacing certain statues in the city. After he left with the ships, he was tried and condemned. From anger and shame as well as from desperation he abandoned the expedition and found his way to Sparta and was later found to be helping Spartans in the war. In spite of his many tomfooleries and obvious misbehavior he was probably the most brilliant mind and dashing soldier of his time.
Without the very brilliance of mind and deed that he might have provided, the Athenians suffered one of the great defeats of all time at Syracuse. The ships and the men were destroyed.
This defeat was followed by demoralization and disorder in Athens; there were oligarchic revolutions and counter-revolutions, each weaker and more confused than its predecessor. Ten years later Athens capitulated to the Spartans, the walls of the city were razed, and Athens never again became powerful.
Socrates was born in the early days of the peace following the Persian War, and lived most of his life in the glory and brilliance of the Periclean Age. He saw the strains of empire in the growing power of Athens and in the dulling edge of decision in its personalities. His chief concern became the teaching of virtue, which is the theme of many of the dialogues. Plato was born four years after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the year that Pericles died. He was a war-baby and saw only the dimming of the glory. He could have known Socrates only ten years, Socrates the living evidence of the glory and almost the only sign of its cause, a man concerned about human virtue. It was the trial and death of Socrates that stung Plato into the grasping of his life problem and his life work—to save the soul of Greece in purgatory.
Aside from the political, military, and commercial struggles into which Athens was forced, there were many personal reactions to the crisis. Thucydides was exiled early in the war on a suspicion of having used an Athenian fleet for the protection of personal property. This forced withdrawal provided the occasion and the point, or points, of observation for the writing of the Greek super-tragedy. Alcibiades' exile and quasi-treason moved a testing and inquiring mind into every theater of military and political action. Sympathetic reading of Alcibiades' career might see in it the patriot, desperate and therefore mistaken, acting in any medium he could find at hand to bring about a broad political unity for all the Hellenic people, a federation of the city-states, which a hundred years before had been a lost cause in the Persian War. There may even be seen a touch of Socratic irony in Alcibiades' provocative actions, which would throw a curious glow over his last meeting with Socrates on the eve of the departure of the Syracusan expedition as it is movingly recorded at the end of the Symposium. On ordinary reading, Alcibiades is of course the supposed evidence that Socrates corrupted the youth of Athens.
But there is another eloquent example of the reaction of intelligence to the Athenian crisis. Aristophanes' Birds was presented at the Dionysia in 414 B.C. just as the Athenian fleet set sail for Syracuse. It can be taken as a humorous celebration of a great adventure, but most readers with the advantage of hindsight see in it a deeper judgment of fate. It presents two Athenians, whose names mean Good Hope and Persuasion, leaving Athens to look for a new city where life can be lived simply, without bother. They consult the hoopoe bird, an individual of the species who had once been a man and had been transformed into a bird because of woman trouble. He has nothing to suggest, but Mr. Persuasion has a bright idea: why shouldn't the birds found a city kingdom in the sky? The idea takes hold, and the birds build a walled city strategically placed between the earth and heaven so that messages from the gods can be intercepted and sacrifices from men can be seized. The air blockade works, and Mr. Persuasion is made King of Cloudcuckooland and endowed with all the authority, power, and glory of Zeus. This is accomplished with the help of Prometheus by a marriage of the new King to Basileia, the executive secretary of Zeus. This play was followed later by two so-called utopian plays, the _Lysistrata,_ in which there is staged a women's revolution with the aim of achieving peace through a Greek world federation, and the _Ecclesiazusae_ , in which by another women's revolution a regime of communism is set up in Athens.
Scholars have never wanted to see any connection between Aristophanes, the comedian, and Plato, the philosopher; but then scholars have never been able to view philosophy with anything but a long pedantic face. Anyone who reads these plays and The _Republic_ for what they are saying and talking about cannot but be enlightened by the comparison. Plato must have seen and read the plays. The Aristophanic embroidery on the Spartan trend in Athens must have teased Plato into the assignment to write The _Republic,_ and "lay it up as a pattern in heaven." A. J. Toynbee has made this point in his A _Study of History._ Incidentally Toynbee traces the phrase "the kingdom of heaven" from The Birds to the New Testament.
Timaeus in the dialogue by that name says: "But the race of birds was created out of innocent light-minded men, who although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity, that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be explained by sight." The themes of flight and of sight in the dialogues, as associated with birds, souls, and cities, not to mention words and ideas, are signposts for the reader.
Whatever the literary and scholarly genealogy of the dialogues may be, it seems clear that Plato's reaction to the crisis was to save the soul of Greece by making Socrates its gay and gallant chief witness for all time. The temptation must have been strong to make him the tragic hero of the idea, but the real Socrates did not let that happen. He himself lifted the tragic pathos to the level of comedy; he made himself worse than the average man, and Aristophanes helped Plato raise him and his purposeful sophistry to the level of comic wisdom.
The secret of comedy is vision, and its gift to mortals is insight. The vision is partly ocular and imaginative, but it contains idea, a Greek word derived from seeing; and in the combination there is intellectual vision. Mathematics is the sober comic view of the world, and another portable Plato should contain the dialogues that show this side of the philosopher. But comic poetry is the great maker of the visions behind visions that are called hypotheses. It is in the moving treatment of these aids to insight that Plato has for all time set the locus of philosophical thought. The philosophic method is dialectic as it grew and developed from Socratic ironical questioning of the opinion of the common man. Plato was a bird, the wise bird that sees in the night.
But Plato's own life is hard to see as a comedy. It has the weight and beauty of a tragedy. He came from families of the ruling aristocracy at the height of the Periclean glory. Through his father he was supposed to have been descended from Poseidon, the god of horses and of the sea. Through his mother he was descended from Solon, the wise man and law-giver of Athens. His stepfather was a close friend of Pericles. His uncle Charmides was involved in the oligarchic movements of the Peloponnesian War. His young manhood must have been spent among the most brilliant men of the time, and he followed Socrates. Yet because of the times and their sense of doom for all that mattered, he felt himself born out of his time. He was brought to his mission by the death of Socrates, and must have found himself as a young man of thirty alone and adrift. It was in this way that he wrote the early dialogues, perhaps to know himself.
At the age of forty he was invited by Dion, a relative and advisei to the tyrant in Syracuse, to visit Syracuse and to estimate the possibilities of educating a tyrant and building a good city which might take on the responsibilities for that promising part of the world. The visit was short and uneventful. Plato returned to Athens to join a group of serious friends who wanted to establish an institution of science and education. This was the beginning of the Academy which Plato headed. In twenty years it collected the most brilliant scholars of the time, mostly mathematicians, astronomers, and philosophers; Aristotle entered the Academy and was to be its member for another twenty years. More dialogues were written, and in 367 B.C. Plato was again invited to Syracuse to undertake the task that had been discussed ten years before. Apparently serious efforts were made on both sides, by both teacher and tyrant, to dig deep and lay wise foundations for a federation of the Greek world. There must have been discussions of moving the Academy. But personal jealousy intervened, and quarrels ensued. There is a legend that Plato was suspected of disloyalty and that he was sent home in chains. That can hardly be true, for although he was sent home, he was called back seven years later to continue the enterprise and he accepted. But this also soon failed, and Plato went back to write the so-called later dialogues.
In the absence of real evidence on the date of the writing of _The Republic_ it is permissible to assume that it was written after the first Platonic Syracusan expedition. It and Aristophanes' _Birds_ would then celebrate not only the first Syracusan expedition, but also the loss of the last best hope of Greek intelligence working in the affairs of the Western world. One of the most melancholy and fascinating speculations in all history still contemplates the what-might-have-been of this failure. Greek learning, imagination, and wisdom established itself in the East from this time on, and was carried by Alexander to the ends of the known eastern world. Roman prowess and imperium were already establishing themselves in the West. The Christian Church found the depths of the split, and today we gaze through the cloudy distance that measures the gap.
But Plato returned to Athens and went on teaching orally in the Academy and writing the later dialogues. The Academy, that city in the sky, lasted a thousand years, presiding as much as could be over the affairs of our early forbears in government, in science, in spirit.
But lest I also be guilty of torturing Plato with yet another attempt to "explain" him who speaks so well for himself, let me propound a riddle:
In the third book of _The Republic_ there is the well-known condemnation of the dramatic poets:
"And when therefore any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our soul's health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers."
This might be called Plato's willing acceptance of ostracism of himself. What other city did he go to?
At the end of the _Symposium_ Socrates is discovered with Aristophanes and Agathon, whose tragedy had just been given the prize. They
"were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed around, and Socrates was discoursing to them ... compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they were constrained to give assent, being drowsy and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to sleep, rose to depart."
We may be grateful that Socrates found Plato, of whom, it seems, this is a self-portrait in code.
SCOTT BUCHANAN
**A NOTE ON THE THEATRICAL MACHINERY OF THE DIALOGUES**
I hope no earnest disciple of contemporary scholarship will be misled by the preceding pages. The heresy there proposed is fully intended by the editor. It has been composed out of disappointment with, and in opposition to, two guilds of scholars, the classicists and the philosophers. The former should be treated as Prodicus is treated in the Protagoras, respected and criticized. The latter should be treated as Hippias is treated in the Protagoras, questioned and refuted. Under this treatment both will deliver their goods to us. They should be crowned with laurel and dismissed. We should be grateful for their contributions, and read the dialogues with our own eyes.
If we do this, we shall find the theatrical machinery an instrument of deeper vision in which both literary style and philosophical ideas will find a focus. To aid in that vision the reader may find the following suggestions useful.
All of the characters in the dialogues are historic personages, most of them familiar even to us in other writings. Plato is reporting historic occasions, as far as we know, accurately. And yet, the events take on high dramatic effects, chiefly because the characters are stylized to the point of becoming the abstract types, or stock characters, of comedy. Perhaps the best evidence for this is that the names, although real names, are also allegorical, like those in mystery or morality plays. The etymology of them is too good to be true. Also, the plots are semi-ritualistic, although again the historic content is factual. The following selected points of interest may be welcome to the beginning reader.
# **PROTAGORAS**
Probably written toward the end of the ten-year period of the earlier dialogues, 398-388 B.C.
Historic meeting of Socrates and Protagoras about 435 B.C. at the end of the peace following the Persian War at the height of the good life in Athens. Protagoras was sixtyfive years old; Socrates thirty-five.
The plot is a free rendering of a meeting of the Assembly or a session of a court, although the actual setting is a private home. The Alexandrian subtitle is _The Sophists:_ An _Arraignment._ It could be an inverted parody on the trial of Socrates.
_The Persons of the Drama_
_Protagoras._ Name means "first in assembly or markets place." Protagoras was a visitor from Abdera, one of the first professional sophists who trained young men for public life, and accepted pay for it. He is recognized as learned and skilled in teaching, but is unaware of the limits of his powers, and, therefore, lacking in wisdom. There is an ironic play on the word sophist.
_Hippias._ Name means "knight," "aristocrat," "plutocrat." A follower of Protagoras and many other sophists. Has a facile tongue and a confused mind.
_Prodicus._ Name means "advocate," or "lawyer for the defense." Another follower of Protagoras, whose scholarly pretensions consist in many pedantries.
_Critias._ Name means "judge in a literary or athletic contest." One of several Critiases, all of whom were involved in politics and were relatives of Plato.
_Callias._ Name means "member of a board of magistrates." A rich man and a soldier, he is said to have spent more money on sophists than any other man in Athens.
_Hippocrates._ Name means "master of horses." Son of Apollodorus, a devoted friend of Socrates.
Alcibiades. Name means "strong in defense of life," possibly also "a cure for snake-bites." Here a very young man, Socrates' problem-child.
_Socrates._ Name means "master of life." His irony here consists in questions that pretend ignorance.
# **PHAEDO**
Also an early dialogue, written some time after the death of Socrates and before the founding of the Academy. It is often included with the Apology, _Crito,_ and Euthyphro to complete the account of the _trial_ and death of Socrates.
Setting is the prison, 399 B.C. five years after the end of the Peloponnesian War.
The clue to the plot is given in the accident that Athenian law prohibited the execution of capital sentence while the ceremonial ship was on its way to Delos and returning. The ceremony connected with this event celebrated the legendary expedition of Theseus to slay the Minotaur of Crete. Ariadne, the daughter of King Minos, showed Theseus how to find his way through the Labyrinth and back by means of a thread. Theseus and his fourteen companions stopped at Delos on their way back to Athens and danced the crane dance, which imitated the windings of the Labyrinth. It seems that Socrates in the dialogue represents Theseus, and there are fourteen companions present. The dialogue is a dialectical dance celebrating the slaying of a monster, the fear of death.
_The Persons of the Drama_
_Echecrates._ Name means "holding power." He is the Pythagorean narrator of the dialogue. He is aware of the power of the "idea."
_Cebes._ Name possibly means "monkey." A Theban, close friend of Simmias, and follower of Philolaus, the Pythagorean teacher. Interested in mathematics and physics.
_Simmias._ Name means "snub-nosed," a play on this well-known feature of Socrates. Also a follower of Philolaus, interested in the physiological doctrines of the Pythagorean schooL
_Crito._ Name means "judge at a contest." He was devoted sentimentally to justice with mercy.
_Apollodorus._ Name means "gift of Apollo." He eagerly accepted Socrates' teaching as his sentimental education.
_Phaedo._ Name means "shining." He was later a founder of the Elean and the Eretrian schools of philosophy.
Socrates. "Master of life." His irony consists in his role as Job, being his own and his companions' comforter.
Others present are: Critobulus, son of Crito; Hermogenes; Epigenes; Aeschines, writer of dialogues; Antisthenes, the first Cynic; Ctessippus, a youngster; Menexenus, a young friend of Ctessippus; Phaedonides, a Theban; Euclides, founder of the Megarian school of philosophy; Terpsion, also a Megarian. These are the witnesses and the recipients of a last will and testament.
# **SYMPOSIUM**
Probably the latest of the earlier dialogues, written about 389 B.C.
The scene is laid in Agathon's house to celebrate the prize for a tragedy that he has written and has had performed. It is on the eve of the great Athenian expedition to Syracuse.
There are many allegorical readings of this dialogue, but the banquet itself is enough to provide the plot. Wine, dancing girls, and flute playing are put aside or postponed to give place to talk. Characteristically enough, the talk becomes the medium for fancy rhetoric, inspired and comic poetry, and some of the highest speculation in any literature. In a closely related dialogue about love, the _Phaedrus,_ there is considerable discussion of the kinds of madness: poetry, demonic possession, speculation, and love. The Symposium might be read as the medical theory of madness, Greek psychiatry.
_The Persons of the Drama_
_Phaedrus._ Name means "bright, beaming with joy." A pupil of Hippias and Lysias.
_Pausanias._ Name means "allayer of sorrow." A pupil of Prodicus.
_Eryximachus._ Name means "savior in battle" or military physician. A medical man talking Sicilian medicine.
_Aristophanes._ Name means "best appearance." He may have invented the definition of a sophist as the man who makes the worse reason appear the better. He casts his own comic character as the cure for sophistry.
_Agathon._ Name means "good." A pupil of Gorgias and Prodicus.
_Diotima._ Name means "honor to Zeus." A soothsayer, perhaps an imitation of the Pythian Maiden at the Delphic Oracle. She and the old philosopher, Parmenides, in a dialogue named for him, are the only persons who turn the tables on Socrates and ask him questions.
_Alcibiades._ Name means "strong defender of life." Here he is the elected commander-in-chief of the Sicilian expedition, embodying all the riddles of the Hellenic man, including those of Odysseus and Socrates.
_Socrates._ "Master of life." He says in this dialogue that the only science he knows is the science of love.
# **THE REPUBLIC**
## or the Polity [which in Greek means the constitutional government of a city]
Probably written immediately after Plato's first Syracusan expedition.
The scene is laid in the house of a rich merchant of foreign origin in the Piraeus, the port city of Athens, during the Peace of Nicias, a truce in the Peloponnesian War. The persons present have just been spectators at a celebration of a foreign festival. There is the atmosphere, though no explicit proposal, of the larger political responsibilities of Athens to the community of which it was a part, a foreshadowing to us with hindsight of the Alexandrian and Roman Empires, to the founding of which The Republic made great contributions. The Platonic Syracusan expeditions give occasion for such guesses.
The plot might be imagined as the withdrawal from the Athenian Assembly, pictured in the first book, to the meeting of the philosopher-kings in Nocturnal Council, the city of the birds.
_The Persons of the Drama_
_Cephalus._ The name means "head." A retired business-man, head of a business family. A man of experience and sound opinion.
_Polemarchus._ The name means "war-lord" or "general." Son of Cephalus, pupil of Lysias, the teacher of rhetoric.
_Thrasgmachus._ The name means "rash fighter." A sophist from Thrace.
These three men speaking in character are caricatures of the three classes in the state which is constructed in the fourth book. Their types and others are fully characterized in the eighth book.
_Adeimantus._ The name means "singer of oracles" or "sooth-singer." An older half-brother of Plato, here a young man. His medium is poetry.
_Claucon._ The name means "gleaming eyes" or "owl." He is also a half-brother of Plato, a young man. The suggestion is that he is the owl of Athena, the bird that sees in the gathering twilight.
_Socrates._ "Master of life." In this great comedy Socrates takes all the roles of all the types of comic hero, including that of the playwright himself.
**CHRONOLOGY**
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
Translations _into English:_
Benjamin Jowett. The _Dialogues of Plato,_ with an introduction to each dialogue. 5 volumes. London: Oxford University Press, 1871
The _Dialogues of Plato._ General introduction by Raphael Demos. 2 volumes. New York: Random House, 1937
Various translators. Plato's Dialogues in Greek and English. 11 volumes. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Francis M. Cornford. _The Republic of Plato,_ with introduction and notes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942
I. A. Richards. _The Republic of Plato._ Condensed with the help of Basic English. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1942
_Commentaries and references:_
A. E. Taylor. _Plato, the Man and his Work._ New York: The Dial Press, 1926
John Burnet. _Greek Philosophy, Part I. Thales_ to Plato. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914 _Early Greek Philosophy._ New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920
Paul Shorey. _What Plato Said._ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933
Gilbert Murray. _History of Ancient Greek Literature._ New York: Appleton, 1927
R. L. Nettleship. _Lectures on the Republic of Plato._ New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936
J. A. Stewart. _The Myths of Plato._ New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905 _Plato's Doctrine of Ideas._ New York: Oxford University Press, 1909
Robert S. Brumbaugh. _Plato_ for the _Modern_ Age. New York: Crowell Collier, 1962.
Harold Cherniss, Riddle _of_ the Early Academy. New York: Russell, 1945.
Francis M. Cornford. Before and _after Socrates._ Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1960.
Raphael Demos. _Philosophy of Plato._ New York: Octagon, 1966.
Jacob Klein. _Commentary_ on _Plato's Meno._ Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1965.
Karl R. Popper. _Spell_ of _Plato (Open Society_ and Its Enemies, Vol. I). Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1963.
Leo Strauss. City and _Man._ Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
Eric Voegelin. Plato. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. P., 1957.
John Wild. _Plato's Modern_ Enemies and the _Theory_ of _Natural_ Law. Chicago: University of Chicago. 1953.
**PROTAGORAS**
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE
SOCRATES, _who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion_ HIPPOCRATES ALCIBIADES CRITIAS PROTAGORAS, to HIPPIAS, PRODICUS, CALLIAS, a _wealthy_ _Athenian_ _Sophists_
SCENE: _The House of Callias_
**C** OM. Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man,—and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming.
Soc. What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says
"Youth is most charming when the beard first appears"? And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.
_Com._ Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?
Soc. Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present.
_Com._ What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.
Soc. Yes, much fairer.
Com. What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner?
Soc. A foreigner.
_Com._ Of what country?
Soc. Of Abdera.
_Com._ And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?
_Soc._ And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
_Com._ But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
_Soc._ Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.
_Com._ What! Is Protagoras in Athens?
_Soc._ Yes; he has been here two days.
_Com._ And do you just come from an interview with him?
_Soc._ Yes; and I have heard and said many things.
_Com._ Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you.
_Soc._ To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.
_Com._ Thank you, too, for telling us.
_Soc._ That is thank you twice over. Listen then:—
Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?
I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?
Good news, he said; nothing but good.
Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?
He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.
Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?
Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening.
At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way;—on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brotner said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.
I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?
He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.
But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.
Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends, have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him (when he visited Athens before I was but a child); and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start.
I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until daybreak; when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.
Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him money? how would you have answered?
I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician.
And what will he make of you?
A physician, he said.
And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money?—how would you have answered?
I should have answered, that they were statuaries.
And what will they make of you?
A statuary, of course.
Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you, Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money,—how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?
They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.
Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?
Certainly.
But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?
He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him) : Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.
By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?
Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.
But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?
Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.
I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
And what am I doing?
You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.
I certainly think that I do know, he replied.
Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name implies.
And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?—how should we answer him?
How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?
Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?
Yes.
Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?
Yes, that may be assumed.
And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?
Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.
Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all,—about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;—you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.
When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can be drawn from your words.
I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.
And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?
Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young—too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.
To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists—he is not at home; and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, you need not be alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.
When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, attracting them by his voice, and they following. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.
After him, as Homer says, "I lifted up my eyes and saw" Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, ex _cathedra,_ was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.
Also, "my eyes beheld Tantalus"; for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible.
No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.
On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.
Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?
Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard the purpose of our visit.
And what is your purpose? he said.
I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or in the presence of the company.
Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for I do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgment appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my years when added up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to speak with me, in the presence of the company.
As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?
Very good, he said.
Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss.—This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and brought in him and his companions.
When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now speaking.
I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say.
Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day before.
When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you sav, that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, "In what shall I become better, and in what shall I grow?"—Zeuxippus would answer, "In painting." And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him, "In what shall I become better day by day?" he would reply, "In flute-playing." Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner,—in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?
When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state.
Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?
That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.
Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are esteemed to be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low—any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias, the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?
That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?
To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.
Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.
Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: "Let me distribute, and do you inspect." This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food,—herbs of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,—and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who, moreover, had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise their favourite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.
Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men:—Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? "Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?" "To all," said Zeus; "I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state."
And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.
And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.
I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him—of these evil qualities one is impiety, another injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,—clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil-doers; and hence we may infer them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.
There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and, notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things, of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them,—not to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates!
Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time; these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more surprising.
But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If so—and nothing can be truer—then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws,—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practice virtue—with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say, Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,—but who will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:—When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.
Such is my apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.
Protagoras ended, and in my ear
"So charming left his voice, that I the while Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear."
At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught;—that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.
There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.
And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?
I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.
And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?
By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.
You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?
Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.
And they are all different from one another? I said.
Yes.
And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;—the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.
Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.
Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?
No, he answered.
Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?
Mine also, he said.
And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, "O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust?"—and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?
With you, he said.
Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?
Yes, he said.
And suppose that he went on to say: "Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?"—we should answer, "Yes," if I am not mistaken?
Yes, he said.
Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so?
He assented.
"And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?" I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, "Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy." What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?
Certainly, he said.
And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, "What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another." I should reply, "You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer." And suppose that he turned to you and said, "Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?"—how would you answer him?
I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.
Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, "Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy": how shall we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.
He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.
Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this "if you wish" or "if you will" sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no "if."
Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.
And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.
Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?
I do.
And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
That is true, he said.
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?
Yes, he said.
And temperance makes them temperate?
Certainly.
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?
I agree, he said.
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
He assented.
And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?
He agreed.
And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?
He assented.
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?
He assented again.
And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?
He agreed.
Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
Yes.
To which the only opposite is the ugly?
There is no other.
And is there anything good?
There is.
To which the only opposite is the evil?
There is no other.
And there is the acute in sound?
True.
To which the only opposite is the grave?
There is no other, he said, but that.
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
He assented.
Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
We did so.
And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?
Yes.
And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?
Yes.
And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?
He agreed.
And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
Yes.
And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
Yes.
And in opposite ways?
Certainly.
And therefore by opposites:—then folly is the opposite of temperance?
Clearly.
And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?
He assented.
And we said that everything has only one opposite?
Yes.
Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?
He assented, but with great reluctance.
Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?
I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this which nevertheless many may be found to assert.
And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.
I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.
Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial.
Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.
Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?
Yes, he said; let that be admitted.
And temperance is good sense?
Yes.
And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?
Granted.
If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?
If they succeed.
And you would admit the existence of goods?
Yes.
And is the good that which is expedient for man?
Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.
I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—
When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?
Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things,—meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.
When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.
What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?
Certainly not, I said.
But short enough?
Yes, I said.
Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?
I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.
Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere.
I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.
Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.
Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.
But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.
Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks.
When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one—Critias, I believe—went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.
Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.
Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length.
This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, "Let us have a better then,"—to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answeredas many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter—all of you shall be arbiters.
This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:—
I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian:—
"Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw."
Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?
There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode,—I have made a careful study of it.
Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?
Yes, I said, both good and true.
But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?
No, not in that case, I replied.
And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.
Well, my friend, I have reflected.
And does not the poet proceed to say, "I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good?" Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.
I know it.
And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?
Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise?
Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as his own thought, "Hardly can a man become truly good"; and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, "Hardly can a man be good," which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.
Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simoïs to aid him, saying:
"Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero."
And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish "will" and "wish," and make other charming distinctions like those which you drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, "being" is the same as "becoming."
Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.
Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that "Hardly can a man become truly good"?
Quite right, said Prodicus.
And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, "On the one hand, hardly can a man become good,
For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil;
But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height, Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy."
Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.
Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.
Such is the fact, he said.
How so? I asked.
The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily retained.
Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word "hard" (χαλεπóν) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word "awful" (δεɩνóν) as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an "awfully" wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good "awful"; and then he explains to me that the term "awful" is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being "awfully" healthy or wealthy, or "awful" peace, but of "awful" disease, "awful" war, "awful" poverty, meaning by the term "awful," evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of "hard" meant "evil," or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term "hard"?
Evil, said Prodicus.
And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, "Hard is the good," just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.
Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.
Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?
You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word "hard" meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy—that which takes a great deal of trouble: of this I am positive.
I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.
To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;—and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.
Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical _séance_ unknown to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities—in this they are like the Cretans—in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation: If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedāmonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character; consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's mouths,—"Know thyself," and "Nothing too much."
Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, "Hard is it to be good." And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying.
Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted µέν, "on the one hand" ["on the one hand to become good is hard"]; there would be no reason for the introduction of µέν, unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying "Hard is it to be good," and he, in refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not joining "truly" with "good," but with "hard." Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word "truly" (άλαθέως), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): "O my friends," says Pittacus, "hard is it to be good," and Simonides answers, "In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw—that is hard truly." This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of µέν, "on the one hand," and for the position at the end of the clause of the word "truly," and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; "but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him." Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?—not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:—
"The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad."
But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, "Hard is it to be good." Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility—
"For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad."
But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the sick. "But he who does ill is the bad." Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that
"They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love."
All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds:—
"Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth: if I find him, I will send you word."
(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem):
"But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love; —not even the gods war against necessity."
All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word "voluntarily" applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious.
"For I am satisfied," he says, "when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are innumerable fools"
(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault).
"All things are good with which evil is unmingled."
In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say "All things are white which have no black in them," for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state.
["I do not hope," he says, "to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every one"]
(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, έπαíνηµɩ (approve), because he is addressing Pittacus,—
"Who love and _approve_ every one _voluntarily,_ who does no evil:"
and that the stop should be put after "voluntarily"); "but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely about the highest matters."—And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.
Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.
Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.
I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing our unfinished argument.
I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said:—Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.
I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.
So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that
"When two go together, one sees before the other," for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man
"Sees a thing when he is alone,"
he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover, such confidencehave you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I must indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.
I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage.
Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?
Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.
In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.
Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right mind.
And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?
Wholly good, and in the highest degree.
Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?
I should say, the divers.
And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
Yes, that is the reason.
And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?
The skilled.
And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?
The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.
And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?
Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident.
And are not these confident persons also courageous?
In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.
Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?
Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere.
And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.
Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered "Not all of them:" and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say "Yes;" and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.
I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?
He assented.
And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?
He does not.
But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?
He will.
Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?
Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.
And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.
I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.
And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?
Certainly, he said.
Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.
According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, "let us reflect about this," he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.
And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin?
You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the discussion.
May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another:—he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view:—that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?
I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.
Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.
Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.
Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they call "being overcome by pleasure," and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called "being overcome by pleasure," pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it?
But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?
I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but if not, never mind.
You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.
Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: "In what way do you say that they are evil,—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?"—Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?
I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you do.
And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;—they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?
Protagoras assented.
Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures:—there again they would agree?
We both of us thought that they would.
And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: "Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?"—they would assent to me?
He agreed.
"And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and wealth?"—they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?
He assented.
"Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?"—they would acknowledge that they were not?
I think so, said Protagoras.
"And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?"
He assented.
"Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show."
I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.
"And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot."
True, said Protagoras.
Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: "Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?" Excuse me, friends, I should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression "overcome by pleasure;" and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences:—If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply "By pleasure," for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. "By what?" he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, "That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil"? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. "But how," he will reply, "can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good"? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome—" what do you mean," he will say, "but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good"? Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says: "Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain"—To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.
He agreed with me.
Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?
Yes, he said, the art of measurement.
Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not?
Protagoras himself thought that they would.
Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?
This is undeniably true.
And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?
They will agree, he said.
The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this?—tell us what you call such a state: —if we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance," you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;—ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things—you take care of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life:—Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?
They all thought that what I said was entirely true.
Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words.
Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.
Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good?
This was admitted.
Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.
They all assented.
And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?
To this also they unanimously assented.
Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.
All of us agreed to every word of this.
Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.
Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.
Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradicton to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil?
That also was universally admitted.
Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)
He assented.
Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against the same dangers as the cowards?
No, he answered.
Then against something different?
Yes, he said.
Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?
Yes, Socrates, so men say.
Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?
No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.
That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which make men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.
He assented.
And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.
And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.
And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.
Honourable, he replied.
And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions we have admitted to be good.
That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.
True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?
The cowards, he replied.
And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?
It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied.
And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?
The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.
But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?
That must be admitted
And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?
True, he replied.
And if not base, then honourable?
He admitted this.
And if honourable, then good?
Yes.
But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?
He assented.
And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?
True, he said.
Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?
I should say cowardice, he replied.
And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?
Assuredly, he said.
And because of that ignorance they are cowards?
He assented.
And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
He again assented.
Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?
He nodded assent.
But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?
Yes.
Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?
To that again he nodded assent.
And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.
And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.
And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?
Finish the argument by yourself,'he said.
I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.
My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: "Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught." Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry.
Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn to something else.
By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation ended, and we went our way.
**SYMPOSIUM**
_PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE_
APOLLODORUS, _who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus, and had already once narrated to Glaucon_
**PHAEDRUS**
**PAUSANIAS**
**ERYXIMACHUS**
**ARISTOPHANES**
**AGATHON**
SOCRATES
**ALCIBIADES**
**A TROOP OF REVELLERS**
SCENE: _The House of Agathon_
**C** ONCERNING the things about which you ask C to be informed I believe that I am not ill-prepared with an answer. For the day before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintance, who had caught a sight of me from behind, calling out playfully in the distance, said: Apollodorus, O thou Phalerian man, halt! So I did as I was bid; and then he said, I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now, that I might ask you about the speeches in praise of love, which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philip, told another person who told me of them; his narrative was very indistinct, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?
Your informant, Glaucon, I said, must have been very indistinct indeed, if you imagine that the occasion was recent; or that I could have been of the party.
Why, yes, he replied, I thought so.
Impossible: I said. Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens; and not three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, and have made it my daily business to know all that he says and does. There was a time when I was running about the world, fancying myself to be well employed, but I was really a most wretched being, no better than you are now. I thought that I ought to do anything rather than be a philosopher.
Well, he said, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.
In our boyhood, I replied, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.
Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you—did Socrates?
No indeed, I replied, but the same person who told Phoenix;—he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast; and I think that in those days there was no one who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover, I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them. Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation ? And so we walked, and talked of the discourses on love; and therefore, as I said at first, I am not ill-prepared to comply with your request, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear another strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me; and I pity you who are my companions, because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return, whom you regard as an unhappy creature, and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me—there is the difference.
_Companion._ I see, Apollodorus, that you are just the same—always speaking evil of yourself, and of others; and I do believe that you pity all mankind, with the exception of Socrates, yourself first of all, true in this to your old name, which, however deserved, I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman; for you are always raging against yourself and everybody but Socrates.
_Apollodorus._ Yes, friend, and the reason why I am said to be mad, and out of my wits, is just because I have these notions of myself and you; no other evidence is required.
Com. No more of that, Apollodorus; but let me renew my request that you would repeat the conversation.
_Apoll._ Well, the tale of love was on this wise:—But perhaps I had better begin at the beginning, and endeavour to give you the exact words of Aristodemus:
He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandalled; and as the sight of the sandals was unusual, he asked him whither he was going that he had been converted into such a beau:—
To a banquet at Agathon's, he replied, whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday, fearing a crowd, but promising that I would come to-day instead; and so I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked?
I will do as you bid me, I replied.
Follow then, he said, and let us demolish the proverb: —
"To the feasts of inferior men the good unbidden go"; instead of which our proverb will run:—
"To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go";
and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself, who not only demolishes but literally outrages the proverb. For, after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men, he makes Menelaus, who is but a faint-hearted warrior, come unbidden to the banquet of Agamemnon, who is feasting and offering sacrifices, not the better to the worse, but the worse to the better.
I rather fear, Socrates, said Aristodemus, lest this may still be my case; and that, like Menelaus in Homer, I shall be the inferior person, who
"To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes."
But I shall say that I was bidden of you, and then you will have to make an excuse.
"Two going together,"
he replied, in Homeric fashion, one or other of them may invent an excuse by the way.
This was the style of their conversation as they went along. Socrates dropped behind in a fit of abstraction, and desired Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open, and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him, and led him at once into the banqueting-hall in which the guests were reclining, for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome, Aristodemus, said Agathon, as soon as he appeared—you are just in time to sup with us; if you come on any other matter put it off, and make one of us, as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you, if I could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?
I turned round, but Socrates was nowhere to be seen; and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation to the supper.
You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?
He was behind me just now, as I entered, he said, and I cannot think what has become of him.
Go and look for him, boy, said Agathon, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.
The servant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and reported that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. "There he is fixed," said he, "and when I call to him he will not stir."
How strange, said Agathon; then you must call him again, and keep calling him.
Let him alone, said my informant; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason. I believe that he will soon appear; do not therefore disturb him.
Well, if you think so, I will leave him, said Agathon. And then, turning to the servants, he added, "Let us have supper without waiting for him. Serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves. But on this occasion imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests; treat us well, and then we shall commend you." After this, supper was served, but still no Socrates; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him; that "I may touch you," he said, "and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought."
How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was desired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, as water runs through wool out of a fuller cup into an emptier one; if that were so, how greatly should I value the privilege of reclining at your side! For you would have filled me full with a stream of wisdom plenteous and fair; whereas my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. But yours is bright and full of promise, and was manifested forth in all the splendour of youth the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Hellenes.
You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you and I will have to determine who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge; but at present you are better occupied with supper.
Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?
I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in drink.
I think that you are right, said Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus; but I should still like to hear one other person speak: Is Agathon able to drink hard?
I am not equal to it, said Agathon.
Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow, if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still feels the effects of yesterday's carouse.
I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.
It was agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day, but that they were all to drink only so much as they pleased.
Then, said Eryximachus, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I move, in the next place, that the flute-girl, who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself, or, if she likes, to the women who are within. To-day let us have conversation instead ; and, if you will allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation. This proposal having been accepted, Eryximachus proceeded as follows:—
I will begin, he said, after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides,
"Not mine the word"
which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For often he says to me in an indignant tone:—"What a strange thing it is, Eryximachus, that, whereas other gods have poems and hymns made in their honour, the great and glorious god, Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have descanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse; and many other like things have had a like honour bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eager interest created about them, and yet that to this day no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love's praises! So entirely has this great deity been neglected." Now in this Phaedrus seems to me to be quite right, and therefore I want to offer him a contribution; also I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honour the god Love. If you agree with me, there will be no lack of conversation; for I mean to propose that each of us in turn, going from left to right, shall make a speech in honour of Love. Let him give us the best which he can; and Phaedrus, because he is sitting first on the left hand, and because he is the father of the thought, shall begin.
No one will vote against you, Eryximachus, said Socrates. How can I oppose your motion, who profess to understand nothing but matters of love; nor, I presume, will Agathon and Pausanias; and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes, whose whole concern is with Dionysus and Aphrodite; nor will any one disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal, as I am aware, may seem rather hard upon us whose place is last; but we shall be contented if we hear some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love, and good luck to him. All the company expressed their assent, and desired him to do as Socrates bade him.
Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said, nor do I recollect all that he related to me; but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance, and what the chief speakers said.
Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god, and wonderful among gods and men, but especially wonderful in his birth. For he is the eldest of the gods, which is an honour to him; and a proof of his claim to this honour is, that of his parents there is no memorial; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says:—
"First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth,
The everlasting seat of all that is,
And Love."
In other words, after Chaos, the Earth and Love, these two, came into being. Also Parmenides sings of Generation :
"First in the train of gods, he fashioned Love."
And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honour and dishonour, without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonourable act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonour is done to him by another, will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his companions, or by any one else. The beloved too, when he is found in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city, abstaining from all dishonour, and emulating one another in honour; and when fighting at each other's side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time; Love would inspire him. That courage which, as Homer says, the god breathes into the souls of some heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.
Love will make men dare to die for their beloved—love alone; and women as well as men. Of this, Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, is a monument to all Hellas; for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when no one else would, although he had a father and mother; but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she made them seem to be strangers in blood to their own son, and in name only related to him; and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom, in admiration of her noble action, they have granted the privilege of returning alive to earth; such exceeding honour is paid by the gods to the devotion and virtue of love. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, and presented to him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they would not give up, because he showed no spirit; he was only a harp-player, and did not dare like Alcestis to die for love, but was contriving how he might enter Hades alive; moreover, they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his cowardliness. Very different was the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus—his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes; and, as Homer informs us, he was still beardless, and younger far). And greatly as the gods honour the virtue of love, still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them, for the lover is more divine; because he is inspired by God. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared to die, not only in his defence, but after he was dead. Wherefore the gods honoured him even above Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life, and of happiness after death.
This, or something like this, was the speech of Phaedrus ; and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember; the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias. Phaedrus, he said, the argument has not been set before us, I think, quite in the right form;—we should not be called upon to praise Love in such an indiscriminate manner. If there were only one Love, then what you said would be well enough; but since there are more Loves than one, you should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect; and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praiseworthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? The elder one, having no mother, who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common; and the Love who is her fellow-worker is rightly named common, as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them, but not without distinction of their natures; and therefore I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves. Now actions vary according to the manner of their performance. Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise. The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul—the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscriminately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other, and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both. But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part,—she is from the male only; this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being older, there is nothing of wantonness in her. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature; any one may recognise the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be developed, much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing young men to be their companions, they mean to be faithful to them, and pass their whole life in company with them, not to take them in their inexperience, and deceive them, and play the fool with them, or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law, because their future is uncertain; they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul, and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them; in this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force, as we restrain or attempt to restrain them from fixing their affections on women of free birth. These are the persons who bring a reproach on love; and some have been led to deny the lawfulness of such attachments because they see the impropriety and evil of them; for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured. Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing, but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible; in Elis and Boeotia, and in countries having no gifts of eloquence, they are very straightforward; the law is simply in favour of these connexions, and no one, whether young or old, has anything to say to their discredit ; the reason being, as I suppose, that they are men of few words in those parts, and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit. In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonourable; loves of youths share the evil repute in which philosophy and gymnastics are held, because they are inimical to tyranny; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power. And, therefore, the ill-repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition of those who make them to be ill-reputed; that is to say, to the self-seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed; on the other hand, the indiscriminate honour which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them. In our own country a far better principle prevails, but, as I was saying, the explanation of it is rather perplexing. For, observe that open loves are held to be more honourable than secret ones, and that the love of the noblest and highest, even if their persons are less beautiful than others, is especially honourable. Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover; neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonourable; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if he fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and lie on a mat at the door, and endure a slavery worse than that of any slave—in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery; the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them; and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them; and, what is strangest of all, he only may swear and forswear himself (so men say), and the gods will forgive his transgression, for there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover, according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to love and to be loved is held to be a very honourable thing. But when parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers, and place them under a tutor's care, who is appointed to see to these things, and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of the sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reprovers and do not rebuke them—any one who reflects on all this will, on the contrary, think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful. But, as I was saying at first, the truth as I imagine is, that whether such practices are honourable or whether they are dishonourable is not a simple question; they are honourable to him who follows them honourably, dishonourable to him who follows them dishonourably. There is dishonour in yielding to the evil, or in an evil manner; but there is honour in yielding to the good, or in an honourable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, inasmuch as he is not even stable, because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble disposition is life-long, for it becomes one with the everlasting. The custom of our country would have both of them proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly; testing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, until they show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why, in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonourable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things; and secondly there is a dishonour in being overcome by the love of money, or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is frightened into surrender by the loss of them, or, having experienced the benefits of money and political corruption, is unable to rise above the seductions of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature; not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honourable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue; for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or a dishonour to himself, so the beloved has one way only of voluntary service which is not dishonourable, and this is virtuous service.
For we have a custom, and according to our custom any one who does service to another under the idea that he will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonour, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good; the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would give himself up to any one's "uses base" for the sake of money; but this is not honourable. And on the same principle he who gives himself to a lover because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection turn out to be a villain, and to have no virtue; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his part he will do anything for anybody with a view to virtue and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other, who is the common goddess. To you, Phaedrus, I offer this my contribution in praise of love, which is as good as I could make extempore.
Pāusănĭās came tŏ ă pāuse—this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak; and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough, and was obliged to change turns with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him. Eryximachus, he said, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I have left off.
I will do both, said Eryximachus: I will speak in your turn, and do you speak in mine; and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath, and if after you have done so for some time the hiccough is no better, then gargle with a little water; and if it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.
Eryximachus spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausanias made a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavour to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that the double love is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything, but is to be found in the bodies of all animals and in productions of the earth, and I may say in all that is; such is the conclusion which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, whence I learn how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all things, divine as well as human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the diseased is another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, and bad men dishonourable:—so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving friends, is a skilful practitioner. Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my ancestor, Asclepius, knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements, was the creator of our art, as our friends the poets here tell us, and I believe them; and not only medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion. Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation of opposites; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heracleitus, although his words are not accurate; for he says that The One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord. But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony,—clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. In like manner rhythm is compounded of elements short and long, once differing and now in accord; which accordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in all these other cases, music implants; making love and unison to grow up among them; and thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of songs or in the correct performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love—the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for they are both present.
The course of the seasons is also full of both these principles; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot and cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men—these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation; for I perceive that you are rid of the hiccough.
Yes, said Aristophanes, who followed, the hiccough is gone; not, however, until I applied the sneezing; and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a love of such noises and ticklings, for I no sooner applied the sneezing than I was cured.
Eryximachus said: Beware, friend Aristophanes, although you are going to speak, you are making fun of me; and I shall have to watch and see whether I cannot have a laugh at your expense, when you might speak in peace.
You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing. I will unsay my words; but do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in the speech which I am about to make, instead of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be laughed at by them.
Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and bear in mind that you will be called to account, I may be induced to let you off.
Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done: since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. I will try to describe his power to you, and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am teaching you. In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word "Androgynous" is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great pace, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now the sexes were three, and such as I have described them; because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: "Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners; men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg." He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: he would thus learn a lesson of humility. Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. So he gave a turn to the face and pulled the skin from the sides all over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (the same which is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval state. After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another, entwined in mutual embraces, longing to grow into one, they were on the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them,—being the sections of entire men or women,—and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated, having one side only, like a flat fish, is but the indenture of a man, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lovers of women; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous women who lust after men: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up become our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. When they reach manhood they are lovers of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children,—if at all, they do so only in obedience to the law; but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them meets with his other half, the actual half of himself, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and will not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: these are the people who pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and to say to them, "What do you people want of one another?" they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: "Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two—I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?"—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting into one another, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when we were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo, like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good, of which Love is to us the lord and minister; and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who oppose him. For if we are friends of the God and at peace with him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion in what I am saying to Pausanias and Agathon, who, as I suspect, are both of the manly nature, and belong to the class which I have been describing. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union; and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Wherefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor, both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, for he promises that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. This, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn; each, or rather either, for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.
Indeed, I am not going to attack you, said Eryximachus, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters in the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would have nothing to say, after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.
Socrates said: You played your part well, Eryximachus; but if you were as I am now, or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.
You want to cast a spell over me, Socrates, said Agathon, in the hope that I may be disconcerted at the expectation raised among the audience that I shall speak well.
I should be strangely forgetful, Agathon, replied Socrates, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited, and you came upon the stage with the actors and faced the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be fluttered at a small party of friends.
Do you think, Socrates, said Agathon, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?
Nay, replied Socrates, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon, that or any other want of refinement. And I am quite aware that if you happened to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre, cannot be regarded as the select wise; though I know that if you chanced to be in the presence, not of one of ourselves, but of some really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him—would you not?
Yes, said Agathon
But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?
Here Phaedrus interrupted them, saying: Do not answer him, my dear Agathon; for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one, he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk; but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and from every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.
Very good, Phaedrus, said Agathon; I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak:—
The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest: for, in the first place, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, who is swift enough, swifter truly than most of us like:—Love hates him and will not come near him; but youth and love live and move together—like to like, as the proverb says. Many things were said by Phaedrus about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos:—not so; I maintain him to be the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient doings among the gods of which Hesiod and Parmenides spoke, if the tradition of them be true, were done of Necessity and not of Love; had Love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender:-
"Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
Not on the ground but on the heads of men":
herein is an excellent proof of her tenderness,—that she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very soft, but in the hearts and souls of both gods and men, which are of all things the softest: in them he walks and dwells and makes his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? Of a truth he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile form; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Concerning the beauty of the god I have said enough; and yet there remains much more which I might say. Of his virtue I have now to speak: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers; force comes not near him, neither when he acts does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only. is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others, he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken, but I have yet to speak of his wisdom; and according to the measure of my ability I must try to do my best. In the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame? —he whom Love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire; so that he too is a disciple of Love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to Love, who was the inventor of them. And so Love set in order the empire of the gods-the love of beauty, as is evident, for with deformity Love has no concern. In the days of old, as I began by saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, for they were ruled by Necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And there comes into my mind a line of poetry in which he is said to be the god who
"Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
Who stills the winds and bids the sufferer sleep."
This is he who empties men of disaffection and fills them with affection, who makes them to meet together at banquets such as these: in sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord—who sends courtesy and sends away discourtesy, who gives kindness ever and never gives unkindness ; the friend of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil: in every word, work, wish, fear—saviour, pilot, comrade, helper; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, sweetly singing in his honour and joining in that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, half-playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the god.
When Agathon had done speaking, Aristodemus said that there was a general cheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god. And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acmenus, was there not reason in my fears? and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?
The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, replied Eryximachus, appears to me to be true; but not the other part—that you will be in a strait.
Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words-who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood—that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be gathered anywhere; and you say that "he is all this," and "the cause of all that," making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose upon those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance, and which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?
Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him speak in any manner which he thought best. Then, he added, let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premisses of my discourse.
I grant the permission, said Phaedrus: put your questions. Socrates then proceeded as follows:—
In the magnificent oration which you have just ut tered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the nature of Love first and afterwards of his works-that is a way of beginning which I very much approve. And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself: I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and the answer would be right.
Very true, said Agathon.
And you would say the same of a mother?
He assented.
Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?
Certainly, he replied.
That is, of a brother or sister?
Yes, he said.
And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:-Is Love of something or of nothing?
Of something, surely, he replied.
Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know—whether Love desires that of which love is.
Yes, surely.
And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?
Probably not, I should say.
Nay, replied Socrates, I would have you consider whether "necessarily" is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true. What do you think?
I agree with you, said Agathon.
Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?
That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.
True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?
Very true.
And yet, added Socrates, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they choose or not; and who can desire that which he has? Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have—to him we shall reply: "You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?" He must agree with us-must he not?
He must, replied Agathon.
Then, said Socrates, he desires that what he has at present may be preserved to him in the future, which is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is non-existent to him, and which as yet he has not got.
Very true, he said.
Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want;—these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?
Very true, he said.
Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?
Yes, he replied.
Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love-did you not say something of that kind?
Yes, said Agathon.
Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity ?
He assented.
And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?
True, he said.
Then Love wants and has not beauty?
Certainly, he replied.
And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?
Certainly not.
Then would you still say that love is beautiful?
Agathon replied: I fear that I did not understand what T was saying.
You made a very good speech, Agathon, replied Socrates ; but there is yet one small question which I would fain ask:—Is not the good also the beautiful?
Yes.
Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?
I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon:-Let us assume that what you say is true.
Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.
And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. As you, Agathon, suggested, I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good. "What do you mean, Diotima," I said, "is love then evil and foul?" "Hush," she cried; "must that be foul which is not fair?" "Certainly," I said. "And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?" "And what may that be?" I said. "Right opinion," she replied; "which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom." "Quite true," I replied. "Do not then insist," she said, "that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them." "Well," I said, "Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god." "By those who know or by those who do not know?" "By all." "And how, Socrates," she said with a smile, "can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?" "And who are they?" I said. "You and I are two of them," she replied. "How can that be?" I said. "It is quite intelligible," she replied; "for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair—of course you would—would you dare to say that any god was not?" "Certainly not," I replied. "And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?" "Yes." "And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?" "Yes, I did." "But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?" "Impossible." "Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love."
"What then is Love?" I asked; "is he mortal?" "No." "What then?" "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two." "What is he, Diotima?" "He is a great spirit (δαIµων), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal." "And what," I said, "is his power?" "He interprets," she replied, "between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of god with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love." "And who," I said, "was his father, and who his mother?" "The tale," she said, "will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant. And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist. He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want." "But who then, Diotima," I said, "are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?" "A child may answer that question," she replied; "they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love. The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described."
I said: "O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?" "That, Socrates," she replied, "I will attempt to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful But some one will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima?—or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?" I answered her "That the beautiful may be his." "Still," she said, "the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?" "To what you have asked," I replied, "I have no answer ready." "Then," she said, "let me put the word 'good' in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: If he who loves loves the good, what is it then that he loves?" "The possession of the good," I said. "And what does he gain who possesses the good?" "Happiness," I replied; "there is less difficulty in answering that question." "Yes," she said, "the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final." "You are right," I said. "And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?-what say you?" "All men," I replied; "the desire is common to all." "Why, then," she rejoined, "are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things." "I myself wonder," I said, "why this is." "There is nothing to wonder at," she replied; "the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names." "Give an illustration," I said. She answered me as follows: "There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers." "Very true." "Still," she said, "you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and metre, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets." "Very true," I said. "And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers—the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only-they alone are said to love, or to be lovers." "I dare say," I replied, "that you are right." "Yes," she added, "and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be some one who calls what belongs to him the good, and what belongs to another the evil. For there is nothing which men love but the good. Is there anything?" "Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing." "Then," she said, "the simple truth is, that men love the good." "Yes," I said. "To which must be added.that they love the possession of the good?" "Yes, that must be added." "And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?" "That must be added too." "Then love," she said, "may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?" "That is most true."
"Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further," she said, "what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? and what is the object which they have in view? Answer me." "Nay, Diotima," I replied, "if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter." "Well," she said, "I will teach you:-The object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul." "I do not understand you," I said; "the oracle requires an explanation." "I will make my meaning clearer," she replied. "I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation—procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only." "What then?" "The love of generation and of birth in beauty." "Yes," I said. "Yes, indeed," she replied. "But why of generation?" "Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality," she replied; "and if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality."
All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember her once saying to me, "What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds, as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?" Again I replied that I did not know. She said to me: "And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?" "But I have told you already, Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you; for I am conscious that I want a teacher; tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love." "Marvel not," she said, "if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation—hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word 'recollection,' but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind—unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality ; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality."
I was astonished at her words, and said: "Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?" And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist: "Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;—think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run all risks greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal? Nay," she said, "I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.
"Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies-conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring-for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.
"These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only-out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention:
"He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, beings to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates," said the stranger of Mantineia, "is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible-you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life-thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine ? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?"
Such, Phaedrus-and I speak not only to you, but to all of you-were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better than love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.
The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.
When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. "If they are friends of ours," he said, "invite them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over." A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting, "Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon," and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them. "Hail, friends," he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribands. "Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth, although you may laugh. But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke? Will you drink with me or not?"
The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take off his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same couch.
By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels? said Alcibiades, turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates. By Heracles, he said, what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always, as his way is, coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and why are you lying here, where I perceive that you have contrived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?
Socrates turned to Agathon and said: I must ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me, and at this moment he may do me some harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.
There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And I must beg you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot-I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conquerer of all mankind ; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but always. Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.
Then he said: You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endured; you must drink-for that was the agreement under which I was admitted-and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said, addressing the attendant, bring me that wine-cooler. The wine-cooler which had caught his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts—this he filled and emptied, and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates. Observe, my friends, said Alcibiades, that this ingenious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates drank the cup which the attendant filled for him.
Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?
Alcibiades replied: Hail, worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire!
The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do?
That I leave to you, said Alcibiades.
"The wise physician skilled our wounds to heal"
shall prescribe and we will obey. What do you want?
Well, said Eryximachus, before you appeared we had passed a resolution that each one of us in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right; and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak, and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and he on his right-hand neighbour, and so on.
That is good, Eryximachus, said Alcibiades; and yet the comparison of a drunken man's speech with those of sober men is hardly fair; and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe what Socrates was just now saying; for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact, and that if I praise any one but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.
For shame, said Socrates.
Hold your tongue, said Alcibiades, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise when you are of the company.
Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise Socrates.
What do you think, Eryximachus? said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?
What are you about? said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise?
I am going to speak the truth, if you will permit me.
I not only permit, but exhort you to speak the truth.
Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades, and if I say anything which is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and say "that is a lie," though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.
And now, my boys, I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him to be a caricature, and yet I speak, not to make fun of him, but only for the truth's sake. I say, that he is exactly like the busts of Silenus, which are set up in the statuaries' shops, holding pipes and flutes in their mouths; and they are made to open in the middle, and have images of gods inside of them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully, as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the powers of his breath, and the players of his music do so still: for the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are divine. But you produce the same effect with your words only, and do not require the flute; that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,-he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wit's end.
And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvellous his power. For let me tell you; none of you know him; but I will reveal him to you; having begun, I must go on. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—such is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like a Silenus in this? To be sure he is: his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companions in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within! Know you that beauty and wealth and honour, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are utterly despised by him: he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them; mankind are nothing to him; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a moment whatever Socrates commanded : they may have escaped the observation of others, but I saw them. Now I fancied that he was seriously enamoured of my beauty, and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew, for I had a wonderful opinion of the attractions of my youth. In the prosecution of this design, when I next went to him, I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me (I will confess the whole truth, and beg you to listen; and if I speak falsely, do you, Socrates, expose the falsehood). Well, he and I were alone together, and I thought that when there was nobody with us, I should hear him speak the language which lovers use to their loves when they are by themselves, and I was delighted. Nothing of the sort; he conversed as usual, and spent the day with me and then went away. Afterwards I challenged him to the palaestra; and he wrestled and closed with me several times when there was no one present; I fancied that I might succeed in this manner. Not a bit; I made no way with him. Lastly, as I had failed hitherto, I thought that I must take stronger measures and attack him boldly, and, as I had begun, not give him up, but see how matters stood between him and me. So I invited him to sup with me, just as if he were a fair youth, and I a designing lover. He was not easily persuaded to come; he did, however, after a while accept the invitation, and when he came the first time, he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over, and I had not the face to detain him. The second time, still in pursuance of my design, after we had supped, I went on conversing far into the night, and when he wanted to go away, I pretended that the hour was late and that he had much better remain. So he lay down on the couch next to me, the same on which he had supped, and there was no one but ourselves sleeping in the apartment. All this may be told without shame to any one. But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober. Yet as the proverb says, "In vino veritas," whether with boys, or without them; and therefore I must speak. Nor, again, should I be justified in concealing the lofty actions of Socrates when I come to praise him. Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting; and he who has suffered, as they say, is willing to tell his fellow-sufferers only, as they alone will be likely to understand him, and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony. For I have been bitten by a more than viper's tooth; I have known in my soul, or in my heart, or in some other part, that worst of pangs, more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth, the pang of philosophy, which will make a man say or do anything. And you whom I see around me, Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes, all of you, and I need not say Socrates himself, have had experience of the same madness and passion in your longing after wisdom. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close up the doors of their ears.
When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said: "Socrates, are you asleep?" "No," he said. "Do you know what I am meditating?" "What are you meditating?" he said. "I think," I replied, "that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than any one else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what the world, who are mostly fools, would say of me if I granted it." To these words he replied in the ironical manner which is so characteristic of him:—"Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than any which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in return for appearance-like Diomede, gold in exchange for brass. But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and it will be a long time before you get old." Hearing this, I said: "I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me." "That is good," he said; "at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters." Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that the words which I had uttered like arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of the year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. This again, Socrates, will not be denied by you. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty—which really, as I fancied, had some attractions -hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates-nothing more happened, but in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose from the couch of a father or an elder brother.
What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness. I never imagined that I could have met with a man such as he is in wisdom and endurance. And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and my only chance of captivating him by my personal attractions had failed. So I was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. All this happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvellous when, being cut off from our supplies, we were compelled to go without food-on such occasions, which often happen in time of war, he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment; though not willing to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that,—wonderful to relate! no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk; and his powers, if I am not mistaken, will be tested before long. His fortitude in enduring cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on an amazing quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces: in the midst of this, Socrates with his bare feet on the ice and in his ordinary dress marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.
I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing,
"Of the doings and sufferings of the enduring man"
while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wandering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way. I will also tell, if you please-and indeed I am bound to tell-of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour: for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but rescued me and my arms; and he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this, again, Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very remarkable—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed,-I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, for I was myself on horseback, and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating, for the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped—for this is the sort of man who is never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the marvels which I might narrate in praise of Socrates; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man, but his absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles; or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles ; and the same may be said of other famous men, but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness, however remote, either among men who now are or who ever have been—other than that which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs; and they represent in a figure not only himself, but his words. For, although I forgot to mention this to you before, his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that any ignorant or inexperienced person might feel disposed to laugh at him; but he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honourable man.
This, friends, is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me; and he has ill-treated not only me, but Charmides the son of Glaucon, and Euthydemus the son of Diocles, and many others in the same way—beginning as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you, Agathon, "Be not deceived by him; learn from me and take warning, and do not be a fool and learn by experience, as the proverb says."
When Alcibiades had finished, there was a laugh at his outspokenness; for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. You are sober, Alcibiades, said Socrates, or you would never have gone so far about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises, for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution, of which the point comes in by way at the end; you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon, and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else, and that you and you only ought to love Agathon. But the plot of this Satyric or Silenic drama has been detected, and you must not allow him, Agathon, to set us at variance.
I believe you are right, said Agathon, and I am disposed to think that his intention in placing himself between you and me was only to divide us; but he shall gain nothing by that move; for I will go and lie on the couch next to you.
Yes, yes, replied Socrates, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.
Alas, said Alcibiades, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.
Certainly not, said Socrates, as you praised me, and I in turn ought to praise my neighbour on the right, he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous, for I have a great desire to praise the youth.
Hurrah! cried Agathon, I will rise instantly, that I may be praised by Socrates.
The usual way, said Alcibiades; where Socrates is, no one else has any chance with the fair; and now how readily has he invented a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.
Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates, when suddenly a band of revellers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Some one who was going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home; great confusion ensued, and every one was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others went away —he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest: he was awakened towards day-break by a crowing of cocks, and when he awoke, the others were either asleep, or had gone away; there remained only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round, and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus was only half awake, and he did not hear the beginning of the discourse; the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they were constrained to assent, being drowsy, and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when the day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to sleep, rose to depart; Aristodemus, as his manner was, following him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.
**PHAEDO**
**_PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE_**
PHAEDO, _who is the narrator of the Dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius_
SOCRATES
ATTENDANT OF THE
PRISON
APOLLODORUS
SIMMIAS
CEBES
CRITO
SCENE: _The Prison. of Socrates_
PLACE OF THE NARRATION: _Phlius_
_**E** CHECRATES._ Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?
_Phaedo._ Yes, Echecrates, I was.
