context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classificatio... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "541 U.S. 509, 522",
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (... | 8,378,284 | b |
With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classificatio... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classificatio... | 8,378,284 | a |
With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that "[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications" for equal protection purposes. Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "645 N.W.2d 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classificatio... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classificatio... | 8,378,284 | b |
The BIA concluded that Diaz-Jaimes was ineligible to adjust his status because his conviction under Oregon Revised Statute SS 163.415 was a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequent to the BIA's order, we held that a conviction under a similar California state statute did not categorically constitute a crime involvin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 688, 693",
"parenthetical": "engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude",
"sentence": "See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 1061, 1061",
"parenthetical": "crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury",
"sentence": "See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not... | 3,858,085 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enf... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "326 S.C. 532, 532-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 S.C. 90, 92",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘r... | 1,258,948 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enf... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "326 S.C. 532, 532-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 S.E.2d 370, 371",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant wh... | 1,258,948 | a |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enf... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 S.C. 90, 92",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant who ‘r... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 S.E.2d 596, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 4... | 1,258,948 | b |
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one state give "such force and effect to a foreign judgment as the judgment would receive in its own state." However, "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent the litigation of personal jurisdiction in an action to enf... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 S.E.2d 596, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "\"Only a defendant who 'remains aloof by not making an appearance and has a default judgment entered against him may contest the issue of personal jurisdiction in a later proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 S.E.2d 370, 371",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court is bound to enforce the judgment of a court in another state only if the court in the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment.\"",
"sentence": "Taylor, 326 S.C. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 596-97 (“Only a defendant wh... | 1,258,948 | a |
Plaintiffs have failed, though, to explain how the training that was conducted was deficient or offered evidence that "the need for more or different training [was] so obvious that a violation of [plaintiffs'] constitutional right to bodily integrity was likely to result from not providing it." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "143 F.3d 1308, 1308",
"parenthetical": "\"Specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.\"",
"sentence": "Schneider, 717 F.3d at 773-74 (internal quotations omitted); see Barney, 143 F.3d at... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"We are not persuaded, however, that it was highly predictable or plainly obvious that a forensic chemist would decide to falsify test reports and conceal evidence if she received only nine months of on-the-job training and was not supervise... | 4,122,233 | a |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80",
"parenthetical": "finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because \"when testing requested by expert witn... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1032, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes def... | 3,784,842 | b |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1037, 1037",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist's advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]h... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1032, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes def... | 3,784,842 | b |
Counsel's failure to follow Dr. Winig's advice to investigate Heishman's mental condition constitutes deficient performance unless it can be justified as a reasonable tactical decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "70 F.3d 1037, 1037",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel followed a psychiatrist's advice to obtain additional psychological evaluation",
"sentence": "See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.3d 1073, 1078-80",
"parenthetical": "finding penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel waited 10 months to follow the recommendation of two mental health experts for further neuropsychological testing, because \"when testing requested by expert witn... | 3,784,842 | b |
Thus, this claim is also inextricably intertwined with the CBA; the Court must apply or interpret provisions of the CBA to determine whether Defendants acted improperly, without privilege and maliciously. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 F.3d 1532, 1540",
"parenthetical": "tortious-interference claim preempted where assessment of union's actions could only be done by interpreting CBAs, which may have allowed some of union's conduct",
"sentence": "See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "626 F.3d 1180, 1180",
"parenthetical": "negligence claim preempted because duties underlying claim arose directly from CBA",
"sentence": "See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir.2004) (determining whether employer’s pre-termination statements were ... | 4,025,584 | a |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "769 F.2d 958, 964-66",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover life insurance premiums that employer would have paid even though employee failed to obtain substitute coverage",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 95... | 10,526,215 | b |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "631 F.Supp. 174, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recover proceeds of life insurance policy even though employee obtained no substitute coverage",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964-66 (4th Cir.198... | 10,526,215 | b |