_Ech._ I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that we had no clear account.
_Phaed._ Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?
_Ech._ Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?
_Phaed._ An accident, Echecrates: the stem of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried.
Ech. What is this ship?
_Phaed._ It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the saviour of them and of himself. And they are said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.
_Ech._ What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present—so that he had no friends near him when he died?
_Phaed._ No; there were several of them with him.
_Ech._ If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as exactly as you can.
Phaed. I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.
Ech. You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.
_Phaed._ I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus-you know the sort of man?
Ech. Yes.
_Phaed._ He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly moved.
Ech. Who were present?
_Phaed._ Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.
_Ech._ Were there any strangers?
_Phaed._ Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; Euclid and Terpsion, who came from Megara.
_Ech._ And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?
_Phaed._ No, they were said to be in Aegina.
_Ech._ Any one else?
_Phaed._ I think that these were nearly all.
_Ech._ Well, and what did you talk about?
_Phaed._ I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait, talking with one another until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos; and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay until he called us. "For the Eleven," he said, "are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day." He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippè, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: "O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you." Socrates turned to Crito and said: "Crito, let some one take her home." Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the, couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows: as I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.
Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet—he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him:—he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.
Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams "that I should compose music." The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: "Cultivate and make music," said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this; for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and, then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew —they were the first I came upon—and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.
Simmias said: What a message for such a man! hav ing been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.
Why, said Socrates,—is not Evenus a philosopher?
I think that he is, said Simmias.
Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die; but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.
Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.
Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.
My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?
Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful ? as I have certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.
Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.
Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian.
I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?
Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.
And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?
Certainly, replied Cebes.
Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take . his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.
Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which you were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so-he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.
The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning to us, is a man who is always en quiring, and is not so easily convinced by the first thing which he hears.
And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.
Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?
We should like you to do so, said Simmias.
Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.
But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?-for they are a benefit in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.
I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:-the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much; talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.
I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to satisfy him.
Never mind him, he said.
And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?
Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.
And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words "they have found them out"; for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death. But enough of them:—let us discuss the matter among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
To be sure, replied Simmias.
Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?
Just so, he replied.
There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present enquiry if you and I can agree about it:—Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?
Certainly not, answered Simmias.
And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?
By no means.
And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?
I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.
Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.
Quite true.
In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.
Very true.
Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.
That is also true.
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?-is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?
Certainly, he replied.
Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.
True.
Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
Yes.
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her-neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,-when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?
Certainly.
And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?
That is true.
Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?
Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
Of course.
But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?
Certainly.
And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge —who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?
What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.
And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? "Have we not found," they will say, "a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth." For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?
Undoubtedly, Socrates.
But, O my friend, if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.
Certainly, replied Simmias.
And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?
Very true, he said.
And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?
To be sure, he said.
And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?
That is true.
And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.
Clearly.
And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that .there, and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.
He would indeed, replied Simmias.
And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?
Quite so, he replied.
And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?
Certainly.
There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?
Most assuredly.
For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.
How so?
Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.
Very true, he said.
And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?
That is quite true.
Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.
Very true.
And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.
Such appears to be the case.
Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For "many," as they say in the mysteries, "are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics," —meaning, as I interpret the words, "the true philosophers." In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.
Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.
True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.
I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern:—if you please, then, we will proceed with the enquiry.
Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.
Very true, replied Cebes.
Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.
True.
And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.
Yes.
And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.
Very true.
And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.
Of course.
And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?
Yes.
And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?
Yes, he said.
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?
Very true, he replied.
Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?
True, he said.
And what is it?
Death, he answered.
And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?
Of course.
Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do you agree?
I entirely agree.
Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?
Yes.
And they are generated one from the other?
Yes.
What is generated from the living?
The dead.
And what from the dead?
I can only say in answer—the living.
Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?
That is clear, he replied.
Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?
That is true.
And one of the two processes or generations is visible —for surely the act of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.
What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? and shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?
Certainly, he replied.
And what is that process?
Return to life.
And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?
Quite true.
Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.
Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.
What do you mean? he said.
A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?
There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.
Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Sim- mias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?
Incredulous I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.
This is what I would say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.
Very true.
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: —The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
True.
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing.
Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.
And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a house or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes;
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
Quite so.
And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?
It may be.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?
Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
To be sure, he said.
And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities or material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever equal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
Impossible, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior.
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were bom, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
We may.
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
Quite true, Socrates.
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?
Very true.
So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?
I cannot decide at the moment.
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?
Certainly, he will.
But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?
Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.
Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
Certainly not.
They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?
Certainly.
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?
Certainly not.
And therefore, previously?
Yes.
Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.
Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.
Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us when we are bom—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?
No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.
Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.
Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.
I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?
Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:—that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the demonstration will be complete.
But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again?—Surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm.
Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin: him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.
Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the fear.
And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?
Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you will not find others better able to make the search.
The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we disgressed.
By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?
Very good.
Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to inquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.
Very true, he said.
Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.
Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes.
And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.
I agree, he said.
Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of quality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?
They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.
And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?
The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.
And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?
That is very true, he said.
Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.
Let us suppose them.
The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?
That may be also supposed.
And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?
To be sure.
And to which class is the body more alike and akin?
Clearly to be seen—no one can doubt that.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not by man, Socrates.
And what we mean by "seen" and "not seen" is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?
Yes, to the eye of man.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not seen.
Unseen then?
Yes.
Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?
That follows necessarily, Socrates.
And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when she touches change?
Very true.
But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?
That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.
And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?
I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that.
And the body is more like the changing?
Yes.
Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?
True.
And which does the soul resemble?
The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.
Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?
It cannot.
But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?
Certainly.
And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:—Do you agree?
Yes.
And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;—and making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death?—
Certainly—
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational; thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods. Is not this true, Cebes?
Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.
But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;—do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?
Impossible, he replied.
She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.
Very true.
And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.
That is very likely, Socrates.
Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.
What natures do you mean, Socrates?
What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?
I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable.
And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;—whither else can we suppose them to go?
Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question.
And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?
There is not, he said.
Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind.
Why are they the happiest?
Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from them.
Very likely.
No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason. Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.
No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.
No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.
What do you mean, Socrates?
I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body—until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance, and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity. This was her original state; and then, as I was saying, and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.
What is it, Socrates? said Cebes.
The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight.
Very true.
And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?
How so?
Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.
Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.
And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.
Certainly not.
Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.
When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting. For, said he, there are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no more, but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if you think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you.
Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered but which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome at such a time.
Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world; wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same. God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.
Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself (and I dare say that you have the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient
Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient.
In this respect, replied Simmias:—Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, in-corporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished—you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul; and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once; although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?
Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?
Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced? —When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not dead, he must be alive;—see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them; and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and short-lived in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death. For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times —nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.
All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.
Ech. There I feel with you—by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.
_Phaed._ Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.
Ech. What followed?
_Phaed._ You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.
Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.
Not so, if you will take my advice.
What shall I do with them? I said.
To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks: and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.
Yes, I said; but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.
Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.
I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.
That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.
Of what nature? I said.
Lest we become misologists, he replied: no worse thing can happen to a man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarrelled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of character?
I have.
And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them.
What do you mean? I said.
I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?
Yes, I said, I have.
And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?
Yes, that is very likely, I said.
Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsound-ness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.
That is quite true, I said.
Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge—that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.
Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.
Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind—you and all other men having regard to the whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this —that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.
And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have in mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
They both agreed to this statement of them.
He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?
Of a part only, they replied.
And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body?
Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently.
But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it.
Never, Socrates.
But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
Not at all, replied Simmias.
And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme?
There ought, replied Simmias.
But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you retain?
I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive —in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds: and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.
Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?
Certainly not.
Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
He agreed.
Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them.
He assented.
For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts.
That would be impossible, he replied.
And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?
I do not understand you, he said.
I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.
True.
But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
Not in the least.
Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?
Yes, truly.
But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?
I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.
And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?
Quite true.
And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?
True.
And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?
Yes, an equal harmony.
Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?
Exactly.
And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?
She has not.
And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?
Not at all more.
Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.
No.
And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?
How can she have, if the previous argument holds?
Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?
I agree with you, Socrates, he said.
And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?
It cannot be true.
Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?
Indeed, I do not.
And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.
Very true.
But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?
It must be so, he replied.
And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee represents Odysseus doing in the words—
"He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart:
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!"
Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?
Yes, Socrates, I quite think so.
Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict ourselves.
True, he said.
Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him?
I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.
Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those above; while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this: and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be long-lived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.
But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or subtract: I mean what you say that I mean.
Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the whole nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will give you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.
I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.
Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these:—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?
Yes, said Cebes, I think so.
Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the double of one.
And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.
I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect, —as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the other.
Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was good for all. These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.
What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he would say; and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia—by the dog, they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good;—of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.
I should very much like to hear, he replied.
Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only "through a glass darkly," any more than he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me.
No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.
There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.
Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this.
Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?
Yes, he said, I agree.
He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?
I do.
And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?
True.
Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?
Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?—for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.
Very true, he said.
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.
What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.
_Ech._ Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.
_Phaed._ Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole company at the time.
_Ech._ Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?
_Phaed._ After all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that ideas exist, and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:—
This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?
Yes, I do.
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?
True.
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?
That is true.
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.
Simmias assented.
I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change.
That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.
Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; but now this principle seems to be utterly denied.
Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?
No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often disturbed by objections.
Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?
To that we are quite agreed, he replied.
Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me:—There is a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold?
Certainly.
But are they the same as fire and snow?
Most assuredly not.
Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?
Yes.
And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?
Very true, he replied.
And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.
That is true, he said.
And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called by the name of odd?
Very true.
But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?—that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is odd; and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you agree?
Of course.
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?
Very true, said Cebes.
And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?
It is not.
Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.
Very true, he said.
Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these are.
By all means.
Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?
What do you mean?
I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd.
Quite true.
And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?
No.
And this impress was given by the odd principle?
Yes.
And to the odd is opposed the even?
True.
Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?
No.
Then three has no part in the even?
None.
Then the triad or number three is uneven?
Very true.
To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd.
The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole: You will agree?
Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.
And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you "what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot," you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you "why a body is diseased," you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.
Yes, he said, I quite understand you.
Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?
The soul, he replied.
And is this always the case?
Yes, he said, of course.
Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
Yes, certainly.
And is there any opposite to life?
There is, he said.
And what is that?
Death.
Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.
Impossible, replied Cebes.
And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?
The odd.
And that principle which repels the musical or the just?
The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.
And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?
The immortal, he said.
And does the soul admit of death?
No.
Then the soul is immortal?
Yes, he said.
And may we say that this has been proven?
Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.
Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?
Of course.
And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?
True, he said.
Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected?
Certainly, he said.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: "But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?" Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.
Very true.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.
No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.
Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that Cod, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.
Yes, all men, he said—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men.
Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?
Most certainly.
Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?
True.
Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another worldl
I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said.
But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.
Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.
Very true.
But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither.
For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path—if that were so no guide would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius; and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.
Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.
What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like to know, in which of these you put faith.
And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Claucus would tell you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.
That, said Simmias, will be enough.
Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or of any similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.
Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.
Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars also; and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top, then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and the entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded. as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, neither is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud; and even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing.
And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen to you.
The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first place, the earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colours so that the whole presents a single and continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still. The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent; and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them; and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.
Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:—There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words:—
"Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth";
and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in either direction can descend only to the centre and no further, for opposite to the rivers is a precipice.
Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born again as animals. The third river passes out between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.
Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done some violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.
Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great!
A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as a tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.
When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any matter in which we can serve you?
Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no avail.
We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?
In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:—I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,—these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best.
When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us.
Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:—To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be—you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.
Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.
Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hurry—there is time enough.
Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.
Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience. When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said—they were his last words—he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.
Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.
**THE REPUBLIC**
# **BOOK I**
## _PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE_
SOCRATES, _who is the narrator_
GLAUCON
ADEIMANTUS
POLEMARCHUS
CEPHALUS
THRASYMACHUS
CLEITOPHON
And others who are mute auditors
THE SCENE _is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the Timaeus._
**I** WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.
I turned round, and asked him where his master was.
There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.
Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.
Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.
You are not far wrong, I said.
But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?
Of course.
And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.
May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?
But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.
Certainly not, replied Glaucon.
Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.
Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?
With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?
Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.
Glaucon said: I suppose, _since_ you insist, that we must.
Very good, I replied.
Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paenian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:—
You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort arid keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.
I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the "threshold of old age"—Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?
I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is _gone,_ and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age; but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.
I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on—Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.
You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: "If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous." And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.
May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?
Acquiredl Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.
That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.
That is true, he said.
Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? —What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?
One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:
"Hope," he says, "cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;—hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man."
How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.
Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?—to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.
You are quite right, he replied.
But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.
Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus interposing.
I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.
Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.
To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.
Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?
He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.
I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.
True.
Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?
Certainly not.
When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?
Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil.
You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,—that is what you would imagine him to say?
Yes.
And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?
To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to say, evil.
Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.
That must have been his meaning, he said.
By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?
He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.
And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?
Seasoning to food.
And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?
If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.
That is his meaning then?
I think so.
And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?
The physician.
Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?
The pilot.
And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?
In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.
But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?
No.
And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?
No.
Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?
I am very far from thinking so.
You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?
Yes.
Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?
Yes.
Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,—that is what you mean?
Yes.
And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?
In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.
And by contracts you mean partnerships?
Exactly.
But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?
The skilful player.
And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?
Quite the reverse.
Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?
In a money partnership.
Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?
Certainly.
And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?
True.
Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?
When you want a deposit to be kept safely.
You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?
Precisely.
That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?
That is the inference.
And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?
Clearly.
And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?
Certainly.
And so of all the other things,—justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?
That is the inference.
Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?
Certainly.
And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?
True.
And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?
Certainly.
Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?
That, I suppose, is to be inferred.
Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.
That is implied in the argument.
Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that
"He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury."
And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised however "for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,"—that was what you were saying?
No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.
Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?
Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.
Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?
That is true.
Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?
True.
And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?
Clearly.
But the good are just and would not do an injustice?
True.
Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?
Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.
Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?
I like that better.
But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.
Very true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words "friend" and "enemy."
What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.
We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.
And how is the error to be corrected?
We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.
You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?
Yes.
And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?
Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.
But ought the just to injure any one at all?
Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.
When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?
The latter.
Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?
Yes, of horses.
And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?
Of course.
And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?
Certainly.
And that human virtue is justice?
To be sure.
Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?
That is the result.
But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?
Certainly not.
Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?
Impossible.
And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?
Assuredly not.
Any more than heat can produce cold?
It cannot.
Or drought moisture?
Clearly not.
Nor can the good harm any one?
Impossible.
And the just is the good?
Certainly.
Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?
I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.
Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies,—to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.
I agree with you, said Polemarchus.
Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?
I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.
Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?
Whose?
I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies."
Most true, he said.
Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?
Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.
He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, silly-billies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.
I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.
Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.
How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;—that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?
You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,"—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?"—How would you answer him?
Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.
Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?
I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?
I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.
But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?
Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.
What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!
I will pay when I have the money, I replied.
But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.
Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.
Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?
Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request and Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.
That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.
Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't.
Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?
That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.
Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.
Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?
Yes, I know.
And the government is the ruling power in each state?
Certainly.
And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word "interest" which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "of the stronger" are added.
A small addition, you must allow, he said.
Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say "of the stronger"; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.
Proceed.
I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?
I do.
But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?
To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.
Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?
True.
When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?
Yes.
And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and that is what you call justice?
Doubtless.
Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?
What is that you are saying? he asked.
I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?
Yes.
Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?
Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.
Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.
But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.
Yes, Polemarchus,—Tbrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.
Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.
But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest,— this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.
Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.
Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?
Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?
Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.
You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.
Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?
Certainly, he replied.
And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?
Nay, he replied, "suppose" is not the word—I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.
I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?
In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.
And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.
Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.
Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.
A healer of the sick, he replied.
And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?
A captain of sailors.
The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.
Very true, he said.
Now, I said, every art has an interest?
Certainly.
For which the art has to consider and provide?
Yes, that is the aim of art.
And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?
Quite right, he replied.
But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.
Yes, clearly.
Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?
True, he said.
Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?
True, he said.
But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?
To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.
Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?
He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.
Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?
Yes.
And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?
That has been admitted.
And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?
He gave a reluctant "Yes."
Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.
When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?
Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?
Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.
What makes you say that? I replied.
Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is more apparent ; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.
Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?
And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?
You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.
And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?
Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.
Think! Nay, I am sure of it.
Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.
Yes, that is the difference, he replied.
And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?
Yes, he said.
And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?
Certainly not.
Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?
I should say not.
Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
Certainly not.
And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?
Yes.
Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?
True, he replied.
And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?
He gave a reluctant assent to this.
Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?
I suppose not.
But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?
Certainly, he confers a benefit.
Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.
What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.
You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?
Very true.
And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to. rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?
I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.
Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?
Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.
Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?
Most certainly, he replied.
If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.
Very good, he said.
And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.
That which you propose.
Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?
Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.
And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?
Certainly.
I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?
What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.
What else then would you say?
The opposite, he replied.
And would you call justice vice?
No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.
Then would you call injustice malignity?
No; I would rather say discretion.
And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?
Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.
I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.
Certainly I do so class them.
Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.
You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.
Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.
I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you? —to refute the argument is your business.
Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as to answer yet one more question?
Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?
Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.
And would he try to go beyond just action?
He would not.
And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?
He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.
Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?
Yes, he would.
And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?
Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.
And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?
True.
We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?
Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.
And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
Good again, he said.
And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?
Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.
Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
Certainly, he replied.
Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?
Yes.
And which is wise and which is foolish?
Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.
And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?
Yes.
And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?
Yes.
And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?
I do not think that he would.
But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?
Of course.
And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?
He would not.
But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?
Yes.
And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?
That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.
And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?
I dare say.
And the knowing is wise?
Yes.
And the wise is good?
True.
Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?
I suppose so.
Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?
Yes.
But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?
They were.
And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?
Yes.
Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?
That is the inference.
And each of them is such as his like is?
That was admitted.
Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.
Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:
Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?
Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if, however, I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer "Very good," as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod "Yes" and "No."
Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.
Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?
Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.
Proceed.
Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?
True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.
I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.
If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.
I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.
That is out of civility to you, he replied.
You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?
No indeed, he said, they could not.
But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?
Yes.
And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?
I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.
How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?
Certainly.
And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?
They will.
And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?
Let us assume that she retains her power.
Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it and with the just? Is not this the case?
Yes, certainly.
And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?
Yes.
And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?
Granted that they are.
But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friend?
Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument ; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.
Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.
Proceed.
I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?
I should.
And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?
I do not understand, he said.
Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?
Certainly not.
Or hear, except with the ear?
No.
These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?
They may.
But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?
Of course.
And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?
True.
May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?
We may.
Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?
I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.
And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?
It has.
And has not the eye an excellence?
Yes.
And the ear has an end and an excellence also?
True.
And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?
That is so.
Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?
How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?
You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?
Certainly, he replied.
I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?
True.
And the same observation will apply to all other things?
I agree.
Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?
To no other.
And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?
Assuredly, he said.
And has not the soul an excellence also?
Yes.
And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?
She cannot.
Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?
Yes, necessarily.
And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?
That has been admitted.
Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?
That is what your argument proves.
And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?
Certainly.
Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
So be it.
But happiness and not misery is profitable.
Of course.
Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.
Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.
For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.
# **BOOK II**
**W** ITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?
I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.
Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:—How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?
I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.
Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?
Certainly, I said.
And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?
There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?
In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.
Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.
I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.
I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the souL If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?
Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.
I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.
They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.
Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result—when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.
Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.
Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.
I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine.—Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:—
"His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
Out of which spring his prudent counsels."
In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.
I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?
Why, what else is there? I answered.
The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.
Well, then, according to the proverb, "Let brother help brother"—if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.
Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just—
"To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle; And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,"
and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is—
"As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives hin. fish."
Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.
Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome ; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod:—
"Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,"
and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:—
"The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed."
And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us
He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,—those of them, I mean, who are quick-witted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar—
"Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?"
For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things—why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by "sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings." Let us be consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. "But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.
On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth—but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when lie obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time —no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watch-man, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.
I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:—
"Sons of Ariston," he sang, "divine offspring of an illustrious hero."
The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.
Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger—if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.
Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?
I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.
True, he replied.
And is not a State larger than an individual?
It is.
Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.
That, he said, is an excellent proposal.
And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.
I dare say.
When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered.
Yes, far more easily.
But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.
I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.
A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?
There can be no other.
Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.
True, he said.
And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.
Very true.
Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.
Of course, he replied.
Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.
Certainly.
The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.
True.
And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?
Quite right.
The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.
Clearly.
And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock?—the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three-fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?
Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.
Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.
Very true.
And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?
When he has only one.
Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?
No doubt.
For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.
He must.
And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.
Undoubtedly.
Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.
True.
Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?
True.
Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides,—still our State will not be very large.
That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.
Then, again, there is the situation of the city—to find a place where nothing need be imported is well nigh impossible
Impossible.
Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?
There must.
But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.
That is certain.
And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.
Very true.
Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?
They will.
Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?
Yes.
Then we shall want merchants?
We shall.
And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers ?
Yes, in considerable numbers.
Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.
Clearly they will buy and sell.
Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.
Certainly.
Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?
Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.
This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not "retailer" the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?
Yes, he said.
And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.
True.
Then hirelings will help to make up our population?
Yes.
And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected ?
I think so.
Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?
Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else.
I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.
Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.
But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.
True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.
Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?
But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.
Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.
Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.
True, he said.
Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music—poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swine-herds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.
Certainly.
And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?
Much greater.
And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small nuw, and not enough?
Quite true.
Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?
That, Socrates, will be inevitable.
And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?
Most certainly, he replied.
Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.
Undoubtedly.
And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.
Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?
No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.
Very true, he said.
But is not war an art?
Certainly.
And an art requiring as much attention as shoemak ing?
Quite true.
And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?
Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.
And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?
No doubt, he replied.
Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?
Certainly.
Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures. which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?
It will.
And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.
We must.
Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?
What do you mean?
I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.
All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.
Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?
Certainly.
And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?
I have.
Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.
True.
And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?
Yes.
But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?
A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.
Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.
True, he said.
What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?
True.
He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.
I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.
Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.—My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.
And where do you find them?
Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.
Yes, I know.
Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?
Certainly not.
Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?
I do not apprehend your meaning.
The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.
What trait?
Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?
The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.
And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming; —your dog is a true philosopher.
Why?
Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?
Most assuredly.
And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?
They are the same, he replied.
And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?
That we may safely affirm.
Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?
Undoubtedly.
Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.
Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.
Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.
Certainly not.
Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.
By all means.
And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.
True.
Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?
By all means.
And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?
I do.
And literature may be either true or false?
Yes.
And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?
I do not understand your meaning, he said.
You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.
Very true.
That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.
Quite right, he said.
You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.
Quite true.
And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?
We cannot.
Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.
Of what tales are you speaking? he said.
You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.
Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.
Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.
But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?
A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.
But when is this fault committed?
Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.
Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?
First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him.1 The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.
Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.
Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and great est among the gods.
I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.
Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we 1Hesiod, Theogony, 154, 459.
shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.
There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?
I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.
Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?
Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.
Right.
And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?
Certainly.
And no good thing is hurtful?
No, indeed.
And that which is not hurtful hurts not?
Certainly not.
And that which hurts not does no evil?
No.
And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?
Impossible.
And the good is advantageous?
Yes.
And therefore the cause of well-being?
Yes.
It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?
Assuredly.
Then Cod, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.
That appears to me to be most true, he said.
Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks
"Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,"
and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two
"Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good";
but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,
"Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth."
And again—
"Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us."
And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that
"God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house."
And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur—or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.
I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.
Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.
That will do, he said.
And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?
I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.
Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be affected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?
Most certainly.
And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.
Of course.
And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?
True.
And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things—furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.
Very true.
Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?
True.
But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?
Of course they are.
Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?
He cannot.
But may he not change and transform himself?
Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.
And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?
If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.
Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?
Impossible.
Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.
That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.
Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that
"The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms";
and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms
"For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos";
—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, "Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms"; but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.
Heaven forbid, he said.
But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?
Perhaps, he replied.
Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?
I cannot say, he replied.
Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?
What do you mean? he said.
I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.
Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.
The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like;—that, I say, is what they utterly detest.
There is nothing more hateful to them.
And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?
Perfectly right.
The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?
Yes.
Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.
Very true, he said.
But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?
That would be ridiculous, he said.
Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?
I should say not.
Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?
That is inconceivable.
But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?
But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.
Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?
None whatever.
Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?
Yes.
Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.
Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.
You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.
I grant that.
Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials
"Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this—he it is who has slain my son."
These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.
I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.
# **BOOK III**
**S** UCH then, I said, are our principles of theology—some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.
Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.
But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?
Certainly not, he said.
And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?
Impossible.
Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.
That will be our duty, he said.
Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses,
"I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portion-less man than rule over all the dead who have come to nought."
We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,
"Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals."
And again:—
"O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at alll"
Again of Tiresias:—
"[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades."
Again:—
"The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth."
Again:—
"And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth."
And,—
"As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved."
And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.
Undoubtedly.
Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them.
There is a real danger, he said.
Then we must have no more of them.
True.
Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.
Clearly.
And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?
They will go with the rest.
But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.
Yes; that is our principle.
And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?
He will not.
Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.
True, he said.
And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.
Assuredly.
And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.
Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.
Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.
That will be very right.
Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,
"Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name."
Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying,
"Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow."
But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—
"0 heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful."
Or again:—
"Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius."
For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.
Yes, he said, that is most true.
Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better.
It ought not to be.
Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.
So I believe.
Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.
Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.
Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how
"Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion."
On your views, we must not admit them.
On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain.
Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.
Clearly not, he said.
Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors.
Most true, he said.
If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,
"Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,"
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State.
Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.
In the next place our youth must be temperate?
Certainly.
Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?
True.
Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,
"Friend, sit still and obey my word,"
and the verses which follow,
"The Greeks marched breathing prowess,
... in silent awe of their leaders,"
and other sentiments of the same kind.
We shall.
What of this line,
"O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,"
and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?
They are ill spoken.
They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with me there?
Yes.
And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than
"When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups";
is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse
"The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?"
What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another
"Without the knowledge of their parents";
or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?
Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.
But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,
"He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!"
Certainly, he said.
In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money.
Certainly not.
Neither must we sing to them of
"Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings."
Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so.
Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.
Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,
"Thou hast wronged me, 0 far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power";
or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.
You are quite right, he replied.
And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.
Assuredly not.
And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—
"The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,"
and who have
"the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins."
And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young.
By all means, he replied.
But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been already laid down.
Very true.
And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.
Clearly so.
But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend.
Why not?
Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain—these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.
To be sure we shall, he replied.
But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.
I grant the truth of your inference.
That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seems to be just or not.
Most true, he said.
Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.
I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.
Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?
Certainly, he replied.
And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?
That again, he said, I do not quite understand.
I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,
"And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people,"
the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.
Yes.
And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?
Quite true.
But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?
Certainly.
And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?
Of course.
Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?
Very true.
Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say, "I don't understand," I will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said, "The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings"; and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre), "The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said—she should grow old with him in Argos. And then ho told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,"—and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.
I understand, he said.
Or you may suppose the opposite case—that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.
That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.
You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?
Yes, he said; I see now what you meant.
I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.
Yes, I remember.
In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art,—whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?
You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?
Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.
And go we will, he said.
Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?
Certainly.
And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?
He cannot.
Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitations?
Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.
Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?
True.
Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but imitations.
They are so.
And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.
Quite true, he replied.
If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession—the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?
Yes, certainly, he said.
Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labour.
Very right, he said.
Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?
They must not.
And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated.
Very true, he replied.
Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?
How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?
Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?
Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen.
You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education.
And which are these two sorts? he asked.
Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good man,—I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.
So I should expect, he replied.
Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?
Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take.
But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.
That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.
These, then, are the two kinds of style?
Yes.
And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?
That is quite true, he said.
Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes.
That is also perfectly true, he replied.
And do not the two styles. or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.
They include all, he said.
And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?
I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.
Yes, I said, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in general.
I do not deny it.
But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?
Yes; quite unsuitable.
And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?
True, he said.
And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.
We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.
Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.
I think so too, he said.
Next in order will follow melody and song.
That is obvious.
Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.
I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word "every one" hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may guess.
At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?
Yes, he said; so much as that you may.
And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?
Yes.
And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?
Certainly.
We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentations and strains of sorrow?
True.
And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me.
The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.
These then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.
Certainly.
In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.
Utterly unbecoming.
And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?
The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed "relaxed."
Well, and are these of any military use?
Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.
I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stem resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.
And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking.
Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?
I suppose not.
Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonised instruments?
Certainly not.
But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?
Clearly not.
There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country.
That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.
The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said.
Not at all, he replied.
And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.
And we have done wisely, he replied.
Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.
But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmoniesare composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.
Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?
Rather so, I should say.
But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm.
None at all.
And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.
Just so, he said, they should follow the words.
And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?
Yes.
And everything else on the style?
Yes.
Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity,—I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?
Very true, he replied.
And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?
They must.
And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them,—weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,—in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.
That is quite true, he said.
But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.
There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.
And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.
Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise them wherever they are found:
True—
Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both:
Exactly—
Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study.
Most assuredly.
And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it?
The fairest indeed.
And the fairest is also the loveliest?
That may be assumed.
And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?
That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the same.
I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?
How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain.
Or any affinity to virtue in general?
None whatever.
Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?
Yes, the greatest.
And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?
No, nor a madder.
Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and harmonious?
Quite true, he said.
Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?
Certainly not.
Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?
No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.
Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.
I quite agree, he said.
Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?
I agree, he said.
After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.
Certainly.
Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,—and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,—not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?
Yes, I agree.
Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.
Very good.
That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.
Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed.
But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all—are they not?
Yes, he said.
And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?
Why not?
I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?
Yes, I do.
Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.
That is my view.
The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.
How so?
Why, I conceive thac there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the military gymnastic.
What do you mean?
My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.
True.
And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.
Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.
Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?
I think not.
Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?
Certainly not.
Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionary?
Certainly not.
All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.
Exactly.
There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.
Most true, he said.
But when intemperance and disease multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.
Of course.
And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of want of good breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?
Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.
Would you say "most," I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?
Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.
Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?
Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to diseases.
Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case,
Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.
Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.
How was that? he said.
By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.
A rare reward of his skill!
Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.
How do you mean? he said.
I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,—these are his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.
Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only.
Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?
Quite true, he said.
But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.
He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.
Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?
Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.
Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?
Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the practice of virtue.
Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all, irreconcilable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection —there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.
Yes, likely enough.
And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons;—if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State.
Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.
Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they
"Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,"
but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.
They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.
Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both;—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.
All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?
Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?
Will you tell me?
I will, if I can. Let me, however, note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.
How so? he asked.
Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing.
That is very true, he said.
But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.
Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.
Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he snould have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.
Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.
Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke,—he who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.
Most true, he said.
Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom—in my opinion.
And in mine also.
This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction in your State. They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves.
That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.
And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.
Clearly.
And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case.
That I quite believe.
The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.
Very right, he said.
Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body.
What then is the real object of them?
I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.
How can that be? he asked.
Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?
In what way shown? he said.
The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy, I replied.
Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him.
Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal.
That I quite think.
On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.
True.
And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?
Assuredly.
And both should be in harmony?
Beyond question.
And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?
Yes.
And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?
Very true.
And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.
Very true.
If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable;—on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.
Exactly.
And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was.
Certainly.
And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?
True, he said.
And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion,—he is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.
That is quite true, he said.
And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and the body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.
That appears to be the intention.
And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.
You are quite right, Socrates.
And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last?
Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.
Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education : Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.
I dare say that there will be no difficulty.
Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?
Certainly.
There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.
Clearly.
And that the best of these must rule.
That is also clear.
Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?
Yes.
And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?
Yes.
And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?
True.
And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?
To be sure.
And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?
Very true, he replied.
Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.
Those are the right men.
And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.
How cast off? he said.
I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.
I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.
Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?
Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.
And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?
Still, he replied, I do not understand you.
I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?
Yes.
Those again who are forced are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.
I understand, he said, and you are quite right.
And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?
Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.
Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?
Yes.
And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.
Very right, he replied.
And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.
And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.
And perhaps the word "guardian" in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.
I agree with you, he said.
How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?
What sort of lie? he said.
Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it did.
How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!
You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.
Speak, he said, and fear not.
Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.
You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.
True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?
Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.
I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.
Just so, he said.
And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.
I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.
Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shopkeepers.
What is the difference? he said.
That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?
Truly monstrous, he said.
And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?
Yes, great care should be taken.
And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?
But they are well-educated already, he replied.
I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.
Very true, he replied.
And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.
He must.
Then let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?
Yes, said Glaucon.
# **BOOK IV**
**H** ERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?
Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.
But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.
You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?
Yes.
If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body —the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black—to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians ; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy—and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seemingly and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.
I think that you are quite right.
I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.
What may that be?
There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.
What are they?
Wealth, I said, and poverty.
How do they act?
The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?
Certainly not.
He will grow more and more indolent and careless?
Very true.
And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?
Yes; he greatly deteriorates.
But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.
Certainly not.
Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?
That is evident.
Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.
What evils?
Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.
That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.
There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.
How so? he asked.
In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.
That is true, he said.
And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?
Hardly, if they came upon him at once.
What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?
Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.
And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.
Likely enough.
Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?
I agree with you, for I think you right.
And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?
That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.
But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!
Why so?
You ought to speak of other States in the plural number ; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.
That is most true, he said.
And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?
What limit would you propose?
I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the proper limit.
Very good, he said.
Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing.
And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.
And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.
Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.
The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,—a thing, however, which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.
What may that be? he asked.
Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.
That will be the best way of settling them.
Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.
Very possibly, he said.
Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed,—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard
"The newest song which the singers have,"
they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him;—he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.
Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.
Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?
Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.
Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears harmless.
Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.
Is that true? I said.
That is my belief, he replied.
Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous citizens.
Very true, he said.
And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again.
Very true, he said.
Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.
What do you mean?
I mean such things as these:—when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?
Yes.
But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,—I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.
Impossible.
It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?
To be sure.
Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?
That is not to be denied.
And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.
Naturally enough, he replied.
Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and extractions of market and harbour dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?
I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.
Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.
And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.
You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?
Exactly.
Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.
Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.
Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.
Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right
These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.
Assuredly not.
Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this régime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing ?
Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising them.
But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?
Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.
What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?
Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.
Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?
Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.
I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.
What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?
Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.
Which are they? he said.
The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.
You are right, and we will do as you propose.
But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.
Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?
I do not deny that I said so; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.
We will, he replied.
Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.
That is most certain.
And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.
That is likewise clear.
And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?
Very good.
If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.
Very true, he said.
And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?
Clearly.
First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.
What is that?
The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?
Very true.
And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?
Clearly.
And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?
Of course.
There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?
Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.
Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?
Certainly not.
Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?
Not by reason of any of them, he said.
Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?
Yes.
Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?
There certainly is.
And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.
It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.
And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?
The name of good in counsel and truly wise.
And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?
The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.
Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?
Much the smallest.
And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least.
Most true.
Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered.
And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.
Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.
How do you mean?
Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.
No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.
The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.
Certainly not.
The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.
I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.
I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.
Salvation of what?
Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?
If you please.
You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour.
Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.
Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.
But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.
Most certainly.
Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?
Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words "of a citizen," you will not be far wrong;—hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.
You are right, he replied.
Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.
Very true.
Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?
I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.
Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.
Then consider, he said.
Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.
How so? he asked.
Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of "a man being his own master"; and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.
No doubt, he said.
There is something ridiculous in the expression "master of himself"; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.
Certainly.
The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.
Yes, there is reason in that.
And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words "temperance" and "self-mastery" truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.
Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.
Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.
Certainly, he said.
Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.
Very true.
These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.
That I perceive, he said.
Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?
Certainly, he replied.
It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?
Yes.
And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?
Undoubtedly.
And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?
In both, as I should imagine, he replied.
Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?
Why so?
Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and individuals.
I entirely agree with you.
And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.
The inference is obvious.
The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.
Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I am good for.
Offer up a prayer with me and follow.
I will, but you must show me the way.
Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.
Let us push on.
Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.
Good news, he said.
Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.
Why so?
Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.
What do you mean?
I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her.
I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.
Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.
Yes, we said so.
Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I cannot, but I should like to be told.
Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.
That follows of necessity.
If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
Exactly.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?
Certainly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?
Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?
Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?
Certainly.
This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.
I agree with you.
We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual—if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.
That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.
I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?
Like, he replied.
The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?
He will.
And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?
True, he said.
And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner ?
Certainly, he said.
Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?
An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.
Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.
May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I am quite content.
I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.
Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.
Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e. g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.
Exactly so, he said.
There is no difficulty in understanding this.
None whatever.
But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.
Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.
Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.
How can we? he asked.
I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.
Good.
For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?
Impossible.
Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.
Very true.
And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference ; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.
That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.
Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.
Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.
Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.
Yes, he said, that will be the best way.
Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?
Yes, he said, they are opposites.
Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing,—all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desires; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desires, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?
Very true.
And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?
Certainly.
Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?
Let us take that class, he said.
The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
Yes.
And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?
Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.
But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.
Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.
Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation ; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.
I do not know what you mean.
Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?
Certainly.
And the much greater to the much less?
Yes.
And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?
Certainly, he said.
And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;—is not this true of all of them?
Yes.
And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.
Certainly.
Because it has a particular quality which no other has?
Yes.
And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?
Yes.
Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.
I quite understand, and I think as you do.
Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation—
Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?
Certainly.
Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?
That is plain.
And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thristy principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.
Impossible.
No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.
Exactly so, he replied.
And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?
Yes, he said, it constantly happens.
And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?
I should say so.
And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?
Clearly.
Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?
Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.
Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?
I should be inclined to say—akin to desire.
Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them: for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.
I have heard the story myself, he said.
The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.
Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?
Certainly not.
Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him—these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.
True, he said.
But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.
The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.
I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.
What point?
You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.
Most assuredly.
But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?
Yes, he said, there must be a third.
Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.
But that is easily proved:—We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.
Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us,
"He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul";
for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.
Very true, he said.
And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.
Exactly.
Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
Certainly.
Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?
Assuredly.
And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?
That follows of course.
We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?
We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.
We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?
Yes, he said, we must remember that too.
And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?
Certainly.
And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?
Quite true, he said.
And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?
Very true, he said.
Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?
True.
And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?
Right, he replied.
And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?
Assuredly.
And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?
Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.
And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.
That is very certain.
And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?
There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.
What sort of instances do you mean?
If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this?
No one, he replied.
Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?
Never.
Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?
Impossible
No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?
No one.
And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?
Exactly so.
Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such States is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?
Not I, indeed.
Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified ?
Yes, certainly.
And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?
Clearly.
But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
You have said the exact truth, Socrates.
Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?
Most certainly not.
May we say so, then?
Let us say so.
And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.
Clearly.
Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?
Exactly so.
And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?
What do you mean? he said.
Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.
How so? he said.
Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.
Yes.
And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?
That is certain.
And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?
True.
And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?
Exactly so, he said.
Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?
True.
And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?
Assuredly.
Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?
In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?
Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.
Certainly not, he replied.
Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.
I am following you, he replied: proceed.
I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.
How many?
There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.
What are they?
The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.
True, he replied.
But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.
That is true, he replied.
# **BOOK V**
**S** UCH is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.
What are they? he said.
I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, "Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?"
Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.
Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?
You, he said.
I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?
Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children "friends have all things in common."
And was I not right, Adeimantus?
Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained; for communitymay be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this.
To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.
And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.
I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a homet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.
For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus,—to look for gold, or to hear discourse?
Yes, but discourse should have a limit.
Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.
Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.
Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not sceptical or hostile.
I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.
Yes, he said.
Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to encourage me.
Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.
Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.
Then why should you mind?
Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.
For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.
True.
Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.
What do you mean?
What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour enough for them?
No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.
But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?
You cannot.
Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?
Yes.
The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.
Yes.
Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?
That is the inference, I suppose.
I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.
No doubt of it.
Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.
Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.
But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!
Very true, he replied.
Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.
No doubt.
But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good.
Very true, he replied.
First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.
That will be much the best way.
Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves? in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.
Why not? he said.
Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: "Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature." And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. "And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?" And we shall reply: Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, "Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?" Certainly they should. "But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?" —What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?
That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.
These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.
By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.
Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid-ocean, he has to swim all the same.
Very true.
And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?
I suppose so, he said.
Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged—did we not? that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,—this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.
Precisely.
Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!
Why do you say so?
Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.
Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?
A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.
In what way?
Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.
Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.
I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?
That would be a jest, he said.
Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same nature.
True.
Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?
Certainly.
And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.
Very true, he said.
Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?
That will be quite fair.
And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.
Yes, perhaps.
Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.
By all means.
Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:—when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?—would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?
No one will deny that.
And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?
You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.
And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in a State which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.
Very true.
Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?
That will never do.
One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature?
Very true.
And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?
Certainly.
And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?
That is also true.
Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?
Yes.
Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.
Obviously.
And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?
Very true.
And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?
They ought.
Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again.
Certainly not.
The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.
That appears to be true.
We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?
Yes.
And the possibility has been acknowledged?
Yes.
The very great benefit has next to be established?
Quite so.
You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?
Yes.
I should like to ask you a question.
What is it?
Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?
The latter.
And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?
What a ridiculous questionl
You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?
By far the best.
And will not their wives be the best women?
Yes, by far the best.
And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?
There can be nothing better.
And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?
Certainly.
Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?
True.
Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking
"A fruit of unripe wisdom,"
and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about;—for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, _That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base._
Very true.
Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.
Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.
Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.
Go on; let me see.
The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect,—"that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent."
Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.
I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.
I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.
You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.
But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.
Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.
I have no objection; proceed.
First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care.
That is right, he said.
You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them; —they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word, I think?
Yes, he said;—necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.
True, I said; and this, Claucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.
Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.
Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?
Exactly.
And how can marriages be made most benencial?—that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?
In what particulars?
Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?
True.
And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?
From the best.
And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?
I choose only those of ripe age.
And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?
Certainly.
And the same of horses and animals in general?
Undoubtedly.
Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!
Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?
Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.
That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?
I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.
And we were very right.
And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.
How so?
Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.
Very true.
Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.
Certainly, he replied.
We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.
To be sure, he said.
And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.
True.
And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—
Yes—
The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.
Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.
They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the prooess of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.
You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.
Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?
Very true.
And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?
Which years do you mean to include?
A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.
Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour.
Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.
Very true, he replied.
And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.
Very true, he replied.
This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.
That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?
They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grand-children, and they will call the elder generation grand-fathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.
Quite right, he replied.
Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better—would you not?
Yes, certainly.
Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State,—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?
By all means.
Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?
There cannot.
And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?
No doubt.
Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?
Certainly.
Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms "mine" and "not mine," "his" and "not his:"
Exactly so.
And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms "mine" and "not mine" in the same way to the same thing?
Quite true.
Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.
Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.
Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?
Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.
It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.
Very good.
Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?
True.
All of whom will call one another citizens?
Of course.
But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?
Generally they call them masters, but in democratic, States they simply call them rulers.
And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?
They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.
And what do the rulers call the people?
Their maintainers and foster-fathers.
And what do they call them in other States?
Slaves.
And what do the rulers call one another in other States?
Fellow-rulers.
And what in ours?
Fellow-guardians.
Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?
Yes, very often.
And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?
Exactly.
But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?
Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.
Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in the use of the word "father," would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?
These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?
Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be "with me it is well" or "it is ill."
Most true.
And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?
Yes, and so they will.
And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call "my own," and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?
Yes, far more so than in other States.
And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?
That will be the chief reason.
And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?
That we acknowledged, and very rightly.
Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?
Certainly.
And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.
Right, he replied.
Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about "mine" and "not mine"; each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards a common end.
And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.
Of course they will.
Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity.
That is good, he said.
Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.
Certainly.
To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.
Clearly.
Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.
That is true, he replied.
Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?
Yes, there will be no want of peace.
And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.
None whatever.
I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvio is enough, and not worth speaking of.
Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.
And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.
How so?
The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honourable burial.
Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.
Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?
Yes, I remember.
And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?.
Certainly not.
At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up,into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole State to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, "half is more than the whole."
If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.
You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described —common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.
I agree with you, he replied.
The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible—as among other animals, so also among men—and if possible, in what way possible?
You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.
There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.
How?
'Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?
Yes, I have.
And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?
The idea is ridiculous, he said.
There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour.
That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.
True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?
I am far from saying that.
Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?
Clearly.
Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.
Yes, very important.
This then must be our first step,—to make our children spectators of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all will be well.
True.
Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?
That may be assumed.
And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?
True.
And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?
Very properly.
Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?
True.
Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.
I believe that you are right, he said.
Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?
By all means, I should say.
And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.
Certainly.
But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?
I approve.
And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?
To that too, I agree.
But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.
What is your proposal?
That he should kiss and be kissed by them.
Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.
capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?
Agreed.
Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.
Most true, he said.
Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with
"seats of precedence, and meats and full cups";
and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.
That, he replied, is excellent.
Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?
To be sure.
Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead
"They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men"?
Yes; and we accept his authority.
We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?
By all means.
And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.
That is very right, he said.
Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?
In what respect do you mean?
First of all, in regard to slavery. Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?
To spare them is infinitely better.
Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.
Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.
Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.
Very true.
And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanish-ness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?
Very like a dog, he said.
Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?
Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.
Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?
Very true.
Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?
May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?
Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?
Pray do.
Why, you see, there is a difference in the names "discord" and "war," and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.
That is a very proper distinction, he replied.
And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?
Very good, he said.
And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.
I agree.
Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.
Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.
And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?
It ought to be, he replied.
Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?
Yes, very civilized.
And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?
Most certainly.
And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?
Certainly not.
Then they will quarrel as those who Intend some day to be reconciled?
Certainly.
They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?
Just so.
And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor even suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?
I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.
Then let us enact this law also for our guardians:—that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.
Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good.
But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside:—Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means—the rest may be left.
If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate.
The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.
Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.
True, he replied; but what of that?
I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?
The approximation will be enough.
We are enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.
True, he said.
Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?
He would be none the worse.
Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?
To be sure.
And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?
Surely not, he replied.
That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.
What admissions?
I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you say?
I agree.
Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented—will not you?
Yes, I will.
Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.
Certainly, he replied.
I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.
What is it? he said.
Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.
Proceed.
_I said: Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,_ — _no, nor the human race, as I believe,_ — _and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day._ Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.
Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be "pared by their fine wits," and no mistake.
You got me into the scrape, I said.
And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.
I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.
Then now for a definition, he said.
Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.
Proceed.
I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.
I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.
Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet "honey pale," as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not adverse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth.
If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.
And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.
Very good.
And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner people,—but honour of some kind they must have.
Exactly.
Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?
The whole.
And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?
Yes, of the whole.
And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?
Very true, he said.
Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?
Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?
Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.
He said: Who then are the true philosophers?
Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.
That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?
To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.
What is the proposition?
That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?
Certainly.
And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?
True again.
And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?
Very true.
And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.
How do you distinguish them? he said.
The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.
True, he replied.
Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.
Very true.
And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?
I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.
But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake?
He is wide awake.
And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?
Certainly.
But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?
We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.
Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)
I answer that he knows something.
Something that is or is not?
Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?
And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?
Nothing can be more certain.
Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?
Yes, between them.
And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?
Certainly.
Do we admit the existence of opinion?
Undoubtedly.
As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?
Another faculty.
Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?
Yes.
And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.
What division?
I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?
Yes, I quite understand.
Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?
Yes.
And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?
Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.
And is opinion also a faculty?
Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion.
And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?
Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?
An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.
Yes.
Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject-matters?
That is certain.
Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?
Yes.
And opinion is to have an opinion?
Yes.
And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same as the subject-matter of knowledge?
Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.
Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject-matter of opinion?
Yes, something else.
Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?
Impossible.
He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?
Yes.
And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?
True.
Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?
True, he said.
Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?
Not with either.
And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?
That seems to be true.
But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?
In neither.
Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?
Both; and in no small degree.
And also to be within and between them?
Yes.
Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?
No question.
But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?
True.
And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?
There has.
Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,—the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.
True.
This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one—to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?
No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.
And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?—doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?
Quite true.
And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?
True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.
And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?
He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both, or neither.
Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.
That is quite true, he said.
Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being?
We have.
Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.
Quite true.
Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?
That is certain.
But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?
Neither can that be denied.
The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.
Yes, I remember.
Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?
I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.
But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.
Assuredly.
# **BOOK VI**
**A** ND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.
I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.
I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.
And what is the next question? he asked.
Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?
And how can we rightly answer that question?
Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State—let them be our guardians.
Very good.
Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?
There can be no question of that.
And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them—are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?
Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.
And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?
There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.
Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.
By all means.
In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.
What do you mean?
Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.
Agreed.
And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.
True.
And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?
What quality?
Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.
Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.
"May be," my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather "must be affirmed": for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.
Right, he said.
And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?
How can there be?
Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?
Never.
The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?
Assuredly.
But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.
True.
He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure—I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.
That is most certain.
Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.
Very true.
Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.
What is that?
There should be no secret comer of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.
Most true, he replied.
Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?
He cannot.
Or can such an one account death fearful?
No indeed.
Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?
Certainly not.
Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward —can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?
Impossible.
Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.
True.
There is another point which should be remarked.
What point?
Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.
Certainly not.
And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?
That is certain.
Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?
Yes.
Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?
Certainly.
And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?
Undoubtedly.
And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?
To proportion.
Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.
Certainly.
Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?
They are absolutely necessary, he replied.
And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to leam,—noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?
The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.
And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.
Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.
Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?
I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.
Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.
Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?
You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.
Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.
I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?
Of course, said Adeimantus.
Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you understand already.
Certainly.
Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far more extraordinary.
I will.
Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophyto be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature ; neither are "the wise to go to the doors of the rich"—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers.
Precisely so, he said.
For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.
Yes.
And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?
True.
Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?
By all means.
And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.
Yes, that was said.
Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?
Certainly, he said.
And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.
Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.
And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?
He will.
And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?
Impossible.
Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?
True, he replied.
Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.
Exactly.
And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked—and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.
What are these corruptions? he said.
I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.
Rare indeed.
And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!
What causes?
In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.
That is very singular, he replied.
Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State—you understand the sort of things—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.
I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.
Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.
And how am I to do so? he asked.
Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than what is not.
Very true.
There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.
Certainly.
And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?
There I think that you are right.
And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?
When is this accomplished? he said.
When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame —at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?
Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.
And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.
What is that?
The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.
Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.
Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?
None, he replied.
No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.
I quite assent, he replied.
Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.
What are you going to say?
Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceedsto teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?
Indeed he would.
And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?
No, nor am I likely to hear.
You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?
Certainly not.
Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?
Impossible.
And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?
They must.
And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?
That is evident.
Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence —these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.
Yes.
Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?
Certainly, he said.
And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?
No question.
Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he will one day possess.
That often happens, he said.
And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?
To be sure he will.
Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?
Far otherwise.
And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?
There can be no doubt of it.
And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?
Impossible.
Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?
We were quite right.
Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.
That is most true, he said.
And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.
That is certainly what people say.
Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?
Yes.
Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?
A most exact parallel.
What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?
There can be no question of it.
And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is a rank above them what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?
No doubt, he said.
Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;—or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.
Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.
A great work—yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.
The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been shown—is there anything more which you wish to say?
Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.
Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and enstranged;—as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human;—and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State is.
No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?
Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.
That was said, he replied.
Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.
What is there remaining?
The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; "hard is the good," as men say.
Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be complete.
I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.
In what manner?
At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.
But what ought to be their course?
Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.
How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.
Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.
You are speaking of a time which is not very near.
Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them —do you think that they ever did?
No indeed.
No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.
They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.
And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?
Quite right.
If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.
My opinion agrees with yours, he said.
But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?
I should imagine not, he replied.
O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind.
I quite agree with you, he said.
And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.
It is most unbecoming.
For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?
Impossible.
And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he will suffer from detraction.
Of course.
And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?
Anything but unskilful.
And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?
They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?
They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.
They will be very right, he said.
Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?
No doubt.
And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and thus they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.
Very true, he said.
And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?
Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.
And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?
Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.
Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?
They would not be so unreasonable.
Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?
Neither can they doubt this.
But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?
Surely not.
Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?
I think that they will be less angry.
Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?
By all means, he said.
Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?
Surely no man, he said.
And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—who will venture to affirm this?
Who indeed!
But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.
Yes, one is enough.
The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?
Certainly.
And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?
I think not.
But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.
We have.
And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.
Very good.
And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed;—how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?
Certainly.
I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.
I perfectly remember, he said.
Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now let me dare say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.
Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.
And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.
What do you mean? he said.
You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similiar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.
Very true, he said.
On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.
Quite true.
And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.
Certainly, he said.
And will they be a class which is rarely found?
Yes, indeed.
Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.
Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?
You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?
Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.
And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?
To what do you refer?
We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.
Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.
But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.
Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.
Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.
True.
The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.
What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?
Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!
A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?
Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?
Assuredly not.
You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?
Yes.
And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?
How ridiculous!
Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term "good"—this is of course ridiculous.
Most true, he said.
And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.
Certainly.
And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?
True.
There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.
There can be none.
Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.
Very true, he said.
Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things,—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?
Certainly not, he said.
I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.
That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.
And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?
Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?
Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.
True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.
Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?
Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.
And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?
Very true.
And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?
Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.
Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.
By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.
I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.
Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.
Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.
What?
The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them "many" is applied.
True, he said.
And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term "many" is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.
Very true.
The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.
Exactly.
And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
The sight, he said.
And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?
True.
But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?
No, I never have, he said.
Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?
Nothing of the sort.
No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?
Certainly not.
But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?
How do you mean?
Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.
Of what nature are you speaking?
Of that which you term light, I replied.
True, he said.
Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?
Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.
And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?
You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.
May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?
How?
Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?
No.
Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
By far the most like.
And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?
Exactly.
Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight.
True, he said.
And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind.
Will you be a little more explicit? he said.
Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?
Very true.
But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?
Certainly.
And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?
Just so.
Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher.
What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?
God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?
In what point of view?
You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?
Certainly.
In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.
Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!
Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies.
And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.
Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.
Then omit nothing, however slight.
I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.
You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy than I am playing upon the name (σùρανóς, óρατóς). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?
I have.
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?
Yes, I understand.
Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.
Very good.
Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?
Most undoubtedly.
Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.
In what manner?
Thus:—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former divisionas images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.
I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.
Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?
Yes, he said, I know.
And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?
That is true.
And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, .they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.
I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.
I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.
You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the sou!—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.
I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.
# **BOOK VII**
**A** ND now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:—Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.
I see.
And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.
You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?
True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?
And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?
Yes, he said.
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?
Very true.
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?
No question, he replied.
To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.
That is certain.
And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?
Far truer.
And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?
True, he said.
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.
Not all in a moment, he said.
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?
Certainly.
Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.
Certainly.
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?
Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?
Certainly, he would.
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,
"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,"
and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.
Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?
To be sure, he said.
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
No question, he said.
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.
I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.
Yes, very natural.
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?
Anything but surprising, he replied.
Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.
That, he said, is a very just distinction.
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.
They undoubtedly say this, he replied.
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.
Very true.
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?
Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.
And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?
Very true, he said.
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.
Very likely.
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the Islands of the Blest.
Very true, he replied.
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.
What do you mean?
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.
But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.
True, he said, I had forgotten.
Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.
Quite true, he replied.
And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?
Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stem necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.
Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.
Most true, he replied.
And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?
Indeed, I do not, he said.
And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.
No question.
Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics?
They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.
And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?
By all means, he replied.
The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?
Quite so.
And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?
Certainly.
What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?
Yes, that was said.
Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?
What quality?
Usefulness in war.
Yes, if possible.
There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?
Just so.
There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?
True.
Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?
No.
But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?
Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.
You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?
Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?
Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal application.
What may that be?
A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education.
What is that?
The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three —in a word, number and calculation:—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?
Yes.
Then the art of war partakes of them?
To be sure.
Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?
I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.
Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?
Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.
I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?
What is your notion?
It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.
Will you explain your meaning? he said.
I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say "yes" or "no" when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.
Explain, he said.
I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is imperatively demanded.
You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.
No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.
Then what is your meaning?
When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:—here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.
Very good.
You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.
What is it?
Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.
True.
And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.
There is not, he said.
But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?
You are quite right, he said.
And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?
Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.
Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.
True.
And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?
Certainly.
And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?
True.
The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.
Yes.
Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.
Very true.
Was not this the beginning of the enquiry "What is great?" and "What is small?"
Exactly so.
And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.
Most true.
This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.
I understand, he said, and agree with you.
And to which class do unity and number belong?
I do not know, he replied.
Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being, but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks "What is absolute unity?" This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.
And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?
Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?
Certainly.
And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?
Yes.
And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?
Yes, in a very remarkable manner.
Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.
That is true.
And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?
Certainly.
Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.
That is excellent, he said.
Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeperl
How do you mean?
I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.
That is very true.
Now, suppose a person were to say to them: 0 my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible,—what would they answer?
They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought.
Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?
Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.
And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been.
Very true, he said.
And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.
You will not.
And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.
I agree.
Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?
You mean geometry?
Exactly so.
Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.
Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry—whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.
True, he said.
Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?
Yes, that is what we assert.
Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians.
How so?
They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.
Certainly, he said.
Then must not a further admission be made?
What admission?
That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.
That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.
Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.
Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.
Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.
Of what kind? he said.
There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.
Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.
Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?
Let us do so, he replied.
And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?
I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.
I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.
I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.
Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.
What was the mistake? he said.
After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.
That is true, Soorites; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.
Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into -light.
Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?
Yes, I said.
And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?
Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.
True, he said.
Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.
The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.
Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not to me.
And what then would you say?
I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.
What do you mean? he asked.
You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.
I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?
I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by, sight.
True, he replied.
The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.
No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.
And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.
I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.
Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.
That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.
Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?
No, he said, not without thinking.
Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.
But where are the two?
There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.
And what may that be?
The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?
Yes, he replied.
But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.
What is that?
There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.
Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbour's wall ——one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting their ears before their understanding.
You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.
That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.
A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless.
Very true, he said.
Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.
I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.
What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?
Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.
But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?
Neither can this be supposed.
And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.
Exactly, he said.
Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?
True.
But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water [which are divine], and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image) —this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world—this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.
I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain,and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.
Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident.
Doubtless, he replied.
But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.
Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.
And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?
Impossible, he said.
Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider?
Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?
At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two fer intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:—
As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows.
But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been.
As far as I understand, he said, I agree.
And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?
Yes, he said; how can I deny it?
And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science;—dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.
In all that I should most certainly agree with you.
And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?
Certainly not.
Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?
Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.
Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go?
I agree, he said.
But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.
Yes, clearly.
You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?
Certainly, he said.
The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.
And what are these?
Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.
Very true, he replied.
Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.
Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.
The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.
What do you mean?
In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.
Certainly, he said.
And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?
To be sure.
And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities States and individuals unconsciously err; and the State makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.
That is very true, he said.
All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.
That would not be creditable.
Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.
In what respect?
I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.
Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.
But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.
Of course.
And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.
Why not?
Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.
Very true.
Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.
That is a very rational notion, he said.
Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?
Yes, I remember.
The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things—labours, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.
At what age?
At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.
Certainly, he replied.
After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.
Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.
Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.
I agree with you, he said.
These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are more steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.
Why great caution?
Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?
What evil? he said.
The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.
Quite true, he said.
Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?
In what way make allowance?
I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?
If you please.
Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.
He will.
But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.
Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?
In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.
That is true.
There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.
True.
Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before?
Impossible.
And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?
He cannot.
And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?
Unquestionably.
Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.
Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.
Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.
Certainly.
There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.
Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.
And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.
Too true, he said.
But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of the pursuit.
Very true, he said.
And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?
Very true.
Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?
Would you say six or four years? he asked.
Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.
And how long is this stage of their lives to last?
Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation; the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demi-gods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.
You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.
Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.
There you are right, he said,. since we have made them to share in all things like the men.
Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?
How will they proceed?
They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.
Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.
Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image—there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.
There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.
# **BOOK VIII**
**A** ND so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?
That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.
Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?
Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.
True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.
There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was riot also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have. now arrived.
Your recollection, I said, is most exact.
Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.
Yes, if I can, I will, I said.
I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.
That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.
Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.
Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of "oak and rock," and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?
Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.
Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?
Certainly.
Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.
We have.
Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.
Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.
Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.
That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.
First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.
Very true, he said.
In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us "how discord first arose"? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?
How would they address us?
After this manner:—A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution:—In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number, but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution [or squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times as great (400=4x100), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i. e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five (7X7=49X100=4900), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five=50+50 =100); and a hundred cubes of three (27x100=2700 +4900+400=8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by under-valuing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.
Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.
Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?
And what do the Muses say next?
When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.
I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.
And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?
Very true.
Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.
True, he said.
In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this State will resemble the former.
True.
But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar.
Yes.
Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.
That is most true, he said.
And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured gymnastic more than music.
Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.
Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen,—the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.
Assuredly, he said.
Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.
Very true, he replied.
Now what man answers to this form of government—how did he come into being, and what is he like?
I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.
Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different.
In what respects?
He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.
Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.
Such an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.
Who was that? said Adeimantus.
Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.
Good, he said.
Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.
Exactly.
His origin is as follows:—He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.
And how does the son come into being?
The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.
Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.
And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things—hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others—is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.
You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.
Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?
We have.
Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,
"Is set over against another State";
or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.
By all means.
I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.
And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?
A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.
I understand, he replied.
Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?
Yes.
Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.
How?
The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the laws?
Yes, indeed.
And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.
Likely enough.
And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.
True.
And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.
Clearly.
And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected.
That is obvious.
And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.
They do so.
They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.
Very true.
And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.
Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?
First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?
You mean that they would shipwreck?
Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?
I should imagine so.
Except a city?—or would you include a city?
Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.
This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?
Clearly.
And here is another defect which is quite as bad.
What defect?
The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.
That, surely, is at least as bad.
Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.
How discreditable!
And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings—they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?
Anything but well.
There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.
What evil?
A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.
Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.
The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.
True.
But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?
As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.
May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?
Just so, Socrates.
And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.
Most true, he said.
Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.
Clearly.
Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?
Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.
And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?
Certainly, we may be so bold.
The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?
True.
Such, then, is the torm and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.
Very likely.
Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.
By all means.
Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?
How?
A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.
Nothing more likely.
And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock am1 bition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making. and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?
Most true, he replied.
And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.
Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.
And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?
Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.
Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.
Very good.
First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?
Certainly.
Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.
True.
He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?
He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.
You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.
I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus or given him chief honour.
Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him drone-like desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?
True.
Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?
Where must I look?
You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.
Aye.
It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.
To be sure.
Yes, indeed, my dear friends, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.
Yes, and they will be strong in him too.
The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.
True.
For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.
I should expect so.
And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.
Very true.
Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the oligarchical State?
There can be no doubt.
Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.
That, he said, is our method.
Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise?—The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?
What then?
The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?
To be sure.
There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same State to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.
That is tolerably clear.
And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?
Yes, often.
And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution.
That is true.
On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting—that is, their money—into some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.
Yes, he said, there are plenty of them—that is certain.
The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy:
What other?
One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters:—Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.
Yes, they will be greatly lessened.
At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.
Very true.
They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.
Yes, quite as indifferent.
Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another "Our warriors are not good for much"?
Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.
And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasions may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.
Yes, surely.
And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.
Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.
And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.
Clearly, he said.
In the first place, are they not free; and is npt the city full of freedom and frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?
'Tis said so, he replied.
And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?
Clearly.
Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?
There will.
This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.
Yes.
Yes, my good sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.
Why?
Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democray as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.
He will be sure to have patterns enough.
And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed—there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?
For the moment, yes.
And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?
Yes, he replied, many and many a one.
See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the "don't care" about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city—as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend.
Yes, she is of a noble spirit.
These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.
We know her well.
Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.
Very good, he said.
Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?
Exactly.
And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?
Obviously.
Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?
I should.
Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.
True.
We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?
We are not.
And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right. in saying that all these are unnecessary?
Yes, certainly.
Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?
Very good.
Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?
That is what I should suppose.
The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?
Yes.
But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?
Certainly.
And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?
Very true.
May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?
Certainly.
And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?
True.
And the drone of whom we spoke was he who has surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?
Very true.
Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.
What is the process?
When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?
Inevitably.
And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?
Certainly.
And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.
It must be so.
And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.
Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.
And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.
Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.
They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.
Very true.
At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.
None better.
False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place.
They are certain to do so.
And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.
Yes, with a will.
And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.
Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.
After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.
Very true, he said.
Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others —whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.
Yes, he said; that is the way with him.
Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.
Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.
Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many;—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.
Just so.
Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.
Let that be his place, he said.
Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tryanny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.
Quite true, he said.
Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?—that it has a democratic origin is evident.
Clearly.
And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?
How?
The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and tne means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth —am I not right?
Yes.
And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?
True.
And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?
What good?
Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.
Yes; the saying is in every body's mouth.
I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.
How so?
When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.
Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.
Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?
Certainly not.
By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.
How do you mean?
I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.
Yes, he said, that is the way.
And these are not the only evils, I said—there are several lesser ones: In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.
Quite true, he said.
The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.
Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?
That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at any body who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.
When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.
And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.
Yes, he said, I know it too well.
Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.
Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?
The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty over-masters democracy—the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.
True.
The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.
Yes, the natural order.
And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?
As we might expect.
That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?
Just so, he replied.
Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.
A very just comparison.
These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.
Yes, by all means, he said.
Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.
That is true.
And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.
How so?
Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffei a word to be said on the other side; hence m democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.
Very true, he said.
Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.
What is that?
They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.
Naturally so.
They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.
Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.
And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.
That is pretty much the case, he said.
The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.
True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.
And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?
Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.
And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?
What else can they do?
And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?
True.
And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.
That is exactly the truth.
Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.
True.
The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.
Yes, that is their way.
This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.
Yes, that is quite clear.
How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.
What tale?
The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?
O yes.
And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizen; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a tyrant?
Inevitably.
This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?
The same.
After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.
That is clear.
And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.
Yes, he said, that is their usual way.
Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—"Let not the people's friend," as they say, "be lost to them."
Exactly.
The people readily assent; all their fears are for him—they have none for themselves.
Very true.
And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,
"By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward,"
And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.
But if he is caught he dies.
Of course.
And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not "larding the plain" with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.
No doubt, he said.
And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.
Yes, he said, let us consider that.
At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes every one whom he meets;—he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to every one!
Of course, he said.
But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.
To be sure.
Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?
Clearly.
And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.
He must.
Now he begins to grow unpopular.
A necessary result.
Then some of those who joined in setting him up and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.
Yes, that may be expected.
And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.
He cannot.
And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.
Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.
Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.
If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.
What a blessed alternative, I said:—to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all !
Yes, that is the alternative.
And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?
Certainly.
And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?
They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.
By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.
Yes, he said, there are.
But will he not desire to get them on the spot?
How do you mean?
He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol them in his body-guard.
To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.
What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends.
Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.
Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.
Of course.
Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.
Why so?
Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,
"Tyrants are wise by living with the rase";
and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.
Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.
And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.
Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.
But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.
Very true.
Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour —the greatest honour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.
True.
But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.
If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.
And when these fail?
Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.
You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions ?
Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves.
But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.
By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.
Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?
Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.
Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.
True, he said.
Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?
Yes, quite enough, he said.
# **BOOK IX**
**L** AST of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?
Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.
There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.
What question?
I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be confused.
Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.
Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them—either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.
Which appetites do you mean?
I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food—which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.
Most true, he said.
But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one—I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.
I quite agree.
In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.
Yes, I agree.
And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?
True.
And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors; he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?
Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.
And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.
I can imagine him.
Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father:—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts—a sort of monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.
Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.
And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.
Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.
And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?
I should not wonder.
Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?
He has.
And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?
That he will.
And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?
Assuredly.
Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?
Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.
I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.
That is certain.
Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.
They are indeed, he said.
His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.
True.
Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property.
Of course.
When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by Love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them?
Yes, that is sure to be the case.
He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.
He must.
And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.
No doubt he will.
And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.
Very true.
And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.
Yes, probably.
And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?
Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.
But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some newfangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?
Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.
Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.
He is indeed, he replied.
He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of Love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?
Yes, indeed, he said.
And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.
What sort of mischief?
For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cutpurses, foot-pads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.
A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.
Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.
Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.
If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.
Exactly.
When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.
Yes, truly.
They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.
Certainly not.
And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?
No question.
Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?
Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.
Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.
Most true.
And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.
That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.
And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?
Yes, he said, inevitably.
And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?
Certainly.
And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?
To be sure.
Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?
They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.
There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every comer of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.
A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.
And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger —he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?
That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.
Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will answer our enquiries.
By all means.
Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?
What do you mean? he asked.
Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved ?
No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.
And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?
Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.
Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity—the best elements in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.
Inevitably.
And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, or of a slave?
He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.
And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?
Utterly incapable.
And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?
Certainly.
And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?
Poor.
And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable ?
True.
And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?
Yes, indeed.
Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?
Certainly not.
And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?
Impossible.
Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?
And I was right, he said.
Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?
I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.
There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.
What do you mean?
I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.
Then who is more miserable?
One of whom I am about to speak.
Who is that?
He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.
From what has been said, I gather that you are right.
Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.
Very true, he said.
Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.
What is your illustration?
The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.
Yes, that is the difference.
You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?
What should they fear?
Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?
Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.
Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?
Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.
The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants.
Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.
And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?
His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.
And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.
Very true, he said.
And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own person—the tyrannical man, I mean—whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all—will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.
Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.
Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?
Certainly.
He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions, and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?
Very true, he said.
Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.
No man of any sense will dispute your words.
Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.
The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.
Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Aristón [the best] has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?
Make the proclamation yourself, he said.
And shall I add, "whether seen or unseen by gods and men"?
Let the words be added.
Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.
What is that?
The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the, individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.
Of what nature?
It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also three desires and governing powers.
How do you mean? he said.
There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.
That is true, he said.
If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money
I agree with you.
Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?
True.
Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be suitable?
Extremely suitable.
On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.
Far less.
"Lover of wisdom," "lover of knowledge," are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?
Certainly.
One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?
Yes.
Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?
Exactly.
And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?
Very true.
Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?
True, he said.
And the lover of honour—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?
Very true.
And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?
There can be no doubt of that, he replied.
Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know who speaks truly?
I cannot myself tell, he said.
Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?
There cannot be a better, he said.
Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?
The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted—or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.
Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?
Yes, very great.
Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?
Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.
His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?
Far better.
And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?
Certainly.
Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?
What faculty?
Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.
Yes.
And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?
Certainly.
If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?
Assuredly.
Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?
Clearly.
But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges—
The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.
And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.
Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.
And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?
Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself than the money-maker.
Last comes the lover of gain?
Very true, he said.
Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?
Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?
I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.
Proceed.
Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?
True.
And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?
There is.
A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?
Yes.
You remember what people say when they are sick?
What do they say?
That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.
Yes, I know, he said.
And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?
I have.
And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?
Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.
Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?
Doubtless, he said.
Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?
So it would seem.
But can that which is neither become both?
I should say not.
And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?
Yes.
But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in a mean between them?
Yes.
How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?
Impossible.
This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?
That is the inference.
Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.
What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?
There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.
Most true, he said.
Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.
No.
Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.
That is true.
And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?
Yes.
Shall I give you an illustration of them?
Let me hear.
You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?
I should.
And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?
To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?
But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?
No doubt.
All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?
Yes.
Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain. to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white—can you wonder, I say, at this?
No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.
Look at the matter thus:—Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?
Yes.
And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?
True.
And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?
Certainly.
And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?
Clearly, from that which has more.
What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way:—Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?
Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.
And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?
Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.
And of truth in the same degree?
Yes.
And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?
Necessarily.
Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?
Far less.
And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?
Yes.
What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?
Of course.
And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?
Unquestionably.
Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.
Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.
Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.
Something of that sort must inevitably happen.
And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?
Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.
Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?
Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.
And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?
Exactly.
But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?
True.
And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?
Yes.
And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?
Clearly.
And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance?
Yes.
And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?
Yes.
Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?
Certainly.
But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?
Inevitably.
Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?
Will you tell me?
There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.
How do you mean?
I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?
Yes.
And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?
He will.
And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?
Yes, he is third.
Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?
Manifestly.
The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure.
Certainly.
And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.
Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.
Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is complete, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.
What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!
Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years.
Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.
Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?
Immeasurably greater.
Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?
Yes, that was said.
Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.
What shall we say to him?
Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.
Of what sort?
An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.
There are said to have been such unions.
Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.
You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.
Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.
That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.
And now join them, and let the three grow into one.
That has been accomplished.
Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature.
I have done so, he said.
And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.
Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.
To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.
Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.
And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?
Yes, from every point of view.
Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. "Sweet sir," we will say to him, "what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?" He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he now?
Not if he has any regard for my opinion.
But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: "Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin."
Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for him.
Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?
Clearly.
And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?
Yes.
And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?
Very true.
And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?
True, he said.
And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.
Such appears to be the reason.
And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.
True, he said.
And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.
Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.
From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?
From no point of view at all.
What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.
Certainly, he said.
To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?
Clearly, he said.
In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?
Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.
And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?
Certainly not, he said.
He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.
Very true.
And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private, or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?
Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.
By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.
I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth?
In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.
I think so, he said.
# **BOOK X**
**O** F THE many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.
To what do you refer?
To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.
What do you mean?
Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them.
Explain the purport of your remark.
Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.
Very good, he said.
Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.
Put your question.
Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.
A likely thing, then, that I should know.
Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.
Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?
Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form:—do you understand me?
I do.
Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not?
Yes.
But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.
True.
And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea —that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?
Impossible.
And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of him.
Who is he?
One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.
What an extraordinary man!
Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.
He must be a wizard and no mistake.
Ohl you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?
What way?
An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.
Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.
Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another —a creator of appearances, is he not?
Of course.
But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?
Yes, he said, but not a real bed.
And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?
Yes, I did.
Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.
At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.
No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.
No wonder.
Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is?
If you please.
Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?
No.
There is another which is the work of the carpenter?
Yes.
And the work of the painter is a third?
Yes.
Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?
Yes, there are three of them.
God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.
Why is that?
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.
Very true, he said.
God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.
So we believe.
Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?
Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things.
And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed?
Yes.
But would you call the painter a creator and maker?
Certainly not.
Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?
I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.
Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?
Certainly, he said.
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?
That appears to be so.
Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?—I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?
The latter.
As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.
What do you mean?
I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.
Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.
Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?
Of appearance.
Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.
Certainly.
And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.
Most true.
And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?
The question, he said, should by all means be considered.
Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?
I should say not.
The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.
Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.
Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. "Friend Homer," then we say to him, "if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?" Is there any city which he might name?
I think not, said Claucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.
Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?
There is not.
Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?
There is absolutely nothing of the kind.
But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?
Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?
Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries: "You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education"—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?
Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.
Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures.
Quite so.
In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.
Yes, he said.
They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?
Exactly.
Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?
Yes.
Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.
Proceed.
Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?
Yes.
And the worker in leather and brass will make them?
Certainly.
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.
Most true.
And may we not say the same of all things ?
What?
That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?
Yes.
And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.
True.
Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer ; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?
Of course.
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?
True.
The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?
True.
But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?
Neither.
Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?
I suppose not.
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?
Nay, very much the reverse.
And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?
Just so.
Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?
Very true.
And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?
Certainly.
And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?
What do you mean?
I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?
True.
And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.
True.
And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?
Most true.
And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?
To be sure.
And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?
True.
But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?
Very true.
Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?
True.
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?
Certainly.
And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?
No doubt.
This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.
Exactly.
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.
Very true.
And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?
Probably the same would be true of poetry.
Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.
By all means.
We may state the question thus:—Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?
No, there is nothing else.
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?
And we were right, he said.
Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.
What was the omission?
Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?
Yes.
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?
The latter, he said, is the truer statement.
Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?
It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.
When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?
True.
There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?
True.
But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?
Certainly.
One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?
How do you mean?
The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.
What is most required? he asked.
That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishir.g the cry of sorrow by the healing art.
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?
Clearly.
And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?
Indeed, we may.
And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.
Certainly.
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?
Clearly.
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.
Exactly.
But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.
Yes, of course I know.
But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.
Very true, he said.
Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?
No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.
Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.
What point of view?
If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.
How very truel
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness; —the case of pity is repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.
Quite true, he said.
And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.
I cannot deny it.
Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things —they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.
That is most true, he said.
And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of "the yelping hound howling at her lord," or of one "mighty in the vain talk of fools," and "the mob of sages circumventing Zeus," and the "subtle thinkers who are beggars after all"; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?
Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.
Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?
Certainly.
And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?
Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.
If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.
And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.
What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.
Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?
Say rather "nothing," he replied.
And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?
Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?
Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?
He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?
Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it.
I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.
Listen then.
I am attending.
There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?
Yes, he replied.
Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?
Yes.
And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?
Yes, he said.
And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?
True.
The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.
Certainly not.
If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?
That may be assumed.
Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?
Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.
But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?
Yes.
Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?
Certainly not.
And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?
It is, he replied.
Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection—this we shall absolutely deny?
Very true.
And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?
Yes, he said, there is reason in that.
Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.
And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.
But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?
Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.
True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.
Yes, that can hardly be.
But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?
Certainly.
That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.
Very true.
But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us —any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.
What do you mean? he said.
The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?
Certainly not.
Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.
Where then?
At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.
True, he replied.
And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.
Very true.
And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.
Certainly not, he said.
Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?
What did I borrow?
The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?
I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.
Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearancewhich is hers also, and which she gives to her own.
The demand, he said, is just.
In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.
Granted.
And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?
True.
And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?
Certainly.
Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?
Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.
And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?
Certainly.
Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?
That is my conviction.
And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.
True.
And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?
Certainly, he said, what you say is true.
These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.
Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.
And yet, I said, all these are as nothing, either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.
Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.
Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:—He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, "Where is Ardiaeus the Great?" (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: "He comes not hither and will never come. And this," said he, "was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell." And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.
Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the eighth [or moon] coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third [Venus] has the whitest light; the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: "Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—Cod is justified." When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disiegard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.
And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: "Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair." And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had.been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings.About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.
All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them ir. reversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunder-storm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.
And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.
Translated by A. J. Murray. Loeb Classical Library.
Iliad xxiv. 348·
Cp. Rep. x., p. 666.
Odyssey xi. 601 foll.
Ib. xi. 582.
Borrowed by Milton, Paradise Lost, viii. 2, 3.
Reading sµiv.
Iliad xxi. 308.
Works and Days 264 foll.
Reading φɩλεiν καì έπαɩνεɩν καì φíλoυ τiυí _κ.τ.λ._
Il. x. 224.
Probably a play of words on φαλαρòs "bald-headed."
Iliad ii. 408, and xvii. 588.
Ib. x. 224.
Cp. Prot., p. 97.
Cp. Rep. v., p. 484.
Cp. Arist. Politics, v. 11, S 15.
Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 4, § 6.
Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, § 3.
A fragment of the Sthenoboea of Euripides.
Odyssey, λ. 632.
Eurip. Hyppolytus, 1. 622.
Cp. Plato, I. Alcibiades.
Cp. Plato, Gorgias.
Supra p. 150.
"Will you have a very drunken man?" etc., a few lines above.
From Pope's Homer, Iliad xi. 514.
Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 5, § 16.
In allusion to the two proverbs, _olvos κ_ αi παiδες _άληθεiς_ , and _olvos καi ăλnθεɩα._
Cp. supra p. 125.
Aristoph. Clouds, 362.
Cp. Gorg.
But cp. Rep. x., p. 682.
Cp. Plato, Meno.
Cp. Plato, Apology.
Cp Milton, Comus, 463 foll.:—
"But when lust,
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,
The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose,
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres,
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,
As loath to leave the body that it lov'd,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state."
Cp. Rep. x., pp. 693-94.
Cp. Revelation, esp. c. xxi. v. 18 ff.
Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.
Reading φυλξασθα **καi** λαθεiν, ouτoς, _κ.τ.λ._
Reading Γγη _τ_ Kρoiσoυ τou Δυδou _πρoγδνw._
Seven against Thebes, 574.
Hesiod, Works and Days, 230.
Homer, Odyssey xix. 109.
Eumolpus.
Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.
Homer, Iliad ix. 493.
Placing the comma after _γpavσl,_ and not after γiγoµένoiς.
Il. XXIV. 527.
Il. ii. 69.
Ib. xx.
Od. xvii- 485.
Omitting κατά Øαντασíας.
From a lost play.
Od. ix. 489.
II. xx. 64.
Ib. xxiii. 103.
Od. x. 495.
Il. xvi. 856.
lb. xxiii. 100.
Od. xxiv. 6.
Il. xxiv. 10.
Ib. xviii. 23.
Ib. xxii. 414.
Ib. xviii. 54.
Il. xxii. 168.
Ib. xvi. 433.
Il. i. 599.
Od. xvii. 383 sq.
Or, "if his words are accompanied by actions."
Il. iv. 412.
Od. iii. 8.
Ib. iv. 431.
Ib. i. 225.
Od. ix. 8.
Ib. xii. 342.
Il. xiv. 342.
Od. viii. 266
Od. xx. 17.
Quoted by Suidas as attribute to Hesiod.
Il. ix. 515.
Ib. xxiv. 175.
Cp. infra x., p. 658
Il. xxii. 15 sq.
Il xxi. 130, 223 sq.
Ib. xxiii. 151.
Ib. xxii. 394
Ib xxiii. 175
From the Niobe of Acschylus.
i. e., the four notes of the tetrachord.
Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of paconic rhythms which are in the ratio of ; in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, which are in the ratio of ; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of or .
Cp. supra ii., p. 339
Making the answer of Socrates begin at καl γάρ πρδς κ.τ.λ.
Il. iv. 218.
Cp. Plato, Laws.
Or, "that for their own good you are making these people miserable."
Od. i. 352.
Reading _µń δεiν_ dνrπpάτεƖν, without a comma after _**δεɩν.**_
Od. xx. 17.
Reading πρoστατńσετoν with Bekker; or, if the reading πρoστńσετoν, which is found in the MSS., be adopted, then the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence: "Music and gymnastic will place in authority over ..." This is very awkward, and the awkwardness is increased by the necessity of changing the subject at πηρńσετoν.
Reading έτɩ έγώ ε _l_ π _v_.
Or, inserting _k_ ai! before _**voµlµωv,**_ "a deceiver about beauty or goodness or principles of justice or law."
Reading _**ω**_ στ _ **e εv µε παpαµvθei.**_
Reading with Paris A. καì καλovύ ...
Reading _**l**_ **ατρδ** _ **v µεv l**_ **ατρɩκò** _ **v**_ τń _v **ψvχηv Ծv**_ **τα.**
Cp. supra iv., PP- 413 ff.
**II.** vii. 321,
II. viii. 162.
Probably Works and Days, 121 foll.
Reading στραγγε _v_ oµεέ _v_ ψ.
Or, applying δπως δέ _κυβερνńσεɩ_ to the mutineers, "But only understanding (έ _παtoντaς_ ) that he (the mutinous pilot) must rule in spite of other people, never considering that there is an art of command which may be practised in combination with the pilot's art."
Or, taking παρàin another sense, "trained to virtue on their principles."
Putting a comma after _τών αναγκαlων._
Or, "will they not deserve to be called sophisms," ...
Heracleitus said that the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning.
Reading _κατηκбщ or κατηκбoɩs._
Reading ń κα έάv oύτω _θεwνταɩ_ without a question, and _άλλolαν rot:_ or, retaining the question and taking ά _λλolαν δóξαν_ in a new sense: "Do you mean to say really that, viewing him in this light, they will be of another mind from yours, and answer in another strain?"
Cp. supra iv., p. 437.
Or, separating _καì µάλα_ from ϭ _ξɩoν,_ "True, he said, and a noble thought": or ăξɩoν τϭ _δɩανóηµα_ may be a gloss.
Reading ά _νńρ καλós_ : or reading ά _νńρ καλώς,_ "I quite well knew from the very first, that you, &c."
A play upon _τoκós,_ which means both "offspring" and "interest."
Reading _δɩανooù._
Reading ă _νɩσα._
Reading ώ _νπερ έκεiνo εìκóνων._
Reading _παρóντα._
In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.
Reading _oνσαν έ_ πάνoδoν.
Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units
Or; "close alongside of their neighbour's instruments, as if to catch a sound from them."
0mitting ένταùθα δέ _**πρϭ** s φαντϭµατα._ The word θεɩα is bracketed by Stallbaum.
A play upon the word _vδµos_ , which means both "law" and "strain."
_γραµµsά_ literally "lines," probably the starting-point of a race-course.
i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.
Probably the numbers, 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first=the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 38, 43, 58, which together=68=216.
Or the first a square which is 100x100=10,000. The whole number will then be 17,5oo=a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.
Reading _πρµńkη δέ._
Or, "consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters," &C.=100.
Cp. supra viii., p. 586.
Omitting ń τɩνos
Reading **κατ έ** _Tiµα_ µάλστα Eù, ń _v_ δ έγw, according to Schneider's excellent emendation.
Omitting τí µńν έφη.
Or, "the philosophical temper of the condemned."
Herod. i. 5 5.
Or, "opinions or appetites such as are deemed to be good."
Reading with Grasere and Hermann _τí oτώµεθα,_ and omitting oύϭέν, which is not found in the best MSS.
729 nearly equals the number of days and nights in the year.
Or, "take up his abode there."
Omitting eis.
Or, "with his nouns and verbs."
Reading εìδωλoπoɩoùντα ..... ά _φεστώτα_.
Or, if we accept Madvig's ingenious but unnecessary emendation άσóµεθα, "At all events we will sing, that" &c.
Reading άπελυσάµεθα.
Reading ńµών.
Reading αύ _τó_ χ _εɩρα_ ς.
Reading καì ŏτɩ.
Reading _ε_ ì _κoστńν._
| 2024-04-04T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2898 |
For over 60 years nuclear power has been used to generate electricity and is responsible for around 16% of the electrical energy produced globally. This percentage is presumably going to increase, as countries depart from the use of fossil fuels in the pursuit of an energy source that will make up any shortfall this will cause.
Image credit: Shutterstock | vlastas
With more and more nuclear reactors becoming active and increases in fuel consumption, an issue is raised: there is no conclusive method to handle the spent fuel. Vitrification of nuclear waste in glass is one accepted solution, yet there is still room for improvement in this method.
The Issue of Nuclear Waste
One major issue with nuclear power is what to do with the waste products when the fuel has been exhausted. Although no longer suitable to generate power, this waste is extremely dangerous if stored incorrectly.
Highly radioactive and the most problematic waste, known as ‘high level’ nuclear waste (HLW), has an extremely long half-life that necessitates cooling and containment due to the elemental decay, which significantly emits heat and radiation.
Furthermore, numerous radioactive isotopes such as Tc-99, Se-79, and I-129 are mobile in water, which requires additional measures so that their ability to move into the groundwater is reduced. Secondary waste streams can also present issues as this waste can contain large amounts of molybdenum and noble metals.
Nuclear Vitrification in Glass
One method of long-term storage and disposal is using glass for nuclear waste vitrification. HLW immobilization has been used for over 40 years in most countries that have a nuclear power program, including France, UK, Germany, Belgium, Russia, USA and Japan. Vitrification is the processing and transformation of the spent fuel into a glass.
The relative insolubility of glass makes it desirable as a form for long-term storage as well as it being a compact and solid material. This form allows for easier storage and handling, thus saving space and reducing costs. Glass also possesses high chemical durability, which means that it can remain in a corrosive environment for thousands or even millions of years without being compromised. Often thought of as a fragile material, a properly treated block of borosilicate glass is incredibly resilient.
Process of Nuclear Waste Vitrification in Glass
Vitrification as a process is quite simple but the execution can prove to be difficult. Firstly, waste is dried, then heated to convert the nitrates to oxides. Glass-forming additives are blended with the waste material and heated again to around 1000 °C. Molten liquid is then poured into an appropriate containment vessel that will cool and form the glass. Once solidified, the final vitreous product has consolidated the waste contaminants in its macro- and micro-structure, immobilizing the hazardous waste constituents.
Borosilicate and aluminophosphate are the two main types of glass currently used to immobilize nuclear waste. Both of these materials allow for high waste loadings and can render large amounts of actinides inactive. For example, borosilicate glasses can house up to 7.2 mass pct of PuO 2 .
Advantages and Limitations of Nuclear Waste Vitrification in Glass
Despite the fact that it is often the preferred method of waste storage, the current glass vitrification technique has its drawbacks, both with the requisite setup and materials used. The initial investment cost is high as well as increased operational costs and complex technology requiring qualified personnel for the process of vitrification.
This makes it most economically viable in locations where the availability of radioactive waste with stable composition is in relatively large volumes, such as HLW from nuclear power plants.
The current generation of glasses cannot deal with large amounts of MoO 3 and noble metals that come from secondary waste streams. The amount of waste that can be loaded into the material is limited due to these compounds being poorly soluble in borosilicate glasses; increasing process time and material costs.
Mo-Sci Leading Glass Manufacturer
For the long-term success of nuclear power it is clear that vitrification is of vital importance. Recognizing that there must also be improvement in the materials, Mo-Sci has started working on new types of glass that can immobilize a higher percentage of waste, as well as developing methods within the processing that can speed up the vitrification.
This includes an iron phosphate waste form with the ability to contain 40 wt% of the simulated molybdenum-rich nuclear waste. This nuclear waste vitrified glass is prepared by melting the mixture of simulated waste components and iron phosphate glass additives in a commercial-scale cold crucible induction melter (CCIM). When the waste form was measured for chemical durability, it was determined to be as good as or better than that of borosilicate glass.
The CCIM melting technology can also accelerate the processing of waste forms: as it removes the metal electrodes that directly contact the molten glass and refractory used to contain the melt, it is also safer and less costly than other melting technologies.
This innovative CCIM-processed iron phosphate waste form could instigate great savings in time and money relative to the industry’s need to remediate nuclear waste, and strengthen the appeal of nuclear power as a choice for the future.
References
Thompson, L. (2010) Vitrification of Nuclear Waste http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/thompson2/
Criscenti, L. et al. (2013). An international initiative on long-term behavior of high-level nuclear waste glass. Materials Today, 16 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mattod.2013.06.008
Ojovan, M. I., & Lee, W. E. (2011). Glassy Wasteforms for Nuclear Waste Immobilization, 42 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11661-010-0525-7
Ojovan, M. I. (2007). Glasses for Nuclear Waste Immobilization, WM’07 Conference. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267700284_Glasses_for_Nuclear_Waste_Immobilization/download
Cheol-Woon, K. (2018) Iron Phosphate Waste Forms for Nuclear Waste Disposal https://mo-sci.com/iron-phosphate-nuclear-waste-disposal
This information has been sourced, reviewed and adapted from materials provided by Mo-Sci Corp.
For more information on this source, please visit Mo-Sci Corp. | 2024-04-13T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3325 |
With this set you have a variety of possibilities to create a unique artwork. You can mix or match the textures and masks together. Or you can use them along with other textures and frames. Experiment with different blending modes and/or opacity.
Create easy a nice composition for your scrapbook project or use them to create a new unique artwork from scratch.
Details
With this set you have a variety of possibilities to create a unique artwork. You can mix or match the textures and masks together. Or you can use them along with other textures and frames. Experiment with different blending modes and/or opacity.
Create easy a nice composition for your scrapbook project or use them to create a new unique artwork from scratch. | 2023-10-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2074 |
Rehabilitation Case Manager
Rehabilitation Case Manager
What is a rehabilitation case manager?
A rehabilitation case manager is a trained professional who helps to plan, organize, coordinate, monitor, and evaluate services and resources for a rehabilitation patient. Case managers usually do not provide actual, direct, patient care, but may work either as part of the rehabilitation team (internal case manager) or for the patient's insurance company (external case manager). A case manager is responsible for ensuring quality and cost-effective health care services, and serves as a patient advocate.
Case managers are often rehabilitation nurses or clinical social workers. They may practice in a variety of settings, including the following: | 2024-05-29T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5470 |
load("docdraw.mac");
docdraw2d("figures/draw_bars",
key = "Group A",
fill_color = blue,
fill_density = 0.2,
bars([0.8,5,0.4],[1.8,7,0.4],[2.8,-4,0.4]),
key = "Group B",
fill_color = red,
fill_density = 0.6,
line_width = 4,
bars([1.2,4,0.4],[2.2,-2,0.4],[3.2,5,0.4]),
xaxis = true); | 2023-08-22T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8868 |
I got the game with the Star Wars bundle. I like it to an extent as I am new to Kinect. The graphics are average, the gameplay is fun, but repetitive. I think that those who grew up with Star Wars, like myself, will find it enjoyable. As an admitted achievement whore, I find myself playing it to unlock ach. . . much like other mediocre games I have played. Overall, since it came with the bundle, I am happy to have it, but I would not have purchased the game by itself if I had played it first. | 2024-03-18T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6345 |
Non-IT Staff Augmentation
Engineering:
Aita’s engineering team comprises of SMEs in specific domains such as Energy, Utilities, Chemicals, Manufacturing, Pharma and Life sciences. Apart from a strong domain knowledge they also have STEM degrees from leading universities.
Civil / Structural Engineers
Construction Managers
Electrical/ Mechanical Engineers
Designers / Drafters
Engineering Technicians
Industrial / Instrumentation Engineers
Plant / Facilities
Layout Designer
ASIC Design Engineer
Analog / RF engineers
Telecom Engineers
Safety & Environmental Engineers
Packaging Engineer
Quality Assurance
Clinical & Scientific Staffing:
Aita’s Clinical staffing division comprises of experienced and diverse team of professionals who serve in the life sciences, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and medical device manufacturers. Some of the skills we support are as follows:
Clinical Data Analyst
Clinical research professionals
Biostatistician
Drug Specialist
Nurse
Medical & Regulatory Affairs
Biochemist
Physicist
Chemist
Environmental scientists
Geospatial technicians
Seismic Geolist
Hydrologist
Waste Water Plant operators
Admin / Clerical:
An organization’s efficiency is critically impaired without the right administrative staff and is often referred as the backbone of any organization. Aita is well equipped to provide administrative personnel in a variety of engagement roles such as contract, temp to perm, direct hire etc. Some of the administrative staff we can help with are:
Receptionists/ Front Desk Coordinators
Data Entry/ Telemarketing
File Clerks
Clerks Account Receivables and Payables
Customer Service/ Call Center Reps
General Office Assistants
Administrative Assistants I, II, and III
Jr./ Sr. Executive Assistants
Office Managers
Have to include the kind of people we can help with.
Finance & Accounting:
Aita’s finance and accounting staffing team has vast experience in fulfilling both contract and permanent staff, covering all levels in the finance and accounting professionals. The following are some of the professionals we can help you with:
Financial Analysts
Accountants
Banking
Bookkeeping
Controller
Cost Accounting
Credit and Collections
Foreign Exchange
Payroll management
Payroll Tax
Regulatory Compliance
SEC Reporting
Insurance Underwriting
Clerks
Tax Accountants
Auditors
Healthcare:
The team at Aita is well equipped to fulfill staffing requirements in the healthcare sector. Some of the staffing requirements we have worked are: | 2024-02-07T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8783 |
Your body is still growing ” In one study, epileptic children experienced a reduction in symptoms and improved cognitive performance when a ketogenic diet was introduced.49 However, this may have a negative effect on the growth of their bodies in the long run, according to a study published in the journal Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology.50
The electrolyte minerals are sodium, potassium, magnesium, and calcium, and you need all four. Sports drinks are full of sugars, and only have low amounts of these minerals, so it's best to avoid them. Instead, focus on vegetables that contain high amounts of these minerals, and make sure to salt your food to taste. You can also make an electrolyte drink that contains all of these minerals. Lite Salt or No Salt is available in the grocery store as a salt substitute, and contains potassium. Magnesium and calcium powders are available in health food stores and online.
¢ High-protein ketogenic diet ” This method is a variant of the SKD. In a high-protein diet, you increase the ratio of protein consumption to 10 percent and reduce your healthy fat consumption by 10 percent. In a study involving obese men that tried this method, researchers noted that it helped reduce their hunger and lowered their food intake significantly, resulting in weight loss.11
But generally speaking, if you plan to follow a ketogenic diet, you should aim to consume less than 10 percent of your total calories from carbohydrates per day. The remaining calories should come from 20 to 30 percent protein and 60 to 80 percent fat. That means if you follow a daily 2,000-calorie diet, no more than 200 of your calories (or 50 grams) should come from carbs, while 400 to 600 calories should come from protein and 1,200 to 1,600 should come from fat. (There's a reason this plan is also called a high-fat, low-carb diet!)
¢ Increasing muscle mass ” Jeff Volek, Ph.D., is a registered dietitian specializing in how a high-fat, low-carb diet can affect health and athletic performance. He's written many scientific articles on this topic, as well as two books, and he explains that ketones have a similar structure to branched-chain amino acids that can be useful for building muscle mass. Ketones spare these amino acids, leaving higher levels of them around, which can help promote muscle mass.
Note: Are you a vegetarian or vegan and want to go on a ketogenic diet? It's still possible! Just keep in mind that the dietary restrictions can sometimes be a little bit intense. Make sure to plan ahead and prepare to aid your success. To help out, we've published articles (with 7 day meal plans included) for both the vegetarian ketogenic diet and the vegan ketogenic diet.
Hey there! Welcome to my site! I am Kyndra Holley - International Best Selling Cookbook Author, and the face behind this blog. I am an avid lover of all things low carb and gluten free. I focus on real, whole food ingredients that you can find at your local grocer. I am a lifter of heavy things, world traveler, obsessed dog mom, hiker, essential oiler, nature lover, just to name a few. I believe that kindness is king! Read more...
Taking your first step into the ketogenic diet is an exciting phase for your health. But before coming up with an actual ketogenic diet food list, it's important to first take a look at what you're eating now and take out anything that's unhealthy. This means that you have to remove sugars, grains, starches and packaged and processed foods from your diet. Basically, anything that won't add to your new eating regimen has to go. This is what I call a "pantry sweep."
Keto breath, on the other hand, is less of a side-effect and more of a major (not harmful) inconvenience (your breath literally smells like nail polish remover). Basically, when your body breaks down all that extra fat on the keto diet, it produces ketones”one of which is the chemical acetone (yes, the same stuff that's in nail polish remover), Keatley previously told WomensHealthMag.com.
The information on this website has not been evaluated by the Food & Drug Administration or any other medical body. We do not aim to diagnose, treat, cure or prevent any illness or disease. Information is shared for educational purposes only. You must consult your doctor before acting on any content on this website, especially if you are pregnant, nursing, taking medication or have a medical condition.
Ketosis is the result of following the standard ketogenic diet, which is why it's also sometimes called œthe ketosis diet. Ketosis takes place when glucose from carbohydrate foods (like grains, all sources of sugar or fruit, for example) is drastically reduced, which forces the body to find an alternative fuel source: fat. Ketosis can also be achieved by multiple days of total fasting, but that isn't sustainable beyond a few days. (It's why some keto diet plans combine intermittent fasting or IMF with the keto diet for greater weight loss effects.)
The book contains a two week menu for beginners. (Face it, there's a 90% chance you won't follow it to the letter, but it does help set your thinking in the right direction.) For each individual week there's a shopping list which, by itself, will help you adjust your kitchen quite a bit. There are tips on the best sweeteners (Swerve over Splenda), the oils you'll need, produce, canned and bottled items, pantry items, and meats. Something to consider as you go along is that some items, like almond and coconut flour are expensive items to stock up on, but you'll use considerably less than non-keto recipes will use for regular flour. Do what you can afford. Just know that there are some must-have staples like coconut oil and olive oil.
This means that if you have risk factors for heart disease ” such as elevated cholesterol levels, high blood pressure (hypertension), or a strong family history of the disease ” you should use caution when following this diet. The diet's heavy reliance on fat, especially saturated fat, can elevate cholesterol levels, further increasing your chances of developing heart disease in the future. (7)
That said, I think the biggest changes are the result of me dropping the sugars and breads. Tracking my eating and being more conscious about my foods has made a difference. I definitely plan to keep on this track for a while and slowly work towards a fuller keto-adapted diet/body. I'm not going with the œall-in that some recommend, cutting out all artificial sweeteners and such, though I have limited them. I'm not really tempted to indulge in the sweets that have been tempting in the past.
It's always good to go into the grocery store with a game plan so you don't buy things you'll regret later. I also like to keep things as simple as possible. Going through Pinterest, every recipe seems to have a bazillion ingredients, take hours & a culinary degree to make, or require random ingredients that are annoying to find and super expensive.
Disclaimer: The entire contents of this website are based upon the opinions of Dr. Mercola, unless otherwise noted. Individual articles are based upon the opinions of the respective author, who retains copyright as marked. The information on this website is not intended to replace a one-on-one relationship with a qualified health care professional and is not intended as medical advice. It is intended as a sharing of knowledge and information from the research and experience of Dr. Mercola and his community. Dr. Mercola encourages you to make your own health care decisions based upon your research and in partnership with a qualified health care professional. If you are pregnant, nursing, taking medication, or have a medical condition, consult your health care professional before using products based on this content.
The electrolyte minerals are sodium, potassium, magnesium, and calcium, and you need all four. Sports drinks are full of sugars, and only have low amounts of these minerals, so it's best to avoid them. Instead, focus on vegetables that contain high amounts of these minerals, and make sure to salt your food to taste. You can also make an electrolyte drink that contains all of these minerals. Lite Salt or No Salt is available in the grocery store as a salt substitute, and contains potassium. Magnesium and calcium powders are available in health food stores and online.
Hi I having problems figuring out how to eat Keyto n lose weight. I've actually gained 7lbs in 2 months :( Wondering how u eat veggies without going over your carbs n how do you get all the fats in. I've put the requirements into my fitness pal(macros) but I'm still not losing. Mine are set at 5% carbs 25% protein n 70% fats. Don't know what I'm doing wrong. I'm allergic to gluten some dairy n eggs. Any help would be great so I can start losing instead of gaining Thank you Donna
To be confident about being in ketosis, especially at the beginning when you're not quite sure how you should feel, it's best to measure your ketone levels. By monitoring your ketone levels, you can assure that you're doing the diet correctly and make dietary adjustments based on what you measure. People also respond to diet and exercise differently, so the best way to cater the keto diet to your own biology is to measure.
One of the most common side effects of starting the ketogenic diet is the œketo flu. This term describes the often unpleasant, fatigue-inducing symptoms that occur as the body adjusts from a high-carbohydrate to a low-carbohydrate diet. During the keto flu, the body's stored glucose begins depleting, and the body starts adapting to producing and utilizing ketones as energy. (2)
Hello can you help me please. ive been on a keto diet plan now for 4 weeks (including diary) not sure if this is considered more clean eating?? anyway i have worked out that my personal macro's are: 1169 calorie intake 25g carbs 80g protein 83g fat The thing is even though ive been eating thing on the keto food list including one fat bomb a day and coffee using cream. i have no idea how to measure my fats or carbs. I would like to loose about 8 lbs but overall it is more about health as i am postmenopausal and I want to stick to something that will level out my hormones as well as provide me with energy. (which i have very little of now and my hormones are bothe wall!!) So how do i measure what ive eaten. Sorry i don't get it?
Articles and information on this website may only be copied, reprinted, or redistributed with written permission (but please ask, we like to give written permission!) The purpose of this Blog is to encourage the free exchange of ideas. The entire contents of this website is based upon the opinions of Dave Asprey, unless otherwise noted. Individual articles are based upon the opinions of the respective authors, who may retain copyright as marked. The information on this website is not intended to replace a one-on-one relationship with a qualified health care professional and is not intended as medical advice. It is intended as a sharing of knowledge and information from the personal research and experience of Dave Asprey and the community. We will attempt to keep all objectionable messages off this site; however, it is impossible to review all messages immediately. All messages expressed on The Bulletproof Forum or the Blog, including comments posted to Blog entries, represent the views of the author exclusively and we are not responsible for the content of any message.
Every recipe is less than 10 grams of carbs per serving. All recipes are gluten free and made only from whole, real, easy to find foods that you can find at your local grocery store. New resources are added to the plans each week. All the best information to help keep you on track with your low carb, keto lifestyle. I've even included a journal where you can track what you eat, how much you moved and how you are feeling overall. It is definitely the most comprehensive low carb meal plan out there. And for only $4.99 per week, you simply cannot beat the price.
A ketogenic diet helps control blood sugar levels. It is excellent for managing type 2 diabetes, sometimes even leading to complete reversal of the disease. This has been proven in studies. It makes perfect sense since keto lowers blood-sugar levels, reduces the need of medications and reduces the potentially negative impact of high insulin levels.
Cyclical ketogenic diet: The Bulletproof Diet falls into this category. You eat high fat, low carb (less than 50 grams of net carbs a day) five to six days of the week. On day seven, you up your carb intake to roughly 150 grams, during what's called a carb refeed day. Carb cycling this way helps you avoid the negative effects some people experience when they restrict carbs long term, like thyroid issues, fatigue and dry eyes.[10] [11] Full ketosis isn't for everyone, and adding carbs such as sweet potatoes, squash, and white rice one day a week keeps your body systems that need some amount of carbs functioning properly.
Rami co-founded Tasteaholics with Vicky at the start of 2015 to master the art of creating extremely delicious food while researching the truth behind nutrition, dieting and overall health. You can usually find him marketing, coding or coming up with the next crazy idea because he can't sit still for too long. His favorite book is The 4-Hour Workweek and artist is Infected Mushroom.
Probably, and there are a few reasons why, Keatley says. For starters, people usually reduce their daily caloric intake to about 1,500 calories a day because healthy fats and lean proteins make you feel fuller sooner”and for a longer period of time. And then there's the fact that it takes more energy to process and burn fat and protein than carbs, so you're burning slightly more calories than you did before. Over time, this can lead to weight loss.
Basically, when you have alcohol in your body, the first thing that will be burnt is the alcohol. Only then, can your body begin to burn carbohydrates, and ultimately move on to fat-burning mode. By consuming small amounts of alcohol, the alcohol will be burnt quite fast and then move on to burning carbohydrates. The biggest tip here is to only include alcohol in your diet once your body is fully adapted to a high-fat diet.
It's important to remember that the goal of any dietary change is to promote a healthy lifestyle, so make sure to select a meal plan you can envision yourself following long term. If you know you will not be able to comply with such stringent carbohydrate restrictions for years to come, the ketogenic diet is most likely not the right choice for you.
In some ways, it's similar to the Atkins diet, which similarly boosts the body's fat-burning abilities through eating only low-carb foods, along with getting rid of foods high in carbs and sugar. Removing glucose from carbohydrate foods will cause the body to burn fat for energy instead. The major differences between the classic keto diet and the Atkins diet is ketogenic emphasizes healthier fats, less overall protein and no processed meat (such as bacon) while having more research to back up its efficacy.
Don't stick to chicken and steak just because you're comfortable cooking them. Make dinner time the place where you can try new meats and recipes that increase your keto recipe resources. œAt lunch and dinner, you can be creative and experiment, Weaver says. œJust focus on cooking meat”pork, chicken, lamb, beef, or seafood. Meat is rich in iron and fish contains omega-3 fatty acids and vitamin D. Use only organic oils, such as avocado oil, coconut oil, and olive oil.
For any individual with diabetes, discussing dietary changes ” especially those as dramatic as the ones the ketogenic diet requires ” with your healthcare team is essential. Because carbohydrates are broken down into glucose in the blood, cutting carbohydrates from your diet could cause levels to crash rapidly depending on your current medication regimen. Such a change may require significant adjustments to medication and insulin to prevent dangerous side effects such as low blood sugar, called hypoglycemia. (8)
Your body is still growing ” In one study, epileptic children experienced a reduction in symptoms and improved cognitive performance when a ketogenic diet was introduced.49 However, this may have a negative effect on the growth of their bodies in the long run, according to a study published in the journal Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology.50
It can be very difficult to obtain some of the very high levels of blood ketones on this table - especially as you become "fat adapted" or "keto adapted" or whatever you want to call it. Once your body is efficient at using ketones, it makes only what it needs. Beginners may see very high levels of ketones, and then they see them drop off. This isn't because you are making a mistake and are out of ketosis - your body is no longer overproducing them.
It also interferes with some of the social aspects of food, considering how limiting it is. No cake on your birthday. No pie on Thanksgiving. No chocolate truffles on Valentine's Day. Boo to that! If you consider yourself someone who loves to eat and takes great joy in the social experience of a good meal, then the restriction of this diet may be emotionally unhealthy.
¢ Keto "Flu": Your body isn't accustomed to using ketones on the regular, so when you make the switch, you tend to feel unwell. The keto diet also influences electrolyte balance, resulting in brain fog, headaches, nausea and fatigue. Keto dieters also consistently complain about getting bad-smelling breath, sweat and pee as a result of the by-product of fat metabolism (acetone) seeping out. Thankfully, this effect is just temporary, so just know you won't have to spend your life smelling rank.
But people who started following the keto diet noticed weight loss for a few reasons: When you eat carbs, your body retains fluid in order to store carbs for energy (you know, in case it needs it). But when you're not having much in the carb department, you lose this water weight, says Warren. Also, it's easy to go overboard on carbohydrates”but if you're loading up on fat, it may help curb cravings since it keeps you satisfied.
It can be very difficult to obtain some of the very high levels of blood ketones on this table - especially as you become "fat adapted" or "keto adapted" or whatever you want to call it. Once your body is efficient at using ketones, it makes only what it needs. Beginners may see very high levels of ketones, and then they see them drop off. This isn't because you are making a mistake and are out of ketosis - your body is no longer overproducing them.
Taking your first step into the ketogenic diet is an exciting phase for your health. But before coming up with an actual ketogenic diet food list, it's important to first take a look at what you're eating now and take out anything that's unhealthy. This means that you have to remove sugars, grains, starches and packaged and processed foods from your diet. Basically, anything that won't add to your new eating regimen has to go. This is what I call a "pantry sweep."
Other forms of ketogenic diets include cyclic ketogenic diets, also known as carb cycling, and targeted ketogenic diets, which allow for adjustments to carbohydrate intake around exercise. These modifications are typically implemented by athletes looking to use the ketogenic diet to enhance performance and endurance and not by individuals specifically focused on weight loss.
Wrong! Dietary cholesterol has been shown to not increase blood cholesterol “ check this article here. And fat is healthy when consumed as part of a nutritious meal. As pointed out in this study, a Low Carbohydrate Diet resulted in decreased bodyweight, abdominal circumference, diastolic blood pressure, triglycerides, insulin, and an increase in high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (the good stuff).
Affiliate Disclosure: There are links on this site that can be defined as affiliate links. This means that I may receive a small commission (at no cost to you) if you purchase something when clicking on the links that take you through to a different website. By clicking on the links, you are in no way obligated to buy.
Medical Disclaimer: The material on this site is provided for informational purposes only and is not medical advice. Always consult your physician before beginning any diet or exercise program. | 2024-07-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7774 |
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This file is part of Ext JS 4
Copyright (c) 2011 Sencha Inc
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If you are unsure which license is appropriate for your use, please contact the sales department at http://www.sencha.com/contact.
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* width: 2px;
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* title: 'Toolbar Spacer Example',
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* 'Item 1',
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Ext.define('Ext.toolbar.Spacer', {
extend: 'Ext.Component',
alias: 'widget.tbspacer',
alternateClassName: 'Ext.Toolbar.Spacer',
baseCls: Ext.baseCSSPrefix + 'toolbar-spacer',
focusable: false
});
| 2024-03-16T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3786 |
Just as Mitt Romney declared that he's in, it's suddenly looking like he'll have more company in his campaign for the Republican US presidential nomination.
While Romney made his candidacy official in New Hampshire, political heavyweights Sarah Palin and Rudy Giuliani caused a stir of their own with visits to the first-in-the-nation primary state. And rumblings from Texas Governor Rick Perry, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and Republican Michele Bachmann of Minnesota further undercut Romney's standing as the closest thing the GOP has to a front-runner.
"I'm Mitt Romney and I believe in America. And I'm running for president of the United States," Romney said to cheers on a sunny farm here in Southern New Hampshire.
The former business executive previewed a campaign message focused on the economic woes that top voters' concerns: rising gas prices, stubbornly high unemployment and persistent foreclosures.
"It breaks my heart to see what is happening to this great country," Romney said. "No, Mr. President, you had your chance."
It's a pitch tailored to the conservatives who hold great sway in picking the GOP's presidential nominee in Iowa and South Carolina - and the independents who are the largest political bloc in New Hampshire. And it is as much a statement on his viability as it is an indictment of Obama's leadership.
"Barack Obama has failed America," Romney said as he began his second White House bid. "When Barack Obama took office, the economy was in recession, and he made it worse."
Romney comes to a presidential contest that lacks a true front-runner.
In the last week, the still-forming field became less certain with Giuliani visiting an Italian restaurant here and meeting privately with state activists. In North Conway, Giuliani said he hasn't decided yet if he will run again and that he expects to make up his mind by the end of the summer.
But he certainly sounded like a candidate, telling reporters that the nation is being led in the wrong direction by Obama.
"He's been in office a very long time now and his results on the economy have been abysmal," Giuliani said. "His only answer to it has been, 'Oh, I inherited this.' Well, my goodness, he's been in office long enough now, so that whatever he inherited, he should've straightened out by now."
Palin, her party's 2008 vice presidential nominee, was set to arrive in New Hampshire later today (NZ time) for appearances that highlighted her potential to upend the race should she run. Aides weren't releasing her schedule, but her family's bus tour that rumbled out of Washington last weekend was likely to overshadow the declared candidates.
Perry, too, gave hints he was considering a bid, though his aides sought to tamp down expectations he would join. Tea party darling Bachmann is inching toward a run, perhaps giving the anti-tax, libertarian-leaning grassroots movement a candidate to rally around.
"Who is it that rules this great nation?" Romney said in a nod to tea partyers. "You do."
Embracing familiar conservative rhetoric, Romney said Obama has spent his first three years in office apologizing to the world for the United States' greatness, undercutting Israel and borrowing European-style economic policies. He cast Obama as beholden to Democratic interest groups and indifferent to out-of-work Americans.
"It's time for a president who cares more about America's workers than America's union bosses," Romney said.
He said Obama's policy in Afghanistan was wrong, his spending too high and said his administration sought to seize power through regulation and fiat.
"This president's first answer to every problem is to take power from you. ... And with each of those decisions, we lose more of our freedoms," Romney said.
Romney's strengths are substantial: He's well known and he's an experienced campaigner. He has a personal fortune and an existing network of donors. He has a successful businessman's record.
But his challenges are big, too. They include a record of changing positions on social issues including abortion and gay rights, shifts that have left conservatives questioning his sincerity. He also has struggled to allay some skeptics of his Mormon faith.
Romney oversaw a health care law enacted in Massachusetts that's similar to Obama's national health overhaul, which conservatives despise.
"If I ran through all my mistakes, Ann would love it and you'd be here all night," Romney said, referencing his wife but not explicitly acknowledging the hurdle while calling for a repeal of Democrats' national plan.
His rivals weren't about to let it go. Asked about how big a problem Romney faces regarding the Massachusetts health care law, Giuliani was critical.
"The reality is that Obamacare and Romneycare are almost exactly the same," Giuliani said. "It's not very helpful trying to distinguish them. I would think the best way to handle it is to say, it was a terrible mistake and if I could do it over again, I wouldn't do it." | 2024-07-08T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8871 |
Shark Week 2014: The Quick-And-Dirty Viewing Guide
Shark Week kicks off tonight at 8 p.m. EST on the Discovery Channel, and don’t act like you’re not excited. For seven glorious days, we get to indulge in a topic that frightens and excites us more than anything else: SHARKS ATTACKING PEOPLE. Well, sharks doing anything, really. These razor-toothed fishes are f—kin’ awesome creatures that dazzle us with their majestic prowess, and Discovery acknowledges this with its annual week-long homage. There should be a channel solely dedicated to Jaws, to be honest.
As always, Shark Week is a hodgepodge of new specials and oldie-but-goodie throwbacks. At VH1, we want to make your viewing experience as smooth and painless as possible, so here’s a quick-and-dirty guide to the most exciting week of television. Ever.
Sunday
The New:
8 p.m.: Air Jaws: Fins of FuryThe iconic Air Jaws series comes back to explore one of our favorite sharks, the great white. This time, Natural History producer Jeff Kurr and his team return to track down “Colossus,” a missing “mega-shark.” Expect lots of cool gadgets.
9 p.m.: Shark of Darkness: Wrath of SubmarineThis documentary tells the legend of “Submarine,” a 30-foot great white off the coast of South Africa. But is it real?
1 p.m.: Great White GauntletDivers head into Australia’s shark-infested waters for a million-dollar reward, but they’ve got to survive the great whites that lurk underneath.
Monday
The New:
9 p.m.: Jaws Strikes BackIn this nail-biting special, a team of marine biologists head to the Pacific island Guadalupe and document the biggest great whites in action. We think we’re going to need a bigger boat.
10 p.m.: Monster HammerheadScientists head to the Florida shores to see if a legendary hammerhead shark has really been flourishing there for 60 years.
9 a.m.: Bull Shark: World’s Deadliest SharkZoologist Nigel Marven travels around the world to learn more about bull sharks. A little too early in the morning for shark attacks? Nah.
Tuesday
The New:
9 p.m.: Alien Sharks 2: Return to the AbyssResearcher Paul Clerkin treks deep into the Indian Ocean to investigate a new shark species and see the last known group of bioluminescent sharks. Don’t miss this one, guys.
10 p.m.: Lair of the Mega SharkKurr returns with fellow shark expert Andy Casagrande; they journey to New Zealand and investigate sightings of a 20-foot great white known as the “lord of the sharks.” Think Big Foot, only under water.
Must-Watch Oldie-But-Goodie:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54FNSSFRy8g12 p.m.: Blood in the WaterThis special explores the real shark attacks in 1916 that inspired the 1975 classic Jaws.
Wednesday
The New:
9 p.m.: Zombie SharksSharks can achieve tonic immobility, a zombie-like state that allows them to appear almost dead. Scientists explore this phenomenon in a new documentary, paying close attention to the recent rise in orca whale attacks on great whites.
10 p.m.: Spawn of Jaws: The BirthDr. Michael Domeier attempts to make history and capture the birth of a baby great white for the first time. Will he be successful? This one’s a must-see.
3 p.m.: Air Jaws ApocalypseA team of experts use high-tech gadgets to capture the 3,000-pound “Colossus” shark in its stomping grounds.
Thursday
The New:
9 p.m.: I Escaped Jaws 2This riveting series returns. Survivors share their shark attack stories using actual footage from the encounters. Watch this one with friends. With the lights on.
10 p.m.: SharkageddonPoints for the punny title, Discovery. Hawaii’s placid shores are experiencing an uncommon amount of shark attacks, so surfer and Hawaii native Kala Alexander attempts to get to the bottom of it.
12 p.m.: Voodoo SharksIs there a monster shark lurking in the Louisiana bayous? A team of fishermen find out. Meanwhile, a scientist explores bull sharks potentially living in a New Orleans freshwater lake.
Don’t forget to watch the live talk show Shark After Dark every night at 11 p.m., where host Josh Wolf keeps the fun going with celebrity guests and shark experts. | 2024-04-13T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9059 |
Q:
Android mkdir not making folder
Tonight I am currently having issues doing something that I thought would be simple... making a folder in /mnt/sdcard.
I have set the follow permission:
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"></uses-permission>
My Main.java has the following to make the folder:
public class Main extends TabActivity {
static int index = 1;
private static final String TAG = "Main";
public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.main);
File folder = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory () + "/tallgrass/images");
boolean success = false;
if(!folder.exists()){
success = folder.mkdir();
}
if (!success){
Log.d(TAG,"Folder not created.");
}
else{
Log.d(TAG,"Folder created!");
}
}
I get the "Folder created!" message in my log but when I check both /mnt/sdcard and /sdcard neither one has the folder. I have tried calling:
Environment.MEDIA_MOUNTED.equals(Environment.getExternalStorageState())
and it returns true. I just can't figure this one out because all signs are pointing that it should work. I have also tried it with the phone disconnected from the PC in case the SD card was mounting or something as I am currently using my phone instead of the emulator for developing. Speaking of which, does debuggable to true maybe prevent it from making the folder?
Thanks!
A:
Does the /mnt/sdcard/tallgrass/ directory exist? (I'm guessing not, but you never know.)
The File.mkdirs() method will create all needed directories; mkdir() will only create the last directory in the pathname.
| 2024-02-28T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6275 |
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// (C) Copyright Olaf Krzikalla 2004-2006.
// (C) Copyright Ion Gaztanaga 2006-2013
//
// Distributed under the Boost Software License, Version 1.0.
// (See accompanying file LICENSE_1_0.txt or copy at
// http://www.boost.org/LICENSE_1_0.txt)
//
// See http://www.boost.org/libs/intrusive for documentation.