At trial, Tolan testified he actually spent $7,236 on medical insurance and medical expenses during the period from his discharge to trial. Tolan further indicated the cost of replacing the life insurance benefits previously provided by Levi exceeded $12,000, but Tolan admitted he had not spent that amount on life insu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in unfair representation case, plaintiff can recover only amounts spent for substitute insurance coverage or for medical expenses previously covered under employer's insurance plan",
"sentence": "Cf. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 & n. 15 (9th... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.Supp. 169, 179",
"parenthetical": "employee can recover lost insurance benefits even though no substitute coverage obtained",
"sentence": "Compare Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964-66 (4th Cir.1985) (plaintiff, the wife of a deceased employee, can recov... | 10,526,215 | b |
The Act sets forth a statutory scheme for the licensing of security guards and grants them the power to arrest and detain persons on the premises they have been hired to protect. S.C.Code Ann. SS 40-17-130 (Law.Co-op.1986). If Crooks had arrested plaintiff on Colonial Life's premises in exercise of rights granted him u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"According to this provision [SS 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCo... | 155,293 | a |
The Act sets forth a statutory scheme for the licensing of security guards and grants them the power to arrest and detain persons on the premises they have been hired to protect. S.C.Code Ann. SS 40-17-130 (Law.Co-op.1986). If Crooks had arrested plaintiff on Colonial Life's premises in exercise of rights granted him u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"According to this provision [SS 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Thompson v. McCo... | 155,293 | a |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 689, 695",
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caroni... | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 S.Ct. 331, 335",
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caroni... | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act and accordingly upholding the provision requiring adequate directions for use and adequate warning against use",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y.2008)... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caroni... | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 F.2d 748, 751",
"parenthetical": "finding that the phrase \"current good manufacturing practice,\" as used in the FDCA, relating to adulterated drugs and devices, was not unconstitutionally vague",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp.2d 385, 402 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caroni... | 4,365,584 | b |
Therefore, the Court declines to address any such argument. However, the Court notes that "Courts ... have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions [other than 352(c) ] of the FDCA in the face of vagueness challenges ..." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "638 F.Supp. 556, 564",
"parenthetical": "\"The [FDCA] on numerous occasions has been upheld against vagueness challenges ... this Court is unaware of any case holding any provision of the Act void for vagueness in any circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caroni... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upheld the FDCA against the defendants' vagueness challenge, specifically holding that the \"provisions of th[e] Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Caronia, 576 F.Supp... | 4,365,584 | a |
That reading of DeSouza's holding is incorrect. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in proceeding with the defendant's retrial during the pendency of his appeal from the denial of a plea in bar that was found to be frivolous. See id. at 202-203. The court noted in passing that the defendant's "se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "263 Ga. App. 462, 463-466",
"parenthetical": "deciding a challenge to the denial of a plea in bar that the trial court found to be frivolous in an appeal from the defendant's convictions and sentence",
"sentence": "See also Baker v. State, 263 Ga. App. 462, 463-466 (588 SE... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "258 Ga. 764, 766, n. 1",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that a merits appeal from a conviction and sentence and an appeal from the earlier denial of a plea in bar could be decided together if the General Assembly required an application to appeal the denial of a plea in bar, which ... | 4,349,521 | b |
Here, we find no conflict between Pennsylvania and New Jersey law: both rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and require similar elements for defamation. Accordingly, we need not resolve the conflict-of-law issue, and may "refer interchangeably" to Pennsylvania and New Jersey law when reviewing Kerrigan's defamati... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 808, 813",
"parenthetical": "applying both states' laws where there was a false conflict",
"sentence": "Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir.1994) (applying both states’ laws where there was a false conflict); see also Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "983 F.2d 1110, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "\"We need not resolve the [conflict-of-law] issue ... as the outcome is the same under the substantive law of either jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir.1994) (applying both states... | 3,596,056 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a d... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (199... | 9,099,661 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 A.2d 27, 30-31",
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying a defendant-protective malicious prosecution rule to Texas defendants",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsylvania has no interest... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (199... | 9,099,661 | a |
Here, Lumbermens is an Illinois corporation, not a Pennsylvania corporation. Thus, Pennsylvania has no contact with the dispute between Air Products and Lumbermens relevant to its interest in protecting manufacturers from extraordinary liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania has no interest in applying its rules of the road to conduct occurring on New Jersey roads even though injured plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (199... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 173, 178",
"parenthetical": "Massachusetts has little interest in shielding a foreign corporation from liability under a statute limiting wrongful death recovery",
"sentence": "Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 226, 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (Pennsyl... | 9,099,661 | b |