//
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#ifndef BOOST_INTRUSIVE_SLIST_ITERATOR_HPP
#define BOOST_INTRUSIVE_SLIST_ITERATOR_HPP
#ifndef BOOST_CONFIG_HPP
# include <boost/config.hpp>
#endif
#if defined(BOOST_HAS_PRAGMA_ONCE)
# pragma once
#endif
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/config_begin.hpp>
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/workaround.hpp>
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/std_fwd.hpp>
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/iiterator.hpp>
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/mpl.hpp>
namespace boost {
namespace intrusive {
// slist_iterator provides some basic functions for a
// node oriented bidirectional iterator:
template<class ValueTraits, bool IsConst>
class slist_iterator
{
private:
typedef iiterator
<ValueTraits, IsConst, std::forward_iterator_tag> types_t;
static const bool stateful_value_traits = types_t::stateful_value_traits;
typedef ValueTraits value_traits;
typedef typename types_t::node_traits node_traits;
typedef typename types_t::node node;
typedef typename types_t::node_ptr node_ptr;
typedef typename types_t::const_value_traits_ptr const_value_traits_ptr;
class nat;
typedef typename
detail::if_c< IsConst
, slist_iterator<value_traits, false>
, nat>::type nonconst_iterator;
public:
typedef typename types_t::iterator_type::difference_type difference_type;
typedef typename types_t::iterator_type::value_type value_type;
typedef typename types_t::iterator_type::pointer pointer;
typedef typename types_t::iterator_type::reference reference;
typedef typename types_t::iterator_type::iterator_category iterator_category;
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator()
{}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE explicit slist_iterator(const node_ptr & nodeptr, const const_value_traits_ptr &traits_ptr)
: members_(nodeptr, traits_ptr)
{}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator(const slist_iterator &other)
: members_(other.pointed_node(), other.get_value_traits())
{}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator(const nonconst_iterator &other)
: members_(other.pointed_node(), other.get_value_traits())
{}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator &operator=(const slist_iterator &other)
{ members_.nodeptr_ = other.members_.nodeptr_; return *this; }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE node_ptr pointed_node() const
{ return members_.nodeptr_; }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator &operator=(const node_ptr &node)
{ members_.nodeptr_ = node; return static_cast<slist_iterator&>(*this); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE const_value_traits_ptr get_value_traits() const
{ return members_.get_ptr(); }
public:
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator& operator++()
{
members_.nodeptr_ = node_traits::get_next(members_.nodeptr_);
return static_cast<slist_iterator&> (*this);
}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator operator++(int)
{
slist_iterator result (*this);
members_.nodeptr_ = node_traits::get_next(members_.nodeptr_);
return result;
}
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE friend bool operator== (const slist_iterator& l, const slist_iterator& r)
{ return l.pointed_node() == r.pointed_node(); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE friend bool operator!= (const slist_iterator& l, const slist_iterator& r)
{ return !(l == r); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE reference operator*() const
{ return *operator->(); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE pointer operator->() const
{ return this->operator_arrow(detail::bool_<stateful_value_traits>()); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE slist_iterator<ValueTraits, false> unconst() const
{ return slist_iterator<ValueTraits, false>(this->pointed_node(), this->get_value_traits()); }
private:
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE pointer operator_arrow(detail::false_) const
{ return ValueTraits::to_value_ptr(members_.nodeptr_); }
BOOST_INTRUSIVE_FORCEINLINE pointer operator_arrow(detail::true_) const
{ return this->get_value_traits()->to_value_ptr(members_.nodeptr_); }
iiterator_members<node_ptr, const_value_traits_ptr, stateful_value_traits> members_;
};
} //namespace intrusive
} //namespace boost
#include <boost/intrusive/detail/config_end.hpp>
#endif //BOOST_INTRUSIVE_SLIST_ITERATOR_HPP
| 2023-08-29T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2634 |
Issue: Whether the Federal Circuit’s two-part test for willful patent infringement, with separate objective and subjective prongs, should be rejected and replaced with a more flexible “totality of the circumstances” test.
Held: Vacated and Remanded. The Federal Circuit’s two-prong Seagate standard for willful infringement and enhanced damages is “unduly rigid,” conflicts with the text of §284, and “impermissibly encumbers” the statute’s grant of discretion to the district court.
As previewed in the Q4 2015 Supreme Court Corner, the Court has now decided both Halo v. Pulse Electronics and Stryker v. Zimmer, and in doing so, has changed the applicable legal standard for a finding of willful infringement and enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
In 2007, the Federal Circuit decided Seagate, making a willful infringement finding more difficult than it had been under prior precedent by applying a heftier two-pronged standard: (1) “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the accused infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” (the objective prong) and (2) the patentee must then demonstrate the objectively defined risk was “either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer” (the subjective prong).
In Halo and Stryker, the Court has now rejected the Seagate standard. Recognizing that enhanced damages are “as old as U.S. patent law,” the Court’s opinion traces their history from the Patent Act of 1793 through the 1952 enactment of §284, in which Congress “merely reorganiz[ed]” the language of the statutes to “clarify” them. Slip Op. at 2-4. Consistent with this history, the Supreme Court quickly recognized that the “new” enhanced damages provision of the Patent Act, §284, provided for “punitive or increased damages” in a case of “willful or bad-faith infringement.” Id.
In rejecting the Seagate framework as “unduly rigid” and as an “impermissib[e] encumber[ance]” on the statutory grant of discretion, id. at 9, the Court explained that §284 (which states that a district court “may” enhance damages) “contains no explicit limit or condition” and that the statute’s use of the word “may” “clearly connotes discretion.” Id. at 7-8. Indeed, 180 years of precedent established that enhanced damages “are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ sanction for egregious infringement behavior” which includes “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Id. at 8.
Responding to the argument that removing the Seagate standard will “embolden [patent] ‘trolls,’” the Court cautioned that enhanced damages are not to be awarded in “garden variety cases.” Id. at 14-15. Moreover, an unspecified threat that so-called “patent trolls” will seek enhanced damages more often simply “cannot justify imposing an artificial construct such as the Seagate test on the discretion conferred under §284.” Id. at 15.
Thus, in applying their discretion to award enhanced damages, district courts are to be “guided” by the “nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of the Patent Act” which “limit[s] the award of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement.” Id. at 15. | 2023-12-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6354 |
In many assays, hydrogen peroxide is employed as a reagent. When the assays are quantitative or semi-quantitative, it is necessary that the hydrogen peroxide react in the manner intended to produce a detectable signal, usually chromogen formation. In many assays, blood, or blood derivatives such as serum or plasma are present, where the blood sample contains a complex mixture of components. These components vary from individual to individual and, it is found can have an effect on the quantitation of hydrogen peroxide. It is therefore important to provide systems which prevent the reaction of hydrogen peroxide by pathways other than the desired assay pathway. | 2024-05-13T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5160 |
Q:
Black subview as picker view
I'm having some problems while popping up a picker view when clicking into a textfield. It's correctly popped (and keyboard is properly hidden), but instead of showing my array of data, it pops up as a black subview... any similar experience? any idea? Thanks!
A:
I think you dont make connection for datasource and delegate methods of picker view check those and implement
- (NSInteger)numberOfComponentsInPickerView:(UIPickerView *)thePickerView
- (NSInteger)pickerView:(UIPickerView *)thePickerView numberOfRowsInComponent:(NSInteger)component
- (NSString *)pickerView:(UIPickerView *)thePickerView titleForRow:(NSInteger)row forComponent:(NSInteger)component
| 2024-04-14T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3861 |
Dragging the dog
(originally posted on December 3rd 2009)
I was met by an interesting sight as I left the office. An elderly man was “walking” a Lhasa Apso. However the dog just refused to budge and ended up being dragged. The battle between the rest of Europe and U.K. is similar. Now I have to state that by no means am I calling the U.K. a dog. Nicolas Sarkozy made a big mistake by hailing the appointment of Michael Barnier as a victory for the French European economic model and that they will be in control of the City. I have not been to the equivalent of the City in any other country except for America. There is no charm or beauty on wall street or the areas surrounding the site that previously held the World Trade Centre. The area is like a huge monolith. It does not have any character. You know it is there and hope it stays in place and does not come crashing on you. The City on the other hand is like a beautiful panther. Beautiful, full of mystery and most dangerous when injured. It may face extinction but it will go down fighting and there will be humans that will try their best to help its population grow. The Euro Zone are like poachers. They will try their best to kill the panthers off. However if they succeed well they are going to go out of a job. The City may get hurt especially if Darling introduces the 50% income tax on wealthy individuals. However I think the beneficiary of that will be Switzerland rather than Europe. When the dollar weakened, people shifted to Gold rather than the Euro or Pound. I support Gordon Brown for not being able to talk to Sarkozy due to his calendar being full. First Hienry pushes France into the world cup and denied Ireland the opportunity. Now Sarkozy has decreased the goodwill (Was there any left after France lost the 2012 Olympic bid?). You may try to drag a dog but be aware that the dog will be behind you and you have a good chance that the dog will take more than a nibble of your arse. | 2024-07-09T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9750 |
"(DOG BARKS)" "Go and get a sharper one." "David?" "~ David!" "~ I've finished!" "You're supposed to clear up with the girls." "They didn't ask." "You are going to earn yourself such a thrashing!" "Give him a chance." "He's a 10-year-old boy." "That's no excuse." "I'd better go." "~ You won't stay for dinner?" "~ No, the Duke is back tomorrow, so I've got to finish getting the house ready." "I'll walk you home." "It's only just down the hill." "I need some air." "What's she done?" "Come here." "That's better." "It'll get better." "I'm just seeing Auntie Sarah home and then I'm off to the Navy Yards." "Whoa." "I have to go to Islington on Sunday to pick up some more firewood if you fancy a day out." "Thomas Farriner, you certainly know how to show a girl a good time!" "Oi!" "Come here!" "Leave it, Tom." "Someone's got to fight his corner." "That's not going to help him." "They've been teasing him, saying his father's been killed in the war." "He'll be back." "My brother is as strong as an ox." "You know that." "~ If anyone survived, it's Will." "~ Mm." "See you, Tom." "It's all there, I promise you." "All right, Farriner." "Mr Sheridan?" "Yes." "~ It was all in order?" "~ Yes, as I've said." "I require payment, sir." "For this and for other orders." "It's overdue." "So is the Second Coming of Christ, Mr Farriner." "There's nothing we can do about that." "~ It is long overdue." "~ Feel free to take it up with the King." "I don't work for the King, I supply his navy, which is to say you." "~ If I cannot buy the flour to..." "~ That is your problem, Mr Farriner." "Good day." "Don't walk away from me, sir." "~ Excuse me?" "~ We're not finished." "Aren't we?" "What exactly is there left to say?" "I need that payment." "You will regret this." "Your Majesty." "I don't like it when you address me that way." "It puts distance between us." "That might prove useful." "It's killing me, Frances." "I don't think it is killing you, sir." "You're not a man." "Yes." "Thank heavens for that." "You have a voice, Hyde." "Tell the King yourself." "This war with the Dutch is bankrupting us." "We can't keep spending like this." "~ It will imperil our chance..." "~ Then tell him that." "That is your job." "You are his councillors, I am merely his brother." "Perhaps the King should know how depleted the royal finances are." "No-one ever advanced their prospects by bringing bad news to the King." "I thought my sister sent you here to entertain me." "She sent me here to support the Queen, which is perhaps not quite the same thing." "(APPLAUSE)" "Do offer the Queen my warmest wishes." "You look like a rain cloud." "Sometimes appearances do not deceive." "Why don't you come up to my chamber tonight?" "It might cheer you up." "I doubt it." "Your specials aren't what they used to be." "For one half of the human population, being pregnant isn't a choice, you know." "Well, the Queen seems to manage it." "Make a sound or move a muscle and I'll put this blade right between your shoulders." "(APPLAUSE)" "How did you get in here?" "Let me guess." "You're a Catholic and you are here to return our great Kingdom to the path of the true religion?" "I am proud of my faith." "I am sure you are." "Where did you get this?" "I am justice!" "And I am Lord Denton, His Majesty's intelligence officer." "He claims to have been acting alone." "Don't they always?" "He was a fanatic." "A lunatic, nothing more." "And the city's full of them." "I assumed I'd at least be safe in my own palace." "It's been taken care of." "Now, Denton says he used to work for the Duke of Hanford." "Hanford employs just about every Catholic down on his luck." "But he is not a rebel, let alone an assassin." "What makes you so sure?" "Instinct." "(APPROACHING FOOTSTEPS)" "(KNOCK AT THE DOOR)" "~ Mr Wickes." "~ Oh, Edward by now, surely." "I wasn't expecting you." "Forgive the intrusion." "I brought this for David." "For you to borrow, Mr Wickes means, and to look after carefully." "For as long as you like." "What do you say?" "Thank you." "A young boy hungry for knowledge." "Perhaps provision could be made for him to go to school." "And as a boy can't eat books, I thought you'd appreciate some mutton." "Mr Wickes, that is very kind, sir." "Thank you." "But I cannot accept that." "There's no shame in accepting a little help." "What harm can it do?" "Besides, he looks as if he could do with feeding up." "Thank you." "So your employer is about to return?" "Yes." "Lord Hanford returns tomorrow." "Mm." "Well, enjoy your dinner." "I bid you good night, mistress." "Thomas!" "Who's that?" "He's just someone from church." "Will the miller give you flour against next week's order?" "I doubt it." "Think the navy will be buying bread from me next week?" "I knocked the man's bloody wig off." "Hannah'll be furious with me." "We're down to the bone anyway." "Without the navy contract..." "It's fine, Tom." "We'll work it out." "I don't know how your gentleman friend expects you to cook this without an oven." "Perhaps he knows I have a brother-in-law who's a baker." "Well, watch him." "I'll bring it back in the morning." "Whoa!" "Whoa!" "Thank you, Carter." "Good morning, Sarah." "My lord Hanford." "How was your journey?" "Long and tiresome, but for the company." "Hanford calls him Romero." "He's a Spaniard, and from the way he carries himself, I'd say he's a soldier." "~ Who did they meet?" "~ No-one." "They travelled alone, dined alone, very careful not to be overheard discussing anything of substance." "We stayed half a day behind them all the way." "They don't suspect a thing." "We've caught an assassin." "He left Hanford's employ three years ago." "Maybe he brought the Spaniard to make sure he finishes the job." "They always say Catholic wenches make the best whores." "I'll see what the footman has to say." "What time is it?" "I'm not sure." "Half past seven?" "God's blood, woman, didn't I tell you to wake me at seven?" "I'm going to be late!" "It's a game of Pall Mall, Samuel." "I'm sure it can wait." "The King waits for no man, as well you know." "Are these sufficient for sport, do you think?" "The brocade is smarter, but rather stiff." "Please tell me you do not wish to carry on this argument." "My terms have started." "Oh, Lizzie." "Seven weeks." "I really thought I was with child." "You are young and healthy." "There is no reason for your failure to continue." "(BELLS CHIMES THE HOUR)" "Eight o'clock!" "You have made me late!" "Do you have to go?" "Tell Ruth to prepare you a poultice." "It would be courteous to let me win, Pepys." "Particularly in this heat." "I was told you like competition." "Whoever told you that is a brazen liar." "My God, it's hot." "WOMAN:" "Here we are again." "Is she not the most lovely thing you've ever seen?" "I have always admired my Lady Castlemaine." "~ She has the benefit of a ready wit..." "~ Not Castlemaine." "I mean Frances." "Yes, she's... comely, my lord." "Comely?" "Really, Pepys, is that the best you can do?" "I hear you once said the poor folk who used to toast my health on their knees outside the gates" "~ were "a little too much"?" "~ Yes." "Why?" "You don't need sycophancy." "I wouldn't be so sure." "The alternative to sycophancy is contempt, which, if you are a king, can lead to very unhappy consequences." "Forgive me, but the alternative to sycophancy is respect." "Which is a sounder basis for government." "But the people do respect me." "Do they not?" "That is what my courtiers always tell me." "I think that would be true if the people saw a little more of you." "Explain." "An increasingly common view is you are consumed by the pursuit of pleasure and surrounded by sycophants who will not dare tell you you are bankrupting the country." "If the people wanted austerity, they would have stuck with Cromwell's bastard sons." "We are here to provide something to aspire to, a canvas onto which they can project their dreams." "Yes, Majesty." "But even the purveyors of dreams must control their outgoings." "The people removed my father's head and lived with the consequences." "~ They will not wish to repeat the experience." "~ The people are fickle." "I doubt they fear a new republic as much as your advisers claim." "WOMAN:" "Oh." "(POLITE APPLAUSE)" "A King can have many things he wants, Samuel." "But someone who is prepared to beat him at his favourite game, perhaps that is what he needs." "I... ~ Don't worry, John." "Give it to me next week." "~ Thank you, Tom." "I appreciate that." "Father, we're not a charity." "~ He's a good customer." "~ Not if he doesn't pay." "What are we going to do about flour?" "That was the last sack." "The rest of it went on that bloody order for the navy." "First, no cursing." "Second, trust me." "It'll be all right." "How?" "I'm 13, Father, not five." "And you're my daughter, not my wife." "So leave it to me." "See you later." "(SIGHS)" "David will be happy." "Good." "And there'll be plenty for you and the girls." "Could I ask a favour, Sarah?" "Would you write to the Navy Board for me?" "One look at the shape of my letters, he'll dismiss my case." "But you know how to put things." "~ Of course, Tom." "~ Thank you." "To..." "To Mr Pepys himself..." "I have to get the navy contract back or I'm in trouble." "How should I address him?" "His full title, which is Surveyor General of Victualling... .. and Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board." "Do you think your title gets longer the less effective you are?" "If you do manage to speak to him, you'll ask about Will?" "I've got nowhere with the clerks." "I can't stand another 16 months of this, Tom." "I know." "I know." "I'll ask him." "Hey..." "~ I do not really have time for this, Mr... ~ Farriner, sir." "Farriner, but you are lucky to catch me in excellent humour." "Well?" "I cannot buy the flour to bake for the King's navy if the King's navy will not pay its bills, sir." "It's regrettable but shouldn't you share the pain with your suppliers like everyone else?" "I've tried." "But if I have no flour, I have nothing to bake with and if I cannot bake, then... ~ Then I've nothing to feed my family on, sir." "~ We are at war." "It's an expensive business and I cannot pay you with money I do not have." "The King's finances are stretched." "Have you received your pay this month, Mr Pepys?" "You are, by all accounts, a good man, Farriner." "You work hard." "I have no intention of taking the navy contract away from you." "Thank you, sir." "But there is nothing I can do on the question of payment." "You will have to find a way to hold on." "For King and country." "Is there something else?" "Well, I seek news of my brother, William Farriner, sir." "He was on His Majesty's ship the Charity at the battle of Lowestoft and we heard these reports that men were picked from the water." "If so, wouldn't he have returned by now?" "Sir, he has a wife and a son..." "and they're waiting for news of him." "She needs to know, sir." "~ Robins." "~ Sir?" "I want to check the records for the Charity." "I shall write your sister-in-law a letter." "Unfortunately I do not have good news." "How did it go?" "Oh." "They're not going to take the navy contract away." "~ Well, will they pay what's owed?" "~ No." "What is it?" "I need to go and talk to Auntie Sarah." "~ Do you want me to rake out the ovens?" "~ No, no." "It's early yet." "~ I'll do it later." "~ I can do it before I go to sleep." "Hannah!" "Hannah!" "Yes, mouse, what is it?" "When people die, and you see them again in heaven, do they look exactly the same?" "Yes, I reckon so." "I don't think I'd recognise Mother." "Course you wouldn't." "She died when you were born." "How would she recognise me, then?" "In heaven." "She just would." "Stay, just for a little while." "♪ Jockey was a Piper's Son" "♪ And fell in love when he was young" "♪ But all the tunes that he could play" "♪ Was over the Hills and Far Away" "♪ Over the Hills and Far Away" "♪ Far away, far away" "♪ Over the Hills and Far Away" "♪ Was all that he could play" "David!" "Oh, my God." "Mr Wickes." "~ Where's David?" "~ That's everywhere, my lord." "Nothing." ""My lord"?" "What's going on?" "What is your business here?" "The King's business, Sarah." "What have you done with David?" "A penny for the pie shop." "I thought it better to work uninterrupted." "Forgive me, I have deceived you." ""Edward Wickes" is an invention." "My name is Lord Denton and I'm a servant of the King." "Now, I know that you work for the Duke of Hanford." "It's no secret that he employs every papist waif and stray in London." "I am no Catholic." "The Duke gave me work with no thought of my faith when we'd been thrown out on the streets." "He's a good man." "Your employer is a seditious sectarian bigot who's in league with our foreign enemies." "He has shown me nothing but kindness." "I'll bet." "Sarah, if you will agree to help me, it would make it easier to believe you've not been drawn into Hanford's treacherous web." "You see, he arrived back this morning with a Spanish soldier called Romero and there's every chance he intends to make an attempt on the King's life." "How am I to know you speak the truth?" "Your person, the interest you showed in David, that was all lies." "It was a necessity." "Now I need to know where this man Romero goes and who he speaks to." "I wish to be informed of everything that happens inside that house." "The Duke trusts me." "I can see you need time to compose your thoughts." "Now, you may present yourself to me at the Star Inn on Fish Street before midnight - hmm?" " and I will give you your full instructions." "You will not wish to be acquainted with the consequences of refusal." "(DOG BARKS)" "Fire!" "Fire!" "Hannah!" "Hannah!" "Mary!" "Mary!" "Hannah!" "Wake up!" "Mary!" "Mary!" "Hannah, Mary, wake up!" "Wake up!" "Fire!" "Fire!" "~ Daddy!" "~ We've got to go!" "~ Check the ovens?" "~ Now!" "~ Well, did you?" "~ Quickly!" "Quickly!" "(COUGHING) Father, no!" "It's no good." "Up to the attic." "Quick, come on!" "Here we go, here we go." "Here we go." "~ Cover your eyes." "~ Be careful." "What are you doing?" "Father!" "Right, we go over to the next roof." "~ Use the ledge." "~ Be careful." "~ Don't go." "Please!" "~ Father, don't leave us." "Stay there." "~ Hannah, help Mary onto my back." "~ I'm scared." "Help her, Hannah." "That's it, that's it, that's it." "Now, I've got you." "Hold on." "Try to be brave." "That's it." "Now, wrap your legs around me." "All right." "It's all right." "I've got you." "Now, we can do this." "~ All right?" "Now hold on." "~ Father!" "There, see, see?" "Going to be fine." "Hold tight." "~ I'm slipping." "~ No, you're not." "No, you're not." "Just hold tight." "Just hold on." "I'm going to jump, Mary." "Hold on." "Father, no!" "(SCREAMS)" "Sit on the ledge." "Sit on the ledge." "That's it." "That's it." "That's it." "Now, stay there, stay there." "Hannah!" "Hannah!" "I can't come back." "You're going to have to do it yourself." "Just climb out!" "Now come to me." "Come to me, Hannah." "Hannah, that's it, use the ledge." "Use the ledge." "That's it." "I can see you." "I can see you." "I can see you, Hannah." "Now just keep coming." "Come to me, Hannah." "Hannah." "Hannah, come on." "Come on!" "That's it, that's it." "Don't look down, don't look down." "Just focus on me." "Now you're going to have to jump!" "Now, reach for my hand." "Reach." "Hannah, reach." "I can't." "You're too far." "Reach for my hand, Hannah." "Reach, Hannah, please." "~ (SHRIEKS) ~ Reach..." "Quick." "Reach for my hand!" "That's it!" "Reach." "Reach!" "You can do it." "Hannah, please." "Jump." "Jump, Hannah!" "~ (SCREAMS) ~ No." "Don't let me go." "~ Hold on." "~ Please!" "That's it." "Pull yourself." "(That's it." "That's it.)" "(That's it.)" "Take Mary to Auntie Sarah's." "I'll be there as soon as I can." "~ Please, come with us." "~ I have to make sure the fire doesn't spread." "Tom!" "We have to dig down, find the water pipes." "Hannah, go, go, go." "Lizzie." "The day has quite simply been a stunning success." "The King's favour... (LIZZIE LAUGHS)" "Signor Alfredo is here, sir." "Madam's dance lesson." "(LIZZIE LAUGHS)" "(HUMS TUNE)" "(BELL RINGS OUT)" "Where are you going?" "Go back to sleep." "Go back to sleep." "Lie down, go on." "You warm enough?" "Go back to sleep." "Send word for Mayor Bludworth." "The street's on fire." "Hurry, man, if you want to save your premises!" "(KNOCK AT DOOR)" "Hannah." "There was a fire." "We've lost everything." "Where's your father?" "~ Is he all right?" "~ He's trying to stop it spreading." "You're safe now." "That's all that matters." "Hannah, Hannah, you're safe." "Tom!" "Tom, the mayor's here." "Shall we pull down the houses either side, my lord?" "To stop it spreading." "Are you out of your mind?" "An old woman could piss it out!" "(MEN LAUGH)" "An hour." "You seem to have found some stamina about you, Mr Pepys." "I asked for carriage, not entertainment." "(RAPPING AT DOOR)" "Make sure you lift him if he starts to cough." "I don't suppose there was any luck, sir, down the yards?" "I have asked." "I can turn my hand to anything." "I'll see what I can do." "(PANTING)" "(PANTING INTENSIFIES)" "I thought you weren't going to visit again." "Would you rather I didn't?" "That's not what I said." "This way." "Over here!" "That's it." "(SHOUTING)" "Water!" "We need water!" "~ Get some water!" "~ Out of the way!" "They says there's a fire in Pudding Lane." "Not a good omen in this heat and wind." "Who cares if the poor burn, eh, Pepys?" "I care." "It is my city." "Without London, there's no commerce, country or King." "Without London, we are nothing but a nation of sheep farmers." "Well, maybe it'll flush out some of the papist vermin." "If it wasn't them who started this fire." "Wilson, you well know the King demands tolerance of our Catholic brethren." "The King should enforce the law." "The King only cares for his pleasure." "I hear things down here on my river, Mr Pepys." "You hear the sound of the wind whistling through the space where your brain should be." "(SNIFFS)" "(BELL RINGS)" "Mr Ambassador." "We thank you for your hospitality." "Our guest awaits." "In nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti." "Amen." "Welcome." "How did you acquire so many knots?" "Ow!" "Take pity." "It is important to look beautiful for the King." "He seems to require no special effort." "You are wrong." "And it's your duty under God, no less." "We will not harm you, my child." "No." "No, I do not want this." "Frances." "Frances." "Now, come on." "No harm was intended." "Now don't be cross, you're too beautiful." "Am I really so deficient, so ugly?" "The whole world knows you are handsome." "Then what can I do to persuade you to change your mind?" "Sir, since you can have everything, you know the value of nothing." "(NEIGHING)" "(SHOUTING)" "Tom!" "(SHOUTING)" "Tom!" "(PROTESTS MUFFLED)" "Go on, get in there." "~ Get her in." "~ Get in there, go on." "Tom!" "Tom!" "Tom!" "Mama!" "Sarah!" "Mama!" "Sarah!" "You are in serious trouble, Sarah." "Where is the rescue effort?" "A fire in the poorest quarter of the city, on the hottest night of the year." "Chaos, panic, confusion." "What better time to strike against the King?" | 2024-05-18T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3560 |
Liver transplantation using low-weight recipients from a graft split program.
We present our experience with a split liver (SL) program shared with the children's liver transplantation (LT) program from 2 different hospitals in the use of partial grafts from cadaver donors in brain death. We describe an observational, retrospective study, which included patients who underwent a SL transplantation in our center between January 2006 and December 2012. Clinical variables were recorded of both donors and recipients and their data were analyzed using SPSS 19.0 software. Of a total of 204 LT, 4 (2%) patients were treated with a SL. The causes of LT were alcoholic cirrhosis in 2 cases, cryptogenic cirrhosis, and primary biliary cirrhosis (PBC). In all cases there was a temporary portocaval shunt. The confluence of the hepatic veins of the recipient was anastomosed to the donor vena cava and arterial anastomosis was performed. The reconstruction was hepato-choledochal in all cases. There were no cases of postreperfusion syndrome or vascular thrombosis and no retransplantation was necessary. Currently, 3 of the 4 cases are still alive. Death in the other patient was due to mesenteric ischemia. Our center has participated in the development of a protocol that considers the indication of this technique provided expert groups are involved in its development, regardless of hospital level. This will expand the pool of donors and partially solve the current problems with available grafting. | 2024-03-06T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7461 |
Sensory strategies in adult mental health: A qualitative exploration of staff perspectives following the introduction of a sensory room on a male adult acute ward.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the use of sensory techniques to help with emotional regulation in adult mental health populations. This is against a backdrop of international policies aimed at reducing restrictive interventions and improving the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques. A sensory room was designed and implemented on a male adult acute psychiatric ward. Staff perspectives were sought to evaluate the effectiveness of the room in managing emotional distress by exploring staff awareness of a broader range of de-escalation strategies and by exploring what effect the room had on staff behaviours with respect to sensory interventions. A series of semi-structured interviews were carried out, analysed, and grouped into themes. Three themes emerged as follows: enhancing de-escalation, sensory interventions, and impact on staff. Findings showed that increased awareness of sensory processing and use of sensory strategies such as the sensory room were perceived by staff to have a positive impact on reducing distress with male service users. Staff use of the room was also discovered to have benefits that included staff attending to their own emotional needs and the use of the room supporting reflective learning during critical incident debriefing. | 2024-04-14T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6417 |
[**Transcendental Hodge algebra\
**]{}
Misha Verbitsky[^1]
[**Abstract**]{}\
The transcendental Hodge lattice of a projective manifold $M$ is the smallest Hodge substructure in $p$-th cohomology which contains all holomorphic $p$-forms. We prove that the direct sum of all transcendental Hodge lattices has a natural algebraic structure, and compute this algebra explicitly for a hyperkähler manifold. As an application, we obtain a theorem about dimension of a compact torus $T$ admitting a symplectic embedding to a hyperkähler manifold $M$. If $M$ is generic in a $d$-dimensional family of deformations, then $\dim T{\geqslant}2^{[(d+1)/2]}$.
Introduction
============
Transcendental Hodge lattice is the smallest substructure in a Hodge structure of a projective manifold containing the cohomology classes of all holomorphic $p$-forms.
Transcendental Hodge lattices were (as Yu. Zarhin notices) a somewhat neglected subject in Hodge theory. This is somewhat surprising, because, unlike the Hodge structure on cohomology, the transcendental Hodge lattice is a birational invariant.
The observation made in this paper was probably made before, but it is still very useful: the direct sum of all transcendental Hodge lattices is naturally an algebra (Subsection \[\_tra\_alge\_Subsection\_\]). Using Zarhin’s classification of transcendental Hodge structures of K3 type, we compute this algebra for all hyperkähler manifolds (\[\_transcende\_Theorem\_\]; see Subsection \[\_hk\_Subsection\_\] for the definition and basic properties of hyperkähler manifolds). This computation gives a way to several generalization of results which were previously known for general (non-algebraic) hyperkähler manifolds, proving non-existence of low-dimensional holomorphic symplectic tori in projective hyperkähler manifolds (\[\_k\_symple\_in\_families\_Corollary\_\]).
We expect more results to be obtained in the same direction, because the transcendental Hodge algebra has a promise to become a very powerful tool in the study of projective holomorphically symplectic varieties.
Mumford-Tate group and Hodge group
----------------------------------
Mumford defined the Mumford-Tate group in [@_Mumford:families_], and called in “Hodge group”, and in most literature these terms are considered equivalent. However, in Zarkhin’s papers, as in [@_Peters_Steenbrink:MHS_], these notions are distinct.
Given a Hodge structure $V=\bigoplus V^{p,q}$, we consider action of $\C^*$ on $V$ where $z$ acts on $V^{p,q}$ as multiplication by $z^{p-q}$. Then “Mumford-Tate group” is a smallest rational algebraic group containing image of $\C^*$ and “Hodge group” a smallest rational algebraic group containing image of $U(1)\subset \C^*$
We shall not pay attention to this difference, and for our purposes “Hodge group” is synonymous to “Mumford-Tate”, with Mumford-Tate being the smallest rational algebraic group containing image of $U(1)\subset \C^*$.
Hyperkähler manifolds: an introduction {#_hk_Subsection_}
--------------------------------------
Here we list some basic facts and properties of hyperkähler manifolds; for more details, proofs and history, please see [@_Besse:Einst_Manifo_] and [@_Beauville_].
[ ]{}A [**hyperkähler structure**]{} on a manifold $M$ is a Riemannian structure $g$ and a triple of complex structures $I,J,K$, satisfying quaternionic relations $I\circ J = - J \circ I =K$, such that $g$ is Kähler for $I,J,K$.
[ ]{}Let $\omega_I, \omega_J, \omega_K$ be the Kähler symplectic forms associated with $I,J,K$. A hyperkähler manifold is holomorphically symplectic: $\omega_J+\1 \omega_K$ is a holomorphic symplectic form on $(M,I)$. Converse is also true:
[ ]{}(Calabi-Yau; see [@_Yau:Calabi-Yau_], [@_Besse:Einst_Manifo_]) A compact, Kähler, holomorphically symplectic manifold admits a unique hyperkähler metric in any Kähler class.
[ ]{}A compact hyperkähler manifold $M$ is called [**maximal holonomy manifold**]{}, or [**simple**]{}, or [**IHS**]{} if $\pi_1(M)=0$, $H^{2,0}(M)=\C$.
[ ]{}(Bogomolov Decomposition Theorem; [@_Bogomolov:decompo_].)\
Any hyperkähler manifold admits a finite covering which is a product of a torus and several maximal holonomy (simple) hyperkähler manifolds.
[ ]{}From now on, all holomorphic symplectic manifolds are tacitly assumed to be of Kähler type, “holomorphic symplectic” is used interchangeably with “hyperkähler”, and all hyperkähler manifolds are assumed to be of maximal holonomy.
Trianalytic and holomorphic symplectic subvarieties
---------------------------------------------------
The starting point of the study of holomorphically symplectic subvarieties in hyperkähler manifolds was the paper [@_Verbitsky:Symplectic_I_], where it was shown that any complex subvariety of a general (non-algebraic) hyperkähler manifold is holomorphically symplectic outside of its singularities. In [@_Verbitsky:Symplectic_II_] this result was improved: it was shown that for a general complex structure induced by a quaternion $L=aI+bJ +cK$ on a hyperkähler manifold $(M,I,J,K)$, any complex subvariety of $(M,L)$ is in fact [**trianalyric**]{}, that is, complex analytic with respect to $I, J, K$. The notion of a trianalytic subvariety, introduced in this paper, had many uses further on. In [@_Verbitsky:hypercomple_], the notion of an abstract “hypercomplex manifold” was developed, following Deligne and Simpson. The examples of hypercomplex varieties include all trianalytic subvarieties of hyperkähler manifold. It was shown that hypercomplex varieties admit a natural hypercomplex desingularization. Applied to trianalytic subvarieties of $M$, this gives a holomorphically symplectic desingularization immersed to $M$ holomorphically symplectically.
In [@_Verbitsky:non-compact_subva_], the results of [@_Verbitsky:Symplectic_II_] were generalized to non-compact hyperkähler manifolds, with further generalizations in [@_Soldatenkov_Verbitsky:subvarieties_].
Much advance was done towards classifying trianalytic subvarieties in general deformations of hyperkähler manifolds ([@_Verbitsky:Hilbert_], [@_KV:partial_], [@_Kurnosov:tori_], [@_SV:k-symplectic_]). However, the subject of more general (that is, not necessarily trianalytic) holomorphic symplectic subvarieties was mostly neglected, with the paper [@_V:Wirtinger_] being the only exception (as far as we know).
In [@_V:Wirtinger_], the [**Wirtinger invariant**]{} of a holomorphically symplectic (possibly, immersed) subvariety $Z$ in a hyperkähler manifold $M$ was defined. Wirtinger number measures how far a holomorphically symplectic subvariety $Z\subset M$ is from being trianalytic. This invariant satisfies the inequality $\mu(Z,M) {\geqslant}1$, with equality reached if and only if $Z$ is trianalytic.
It was shown that $\mu(Z,M)$ is monotonous and multiplicative, in the following sense. Given a chain of symplectic immersions $Z_1{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}Z_2{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}M$, one has $$\mu(Z_1, M) =\mu(Z_1, Z_2) \mu(Z_2, M).$$ Therefore, $Z_1$ is trianalytic in $M$ if and only if it is trianalytic in $Z_2$ and $Z_2$ is trianalytic in $M$.
The formalism of transcendental Hodge algebra seems to be particularly suited for the study of the holomorphically symplectic subvarieties. In this paper, we generalize the results of [@_SV:k-symplectic_] from trianalytic to more general symplectic subvarieties. In [@_SV:k-symplectic_] it was shown that a trianalytic complex subtorus $Z$ in a very general deformation of a hyperkähler manifold $M$ satisfies $\dim Z{\leqslant}2^{\left\lfloor \frac{d+1}2\right\rfloor}$, where $d=b_2-2$ is the dimension of the universal family of deformations of $M$. In this paper, the same result is proven for projective $M$ generic in a $d$-dimensional family of deformations (\[\_k\_symple\_in\_families\_Corollary\_\]).
Hodge structures
================
In this section we briefly introduce the Hodge structures; for more examples, context and applications, see [@_Voisin-Hodge_] and [@_Griffiths:transcendental_].
Hodge structures: the definition
--------------------------------
[ ]{}Let $V_{{\Bbb R}}$ be a real vector space. [**A (real) Hodge structure of weight $w$**]{} on a vector space $V_\C=V_{{\Bbb R}}\otimes_{{\Bbb R}}\C$ is a decomposition $V_\C =\bigoplus_{p+q=w} V^{p,q}$, satisfying $\overline{V^{p,q}}= V^{q,p}$. It is called [**rational Hodge structure**]{} if one fixes a rational lattice $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ such that $V_{{\Bbb R}}=V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes {{\Bbb R}}$. A Hodge structure is equipped with $U(1)$-action, with $u\in U(1)$ acting as $u^{p-q}$ on $V^{p,q}$. [**Morphism**]{} of Hodge structures is a rational map which is $U(1)$-invariant.
[ ]{}[**Polarization**]{} on a rational Hodge structrure of weight $w$ is a $U(1)$-invariant non-degenerate 2-form $h\in V_{{\Bbb Q}}^*\otimes V^*_{{\Bbb Q}}$ (symmetric or antisymmetric depending on parity of $w$) which satisfies $$\label{_Hodge_Riemann_Equation_}
-(\1)^{p-q}h(x, {\overline}x)>0$$ (“Riemann-Hodge relations”) for each non-zero $x\in V^{p,q}$.
[ ]{}Further on, the Hodge structures we consider are tacitly assumed to be rational and polarized.
[ ]{} Let $(M, \omega)$ be a compact Kähler manifold. Then the Hodge decomposition $H^*(M,\C)=\oplus H^{p,q}(M)$ defines a Hodge structure on $H^*(M,\C)$. If we restrict ourselves to the primitive cohomology space $$H^*_{\text{\sf prim}}:= \{ \eta\in H^*(M) \ \ (*\eta)\wedge\omega=0\},$$ and consider $h(x,y):= \int_M x\wedge y \wedge \omega^{\dim_\C M -w}$, relations become the usual Hodge-Riemann relations. If, in addition, the cohomology class of $\omega$ is rational (in this case, by Kodaira theorem, $(M,\omega)$ is projective) the space $H^*_{\text{\sf prim}}(M)$ is also rational, and the Hodge decomposition $H^*_{\text{\sf prim}}(M,\C)=\oplus H^{p,q}_{\text{\sf prim}}(M)$ defines a polarized, rational Hodge structure.
Mumford-Tate group
------------------
[ ]{}A [**simple object**]{} of an abelian category is an object which has no proper subobjects. An abelian category is [**semisimple**]{} if any object is a direct sum of simple objects.
[ ]{} Category of polarized Hodge structures in semisimple
[[**Proof: **]{}]{} Orthogonal complement of a Hodge substructure $V'\subset V$ with respect to $h$ is again a Hodge substructure, and this complement does not intersect $V'$; both assertions follow from the Riemann-Hodge relations.
[ ]{}Let $V$ be a Hodge structure over ${{\Bbb Q}}$, and $\rho$ the corresponding $U(1)$-action. [**Mumford-Tate group**]{} (Mumford, [@_Mumford:families_]; Mumford called it “the Hodge group”) is the smallest algebraic group over ${{\Bbb Q}}$ containing $\rho$.
[ ]{}\[\_Mumford\_Tate\_via\_invariants\_Theorem\_\] Let $V$ be a rational, polarized Hodge structure, and ${\operatorname{MT}}(V)$ its Mumford-Tate group. Consider the tensor algebra of $V$, $W= T^{\otimes}(V)$ with the Hodge structure (also polarized) induced from $V$. Let $W_h$ be the space of all $\rho$-invariant rational vectors in $W$ (such vectors are called [**“Hodge vectors”**]{}). Then ${\operatorname{MT}}(V)$ coincides with the stabilizer $${\operatorname{St}}_{GL(V)}(W_h):= \{ g\in GL(V)\ \ |\ \ \forall w\in W_h, g(w)=w\}.$$ [[**Proof: **]{}]{}Follows from the Chevalley’s theorem on tensor invariants.
[ ]{}\[\_MT\_inva\_=\_Hodge\_substra\_Corollary\_\] Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a rational Hodge structure, and $W\subset V_\C$ a subspace. Then the following are equivalent:
(i)
: $W$ is a Hodge substructure.
(ii)
: $W$ is Mumford-Tate invariant.
Mumford-Tate group and the ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$-action
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ ]{} Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a ${{\Bbb Q}}$-vector space, and $V_\C:= V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$ its complexification, equipped with a natural Galois group ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$ action. We call a complex subspace $T\subset V_\C$ [**rational**]{} if $T=T_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$, where $T_Q= V_{{\Bbb Q}}\cap T$.
[ ]{} A complex subspace $W\subset V_\C$ is rational if and only if it is ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$-invariant.
This implies
[ ]{}\[\_Gal\_gene\_smallest\_HS\_Claim\_\] Consider a subspace $W\subset V_\C$, and let ${\widetilde}W_{{\Bbb Q}}\subset V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be the smallest subspace of $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ such that ${\widetilde}W_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C\supset W$. Then $W_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$ is generated by $\sigma(W)$, for all $\sigma\in {\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$.
[ ]{}Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a rational, polarized Hodge structure, $\rho$ the corresponding $U(1)$-action, and ${\operatorname{MT}}$ its Mumford-Tate group. Then ${\operatorname{MT}}$ is a Zariski closure of a group generated by $\sigma(\rho)$, for all $\sigma\in {\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}Since ${\operatorname{MT}}$ is rational, it is preserved by ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$. The algebraic closure of the group generated by $\sigma(\rho)$ coincides with ${\operatorname{MT}}$, because it is the smallest group which is rational, Zariski closed and contains $\rho$.
Transcendental Hodge algebra
============================
Transcendental Hodge lattice
----------------------------
[ ]{}Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a rational, polarized Hodge structure of weight $w$, $V_C= \bigoplus_{ p+q=w \atop p,q {\geqslant}0} V^{p, q}$, and $V^{tr}\subset V_\C$ a minimal rational subspace containing $V^{d,0}$. Then $V^{tr}$ is a Hodge substructure.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}By \[\_Gal\_gene\_smallest\_HS\_Claim\_\], $V^{tr}$ is generated by $\sigma(V^{d,0})$ for all $\sigma\in {\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$. Since $V^{d,0}$ is preserved by the $U(1)$-action $\rho$, $V^{tr}$ is preserved by the group generated by all $\sigma(\rho)$, which is ${\operatorname{MT}}(V)$. Finally, a rational subspace is a Hodge substructure of $V$ if and only if it ${\operatorname{MT}}(V)$-invariant \[\_MT\_inva\_=\_Hodge\_substra\_Corollary\_\].
[ ]{}Transcendental Hodge lattice is a birational invariant.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}Let ${\varphi}:\; X {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}Y$ be a birational morphism of projective varieties. Then ${\varphi}^*:\; H^d(Y){{\:\longrightarrow\:}}H^d(X)$ induces isomorphism on $H^{d,0}$. Therefore, it is injective on $H^d_{tr}(Y)$. Indeed, its kernel is a Hodge substructure of $H^d_{tr}(Y)$ not intersecting $H^{d,0}$, which is impossible. Applying the same argument to the dual map, we obtain that ${\varphi}^*$ is also surjective on $H^d_{tr}(Y)$.
Transcendental Hodge algebra: the definition {#_tra_alge_Subsection_}
--------------------------------------------
[ ]{}Let $M$ be a projective Kähler manifold, $$H^*_{tr}(M):=\oplus_d H^d_{tr}(M)$$ the direct sum of all transcendental Hodge lattices, and $H^*_{tr}(M)^\bot$ its orthogonal complement with respect to the polarization form $$h(x,y):= \int_M x\wedge y \wedge \omega^{\dim_\C M -{\widetilde}x -{\widetilde}y},$$ where ${\widetilde}z=i$ for any $z\in \Lambda^i(M)$. Then $H^*_{tr}(M)^\bot$ is an ideal in the cohomology algebra.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}The space $V^*:=H^*_{tr}(M)^\bot$ is a maximal Hodge structure contained in $$A^* :=\bigoplus\limits_{ p+q=w \atop p,q > 0} V^{p, q}.$$ The space $A^*$ is clearly an ideal. For any two Hodge substructures $X, Y\subset H^*(M)$, the product $X\cdot Y$ also rational and $U(1)$-invariant, hence it is also a Hodge substructure. However, $A^*$ is an ideal, hence $X \cdot V^*$ is a Hodge structure contained in $A^*$. Therefore, $H^*(M) \cdot V^*$ is contained in $V^*$.
[ ]{}The quotient algebra $H^*(M)/H^*_{tr}(M)^\bot= H^*_{tr}(M)$ is called [**the transcendental Hodge algebra**]{} of $M$.
[ ]{} Transcendental Hodge algebra is a birational invariant.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}Same as for transcendental Hodge lattices.
Zarhin’s results about Hodge structures of K3 type
==================================================
Number fields and Hodge structures of K3 type
---------------------------------------------
In this subsection we give a survey of Zarhin’s results on simple Hodge structures of K3 type given in a beautiful and very enjoyable paper [@_Zarhin:Hodge_K3_]. We use these results in Subsection \[\_transcende\_alge\_Subsection\_\].
[ ]{}A polarized, rational Hodge structure $V_\C= \bigoplus_{ p+q=2 \atop p,q {\geqslant}0} V^{p, q}$ of weight 2 with $\dim V^{2,0}=1$ is called [**a Hodge structure of K3 type**]{}.
[ ]{}Let $M$ be a projective K3 surface, and $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ its transcendental Hodge lattice. Then $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ is simple and of K3 type.
[ ]{}(Zarhin) Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a simple Hodge structure of K3 sype, and $E={\operatorname{End}}(V_{{\Bbb Q}})$ an algebra of its endomorphisms in the category of Hodge structures. Then $E$ is a number field.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}By Schur’s lemma, $E$ has no zero divisors, hence it is a division algebra. Since $E\subset {\operatorname{End}}(V_{{\Bbb Q}})$, it is countable. To prove that it is a number field, it remains to show that $E$ is commutative. However, $E$ acts on a 1-dimensional space $V^{2,0}$. This defines a homomorphism from $E$ to $\C$, which is injective, because $E$ is a division algebra.
[ ]{}(Zarhin) Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a Hodge structure of K3 type, and $E:= {\operatorname{End}}(V_{{\Bbb Q}})$ its endomorphism field. Then $E$ is either totally real (that is, all its embeddings to $\C$ are real) or is an imaginary quadratic extension of a totally real field $E_0$.
For the convenience of the reader, we sketch Zarhin’s proof here.
[**Proof. Step 1:**]{} Let $a\in E$ be an endomorphism, and $a^*$ its conjugate with respect to the polarization $h$. Since the polarization is rational and $U(1)$-invariant, the map $a^*$ also preserves the Hodge decomposition. Then $a^*\in E$. Denote the generator of $V^{2,0}$ by $\Omega$. Then $h(a(\Omega), a({\overline}\Omega)) = h(a^*a(\Omega), {\overline}\Omega)>0$, hence $\frac{a^*a(\Omega)}{\Omega}$ is a positive real number. Therefore, the embedding $E\hookrightarrow \C$ induced by $b {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}\frac{b(\Omega)}{\Omega}$ maps $a^*a$ to a positive real number.
[**Step 2:**]{} Since the group ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$ acts on $V$ by automorphisms, it preserves $E$, hence $[E:{{\Bbb Q}}]$ is a Galois extension. This means that ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(\C/{{\Bbb Q}})$ acts transitively on embeddings from $E$ to $\C$, preserving the map $a{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}a^*$. Therefore, all embeddings $E\hookrightarrow \C$ map $a^*a$ to a positive real number.
[**Step 3:**]{} The map $a {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}a^*$ is either a non-trivial involution or identity. In the second case, all embeddings $E\hookrightarrow \C$ map $a^2$ to a positive real number, and $E$ is totally real. In the second case, $\tau(a)=a^*$ is an involution, hence its fixed set $E^\tau=: E_0$ is a degree 2 subfield of $E$, with $\tau$ the generator of the Galois group ${\operatorname{{\mathcal{G\!\!\:a\!\!\:l}}}}(E/E_0)$.
[**Step 4:**]{} Let $r$ be the root of the corresponding quadratic equation $x^2-u=0$. Then $\tau(r)=-r$, which gives $-r^2 = r\tau(r)>0$, and $-r^2$ is positive and real for all embeddings $E\hookrightarrow \C$. Therefore, $[E:E_0]$ is an imaginary quadratic extension.
[ ]{}(Zarhin) Let $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ be a Hodge structure of K3 type, and $E:= {\operatorname{End}}(V_{{\Bbb Q}})$ the corresponding number field. Denote by $SO_E(V)$ the group of $E$-linear isometries of $V$ for $[E:{{\Bbb Q}}]$ totally real, and by $U_E(V)$ the group of $E$-linear isometries of $V$ for $E$ an imaginary quadratic extension of a totally real field. Then the Mumford-Tate group ${\operatorname{MT}}$ is $SO_E(V)$ in the first case, and $U_E(V)$ in the second
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}See [@_Zarhin:Hodge_K3_] for original proof, for [@_Zarhin:Hodge_K3_LNM_] for an alternative proof using B. Kostant’s theorem and [@_Zarhin:small_number_] for generalizations.
Mumford-Tate group for Hodge structures of K3 type {#_MT_Zarhin_Subsection_}
--------------------------------------------------
Let $V_\C=V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$ and $V_\C=V_{{\Bbb R}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}{{\Bbb R}}$. We would be interested in the real and complex Lie groups $SO_E(V_\C)$ and $U_E(V_\C)$, obtained as a complexification of $MT(V)$.
As a Lie group, $SO_E(V)$ is isomorphic to $SO(\C^n)$, where $n$ is dimension of $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ over $E$. To see this, consider the tensor product $$E\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C=\underbrace{\C\oplus\C\oplus...\oplus\C}_{\text{$k$ times}},$$ where $k$ is degree of $E$. The $k$ factors of $E\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$ correspond to all embeddings of $E$ to $\C$. Let $\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_k$ be all such factors, $\sigma_i:\; E\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}\C$, and denote by $V_{\sigma_i}$ the subset of $V= V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$ corresponding to $\sigma_i$, $$V_{\sigma_i}= \{v\in V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C\ \ \forall a\in E, \ \ a(x)=\sigma_i(x)\}.$$ Clearly, $V= \bigoplus_i V_{\sigma_i}$, and $SO_E(V)$ embeds to each of $SO(V_{\sigma_i})$ tautologically. Since $V$ is generated as a $E$-module by each of $V_{\sigma_i}$, this implies that $SO_E(V)=SO(V_{\sigma_i})$, for each $i$.
The same argument is used to show that for an imaginary quadratic case, $U_E(V_{{\Bbb R}})$ is isomorphic to $U(W)$, for a complex vector space $W$ obtained as follows. Since $E$ is totally imaginary, $E\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}{{\Bbb R}}= \underbrace{\C\oplus\C\oplus...\oplus\C}_{\text{$k/2$ times}}$. Then $V_{{\Bbb R}}$ is a sum of $k$ copies of the same complex vector space $W$ with the Galois group acting transitively, and $U_E(V_{{\Bbb R}})=U(W)$.
The space $W\otimes_{{\Bbb R}}\C$ can be identified with $W\oplus {\overline}W$, and the Hermitian form $h$ identifies ${\overline}W$ with $W^*$, which are both isotropic subspaces with respect to $h$. This implies that $U_E(V_\C)$ is a group of isometries of $W\oplus W^*$ preserving this direct sum decomposition, and is identified with $GL(W)$.
Transcendental Hodge algebra for hyperkähler manifolds
======================================================
Irreducible representations of $SO(V)$
--------------------------------------
Before we start describing the transcendental Hodge algebra for a hyperkähler manifold, we have to define a certain $SO(V)$-invariant quotient algebra of the symmetric algebra ${\operatorname{Sym}}^*(V)$ of a vector space equipped with a non-degenerate scalar product.
[ ]{}\[\_Sym\_+-defi\_Claim\_\] Let $V$ be a vector space equipped with a non-degenerate symmetric product $h$, and $b \in {\operatorname{Sym}}^2(V)$ an $SO(V)$-invariant bivector dual to $h$. Denote by ${\operatorname{Sym}}_+^*(V)$ the quotient of ${\operatorname{Sym}}^*(V)$ by the ideal generated by $b$. Then ${\operatorname{Sym}}_+^i(V)$ is irreducible as a representation of $SO(V)$.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}It is well known (see [@_Weyl:invariants_]) that ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i(V)$ is decomposed to a direct sum of irreducible representations of $SO(V)$ as follows: $${\operatorname{Sym}}^i(V)= {\operatorname{Sym}}^i_i(V)\oplus {\operatorname{Sym}}^i_{i-2}(V) \oplus ... \oplus
{\operatorname{Sym}}^i_{i-2\lfloor i/2\rfloor }(V),$$ where ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i_{i-k}(V)\cong {\operatorname{Sym}}^{i-k}_{i-k}(V)$ and the subrepresentation ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i_{i-2}(V) \oplus ... \oplus {\operatorname{Sym}}^i_{i-2\lfloor i/2\rfloor }(V)$ is the image of ${\operatorname{Sym}}^{i-2}(V)$ under the map $\alpha {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}\alpha \cdot b$. Then ${\operatorname{Sym}}_+^i(V)={\operatorname{Sym}}_i^i(V)$, hence irreducible.
Transcendental Hodge algebra for hyperkähler manifolds {#_transcende_alge_Subsection_}
------------------------------------------------------
[ ]{}\[\_hyperka\_cohomo\_1995\_Theorem\_\] ([@_Verbitsky:cohomo_; @_Verbitsky:coho_announce_]) Let $M$ be a maximal holonomy hyperkähler manifold, $\dim_\C M=2n$, and $H^{*}_{(2)}(M)$ subalgebra in cohomology generated by $H^2(M)$. Then $H^{2i}_{(2)}(M)= {\operatorname{Sym}}^i H^2(M)$ for all $i {\leqslant}n$.
The main result of this paper:
[ ]{}\[\_transcende\_Theorem\_\] Let $M$ be a projective maximal holonomy hyperkähler manifold, $\dim_\C M=2n$, $H^{2*}_{tr}(M)$ its transcendental Hodge algebra, and $E={\operatorname{End}}(V)$ the number field of endomorphisms of its transcendental Hodge lattice $V= H^2_{tr}(M)$. Let ${\operatorname{Sym}}(V)_E$ denote the $E$-linear symmetric product. Then $$\bigoplus_{i=0}^n H^{2i}_{tr}(M)= \bigoplus_{i=0}^n {\operatorname{Sym}}^i(V)_E$$ for $E$ imaginary quadratic extension, and $$\bigoplus_{i=0}^n H^{2i}_{tr}(M)= \bigoplus_{i=0}^n {\operatorname{Sym}}^i_+(V)_E$$ for $E$ totally real.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}By definition, $H^{2i}_{tr}(M)$ is the smallest Hodge substructure (that is, the Mumford-Tate subrepresentation) of $H^{2i}(M)$ containing $\Omega^i$. By \[\_hyperka\_cohomo\_1995\_Theorem\_\], one could replace $H^{2i}(M)$ with ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i(V)$. This means that we need to find the smallest $U_E(V)$- and $SO_E(V)$-representation containing $\Omega^i$. If $V$ is a fundamental representation of $U(V)$, the space ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i(V)$ is irreducible, and for $SO(V)$, the irreducible component containing $\Omega^i$ is precisely ${\operatorname{Sym}}^i_+(V)$ (\[\_Sym\_+-defi\_Claim\_\]).
[ ]{}Let $S$ be a family of deformations of a hyperkähler manifold, $s\in S$ a point, $M_s$ its fiber, and $T_sS
{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}H^1(TM_s)$ the corresponding tangent map, defined by Kodaira and Spencer. The dimension of its image in general $s\in S$ is called [**the essential dimension**]{} of the deformation family. Essential dimension of a holomorphic family $S$ of deformations is a smallest $d$ such that $S$ can be locally obtained as a pullback of a $d$-dimensional family.
The dimension of the transcendental Hodge lattice of a general member of a family is determined by the essential dimension of the deformation family:
[ ]{}\[\_MT\_family\_Theorem\_\] Let $M$ be a projective hyperkähler manifold, which is generic in a family $S$. Assume that the essential dimension of this deformation family is $d$. Then $\dim_E H^2_{tr}(M){\leqslant}d+2$, where $E={\operatorname{End}}(H^2_{tr}(M))$ is the corresponding number field.
[**Proof:**]{} Using the Torelli theorem ([@_V:Torelli_]), we may assume that $S$ is a subset of the period space ${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$ of the Hodge structures on $H^2(M)$. Then \[\_MT\_family\_Theorem\_\] is implied by \[\_dimension\_family\_MT\_Proposition\_\] below.
Variations of Hodge structures of K3 type and Mumford-Tate group
================================================================
Variations of Hodge structures and Mumford-Tate group
-----------------------------------------------------
[ ]{}Let $M$ be a complex manifold, and $V$ a real vector bundle equipped with a flat connection over $M$. Assume that at each point $m\in M$, the fiber $V_m$ is equipped by a rational, polarized Hodge structure, that is, a Hodge decomposition $V_m \otimes \C = \bigoplus V_m^{p,q}$, smoothly depending on $M$, a rational structure $V_m=V_m({{\Bbb Q}})\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}{{\Bbb R}}$ and a polarization $s\in V_m({{\Bbb Q}})^*\otimes V_m({{\Bbb Q}})^*$Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied. First, the rational lattice $V_m({{\Bbb Q}})$ and the polarization are preserved by the connection. Second, the Hodge decomposition $V_m \otimes \C = \bigoplus V_m^{p,q}$ satisfies [**the Griffiths transversality condition**]{}: $$\nabla(V^{p,q})\subset \bigg(V^{p,q}\otimes \Lambda^1(M)\bigg) \oplus
\bigg(V^{p+1,q-1}\otimes \Lambda^{0,1}(M)\bigg) \oplus
\bigg(V^{p-1,q+1}\otimes \Lambda^{1,0}(M)\bigg).$$ Then $(V, V_m \otimes \C = \bigoplus V_m^{p,q}, V_m({{\Bbb Q}}), s)$ is called [**a rational, polarized variation of Hodge structures**]{}, abbreviated to VHS.
[ ]{}Let ${\cal X}{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}S$ be a holomorphic family of compact Kähler manifolds over a base $S$, and $V$ the corresponding vector bundle of cohomology of the fibers ${\cal X}_t, t\in S$. Clearly, $V$ is equipped with the tautological connection $\nabla$, called [**the Gauss-Manin connection**]{}. The Hodge decomposition on $H^*({\cal X}_t)$ depends smoothly on $t\in S$. If, in addition, all ${\cal X}_t$ admit a polarization (that is, an ample line bundle) $L_t$ with $c_1(L_t)$ invariant with respect to $\nabla$. Then the sub-bundle of primitive forms is also $\nabla$-invariant, and the corresponding Hodge structures glue together to give a polarized, rational variation of Hodge structures (see [@_Griffiths:transcendental_] or [@_Voisin-Hodge_]).
From \[\_Mumford\_Tate\_via\_invariants\_Theorem\_\] it is obvious that the Mumford-Tate group is lower semicontinuous in smooth families of Hodge structures. Indeed, it is the biggest group which fixes all Hodge vectors in all tensor powers of $V$. The sets Hodge vectors are upper semicontinuous as functions of a base, because for each rational vector, the set of fibers where it is of Hodge type $(p,p)$ is closed. This set has a special name in the theory of variations of Hodge structures.
[ ]{}Let $V$ be a variation of Hodge structures over $S$, and ${\varphi}\in V^{\otimes n}$ any tensor. The set of all $x\in S$ such that ${\varphi}$ is of Hodge type $(p,p)$ in $x$ is called [**the Hodge locus**]{} of ${\varphi}$.
The following claim is easily deduced from Griffiths transversality condition.
[ ]{}([@_Griffiths:transcendental_], [@_Voisin-Hodge_]) Let $V$ be a variation of Hodge structures over a base $S$, ${\varphi}\in V^{\otimes n}$ any tensor, and $S_{\varphi}$ the corresponding Hodge locus. Then $S_{\varphi}$ is a complex analytic subset of $S$.
[ ]{}\[\_MT\_generic\_Corollary\_\] Let $V$ be a VHS over a connected bas $S$, and $R$ the set of all rational vectors ${\varphi}\in V_{{\Bbb Q}}^{\otimes n}$ such that the corresponding Hodge locus $S_{\varphi}$ is a proper subset of $S$, and $S_0\subset S$ the complement $S\backslash \bigcup_{{\varphi}\in R} S_{\varphi}$. Then for each $t\in S_0$ the Mumford-Tate group $MT(V_t)$ is independent from $t$, and contains $MT(V_s)$ for any other $s\in S$.
[**Proof:**]{} Follows immediately from \[\_Mumford\_Tate\_via\_invariants\_Theorem\_\].
[ ]{}In assumptions of \[\_MT\_generic\_Corollary\_\], a point $s\in S_0$ is called a [**Mumford-Tate generic**]{} point of $S$.
Variations of Hodge structures of K3 type
-----------------------------------------
[ ]{}\[\_periods\_K3\_type\_Remark\_\] Consider the space ${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$ of all K3-type Hodge structures on $(V_{{\Bbb Q}}, q)$, where $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ is a rational vector space and $q$ a rational bilinear symmetric form on $V_{{\Bbb Q}}$ of signature $(2,n)$. Let $V_\C:= V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}\C$. Then $${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}= \{ l\in {\Bbb P} V_\C\ \ |\ \ q(l,l)=0, q(l, {\overline}l) >0\}.$$ Indeed, for each $l$ in this set, we can define a decomposition $V^{2,0}=l$, $V^{0,2}={\overline}l$, $V^{1,1}=\langle V^{2,0}+ V^{0,2}\rangle^\bot$. The following claim is well known.
[ ]{}The trivial local system $(V_{{\Bbb Q}}\otimes_{{\Bbb Q}}{{\Bbb R}}, q)$ over ${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$ with the Hodge decomposition defined in \[\_periods\_K3\_type\_Remark\_\] is a VHS.
[**Proof:**]{} The only non-trivial part is Griffiths transversality: we need to show e. g. that $$\label{_Griffiths_tra_for_K3_type_Equation_}
\nabla(V^{2,0})\subset V^{2,0}\otimes \Lambda^1(M)
\oplus V^{1,1}\otimes \Lambda^{1,0}(M).$$ Choose any section $\xi$ of the line bundle $V^{2,0}$ on ${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$. Differentiating $q(\xi, \xi)=0$, we obtain $q(\nabla(\xi), \xi)=0$, which implies immediately.
[ ]{}\[\_dimension\_family\_MT\_Proposition\_\] Let $V$ be a VHS of K3 type over a complex manifold $S\subset {\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$, and $G$ the Mumford-Tate group of a generic point $s\in S$. Then $k{\geqslant}\dim S+2$.
[**Proof:**]{} Let $W\subset T^{\otimes} V$ be the set of all rational tensors ${\varphi}\in T^{\otimes} V$ which are of type $(p,p)$ in $s$. By \[\_Mumford\_Tate\_via\_invariants\_Theorem\_\], $W$ is the space of $G$-invariants: $W= (T^{\otimes} V)^G$. Replacing $S$ by a bigger complex analytic subvariety of ${\operatorname{{\Bbb P}\sf er}}$, we may assume that $S$ is an open subset of the intersection $S_1$ of all Hodge loci for all $w\in W$; indeed, this intersection is complex analytic, contains $S$, and has the same generic Mumford-Tate group.
The space $S_1$ is preserved by $G$ acting on ${\Bbb P}V_\C$, hence contains an orbit of $G$. For $G=SO_E(V)$, this orbit has complex dimension $\dim_E V_{{\Bbb Q}}-2$, because it contains an open subset of a projectivization of an appropriate quadric, and a quadric in ${\Bbb P} A$ has dimension $\dim A-2$.
For $G=U_E(V)$, we have $E_E(V_\C)= GL(W)$ (Subsection \[\_MT\_Zarhin\_Subsection\_\]) acting on $V=W\oplus W^*$. Clearly, $S$ contains a point on a quadric $$Q=\{l\in {\Bbb P}V \ \ |\ \ l=\C \cdot (x_1, x_2)\ \ |\ \ \langle x_1, x_2\rangle =0\}.$$ The whole quadric is an orbit of $GL(W)=U_E(V_\C)$, hence it contains $S$, and its dimension is again $\dim_E V_{{\Bbb Q}}-2$.
$k$-symplectic structures and symplectic embeddings
===================================================
Non-degeneracy of the map $x{{\:\longrightarrow\:}}x^n$ in $H^*_{tr}(M)$.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applications of \[\_transcende\_Theorem\_\] are based on the following observation.
[ ]{}Let $M$ be a projective maximal holonomy hyperkähler manifold, $\dim_\C M=2n$ and $x\in H^2_{tr}(M)$ a non-zero vector. Then $x^n\neq 0$ in $H^n_{tr}(M)$.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}When $E$ is purely imaginary and $H^*_{tr}(M)={\operatorname{Sym}}^*(V)$, this is trivial. When $E$ is totally real and $H^*_{tr}(M)={\operatorname{Sym}}^*_+(V)$, this is proven as follows. The action of $SO(V)$ on the projectivization ${\Bbb P}V$ has only two orbits: the quadric $Q:= \{x \ \ |\ \ h(x,x)=0\}$ and the rest. The map $P(x) = x^n$ is non-zero, hence it is non-zero on the open orbit. To check that it is non-zero on the quadric, notice that $\Omega$ belongs to $Q$, and $\Omega^n$ is non-zero in ${\operatorname{Sym}}^n_+(V)$.
[ ]{}\[\_symple\_torus\_non-dege\_Corollary\_\] Let $M$ be a projective maximal holonomy hyperkähler manifold, $N \hookrightarrow M$ a subvariety, $\dim_\C N = 2n$, embedded holomorphically symplectically in $M$, and $x\in H^2(N)$ a restriction of a non-zero class $x\in H^2_{tr}(M)$. Then $x^n \neq 0$.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}Since the embedding $N\hookrightarrow M$ is holomorphically symplectic, the restriction map $H^{2n}_{tr}(M){{\:\longrightarrow\:}}H^{2n}_{tr}(N)$ is non-zero, hence injective. On the other hand, $x^n \neq 0$ in $H^{2n}_{tr}(M)$, as shown above.
$k$-symplectic structures: definition and applications.
-------------------------------------------------------
[ ]{} Let $V$ be a $4n$-dimensional vector space, and $\Psi:\; W {{\:\longrightarrow\:}}\Lambda^2(V)$ a linear map. Assume that $\Psi(\omega)$ is a symplectic form for general $\omega\in W$, and has rank $\frac 1 2 \dim W$ for $\omega$ in a non-degenerate quadric $Q\subset W$. Then $\Psi$ is called [**$k$-symplectic structure on $V$**]{}, where $k=\dim W$.
[ ]{}\[\_k-symple\_Clifford\_Theorem\_\] ([@_SV:k-symplectic_]) Let $V$ be a $k$-symplectic space. Then $V$ is a Clifford module over a Clifford algebra ${\operatorname{Cl}}(W_0)$, with $\dim W_0= \dim W-1=k$, and $\dim V$ is divisible by $2^{\left\lfloor(k-1)/2\right\rfloor}$.
[ ]{}\[\_k\_symple\_in\_families\_Corollary\_\] Let $M$ be a projective hyperkähler manifold, generic in a deformation family of dimension $d$, and $N \hookrightarrow M$ a holomorphic symplectic torus. Then $\dim N$ is divisible by $2^{\left\lfloor \frac{d+1}2\right\rfloor}$.
[[**Proof: **]{}]{}By \[\_symple\_torus\_non-dege\_Corollary\_\], $H^1(T)$ is $k$-symplectic, where $k = \dim_E H^2_{tr}(M)$, and $E={\operatorname{End}}(H^2_{tr}(M)$ the number field associated with $M$. Indeed, fix an embedding $E\hookrightarrow \C$, ad let $A:=H^2_{tr}(M)\otimes \C$. This space is equipped with a natural action of the complexification of the Mumford-Tate group $G_\C$, and $A$ has only two non-zero orbits with respect to $G_\C$-action (Subsection \[\_MT\_Zarhin\_Subsection\_\]). This implies that non-zero 2-forms on $H^1(T)$ induced from $A$ can possibly be non-degenerate or have rank $r< \dim H^1(T)$ for a fixed $r>0$. This implies that for any two symplectic forms $\omega, \omega'\in A$, the operator $\omega^{-1} \circ \omega':\; H^1(T,\C){{\:\longrightarrow\:}}H^1(T,\C)$ has at most two dofferent eigenvalues, and the corresponding eigenspaces have the same dimension: $r= \frac {\dim H^1(T)}{2}$. The space of degenerate 2-forms $\eta \in A$ is a quadric, and they all have rank either 0 or $r$, hence $A$ defines a $k$-symplectic structure on $H^1(T, \C)$.
Then $k{\geqslant}d+2$, as follows from \[\_MT\_family\_Theorem\_\]. By \[\_k-symple\_Clifford\_Theorem\_\] it is a Clifford module over ${\operatorname{Cl}}_E(d+1)$, and $\dim H^1(T)$ is divisible by $2^{\left\lfloor {d+1}/2\right\rfloor}$.
This means, in particular, that $\dim_\C =2$ symplectic tori exist only in families of essential dimension ${\leqslant}3$ and $\dim_\C 4$ symplectic tori exist only in families of essential dimension ${\leqslant}5$. Also, for a general projective hyperkähler manifold with $b_2=23$ and ${\operatorname{Pic}}={{\Bbb Z}}$, any symplectic subtorus has dimension divisible by $2^{10}=1024$, because the corresponding deformation space has dimension $b_2(M)-3=20$.
As another application, we generalize [@_SV:k-symplectic_ Corollary 1.17].
[ ]{}Let $Z\subset M$ be a symplectic subvariety in a hyperkähler manifold. Then $H^2_{tr}(M)$ maps injectively to $H^2_{tr}(Z)$. In particular, if the pair $(M,Z)$ can be deformed in a family $S$ such that the essential dimension of the corresponding deformation of $M$ is $d$, then $\dim H^2_{tr}(Z){\geqslant}(d+2) e$, where $e=\dim_{{\Bbb Q}}E$ and $E={\operatorname{End}}_{{\Bbb Q}}(H^2_{tr}(M))$ is the corresponding number field.
[**Proof:**]{} The first statement is clear because $H^2_{tr}(M)$ is irreducible, and mapped to $H^2_{tr}(Z)$ non-trivially because $Z$ is holomorphically symplectic.
To prove the second statement, notice that dimension of $H^2_{tr}(M)$ over $E$ is at least $d+2$ (\[\_MT\_family\_Theorem\_\]), hence the dimension of $H^2_{tr}(M)$ over ${{\Bbb Q}}$ is at least $(d+2) e$, and this space is embedded to $H^2(Z,{{\Bbb Q}})$.
[**Acknowledgements:**]{} I am grateful to Yuri Zarhin for generously sharing his insight in the transcendental Hodge lattices and to Ljudmila Kamenova for many interesting discussions.
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A. Soldatenkov, M. Verbitsky, Misha, [*$k$-symplectic structures and absolutely trianalytic subvarieties in hyperkähler manifolds*]{}, J. Geom. Phys. 92 (2015), 147-156.
Verbitsky, M., [*Cohomology of compact hyperkähler manifolds.*]{} alg-geom electronic preprint 9501001, 89 pages, LaTeX.
Verbitsky, M., [*Cohomology of compact hyperkähler manifolds and its applications,*]{} GAFA vol. 6 (4) pp. 601-612 (1996).
Verbitsky M., [*Hyperkähler and holomorphic symplectic geometry I,*]{} Journ. of Alg. Geom., [**5**]{} no. 3 (1996) pp. 401-415.
Verbitsky, M., [*Trianalytic subvarieties of hyperkähler manifolds*]{}, GAFA vol. 5 no. 1 (1995) pp. 92-104, also published as [*Hyperkähler embeddings and holomorphic symplectic geometry II*]{} in alg-geom/9403006.
Verbitsky, M., [*Hypercomplex Varieties*]{}, alg-geom/9703016, Comm. Anal. Geom. [**7**]{} (1999), no. 2, 355–396.
M. Verbitsky, [*Trianalytic subvarieties of the Hilbert scheme of points on a K3 surface,*]{} GAFA, [**8**]{} (1998), 732–782.
Verbitsky, M., [*Subvarieties in non-compact hyperkähler manifolds*]{},\
math.AG/0312520, Math. Res. Lett. vol. 11 (2004), no. 4, pp. 413-418
Verbitsky M., [*Wirtinger numbers and holomorphic symplectic immersions*]{}, Selecta Math. (N.S.) 10 (2004), no. 4, 551–559.
Verbitsky, M., [*A global Torelli theorem for hyperkähler manifolds,*]{} Duke Math. J. **162** (2013), 2929-2986.
Voisin, C., [*Hodge theory and complex algebraic geometry I,II*]{}. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2002.
Weyl, H. [*The classical groups, their invariants and representations,*]{} Princeton Univ. Press, New York (1939).
Yau, S. T., [*On the Ricci curvature of a compact Kähler manifold and the complex Monge-Ampère equation I,*]{} Comm. on Pure and Appl. Math. 31, 339-411 (1978).
Zarhin, Yu.G., [*Hodge groups of K3 surfaces,*]{} Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik, Volume 341, page 193-220, 1983.
Zarhin, Yu. G. [*Linear semisimple Lie algebras containing an operator with small number of eigenvalues*]{}, Arch. Math. (Basel) 46 (1986), no. 6, 522-532.
Zarhin, Yuri G. [*Linear irreducible Lie algebras and Hodge structures*]{}, Algebraic geometry (Chicago, IL, 1989), 281-297, Lecture Notes in Math., 1479, Springer, Berlin, 1991.
[[Misha Verbitsky\
[Laboratory of Algebraic Geometry,\
National Research University HSE,\
Department of Mathematics, 7 Vavilova Str. Moscow, Russia,]{}\
mverbits@ulb.ac.be]{}, also:\
[Université Libre de Bruxelles, CP 218,\
Bd du Triomphe, 1050 Brussels, Belgium]{} ]{}
[^1]: Partially supported by RSCF, grant number 14-21-00053.
[**Keywords:**]{} hyperkähler manifold, Hodge structure, transcendental Hodge lattice, birational invariance
[**2010 Mathematics Subject Classification:**]{} 53C26,
| 2023-11-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1167 |
health
If it impacts the tendon, it’s called tendonitis. From time to time, the tendon will want to get anchored back to the bone. For instance, a wounded extensor tendon may stop the fingers from fully straightening the fingers although building a fist can continue to be possible.
Type of Tendon Injuries
If you are in possession of a complete tear of your tendon, it’s referred to as a rupture. There might be a tender fullness in the event the tendon was retracted. The Achilles tendon is the biggest tendon in your system.
What You Don’t Know About Tendon Injuries
Under normal circumstances it will help to permit the tendons to contract with extremely higher forces without dislocating. The tendon remains substantially connected to the humeral head. Then it begins to fray and may eventually tear.
In case it will become inflamed, swollen, and irritated, it’s called tendonitis. In extreme situations, tendonitis can be the result of a quick calf muscle. Tendonitis may be associated with a disease like diabetes or rheumatoid arthritis.
The Tendon Injuries Cover Up
Different types of pain The essence of the pain felt may vary from one person to the next. The pain may also restrict the selection of motion or hamper totally free shoulder movement. Usually it becomes chronic, that is, it seems to never go away. Pain from this kind of injury often remains provided that the muscle imbalances persist. The collarbone pain connected with acromioclavicular joint injury is felt at the close of the collarbone.
A great deal of lower back pain results from poor posture. Shoulder pain might also be because of arthritis. Spine and shoulder pain might also be a problem.
The pain may come from a wide variety of causes be it the sort of movement or the lifestyle you follow. As long as it’s not a medical emergency, elbow pain is easily managed at home. Elbow pain is just one of the most frequent complaints caused by different troubles. Lateral elbow pain is typically known as epicondylitis.
How to Choose Tendon Injuries
If you have pain however, you’re certainly not alone. You shouldn’t have any pain on account of the nerve block. It is very important to remember that pain in shoulder blade differs from pain in the shoulders. Some shoulder blade pain could possibly be due to a twist or sprain or bruising and could mend itself.
Apply ice once injury occurs. In case the injury isn’t too severe, your physician will prescribe medication to alleviate pain and inflammation, and could refer you to a physiotherapist. Chronic tendon injuries are normally presented to the main care physician,1,2 and have a considerable effect on the capability of patients to work, exercise, and carry out routine daily pursuits.
Up in Arms About Tendon Injuries?
The injuries can keep you from exercising for some time, which makes it counterproductive. Despite the fact that it can look like an injury that only affects athletes, the fact remains that tendonitis can happen to anybody. There are six kinds of ACJ ligament injury based on its severity. | 2024-05-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4921 |
Q:
How to log output to file
powershell newb here. I am having some difficulty trying log my output to a file. I have tried two tactics, both of which do not work for me. The first is using the Start/Stop-Transcript cmdlet. This works great in testing on my local machine, but doesn't seem to work at all in a script that I deploy to workstations.
$path1 = Test-Path ($env:ProgramFiles + "\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Virus\SavService.exe")
$path2 = Test-Path (${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} + "\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Virus\SavService.exe")
$shareloc = '\\SERVER1\NETLOGON\SophosPackages\SophosInstall_wFW_Silent.exe'
$logpath = '\\SERVER1\NETLOGON\si_sophos_log.txt'
if (($path1 -eq $true) -or ($path2 -eq $true)) {} ELSE {
& $shareloc
Start-Transcript -Append -Path $logpath | Out-Null
Write-Output ""
Get-Date
Write-Output "Sophos has been installed on `"$env:COMPUTERNAME`""
Write-Output ""
Stop-Transcript
}
The way I would prefer to do it, is using: | Out-File -Append -FilePath $logpath
I think this would be the preferred method because it would catch any error that might occur in the log, as apposed to Start-Transcript. When I try to use this method however, I get an error at the pipeline "An empty pipeline element is not allowed."
$path1 = Test-Path ($env:ProgramFiles + "\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Virus\SavService.exe")
$path2 = Test-Path (${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} + "\Sophos\Sophos Anti-Virus\SavService.exe")
$shareloc = '\\SERVER1\NETLOGON\SophosPackages\SophosInstall_wFW_Silent.exe'
$logpath = '\\SERVER1\NETLOGON\si_sophos_log.txt'
if (($path1 -eq $true) -or ($path2 -eq $true)) {} ELSE {
& $shareloc
Write-Output ""
Get-Date
Write-Output "Sophos has been installed on `"$env:COMPUTERNAME`""
Write-Output ""
} | Out-File -Append -FilePath $logpath
Thank you in advance for any assistance!
A:
If you write the following :
if ($true) {Write-Output "titi"} else {Write-Output "toto"} | Out-File -Append c:\temp\titi
You will get the same error, because the if condition is not evaluated when you pipe.
You can try to force ti evaluate it
$(if ($true) {Write-Output "titi"} else {Write-Output "toto"}) | Out-File -Append c:\temp\titi
| 2024-05-03T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8688 |
Environmental conditions, air pollutants, and airway cells in runners: a longitudinal field study.
Runners have increased numbers of neutrophils in the airways at rest and after exercise compared with sedentary individuals. The aim of this study was to determine whether Mediterranean seasonal changes in temperature, humidity or airborne pollutants affect the airway cells of runners training outdoors in an urban environment. In nine male amateur runners, cell composition, apoptosis, and inflammatory mediators were measured in induced sputum collected at rest (baseline) and the morning after races held in the fall (21 km), winter (12 km), and summer (10 km). Concentrations of air pollutants were below the alert threshold at all times. Neutrophil differential counts tended to increase after all races (P = 0.055). Apoptosis of neutrophils increased with ozone (P < 0.005) and particulate matter <10 microm (PM10) (P < 0.05) exposure. Bronchial epithelial cell counts were low at all times and weakly correlated with ozone and PM10 concentrations. Apoptotic bronchial epithelial cells increased after all races (P < 0.05). Inflammatory mediators in induced sputum were low at baseline and after the races, and correlated with neutrophil differential counts only at rest. In conclusion, apoptosis of airway cells in runners appears to be affected by both exercise and environmental conditions. Apoptosis of neutrophils increased with exposure to environmental pollutants while apoptosis of bronchial epithelial cells increased after intense exercise. Since no relationship was observed between neutrophil counts and inflammatory mediators 20 h after races, airways inflammation at this time point appears blunted in healthy runners and little affected by exposure to mild seasonal changes and airborne pollutants. | 2023-08-24T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1105 |
Opening whistle blows on fall sports
The wait is over, and so is the summer, as the fall sports season officially began for all teams on Thursday.
For some teams, it was the first day of a new coaching era.
For others, it was an initial step in a race for the top of the standings.
With a lack of rain, field conditions are a concern for some, and not having a game field is a concern for another team.
Almost all athletes do some sort of summer training for their sports. Few sports have an actual team league as well structured as the Fast Break Summer Field Hockey program.
Oakmont Regional won the league title this summer and not only are the athletes in shape, motivated, and already have team chemistry, but now they are antsy to get the all important varsity season started.
"We started this morning at 7 a.m., and there was definitely a good positive vibe going," Oakmont Regional field hockey head coach Leanne Roy said. "I would absolutely attribute that to their high coming off of the summer league. The girls are really prepared for the season, and I'm really excited for the season because they had great focus this morning."
The drought has taken a toll on some local fields. For golf in particular, the condition of the grass is a huge factor.
The Leominster golf team, which is coming off of a year with its lowest team scoring average since 1998, needs some strong course conditions to continue the trend it started last year. Lucky for the Blue Devils, Gardner Municipal Golf Course is in good shape.
Advertisement
"I played a couple of courses throughout the region this summer, and Gardner Municipal is as green, if not greener, than any course I played," Leominster head coach Daryl Robichaud said. "That's a credit to their staff. We're excited to start the season."
Lunenburg High is in the process of replacing its turf field, meaning the first half of the boys' soccer season will be on the road.
The soccer team is particularly lucky in the juggle to find practice space, as it opened practice on a nearly finished grass field in front of the school on Massachusetts Ave.
The field has an irrigation system and is a little short of the preferred size of 88-by-55-yards, but things could be a lot worse.
"One of the three new fields is 90 percent complete," Lunenburg head coach Mike Gutzler said. "Other than being a little short, that field worked out well for us for the first day of practice. The condition is absolutely perfect. It's probably the best field we've played on for the first day of practice since they put in the turf."
Local football players got a little bit of a head start on the other sports, as they started their season last Friday. For the Monty Tech football team, not only do the Bulldogs have high expectations this season, but they also welcomed in a new head coach.
Anthony Secino rose from the assistant ranks to the head coaching job after head coach Matt Sallila announced his early retirement in the offseason. With virtually all of the assistants from last year in place, things are not looking too different for the Bulldogs.
"Very little has changed, and we're not reinventing the wheel at this point," Secino said.
"I'm adding my own touch to it all, but the staff is a very capable staff and know what they're doing. We work well together, and things are pretty much the same."
After missing the playoffs by just one point last season, the Bulldogs pulled off a huge winning streak, culminating with a Vocational Bowl Championship, expectations are as high as they have ever been at Monty Tech.
"In every season you need things to break right and hope to stay injury free," Secino said.
"They broke right last year for us, but we're focused at one day at a time. The kids know there are expectations there for us, and we're not going to shy away from them, but that said, I tell them every day that we haven't won a game this year, yet."
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Comments made here are the sole responsibility of the person posting them; these comments do not reflect the opinion of The Sentinel and Enterprise. So keep it civil. | 2024-06-19T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7940 |
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Truth? Changes every 7 days. Come back! To love is to receive a glimpse of heaven. - (Karen Sunde)
Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, have the strength to force the moment to its crisis? - (T. S. Eliot)
It is better to be happy for a moment and be burned up with beauty than to live a long time and be bored all the while. - (Don Marquis)
Every minute your mouth is turned down you lose sixty seconds of happiness. - (Tom Walsh)
Courage is to feel the daily daggers of relentless steel and keep on living. - (Douglas Malloch)
( Photo: 2007 by Tomascastelazo; GNU Free Doc.Lic.v1.2++ ........ In Mexican folk culture, the Catrina is the skeleton of a high society woman and is one of the most popular figures of the celebrations 'Day of the Dead'.)
* Access to all scientifically proven truth on the Internet about paranormal phenomena: Extra-sensory perception like: Prophecy / clairvoyance; telepathy; psychokinesis / telekinesis... * ... purported phenomena like UFOs, extraterrestrials which visited Earth in the past, the Bermuda Triangle,... * ... communication with the dead, reincarnation, ghosts, haunted houses, witches, demonic possession, nocebos, and creatures that fall under the scope of cryptozoology,... * ... The unknown like other worlds with human-like civilisations, black holes, the origin of the universe, the before-universe and the post-universe of the universe;... * ... phenomena between science and the paranormal point of view, like psychic / spiritual healing, placebos and nocebos..., * ... and about the most successful conspiracies (or conspiracy theories?...) in history - from Caesar & Brutus & Cleopatra to swine flu and climate catastrophe.
Higher education, degrees, honors - everybody wants intelligence and awards during the few years of his short visit of human civilisation. Here you find legal and other information why not to buy from the various diploma mill addresses on the worldwide Internet.
(Photo: A shell casing flies out with a trail of smoke as U.S. Army Pfc. Michael Freise fires an M-4 rifle during a reflex firing exercise at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea, on March 23, 2005. From: US Dpt.of Def./US Air Force.) | 2023-08-11T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9396 |
Q:
Do electret microphones have polarity?
So do electret mics have polarity?
The following circuits seem to contradict each other...
1)
2)
Now the problem is one image shows polarity while the other one does not!!
What's the holdup here?
A:
Yes, they have polarity and it has to be right to work- the output needs to be biased positive with respect to the ground terminal.
The ground/GND terminal should be common with the case, so you can check polarity with a multimeter.
Here, from a Panasonic Datasheet, is a typical arrangement:
The two diagrams you show are equivalent, one is just drawn upside-down (potentially.. as it were.. confusing and not to be encouraged, but still valid).
| 2024-07-17T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7723 |
As the boys from Queens chase their dreams of winning a World Series, their better halves are ready to cheer them on.
Stacey Harris deGrom
Married to pitcher Jacob deGrom
This soft-spoken 29-year-old blonde was born in the same Florida town as her husband, but they didn’t meet until after high school, when a mutual friend introduced them at a bull-riding event. “She’s kind of like me, easygoing,” Jacob, 27, told The Post back in January.
After dating for seven years, he popped the question on Christmas 2013 with a diamond sparkler and “Will You Marry Me?” T-shirt. They wed in November 2014 in a rustic Florida barn.
While he was pitching his way up through the minor leagues, Stacey worked the night shift doing clinical studies for people with sleep apnea.
Nowadays, her full-time job is housewife — including decorating the couple’s one-bedroom Manhattan apartment, which is kitted out with country-chic furniture and photo collages of their family and friends. The two don’t have any children, but during spring training, Stacey convinced her hubby to get a small dog to keep her company throughout the long season.
Molly Beers Wright
Married to third baseman David Wright
The 30-year-old Arizona native with dark brown eyes and matching locks met her Mets superstar in 2006 at the World Baseball Classic. But Molly wasn’t unveiled to the world as David’s main squeeze until 2008, when he threw her a big birthday party during the All-Star break. A Ford model with enviable abs, she has posed for mostly commercial work, including her biggest client, JCPenney.
The 32-year-old team captain clearly relies on her counsel. In 2013, she accompanied him to winter baseball meetings when he announced his $138 million contract extension with the Mets. They were engaged later that year and married in California over the 2014 holidays. After the wedding, David told The Wall Street Journal the two delayed their honeymoon because he didn’t want to travel during the off-season. Wherever they eventually jetted off to, it was Molly’s call. “She did such a good job planning the wedding, she can pick where she wants to go.”
Ania Cywinska
Dating pitcher Matt Harvey
A year after splitting with Victoria’s Secret model Anne V, the ace pitcher moved on with Polish model Cywinska. Signed to the prestigious Marilyn Agency, she started dating Harvey, 26, in February after meeting through mutual friends. When not rooting for the Mets, the fun-loving model cuddles with her English springer spaniel, Bon Bon, stand-up paddle-boards and parties in Paris.
Rosanna Colón
Married to pitcher Bartolo Colón
Last September, the 42-year-old pitcher and his wife became US citizens — the day before the Mets’ 2014 season finale. The Dominican Republic natives, married since 1996, live in Clifton, NJ, with their four sons: Bartolo Jr., Emilio, Wilder and Randy.
Bethany Nieuwenhuis
Married to outfielder Kirk Nieuwenhuis
Bethany Nieuwenhuis (née Bridges) met her future spouse at Azusa Pacific University in California. More than five years later, they tied the knot in November 2013 in a Coto de Caza, Calif., ceremony. Bethany, 26, is the more daring of the two, according to the 28-year-old outfielder. He told The Wall Street Journal that they went zip-lining on their honeymoon: “She was fine. I’m terrified of heights.”
Leah Niese
Married to pitcher Jon Niese
Think you get nervous watching the Mets? Imagine being married to a player. “I’m all focused on [Jon]. I’m shaking, I’m biting my nails, I’m so nervous,” Leah Niese (née Eckman), 26, told The Post two years ago about how it feels to watch her husband pitch.
The pair, who live in Long Island City, met in 2009 during a bonfire at her alma mater, Bowling Green State University. She gave birth to the couple’s son, Tatum Jeffery, in July as her hurler hubby watched on FaceTime after pitching at Citi Field. They also have a daughter, Graylee Mae, who turns 2 in
November.
Tayler Francel
Engaged to backup catcher Kevin Plawecki
California-born Francel is an athlete in her own right. She met her soon-to-be hubby at Purdue University in Indiana, where she played soccer. They first saw each other in a mutual friends’ dorm room and hit it off immediately. The couple became best friends, watching “The Blind Side” and sharing meals.
“I even helped him with an online class we shared — and by help, I mean basically did [the class work],” she wrote on the pair’s wedding site. They will tie the knot on Nov. 28 in San Diego.
Victoria “Tori” Murphy
Married to second baseman Daniel Murphy
In 2014, Tori Murphy (née Ahern), 29, found herself at the center of controversy when her husband, 30, opted to miss the first two games of the season to be with her as she gave birth to their first child, son Noah. His decision was blasted by sports commentators like Mike Francesa and Boomer Esiason — who said she should have scheduled a C-section.
Victoria — a Florida native just like her MVP hubby — is an accomplished athlete herself, having been a standout softball pitcher at the University of North Florida, where she once threw a no-hitter. She later coached high-school softball alongside her father.
The couple weathered rocky times in 2010, splitting when Murphy hit a rough patch professionally. They reunited soon thereafter and married in December 2012 in Wellington, Fla. | 2023-11-14T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3871 |
This invention pertains to the field of electronic circuits for driving reflective liquid crystal displays (RLCD).
In an RLCD having a matrix of m horizontal rows and n vertical columns, each m-n intersection forms a cell or picture element (pixel). By applying an electric potential difference, such as 7.5 volts (v), across a cell, a phase change occurs in the crystalline structure at the cell site causing the pixel to change the incident light polarization vector orientation, thereby blocking the light from emerging from the electro-optical system. Removing the voltage across the pixel causes the liquid crystal in the pixel structure to return to the initial xe2x80x9cbrightxe2x80x9d state. Variations in the applied voltage level produce a plurality of different gray shades between the light and dark limits.
FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of a conventional column driving arrangement for an RLCD device. A column driver 18 provides a ramp voltage to each of a plurality of column lines 20, progressively applying a voltage corresponding to each gray-scale level. A counter 12 sequentially progresses through each gray-scale value, typically 0-256, although other levels of gray-scale resolution may be provided. A look-up-table LUT 14 maps each gray-scale value to a voltage that corresponds to this value; this mapping is a function of the particular RLCD, and is typically non-linear. The voltage value is converted to an analog voltage level by a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) 16, and this analog voltage provides the input to the driver 18. As discussed further below, the driver 18 is typically a high-current device.
The load that each column line 20 presents to the driver 18 is represented as a capacitance 28, which represents the sum of the capacitances of the individual pixels in the column and the capacitance of the lines to these pixels. Each column line 20 includes a switch 26 that serves as a sample-and-hold gate, wherein the capacitance 28 serves as the xe2x80x9choldxe2x80x9d storage element. Each column switch 26 is controlled by a comparator 24 that compares the current count of the counter 12 to the desired gray-scale level for the column, which is stored in a data memory 22. When the count from the counter 12 reaches the desired gray-scale level for the column, the comparator 24 opens the switch 26, placing the capacitance 28 in the hold-state, holding the current value of the ramp voltage from the driver 18. Not illustrated, a row-controller subsequently applies the voltage on the capacitance 28 to the pixel at the intersection of the column and the selected row.
At the end of each row-cycle, all of the capacitances 28 are discharged and the above process is repeated. Because this discharge must occur quickly (typically within 30 nanoseconds), and must discharge all of the capacitances 28 (typically 5-10 nanofarads), the peak current of the discharge can be as high as a few amperes. In a conventional RLCD, the driver 18 is configured to provide this high-current capacity.
A number of drawbacks can be attributed to the conventional RLCD column driver arrangement of FIG. 1. As noted above, the driver 18 must be configured to accommodate a high discharge current. Additionally, when each switch 26 is opened, a transient is fed back to the driver 18 from the gate of the switch 26. This transient can be substantial, particularly when a large number of switches 26 open simultaneously, such as when a line segment of uniform gray-scale is being displayed. This transient modifies the voltage level from the driver 18, causing it to differ from the voltage provided by the LUT 14 corresponding to the current gray-scale value in the counter 12. Any columns that have not yet entered the hold-state will receive this erroneous voltage, and will display an improper gray-scale level. This transient effect is commonly termed xe2x80x9chorizontal crosstalkxe2x80x9d. Further, the common connection of multiple column lines 20 to the driver 28 provides a substantial xe2x80x9cantennaxe2x80x9d, and is susceptible to noise transients as well.
In this invention, a column driving arrangement for an RLCD device is provided that isolates the source of a ramp voltage corresponding to gray-scale levels from the sample-and-hold gates of the individual columns. Preferably, this isolation is provided by an operational transconductance amplifier (OTA) at each column that provides a controlled current for charging the column capacitance to the appropriate gray-scale voltage level. The capacitor effects an integration of the current, thereby providing a noise-filtering effect. Additionally, a each column capacitance is individually discharged, thereby obviating the need for a common high-current discharge device. | 2023-11-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3092 |
Water Department
Boil water orders or advisories are public announcements advising the public that they should boil their tap water for drinking and other human consumption uses like cooking, hand washing, brushing teeth, etc. Boil water orders are preventative measures issued to protect public health from waterborne infectious agents that could be or are known to be present in drinking water. | 2024-07-06T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9524 |
Tag Archives: Time Pirates
Originally published in 2012; reprinted due to popular demand, in honor of Valentine’s Day, and because I’m lazy.
“No! You never fucking get them!” the Pirate screamed, almost throwing the empty whiskey glass directly at the bartender. He held back, as if some unseen force softly touched his arm and coaxed him to lower it.
The force in question, he would later explain, was actually just a moment of clarity, having dealt with the frustration of reaching this point with the bartender no less than seven times in the last hour. At exactly 11:34 he would reach the point of the argument with the bartender, scream and hurl his glass at the bartender’s face, break the glass and two of the bartender’s teeth and immediately be kicked out of the bar, where he would then activate his personal chrono-manipulator and go back ten minutes to when he was in the bathroom, merge with the version of himself sitting on the toilet and try again. | 2024-07-31T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9737 |
Synchromystic Nature of Pepe/Kek & Occult Meme Magic of the Alt-Right
Sep 26, 2016
StyxHexenHammer666 and Reinhard Wolff join us to discuss the esoteric and synchromystic expressions of Pepe / Kek. Ever since Hillary Clinton attacked Pepe and then fell ill on 9/11, an occult power behind the meme magic of the Alt-Right has begun to show itself. It turns out that the chaotic energies of Kek, as the bringer-in of light has been with us since ancient Egyptian times.
This is an excerpt from the thirteenth episode of Weekend Warrior, a live show available to Red Ice Members.
Watch the entire episode here
StyxHexenHammer666's channel | 2024-05-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5257 |
Q:
Simplify Regex on Phone Number in XAML Converter
C# Regex
Here is a simple converter for WPF using Regex to display a consistent TextBox with a phone number mask:
public class MyStringToPhoneConverter : IValueConverter
{
public object Convert(object value, Type targetType, object parameter, CultureInfo culture)
{
if (value == null)
return string.Format("( ) - ");
//remove formating...returns a string of digits.
string phoneNo = value.ToString().Replace("(", string.Empty).Replace(")", string.Empty).Replace(" ", string.Empty).Replace("-", string.Empty);
// All displayed formating in WPF depends on the control FontSytle. Use a fixed-width, monospaced, font with no kerning.
// Examples: Consolas, Courier New, Lucida Console, MS Gothic
switch (phoneNo.Length)
{
case 0:
return string.Format("( ) - ");
case 1:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{1})", "($1 ) - ");
case 2:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{2})", "($1 ) - ");
case 3:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})", "($1) - ");
case 4:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{1})", "($1) $2 - ");
case 5:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{2})", "($1) $2 - ");
case 6:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{3})", "($1) $2- ");
case 7:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{3})(\d{1})", "($1) $2-$3 ");
case 8:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{3})(\d{2})", "($1) $2-$3 ");
case 9:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{3})(\d{3})", "($1) $2-$3 ");
case 10:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{3})(\d{3})(\d{4})", "($1) $2-$3");
case 11:
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(\d{1})(\d{3})(\d{3})(\d{4})", "$1-$2-$3-$4");
default:
return phoneNo;
}
}
public object ConvertBack(object value, Type targetType, object parameter, CultureInfo culture)
{
return value;
}
}
This seems awfully repetitive having to write a different string and regex expression for each string length.
Is there a single one or two regex expressions that can handle the different string lengths with a consistent output format? (I'm not really concerned with 11 digits :) )
TIA
A:
Below is an attempt to get rid of multiple Regex templates, and replacement strings. The Regex I came up with is a bit more complicated, and a custom evaluator is required for replacement procedure. Anyways it seems achieves the desired goal.
Some comments:
(?<!\d.*) - makes sure a match starts with the 1st digit
((?=\d{11})\d{1})? - match the 1st group (1 digit) when all 11 digits were provided
(\d{1,3}) - allow partially filled groups
|^(?!.*\d) - still match when no digits found
public object Convert(object value, Type targetType, object parameter, CultureInfo culture)
{
//remove formating...returns a string of digits.
string phoneNo = Regex.Replace(value?.ToString() ?? string.Empty, @"[\(\)\- ]", string.Empty);
return Regex.Replace(phoneNo, @"(?<!\d.*)((?=\d{11})\d{1})?(\d{1,3})(\d{1,3})?(\d{1,4})?|^(?!.*\d)", m =>
{
var gr1 = m.Groups[1].Value;
var gr2 = m.Groups[2].Value.PadRight(3);
var gr3 = m.Groups[3].Value.PadRight(3);
var gr4 = m.Groups[4].Value.PadRight(4);
return m.Groups[1].Success
? $"{gr1}-{gr2}-{gr3}-{gr4}"
: $"({gr2}) {gr3}-{gr4}";
});
}
| 2024-06-29T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7508 |
Thoracic outlet syndrome.
Of the many clinical entities involving the neck region, one of the most intriguing is thoracic outlet syndrome (TOS). TOS is an array of disorders that involves injury to the neurovascular structures in the cervicobrachial region. A classification system based on etiology, symptoms, clinical presentation, and anatomy is supported by most physicians. The first type of TOS is vascular, involving compression of either the subclavian artery or vein. The second type is true neurogenic TOS, which involves injury to the brachial plexus. Finally, the third and most controversial type is referred to as disputed neurogenic TOS. This article aims to provide the reader some understanding of the pathophysiology, workup, and treatment of this fascinating clinical entity. | 2023-10-16T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5040 |
Intensive LOwering of BlOod pressure and low-density lipoprotein ChOlesterol with statin theraPy (LOBOCOP) may improve neointimal formation after coronary stenting in patients with coronary artery disease.
This prospective study was carried out to evaluate the benefits of intensive lowering of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) with statin and intensive blood pressure (BP)-lowering therapy as aggressive medical interventions after stent implantation. Fifty-four patients with coronary artery disease initially received statin immediately after successful stent implantation. They were divided into intensive therapy (IT group, n = 27; therapeutic target levels of LDL-C and BP were 60 mg/dl and <120/80 mmHg at follow-up coronary angiography, respectively, 6-8 months after stent implantation) and conventional therapy groups (CT group, n = 27; target levels of LDL-C and BP were 100 mg/dl and <130/85 mmHg, respectively). Additional antihypertensive therapy with angiotensin II type 1 receptor blockers was begun according to the BP levels. There were significant differences in the levels of LDL-C at follow-up between the IT and CT groups [average, 68+/-10 (cut-off value,>or=83.4) mg/dl and 102+/-14 (<83.4) mg/dl, respectively]. Percentage diameter stenosis (P = 0.039) and diastolic BP (P = 0.005) in the IT group were significantly decreased compared with those in the CT group at follow-up. In addition, percentage diameter stenosis was most significantly related to the level of LDL-C (P = 0.03) among other metabolic factors (BP, body mass index, triglyceride, high-density lipoprotein cholesterol, hemoglobin A1c, and adiponectin) at follow-up as assessed by a stepwise multivariable regression analysis. These results suggest that intensive lowering of LDL-C by statin decreased the neointimal formation after stent implantation, and an LDL-C level of at least 83.4 mg/dl was the most acceptable clinical therapeutic target at follow-up. | 2024-04-01T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9893 |
// See www.openfst.org for extensive documentation on this weighted
// finite-state transducer library.
//
// Extracts component FSTs from an finite-state archive.
#ifndef FST_EXTENSIONS_FAR_EXTRACT_H_
#define FST_EXTENSIONS_FAR_EXTRACT_H_
#include <memory>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <fst/extensions/far/far.h>
#include <fst/util.h>
namespace fst {
template <class Arc>
inline void FarWriteFst(const Fst<Arc> *fst, string key, string *okey,
int *nrep, int32 generate_filenames, int i,
const string &filename_prefix,
const string &filename_suffix) {
if (key == *okey) {
++*nrep;
} else {
*nrep = 0;
}
*okey = key;
string ofilename;
if (generate_filenames) {
std::ostringstream tmp;
tmp.width(generate_filenames);
tmp.fill('0');
tmp << i;
ofilename = tmp.str();
} else {
if (*nrep > 0) {
std::ostringstream tmp;
tmp << '.' << nrep;
key.append(tmp.str().data(), tmp.str().size());
}
ofilename = key;
}
fst->Write(filename_prefix + ofilename + filename_suffix);
}
template <class Arc>
void FarExtract(const std::vector<string> &ifilenames, int32 generate_filenames,
const string &keys, const string &key_separator,
const string &range_delimiter, const string &filename_prefix,
const string &filename_suffix) {
std::unique_ptr<FarReader<Arc>> far_reader(
FarReader<Arc>::Open(ifilenames));
if (!far_reader) return;
string okey;
int nrep = 0;
std::vector<char *> key_vector;
// User has specified a set of FSTs to extract, where some of these may in
// fact be ranges.
if (!keys.empty()) {
auto *keys_cstr = new char[keys.size() + 1];
strcpy(keys_cstr, keys.c_str());
SplitString(keys_cstr, key_separator.c_str(), &key_vector, true);
int i = 0;
for (size_t k = 0; k < key_vector.size(); ++k, ++i) {
string key = key_vector[k];
auto *key_cstr = new char[key.size() + 1];
strcpy(key_cstr, key.c_str());
std::vector<char *> range_vector;
SplitString(key_cstr, range_delimiter.c_str(), &range_vector, false);
if (range_vector.size() == 1) { // Not a range
if (!far_reader->Find(key)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "FarExtract: Cannot find key " << key;
return;
}
const auto *fst = far_reader->GetFst();
FarWriteFst(fst, key, &okey, &nrep, generate_filenames, i,
filename_prefix, filename_suffix);
} else if (range_vector.size() == 2) { // A legal range
string begin_key = range_vector[0];
string end_key = range_vector[1];
if (begin_key.empty() || end_key.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "FarExtract: Illegal range specification " << key;
return;
}
if (!far_reader->Find(begin_key)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "FarExtract: Cannot find key " << begin_key;
return;
}
for (; !far_reader->Done(); far_reader->Next(), ++i) {
const auto &ikey = far_reader->GetKey();
if (end_key < ikey) break;
const auto *fst = far_reader->GetFst();
FarWriteFst(fst, ikey, &okey, &nrep, generate_filenames, i,
filename_prefix, filename_suffix);
}
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "FarExtract: Illegal range specification " << key;
return;
}
delete[] key_cstr;
}
delete[] keys_cstr;
return;
}
// Nothing specified, so just extracts everything.
for (size_t i = 1; !far_reader->Done(); far_reader->Next(), ++i) {
const auto &key = far_reader->GetKey();
const auto *fst = far_reader->GetFst();
FarWriteFst(fst, key, &okey, &nrep, generate_filenames, i, filename_prefix,
filename_suffix);
}
return;
}
} // namespace fst
#endif // FST_EXTENSIONS_FAR_EXTRACT_H_
| 2024-06-20T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2249 |
//
// MatOfFloat.h
//
// Created by Giles Payne on 2019/12/26.
//
#pragma once
#import "Mat.h"
NS_ASSUME_NONNULL_BEGIN
/**
* Mat representation of an array of floats
*/
CV_EXPORTS @interface MatOfFloat : Mat
#ifdef __cplusplus
- (instancetype)initWithNativeMat:(cv::Mat*)nativeMat;
#endif
/**
* Create MatOfFloat from Mat object
* @param mat Mat object from which to create MatOfFloat
*/
- (instancetype)initWithMat:(Mat*)mat;
/**
* Create MatOfFloat from array
* @param array Array from which to create MatOfFloat
*/
- (instancetype)initWithArray:(NSArray<NSNumber*>*)array;
#pragma mark - Methods
/**
* Allocate specified number of elements
* @param elemNumber Number of elements
*/
- (void)alloc:(int)elemNumber;
/**
* Populate Mat with elements of an array
* @param array Array with which to populate the Mat
*/
- (void)fromArray:(NSArray<NSNumber*>*)array;
/**
* Output Mat elements as an array
*/
- (NSArray<NSNumber*>*)toArray;
/**
* Total number of values in Mat
*/
- (int)length;
@end
NS_ASSUME_NONNULL_END
| 2023-09-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5237 |
All Blacks: Taylor called up
Tom Taylor. Photo / Geoff Sloan
Hooker Hika Elliot and utility back Tom Taylor have been called into the All Blacks as the squad deals with injuries and another judicial issue.
As expected Elliot has been drafted in from the just compeleted NZ Maori tour to cover for the rash of problems at hooker.
Keven Mealamu is still recovering from his latest calf problem and remains an uncertain starter for Sunday's final test on tour against England.
The side's other senior hooker Andrew Hore is likely to face a judicial hearing this week after clobbering Wales' lock Bradley Davies in the opening minute of today's 33-10 victory in Cardiff.
Rookie tourist Dane Coles is the only fit hooker, so a rapid call was made to draft in Elliot before the Maori squad flew home.
Taylor's inclusion is more of a mystery.
However it suggests injury problems for all three five eighths are more serious than first thought.
Daniel Carter has damaged the lower part of his right calf-Achilles tendon area and remains in coach Steve Hansen's estimate today, a 50-50 chance for this week's Twickenham test.
Aaron Cruden was subbed after 67 minutes yesterday during his prominent role in the All Blacks victory. Not long after the match Hansen said Cruden had cramped up so they decided to replace him with Barrett.
Barrett was playing with his ribs heavily strapped and protected after taking a wallop against Italy and being subbed in that game.
An All Black spokesman said further details about the injuries and replacements would come later today. | 2024-02-20T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9117 |
Concerns about the depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts of global warming issues result in increasing attention on the conversion of renewable biomass to fuels and chemicals[@b1][@b2][@b3][@b4]. For environmental and economic reasons, lignocellulose-derived sugar alcohols, such as sorbitol and xylitol, have emerged as the most potential building block chemicals.
Ethylene glycol (EG) and propylene glycol (1,2-PD) with annul consumption of over 20 million tons are industrially important chemicals used in the manufacture of polymers, resins, functional fluids, perfumes, cosmetics, etc[@b5][@b6]. Currently, they are industrially produced by multiple steps of cracking, epoxidation, and hydration from petroleum-derived ethylene and propylene, respectively[@b7]. To replace petroleum-based sources, the hydrogenolysis of sorbitol for the production of glycols is a hot topic[@b8][@b9].
The selective hydrogenolysis of sorbitol into glycols such as EG, 1,2-PD and glycerol (GLY) was a challenge since complex parallel and consecutive C−C and C−O bond cleavage reactions occurred in aqueous medium, leading to a complex mixture of reactants, intermediates and products.
Many metals such as Ni, Cu, Ru, Pt and Pd-based catalysts have been used for the polyol hydrogenolysis reaction[@b10][@b11][@b12], among them, Ru showed the highest catalytic activity. Sun and Liu[@b13] found that activated carbon supported Ru catalyst exhibited higher activities and glycol selectivities than Ru on TiO~2~, ZrO~2~, Al~2~O~3~ and Mg~2~AlO~x~ supports for xylitol hydrogenolysis. Zhao *et al*.[@b14] reported that carbon nanofibers (CNFs)-supported Ru catalyst displayed attracting catalytic performance in comparison with commercial activated carbon-supported Ru catalyst, thus leading to a significant increase in the selectivity to EG, 1,2-PD and GLY from 26.1% to 51.3% at 70--85% sorbitol conversions under 220 ^o^C and 8 MPa H~2~. However, the nano-scale CNFs will induce severe difficulty in catalyst separation and product purification for practical application.
Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) as a new kind of carbon materials offer interesting possibilities as supports for metal particles, due to the sp^2^ carbon-constructed surface, the excellent electron transport performance and the electronic interaction of active nanoparticles with the CNTs walls[@b15]. It was reported that Ru-based nanoparticles deposited on CNTs showed higher catalytic activity than those on other carriers, like alumina, silica, or even activated carbon (AC), for sorbitol hydrogenolysis[@b16]. Therefore, CNTs were considered a promising supporting material for sorbitol hydrogenolysis.
Recently, bimetallic catalysts have been reported for many heterogeneous catalysis reactions, because bimetallic catalysts showed great improvements in activity than their monometallic analogues due to the "synergistic" effects between the two metals[@b17]. The use of bimetallic catalysts for sorbitol hydrogenolysis reaction has been reported. Chaudhari *et al*.[@b18] investigated the promoting effect of Re on the activity of Ru/C during sorbitol hydrogenolysis and found that addition of Re could significantly enhance the yields of 1,2-PD and EG.
In this work, we prepared a series of Ru catalysts using AC and CNTs as supports and compared their intrinsic activities and selectivities in sorbitol hydrogenolysis. Furthermore, the catalytic performance was tuned by controlling the location of metal particles on interior or exterior walls of CNTs. The effect of different basic promoters such as Ca(OH)~2~ and Ba(OH)~2~, and the modification of Ru/CNTs with WO~x~ were also thoroughly investigated during sorbitol hydrogenolysis.
Results
=======
Catalyst characterization
-------------------------
The XRD patterns of Ru catalysts with different supports after the reduction at 350 ^o^C are displayed in [Fig. 1](#f1){ref-type="fig"}. The diffraction peaks at around 26.0, 42.9 and 53.7^o^ were assigned to (002), (100) and (004) diffraction lines of raw CNTs, respectively[@b19]. No characteristic signals related to Ru species or WO~x~ particles were observed for all the samples, indicating that Ru or WO~x~ particle sizes on the supports were below the XRD detection limit, when the loadings of Ru and WO~x~ were lower than 10 wt%.
As displayed in [Fig. 2](#f2){ref-type="fig"}, H~2~-TPR profiles for the samples Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out showed two reductive peaks centered at about 100--300 ^o^C and 500 ^o^C, respectively. The low temperature peak was likely due to the reduction of Ru^3+^ species to metallic Ru. The high temperature peak might be assigned to the reduction of carbon species on the surfaces of CNTs[@b20]. It was noted that Ru/CNTs-in sample had lower Ru^3+^ species reduction peak than Ru/CNTs-out, implying that the confinement of Ru oxide inside the CNTs pore resulted in easier reduction due to the shifting of π electron density from the inner to the outer surface caused by the deviation of the graphene layers from planarity[@b21]. As displayed, a new H~2~ consumption peak appeared for the WO~x~-containing catalysts at ca. 250 ^o^C. Clearly, this peak only observed for RuWO~x~/CNTs catalysts was assigned to the reduction of WO~x~ species[@b22]. Moreover, the intensity of the reduction peak increased with the increasing WO~x~ loading ([Fig. 2d](#f2){ref-type="fig"}), suggesting a significant amount of reducible species was present on the modified catalyst.
The average Ru particle size and distribution of the as-prepared catalysts were also characterized by using HRTEM. It can be seen from [Fig. 3](#f3){ref-type="fig"} that, aggregation of Ru nanoparticles was minimal, and Ru nanoparticles were highly dispersed with the average size of 2.0--3.0 nm for all the samples. For Ru/CNTs-in ([Fig. 3a](#f3){ref-type="fig"}), the majority of metal particles were well distributed inside the nanotubes with an average size of 1.73 ± 0.26 nm. While for Ru/CNTs-out ([Fig. 3b](#f3){ref-type="fig"}), Ru particles were found predominantly deposited on the exterior of the tubes with an average size of 1.97 ± 0.37 nm. From the histogram results, it could be observed that Ru particles deposited on the inside surface of CNTs were slightly smaller than that on the outside of the CNTs. This could be attributed to the strong metal-support interaction between the metal site with the inner surface of the CNTs which might prevent metal species from aggregating[@b23].The as-prepared Ru/CNTs catalyst had a narrow Ru size distribution in the range of 1.85--2.65 nm as determined by TEM. The HRTEM images of RuWO~x~/CNTs ([Fig. 3d](#f3){ref-type="fig"}) reveal homogeneous distribution of the metal nanocrystals with the average particle sizes of 1.82 nm. The Ru nanoparticle sizes of Ru/AC sample had a relatively wider size distribution, as shown in [Fig. 3e](#f3){ref-type="fig"} and the mean nanoparticle sizes (diameter) were 2.66 ± 0.50 nm.
Raman spectra of Ru/AC and Ru/CNTs, obtained with the 532 nm laser excitation line, are displayed in [Fig. 4](#f4){ref-type="fig"}. The analysis of the peak positions and intensities give information about the changes of the structural characteristics of the samples. Each exhibited two characteristic bands, namely, the G-band at 1550--1600 cm^−1^ originating from the high degree of symmetry and order of carbon materials in graphene sheets, the D-band at 1250--1450 cm^−1^ attributed to the disordered graphite structure[@b24]. The intensity ratio of D and G bands (*I*~D~/*I*~G~) was an indicator of the degree of disorder with the samples[@b25]. [Figure 4](#f4){ref-type="fig"} presents that the *I*~D~/*I*~G~ ratios for Ru/AC, Ru/CNTs, Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out were 0.92, 0.72, 0.68 and 0.63, respectively. Ru/AC sample exhibited a pair of relatively broad peaks at about 1350 and 1579 cm^−1^, corresponding to the D- and G-bands. A high intensity ratio of D-bands to G-bands for Ru/AC implied a typical of amorphous carbons, indicating that its graphitic domains were much smaller in comparison with CNTs[@b26]. These results coincided with the observations from HRTEM.
[Figure 5](#f5){ref-type="fig"} shows the XPS survey scans of Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out after reduction in hydrogen at 350 ^o^C. One distinct sharp Ru (3d) peak around 281.2 eV was clearly observed on Ru/CNTs-out ([Fig. 5a](#f5){ref-type="fig"}). This was typical value for zero-valence Ru, indicating that the deposited Ru was metallic. Compared with the sample of Ru/CNTs-out discussed above, the peak at 281.2 ± 0.2 eV corresponding to Ru (3d) was disappeared for Ru/CNTs-in sample ([Fig. 5b](#f5){ref-type="fig"}) which might be shielded by the 3--5 nm thick CNTs walls, indicating Ru/CNTs-out could offer more Ru particles on the surface than the Ru/CNTs-in sample. Additionally, no obvious signals characteristic of Cl species were observed for both of the samples, showing that Cl species were removed completely from RuCl~3~ after the HNO~3~ treatment and followed reduction in hydrogen at 350 ^o^C.
BET surface, metal loading, dispersion and average metal particle sizes obtained from N~2~ physisorption and TEM measurements of all the catalysts are shown in Table S1. As could be seen, Ru/AC had higher BET surface areas in comparison with CNTs-supported Ru catalysts. It should be noted that the Ru particle size for Ru/AC sample was higher than those supported on CNTs, as measured by HRTEM. On the other hand, the value of average particle size over Ru/CNTs-in was similar to that of Ru/CNTs-out, in spite of the fact that the former exhibited higher dispersion values than the latter as measured from H~2~ chemisorption.
Catalytic activity measurement
------------------------------
### Hydrogenolysis of sorbitol over Ru/AC and Ru/CNTs
[](#t1){ref-type="table"}[Table 2](#t2){ref-type="table"} shows the catalytic results obtained over a series of supported Ru catalysts in the hydrogenolysis of sorbitol. When Ru/AC was used as a catalyst in this system, 88.6% of sorbitol was consumed in 2 h with 41.5% selectivity for 1,2-PD and EG ([Table 1](#t1){ref-type="table"}, entry 1). For comparison, the activity of Ru/CNTs was tested under the same conditions and it was found that Ru/CNTs showed remarkably high catalytic activity, with 99.2% conversion of sorbitol and 55.2% yield for 1,2-PD and EG (entry 2). In general, this might be dependent on the dispersion of Ru catalysts and the different properties of supports.
However, HRTEM images of the different Ru catalysts showed that the Ru particles were distributed uniformly on the supports for all the five samples. The mean Ru particle sizes in Ru/CNTs and Ru/AC ([Fig. 3c,e](#f3){ref-type="fig"}) samples were 2.25 nm and 2.66 nm, respectively, indicating that the Ru species prepared by impregnation method were almost the same. From these results, we could conclude that the intrinsic properties of the supports might play an important role in determining the activity of Ru catalysts for the hydrogenolysis of sorbitol in water.
From the element analysis as shown in [Table S2](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} (Supplementary), it could be seen that the catalytic performance was strongly affected by the impurities content in Ru/AC catalyst. There were larger amounts of impurities (such as Cl^−^, SO~4~^2−^, PO~4~^3−^) on AC than CNTs. These electron-withdrawing elements would cause negative effects on the electronic structure of Ru catalysts for sorbitol hydrogenolysis, which leaded to the decrease in sorbitol hydrogenolysis activity greatly. On the other hand, the catalytic activities could be influenced by the electron conductivities for carbon materials supported Ru catalysts. As displayed in the HRTEM images ([Fig. 3](#f3){ref-type="fig"}), CNTs showed a higher degree of graphitization than AC, indicating that CNTs had a higher electron conductivity than AC[@b27][@b28], which made electron transfer from CNTs to ruthenium easier. This might be another reason for the increased activity of Ru/CNTs than Ru/AC.
### Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out catalysts
The catalytic performance of Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out catalysts were tested in a stainless-steel autoclave reactor at 205 ^o^C and 5.0 MPa, and the results were summarized in [Table 1](#t1){ref-type="table"} (entries 3 and 4). With the same Ru loading of 4%, the Ru/CNTs-in catalyst yielded 98.3% sorbitol conversion after 2 h with 28.5 and 18.4% yields to 1,2-PD and EG, respectively. The Ru/CNTs-out catalyst achieved almost complete sorbitol conversion with 58.5% combined yields towards 1,2-PD and EG. The XRD result and TEM measurement showed that the Ru particles located inside of the CNTs were distributed homogeneously which was similar to the dispersion of Ru/CNTs-out catalyst ([Supplementary Table S1](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). So the activity difference between Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out could be ascribed to the different positions of Ru species. Guo *et al*.[@b29] reported that the outside Ru exhibited a higher electron density than the inside Ru as revealed in the HRTEM characterization and first-principles calculations. Gallegos-Suarez *et al*.[@b30] observed that electron rich Ru species (Ru ^δ−^) could favor the cleavage of the C=O bond and promote the hydrogenolysis of polyol into PD and EG. The dehydrogenation of polyol to the corresponding aldehyde or ketone intermediate on the metal catalysts was an electrophilic process. The outside Ru catalyst exhibited a high electron density should facilitate adsorption and activation of H~2~ or sorbitol, thus might be the reason for the enhanced sorbitol hydrogenolysis activities over Ru/CNTs-out in comparison with Ru/CNTs-in, as observed in [Table 1](#t1){ref-type="table"}.