Sebasky also argues the evidence from M.B. was not clear and convincing. However, the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue and the defense did not attempt to rebut M.B.'s testimony. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses' identification of the defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Coleman, 373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Minn.1985) (upholding the trial court... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 N.W.2d 593, 602",
"parenthetical": "stating Spreigl evidence was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the defendant's identity was not in doubt and the victim testified about the incident",
"sentence": "See State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Minn.1993) (stati... | 10,695,609 | b |
Sebasky also argues the evidence from M.B. was not clear and convincing. However, the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue and the defense did not attempt to rebut M.B.'s testimony. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "upholding the trial court's admission of other crime evidence despite some uncertainty in the witnesses' identification of the defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Coleman, 373 N.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Minn.1985) (upholding the trial court... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 N.W.2d 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "finding Spreigl incidents were proven by clear and convincing evidence because there was eyewitness testimony, no rebuttal, and the identity of the participants was not in doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Mi... | 10,695,609 | b |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Br... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 U.S. 510, 520-21",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decis... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court... | 3,692,808 | a |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Br... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objec... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court... | 3,692,808 | a |
Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Br... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 F.3d 707, 709-11",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a state court's decision must be \"objectively unreasonable\" to merit habeas relief",
"sentence": "See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objec... | 3,692,808 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"T... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 189",
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencemen... | 4,027,726 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 189",
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencemen... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000... | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litiga... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"T... | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litiga... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000... | 4,027,726 | a |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1149, 1155",
"parenthetical": "\"As with all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (\"T... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litiga... | 4,027,726 | b |
However, these post-complaint affidavits -- swearing to such facts as they exist at the date of the affidavit -- have no bearing on the standing analysis. Rather, they should be reserved for an argument of mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "654 F.3d 1012, 1019",
"parenthetical": "\"[Standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.\"",
"sentence": "(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The confusion is understandable, given this Court's repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litiga... | 4,027,726 | b |
Accordingly, the trial court was not in a position to consider the new sale claim. Likewise, although able appellate counsel did an excellent job arguing the claim on appeal, this theory has not been preserved for consideration by this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs alternative argument that the loan modification was a separate sale under the MMPA not addressed where complaint only alleged that lender's actions occurred \"in connection with the servicing of the ... mortgage\"",
"sentence": "See also W... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant's motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S... | 6,840,961 | b |
Accordingly, the trial court was not in a position to consider the new sale claim. Likewise, although able appellate counsel did an excellent job arguing the claim on appeal, this theory has not been preserved for consideration by this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissal of MMPA claim based on lenders' failure to timely finalize loan modification agreement was upheld where allegations did not relate to any acts or omissions connected with original loan and amended petition did not allege a separate sale",
"... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 S.W.3d 296, 320-21",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not base civil conspiracy claim on two new independent causes of action not pleaded in his petition and only mentioned in his response to defendant's motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S... | 6,840,961 | b |
Thus, it is very unlikely that Congress intended for vessel owners to be able to cancel out this legislative decision by relying on the similar in rem protection of the 1851 Limitation Act. Permitting Southern Scrap to invoke the Limitation Act in this case would nullify the effect of the new SSSS 414(b) and 415(c), wh... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 335, 338",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Wreck Act claims arise \"from statutory authority creating an independent statutory duty on the part of the shipowner\" and that to subject such claims to limitation \"would thwart the expressed intent of Congress-removal of s... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "557 F.2d 453, 453",
"parenthetical": "disallowing application of the Limitation Act there because it \"would merely reinstate at another level the limitation on a negligent party's liability that Wyandotte had removed by authorizing an in personam suit\"",
"sentence": "See In r... | 3,751,810 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1... | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d ... | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | 4,882,964 | b |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d ... | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1... | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d ... | 4,882,964 | a |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 Idaho 594, 597",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | 4,882,964 | b |
Here, Kluss contends that the error committed is "of constitutional dimensions," and he focuses solely upon Article I, SS 13 of the Idaho Constitution, providing that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ..." However, as our Supreme Court has often held, even constitutional issues presented fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge to the statute on included offenses, I.C. SS 19-2132, first raised on appeal was held to be barred by the rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) (constitutional challenge to the statute o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "826 P.2d 1306, 1309",