### Effects of promoters (WO~x~) on selective hydrogenolysis of sorbitol
The catalytic performance RuWO~x~/CNTs catalysts (with molar ratio of W/Ru of 0.25 and 0.50) in the sorbitol hydrogenolysis is given in [Table 1](#t1){ref-type="table"}. It could be found that addition of WO~x~ to Ru/CNTs enhanced the hydrogenolysis activity of sorbitol and glycols yields significantly ([Table 1](#t1){ref-type="table"}, entry 5). Ru0.25WO~x~/CNTs catalyst displayed a strong synergistic effect resulting in approximately 99.6% of sorbitol conversion with a 60.2% of total yield of products (Y~1,2-PD~ = 34.6%, Y~EG~ = 25.6%). However, further increase in molar ratio of WO~x~/Ru to 0.50, the conversion of sorbitol declined to 79% and over which only 46.4% glycols yields (Y~1,2-PD~ = 28.1%, Y~EG~ = 18.3%) was obtained. This was due to the fact that Ru metal surface was partially covered by WO~x~ cluster when doping much WO~x~ to Ru/CNTs catalysts[@b31]. H~2~-TPR profiles of Ru/CNTs and Ru--WO~x~/CNTs catalysts are also displayed in [Fig. 2](#f2){ref-type="fig"}. It was found that the incorporation of WO~x~ component could remarkably increase the Ru species dispersion as indicated by the average Ru particle sizes on Ru/CNTs and RuWO~x~/CNTs. The HRTEM results ([Supplementary Fig. S3](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}) suggested that the presence of WO~x~ could also prevent Ru metal particles aggregation during the reaction, thus enhancing the selectivity of sorbitol towards the glycols.
### Alkali promoter effect on Ru/CNTs catalysts
As reported before[@b32], the activity of sorbitol hydrogenolysis over Ru/CNTs catalyst depended strongly on the basicity of catalyst. Sorbitol hydrogenolysis on a Ru catalyst in a basic medium follows a retro-aldolreaction mechanism which yields C2-C3 products such as EG, 1,2-PD, and GLY. The effect of base type on sorbitol hydrogenolysis was investigated by using various solid bases (i.e. Mg(OH)~2~, Ca(OH)~2~, Sr(OH)~2~ and Ba(OH)~2~) with equivalent theoretical OH^−^ and the results are listed in [Table 2](#t2){ref-type="table"}. It can be seen that all the bases could enhance the sorbitol hydrogenolysis activity of Ru/CNTs catalyst.
Alkaline earth metal hydroxides were weaker bases compared to their corresponding oxides, and the order of the strength of the basic sites was Ba(OH)~2~ \> Sr(OH)~2~ \> Ca(OH)~2~ \> Mg(OH)~2~. The activities of Ru/CNTs catalyst for sorbitol hydrogenolysis with these promoters decreased in the order of Ca(OH)~2~ \> Sr(OH)~2~ \> Ba(OH)~2~ \> Mg(OH)~2~, which was reversed to the strength of the basicity except Mg(OH)~2~. Among the four alkaline earth metal hydroxides examined above, Ca(OH)~2~ was clearly the most preferable one, leading to sorbitol conversion at above 99.2% and yield to glycols at 55.2% after 2 h ([Table 2](#t2){ref-type="table"}). In the case of Mg(OH)~2~, the conversion of sorbitol was 84.4% after 2 h reaction with a 1,2-PD yield of 11.5% and EG of 9.0%, and the major byproducts in this reaction were found to be glycerol (27.1%), mannitol (3.6%) and erythritol (6.9%) species. Some other gas products such as CO~2~, CH~4~, C~3~H~8~, n-butane, iso-butane, n-hexane and so on were also confirmed by GC-MS. This was possibly because of the low solubility of Mg(OH)~2~ in this reaction system.
According to the analyses above, the improved catalytic activity of the Ru-based catalysts in the presence of alkali promoters might be due to the fact that they could serve either as a Cl scavenger in the containing Ru catalysts, or as a modifier of the surface electronic states of Ru. The increased electron density of Ru catalyst facilitated dehydrogenation of polyols to the corresponding aldehyde or ketone intermediate. On the other hand, as a base additive, it provided a moderate basic medium for accelerating a retro-aldol reaction in the cleavage of C--C bond. However, an overly high OH^−^ strength also enhanced reversible and scrambling aldol reactions, resulting in a decline in selectivities to desired EG and 1,2-PD and a rise in yield of other undesirable hydrocracked products[@b33].
#### Selectivity and Stability
[Figure S1](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} (Supplementary) displays the change of selectivities for the three major products (1,2-PD, EG and GLY), as a function of the sorbitol conversions on Ru/CNTs and RuWO~x~/CNTs. It was shown that the selectivities for the three products strongly depended on sorbitol conversion and catalyst properties. The RuWO~x~/CNTs catalyst gave higher selectivities of 1,2-PD and EG compared with Ru/CNTs catalyst under the same conversion. On the RuWO~x~/CNTs catalyst, the selectivities to 1,2-PD increased from 16.4 to 34.7% with increasing the sorbitol conversion from 18.5 to 99.6%, meanwhile, the EG selectivities increased from 12.9 to 25.7%. Such trend led to the increase in the combined selectivity to 60.4% for the target glycols at nearly 100% sorbitol conversion, presenting the potential advantage of the RuWO~x~/CNTs catalyst for the selective hydrogenolysis of sorbitol. For Ru/CNTs catalyst, the selectivities to 1,2-PD increased from 14.4 to 31.6% with increasing the sorbitol conversion from 17.9 to 99.2%, and the selectivities to EG increased from 10.9 to 21.9%. As a consequence, the total selectivity for these two glycols reached 53.5% at almost completely sorbitol conversion. In contrast, the selectivities to GLY slightly declined for both RuWO~x~/CNTs and Ru/CNTs catalysts with increasing sorbitol conversion, which might be caused by the further conversion of GLY to glycols, as previously reported for the hydrogenolysis of glycerol over Ru-based catalysts[@b36][@b37].
[Figure S2](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} (Supplementary) shows the catalytic results for Ru/CNTs and RuWO~x~/CNTs in the hydrogenolysis of sorbitol with H~2~ under the identical reaction conditions in the presence of Ca(OH)~2~ through 5 repeated runs with regeneration. For Ru/CNTs catalyst, as illustrated in [Fig. S3a](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} (Supplementary), the Ru species of spent Ru/CNTs after five cycles increased from 2.25 to 3.25 nm. Thus, the activity decline was probably due to the partial agglomeration of Ru species caused by high pressure and the liquid phase nature of the reaction. Clearly, RuWO~x~/CNTs showed higher sorbitol conversion and glycols yields for all the runs than Ru/CNTs. As shown in [Fig. S3b](#S1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} (Supplementary), the sizes of the Ru particles (being around 2.46 nm) changed slightly after the sorbitol hydrogenolysis reaction, indicating its exhibited better stability than Ru/CNTs catalyst upon reuse during the process of reaction. This was supported by the fact that no leaching of Ru or WO~x~ was detected by ICP and no clear lines attributed to Ru or WO~x~ species was revealed by XRD measurements for both the spent catalysts. The relatively higher stability of RuWO~x~/CNTs could be attributed to the synergy effect between Ru and WO~x~. Doping WO~x~ to Ru/CNTs catalysts could increase Ru dispersion and suppress the aggregation of Ru metal particles remarkably, but characteristic diffraction peaks of CaCO~3~ at 2θ = 23.04^o^, 29.40^o^, 36.00^o^, 36.40^o^, 43.16^o^, 47.48^o^ and 48.50^o^ were found for Ru/CNTs and RuWO~x~/CNTs after the fifth run, as revealed by XRD analysis ([Fig. 1f,g](#f1){ref-type="fig"}). This demonstrated that part of the Ca(OH)~2~ was transformed into CaCO~3~ in the hydrogenolysis reaction.
Discussion
==========
The catalytic hydrogenolysis of sorbitol to 1,2-PD and EG under mild reaction conditions was investigated. It was found that support properties as well as position of Ru on CNTs had significant effects on the catalytic performance. The Ru/CNTs showed higher catalytic activity for sorbitol hydrogenolysis than Ru/AC which might be due to the higher graphitization degree and electron conductivities of CNTs. Ru nanoparticles dispersed on the outside surfaces of CNTs exhibited a higher activity than the CNTs-confined Ru. Addition of WO~x~ to Ru/CNTs was efficient in improving the catalytic performances and inhibiting the aggregation of Ru metal particles due to the synergistic effect between Ru with WO~x~. The suitable molar ratio of WO~x~/Ru was 0.25. Almost 100% conversion of sorbitol and above 60% glycols yields was obtained over Ru0.25WO~x~/CNTs catalyst at 205 ^o^C under 5.0 MPa. Importantly, this catalyst was structurally stable and showed excellent reusability.
Methods
=======
Materials
---------
Sorbitol, 1,2-PG, EG, Mg(OH)~2~, Ca(OH)~2~, Sr(OH)~2~ and Ba(OH)~2~ were purchased from Aladdin Industrial Inc. Commercial activated-carbon (AC), and multi-walled carbon nanotubes (CNTs, length: 0.5--2 μm,ID:5--10 nm, OD: 10--20 nm) were obtained from Chengdu Organic Chemicals Co., LTD and used as supports, Ruthenium chloride hydrate (RuCl~3~·xH~2~O) and ammonium tungstate ((NH~4~)~10~H~2~(W~2~O~7~)~6~) were purchased from Sinopharm Chemical Reagent Co., Ltd. (Shanghai, China) and used as precursors of ruthenium and tungsten, respectively.
Catalyst preparation
--------------------
Ru/AC and Ru/CNTs catalysts were prepared by the incipient wetness impregnation method using an aqueous RuCl~3~ solution as the Ru precursor, AC and CNTs as supports, respectively. After impregnation and subsequent evaporation of water under stirring, the samples were dried overnight at 110 °C, and then followed by reduction in a flow of H~2~/Ar at 350 °C for 3 h.
The RuWO~x~/CNTs was prepared by impregnating the dried Ru/CNTs in aqueous solutions of (NH~4~)~10~H~2~(W~2~O~7~)~6~. The catalyst was reduced in H~2~ at 350 °C for 3 h after drying at 110 °C for 12 h. The molar ratio of the WO~x~ to metal ruthenium (WO~x~/Ru) was 0.25 and 0.50, respectively.
Ru/CNTs-in and Ru/CNTs-out catalysts were prepared as described previously with some modifications[@b34]. In order to incorporate the Ru species into the channel of CNTs, the as-received raw CNTs were sonicated in concentrated HNO~3~ (68 wt%) at 40 ^o^C for 2 h. The mixture was then refluxed at 140 ^o^C for 12 h, washed with deionized water, and dried at 60 ^o^C for 10 h. Oxidized MWCNTs were dispersed in the acetone solution of RuCl~3~ utilizing the capillary forces aided by ultrasonication. After that the mixture was dried at 90 ^o^C for 10 h under a vacuum, followed by reduction in H~2~ at 350 ^o^C for 4 h. The final powder was labeled as Ru/CNTs-in catalyst.
For Ru/CNTs-out catalyst, the pretreated CNTs were impregnated in xylene with ultrasonication for 4 h. An aqueous solution of RuCl~3~ was then added, followed by addition of a solution of NH~4~HCO~3~ dissolved NH~3~·H~2~O. After stirring at 80 ^o^C for 0.5 h, the sample was subjected to the same drying and reduction treatment as previously. All the catalysts were prepared using RuCl~3~·xH~2~O as active component precursor with a nominal Ru loading of 4wt%.
Catalyst characterization
-------------------------
Powder X-ray diffraction (XRD) patterns of catalyst samples were recorded on a D8 Advance X-ray diffractometer (Bruker, Germany) operated with Cu K irradiation and 2θ ranged from 10^o^ to 80^o^. Temperature programmed reduction by H~2~ (H~2~-TPR) measurements were conducted in an Auto Chem. II 2920 equipment (Mircromeritics, USA). The High Resolution Transmission Electron Microscopy (HRTEM) images were taken for determination of particle size on a JEOL-2100F microscope operated at 200 KV. For Raman spectroscopy tests, the 532-nm line from a Kimmon IK3201 R-F He-Cd laser was used for excitation with an intensity of \~20 Mw measured at the source. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) was performed using a PHI-560 ESCA (Perkin Elmer) spectrometer equipped with an Mg Kα target. A Thermo IRIS Intrepid II XSP atomic emission spectrometer was applied to determine the chemical composition of catalysts and metal leaching after reaction. The Brunauer--Emmett--Teller (BET) surface areas of the catalysts were carried out by the N~2~ physisorption technique with an apparatus (Micromeritics Tristar 3020). ICP analyses were carried out on a Thermo IRIS Intrepid II XSP atomic emission spectrometer to determine the chemical composition of catalysts and to examine metal leaching during reactions.
Catalytic tests and analytical method
-------------------------------------
A general procedure to conduct the sorbitol conversion was the same as reported before[@b35]. The catalytic performance was examined in a 100 mL stainless steel autoclave equipped with a mechanical stirrer. For a typical test, known amounts of sorbitol aqueous solution and alkali were charged to the reactor along with an appropriate amount of catalysts. The reactor was purged three times with H~2~ at 5 MPa and heated up to the desired temperature for a given period at 500 rpm stirring speed.
The obtained products were quantified by Agilent 7890A gas chromatography coupled with Dionex ICS-3000ion chromatography. The total carbon balance (TC) was also measured on a liqui TOC II analyzer (Elementar Analysensysteme).
Additional Information
======================
**How to cite this article**: Guo, X. *et al*. Conversion of biomass-derived sorbitol to glycols over carbon-materials supported Ru-based catalysts. *Sci. Rep*. **5**, 16451; doi: 10.1038/srep16451 (2015).
Supplementary Material {#S1}
======================
###### Supplementary Information
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (21306216, 21273260, 21303238, 21406251, and 31470609), the Shan Dong Provincial Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholar, China (JQ 201305), and the Taishan Scholars Climbing Program of Shandong (No. tspd 20150210).
**Author Contributions** X.C.G. planned the research, performed the experiments, and drafted the main manuscript. J.G., B.L. and X.C.W. helped in preparing Figures 1--4 and analyzed the data. X.D.M. and H.Z.L. supervised the project and discussed the results.
{#f1}
{#f2}
{#f3}
{#f4}
{#f5}
###### Hydrogenolysis of sorbitol over different ruthenium samples.
Entry Catalyst Conversion (%) Yield based on carbon (%)
------- ----------------------------------------- ---------------- --------------------------- ------ ----- ----- -----
1 Ru/AC 88.6 24.8 16.7 0.3 0.9 4.3
2 Ru/CNTs 99.2 31.4 23.8 0.7 0.4 7.5
3 Ru/CNTs-in 98.3 28.5 18.4 0.8 0.6 8.7
4 Ru/CNTs-out 99.5 33.4 25.1 0.9 1.4 4.3
5 RuWO~x~/CNTs[a](#t1-fn1){ref-type="fn"} 99.6 34.6 25.6 0.9 0.7 7.0
6 RuWO~x~/CNTs[b](#t1-fn2){ref-type="fn"} 79.5 28.1 18.3 0.6 0.8 6.3
Reaction conditions: 10wt% D-sorbitol aqueous solution 25 g, catalyst 0.3 g, *n*(Ca(OH)~2~) = 1.7 mmol, 205 °C, 5.0 MPa H~2~, 2 h, 500 r/min. Note:
^a^*n*(WO~x~)/*n*(Ru) = 0.25.
^b^*n*(WO~x~)/*n*(Ru) = 0.50. 1,2-BD = 1,2-butanediol.
###### Effect of base type on sorbitol hydrogenolysis.
Base Conversion (%) Yield (on a carbon basis, %)
----------- ---------------- ------------------------------ ------ ----- ----- ------
None 44.9 2.7 2.5 0.8 0.7 4.0
Mg(OH)~2~ 84.4 11.5 9.0 0.8 0.9 27.1
Ca(OH)~2~ 99.2 31.4 23.8 0.7 0.4 7.5
Sr(OH)~2~ 75.4 26.1 15.8 0.6 0.7 7.3
Ba(OH)~2~ 66.1 30.9 18.8 0.9 0.7 9.5
Reaction conditions: 10wt% D-sorbitol aqueous solution 25 g, Ru/CNTs 0.3 g, *n*(OH^−^) = 3.4 mmol, 205 °C, 5.0 MPa H~2~, 2 h, 500 r/min.
| 2023-10-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9422 |
Q:
convert jpeg/png to tiff in java
I am using batik library for image conversion , I need to convert jpeg/png to tiff format.
Can anyone help me on how to do the conversion using batik (preferable) , because i am using the same library for other SVG conversions.
A:
You could probably do PNG - > SVG - > TIFF conversion.
This link should point you in the right direction:
http://xmlgraphics.apache.org/batik/tools/rasterizer.html
check the "Examples of using the rasterizer task" section.
Hope this helps.
| 2024-06-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8918 |
But What Have You Done for Us Lately?: Some Recent Perspectives on Linguistic Nativism
Abstract
The problem with many contemporary criticisms of Chomsky and linguistic nativism is that they are based upon features of the theory that are no longer germane; aspects that have either been superseded by more adequate proposals, or that have been dropped altogether under the weight of contravening evidence. In this paper, rather than rehashing old debates that are voluminously documented elsewhere, we intend to focus on more recent developments. To this end, we have put a premium on references from the 1990s and the latter half of the 1980s. First, we will describe exactly what is now thought to be innate about language, and why it is thought to be innate rather than learned. Second, we will examine the evidence that many people take to be the greatest challenge to the nativist claim: ape language. Third, we will briefly consider how an innate language organ might have evolved. Fourth we will look at how an organism might communicate without benefit of the innate language structure proposed by Chomsky, and examine a number of cases in which this seems to be happening. Finally we will try to sum up our claims and characterize what we believe will be the most fruitful course of debate for the immediate future.
References in Article
Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.
Bates, E. (1976). Language and context: Studies in the acquisition of pragmatics. New York: | 2023-11-17T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9953 |
It is known to support a surface, such as may be defined by a keyboard supporting tray, for vertically swinging movement relative to a base, such as may be defined by the top of a table or work station, by a mechanism including a pair of link elements each having first and second ends thereof pivotally connected to a surface mounting element and a base mounting element, respectively. Such mechanisms typically include a counterbalance spring tending to bias the surface mounting element and link elements upwardly relative to the base, and a manually operable locking mechanism serving to releasably retain the surface mounting element in a desired vertical position.
It has also been proposed to provide an additional bracket serving to interconnect the surface mounting element to the link elements in a manner allowing downwardly directed tilting movement of the surface mounting element in combination with an additional manually operable locking mechanism serving to releasably retain the surface mounting element in a desired tilted position.
Known clamping mechanisms are disclosed for example by U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,616,798; 4,644,875; 4,691,888; 5,037,054 and 5,791,263. | 2023-11-03T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2693 |
Use of an extracorporeal femoral-carotid shunt in the management of complex supra-aortic disease.
Management of symptomatic multifocal supra-aortic atherosclerotic disease presents a complex surgical challenge. We describe a novel approach where a temporary extra-corporeal femoro-carotid shunt was used to maintain cerebral perfusion during hybrid surgical and endovascular treatment for tandem supra-aortic lesions. | 2024-06-10T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5021 |
There are few real accidents in history and the version we see in the history books, may have happened entirely differently in reality. A prime example being the murder of Rasputin nearly 100 years ago
Our web hosts were threatened with legal action after lawyers representing none other than Dov Zakheim himself claimed this article was “defamatory.” Due to an oversight the article was not fully removed so read it before Zakheim gets us shut down
The sacrifice of “six million Jews” was being talked about before Hitler rose to power. A photocopy from the American Hebrew dated Oct. 1919, speaks openly about a holocaust of six million Jews before declaring “Israel is entitled to a place in the sun”!!
A former high-ranking Republican official, also a well-respected author, tells the American people to stop listening to Bush administration lies about Iraqi war and claims the mainstream media will not publish anything he writes against Bush or his policies
A former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President Reagan stepped back into the political spotlight this week, expressing doubt about the official 9/11 story and claiming “if they lied to us about Ruby Ridge, Waco and weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, why should we believe them now.”
Paul Craig Roberts, listed by Who’s Who in America as one of the 1,000 most influential political thinkers in the world, has evolved over the years into a major Bush basher as well as neo con critic. Roberts said he hasn’t changed his political ideology or jumped from the Republican-conservative ship but “just can’t respect a party leadership who doesn’t respect the truth.”
He is another in the long list of “Republican faithful,” including top-ranking government and military officials who have left or been pushed out Washington, since Bush’s neo con followers continue demonstrating a lack of desire and patience to compromise even with conservatives refusing “to toe the neo con line.”
Expressing doubt about the government’s official version of 9/11 but deferring detailed criticism to the experts, Roberts concerns come on the heels of recent criticism leveled by Morgan Reynolds, a former chief economist in the Bush I administration.
Reynolds is the highest-ranking public official so far to step forward and criticize the government account of 9/11, calling the government story “bogus” and saying the WTC most likely fell from a controlled demolition.
Saying 9/11 is only a part of a mysterious but deadly neo- con puzzle, Roberts looked back at history for some answers.
“They (neo cons) are making such fatalistic mistakes and are about as insane as Hitler and the Nazi Party when they invaded Russia in the dead of the winter,” said Roberts who now, as a hobby, syndicates a national newspaper column, adding to his long and impressive list of academic, journalistic and political credentials.
Serving under President Reagan in 1981-82, Treasury Secretary Regan credited him with having a major role in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. He was then awarded the Treasury Department’s Meritorious Service Award for “his outstanding contributions to the formulation of United States economic policy.”
Roberts is given much of the credit for structuring and drafting a major portion of the famous Kemp-Roth bill as well as having a leading role in developing bipartisan support for a supply-side economic policy. In 1987, the French government recognized him as “the artisan of a renewal in economic science and policy after half a century of state interventionism,” inducted him into the Legion of Honor.
Even with his impressive background, Roberts, once a former columnist for Business Week and a thorn in the side of liberals back then, said “the times have drastically changed,” adding his views are no longer welcome in the mainstream media if they are critical of Bush or any of his policies.
” It’s like the Nazis removing dissent without using the Gestapo,” said Roberts, whose articles are circulated widely on the Internet and appear regularly in the American Free Press, an alternative publication. “Most publications, like the Washington Times, for example, will not print anything critical of Bush, his strategies and, definitely, anything seriously opposing the war is off base.”
Although professing to know “a little about engineering” from his undergraduate days at Georgia Tech, Roberts deferred formulating any serious conclusions about the fall of the WTC, but expressed doubt as to the credibility of the entire official version based on past government lies uncovered at Waco, Ruby Ridge and the threat of WMD in Iraq.
Roberts said the recent statements made by Reynolds, however, reveals just how flimsy and unbelievable the government story comes across.
“This is not some kind of conspiracy nut or kook talking. He is a man with extremely qualified credentials, whose opinions I respect,” said Roberts referring to Reynolds’ comments which have been highly publicized across the country.
“The real story is not Morgan Reynolds or myself, but why have so many former Republican conservatives and top ranking officials who disagree with the neo cons been systematically run out of Washington? And, also, why is the media so intent on covering up the Bush-neo con agenda and all the mistakes surrounding it?
“I guess the real story about 9/11 is about what the people are actually saying. I’ve gotten hundreds of emails in response to my columns and many of them talk about not getting the truth from the government or the media about what really happened at the World Trade Center. I know many qualified engineers and scientists have said the WTC collapsed from explosives. In fact, if you look at the manner in which it fell, you have to give their conclusions credibility.”
Besides 9/11 and blasting the neo con economic agenda as suicide for America, Roberts in his latest column seriously attacks the Bush Iraq war policy. Without mincing words, he wrote:
” The reasons they (the American people) were given by their president, vice president, secretary of defense, national security adviser, secretary of state, and the sycophantic media were nothing but a pack of lies.”
Accusing Bush of also lying to the American people in his recent June 18 radio address, he added:
“Bush again lied to the American people when he told them that the U.S. was forced into invading Iraq because of the Sept. 11 attack on the WTC.
“Bush, the greatest disgrace that America has ever had to suffer, actually repeated at this late date the monstrous lie for which he is infamous throughout the world: ‘We went to war because we were attacked, and we are at war today because there are still people out there who want to harm our country and hurt our citizens.’”
Roberts’ other impressive credentials include being awarded a John M. Olin Fellow at the Institute for Political Economy, a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Research Fellow at the Independent Institute.
In 1992, he received the Warren Brookes Award for Excellence in Journalism and, a year later, the Forbes Media Guide ranked him as one of the top seven journalists in the country. He was also Distinguished Fellow at the Cato Institute from 1993 to 1996 while also from 1982 through 1993, holding the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. | 2024-02-01T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5475 |
export interface ErrorDetail {
field: string;
message: string;
}
export interface ErrorItem {
code: string;
status: number;
message: string;
timestamp: number;
errors: ErrorDetail[];
}
export interface APIResponse<TData> {
data?: TData;
error?: ErrorItem;
success: boolean;
links: Link[];
}
export interface Link {
href: string;
rel: string;
templated: boolean;
}
export interface Role {
id: number;
role: string;
description: string;
label: string;
enabled: boolean;
}
export interface LoginData {
userId: string;
username: string;
accessToken: string;
name: string;
businessId: string;
roles: Role[];
}
export interface Color {
id?: string;
name: string;
value: string;
}
export interface BusinessAccount {
colors?: Color[];
createdAt?: number;
email: string;
id?: string;
logoUrl?: string;
modifiedAt?: number;
name: string;
phone: string;
status?: string;
}
export interface Sort {
}
export interface ListContent<TItem> {
content: TItem[];
first: boolean;
last: boolean;
number: number;
numberOfElements: number;
size: number;
sort: Sort;
totalElements: number;
totalPages: number;
}
export interface ListData<TItem> {
data: TItem[];
success: boolean;
}
export enum BusinessAccountStatus {
INACTIVE = 0,
ACTIVE = 1,
EXPIRED = 2,
BLOCKED = 3,
DELETED = 4
}
export enum DevicePlatform {
ANDROID = 'ANDROID',
IOS = 'IOS',
WINDOWS = 'WINDOWS',
FACEBOOK = 'FACEBOOK'
}
export enum DeviceStatus {
ACTIVE = 'ACTIVE',
INACTIVE = 'INACTIVE',
BLOCKED = 'BLOCKED'
}
export interface Device {
createdAt: Date;
deviceId: string;
devicePlatform: DevicePlatform;
id: number;
status: DeviceStatus;
version: string;
}
export interface User {
businessId: string;
createdAt?: number;
device?: Device;
email: string;
id: string;
name: string;
phone: string;
roles: Role[];
userName: string;
}
export interface UserRegisterModel {
businessId?: string,
email: string,
name: string,
password: string,
phone: string,
roleIds: number[]
}
export interface ChatProject {
businessId: string;
businessName?: string;
createdAt?: number;
flow?: any;
id: string;
name: string;
source?: any;
status?: string;
updatedAt?: number;
userId?: string;
}
export interface RegisterOnAnaCloudDetails {
business: BusinessAccount;
user: UserRegisterModel;
}
| 2024-01-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9566 |
Selective homonuclear Hartmann-Hahn transfer method for in vivo spectral editing in the human brain.
A novel selective homonuclear Hartmann-Hahn transfer method for in vivo spectral editing is proposed and applied to measurements of gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) in the human brain at 3 T. The proposed method utilizes a new concept for in vivo spectral editing, the spectral selectivity of which is not based on a conventional editing pulse but based on the stringent requirement of the doubly selective Hartmann-Hahn match. The sensitivity and spectral selectivity of GABA detection achieved by this doubly selective Hartmann-Hahn match scheme was superior to that achievable by conventional in vivo spectral editing techniques providing both sensitivity enhancement and excellent suppression of overlapping resonances in a single shot. Since double-quantum filtering gradients were not employed, singlets such as the NAA methyl group at 2.02 ppm and the creatine methylene group at 3.92 ppm were detected simultaneously. These singlets may serve as navigators for the spectral phase of GABA and for frequency shifts during measurements. The estimated concentration of GABA in the frontoparietal region of the human brain in vivo was 0.7 +/- 0.2 mumol/g (mean +/- SD, n = 12). | 2024-02-04T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7930 |
The characterization of childhood occipital epilepsy of Gastaut: a study of seven patients.
Characterization of the electroclinical features and evolution of childhood occipital epilepsy of Gastaut (COE-G). Seven children were retrospectively identified as having COE-G and were followed-up clinically using EEGs. Visual manifestations were the most common ictal event. Eye-associated ictal deviation was associated with ipsilateral turning of the head and migraine-like symptoms were frequent. Hemiconvulsions occurred in two children, and only one child had secondary generalized tonic-clonic seizures. In all patients, seizures occurred while awake, while two patients also had seizures while sleeping. EEG showed five patients with occipital spike-wave discharges when their eyes were closed which disappeared once their eyes were opened. Two cases continued having frequent seizures despite antiepileptic drug treatment. These patients also displayed learning difficulties and behavioral impairments after seizure onset. COE-G is a distinctive epileptic syndrome; however, the long-term prognosis for patients with the condition is unclear. | 2024-01-14T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9373 |
Q:
How to share user location from UIActivityViewController in Xcode
I know how to share other objects like images, urls, string or other. But I don't know how can I share from UIActivityViewController the current location.
I tried it
@IBAction func sendLocation(sender: UIBarButtonItem) {
if mapView.userLocationVisible {
let currentCoordinate = mapView.userLocation.location!
print(currentCoordinate)
let arrayLocation = [currentCoordinate]
let activityController = UIActivityViewController(activityItems: arrayLocation, applicationActivities: nil)
presentViewController(activityController, animated: true, completion: nil)
} else {
print("User location is not visible")
}
}
But I see in console <+53.09618071,+49.96449468> +/- 20.00m (speed 0.00 mps / course -1.00) @ 10/11/15, 1:54:26 PM Samara Standard Time. UIActivityViewController doesn't share any location. Please help me.
A:
@IBAction func shareLocation(sender: UIBarButtonItem) {
// print(receivedDictionary)
let postalAdress = CNMutablePostalAddress()
postalAdress.street = receivedDictionary["Name"] as! String
postalAdress.city = receivedDictionary["City"] as! String
postalAdress.state = receivedDictionary["State"] as! String
postalAdress.postalCode = receivedDictionary["ZIP"] as! String
postalAdress.country = receivedDictionary["Country"] as! String
postalAdress.ISOCountryCode = receivedDictionary["CountryCode"] as! String
let streetName = receivedDictionary["Name"] as! String
let urlAddress = receivedDictionary["FormattedAddressLines"] as! [String]
// print(urlAddress)
let postalContact = CNLabeledValue(label: streetName, value: postalAdress)
let urlAddressContact = CNLabeledValue(label: "map url", value: "http://maps.apple.com/maps?address=\(urlAddress.description)")
let contact = CNMutableContact()
contact.contactType = .Organization
contact.organizationName = streetName
contact.departmentName = streetName
contact.postalAddresses = [postalContact]
contact.urlAddresses = [urlAddressContact]
// create path
let directory = fileManager.URLsForDirectory(.DocumentDirectory, inDomains: .UserDomainMask)
let path = directory.first!.path!.stringByAppendingString("/\(streetName).loc.vcf")
// print(path)
do {
let contactData = try CNContactVCardSerialization.dataWithContacts([contact])
contactData.writeToFile(path, atomically: true)
let url = NSURL(fileURLWithPath: path)
// print(url)
let activityViewController = UIActivityViewController(activityItems: [url], applicationActivities: nil)
presentViewController(activityViewController, animated: true, completion: nil)
} catch {
print("CNContactVCardSerialization cannot save address")
}
}
| 2023-09-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6641 |
Q:
Format number with space as thousand separator
First: Yes I know number formatting shall not be done in data layer, but I'm working with an application I can't modify, nor can I format the result set in the application. I can only write a query.
For a SQL Server 2008 query I want to use space as thousand separator and also round to two decimals. Example: 123363.249999 should be displayed as 123 363,25.
I've tried:
SELECT REPLACE(CONVERT(varchar, CONVERT(money, 123363.249999), 1), '.00', '')
But that results in 123,363.25. I'm looking for nicer solution than just replacing comma with space and dot with comma. It would be nice to set the locale in the query.
A:
For SQL Server 2008, I think your best bet for a "nicer" solution within SQL Server would be to write a custom CLR function to handle the formatting based on region/locale.
For SQL Server 2012 or later, the FORMAT function has been introduced.
| 2024-05-11T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6748 |
using CompanyName.MyMeetings.Modules.Payments.Application.Contracts;
namespace CompanyName.MyMeetings.Modules.Payments.Infrastructure.Configuration.Processing.Inbox
{
public class ProcessInboxCommand : CommandBase, IRecurringCommand
{
}
} | 2024-04-17T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6615 |
Flagbearers lower a Chinese national flag (L) and a Hong Kong flag beside a banner set up by pro-democracy protesters outside Legislative Council in Hong Kong, China June 16, 2015. Photo: Reuters/Bobby Yip
RELATED NEWS
More than a thousand people converged on Hong Kong's Legislative Council early on Wednesday before lawmakers debate a Beijing-backed electoral reform plan that could trigger fresh protests in the Chinese-controlled city.
The former British colony has reinforced security after mass protests crippled parts of the Asian financial hub late last year, presenting China's ruling Communist Party with one of its biggest political challenges in decades.
The Legislative Council issued an "amber alert" before the vote on the reform package, which is expected by Friday. The council was expected to begin debating the plan on Wednesday afternoon.
Police were deployed inside the council complex overnight, and police sources said more than 5,000 specially trained officers would be on standby, while some roads leading to government buildings were closed.
Activist groups said they expected 100,000 protesters to show up on Wednesday, although Beijing supporters easily outnumbered opponents of the package early on Wednesday.
"The bill needs to go through. We have to support Hong Kong stability. We cannot keep carrying on like this," said a 60-year-old man surnamed Chan, who declined to give his first name.
"We have worked so hard all these years," said Chan, who was waving a Chinese flag.
Legislators will debate a blueprint that will allow a direct vote for Hong Kong's next leader in 2017, but only from pre-screened, pro-Beijing candidates. Opponents say they want a genuinely democratic vote.
Scores of pro-Beijing activists shouted and booed from behind a barrier as pro-democracy lawmakers entered the building. Others, some elderly, squatted on the ground as temperatures hovered around 30 Celsius (86 Fahrenheit).
One pro-democracy protester wearing a black T-shirt which read "Reject Fake Suffrage", held a black-and-white banner that declared: "Overthrow the Communist dictatorship".
Hundreds of police stood guard as more than a thousand pro-Beijing supporters gathered, some waving banners that said: "Support the reform". They also played the Chinese national anthem over loudspeakers close to government headquarters.
Tensions high
Tension has been running high, especially after 10 people were arrested this week on suspicion of explosives offences. Six of them have been charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion.
China's Foreign Ministry said there were "certain people who want to use a series of damaging acts" to disturb the debate but still hoped it could proceed smoothly.
The ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said in a front-page commentary that the vote was fundamentally about ensuring long-term prosperity and stability.
The proposed package, it added, was designed to be a broadly representative one all sides could accept while at the same time "reducing all sorts of risks universal suffrage could bring.
"Looking around the world, some countries' and regions' universal suffrage systems are not in line with the actual situation on the ground, causing social chaos, economic hardship and difficulties too numerous to mention," the paper said.
Beijing has tried to lobby Hong Kong's 27 pro-democracy lawmakers to back the blueprint.
Those democrats, who hold a crucial one-third veto bloc in the 70-seat Legislative Council, have so far pledged to oppose what they call a "fake" democratic model.
Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption has also said it was investigating allegations by an unidentified legislator that he was offered a bribe to vote for the package.
Hong Kong returned to China in 1997 under a "one country, two systems" formula that gives it a separate legal system and greater freedoms than the party-ruled mainland - and the promise of universal suffrage.
Thousands of activists blockaded major roads across Hong Kong for 79 days last year, defying tear gas and pepper spray, to press China to honor that promise.
While flawed, the package is still the most progressive electoral model ever offered by China's leaders in what might be a pilot for other cities within mainland China, according to a source close to Beijing's leadership.
If the plan is vetoed, Hong Kong's next leader will be selected as before by a 1,200-member committee stacked with pro-Beijing loyalists. Beijing would be unlikely to offer any fresh concessions to Hong Kong anytime soon. | 2023-08-10T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6825 |
Scottish football fan ownership feature
Fan representation in Scottish football has been in the news a lot recently, with the Rangers Supporters Trust and Rangers First building their shareholding at Ibrox.
Often, fan ownership comes about from a crisis situation at a club, such as has happened with Rangers and Hearts.
Here, BBC Scotland speaks to various figures in Scottish football with experience of fan ownership models, or with views on such schemes' likely success.
Ricki Neill, Rangers First
"When we first started we were mocked. Everybody said we'd be lucky to get 400 members. We're now nearly at 13,000 members. It's been a long time. The members didn't really come on board until Christmas time and ever since then thousands are joining every week and now we are the largest fan ownership group in Britain.
Rangers First has become the largest fan ownership group in Britain with almost 13,000 members
"I'd love to get up to the 30,000s and 40,000s and above.
"We just want to get a member of Rangers First on the board. Once we get 10.1% we can do that and that's when we can make a real change. It means we will be part of all the discussions.
"We've already had discussions with Dave King and some of the Three Bears and they all believe in fan involvement."
Ian Murray MP, Foundation of Hearts
"It was really that crisis that galvanised everyone together.
"When the club, 18 months before that, was told they'd played their last game here at Tynecastle against St Mirren they raised over £1m in six weeks just before Christmas.
"That was a phenomenal amount of money. That money was just a charitable donation in a lot of senses.
"There was nothing they were going to get back for it. And then they rallied again just a few months later when the club really needed them to back the Foundation so we could put a credible plan together.
Ian Murray MP admits there are many challenges to be overcome by fans wanting to take over clubs
"So it was borne out of crisis and not every club will be in the same position, which is why every single model of fan ownership will be completely different for different clubs.
"If there are fans' bodies out there that want to discuss with owners who have shareholdings in terms of how to get hold of the club, the first thing to do is to open up constructive dialogue, to work in partnership with them and to say 'we want to do this'.
"And then to show some willing with the supporters base that they're able to raise the revenues and cash to be able to do it.
"In that sense there might be a lot of owners of football clubs out there that want an exit strategy or at least a partial exit strategy and the fan base are able to provide that."
Brian McCafferty, Motherwell chairman
"We've got five years to repay Les [Hutchison's] loan but over the next few months I think our job is to convince the fans who were a bit sceptical to begin with that it's most important that we get their support.
Brian McCafferty says the fan-ownership model at Motherwell relies on supporters turning up to games
"If we don't get enough income coming through the gates, if we don't get enough income through the commercial side of the business, and we don't have enough people joining the society, we don't have enough money to pay back the loan and our dream will be a nightmare."
Mike Mulraney, Alloa Athletic chairman
"Dundee, a big club, went fan-owned and it lasted less than two years and the fans decided they actually didn't like it very much.
"We've got another club that's been fan-owned for a long time that's recently made a statement about the financial problems they're facing because of it.
"The financial tsunamis that face any business and particularly Scottish football, sometimes one owner lends itself to being able to cover those problems. Does it work for my club? Patently it does. Do I believe my club would be where it is if there was fan ownership? I 100% believe it would not.
Alloa chairman Mike Mulraney insists fan-ownership would not be the right model for his club
"And you've got to look at some of our competitor clubs that are fan-owned to see where they are.
"Every ownership structure has a danger and if one owner is pump-priming continually his club, when he stops doing that the circumstance of that club will change.
"But that can be the case whether it's one owner or a fan-owned committee.
"If the people who are organising a club run it badly and the structures are inappropriate and it hits a problem, then the club's going to have a problem.
"If you run your business badly, it will do badly."
Paul Goodwin, fan advisor
"There are some people who have been running their own little dictatorship and they enjoy it and they don't want to see change.
"But change is coming. That's maybe five, six, seven clubs in Scotland that have changed to this model. So I think that will continue to grow.
Paul Goodwin, formerly of Supporters Direct, has advised fans across Scotland on taking over their clubs
"But like in any business there will be people who say 'No. I don't really want that' and there are arguments on both sides.
"It would be fantastic for Scottish football if there was a Roy MacGregor [Ross County chairman] at every single club who invested an awful lot of money. The reality is that there isn't.
"There's no perfect model, there are definitely still people out there who have their doubts but when we get Hearts and Motherwell into a good position, I think it's a matter of time until people see it as an alternative." | 2023-11-03T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9919 |
CLEVELAND, Ohio — An outlet-mall landlord that’s been eyeing downtown Cleveland for years says the market is an obvious void when it comes to name-brand, discount shopping.
“We spend a lot of time looking for sites around the country, and it really was the hole in the doughnut,” said Gary Skoien, president, chairman and chief executive officer of Horizon Group Properties Inc. “Downtown Cleveland has no retail, basically, practically speaking.”
Horizon, a small but established outlet owner and developer based in Illinois, is in talks with retailers about a two-level mall that could rise at the edge of downtown, on the eastern end of the massive Lakefront Municipal Parking Lot. Those leasing conversations are occurring as downtown Cleveland’s population approaches 20,000 people, according to recent figures from the Downtown Cleveland Alliance, a nonprofit group that hopes residential growth will beget retail growth in a center city that has struggled with empty storefronts for decades.
Marketing materials for the Outlet Shoppes at Cleveland describe a 323,000-square-foot building nestled between South Marginal Road and the Cleveland Memorial Shoreway. Leasing plans show large entertainment and restaurant spaces at either end of the mall and a food hall in the middle. Placeholder tenants on those plans — examples of brands that might pop up — include Coach, Nike, North Face, Polo, Timberland, Tommy Hilfiger and Tory Burch. No leases have been announced.
Horizon aims to open the project as soon as 2022.
A site plan being used to market the Outlet Shoppes at Cleveland shows the potential location of the two-story mall, on the eastern end of the Muni Lot. The parking lot to the east of the building would replace unused, city-owned tennis courts.CBRE Group, Inc.
During a recent interview, Skoien said the timeline depends on discussions with two key parties: potential tenants and the city of Cleveland, which owns the property.
Skoien wouldn’t say how many retailers have committed to opening at the mall. And he wouldn’t put a price tag on the development. But, he said, “it’s in excess of $100 million.”
Horizon’s interest in Cleveland first publicly surfaced in 2016. At that time, the company was circulating plans for a four-story building, including a 1,400-car garage, on a parking lot just south and west of Burke Lakefront Airport. That land, north of the Shoreway, also is city-owned.
Construction near the downtown lakefront is challenging. The land — Burke, North Coast Harbor, the Shoreway and even the Muni Lot — once was part of Lake Erie. About a century ago, Cleveland created new ground by piling residents’ cast-off furniture, other household trash, sand and dirt dredged from the Cuyahoga River into the lake, driving the downtown coastline north.
That history creates legal complexities — building on the land requires lease agreements with the city and the state — and technical complications related to the soil.
That’s why Horizon pivoted from the 20-acre Burke lot to 36 acres on the opposite side of the Shoreway, where the company can build a less costly, lower-slung outlet mall with surface parking instead of a garage. The mall would occupy a little-used end of the 2,300-space Muni Lot, an area that’s packed only when tailgaters flock downtown for Cleveland Browns games.
A new parking lot would replace unused city tennis courts that sit just east of the Muni Lot, on the other side of a freeway ramp. Horizon’s plans show a pedestrian bridge over that ramp, leading to the shopping center’s second floor.
The potential 36-acre site for the outlet mall includes unused tennis courts that sit just east of the Muni Lot. Under Horizon's plans, a parking lot would replace the tennis courts.Lisa DeJong/The Plain Dealer
It’s unclear how advanced the developer’s negotiations are with city officials.
In an email, a spokeswoman for Mayor Frank Jackson said, “We have an understanding of the project and we are reviewing the proposed development plan. We may be able to provide additional details at a later date.”
Skoien said Horizon, which is likely to develop the project through a joint venture with an unnamed partner, has been “working cooperatively” with the city. “It’s their property,” he said, “so we ultimately would need to have a lease in place.”
Building anything significant on the Muni Lot also would require substantial investments in utilities, such as water, sewer and natural gas lines and telecommunications infrastructure. Those costs — and the question of how to divvy up the bill between private developers and the public sector — have been an impediment to building on and near the lakefront for decades.
Skoien acknowledged that Horizon has asked Cleveland for financial help, but he would not discuss specifics.
“We’ve never built an outlet center that didn’t get government assistance for the reason that it really is different than other retail,” he said, stressing that the company expects the mall to attract not only downtown residents but also tourists, convention attendees, visiting families of patients at major hospitals, families of college students and Northeast Ohio residents who do much of their outlet shopping in other states today.
“Every place is different,” Skoien said of public incentives for outlet malls. “We’ve had rebates of sales tax. We’ve had rebates of property tax. We’ve had direct grants, and they’re all across the board. … Most municipal officials and economic-development folks understand the difference between building this and a Walmart or a Costco or something.”
The closest outlet malls to Cleveland are older properties more than 30 miles away, in Aurora and Burbank. Horizon studied suburban sites and looked at existing downtown retail space, including the part-empty Galleria on East Ninth Street. But building a ground-up project that’s in an urban setting without being in the center of downtown emerged as the best option.
“The response to this project has been as strong or stronger as any project we’ve taken to market,” Skoien said. “Retailers get it right away.”
The outlet mall would sit at the edge of downtown Cleveland, on the opposite side of the Shoreway from Burke Lakefront Airport. A development on the property would require a long-term land lease between Horizon and the city of Cleveland, which owns the land.Lisa DeJong/The Plain Dealer
Rich Moore, a longtime real estate investment trust analyst, said the model of building discount shopping centers in cornfields and expecting shoppers to drive long distances for deals is outdated. The most successful outlet centers are increasingly in places that appeal to tourists.
“The traditional outlet center is struggling to stay relevant,” said Moore, the managing partner of a Solon-based real estate hedge fund called Lionhead Capital Management. “I would think that whoever’s planning a new one, you’ve got to think in terms of where you’re going to get these shoppers from. The international, the tourist, shopper is still your best bet.
“I also think it’s interesting what you’re going to put in there,” he added. “Outlets have always been majority apparel. Now there’s so much apparel. There are so many different kinds of apparel, and so many ways to get apparel online, that just apparel — I don’t know that that’s a formula for success.”
In a departure from that old-school, clothing-centric outlet model, the CBRE Group Inc. real estate brokerage is marketing two entertainment spaces, one 30,000 square feet and the other 26,000 square feet, and a pair of restaurants, totaling 10,500 square feet, at the project.
Joseph Khouri, a first vice president at CBRE in Cleveland, said the mall is attracting “significant” interest from potential tenants, though he wouldn’t name names.
“From a leasing perspective,” he said, “it absolutely is very, very real. … It’s a surprising amount of progress that’s happening behind the scenes.”
Other Cleveland development news:
Circle Square project will include 24-story apartment tower in University Circle
Construction under way on Axis at Ansel apartments in Hough
Affordable housing for Cleveland student-parents, families seeks tax credits
Sherwin-Williams’ pick of new HQ site stirs talk of more activity downtown | 2023-08-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2410 |
June 30, 2015
What Donald Trump should say in response to NBC firing him
Here's what NBC had to say about parting ways with Donald Trump (via USA Today):
"Due to the recent derogatory statements by Donald Trump regarding immigrants, NBCUniversal is ending its business relationship with Mr. Trump," the statement said.
"To that end, the annual Miss USA and Miss Universe Pageants, which are part of a joint venture between NBC and Trump, will no longer air on NBC. In addition, as Mr. Trump has already indicated, he will not be participating in The Apprentice on NBC," because he is an announced Republican candidate for president.
"Celebrity Apprentice is licensed from Mark Burnett's United Artists Media Group and that relationship will continue," the network added.
Donald Trump had made some comments about Mexicans during his announcement that he was running for president. Were they poorly worded? Yes. They were vintage Trump - no holds barred stating his opinion. Should his shows be cancelled on NBC? Yes, but only because he's running for president and there is a conflict of interests there, just as CNN doing a flattering documentary on Hillary Clinton in 2016 would be.
I'm not interested in seeing Donald Trump win the GOP nomination. Not because I think he'd be a terrible president. I think he'd do miles better than his predecessor. Any of the 16 running candidates would. Trump is not the worst candidate nor is he the best. However in a general election he would be the least electable.
Then again, maybe not. He's somewhat of a wild card. If he can keep himself on message but still display his firebrand persona he could do well. I think it's not likely, but not impossible.
In that spirit let me offer Donald Trump a chance to do some damage control. Some might consider this spin, but that's politics, spin is mandatory for survival.
Trump should turn this around by focusing on the issue of NBC. Make it clear that this was not about immigrants, it was about illegal immigrants specifically, and there is a critical distinction which NBC clearly has misunderstood. They did not seek out clarification from Trump and took action unilaterally. NBC is clearly an agenda driven organization and Brian Williams (an example Trump has already raised) is proof that those of different political stripes are treated differently depending on whether they agree with NBC's viewpoint. NBC has the right to run itself that way, however they owe it to Americans to be forthright about the slant of their perspective. After all, what Trump had to say about illegal immigrants, was said from an America first perspective, something which Americans are likely to appreciate - if not his views, at least the sentiment behind them. | 2024-02-22T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8119 |
Where can i buy thes ziptie mounts/anchors I see ppl using for satoshis?
Click to expand...
I found pack of 10 at Lowes right next to the zip ties. I removed the the sticky double sided foam tape that the mounts had on there so that I had a nice flat surface. Then used Plastic epoxy to glue the mounts down to the back of my satoshi grill. They hold great! Just make sure not to use too much epoxy to fill in the holes where the tip tie threads through. I found it best to barely dip the mount in the epoxy so that you made sure the holes didnt get filled then mount to grill. Once that first set of epoxy dried, use a toothpick and place more epoxy around the edges of the zip tie mount to make sure its really held down good.
I found pack of 10 at Lowes right next to the zip ties. I removed the the sticky double sided foam tape that the mounts had on there so that I had a nice flat surface. Then used Plastic epoxy to glue the mounts down to the back of my satoshi grill. They hold great! Just make sure not to use too much epoxy to fill in the holes where the tip tie threads through. I found it best to barely dip the mount in the epoxy so that you made sure the holes didnt get filled then mount to grill. Once that first set of epoxy dried, use a toothpick and place more epoxy around the edges of the zip tie mount to make sure its really held down good.
Click to expand...
what he said, i just used the foam tape that was on them and after a couple months all but two loosened up and i had to reglue them all | 2023-10-20T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9354 |
Jerri-Lynn here: This short post by Jack Gao of the Institute for New International Thinking (INET) highlights a pressing problem afflicting the world economy: the slowdown of international trade. As the post summarises, there’s no consensus among economists on the causes for that slowdown.
One major quibble with the post. Gal’s passing statement below, “The desire of those hurt by globalization to shield themselves from foreign competition via protectionist or retaliatory policies is a growing influence in the political life of a number of countries, including the world’s most advanced democracies,” seems to fail to grasp the true basis for widespread opposition to pending so-called “trade agreements”. Opposition movements are not necessarily motivated by opposition to trade per se, but by concerns over transparency, how the gains from these agreements have and will be distributed, and limitations on sovereignty and regulation imposed by procedures such as the Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism. And the responses to such concerns under discussion are not what I would describe as traditionally protectionist or retaliatory, but instead combine calls for greater transparency, attention to distributional issues, and a halt– or at minimum, profound rethink– of measures that constrain sovereignty or stymie effective regulation (e.g., threats to the European Union’s precautionary principle). To be fair, these issues are peripheral to Gao’s major aim in the piece, which is to account for the slowdown in international trade.
I should also remind readers who’re only familiar with Paul Krugman through his New York Times column that his initial academic work concerned international trade.
By Jack Gao, who is a Program Economist at the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET), with interests in international economics and finance, energy policy, economic development, and the Chinese economy. He previously worked in financial product and data departments in Bloomberg Singapore, and reported on Asian financial markets in Bloomberg News from Shanghai. Jack holds a MPA in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School, and a B.S. in Economics from Singapore Management University. Originally published at the Institute for New Economic Thinking Website.
Challenged by mathematician Stanislaw Ulam to name one idea in economics that was both true and non-trivial, Nobel economics laureate Paul Samuelson famously nominated comparative advantage — the notion that even a country less productive in producing everything, could still benefit from international trade by specializing in the commodity it faces the least disadvantages in producing. But comparative advantage fails to explain why international trade, which has underpinned the global economy for much its modern history, is showing signs of a slowdown.
Originally attributed to the English classical economist David Ricardo and later formalized by generations of economists including Samuelson, trade theories rooted in comparative advantage hold that free trade should raise the overall welfare of all nations that engage in it. Wages of Chinese workers should rise, as would income levels of American capital owners, if the two countries open up to trade. And any negative impact domestically could be ameliorated by making the necessary transfers to compensate those hurt by trade. The remarkable rise in the living standards of citizens in Japan, the four “Asian Tiger” economies, and most notably China, are testaments to free trade working its magic.
However, many find the marked slowdown in global trade since the 2008 financial crisis as puzzling as the tepid GDP growth that has accompanied the recovery.
First, some facts. In the heyday of its economic expansion, China’s current account surplus stood at more than 10% of its GDP; that figure was a mere 2% for the first half of this year. The IMF has documented a 3% annual expansion of global trade since 2012, less than half of its annual growth rate in the previous three decade. This trend holds within developed countries, as well as between developed and developing countries.
Experts are debating the underlying causes of the trade slowdown. The most obvious explanation may be to point to the disruption caused by the 2008 financial crisis, and the prolonged weakness in subsequent economic activities. With the collapse of the western financial system, world economic growth dipped into negative territory for the first time in recent history — from its pre-crisis level of around 4% — and global trade decline ensued. Since then, however, trade, which has historically grown at twice the rate of GDP growth, has grown more or less in tandem with the sluggish output recovery. Clearly, something else is causing the breakdown.
Another explanation frequently offered has been the restructuring in China. The world’s second largest economy, which in recent decades powered the world’s economic activities, had been an even more important driver of growth in world trade. But after 2008, Beijing put more emphasis on domestic economic concerns instead of promoting foreign trade. This rebalancing, however, represents a response to the fall in external demand rather than a deliberate strategy to turn away from trade, and thus is unlikely to be causing the global trade decline.
The WTO warned that these trends could damage an already weak world economy. The desire of those hurt by globalization to shield themselves from foreign competition via protectionist or retaliatory policies is a growing influence in the political life of a number of countries, including the world’s most advanced democracies. But while they may pose serious threats to the future of globalization, protectionist policies have not been implemented on a time frame that could have caused the trade slowdown. Nor is the decline in trade restricted to commerce between countries where populist influence is strongest.
Economist Paul Krugman sees the answer lying in the relative speed of technological progress in transportation and the rest of the economy. Real transport costs could rise, according to Krugman, if the technological advances in transportation are slower than the economy-wide technological changes. Economists in the IMF believebelieve changes in the pace of international vertical specialization, the decision to use domestic versus imported inputs, are causing the lackluster expansion of trade. All of these explanations, however, seem unlikely in the context of a world of such great differences in cost and technology — precisely the conditions under which, through the logic of comparative advantage, free trade promised such universal benefits.
If the causes of a slowdown in global trade remain a matter of ongoing debate, its impact and implications for the global economy are unmistakably real and increasingly urgent. | 2024-06-22T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2723 |
2 Hour documentary chronicles the production process throughout the making of the cult classic film Death Metal Zombies. Includes interviews with actors, deleted scenes, wrap party footage ... . You can read more in Google, Youtube, Wiki
Making of Death Metal Zombies torrent reviews
Zelyaine T (ru) wrote: While this documentary's encouragement of a nutrient-rich lifestyle is good, the data and information is anywhere from dubious to rubbish. It's very peculiarly biased and is likely made to shock and sway rather than give objective view. On one hand, it criticizes our modern culture in its "more is better" approach to medicines, medical cures, etc. yet hypocritically, it features nutritionists who advocate some ideas that if a patient is in need of vitamins to help her get well, then by all means, give her as much as it takes! That approach could have its benefits, but anything taken in such extremes, whether "good" or "bad," leads to imbalance. Don't take your nutritional education from this film.
Joey S (ca) wrote: Oooooh - Rock Trivia!
Dipika M (ru) wrote: johnny gets more and more perfect by the minute! first, as a beatnik, now as a gonzo journalist? i could not ask for more
Ryan B (au) wrote: Drumline shows a very poor marching class, that is extremely unrealistic. I can assure that no one would have a band run up stands or run 10 laps. However, the movie does give good music and cadences that some drumlines play.
Whitney J (nl) wrote: If you haven't seen this movie, you should! It's a great indie film that never hit theatres.
Joey Q (kr) wrote: Robin Williams was an incredible actor and does what he does best. This film is insanely beautiful visually and has an amazing story to tell about love. It's a bit strange watching this movie including suicide after the events of Robins own untimely death. I highly recommend this film to anyone looking for a good tear jerker.
Quiche E (ca) wrote: Cradingue, inconstant, insolant !
Bill T (ca) wrote: Very "Out of the norm" western for this time period, not so much though if you're a Sam Fuller fan, because this story about Bob Ford is full of cinematographic touches that distances itself quite far from the B westerns of the time period. John Ireland plays Bob Ford quite well, who does a job almost too well, dammit, whyja have to kill Jesse James fer? And soon he's ostracised. Not too sure how much of it's true, but it does make me want to look it up and read about it, which is what a good movie is supposed to do.. | 2023-12-26T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6923 |
Set up a scene and plug your code in the the Lua code section on the scene creator. Code should include the following os.execute('curl -g "http://your bridge ip:7474/?cmd=%7B%22api_id%22:1004,%22command%22:%22send_code%22,%22mac%22:%22b4:43:0d:9b:b0:d5%22,%22data%22:%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%22%7D"')
I could use some help with the Lua code for Vera using the RM Bridge. I have been able to get the RM Bridge set up and have learned codes. I have all the RM Bridge commands documented (Short URL, Command URL, and Plain Command). I'm lost on how to write the Lua code to create a scene in Vera. Can some give me a sample code that I could use? thanks for the help.
I use the RM bridge, set up on an old phone (or Android TV Box). Once setup you can put that phone anywhere as long as it is still connected to the same network. Then Vera uses the bridge to communicate with all of your devices, actually i am looking for away to boost this to all over the house or one per floor. It currently controls my heatpump, fireplace, blinds, and etc. | 2023-10-20T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6341 |
/*
* Copyright 2014 Ranjan Kumar
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package com.restfiddle.entity;
public class AclClass extends AbstractEntity {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
}
| 2023-10-25T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9332 |
Stability of multi-permeable reactive barriers for long term removal of mixed contaminants.
The Permeable Reactive Barriers (PRBs) are relatively simple, promising technology for groundwater remediation. A PRBs consisting of two reactive barriers (zero valent iron-barrier and bio-barrier) were designed to evaluate the application and feasibility of the barriers for the removal of wide range of pollutants from synthetic water. After 470 days of Multi-PRBs column operation, the pH level in the water sample is increased from 4 to 7, whereas the oxidation reduction potential (ORP) is decreased to -180 mV. Trichloroethylene (TCE), heavy metals, and nitrate were completely removed in the zero valent iron-barrier. Ammonium produced during nitrate reduction is removed in the biologically reactive zone of the column. The results of the present study suggest that Multi-PRBs system is an effective alternate method to confine wide range of pollutants from contaminated groundwater. | 2024-02-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2337 |
Fire alarms work efficiently
On Tuesday, Sept. 4, residents of The Commons residence hall evacuated their building for the fifth time that day. This repeated event brought the total number to eight fire alarms that set off in the past two weeks for that building. Residents assumed the alarms were false and just students pulling the alarms themselves, while others blamed it on the weather.
On the York Hill campus, residents in The Crescent had to evacuate their rooms when a fire alarm went off at 3 a.m. Chief of Public Safety, David Barger, explained all alarms weren’t false, and resulted from different student activities.