"parenthetical": "the Court considered whether Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination had been violated because the allegation, had it been true, suggested fundamental error",
"sentence": "See also State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d ... | 4,882,964 | a |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 734, 735-36",
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal sta... | 3,817,794 | b |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunti... | 3,817,794 | a |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "addressing defendant's argument that federal statutes violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal statutes violated a t... | 3,817,794 | b |
. This ruling is also consistent with criminal law, wherein a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the alleged offense violates a federally-secured treaty hunting and/or fishing right. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant to challenge state conviction on the grounds that it violated a treaty-hunting right",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 735-36, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (addressing defendant’s argument that federal sta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting government's argument that hunting right was not a right enjoyed by the tribal member but rather a treaty communal right",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Fox, 573 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.2009) (rejecting government's argument that hunti... | 3,817,794 | a |
First, "federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Thus, prison inmates possess the right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the right to receive publications. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 787, 791",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he blanket prohibition against receipt of the publications by any prisoner carries a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.\"",
"sentence": "Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 550-51, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 1880-81, 60 L.Ed.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 608, 610",
"parenthetical": "in absence of legitimate penological interests, prisoners retain First Amendment right to receive and read publications",
"sentence": "Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 550-51, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 1880-81, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); ... | 1,166,030 | a |
P 31. The trial judge made a careful determination in the record by going through all of the evidence presented before directing a verdict in favor of Bar-rentine. First- the judge considered the issue of fraud. In order to establish its claim of fraud, the Estate was required to prove, among other things, that Barrent... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 So.2d 762, 764",
"parenthetical": "elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence",
"sentence": "See also Martin v. Winfield, 455 So.2d 762, 764 (Miss.1984) (elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 So.2d 753, 761-62",
"parenthetical": "stating that among the elements of fraud are a representation and its falsity",
"sentence": "See Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 761-62 (Miss.1999) (stating that among the elements of fraud are a representation and its falsity)."
} | 9,472,574 | b |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 1136, 1144",
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, —... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United Sta... | 3,988,487 | a |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United Sta... | 3,988,487 | a |
As to his misearriage-of-justice claim that his appeal waiver was otherwise unlawful, defendant must show that the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Defendant's arguments do not support the miscarriage-of-justice exception because his claims only concern t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The relevant question ... is not whether [defendant's] sentence is unlawful ..., but whether ... his appeal waiver itself [is] unenforceable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing knowing and voluntary prong and recognizing \"the logical failings of focusing on the result of a proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal is unknowing or involuntary\"",
"sentence": "See United Sta... | 3,988,487 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "618 U.S. 343, 349",
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a pl... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant's conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a pl... | 12,400,974 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 U.S. 517, 533, 535",
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pli... | 12,400,974 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 3... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | 12,400,974 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Moore's action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful post-deprivation remedies",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 3... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally cons... | 12,400,974 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 438, 445",
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484... | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 U.S. 510, 536",
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing t... | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookse... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing t... | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 U.S. 438, 445",
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 1... | 4,345,829 | a |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distributor of contraceptives who acted as \"an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so\" had third-party standing",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 U.S. 510, 536",
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing t... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | 4,345,829 | b |
Where, as here, the exercise of patients' rights is inextricably bound with the activities of their physicians, so is the provider whose operation is dependent on the existence of that relationship. In this regard, an abortion facility has a " 'direct stake' in the abortion process." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing to sue based on alleged infringement of bookbuyers' First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizati... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enterprises permitted to litigate against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers",