“All five fire alarms that went off in the Commons have been ‘bonafide,’ meaning that none of these were false alarms,” Barger said, stating that students smoking, cooking or even burning their bags of popcorn contributed to setting off the sensitive alarms.
Crescent’s early morning evacuation was cooking related, according to Barger. The alarms function as they are supposed to, Barger said. They detect the faintest smell of smoke to prevent any major damage.
“This is a very sophisticated system, working to detect small amounts of smoke, so that small fires don’t become big fires,” Barger said.
Students were impressed with the intricate and effective device, but still found the constant alarms frustrating.
“It’s good that these fire alarms are so sensitive, because I feel safer knowing that they detect any small amount of smoke,” Commons resident Stefanie Vitulli said. “But it does get annoying when they go off every time someone burns a bag of popcorn.” | 2024-06-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2210 |
Various medical therapies serve to reverse, halt, or at least aid in controlling symptoms that pertain to corresponding physical maladies. Prophylactic approaches, on the other hand, while possibly having one or more therapeutic qualities in some cases, primarily serve to prevent (completely or at least to a large extent) a corresponding physical malady.
Ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) is one example of a physical malady that receives considerable attention as the National HealthCare Safety Network identified VAP as being the second most common hospital-acquired infection and one that is deadlier than either central line-associated bloodstream infections or sepsis. In response, various organizations have identified prophylactic regimens that offer a demonstrable ability to prevent VAP.
Such prophylactic regimens make use of a variety of prophylactic agents that require relatively frequent and periodic administration to the patient. These regimens are sufficiently complex that administration compliance issues can and do arise. The applicant has determined that existing approaches in these regards leave room for considerable improvement.
Common but well-understood elements that are useful or necessary in a commercially feasible embodiment are often not depicted in order to facilitate a less obstructed view of these various embodiments of the present invention. Certain actions and/or steps may be described or depicted in a particular order of occurrence while those skilled in the art will understand that such specificity with respect to sequence is not actually required. The terms and expressions used herein have the ordinary technical meaning as is accorded to such terms and expressions by persons skilled in the technical field as set forth above except where different specific meanings have otherwise been set forth herein. | 2024-01-23T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4928 |
Russian cosmonaut Mikhail Korniyenko and US astronaut Scott Kelly have told RT that they do follow news from Earth, but political tensions down here have no effect on operations aboard the International Space Station.
“The politics down on Earth do not interfere with our work up in space. And, probably, it’s a good example to follow for all politicians down there on Earth – the way we operate here as an international crew,” Korniyenko said during a live Q&A session with RT.
The Russian cosmonaut’s stance was heartily shared by his US counterpart – Kelly stressed that “unfortunate political things” do not affect relationships between ISS crew members.
“On the one hand we’re aware of what’s going on Earth. We follow the news. But what’s most important to us up here is that we’re one big team. We’re a crew. We’re great friends. We rely on each other for, you know, literally our lives,” he said.
“I will be up here with just the two [Russian] cosmonauts. If something was to happen to me they would be the guys to take care of me and vice versa,” the astronaut added.
The successful cooperation aboard the ISS proves that nothing is impossible for humanity when it stands united, Kelly said.
“We do things that are amazing every day: just keeping this place [the ISS] running, just keeping us alive. And it really gives me hope in what our potential is as species. You know, if we can have people from all around the world living in a space station for 15 years, and you know maintaining this environment and keeping us alive then there’s nothing that’s beyond our potential,” he explained.
Read more
Keeping the International Space Station operational is an even more remarkable feat, taking into account the size of the station, Kelly stressed.
The ISS may seem compact on video, but “It’s about the size of a large house, actually. You know, I never get the sense that there’s not enough room up here… The working and livable volume in here is fairly large for six people,” he said.
Korniyenko and Kelly arrived at the station in March as part of a one-year mission to study the health effects of long term spaceflight.
It’s both spacemen’s second time to the ISS, but when asked about whether he’d take on the even longer mission to Mars, Kelly’s reply was: “I’d probably do it.”
“I’m a kind of a type of person that likes challenge. If I had the opportunity I’d probably volunteer,” he said.
However, with a flight to the Red Planet still a distant possibility, the 51-year-old added that he was “sure they can find some younger and capable folks to go on that mission.”
Read more
Kelly also said that his months on the ISS have made “me appreciate my freedom more. We’re living in a very close environment and on a very controlled schedule. And just having the ability to walk outside and to do what you want, when you want, is something that I think I’ll value much more.”
Both the Russian and American recalled looking at the Earth from outside the station during the spacewalk as the mission’s “wow moment,” with Korniyenko saying it had left him with “unforgettable feelings.”
“The first thing I’ll do after landing… I’ll go a swimming pool and then go the sauna in the Star City [outside Moscow]. I’m dreaming about that,” the Russian cosmonaut said.
Answering questions from web users, the duo had to confess that they had received no specific instructions from their space agencies about what to do if the ISS was contacted by an alien spacecraft. | 2023-09-20T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3293 |
Where are we this season with only 2 races to go? The Constructor Championship is done and dusted with Mercedes dominating yet another year. They did not struggle except for two races in the year. In Spain, they had a … Continue reading → | 2024-01-13T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6688 |
Evaluation of infectious etiology and prognostic risk factors of febrile episodes in neutropenic cancer patients.
Febrile neutropenic cancer patients are at risk for development of serious infections, morbidity and mortality. The aim of this study was to determine the type and frequency of infections and to evaluate some prognostic risk factors. 220 episodes of neutropenic fever in 177 cancer patients have been reviewed. Infections could be documented microbiologically in 38 (17.3%) episodes and suspected clinically in 29 (13.2%). The most common focus of infection was the lower respiratory tract (11.4%) followed by the urinary tract (6.4%). The most frequently isolated pathogen was Escherichia coli (31%) followed by Klebsiella pneumoniae (18%), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (13%) and Streptococcus pneumoniae (13%). The median durations of neutropenia and fever were 4 and 3 days, respectively. Mortality was seen in 25 patients (11.4%). Its rate was higher in documented infections except for non-bacteremic microbiologic infections in which no death was seen. Hypotension and shock were the most significant determinants of poor prognosis. The management of these special patients should be given adequate attention and be considered important since the success of therapy depends on revealing of etiologic agents. | 2024-06-25T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1015 |
Q:
Iterated Graphing in For Loop via Python
for k in range(10):
rtpi = (pratio / float(math.pi)) + x*0
plt.plot(x,rtpi,'r')
This produces a flat line. How can I do this:
for k in range(10):
rtpi = (pratio / float(math.pi)) + x*0
plt.scatter(x,rtpi,'r')
Basically, for every individual point, I would like one point to be represented on the graph per 1 point on the x-axis.
A:
If I understand your question correctly, this suggests you should use plt.plot and add an "o"
for k in range(10):
rtpi = (pratio / float(math.pi)) + x*0
plt.plot(x,rtpi,'ro')
| 2023-11-05T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8042 |
Purification and mass spectroscopic analysis of human CB1 cannabinoid receptor functionally expressed using the baculovirus system.
The cannabinoid receptor 1 (CB1) cannabinoid receptor is an essential component of the cannabinergic system. It has been recognized as a therapeutic target for treating numerous diseases and is currently receiving considerable attention by the pharmaceutical community. Target-based drug design, utilizing three-dimensional information of receptor structure and ligand-binding motifs, requires significant amounts of purified protein. To facilitate the purification of CB1, we have expressed the receptor fused to various epitope tags using the baculovirus expression system. In addition, expression levels and ligand-binding profiles corresponding to the expressed fusion proteins have been compared. C-terminal histidine (His)-tagged CB1 gave a Bmax higher than most other systems previously reported in the literature, and was selected for subsequent metal affinity chromatography purification and mass spectroscopic (MS) analysis. Moreover, cells expressing C-terminal His-tagged CB1 were shown to inhibit forskolin-stimulated cyclic adenosine 3',5'-monophosphate (cAMP) production in a concentration-dependent manner in the presence of CP-55,940, confirming the expressed receptor's functional characteristics. A Western blot analysis of the purified receptor showed several forms of CB1, the most abundant being a 57 kDa monomeric protein. The purified CB1 preparations were subjected to protein digestion followed by MS. Fragments corresponding to >70% of the receptor were identified by this method, confirming the identity and purity of the expressed protein. The work presented here demonstrates that epitope-tagged CB1 can be expressed in sufficient amounts and purified to homogeneity for MS analysis. Moreover, these results will serve as a basis for future experiments aimed at characterizing the ligand-binding domains using covalently reacting receptor probes. | 2023-12-09T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7151 |
Screening of the common culture conditions affecting crystallinity of bacterial cellulose.
By analyzing with X-ray diffraction and FT-IR spectroscopy, the main effective factors among common culture conditions on crystallinity index and I(α) fraction of cellulose produced by Gluconacetobacter xylinus were examined with Plackett-Burman design experiment. Varying pH value in the medium by adjusting the composition of citrate buffer or by adding HCl/NaOH solution indicates it is the content of citrate buffer rather than its function of pH buffering that gives the influence on crystallinity. Further experiment reveals that Na+ concentration of 0.174 mol/l in medium with citrate buffer added would decrease the crystallinity index significantly. Comparison of carbon sources shows that fructose leads to a higher crystallinity index than glucose, which suggests a relationship between crystallinity and production speed of bacterial cellulose affected by carbon sources. An interesting phenomenon was that a longer period of cultivation would decrease the crystallinity of bacterial cellulose. The reason is assumed to be the dense network of cellulose formed by bacterial cells that restrict the motion of themselves as the incubation period extends. Though the effect of inoculum age is still unclear, the influence on crystallinity of bacterial cellulose caused by variation of some ordinary culture conditions can be drawn out from data of this work. | 2024-04-03T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3939 |
Atlantic, Iowa Addiction Rehab Treatment Centers
Those in Atlantic who are addicted to alcohol and/or drugs will find that DrugStrategies.org can provide assistance in overcoming those addictions. We are able to assist those suffering from alcohol and drug abuse get clean and help them take back control of their lives. Our company is unique in that every member of our staff is highly trained and has experience treating those suffering from alcohol and drug addiction. We have found that a holistic approach to alcohol and drug rehab is best. All of our members are given an individualized plan. Don't hesitate. Call our office today at the number above. If you live in Atlantic, Iowa or the surrounding area we can be of help. Call us today.
Drug addiction can quickly overtake the life of the user. Those that reside in Atlantic should get help immediately. Drug Addiction has a number of very damaging psychological and physical effects. A person who want to protect their health would be wise to treat their addiction to drugs. It is very important to seek help once an individual determines that they have a drug addiction. Refusing to get help benefits no one. Our experienced staff will be able to help you with your addiction. Those who live in the Atlantic, IA area can call us at the number above.
Addiction to alcohol is also very serious and treatment is necessary. For those that live in Atlantic, we can help! There are even more people that suffer from alcoholism then drug addiction. Taking alcoholism seriously is perhaps the first step to admitting a need for help. Once a person understands the severity of their problem, they need to get help . Alcohol rehabilitation is one of the best ways to treat an addiction. Our organization is able to help those in Atlantic, Iowa. We can be reached at the toll-free phone number at the top of this page.
A holistic approach is what we suggest for those in Atlantic. A holistic approach to treatment treats the entire person. It is also not a "one size fits all" approach. Cookie cutter programs aren't always successful. We prefer a more specialized approach. To create your own holistic alcohol or drug rehab plan, please give us a call at the above phone number if you live in the Atlantic, IA.
For those in Atlantic interested in an effective and holistic approach to rehab, DrugStrategies.org can get help. We will work hard to develop a comprehensive alcohol and drug rehabilitation plan. Our experienced and well trained staff will be of tremendous help. We will work hard to help you break free from alcohol or drug addiction. Please call us if you live in the Atlantic, Iowa, area to discuss treatment.
Given the growing number of meth addictions, one might think that there would be a specialized type of meth rehab for people addicted to that drug. However, meth addicts respond to the same type of treatment given to other substance abusers, without the need for any type of specific meth rehab... | 2023-10-19T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8119 |
Yelena Chernetsova
Yelena Chernetsova (born 21 January 1971) is a Kazakhstani cross-country skier. She competed in five events at the 1994 Winter Olympics.
Cross-country skiing results
Olympic Games
World Championships
World Cup
Season standings
References
Category:1971 births
Category:Living people
Category:Kazakhstani female cross-country skiers
Category:Olympic cross-country skiers of Kazakhstan
Category:Cross-country skiers at the 1994 Winter Olympics
Category:Place of birth missing (living people)
Category:Asian Games medalists in cross-country skiing
Category:Cross-country skiers at the 1996 Asian Winter Games
Category:Asian Games silver medalists for Kazakhstan
Category:Asian Games bronze medalists for Kazakhstan
Category:Medalists at the 1996 Asian Winter Games | 2023-10-19T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7482 |
Vandalism of Maine child’s grave site tugs at hearts, draws donations
A local radio station and people from as far away as New Jersey pledged Wednesday to add to a reward aimed at finding whoever vandalized a 6-year-old girl’s grave site in Fairfield.
By Wednesday afternoon, Fairfield police said the reward pool, which started at $350 Tuesday, had grown to $1,800.
Additional Photos
Avery Lane of Benton was 6 years old in 2012 when she became the first child in Maine to die from influenza since 2010. A reward is being offered for information about who has been vandalizing her grave site in Fairfield. Contributed photo
Avery Lane’s grave at the Friends Cemetery has a polished black granite marker that’s etched with a photo of her blowing bubbles, along with engraved images of two cats. David Leaming/Morning Sentinel
This cemetery in North Fairfield is where the grave site of Avery Lane has been vandalized. Doug Harlow/Morning Sentinel
Kennebec County sheriff's Deputy Jacob Pierce and Tabitha Souzer on Tuesday return a cushion to a bench that was thrown down an embankment near the grave site of Souzer's daughter, Avery Lane. David Leaming/Morning Sentinel
Related Headlines
An Augusta-based security company plans to make its own contribution by donating surveillance equipment to monitor the grave of Avery Lane, who died from complications of the influenza strain that struck central Maine in December 2012. She was the first child in Maine to die from influenza since 2010.
The grave site at the Friends Cemetery – decorated with wind chimes, a bench, toys and other items – was vandalized twice last weekend. It was the third such incident in the past year, said Avery’s family. No other graves in the cemetery have been vandalized.
The cemetery is next to the 1784 North Fairfield Friends Meeting House. No one from the Religious Society of Friends, which owns the cemetery, could be reached for comment Wednesday. Fairfield police said they haven’t been able to contact the owners.
A message left Tuesday at a telephone number said to be the pastor’s was not returned. On Wednesday, that number was listed as no longer in service.
Paul Cates, former minister of the Vassalboro Friends, said grave sites adorned like Avery’s aren’t in keeping with tradition. The religion, whose members are commonly known as Quakers, emphasizes simplicity and unadorned living.
“We don’t have anything like that in our cemetery,” Cates said. “The idea of decorating with pinwheels and toys and stuff like that is not in the tradition of the Friends.”
Cates said decorated grave sites “wouldn’t be forbidden, but they would be considered in poor taste.”
If such decorating were to happen in Vassalboro, Cates said, the Friends probably would discuss it with the family.
VANDALIZED TWO DAYS IN A ROW
Avery’s mother, Tabitha Souzer, 28, of Fairfield, said that when she arrived at the grave Sunday, she found that a shepherd’s hook that held wind chimes was gone. One of the chimes was broken, the other was on the ground, graveside pinwheels were gone, and a glass turkey, a porcelain cat and a heavy iron bench had been moved. She said she replaced all of the items and went home.
She returned Monday and found that the bench had been thrown over an embankment into the nearby woods, the glass turkey was smashed, and the wind chimes and shepherd’s hook were gone again.
Souzer said Avery was buried in the Lane family plot, but she has no affiliation with the Friends church.
Avery’s grave has a polished black-granite marker, etched with a photo of her blowing bubbles, and engraved images of two cats.
Donations poured in after the Morning Sentinel reported the vandalism Wednesday.
“We have received some calls this morning from people who are willing to bring down some money to add to our in-house reward,” said Fairfield Police Chief Thomas Gould. “We expect that number to grow as we have had inquiries all day.”
Gould said Detective Matt Wilcox has been assigned to investigate the case.
Souzer said Wednesday that there had been no new vandalism overnight and that she is grateful for all the attention.
REWARD POOL KEEPS GROWING
Kennebec County Sheriff’s Deputy Jacob Pierce was on duty on Dec. 11, 2012, when an emergency call came in from the home of Avery’s father in Clinton. The girl died in Pierce’s arms. She was a first-grader at Benton Elementary School.
Pierce said he cried when he found the grave vandalized Sunday – just after his return from eight months in Afghanistan with the Maine Army National Guard – and he first offered a reward of $250 for information to help find the culprit.
Fairfield police added $100, and calls and emails offering more money began coming in Wednesday.
Kelly Liberty of Benton, the sister-in-law of Sheriff Randall Liberty, said Wednesday that her family contributed $100 to the reward pool. She said she has a 4-year-old grandchild, and “I can’t imagine somebody doing that. It bothers me.”
Jay Hanson, general manager at radio station 107.9 FM in Waterville, said the morning show Wednesday featured the story of the grave site vandalism.
“First of all, it’s my hometown,” he said of Fairfield. “And whenever we have an opportunity to do anything in central Maine to improve lives or counteract any wrongdoing, we do our best to step up.
“And you have the added disheartening part of it that involved the family that had to endure the unthinkable – losing their 6-year-old child – and to be subjected to this heinous act, it just tugs at the heartstrings,” he said.
CAMERA TO MONITOR GRAVE SITE
Lawrence Bethke of Elizabeth, N.J., who saw the story on Facebook, said he will donate $250 to the reward pool because his 3-year-old child died and he continues to have problems with vandals at the grave site in New Bedford, Mass.
“I am a father of an angel in heaven,” Bethke said. “I have the same problem with people stealing toys and the flowers and stuff like that.”
Steve Hayden, general manager and vice president of Main Security and Surveillance in Augusta, said he has agreed to install a remote night-vision surveillance camera near the grave site to try to catch any future vandalism.
“We’ll do everything that we can do. It’s such a disturbing scenario, we want to help out any way” we can, Hayden said.
Here at MaineToday Media we value our readers and are committed to growing our community by encouraging you to add to the discussion.
To ensure conscientious dialogue we have implemented a strict no-bullying policy. To participate, you must follow our Terms of Use. Click here to flag and report a comment that violates our terms of use. | 2024-01-04T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5740 |
September 2, 2011
Pin It
I was dying for some good pasta. After the terrible experience at a supposedly new and hip good Italian in Taipei, I needed to get the real thing. Dyson 2000 suggested that we do lunch at Gold, where Harlan's pastas have never failed us. We decided to rope in another victim for the meal.
I chatted with Harlan a little about my recent move to Taipei, and told him I needed to come back for a pasta fix at his place. Harlan may rub some people the wrong way, but he's always been good to me. And the man CAN cook, which is what matters most to me.
We decided to share 3 pastas as we were greedy and didn't want to stick to just one dish:
Hand-crafted tagliatelle, Italian wild boar ragout, melting organic egg and shaved Pecorino cheese - the first pasta that made me fall in love with Harlan's food, from the moment I tasted it almost 3 years ago. Dyson 2000 claims this is her comfort food, and I have to say that time and again I have come back to this dish. Lovely orange yolk, and the whole thing was just perfect. As good as it ever was.
Truffle tagliolini, Italian ovuli and porcini mushrooms and Tasmanian black truffles - a lovely dish with loads of fragrance from all the shrooms. Normally porcini alone would make a great dish, and the ovuli would be a bonus, but wow! Once you shave black truffle on top... The fragrance and flavors lingered in my mouth... and I would have been perfectly happy to leave it this way.
Spinobello pasta, Spanish red prawns, wild zucchini, cherry tomatoes and bottaga di muggine - no, I just can't get enough! I'll grab any carabineros I can lay my hands on. Apparently it is approaching the end of the season, so of course we were gonna order this... and they made sure we got 3 of them prawns so we didn't have to fight. The zucchini was lovely, and I prefer this to the fava beans I had a few months ago. I picked up the head with my hands, dissected it and sucked it dry. The intense flavors of the prawns replaced those of the truffles and shrooms.
I was happy, and so was Dyson 2000. We got exactly what we wanted out of this lunch. The only thing left to do was to sip a little espresso and get the digestive process going. | 2024-05-13T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9307 |
Q:
ArrayList without repetition
I'm using arraylist in java and I need to add integers during 10 iterations (integer is got randomly from an array of integers named arrint) without any repetition:
for (int i =0; i<10; ++i)
array.add(integer);
and then add in the same array 20 other integers for the same array of integer(arrint) during 20 iteration without repetition
for (int i =0; i<10; ++i)
array.add(integer);
but repetition is permitted between the 10 first integers and the 20 integers.
thank you
A:
Set, rather than List, prevents duplicates. So you could establish a Set<Integer> and after populating it, add all of its elements to the List (with list.addAll(set)). Then clear the Set and repeat for the next 20.
It's not clear from your description what you want to happen if duplicates are encountered. Do you want to add items into the Set until it contains 10, just discarding duplicates? Or do you want to throw an exception if a duplicate is encountered?
A:
public class Foo {
private final Random random = new Random();
public List<Integer> createList() {
// Create empty list to store results.
List<Integer> ret = new ArrayList<Integer>(30);
// Add 10 randomly generated integers.
ret.addAll(createRandomIntegers(10));
// Add another 20 randomly generated integers which could potentially
// contain integers already added previously (the OP states that this is ok).
ret.addAll(createRandomIntegers(20));
return ret;
}
/**
* Utility function that creates a set of randomly generated
* integers of specified size. We use a Set to avoid duplicates.
*/
protected Set<Integer> createRandomIntegers(int sz) {
Set<Integer> ret = new HashSet<Integer>();
while (ret.size() < sz) {
ret.add(random.nextInt());
}
return ret;
}
}
| 2024-07-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8103 |
Okay...have written to tech support and tried everything. Have Direct X 9.1 and the latest video driver for my NVidia. After I install I try to start the game and I get a black screen with a small blue line at the top of the screen with nothing else and a freeze up. I have tried different screen sizes and 32 bit and 16 bit. To no avail. Tried slowing down the graphic accelerator. So confused at this point I can't stand it. Can someone please help me. Have played so many Dreamcatcher games and can't figure out why this won't work. Have a pentium 3 550GeForce4 Ti4400320 mb ram
Can someone please help me get this game up and running. Oh yea, OS Win98.
To install I turned off all those programs. But do I have to do the same to play the game? Tried BillyBobs suggestion and I get this whining noise in the background.But....I will try all this again. Something has to work. Thankskid
I think you're saying you got the game installed now but where is the whining noise? Is it coming from your speakers or is it the CD ROM drive reving up? Mine makes a whining/whirring noise occasionally as it goes into action.
Those things I posted that you have apparently read are necessary for me not to have those weird pink squares/rectangles in the pictures onscreen. Maybe, once installed, the game will run for you O.K. If not, try each of those settings until you get it to work right.
_________________________
I didn't do it......and if I did I'm not guilty!
Once I have the game installed and double click on the icon. It asks do you want to run game. I say yes. Then that is when I get the black screen with the blue line across the top. The loud noise is when I set the accelerator to the spot one notch above zero and it comes out of the speakers.I haven't even been able to get into the game yet.Will figure this out sooner or later. But hopefully sooner.kid
Okay, sent my game to a friend. He could get it to work. So...we have figured it is my video card that isn't compatible. But....the company didn't say anything about that.Is anyone else using a NVidia GeForce4 Ti 4400?If so, what are the settings that you are using so I can get this game to work.Thanks to all who can and will help.kid
I had a problem with pink squares and rectangles in the game. Graphics not coming through properly. I solved that with some settings on the computer.
Yesterday I installed a new Motherboard that required I also install 4X / 8X Video Card.My old Video Card was 2X / 4X.I no longer have to make adjustments on the computer to avoid the pink squares and rectangles. Apparently, the Video Card was the problem. I'm now using an ATI RADEON 9200 4X / 8X Video Card 128 MB Memory.
So, what I'm driving at is that the Video Card may well be your problem, too, especially since the game worked in another PC.
_________________________
I didn't do it......and if I did I'm not guilty!
They figured the same thing. They told me to update my drivers. Did that. Still didn't work so now they told me to go back and install and older driver. LOLI have Direct 9 on it. So I went to an older version of the Video card driver. Will let you know what happens.kid | 2024-04-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2049 |
BONNIE GREER: The kids don’t want Brexit. And the future belongs to them
Protesters attend a rally at the Federal Courthouse in Fort Lauderdale to demand government action on firearms. Photo: Mike Stocker/Sun Sentinel/TNS/ABACAPRESS.COM ABACA/PA Images
Bonnie Greer says its would be irresponsible to neglect the obvious message - your kids simply don’t want Brexit.
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Become a Supporter Almost four years after its creation The New European goes from strength to strength across print and online, offering a pro-European perspective on Brexit and reporting on the political response to the coronavirus outbreak, climate change and international politics. But we can only continue to grow with your support.
What do Brexiteers and Trumpists have in common? Among quite a few things, one of them is the word ‘tyranny’ and the signs of tyranny.
Brexiteer Ultras see the EU as, quite simply, a tyranny. To them, this state of things, by definition, places British citizens in a state of combat and fear. That so many Brexiteers either say or imply that even questioning the result of the referendum is a cause for national uprising confirms this. Because you have to fight and defeat a tyranny.
As most know, the UK is intrinsically a small ‘c’ conservative country. The idea that the majority of the good people of this nation would pour into the streets to wreak chaos and vengeance is not only ludicrous but another sign of the desperate narrative being woven. A narrative that could lead to tyranny.
One way to accomplish this is to foment a sense of ‘unsafety’. We should have deliberations in “our own language”, as Boris Johnson stated in his ‘important’ Brexit address that had all the gravitas of a best-man’s speech at a wedding breakfast. The implication was that there is danger in non-Anglophone environments. Something intrinsically sinister.
In the States, the ‘unsafe’ – something dangerous and sinister – trope is being built around immigrants. The deeply ironic part about this stance is that it involves a nation in which practically everyone’s ancestors arrived – voluntarily or involuntarily – in a boat. Immigrants have become an alien, malignant and threatening force.
Donald Trump has set himself up as the only means to guarantee order. This is the age-old ‘sell’ of the tyrant, a tendency Trump demonstrated on the campaign trail. President Obama reacted to him then by declaring: “We don’t look to be ruled!”. But Number 44 forgot, or did not know, that to be ruled is precisely what some Trumpists want.
Some older Brexiteers say that they would be happy to go back to rationing in order to escape the EU. We must understand that driving the car off the cliff is worth it to some in order to ‘unshackle’ themselves from what they believe to be a tyranny.
In that cause, they will gladly allow to lead them the likes of ‘Carry On Foreign Secretary’ Johnson, and panto-toff Jacob Rees-Mogg. Back in the day, they would have been considered natural ‘class enemies’ by the people of Hull and Grimsby. Now they are allowed to speak for them. They’ve been given a ‘mulligan’. This is a golf term whose origins are murky.
One foundation myth involves a Canadian named David Mulligan, manager of the ultra-posh Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City in the 1920s.
He once played a round of golf at a country club near Montreal. One day, after hitting a poor tee shot, Mulligan re-teed and shot again. He called it a ‘correction shot’ but his friends named it a ‘mulligan’.
Another story concerns a John A. ‘Buddy’ Mulligan, a locker room attendant in New Jersey in the 1930s. He managed to play a round with the club pro. Mulligan’s shot was bad, so he begged for another chance and at his next attempt was successful.
He then bragged to all and sundry that he had been given another chance, strictly against the laws and norms, and had come good. So club members called their own extra shots – their success at going against the rules – a ‘mulligan’.
It is said that evangelical Christians, Trump’s base, are giving him, too, a mulligan. In effect, they are looking the other way as he breaks practically every tenet of their strict Christianity. In exchange for pushing forward their political agenda and vision of America, Donald Trump gets a pass.
In the UK, working-class stalwarts, in days past, would have had a natural suspicion of a man like Rees-Mogg, who had grown up in a country house in a village in Somerset. Instead they cheer his strangled intonations as well as the B-movie Churchillian stance of Boris Johnson.
Because these Old School ‘class enemies’ deliver what many working-class Brexiteers want, they get a mulligan. Trump’s refusal to go after America’s enemies, a basic deal-breaker for any conservative right-wing Christian, gets a mulligan, too.
The point can be made that many of the tyrants in history began with the people giving them a pass; a dispensation from the rules; a look-the-other-way. There is a parallel story. It is about the paladins who opposed them. Who opposed tyranny itself.
In the US, where the leaders too often act like high schoolers, the high schoolers are beginning to act like leaders. Case in point: the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida on Valentine’s Day.
The students/survivors/activists there and students from all over the county plan a March For Our Lives next month. Washington DC area students were lying on the ground outside the White House on President’s Day, a national holiday. And they have all adopted a slogan of defiance for those adults who say that nothing can be done about guns; and for those who believe that their own Second Amendment rights supersede the right to life. The slogan: “We Call BS!”
It was created by Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School senior: 17-year-old Emma Gonzalez.
The “We Call BS” movement here in the UK can be said to have been founded and is fronted by 27-year-old Femi Oluwole. Femi is cofounder of pro-Remain group, OFOC – Our Future Our Choice. He has been campaigning since at least 2016 when he was, as he describes himself, “a random 25-year-old with no political connections and a couple of homemade signs”.
Generation Z and Millennials – the “We Call BS” generation – are on the field. Like #MeToo and the cultural phenomenon that is the movie Black Panther, “We Call BS” and Our Future Our Choice are altering the landscape.
Millennials and Generation Z may save us from tyranny in the US. And a future of protectionism and xenophobia in the UK.
The 19-year-old accused of the massacre at his former school, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, obtained multiple weapons. He could have bought them in under 15 minutes. All he had to do was prove he was over 18. Plus there is no requirement to register firearms. The ease with which such weapons can be purchased contrasts sharply with some other basics, which are increasingly regulated in Florida, such as:
Cold medicine: To purchase medication for the common cold, customers must show a photo ID that proves the purchaser is at least 18 years old. Then each purchase is recorded on the shop’s database. Florida State Law prohibits the sale of more than 9g within a 30-day period. It is also illegal to purchase more than three packets at once.
A marriage licence: Both parties have to be at least 18 years old. Photo ID is required for all ages. Florida residents have two options: to attend a pre-marital course, or wait the mandatory three days before the marriage licence takes effect.
American Gen X and Gen Z want this absurdity to end. And they will not stop campaigning, protesting and agitating until it does.
Voters aged 24 and under voted heavily for Remain. As Femi Oluwole told older Leave voters: “It would be irresponsible of me to neglect the emotional message: Your kids don’t want Brexit.”
The message is simple: “The kids don’t want it.” And the future belongs to them. | 2023-08-10T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7105 |
"I know you won't make excuses." "But Toya, you purposely failed to capture the C-Genome..." "Chidori Kuruma." "Why is that?" "Have you forgotten that you are an employee of the Mikage?" "I pay you well for your services." "I know you're not a fool." "But you need some time to think things over." "We'll talk about it more tonight." "Dear Aya," "How are you?" "How many days has passed since we've been able to see each other?" "Right now, it doesn't matter." "I must write this quickly..." "while I'm still myself." "No..." "I don't want to remember." "Aki, it's me." "I'm coming in." "Aki!" "What's the matter?" "I can't take this." "I won't be able to remain as myself." "I always believed that if I could remember the past... and clear things up about the celestial robe..." "Ceres would leave Aya's body and return to heaven." "That's why every day..." "I put up with that ghastly machine." "But I'm so scared!" "I want to return to my old life..." "Going to school, playing with Aya." "I just want a normal life." "Back then, I had a future I could envision for myself." "Aki..." "Do you want to leave this place?" "Gee... we stayed at the karaoke bar for five hours!" "Well, it was a welcome party for me." "But Mrs. Q and Aya did all the singing." "Will you stop getting so close to me?" "You may be my age, but I don't go for childish types." "Well then... how about this?" "I told you!" "No transforming whenever you feel like it!" "Good night!" "What if she can't transform back?" "What?" "!" "You're drooling!" "Lost?" "What?" "My choker." "The one with the silver cross." "Oh, the one you used to wear?" "Where'd you lose it?" "I think in Tochigi." "It can't be helped." "Yeah." "I wonder how those people victimized by C-Project felt?" "The ones who died..." "the ones who were left behind." "I swore that I'd stop the Mikage." "But all I did was stand by and watch." "I don't know what to do anymore." "How am I going to put a stop to this?" "If this goes on, even Aki..." "You don't have to... think about saving everyone and everything." "You know... how when you're looking desperately for something... you never can find it." "But then it just happens to turn up, quite by accident." "Right?" "You may be right." "The celestial robe... find my celestial robe." "Ceres?" "Aya?" "Aya, telephone." " It's Toya." " Huh?" "Aya, can you hear me?" "Toya?" "I'm calling from the Mikage building." "I don't have much time." "Listen well." "What is it?" " Tonight, I'm leaving with Aki." " Huh?" "I'm bringing Aki with me." "I won't come back here anymore." "Toya... does that mean...?" "I've come to a decision." "I've chosen you rather than my past." "Toya..." "My concern is Ceres." "Can you control her?" "Aya?" "Aki?" "!" "Is that you?" "Are you all right?" "Have they done anything bad to you?" "I'm okay." "I'm going to do my best to keep Ceres inside." "Shall I come for you?" "I know!" "That place where we first got together... the overpass." "I'll wait there." "Okay." "We'll be at that overpass at midnight." "There's no turning back." "I have to meet Kagami tonight." "Stay in your room until then." "What's going on?" "I thought we were going to talk." "I promised to return your memory to you." "I know it must be difficult for you under these circumstances." "I'm being sincere." "First, you'll regain the memories of your past." "Then we can discuss what path will mutually benefit us." "Toya, please lie down." "Toya...!" "I've had enough of your ways." "I lost my memory... but that doesn't matter anymore." "I can't leave Aki in your hands either." "We're getting out of your C-Project." "Toya, Aki... we'll meet, won't we?" "You'll come, won't you?" "Hah!" "I see..." "Is that your final decision?" "Then go to your Aya." "That's if, and only if you get out of here alive." "Put everyone on alert." "He's headed for Aki's room." "Stop him, at any cost!" "How did this happen?" "We searched him." "He had nothing on him." "He had no weapons?" "I'm staying up here, so I can see Toya and Aki coming." "I'll go park the car." "Okay!" "Watch over her." "Okay." "Do you want to get out of that aquarium, too?" "Even if you know that it means death?" "He's moving so fast!" "He's like some kind of monster." "Halt!" "This as far as you go Toya." "Wei!" "I can't let you pass." "I am leader of security." "And I'm Aki's bodyguard." "I thought I was Aki's bodyguard." "I knew we'd meet like this some day." " Toya!" " Stay back!" "Aki, let's go!" "Toya!" "Huh?" "!" "What's this?" "Let's go." "Aya is waiting for us." "Toya..." "I..." "You think they'll come?" "Yeah." "It's been so long." "We used to walk here..." "Aki and all my friends." "It seems like ages ago." "I'm probably the only one who ever fell from here and survived." "The first time I felt my body float..." "That was the time I met Toya, too." "Toya!" "It gives me quite a rush to break that expressionless face of yours." "Did you think I'd die from that minor scuffle?" "Master Aki... please return to your room." "Now hurry." "This dagger never leaves my side." "It's a part of me." "Now, let's go, Aki!" "Shut down the laser system." "We must not risk injuring Aki." "He's an essential link to the celestial robe." "Our only link." "Where is he?" "!" "On the 48th floor." "In Section A4." "Once we're past this barrier, we'll be able to escape." "Move back." "Let's go, Aki." "What's the matter?" "Aki..." "I can't go." "I can't go with you!" "I can't control it anymore." "She's my sister..." "But I only see the woman inside!" "That's why I'm jealous of you!" "I hate you!" "I can't see Aya in the condition I'm in!" "You go alone." "Please make sure you give this letter to Aya." "Aki..." "Thank you for all you've done for me." "I'm really grateful." "Take care of my sister." "In my place." "If we should meet again and I'm no longer myself... please don't forget how I used to be." "Good-bye." "Aya..." "If Aya so wishes, I'll give her everything." "Where's Ceres?" "Where's my woman?" "!" | 2024-06-01T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6524 |
Cupecoy Beach Club
At Cupecoy Beach Club, you'll find privacy, intimacy, personal service, and all the amenities of a world class resort without any of the crowds! Come discover unique sandstone cliffs and caves to explore near their Mediterranean-styled villas which are nestled atop the cliffs and offer garden-walled walkways and unparalleled views.
Cupecoy Beach Club is an excellent place for vacationers looking for some after-dinner fun, since there is a good selection of places for late-night entertainment close-by. Next Club is one such entertainment possibility, though the entire area is a place people flock to for shows, lounges, and late-night eateries.
Located on the southern outskirts of Lowlands, 0.6 miles west-southwest of Point Pirouette, Cupecoy Beach Club happily welcomes travelers who are interested in staying in this neighborhood. It is 2.1 miles west of the center of Simpson Bay.
Accommodations
The Club is a group of 60 privately owned and individually decorated apartments. Here, guests enjoy the privacy and tranquility that sets Cupecoy Beach Club apart from the hustle and bustle of other St. Maarten resorts. Situated on top of the Cupecoy cliffs, these condos offer spectacular views of Saba and the turquoise Caribbean Sea.
Each apartment comes with a balcony and gorgeous view of the ocean, garden, or pool. Guests have the option of renting three styles of apartments, the Deluxe Double, which has two queen beds; the One Bedroom Suite, which has a king sized bed, two full bathrooms, a kitchen, and a sofa bed; or the Two Bedroom Villa which is essentially the Deluxe Double plus an extra bedroom.
With its 60 rooms, Cupecoy Beach Club is a mid-sized property. Because it offers the perfect balance between a small hotel's comforting features and a large location's conveniences, many visitors will find this property is nicely tailored to their needs. For its overall merit, we've rated this villa complex a three and a half star rating.
Look below for a listing of this property's in-room amenities.
Private Bath
Television
Safe
Cable/Satellite TV
Sofa Bed
Sitting Area
Shower
Balcony
King Bed
Terrace
Bath Tub
Air Conditioned
Queen Bed
Kitchen
Call the property if you're counting on particular amenities, if it's particularly important to you.
What you'll find at the Club are two beaches just 100 yards away, nearby access to the only golf course on the island, a large fresh water pool with swim-up bar, a fitness center, a library and meeting room, and much more.
The following list identifies other amenities on this property:
Exercise Equipment
Wi Fi Internet Access
Parking
To make sure the particular activities you have in mind are available, don't hesitate to call with questions just in case some of the amenities vary. Visit this page to read an in-depth discussion about the kinds of activities and recreation opportunities that Cupecoy Beach Club offers.
The amount of nearby dining is always something to consider when picking your accommodations on the island of St. Martin and Sint Maarten. Guests looking for a bite to eat will discover a limited but good selection of restaurants within reach of these accommodations. To find out more about dining in this area, click here.
Guest Services
Remember to ask about the property's guest services -- including the ones seen below -- may help you have a smooth, stress free vacation in St. Martin.
Maid Service
24 Hour Security
The property also has a small set of business amenities, perfect for those who are visiting for business-related reasons.
You will find many attractions located within a short distance of Cupecoy Beach Club. Some of the closest attractions are Seaside Nature Park, Fort Willem I, and Fort Amsterdam. Since this villa complex is right on Mullet Bay, this property is an ideal place for those who want to thoroughly enjoy the sun, surf, and sand during their visit. You might also like to visit Cupecoy Bay, which is just a few paces from the location.
The villa complex is located in the vicinity of Simpson Bay, a nice destination for travelers to stop over.
To see more about what's in the area of Cupecoy Beach Club, click here.
Contact Info
Location: 5 Rhine Road, Lowlands, the island of St. Martin and Sint Maarten | 2023-08-26T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9155 |
Q:
Emacs -- Increment internal time by x number of days + or -
Is it possible to increment internal time by x number of days (positive or negative) without converting it to days or seconds and then back again?
If we examine the following example of internal time format:
(apply 'encode-time (decode-time (current-time)))
We obtain a result that looks like this:
(21433 63163)
A:
Use time-add defined in time-date.el:
(time-add my-time (days-to-time days))
| 2023-08-30T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8375 |
1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============
Over the past few decades, the focus on viscoelastic fluids behavior especially in oscillatory conditions has been increased substantially due to their wide use in many industries. The significant complexities in mathematical modeling of viscoelastic fluid flow at practical scenarios is the main challenge in determination of flow characteristics.
The response of viscoelastic fluid to the oscillating force was first examined using basic models such as Maxwell model \[[@bib1], [@bib2]\]. In addition to the basic Maxwell model, several models based on the rheology theories are developed and implemented up to now (Bingham model \[[@bib3]\] and Phan-Thien and Tanner (PTT) model \[[@bib4]\]).
Moreover, Oldroyd- B model was used in \[[@bib5]\] to study the flow of polymer dilute solvents on a flexible surface in the range of low Reynolds number. Fluid parameters including solution to solvent viscosity ratio and relaxation time was investigated using the Weissenberg number. According to their results, the flow was stable prior to reaching the maximum *We*.
One of the most familiar examples of oscillating non-Newtonian flood is blood. In the category of physiological applications, the viscoelastic nature of blood \[[@bib6], [@bib7]\] was investigated for low and high oscillation frequencies. The unsteady flow of blood through stenosed artery \[[@bib8]\] was also simulated, based on an oscillatory pressure gradient as the driving force. Blood has also been treated as a non-Newtonian fluid characterized by the Oldroyd-B and Cross models \[[@bib9]\]. According to the evaluated results, the magnitude of normal stress is reported to be much higher than shear stress and the increasing of relaxation time results in higher values of normal stress, as well.
The non-Newtonian viscoelastic fluid between parallel oscillating plates occurs in several applications namely, lubrication of mechanical devices, biomedical engineering and oil industry \[[@bib10]\]. Fluid near the plates would oscillate harmonically with the plate in similar time period, while the amplitude of fluid motion rises slowly across the direction of the guiding surface.
Incompressible fluid flow with porosity effects are examined due to sine and cosine oscillations of infinite plates and the exact solutions were obtained for velocity field corresponding to shear stress using integral transforms techniques (Laplace and Fourier sine transformations) \[[@bib11]\]. Based on the results, the velocity field and the shear stress are decreasing functions of oscillations amplitude. In addition, the dependence of shear stress on the affecting parameters such as relaxation and retardation time, for hydro-magnetic, viscoelastic fluid passing over an oscillating surface is investigated using Oldroyd model for free convection flow \[[@bib12]\].
In 2017, the effect of oscillatory vibration of a thin blade on the non-Newtonian fluid flow inside a channel is numerically examined \[[@bib13]\]. The power-law model for shear thinning and shear thicking fluid is implemented and the heat transfer enhancement due to the presence of vibrating blade is investigated.
Despite the fact that up to now, several investigations focus on the non-Newtonian fluid flow between parallel plates, the lack of a comprehensive examination regarding the flow stability analysis and parameter study is still existed. Some of the recent researches focusing on the Newtonian and non-Newtonian flow between parallel plates will be critically reviewed hereafter. Feng et al. in 2017 \[[@bib14]\], numerically simulate the generalized Oldroyd-B fluid flow between parallel plates. The main novelty of the mentioned study is the utilization of time and space fractional calculus to expand the generality of the proposed method. However, the simulated problem is limited to moving boundary condition and the effect of fluid oscillations at the inlet is not accounted. Moreover, the investigation is merely focused on the numerical scheme proposition and the physical parameters study is the significant missing data. Keimanesh et al. \[[@bib15]\] also conduct similar investigation on the non-Newtonian fluid between two parallel plates using the multi-step differential transform method for non-oscillatory flow condition.
The effect of parallel plates' movement normal to the fluid flow is also examined by several researchers. Rashidi et al. in 2008 \[[@bib16]\] tackled the problem of squeezing flow between parallel plates using the Homotopy analysis method. In another investigation, Hoshyar et al. \[[@bib17]\] focused on unsteady incompressible Newtonian fluid flow between two parallel plates using the same method. Despite the fact these studies are dealing with the flow between parallel plates subjected to external movement effects, the non-Newtonian as well as oscillatory fluid motion is still remained as an intact expansion of the pointed out studies.
The oscillating Couette--Poiseuille flow for the Oldroyd B fluid is examined by Ma et al. in 2019 \[[@bib18]\]. The proposed analytical method is utilized to investigate the inertial, viscous, and elastic effects on the flow behavior and stress responses. However, the range of flow stability and the bifurcation curves, which can be implemented to significantly increase the knowledge of flow behavior, is not examined in the mentioned research. Therefore, a comprehensive study of oscillatory and non-Newtonian fluid flow using Johnson--Segalman model and the flow stability analysis are still intact problems, which should be examined for specific applications.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the steady state and transient behavior of the viscoelastic fluid with time varying inlet condition. The effect of non-linear system is considered through evaluation of time dependent governing equation with Galerkin projection method. The effect of inlet boundary condition fluctuations is investigated via introduction of oscillatory Weissenberg function. Regarding the critical Weissenberg numbers captured form the steady state solution, first the system unsteady behavior in constant Weissenberg number is obtained, then two higher and lower Weissenberg number values with respect to the critical magnitudes are chosen as the amplitude of the sinusoidal Weissenberg number for following examined cases. Moreover, the velocity and stresses plots are analyzed in various intervals of Weissenberg number. The effect of Reynolds number and polymer solute to solution viscosity ratio on velocity, normal and shear stresses are the other examined parameters.
2. Theory {#sec2}
=========
2.1. The fluid flow laws {#sec2.1}
------------------------
The present study investigates the one-dimensional flow of a viscoelastic fluid between two infinite parallel plates. The plates are stationary and separated by a distance of *d*. The isothermal fluid with single relaxation time, constant viscosity and time dependent inlet velocity is examined. Moreover, the viscosity of the polymer solution ($\text{η}$) is determined based on the superposition of Newtonian solvent viscosity ($\text{η}$~1~) and the non-Newtonian polymer with viscosity of $\text{η}$~2~ as the solute fluid. The flow is considered as fully developed with fluctuations occur merely in one direction and no-slip condition at the walls. The schematic of the described model is illustrated in [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}.Fig. 1Schematic of the oscillatory flow passage through the channel.Fig. 1
Generally, the flow behavior is governed by the conservation laws of mass and linear momentum for an incompressible fluid.
Conservation of mass:$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial x} + \frac{\partial v}{\partial y} = 0$$
Conservation of momentum in x-direction$$\rho\left( \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} \right) = \frac{- \partial P}{\partial x} + \frac{\partial\tau_{xy}}{\partial y} + \eta_{2}\frac{\partial^{2}u}{\partial y^{2}}$$where *u* and *v* are velocity components in tangential and normal directions relative to the base flow, *P* is the pressure, *t* denotes the time, *τ* is the shear stress and *η*~*2*~ is the viscosity of the solvent.
The constitutive equation is selected according to the Johnson-Segalman model as:$$\lambda\frac{DT}{Dt} + T = \eta_{1}\left\lbrack {\nabla U + \left( \nabla U \right)}^{t} \right\rbrack$$where *λ* is a dimensionless parameter (relaxation time), *T* is stress tensor, *∇U* denotes the gradient of velocity vector and $\nabla U^{t}$ is the transpose of the *∇U*. Additionally, $\frac{DT}{Dt}$ can be calculated as:$$\frac{DT}{Dt} = \frac{\partial T}{\partial t} + U.\nabla T - \left( {1 - \frac{\zeta}{2}} \right)\left( {\left( {\nabla U} \right)^{t}.T + T.\nabla U} \right) + \frac{\zeta}{2}\left( {\nabla U.T + T.\left( {\nabla U} \right)^{t}} \right)$$where $\text{ζ} \in \left\lbrack 0 - 2 \right\rbrack$ is a non-dimensional fluid parameter which is a measure of non-uniform motion distribution in the stress tensor.
For the present specific case the Johnson-Segalman equation after some simplifications is converted to the following equations.$$T_{xx} = - \lambda\frac{\partial T_{xx}}{\partial t} - \lambda\left( \zeta - 2 \right)\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}T_{xy}$$$$T_{xy} = \eta_{1}\frac{\partial u}{\partial y} - \lambda\left\{ {\frac{\partial T_{xy}}{\partial t} + \frac{\zeta}{2}T_{xx}\frac{\partial u}{\partial y} + \left( {\frac{\zeta}{2} - 1} \right)\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}T_{yy}} \right\}$$$$T_{yy} = - \ \lambda\left\{ {\frac{\partial T_{yy}}{\partial t} + \zeta\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}T_{xy}} \right\}$$
2.2. Non-dimensional form of the governing equations {#sec2.2}
----------------------------------------------------
Taking *U* to be the maximum velocity in the flow direction, the non-dimensional variables can be defined as:$$u = u^{\ast}\frac{d}{\lambda},\text{~\!}p = \ p^{\ast}\frac{\eta_{1}U}{d},\text{~\!}T = \frac{T^{\ast}\eta_{1}}{\lambda},\text{~\!}t = t^{\ast}\lambda,\text{~\!}y = y^{\ast}d,\text{~\!}x = x^{\ast}d$$
By substitution of these transformations into Eqs. [(5)](#fd5){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(6)](#fd6){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(7)](#fd7){ref-type="disp-formula"} the following equations are formed:$$\overline{Re}\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \ - We\left( t \right)\ \frac{dP}{dx} + \ \frac{\partial\tau_{xy}}{\partial y} + \ \varepsilon\ \frac{\partial^{2}u}{\partial y^{2}}$$$$\frac{\partial\tau_{xx}}{\partial t} = \ - \tau_{xx} + \ \left( {2 - \zeta} \right)\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}\tau_{xy}$$$$\frac{\partial\tau_{yy}}{\partial t} = - \tau_{yy} - \zeta\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}\tau_{xy}$$$$\frac{\partial\tau_{xy}}{\partial t} = \ - \tau_{xy} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} - \frac{\zeta}{2}\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}\tau_{xx} + \left( {1 - \frac{\zeta}{2}} \right)\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}\tau_{yy}$$
The boundary condition is defined as:$$u\left( {y = \mp \frac{1}{2},t} \right) = 0$$
Additionally, the three important similarity groups in the present problem, namely, the Reynolds number, *Re*, the Weissenberg number, *We*, the solvent to solute viscosity ratio, $\text{ε}$ ,and the oscillatory inlet velocity are defined as:$$U = U_{{^\circ}\ }sin\left( \omega t \right)$$$$We\left( t \right) = \frac{U_{{^\circ}\ }\lambda\ }{d}sin\left( \omega t \right)$$$$\overline{Re} = \frac{d^{2}\rho}{\eta_{1}\lambda}$$$$\varepsilon = \frac{\eta_{2}}{\eta_{1}}$$
2.3. The base flow governing equations {#sec2.3}
--------------------------------------
The steady state condition is determined via neglecting of time derivative terms in Eqs. [(9)](#fd9){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(10)](#fd10){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(11)](#fd11){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(12)](#fd12){ref-type="disp-formula"}. The steady state stress components are obtained as follows:$$\tau_{xy}^{b} = \frac{u_{'y}}{1 + 2\zeta u_{'y}^{2} - \zeta^{2}u_{'y}^{2}} = \frac{u_{'y}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)u_{'y}^{2}} = \frac{A^{2}y^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)A^{2}y^{2}}$$$$\tau_{xx}^{b} = \frac{\left( 2 - \zeta \right)u_{'y}^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)u_{'y}^{2}} = \frac{\left( 2 - \zeta \right)A^{2}y^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)A^{2}y^{2}}$$$$\tau_{yy}^{b} = \frac{- \zeta u_{'y}^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)u_{'y}^{2}} = \frac{- \zeta A^{2}y^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right)A^{2}y^{2}}$$where the *A* function is defined as:$$A = \frac{We\left( t \right)}{\varepsilon}\frac{dP}{dx}$$
Eqs. [(5)](#fd5){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(6)](#fd6){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(7)](#fd7){ref-type="disp-formula"} can be rewritten by the definition of normal stresses difference (*N*) and a combination of normal stresses (*Z*) as:$$\begin{matrix}
{N = \tau_{xx} - \tau_{yy}} & , & {Z = \frac{\zeta}{2}\tau_{xx} + \left( 1 - \frac{\zeta}{2} \right)\tau_{yy}} \\
\end{matrix}$$
Moreover, to investigate the created disturbances in the flow, the following modifications are applied:$$\begin{matrix}
{u = u^{b} + u^{'},} & {\tau_{ij} = \tau_{ij}^{b} + \tau_{ij}^{'},} & {p = p^{b} + p^{'},} \\
\end{matrix}$$
For simplicity, the first term on the right-hand side of [Eq. (9)](#fd9){ref-type="disp-formula"} is redefined as:$$B\left( t \right) = - We\left( t \right)\frac{dP}{dx}$$
Considering the relation between *A* and *B* parameters and the implementation of [Eq. (23)](#fd23){ref-type="disp-formula"} modifications into Eqs. [(9)](#fd9){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(10)](#fd10){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(11)](#fd11){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(12)](#fd12){ref-type="disp-formula"}, the following governing equations are obtained:$$\overline{Re}u_{'t} = S_{'y} + S_{'y}^{b} + \varepsilon u_{'yy}$$$$N_{'t} = - N + 2\left( {A\left( t \right)yS + u_{'y}S^{b} + u_{'y}S} \right)$$$$S_{'t} = - S + u_{'y} + \alpha\left( {A\left( t \right)yN + u_{'y}N^{b} + u_{'y}N} \right)$$
All of the unknown parameters in Eqs. [(25)](#fd25){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(26)](#fd26){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(27)](#fd27){ref-type="disp-formula"} are defined as:$$N^{b} = \frac{2{u_{'y}^{b}}^{2}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right){u_{'y}^{b}}^{2}}$$$$S^{b} = \frac{u_{'y}^{b}}{1 + \zeta\left( 2 - \zeta \right){u_{'y}^{b}}^{2}}$$$$u_{'y}^{b} = Ay$$$$A = \frac{We}{\varepsilon}\frac{dP}{dx}$$$$\alpha = \ \zeta\left( {\frac{\zeta}{2} - 1} \right)$$
2.4. Solution method {#sec2.4}
--------------------
The solution of Eqs. [(25)](#fd25){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(26)](#fd26){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(27)](#fd27){ref-type="disp-formula"} is determined using the Galerkin projection method. To do so, *U(y,t)*, *S(y,t)* and *N(y,t)* are introduced by Chandrasekhar Function which satisfies the no-slip boundary condition.
Therefore, the general series representation of the velocity and stress differences is given by Eqs. [(33)](#fd33){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(34)](#fd34){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(35)](#fd35){ref-type="disp-formula"} as:$$u\left( {y,t} \right) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{M}{U_{i}\left( t \right)\phi_{i}\left( y \right)}$$$$N\left( {y,t} \right) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{M}{N_{i}\left( t \right)\phi_{i}\left( y \right)}$$$$S\left( {y,t} \right) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{M}{S_{i}\left( t \right)\phi_{i}^{'}\left( y \right)}$$where $\phi_{i}\left( y \right)$ is the even and odd Chandrasekhar functions, for $i$ even and odd, respectively \[[@bib12]\], $\phi_{i}^{'}\left( y \right)$ are defined as $\phi_{i}^{'}\left( y \right) = \left( {1/\alpha_{i}} \right)\left( {d\phi_{i}/dy} \right)$, where $\alpha_{i}$ are constants and *M* is the number of modes. The suitable level of truncation that is imposed hereafter in the calculations is *M* = 2 which leads to a six-dimensional model.
The first step in Galerkin projection method is the substitution of Eqs. [(33)](#fd33){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(34)](#fd34){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(35)](#fd35){ref-type="disp-formula"} into Eqs. [(25)](#fd25){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(26)](#fd26){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(27)](#fd27){ref-type="disp-formula"}. Then each equation is multiplied by the suitable mode and the integration is performed in the range related to the problem geometry (et. $\left. y \in \left\lbrack \frac{- 1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \right\rbrack \right)$. Hence, a set of ordinary, coupled and non-linear differential equations are derived with time dependent coefficients.
The projection method leads to explicit expressions for time derivatives (et. $\text{u}_{\text{k}}$ and $\text{N}_{\text{k}}$ where $\text{k} \in \left\lbrack 1 - \text{M} \right\rbrack$):$$\overline{Re}\frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial t} = S_{1}\alpha_{1}D_{1} + S_{2}\alpha_{2}D_{2} + \varepsilon U_{1}\alpha_{1}^{2}D_{1} + \varepsilon U_{2}\alpha_{2}^{2}D_{2} + E_{1}$$$$\overline{Re}\frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial t} = S_{1}\alpha_{1}D_{3} + S_{2}\alpha_{2}D_{4} + \varepsilon U_{1}\alpha_{1}^{2}D_{3} + \varepsilon U_{2}\alpha_{2}^{2}D_{4} + E_{2}$$$$\frac{\partial N_{1}}{\partial t} = - N_{1} + 2A\left( t \right)S_{1}D_{5} + 2A\left( t \right)S_{2}D_{6} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}D_{10} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}D_{11} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}S_{1}D_{7} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}S_{2}D_{8} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}S_{1}D_{8} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}S_{2}D_{9}$$$$\frac{\partial N_{2}}{\partial t} = - N_{2} + 2A\left( t \right)S_{1}D_{12} + 2A\left( t \right)S_{2}D_{13} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}D_{14} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}D_{15} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}S_{1}D_{16} + 2\alpha_{1}U_{1}S_{2}D_{17} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}S_{1}D_{17} + 2\alpha_{2}U_{2}S_{2}D_{18}$$$$\frac{\partial S_{1}}{\partial t} = - S_{1} + \alpha_{1}U_{1}\left( {1 + \alpha E_{3}} \right) + \alpha\alpha_{2}U_{2}E_{4} + \alpha A\left( t \right)N_{2}D_{19} + \alpha\alpha_{1}U_{1}N_{1}D_{20} + \alpha\alpha_{2}U_{2}N_{2}D_{21}$$$$\frac{\partial S_{2}}{\partial t} = - S_{2} + \alpha_{2}U_{2}\left( {1 + \alpha E_{5}} \right) + \alpha A\left( t \right)N_{1}D_{22} + \alpha\alpha_{1}U_{1}E_{6} + \alpha\alpha_{1}U_{1}N_{2}D_{23} + \alpha\alpha_{2}U_{2}N_{1}D_{24}$$
The coefficients in Eqs. [(36)](#fd36){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(37)](#fd37){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(38)](#fd38){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(39)](#fd39){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(40)](#fd40){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(41)](#fd41){ref-type="disp-formula"} are defined as:$$\begin{matrix}
{\text{D}_{1} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{pp}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{2} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{pp}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{3} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{pp}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{4} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{pp}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{1} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{S}_{\text{'y}}^{\text{b}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{2} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{S}_{\text{'y}}^{\text{b}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{5} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{6} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{y}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{7} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{8} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{9} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{10} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{S}^{\text{b}}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{11} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}\text{S}^{\text{b}}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{12} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{y}\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{13} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{y}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{14} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{S}^{\text{b}}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{16} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{15} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{S}^{\text{b}}\text{dy}}}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{17} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{18} = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}\text{dy}}}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{19} = \text{y}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{20} = \frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{21} = \frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{22} = \text{y}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{23} = \frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{2}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{D}}_{24} = \frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}\varnothing_{1}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{3} = \text{N}^{\text{b}}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} \\
{{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{4} = \text{N}^{\text{b}}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{5} = \text{N}^{\text{b}}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} & {{\mspace{9mu}\text{E}}_{6} = \text{N}^{\text{b}}\frac{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{1}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}{\left( \frac{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}}{\varnothing_{2}^{\text{p}}} \right)}} \\
\end{matrix}$$where $\varnothing_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}}$ denotes second derivative of $\varnothing_{\mathbf{i}}$. The () operator in Eq. [(42)](#fd42){ref-type="disp-formula"} is defined as:$$\left( \frac{\text{a}}{\text{b}} \right) = {\int\limits_{\frac{- 1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}}{\text{ab~\!}\mathbb{d}\text{y}}}$$
Briefly, the nonlinear governing equations are transformed into a set of simultaneous ordinary differential equations (ODE) using the Galerkin method (Eqs. [(36)](#fd36){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(37)](#fd37){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(38)](#fd38){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(39)](#fd39){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(40)](#fd40){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(41)](#fd41){ref-type="disp-formula"}). The coefficients of the ODE set can be obtained using the integration of the Chandrasekhar function modes. The numerical simulation of the Mathematica software is performed with the aid of a computer system with following characteristics: Intel Core i7 <CPU@2.8GHz>, 16 GB of DDR4 RAM. Each simulation is converged in about 3 min to the final results.
3. Results & discussion {#sec3}
=======================
3.1. The bifurcation graph {#sec3.1}
--------------------------
In the present section the numerical solution of the governing equations (Eqs. [(36)](#fd36){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(37)](#fd37){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(38)](#fd38){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(39)](#fd39){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(40)](#fd40){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and [(41)](#fd41){ref-type="disp-formula"}) is presented for various *ξ* and *We* numbers. The variations of velocity, normal and shear stresses (namely *U*~*1*~, *U*~*2*~, *N*~*1*~, *N*~*2*~, *S*~*1*~ and *S*~*2*~) are calculated for $We \in \left\lbrack 0 - 10 \right\rbrack$ and $\delta \in \left\lbrack {0.2 - 1.0} \right\rbrack$ for limiting *Re* values of 0.2 and 10. It should be added that $\text{Δp}$ and *ε* parameters are set to -1 and 0.04, respectively.
According to [Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} (the bifurcation graph), the *U*~*1*~ variable has two sequential maximum and minimum values for relatively low *We* numbers which is due to the disturbance terms in [Eq. (23)](#fd23){ref-type="disp-formula"} (*i.e.* $u\text{'}$, $p\text{'}$ and $\text{τ}_{\text{ij}}^{\text{'}}$). As the value of these peaks is reduced the fluid resistance to the imposed forces and initial disturbances is decreased. Based on [Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"}, three main zones can be defined as subcritical ($We < We_{C1}$), critical ($We_{C1} < We < We_{C2}$) and supercritical ($\left. We > We_{C2} \right)$.Fig. 2The variations of a) *U*~*1*~, and b) *U*~*2*~ as a function of *We* for $\text{ε} = 0.04$,$\text{~\!Re} = 0.2\text{~\!}$ and $\Delta\text{p} = - 1$.Fig. 2
First and second critical *We* numbers are located in the range of $\left\lbrack 0.2 - 0.6 \right\rbrack$ and $\left\lbrack 0.4 - 0.8 \right\rbrack$, respectively. Unstable base flow with nonlinear velocity profile is observed between these two critical *We* numbers.
3.2. Validation {#sec3.2}
---------------
It should be noted that, the oscillatory problem of current study using the Johnson--Segalman model is not tackled in the available literature yet. Thus, the validation is performed by the analytical data of oscillating Couette--Poiseuille flow of upper-convected Maxwell fluid of Ma et al. \[[@bib18]\], which has approximately similar problem definition in comparison to the present study. The velocity profile for Re = 10 at four different time instances during one time period of oscillations are calculated and illustrated in [Fig. 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"}.Fig. 3Velocity profile for oscillating Couette--Poiseuille flow of upper-convected Maxwell fluid at various time instances.Fig. 3
It should be noted that the ξ and π parameters are dimensionless depth and time variables, respectively. According to the results, it can be concluded that the velocity profile of the current study is in close agreement with the analytical data of \[[@bib18]\]. The difference between the numerical results of the current study with the analytical data is below 4% at all of the time instances through the channel depth.
3.3. Transient simulation results {#sec3.3}
---------------------------------
To examine the nonlinear behavior of the system in the transient period, the time dependent outputs of the governing equation from the initial condition is studied. The effect of boundary fluctuations is considered by dedication of a sinusoidal function to the *We* ([Eq. 15](#fd15){ref-type="disp-formula"}). To do so, two *We* numbers in the stable sub/supercritical zones are selected based on the steady solution (et. 0.15 and 15) and the variations of velocity and stress components are examined for both constant and oscillatory *We* numbers. Moreover, the *Re* number is assumed to be 0.2 while the case of *Re* = 10 is also investigated to determine the effect of *Re* number on the fluid flow characteristics.
The velocity profile variations from the initial condition to the steady configuration is presented in [Fig. 4](#fig4){ref-type="fig"}. The velocity profiles approximately resemble the Newtonian velocity profile, although a slight declination to the right is observed in the profiles.Fig. 4The transient behavior of flow in the channel in subcritical zone for $\text{Re} = 0.2$, $\text{We} = 0.15$, $\Delta\text{p} = - 1$, $\text{ε} = 0.04$ and $\text{ζ} = 0.2$.Fig. 4
Considering the final configuration of the velocity profiles, it can be stated that from t = 0 to t = 3 the velocity magnitude is overgrowing, while it is decreased slightly to t = 4 when the final profile is almost shaped.
For better visualization, the y-t-u diagram is presented in [Fig. 5](#fig5){ref-type="fig"}. Considering the results, the fluid has a tendency to fluctuate immediately after the initial condition. However, the oscillations are damped to zero after limited waves near t = 4. In addition, it should be noted that the velocity is set to zero at the walls due to the no-slip condition.Fig. 5The variations of a) velocity, b) normal and c) shear stress as a function of y and t for subcritical *We* with parameters of $\text{ε} = 0.04$, $\text{~\!Re} = 0.2$, $\nabla\text{p} = - 1$, We = 0.15 and, ζ = 0.2.Fig. 5
The normal stress is equal to zero at channel walls and has an increasing trend marching toward the channel midsection, where the maximum is occurred at y = 0.12. Moreover, the early fluctuations as well as the existence of steady state after t = 4.5 is noticeable.
The shear stress as it is expected, has its maximum near the wall (y = 0.5), which is intensified until t = 2.0. Subsequently, the shear stress maximum is reduced slightly toward its stable value (t \> 4.0), which is similar to the Newtonian flow.
The effect of temporal oscillations of the inlet velocity magnitude is illustrated in [Fig. 6](#fig6){ref-type="fig"}. The oscillatory behavior of the inlet boundary is simulated for low and high frequencies (*i.e.* sin (0.5t) and sin (20t)). It can be observed that the low frequency variations of the inlet velocity magnitude have the same effect as the non-fluctuating boundary condition. The same trend can be seen for the shear stress, which leads to the conclusion that the Weissenberg fluctuations especially at low frequencies has negligible effect on both velocity and its derivatives ([Fig. 6](#fig6){ref-type="fig"}).Fig. 6The variations of a) velocity, b) normal and c) shear stress as a function of y and t for subcritical *We* with parameters of $\text{ε} = 0.04$, $\text{Re} = 0.2$, $\nabla\text{p} = - 1$, *We=0.15\*Sin(0.5t)* and ζ = 0.2.Fig. 6
In contrary to the velocity and shear stress, the normal stress is completely affected by the low frequency oscillations of *We*. The normal stress fluctuations have variable time periods from 50 to 200. The effect of inlet sinusoidal *We* on the damping and exciting terms in the *N* equation (Eqs. [(38)](#fd38){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(39)](#fd39){ref-type="disp-formula"}) is the reason for such a behavior.
The effect of increasing of the oscillation frequency is presented in [Fig. 7](#fig7){ref-type="fig"}. The amplitude of *We* is chosen to be 0.15 and its frequency is set to be 20/2π. Velocity and shear stress behaviors are similar to the previous case with inlet velocity frequency of 0.5/2π ([Fig. 6](#fig6){ref-type="fig"}(a) and (c)). However, the amplitude of normal stress fluctuations significantly reduced (to about 0.005) with the period of 100. After t = 30 the oscillations turn into stable periodic waves with a peak value (0.022) slightly lower than the previous case (0.032) with lower oscillation frequency ([Fig. 6](#fig6){ref-type="fig"}).Fig. 7The variations of a) velocity, b) normal and c) shear stress as a function of y and t for subcritical zone with parameters of $\text{ε} = 0.04$, $\text{Re} = 0.2$, $\nabla\text{p} = - 1$, *We=0.15\*Sin(20t)* and ζ = 0.2.Fig. 7
In the current section the characteristics of the viscoelastic flow for *We* variations (constant and low frequency oscillations) is examined in the supercritical range. With the operational conditions of *We* = 15, *ε* = 0.04 and *Re* = 0.2, it is depicted in [Fig. 8](#fig8){ref-type="fig"}, that the velocity has a non-oscillatory behavior and will be uniform after about t = 30, similar to the normal and shear stress diagrams. Comparison to related figures for subcritical condition ([Fig. 5](#fig5){ref-type="fig"}), one can deduce that the location of maximum velocity relocated from channel center to near walls and the required time to stabilization of the flow is substantially increased.Fig. 8The variations of a) velocity, b) normal and c) shear stress as a function of y and t for subcritical zone with parameters of $\text{ε} = 0.04$, $\text{Re} = 0.2$, $\nabla\text{p} = - 1$, *We* = 15 and ζ = 0.2.Fig. 8
The normal stress increases till t = 30 after which a nearly uniform trend is observed with its highest value occurred at y = 0.2. It is worth noting that in contrary to the subcritical case, the normal stress is positive for *We* \> *We*~*C1*~.
Finally, the effect of boundary fluctuations on the viscoelastic flow characteristics in supercritical zone is investigated. According to [Fig. 9](#fig9){ref-type="fig"}(a) the velocity magnitude initially increased and after t = 10 a slight reduction to its steady profile at t = 20 occurred with velocity maximum located at y = 0.2.Fig. 9The variations of a) velocity, b) normal and c) shear stress as a function of y and t for subcritical zone with parameters of $\text{ε} = 0.04$, $\text{Re} = 0.2$, $\nabla\text{p} = - 1$, *We=15\*Sin(0.1t)* and, ζ = 0.2.Fig. 9
The normal stress variable is depicted in [Fig. 9](#fig9){ref-type="fig"}(b). Except of two instabilities between t = 5 and t = 10, the flow is almost stable with zero value of normal stress at the channel walls and maximum at y = 0.2. Regarding the shear stress in the supercritical range of *We*, after some pulsation for t = 5 to 10, its magnitude reaches the final value ([Fig. 9](#fig9){ref-type="fig"}-c).
For the supercritical case especially at high oscillations frequencies, the flow field becomes unstable. The reason of such behavior is due to the relative increase of the *We* in comparison to *ε* parameter, which in turn enhances the magnitude of non-linear terms and leads to instability of flow field.
3.4. The effect of Re on the transient behavior of flow parameters {#sec3.4}
------------------------------------------------------------------
The transient response of the flow parameters (*U*~*1*~, *N*~*1*~ and *S*~*1*~) for *We* = 0.15, *Δp* = -1, *ζ* = 0.2 and *ε* = 0.04 to the variations of *Re* number is presented in [Fig. 10](#fig10){ref-type="fig"}. For small *Re* the convergence to steady condition due to viscosity effect is uniform and rapid with several high amplitude oscillations. In the case with Re = 0.2 after three consecutive vibrations at t = 8 the variables become steady, however the mentioned steady state condition doesn\'t occur before t = 10 for Re = 4. The numerical data show the same trend for stress components. Therefore, the *Re* number determines the number of oscillations as well as convergence rate prior to the stable condition.Fig. 10Transient behavior of a) *U1*, b) *N1* and c) *S1*, for various *Re* with *We* = 0.15, *Δp* = -1, *ζ* = 0.2 and *ε* = 0.04.Fig. 10
3.5. The effect of *ε* on the transient behavior of flow parameters {#sec3.5}
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The effect of *ε* (the viscosity ratio of solvent to soluble) on the velocity, shear and normal stress is examined in the present section.
According to *U*~*1*~ and *U*~*2*~ curves which are obtained for *We* = 0.15 and *Re* = 0.2, by increasing the *ε* parameter from 0.04 to 0.1 the stable velocity magnitude as well as initial fluctuations and the time needed for the system to reach steady state is increased ([Fig. 11](#fig11){ref-type="fig"}).Fig. 11Transient behavior of a) *U*~*1*~ and b) *U*~*2*~, for various *ε* with *We* = 0.15, *Δp* = -1, *ζ* = 0.2 and *Re* = 0.2.Fig. 11
Besides, increasing of *ε* by the assumption of constant viscosity for the Newtonian solute (water), means a reduction in the viscosity of the Non-Newtonian soluble. Hence, the pointed out growths are meaningful as a results of reduction of solution viscosity and its lower capability in damping of the flow fluctuations.
Increasing of *ε* results in generation of higher normal stresses. Moreover, the maximum and minimum peaks at the initial time are intensified. The same observation can be detected for the shear stress ([Fig. 12](#fig12){ref-type="fig"}).Fig. 12Transient behavior of a) *N*~*1*~, b) *N*~*2*~, c) *S*~*1*~ and d) *S*~*2*~, for various *ε* with *We* = 0.15, *Δp* = -1, *ζ* = 0.2 and *Re* = 0.2.Fig. 12
4. Conclusion {#sec4}
=============
1)The examination of the governing equations of the viscoelastic flow with Johnson-Segalman model denotes that the flow behavior between two critical *We* numbers becomes unstable and the nonlinear velocity profile emerges.2)The inspection of the *Re* number effect implies that by enhancement of *Re*, the flow becomes stable for all of the simulated *We* and the early velocity and stress peaks diminish.3)In the subcritical zone, the velocity profile for non-oscillatory viscoelastic fluid is similar to the Newtonian fluid. However, the velocity and stress profiles overgrowing the stable profile at some early instances and damp to the final condition afterwards.4)Increasing of oscillations frequency in subcritical zone, the same as low frequency case, has almost no effect on the velocity and its gradient. Nevertheless, the normal stress amplitude of oscillations is reduced.5)For non-oscillatory, supercritical case in contrary to the subcritical situation in which the velocity maximum occurs at the midline, its location shifted toward the walls and the stabilization period increased.6)The *Re* number determines the number of oscillations and the needed time prior to the steady condition. For lower *Re*, due to higher effect of viscosity the initial fluctuations are intense and occurred in a short time period in contrary to the high *Re* case.
Declarations {#sec5}
============
Author contribution statement {#sec5.1}
-----------------------------
Reza Roohi, Nariman Ashrafi, Sepideh Samghani, Mohammad Najafi: Conceived and designed the analysis; Analyzed and interpreted the data; Contributed analysis tools or data; Wrote the paper.
Funding statement {#sec5.2}
-----------------
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interest statement {#sec5.3}
----------------------------
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Additional information {#sec5.4}
----------------------
No additional information is available for this paper.
| 2023-10-11T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4448 |
by Wayne Friedman , November 5, 2014
In response to unusual caustic remarks from Dish Network's Charlie Ergen yesterday, Turner Broadcasting says it is unclear what this dispute is about.
A couple of weeks ago, Dish Network took off some Turner networks -- including CNN, Adult Swim and Cartoon Network -- over a carriage deal dispute.
“While there were clearly deal points to get done, they were not the type you would usually go dark over,” says a Turner Broadcasting pre-release. “So it is still unclear to us exactly what this dispute is about. We've been told our networks were taken down because we would not move an expiration date later in the year.”
On Tuesday, Charlie Ergen, chairman of Dish Network, during an earnings phone call offered up some eye-opening criticism of some Turner networks -- that TNT and TBS programming isn’t as good as programs on AMC. He also said that CNN’s new programming has half the audience it formerly had, adding that the perhaps the cable news model doesn't work any more. Ergen also said that Cartoon Network isn’t all that special, and that you can find kids programming on many subscription video-on-demand services
advertisement advertisement
And then Ergen offered up this: "When we take something down, we're prepared to take it down forever." He added: "We would prefer to get a deal done. We have a time frame we look at, but if we don't have a deal, we might make a long-term decision to go another direction."
Turner also said: "We are disappointed in the aggressive nature of the comments from Dish Network, particularly given the fact that Dish agreed to our rates and carriage proposals weeks ago."
Turner added: "Other top five distributors have signed up for what Dish has walked away from." | 2024-04-02T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/9412 |
People had some unusual dreams in the 1920s. Dr. Otis G. Button, a veterinarian from Tacoma, Washington, dreamed of something other than a waiting room full of furry patients. He came up with a giant coffee pot diner, 25 feet tall, 30 feet wide.
It’s been 89 years, and his coffee pot is still right where he put it down.
It was 1927, and Dr. Button’s unique piece of mimetic architecture started out as the Coffee Pot Restaurant. Over the years it ran the gamut from diner to drive-in, speakeasy to juke joint to go-go bar. In 1955 it became someone else’s dream, when Bob Radonich, along with his wife Lylabell, turned it into Bob’s Java Jive.
With a Polynesian flair popular at the time, Bob and Lylabell opened their pot up to live music, and it’s been cranking out live tunes (and some karaoke) ever since.
Now on the National Register of Historic Places, Bob’s Java Jive is working hard to hold onto its spot as an important landmark and cultural music hub for Tacoma. Going back to its early years when surf guitar luminaries The Ventures were the house band, they have provided a space, albeit a tight one, for local musicians to follow in their footsteps.
Beer. Burgers. Bands. In a coffee pot. It’s not clear whether or not they serve coffee. | 2023-12-19T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/6065 |
Thursday, 30 October 2008
You don't get this on the tube...
My new trip to work takes me through some places I already know quite well, but also to some complete surprises.
First, I go up the only main road off the Isle of Dogs to Canary Wharf and round the huge roundabout built in under the new developments. This manages to act as a gigantic wind-funnel: a headwind, naturally.
Coming up and out of the roundabout, there's a slightly hairy choice of lanes before ducking out of the main flow of traffic into Narrow Street in Limehouse.
Before the Victorians, this was a base for sailors, often of dubious reputation. Later, warehouses were built along the river; some survive, converted into expensive housing, rubbing shoulders with a converted shop or pub sporting this cherub, model workers' dwellings from a century ago (now gated off and renamed upmarket) and a pub that claims to have been the model for one in Dickens.
A sharp turn comes up to the main road by the Limehouse Tunnel; there's a wait for the roaring flood of traffic to halt a while before you can cross and turn off along Cable Street and its bumpy cycle-path.
This runs almost all the way to the Tower of London, past clumps of social history: a short terrace of two-up, two-down cottages, solid blocks of public housing from slum clearance programmes of the 1920s and 1930s (but mostly of course post-Blitz reconstruction), a Catholic church, and one of those pocket palazzos that the Victorians created for public buildings (now a rather neglected looking base for a number of small community organisations, with a convenient side wall for this mural commemorating the anti-Fascist "Battle of Cable Street" in 1936).
Then there's a longer, older terrace of Regency/ early Victorian houses for the middle class, a corner pub which is now a private residence (next to the halal butcher and a few steps from one of Hawksmoor's "coal churches") and on past slabby and brutalist 1960s concrete and system-built tower blocks. One thing I notice more and more is the waste of odd left-over spaces around these estates - a bit of pointless grass, at best, with little sign that anyone ever uses it. But here and there, some have been taken over, officially or otherwise, for little vegetable gardens, many with the kind of trellis pergola for growing squashes that I take to indicate some initiative by Bangladeshi residents.
On down the nondescript Royal Mint Street, with the apparently prettily-named Rosemary Lane restaurant the only reminder that, in the days when that was the street's name, this was one of the poorest and most destitute streets in London. Here Mayhew came across people who lived by collecting and trading in street-waste - bones, cigar-ends and "pure" (dog dung, used in tanneries).
Here the route turns into the main stream of traffic squeezing its way over Tower Bridge; once over, a lot of traffic is lining itself up to turn left at successive traffic lights, and some decisive judgement is needed to get into lane to turn right, down Tanner Street and into Leathermarket Street (do you see a theme here?). Here's another area gentrified apparently and mercifully without (so far) massive rebuilding: the Morocco Store and the Leather Exchange buildings are still in use as offices for small businesses. Crossing Bermondsey Street you see the greasy spoon is still doing business, even as the kind of sports shoe shop that wouldn't look out of place in Covent Garden has opened up (it's called "United Nude" - nope, me neither) and the pubs have spruced up: "ever popular" the estate agents call it (i.e., property prices beyond the imagining of people who knew it 40 years ago).
This is Dickens territory. A little to the East was Fagin's lair, a little to the West, the Marshalsea debtors' prison, as featured in Little Dorrit (and David Copperfield, and Dickens's own life). And here, all down the side of a building, is a quotation from "Pickwick Papers".
Over the next main road, you're into Chaucer, as the streets in the Tabard Gardens estate (another 1930s public housing development) are all named with reference to the Canterbury Tales (Pilgrimage, Pardoner, Manciple): the pilgrims would have set out from the Tabard Inn on Borough High Street nearby. With wide quiet streets shaded by full-grown plane trees, it looks closer to the planners' pictures than their 50s or 60s equivalents do today.
Crossing over Great Dover Street (the main road to Canterbury and the coast - you see why the pilgrims set out from Borough), the route comes back into Dickens's time, passing a side street of plain Victorian workshop buildings, and turns into the grand, elegant 1830s Trinity Church Square with a church (now a recording studio) at its centre:I could imagine Dickens's not quite upper crust settled here: enclosed among their own kind, but close enough to their businesses to keep an eye on their workers. Apparently it's owned by Trinity House, which operates the nation's lighthouses: this might account for the austere and uniform external decoration.
Turning south again, and past the mosque on Dickens Square (now what would he have made of that?), avoiding a dustcart (or is it a work of art?), it's a short run down and round past the Salvation Army headquarters - how appropriate - to the Elephant and Castle:And in the evening, I get to do it all again in reverse.
about me
60-something, mildly interested in and slightly knowledgeable about a lot of things, but - to my surprise - passionately devoted to little. Londoner born and bred, dyed-in-the-wool Guardianista and quietly settling into retirement. | 2024-05-09T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/7702 |
And they conclude there's a lot of bad information out there. They try to set the record straight.
Bring a bottle.
[ The Diagnostic Guidelines Task Force of the International Society for Bipolar Disorder (ISBD)] chairman S. Nassir Ghaemi, MD, MPH ... brought together some of the world's clinical experts on bipolar disorder and key researchers with the goal of having them develop a more systematic and coherent set of diagnostic guidelines.
Also expanded was the definition of bipolar depression, according to Ghaemi. "It is not just depression in someone who happens to have had manic episodes but rather specific kinds of depression with specific features," he said.
...Clinical features include early onset of first depression (before age 25 years), multiple (5 or more) previous episodes of depression, family history of bipolar disorder, atypical depressive symptoms (such as leaden paralysis), psychomotor retardation, psychotic features, and/or pathological guilt .
The subgroup describes this as a 'probabilistic' approach to the differentiation of bipolar from unipolar depression, and offers a heuristic of operationalized criteria to be studied empirically. Areas of dissensus persist...
Most of the evidence, he explained, suggests that schizoaffective disorder does not represent a separate categorical disease entity; rather, it is "a variation on schizophrenia or a variation on mood disorder or co-occurrence of the two." The subgroup recommended dropping the schizoaffective disorder diagnostic category altogether from DSM-V...
Or, you find an elephant's leg, and say, this is an elephant. And next you find a horse's leg, so you say, this has much in common with an "elephant," same joint here, so this is an elephant also. Which would be okay, except then we start making treatment decisions based on that logic: ah ha! Antifungal cream is the mainstay of treatment for all elephant illnesses! And meanwhile the elephant dies of throat cancer. Does it make any sense that the best of our science suggests that the manipulation of four neurotransmitters is somehow involved in the treatment of every single psychiatric illness known, from anxiety to xenophobia?
What do we say to all of those patients diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder? Oops? Is it any consolation to them, or their families, to hear that it's actually bipolar? How about the criminal cases of schizoaffectives? Should they get new trials? Their new diagnosis of bipolar has more studies to draw from, it has more play in the legal system, and better known to jurors?
As a final question, Ghaemi was asked if he believed bipolar disorder is being overdiagnosed. "While unipolar depression, personality disorders, and schizophrenia have each had periods of overdiagnosis, there has never been an era in which bipolar disorder has been overdiagnosed," he said, "no matter what skeptics claim."
He said that concerns about bipolar overdiagnosis are largely anecdotal, have not been empirically well-established, and ignore solid evidence of continued underdiagnosis.
The lack of focus on bipolar disorder has led to neglect and controversy, Ghaemi noted. "Our task force," he said, "is a step toward more consensus and less controversy."
From the article: In other words, what do the best minds in psychiatry have to say about bipolar disorder? What says the latest data?That's based on the PET scans and the NIMH genetic studies which have so far cost a quadrillion dollars, right? Well, here's a line from the actual Guidelines . It's the kind of line that makes you, well, look upon the works, and despair:Got that? No? Good, it'll go down easier. So it's soon to be official: Farewell, Depression.
What else does the team think? Oh: schizoaffective disorder doesn't exist.The question is, if the evidence has so far been indicating that schizoaffective is not real, why did we have to wait for the DSM to tell us it doesn't exist? Why can't psychiatry simply make it happen?But the sleight of hand is saying that the schizoaffective is "really" a variation on a mood disorder (read: bipolar.) It is equally plausible that bipolar disorder is a variation of schizoaffective disorder since neither one exist except synthetically. I don't mean the symptomatology doesn't exist, I mean the classification is completely empty. We choose to call this thing schizoaffective, and now we choose not to. We chose to call it depression, now we choose to call it bipolar depression. It's not like you chose to call it a unicorn but later discover it'sa rhinoceros. A more accurate analogy is that you chose to call this a unicorn, and now choose to call it a ki-ran. Wait-- what's a ki-ran, you say?And there's some more sleight of hand. Empirically? What's the test to see if it is actually bipolar or actually depression? Especially when you have the power to change definitions?The best is at the end:Bipolar is the neglected diagnosis? And this will cause less controversy? Are you serious? | 2024-01-25T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8463 |
Manifestations of AIDS in the head and neck.
A significant number of patients with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) are initially seen with symptoms related to the head and neck. It is becoming increasingly challenging for clinicians to accurately diagnose new lesions, considering the vast array of manifestations of AIDS in this region and their many atypical presentations. A comprehensive review is a valuable clinical tool. A MEDLINE search of the English language literature from 1984 to the present was done for this study. Dermatologic, otologic, nose/paranasal sinuses/nasopharynx, oral cavity/oropharynx, laryngeal, and neck manifestations are reviewed. The gross and microscopic appearances of lesions are described, with particular emphasis on various presentations of the same lesion and lesions that may mimic the appearance of others. Practical treatment strategies are also discussed. Accurate and early recognition of the many common and uncommon manifestations of AIDS in the head and neck is of critical importance to the timely and effective management of these patients. | 2023-12-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1825 |
One month after drawing a line in the sand with Donald Trump on the volatile issue of immigration, Mayor Rahm Emanuel on Monday talked about ways he believes he can work with the president-elect.
Emanuel emphasized the positive during an hourlong panel discussion with the mayors of Atlanta, Columbus, Ohio, and Detroit at the Detroit Auto Show.
It happened after a moderator asked Emanuel whether he left his face-to-face meeting with the president-elect at Trump Tower in Manhattan last month convinced that he could “get business done” with the incoming Republican administration.
“Well, there are certain things yes, and certain things no. . . . I was pretty clear about where we stood on immigration. . . . On the other hand, we then talked about transportation and I talked to him about the [Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act] loan program and the [Rapid Innovation Fund] program and things we’re using in Chicago. . . . It’s basically an infrastructure bank in embryonic stages,” the mayor said.
“I gave him ideas on how to plus that up, bring private-sector money and you can leverage it. You don’t even need any money from the federal government. [No] new revenue. That’s our job. You just put more money into this loan program.”
“That was where we could cooperate because we have a mutual interest in rebuilding runways, roads and rail systems. . . . There will be places where we will cooperate and places where we’ll stand our ground and confront,” the mayor said.
“I said to him, without exposing too much because I respect the privacy of a conversation, ‘You’re an investor in New York City with a building. You’re an investor in Chicago with a building. You’re an investor in D.C. with a building. They’re all sanctuary cities. You haven’t invested in a property in a non-sanctuary city. So there must be something about a sanctuary city you find appealing as a real estate investor,’” the mayor said.
“I tried to appeal to him — not on the moral component because I think that’s self-evident — but as a business person. Why is it as a business person you’ve decided to invest in cities that are sanctuary cities? Because there’s a vitality and an energy . . . that immigrants add to.”
Emanuel served as President Barack Obama’s first White House chief of staff. Before that, he was a North Side congressman who engineered the 2006 Democratic takeover of the U.S. House.
But he contended that City Hall is where the rubber meets the road.
“This is the government that’s most immediate and intimate to how people think they live their lives. Washington is Disneyland on the Potomac. And it’s gonna get more like it in the next four years,” the mayor said.
“That is how people think about their lives — that playground, that park, that train station, that neighborhood library and the technology that’s there. That’s how they think about government that touches their lives. That is both a great opportunity for us as mayors. And their ability to tell us what they think of what we’re doing is also immediate and intimate as well.”
Trump campaigned on a promise to build a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico, target illegal immigrants and to cut off federal funding to Chicago and other “sanctuary cities” where undocumented immigrants can access city services and live without fear of police harassment.
The president-elect has since said he plans to begin by immediately deporting as many as 3 million undocumented immigrants with criminal records, then make a decision about the “terrific people” who make up the rest of the undocumented population.
Emanuel has said he does not believe Trump will cut off federal funding to Chicago and other “sanctuary cities” because Trump will have “bigger fish to fry” in a White House where you’re dodging constant political fire.
During last month’s meeting at Trump Tower, Emanuel urged Trump not to deport the children of illegal immigrants and not to cut off federal funding to sanctuary cities.
The mayor also pitched the president-elect for federal assistance for his two-year police hiring surge and for summer jobs, after-school and youth mentoring programs that Emanuel hopes will blunt a 60 percent rise in homicides and shootings.
On the same day, Trump softened his hard-line position on immigration. After Time Magazine named him “Person of the Year,” Trump told the magazine, “We’re going to work something out that’s going to make people happy and proud. They got brought here at a very young age, they’ve worked here, they’ve gone to school here. Some were good students. Some have wonderful jobs. And they’re in never-never land because they don’t know what’s going to happen.” | 2024-02-15T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4561 |
Latest Liberal Party stories on ABC Online
The Prime Minister Tony Abbott has a prestigous job to fill after Bronwyn Bishop's resignation as Speaker. She quit following weeks of controversy over her travel expenses. Her travels included last November's $5,000 helicopter flight from Melbourne Airport to a golf course near Geelong for a ...
Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull says that the Speaker Bronwyn Bishop was right to resign. Mr Turnbull says there are some ambiguous areas in the entitlements system but that 'the fundamental principle is often one of common sense.' Mr Turnbull also discussed the Government's project ...
Support appears to be fading in the Liberal Party for Federal Speaker Bronwyn Bishop despite her apology for hiring a helicopter to drop her at a party fundraiser. Mrs Bishop says last year's $5,000 charter flight from Melbourne Airport to Geelong was 'ridiculous' and an 'error of judgment'. ...
Bronwyn Bishop has apologised for controversial travel expense claims, including a $5,000 helicopter flight from Melbourne to Geelong for a political fundraiser. She says there's no excuse for what she did with the helicopter, but she won't bow to public and political pressure to stand down. ...
After weeks of negative publicity about the so-called 'choppergate' scandal and other alleged travel entitlements abuses the Speaker of the Parliament Bronwyn Bishop has apologised to Australians. But she says won't be resigning. The Speaker has told broadcaster Alan Jones there was no ... | 2023-08-23T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/2934 |
[Dimensional structure of the Brazilian version of the Scale of Satisfaction with Interpersonal Processes of General Medical Care].
The objective of this study was to reassess the dimensional structure of a Brazilian version of the Scale of Satisfaction with Interpersonal Processes of General Medical Care, proposed originally as a one-dimensional instrument. Strict confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and exploratory factor analysis modeled within a CFA framework (E/CFA) were used to identify the best model. An initial CFA rejected the one-dimensional structure, while an E/CFA suggested a two-dimensional structure. The latter structure was followed by a new CFA, which showed that the model without cross-loading was the most parsimonious, with adequate fit indices (CFI = 0.982 and TLI = 0.988), except for RMSEA (0.062). Although the model achieved convergent validity, discriminant validity was questionable, with the square-root of the mean variance extracted from dimension 1 estimates falling below the respective factor correlation. According to these results, there is not sufficient evidence to recommend the immediate use of the instrument, and further studies are needed for a more in-depth analysis of the postulated structures. | 2023-08-05T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5341 |
Q:
Differential Equations-Variable Seperable Method
I was solving a basic differential equation which is given below.
$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{1-x^2}}+\frac{dy}{\sqrt{1-y^2}}=0$$
My solution is:- $-\sin^{-1}{x}=\sin^{-1}{y}+c$
I wrote it as $-\sin^{-1}{x}=\sin^{-1}{y}+\sin^{-1}{k}$
So my actual question is can I reduce it further?
If we take sine of both sides I think it will reduce to $-x=y\sqrt{1-c^2}+c\sqrt{1-y^2}$....$(1)$
Is it correct or wrong.If it is wrong then please provide me the correct one.
Further I am unable to get the actual differential equation by differentiating both sides in equation $(1)$ and this is why I am in doubt.
A:
After separating $x$ and $y$ variables we have:
$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{1-x^2}}=-\frac{dy}{\sqrt{1-y^2}}$
We then integrate:
$\int{\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-x^2}} dx}=-\int{\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-y^2}}dy}$
by changing the parameters of $x=sint$ and $y=sint$ likewise, we calculate the integral and conclude that:
$-{sin}^{-1}x={sin}^{-1}y+c$
Let it be like:
${sin}^{-1}x+{sin}^{-1}y=c$ (Note that as $c$ is undetermined, there is no difference between $c$ or $-c$)
Let's say:
${sin}^{-1}x=\alpha , {sin}^{-1}y=\beta$
So we have:
$\alpha+\beta=c$
Taking sine from both sides will provide:
$sin(\alpha+\beta)=sin(c)$
Or simply: $sin(\alpha+\beta)=c$
We now expand the sine:
$sin(\alpha+\beta)=sin\alpha cos\beta+sin\beta cos\alpha$
We can easily find each terms below:
$sin(\alpha)=sin({sin}^{-1}x)=x$
$sin(\beta)=sin({sin}^{-1}y)=y$
$cos(\alpha)=cos({sin}^{-1}x)=\sqrt{1-x^2}$
$cos(\beta)=cos({sin}^{-1}y)=\sqrt{1-y^2}$
So this is the result of simplification:
$x \sqrt{1-y^2} + y \sqrt{1-x^2}=c$
| 2023-10-26T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4315 |
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include "debugfs.h"
/*
* RAS Correctable Errors Collector
*
* This is a simple gadget which collects correctable errors and counts their
* occurrence per physical page address.
*
* We've opted for possibly the simplest data structure to collect those - an
* array of the size of a memory page. It stores 512 u64's with the following
* structure:
*
* [63 ... PFN ... 12 | 11 ... generation ... 10 | 9 ... count ... 0]
*
* The generation in the two highest order bits is two bits which are set to 11b
* on every insertion. During the course of each entry's existence, the
* generation field gets decremented during spring cleaning to 10b, then 01b and
* then 00b.
*
* This way we're employing the natural numeric ordering to make sure that newly
* inserted/touched elements have higher 12-bit counts (which we've manufactured)
* and thus iterating over the array initially won't kick out those elements
* which were inserted last.
*
* Spring cleaning is what we do when we reach a certain number CLEAN_ELEMS of
* elements entered into the array, during which, we're decaying all elements.
* If, after decay, an element gets inserted again, its generation is set to 11b
* to make sure it has higher numerical count than other, older elements and
* thus emulate an an LRU-like behavior when deleting elements to free up space
* in the page.
*
* When an element reaches it's max count of count_threshold, we try to poison
* it by assuming that errors triggered count_threshold times in a single page
* are excessive and that page shouldn't be used anymore. count_threshold is
* initialized to COUNT_MASK which is the maximum.
*
* That error event entry causes cec_add_elem() to return !0 value and thus
* signal to its callers to log the error.
*
* To the question why we've chosen a page and moving elements around with
* memmove(), it is because it is a very simple structure to handle and max data
* movement is 4K which on highly optimized modern CPUs is almost unnoticeable.
* We wanted to avoid the pointer traversal of more complex structures like a
* linked list or some sort of a balancing search tree.
*
* Deleting an element takes O(n) but since it is only a single page, it should
* be fast enough and it shouldn't happen all too often depending on error
* patterns.
*/
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RAS: " fmt
/*
* We use DECAY_BITS bits of PAGE_SHIFT bits for counting decay, i.e., how long
* elements have stayed in the array without having been accessed again.
*/
#define DECAY_BITS 2
#define DECAY_MASK ((1ULL << DECAY_BITS) - 1)
#define MAX_ELEMS (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u64))
/*
* Threshold amount of inserted elements after which we start spring
* cleaning.
*/
#define CLEAN_ELEMS (MAX_ELEMS >> DECAY_BITS)
/* Bits which count the number of errors happened in this 4K page. */
#define COUNT_BITS (PAGE_SHIFT - DECAY_BITS)
#define COUNT_MASK ((1ULL << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
#define FULL_COUNT_MASK (PAGE_SIZE - 1)
/*
* u64: [ 63 ... 12 | DECAY_BITS | COUNT_BITS ]
*/
#define PFN(e) ((e) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define DECAY(e) (((e) >> COUNT_BITS) & DECAY_MASK)
#define COUNT(e) ((unsigned int)(e) & COUNT_MASK)
#define FULL_COUNT(e) ((e) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
static struct ce_array {
u64 *array; /* container page */
unsigned int n; /* number of elements in the array */
unsigned int decay_count; /*
* number of element insertions/increments
* since the last spring cleaning.
*/
u64 pfns_poisoned; /*
* number of PFNs which got poisoned.
*/
u64 ces_entered; /*
* The number of correctable errors
* entered into the collector.
*/
u64 decays_done; /*
* Times we did spring cleaning.
*/
union {
struct {
__u32 disabled : 1, /* cmdline disabled */
__resv : 31;
};
__u32 flags;
};
} ce_arr;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ce_mutex);
static u64 dfs_pfn;
/* Amount of errors after which we offline */
static unsigned int count_threshold = COUNT_MASK;
/*
* The timer "decays" element count each timer_interval which is 24hrs by
* default.
*/
#define CEC_TIMER_DEFAULT_INTERVAL 24 * 60 * 60 /* 24 hrs */
#define CEC_TIMER_MIN_INTERVAL 1 * 60 * 60 /* 1h */
#define CEC_TIMER_MAX_INTERVAL 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 /* one month */
static struct timer_list cec_timer;
static u64 timer_interval = CEC_TIMER_DEFAULT_INTERVAL;
/*
* Decrement decay value. We're using DECAY_BITS bits to denote decay of an
* element in the array. On insertion and any access, it gets reset to max.
*/
static void do_spring_cleaning(struct ce_array *ca)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ca->n; i++) {
u8 decay = DECAY(ca->array[i]);
if (!decay)
continue;
decay--;
ca->array[i] &= ~(DECAY_MASK << COUNT_BITS);
ca->array[i] |= (decay << COUNT_BITS);
}
ca->decay_count = 0;
ca->decays_done++;
}
/*
* @interval in seconds
*/
static void cec_mod_timer(struct timer_list *t, unsigned long interval)
{
unsigned long iv;
iv = interval * HZ + jiffies;
mod_timer(t, round_jiffies(iv));
}
static void cec_timer_fn(unsigned long data)
{
struct ce_array *ca = (struct ce_array *)data;
do_spring_cleaning(ca);
cec_mod_timer(&cec_timer, timer_interval);
}
/*
* @to: index of the smallest element which is >= then @pfn.
*
* Return the index of the pfn if found, otherwise negative value.
*/
static int __find_elem(struct ce_array *ca, u64 pfn, unsigned int *to)
{
u64 this_pfn;
int min = 0, max = ca->n;
while (min < max) {
int tmp = (max + min) >> 1;
this_pfn = PFN(ca->array[tmp]);
if (this_pfn < pfn)
min = tmp + 1;
else if (this_pfn > pfn)
max = tmp;
else {
min = tmp;
break;
}
}
if (to)
*to = min;
this_pfn = PFN(ca->array[min]);
if (this_pfn == pfn)
return min;
return -ENOKEY;
}
static int find_elem(struct ce_array *ca, u64 pfn, unsigned int *to)
{
WARN_ON(!to);
if (!ca->n) {
*to = 0;
return -ENOKEY;
}
return __find_elem(ca, pfn, to);
}
static void del_elem(struct ce_array *ca, int idx)
{
/* Save us a function call when deleting the last element. */
if (ca->n - (idx + 1))
memmove((void *)&ca->array[idx],
(void *)&ca->array[idx + 1],
(ca->n - (idx + 1)) * sizeof(u64));
ca->n--;
}
static u64 del_lru_elem_unlocked(struct ce_array *ca)
{
unsigned int min = FULL_COUNT_MASK;
int i, min_idx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ca->n; i++) {
unsigned int this = FULL_COUNT(ca->array[i]);
if (min > this) {
min = this;
min_idx = i;
}
}
del_elem(ca, min_idx);
return PFN(ca->array[min_idx]);
}
/*
* We return the 0th pfn in the error case under the assumption that it cannot
* be poisoned and excessive CEs in there are a serious deal anyway.
*/
static u64 __maybe_unused del_lru_elem(void)
{
struct ce_array *ca = &ce_arr;
u64 pfn;
if (!ca->n)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&ce_mutex);
pfn = del_lru_elem_unlocked(ca);
mutex_unlock(&ce_mutex);
return pfn;
}
int cec_add_elem(u64 pfn)
{
struct ce_array *ca = &ce_arr;
unsigned int to;
int count, ret = 0;
/*
* We can be called very early on the identify_cpu() path where we are
* not initialized yet. We ignore the error for simplicity.
*/
if (!ce_arr.array || ce_arr.disabled)
return -ENODEV;
ca->ces_entered++;
mutex_lock(&ce_mutex);
if (ca->n == MAX_ELEMS)
WARN_ON(!del_lru_elem_unlocked(ca));
ret = find_elem(ca, pfn, &to);
if (ret < 0) {
/*
* Shift range [to-end] to make room for one more element.
*/
memmove((void *)&ca->array[to + 1],
(void *)&ca->array[to],
(ca->n - to) * sizeof(u64));
ca->array[to] = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) |
(DECAY_MASK << COUNT_BITS) | 1;
ca->n++;
ret = 0;
goto decay;
}
count = COUNT(ca->array[to]);
if (count < count_threshold) {
ca->array[to] |= (DECAY_MASK << COUNT_BITS);
ca->array[to]++;
ret = 0;
} else {
u64 pfn = ca->array[to] >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) {
pr_warn("CEC: Invalid pfn: 0x%llx\n", pfn);
} else {
/* We have reached max count for this page, soft-offline it. */
pr_err("Soft-offlining pfn: 0x%llx\n", pfn);
memory_failure_queue(pfn, 0, MF_SOFT_OFFLINE);
ca->pfns_poisoned++;
}
del_elem(ca, to);
/*
* Return a >0 value to denote that we've reached the offlining
* threshold.
*/
ret = 1;
goto unlock;
}
decay:
ca->decay_count++;
if (ca->decay_count >= CLEAN_ELEMS)
do_spring_cleaning(ca);
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ce_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int u64_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
*val = *(u64 *)data;
return 0;
}
static int pfn_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
*(u64 *)data = val;
return cec_add_elem(val);
}
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(pfn_ops, u64_get, pfn_set, "0x%llx\n");
static int decay_interval_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
*(u64 *)data = val;
if (val < CEC_TIMER_MIN_INTERVAL)
return -EINVAL;
if (val > CEC_TIMER_MAX_INTERVAL)
return -EINVAL;
timer_interval = val;
cec_mod_timer(&cec_timer, timer_interval);
return 0;
}
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(decay_interval_ops, u64_get, decay_interval_set, "%lld\n");
static int count_threshold_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
*(u64 *)data = val;
if (val > COUNT_MASK)
val = COUNT_MASK;
count_threshold = val;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(count_threshold_ops, u64_get, count_threshold_set, "%lld\n");
static int array_dump(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct ce_array *ca = &ce_arr;
u64 prev = 0;
int i;
mutex_lock(&ce_mutex);
seq_printf(m, "{ n: %d\n", ca->n);
for (i = 0; i < ca->n; i++) {
u64 this = PFN(ca->array[i]);
seq_printf(m, " %03d: [%016llx|%03llx]\n", i, this, FULL_COUNT(ca->array[i]));
WARN_ON(prev > this);
prev = this;
}
seq_printf(m, "}\n");
seq_printf(m, "Stats:\nCEs: %llu\nofflined pages: %llu\n",
ca->ces_entered, ca->pfns_poisoned);
seq_printf(m, "Flags: 0x%x\n", ca->flags);
seq_printf(m, "Timer interval: %lld seconds\n", timer_interval);
seq_printf(m, "Decays: %lld\n", ca->decays_done);
seq_printf(m, "Action threshold: %d\n", count_threshold);
mutex_unlock(&ce_mutex);
return 0;
}
static int array_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
return single_open(filp, array_dump, NULL);
}
static const struct file_operations array_ops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.open = array_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
static int __init create_debugfs_nodes(void)
{
struct dentry *d, *pfn, *decay, *count, *array;
d = debugfs_create_dir("cec", ras_debugfs_dir);
if (!d) {
pr_warn("Error creating cec debugfs node!\n");
return -1;
}
pfn = debugfs_create_file("pfn", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, d, &dfs_pfn, &pfn_ops);
if (!pfn) {
pr_warn("Error creating pfn debugfs node!\n");
goto err;
}
array = debugfs_create_file("array", S_IRUSR, d, NULL, &array_ops);
if (!array) {
pr_warn("Error creating array debugfs node!\n");
goto err;
}
decay = debugfs_create_file("decay_interval", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, d,
&timer_interval, &decay_interval_ops);
if (!decay) {
pr_warn("Error creating decay_interval debugfs node!\n");
goto err;
}
count = debugfs_create_file("count_threshold", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, d,
&count_threshold, &count_threshold_ops);
if (!count) {
pr_warn("Error creating count_threshold debugfs node!\n");
goto err;
}
return 0;
err:
debugfs_remove_recursive(d);
return 1;
}
void __init cec_init(void)
{
if (ce_arr.disabled)
return;
ce_arr.array = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ce_arr.array) {
pr_err("Error allocating CE array page!\n");
return;
}
if (create_debugfs_nodes())
return;
setup_timer(&cec_timer, cec_timer_fn, (unsigned long)&ce_arr);
cec_mod_timer(&cec_timer, CEC_TIMER_DEFAULT_INTERVAL);
pr_info("Correctable Errors collector initialized.\n");
}
int __init parse_cec_param(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return 0;
if (*str == '=')
str++;
if (!strcmp(str, "cec_disable"))
ce_arr.disabled = 1;
else
return 0;
return 1;
}
| 2023-11-29T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1484 |
Get all the latest news on coronavirus and more delivered daily to your inbox. Sign up here.
Inmates at a Florida detention center are crafting face masks for local hospitals on donated sewing machines amid the COVID-19 pandemic, according to a local report.
Four women incarcerated at the Hernando County Detention Center in Brooksville made more than 130 masks on their first day, Fox 13 reported this week.
"To see the inmates smile as they developed extreme pride and ownership of the project from a deputy's perspective while giving back to the community is a great gift," Lt. Teresa Stevens told the station.
Masks and other personal protective equipment amid the coronavirus crisis have been in steep demand for hospital workers and first responders as the potentially deadly virus continues to spread.
To help deal with the shortage, individuals and manufacturers across the country have been stepping up production.
MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell on Friday announced that his company would start making masks after converting a 200,000-square-foot pillow factory into a facility capable of turning out more than 10,000 masks a day. And he said he was working on converting additional factories in four states.
“That’s what we do at MyPillow,” he told Fox News’ Ed Henry.
CLICK HERE FOR FULL CORONAVIRUS COVERAGE
Eclipse International, a New Jersey mattress company, is also creating masks. So is the Denver Mattress Co., according to the Denver Post, which reported that the same material used in masks is also used in mattresses.
The nationwide push comes as infections continue to mount. More than 115,000 cases had been confirmed in the U.S. as of Saturday evening.
In Florida alone, there were more than 3,500 coronavirus cases.
Many people in Florida have ties to New York, which has by far the most cases out of any U.S. state so far, more than 50,000. And President Trump on Saturday said he had spoken to Govs. Ron DeSantis and Andrew Cuomo of Florida and New York, respectively, about travelers flying between the two states amid the crisis as he mulled and eventually declined to force a quarantine on his home state.
CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) eventually issued a travel advisory on New York and two of its neighbors, New Jersey and Connecticut, urging people in those states to refrain from nonessential domestic travel for the next 14 days.
Fox News’ Adam Shaw and Julia Musto contributed to this report. | 2023-08-08T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/1762 |
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention is directed towards the field of spatial light modulators (SLM). In particular the present invention is directed towards a directly modulated-SLM.
2. Description of the Related Technology
Gallium arsenide (GaAs) direct bandgap semiconductor material led to the first successful room temperature laser and remains one of the most important types of lasers even today. Its success is largely because it shares nearly the same lattice constant as Ga1-xAlxAs, which serves as a barrier layer for a wide range of x when fabricated into buried heterostructures. Because of both optical and carrier confinement, and because GaAs can be readily p-doped and n-doped, this has made GaAs lasers the most common of all semiconductor lasers. The laser output is centered at 850 nanometer wavelength in the visible red spectral region due to the band gap energy of 4.2 electron volts.
Now turning to Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Lasers (VCSELs), the fundamental difference between conventional edge-emitting semiconductor laser diodes and VCSELs lies in their geometry. As the name VCSEL implies, it is a device that emits power perpendicularly from its surface. More importantly, VCSEL wafers are fabricated using layer-by-layer deposition methods, followed by chemically-assisted ion beam etching to form planar arrays of pillar-shaped microlasers. The geometrical arrangement of their end reflectors consists of many alternating high/low refractive index layers effectively making up a pair of Fabry-Perot resonator mirrors. These mirrors can have reflectances >99%, deposited directly on both sides of a multiple QW active region. VCSEL arrays are usually grown using Metal-Organic Chemical Vapour Deposition (MOCVD) techniques by sequentially depositing all of their layers and then etching away all layers down to the substrate, leaving a two-dimensional array of microlasers with diameters generally ranging from 5μ to 10μ. These microlasers generally have only a few active quantum well layers (QWs) and therefore have low gain in their light propagation direction, which requires them to have mirror reflectances of >99%. However, since they have a small mirror separation, usually about 8μ, their single frequency operation is guaranteed. Two engineering problems that must be faced are attachment of metallic electrodes within a dense 2D VCSEL array and removal of heat from the array when the VCSEL microlaser array is operated at a high duty cycle. Usually one electrode is attached to the non-emitting end of each microlaser, but the output laser beam must emit through the opposite face where a second electrode is attached and limits separation distance between each microlaser. Typically, VCSELs have threshold injection current densities of Jth=5 to 7 kA/cm2, but due to their small size this translates to actual threshold current values of approximately 1 milliampere per microlaser with a typical power output ≦0.5 milliwatt at 850 nm for a GaAs-based device. One important feature of VCSELs is the shape of the output laser beam, which can be controlled to make it highly circular and symmetric about its axis. This obviates the need for external astigmatic type beam correction that is generally necessary in the case of edge-emitting diode lasers. While large 2D arrays may be etched onto a single substrate, the problem of effectively cooling such large arrays remains.
Lasers are typically thought of as devices that emit optical power due to stimulation of radiation as a result of optical gain produced by some type of pumping mechanism. Such devices may be considered as oscillators that generate external optical power in a highly directional beam within a narrow spectral bandwidth. However, all oscillators are amplifiers with feedback. Lasers are optical amplifiers with feedback provided by two or more mirrors. Those lasers having an open Fabry-Perot type resonator oscillate near a well-defined center frequency νo with adjacent frequencies determined by the mirror spacing L, where such side frequencies are separated by: Δν=c/2L.
If it is desired that the device discussed above should not oscillate at all, a device may be built similar to a laser that suppress oscillation by eliminating any feedback. Such a device can remain as strictly an amplifier without feedback. Semiconductor optical amplifiers (SOAs) have all the features of a laser diode type device but it must be ensured that they do not oscillate by equipping them with antireflective end face coatings and not exceeding pump input levels where they may tend to self-oscillate. The unsaturated gain coefficient in a SOA active region is given by:γo(ν)=(λ2/8πτr)ρ(ν)[fc(E2)−fv(E1)]
where: τr=radiative recombination time; ρ(ν)=joint density of states;
[fc(E2)−fv(E1)]=degree of population inversion due to the difference in occupancy factors for electrons in energy level E2 of conduction band versus electrons in energy level E1 of valence band.
When an SOA is pumped by injected current, it behaves as a four-level device, which means the gain coefficient γo(ν) depends upon injected carrier concentration, but in a totally nonlinear way. This makes analysis difficult, but can be treated by considering operation at high gain, where the peak gain γp(ν) varies nearly linearly with injected carrier density. Then it is approximated:γp(ν)≈α(ν)[Δn/ΔnT−1]
where: α(ν)=absorption coefficient under zero current injection; Δn=injected carrier density; ΔnT=injected carrier density at transparency condition where gain just balances loss. Finally, an expression for overall SOA unsaturated gain for an SOA length L given by:Go(ν)=exp[(Γγo(ν)−α(ν))L]
Here Γ is a confinement factor describing the ratio of power flowing in the active device region versus total power flowing through the entire device. Now consider the nonlinear behavior of an SOA device which is chiefly controlled by the injected carrier density Δn. Specifically changes in Δn can induce changes in phase associated with light passing through an SOA device. Conversely, the passage of an optical signal through an SOA can alter the gain by inducing changes in Δn.
The unsaturated gain coefficient denoted above by γo(ν) becomes saturated when power flows through an SOA. Gain media in which homogeneous broadening occurs is considered, and for which gain saturates in the following manner:γ(ν)=γo(ν)/[1+2[(Φν(+)+Φν(−))/Φνsat] Sin2kz]
where: Φνsat is the saturated photon flux in the z-direction along the device, which is related to the optical intensity by: Iν=hνΦν; and where k=2π/λ. The above expression allows for spatial hole burning in the gain medium, which may become important when SOA VCSEL type devices are considered.
The devices discussed above may be useful in variety of systems, however to date they have not been used to their fullest potential.
Current devices use indirectly modulated SLMs. The laser beam is reflected off of a pixilated surface. For example this may be a mirrored surface such as a Digital Micromirror Device. A laser beam is attenuated as it is illuminated through a pixilated surface, for example a pneumatic liquid crystal. This also requires the conversion of a laser beam with a Gaussian transverse profile into a flat-top profile for even illumination of the image.
Therefore, there is need to provide a device and system that requires no flat-top generator, has a broader range of pixel intensity control, such as gray scale. Has pixel control of optical signal power. Has the ability to change polarization on individual pixels within a page on a holographic storage medium. There is a need for a solid state device with no moving parts that can enable optical signal input for holographic storage from a bus or network. | 2024-04-01T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/8320 |
The accessibility and convenience of the Internet rapidly changed the way people access information. The World Wide Web (“WWW”), usually referred to as “the Web”, is the most popular means for retrieving information available through the Internet. The Web gives users access to a vast number of resources from locations around the world. In addition, the Web allows enterprises and organizations to expose their business information and functionality on the Web through software applications, usually referred to as “Web applications”.
A significant problem facing enterprises is the vulnerability of Web applications, databases and Web sites to attacks from malicious, irresponsible, or criminally minded individuals or organizations. As many web applications today utilize command scripts to perform a variety of tasks the number of client-side script attacks in web-applications has been rapidly increasing. A command script, or script code, typically is a computer file containing a sequence of text commands and arguments that conform to a particular scripting language. Examples for two recent harmful client-side script attacks include JavaScript (JS) hijacking and cross-site request forgery (CSRF).
The AJAX technology allows asynchronous and on-demand loading of dynamically generated content. For example, a piece of dynamically generated HTML content or XML document can be loaded in response to a user action. This technology, on one hand, can improve the responsiveness of web applications and enhance the end user experience, and on the other hand, a malicious web site can easily hijack pages from other web sites.
FIG. 1 provides an example for a JS hijacking attack in which an attacker server 110 retrieves confidential information from a trusted server 120 through a client 130. The trusted server 120 runs a web-application compliant with the AJAX technology. The client 130 and server 120 use Javascript to communicate with each other. For example, to get credit card information from a URL in the trusted server 120, the client 130 executes a function (e.g., XMLHttpRequest) that queries server 120 using a HTTP GET request. The server 120 responds with the credit card information in the form of Javascript code. The Javascript code contains a call to a client side function, which upon its execution presents the credit card information. The HTTP GET requests are responded to only during a valid session between the trusted server 120 and client 130.
The attacker creates a web page that contains a script element with a source (src) pointing to the URL that includes the credit card information. In addition, the attacker overrides the function that presents the credit card information with a new function that sends the credit card details to the attacker server 110. In order to get the credit card information, the attacker needs to lure web users to visit the attacker's web page (e.g., using spam emails). When a user follows the link to the attacker's site in server 110 and there is a valid session with the trusted server 120, the client 130 sends the information from the trusted server 120 to the attacker server 110 (using the overridden display function).
CSRF is another type of security vulnerability detected in web-based applications. Such vulnerability is generated by loading into a client's browser, e.g., client 130, HTML elements or Javascript code that generate an authenticated HTTP request to a target site in the trusted server 120. The CSRF allows modifying information stored by the trusted server 120.
Prior art solutions for preventing scripting attacks have not been sufficiently effective. Such solutions include changing the functionality of web-applications. In most cases this is a very costly task that also cannot be applied to any type of software (e.g., third party modules). Other solutions include static analysis of a script programs or validating the results of a script program. These solutions are disclosed in US patent applications 2007/0113282 and 2007/0107057, each of which is incorporated herein by reference for its useful background descriptions of the state of the art heretofore.
In the view of the shortcoming of prior art approaches it would be advantageous to provide an efficient solution for preventing scripting attacks of web applications. | 2023-10-09T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/4381 |
I’d like to start off by saying, some of the kindest, most loving humans I have ever had the pleasure of knowing are deeply devout, so there’s that. Now, that said, there are some very basic issues with Christianity (and most all religions) that one can not resolve without ignoring logic. At some point, you have to say to yourself “Even though it doesn’t make sense, I believe because I want to and that’s that.” Which is fine ( I know, thats what “Faith” is) but It just seems insane to hate, exclude, or belittle anyone based on such ambiguous and contradictory text (let alone to somehow allow it to influence public policy. Just my humble opinion:)
Javis | 2024-05-21T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/5084 |
The activity of wild type and mutant phenylalanine hydroxylase with respect to the C-oxidation of phenylalanine and the S-oxidation of S-carboxymethyl-L-cysteine.
The involvement of the enzyme, phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH), in the S-oxidation of S-carboxymethyl-L-cysteine (SCMC) is now firmly established in man and rat. However, the underlying role of the molecular genetics of PAH in dictating and influencing the S-oxidation polymorphism of SCMC metabolism is as yet unknown. In this work we report that the S-oxidation of SCMC was dramatically reduced in the tetrahydrobiopterin (BH(4)) responsive mutant PAH proteins (I65T, R68S, R261Q, V388M and Y414C) with these enzymes possessing between 1.2% and 2.0% of the wild type PAH activity when SCMC was used as substrate. These same mutant proteins express between 23% and 76% of the wild type PAH activity when phenylalanine was used as the substrate. The PAH mutant proteins (R158Q, I174T and R408W) that result in the classical phenylketonuria (PKU) phenotype expressing 0.2-1.8% of the wild type PAH activity when using phenylalanine as substrate were found to have <0.1% of the wild type PAH activity when SCMC was used as the substrate. Mutations that result in PAH proteins retaining some residual PAH activity with phenylalanine as substrate have <2.0% residual activity when SCMC was used as a substrate. This investigation has led to the hypothesis that the S-oxidation polymorphism in man is a consequence of an individual carrying one mutant PAH allele which has resulted in the loss of the ability of the residual PAH protein to undertake the S-oxidation of SCMC in vivo. | 2024-02-10T01:26:35.434368 | https://example.com/article/3360 |
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