"sentence": "McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1028; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636 (bookseller organizations and booksellers had standing t... | 4,345,829 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk d... | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196",
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific applicati... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 ... | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688",
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk d... | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.W.2d 194, at 195-196",
"parenthetical": "article 42 authorized conviction for homicide committed by accident and mistake while driving intoxicated",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific applicati... | 10,020,493 | a |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | 10,020,493 | b |
The Act revamped existing proscriptions on "drunken drivers" by reducing the maximum punishment from incarceration in the penitentiary to a fine and confinement in jail, making a felony offense for a second DWI, and creating the offense prescribed by article 802c, ante. Regarding the latter, as the Court has often expl... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "one prosecuted under article 802c just as guilty of murder as if one had voluntarily killed victim",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 577 (1948) (Act made specific application to offense of drunk driving... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 S.W.2d 683, at 684, 686-688",
"parenthetical": "article 42 was general statute prescribing particular state of facts applicable to certain offenses actually committed, including certain lesser degrees of homicide",
"sentence": "App.1964); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R.... | 10,020,493 | a |
As we have determined, James-way was aware of its WARN notice obligations prior to it terminating any of the plaintiffs, and it was capable of providing WARN notice but failed to do so. Further, while Jamesway claims that, "once [it] filed its chapter 11 petition for purposes of liquidation on October 18, [1995] it was... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 F.3d 1287, 1287-88",
"parenthetical": "finding that lower court did not err in finding employer did not act in good faith when it was aware of Act's notice requirements, but \"consistently resolved any questionable [notice] issue in its favor.\"",
"sentence": "Aircap, 860 F.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "955 F.Supp. 78, 81",
"parenthetical": "good faith intent to comply with Act requires requisite notice not wait until plant closing or mass layoff is likely but instead employer must give notice when the plant closing or mass layoff is foreseeable",
"sentence": "Aircap, 860... | 11,666,217 | a |
128 Norris further asserts that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment, forbids the "all records" search warrant issued by the magistrate. We decline to address this argument because Norris provides us with no substantive reason for construing Article I, Section 14 of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 P.2d 388, 392",
"parenthetical": "refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refus... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2000 UT 17, ¶5",
"parenthetical": "deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discus... | 9,411,060 | a |
128 Norris further asserts that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment, forbids the "all records" search warrant issued by the magistrate. We decline to address this argument because Norris provides us with no substantive reason for construing Article I, Section 14 of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deciding only the appellant's federal constitutional claim be cause she failed to support her state constitutional argument with any substantive analysis",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to discuss defendant'... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 P.2d 388, 392",
"parenthetical": "refusing to discuss defendant's state constitutional argument because he failed to support it with any substantive analysis that warranted distinct analytical treatment",
"sentence": "See State v: Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refus... | 9,411,060 | b |
. M & G also alleged that defendants "spoofed" the sender identification information on the faxes it sent by including a number at the top of the fax that was not the number from which the transmission originated (see proposed Amended Complaint PP 9, 11(4)). However, while such conduct is proscribed by 47 U.S.C. SS 227... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the district dismissed allegations of statutory violations for omitting information required by TCPA, 47 U.S.C. SS 227(d",
"sentence": "See Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d 76, 91 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that \"Congress plainly opted not to ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "425 F.Supp.2d 76, 91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"Congress plainly opted not to permit a private civil action for violations of the fax-sender identification requirements ... [and that t]he fax identification regulations ... were issued pursuant to subsection (d",
"sen... | 4,262,453 | b |
However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the remedies provisions of the FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") must be interpreted consistently. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.3d 489, 499",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the remedies available under the ADEA and the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act] both track the FLSA, cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consistent.\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "applying ADEA precedent to the FLSA to determine whether wages earned after termination offset lost wage damages because \"[t]he FLSA and ADEA have the same remedies provisions\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d ... | 4,272,042 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, d... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2... | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is no... | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible... | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may ... | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2... | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible... | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, d... | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 1004, 1009",
"parenthetical": "holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may ... | 5,755,359 | a |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is no... | 5,755,359 | b |
The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is no... | 5,755,359 | b |
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