context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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|---|---|---|---|---|
Our insistence on a full explanation is not the caprice of one crotchety circuit. See, e.g., M.P.C. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "739 F.2d 108, 111-12",
"parenthetical": "vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49",
"parenthetical": "remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargain... | 3,490,573 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statement... | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statement... | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated... | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | 11,449,434 | a |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements volu... | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements volu... | 11,449,434 | b |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective as... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 866, 875",
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"... | 11,322,763 | b |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective as... | 11,322,763 | a |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective as... | 11,322,763 | a |
The two should not be equated. Otherwise, a party could always meet this element in a malicious prosecution suit any time an underlying suit is not reinstated before the statute of limitations tolls, an event that has no relation to the merits of the underlying suit or the circumstances surrounding the dismissal itself... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "772 P.2d 699, 699",
"parenthetical": "voluntary dismissal without prejudice in combination with running of statute of limitations did not satisfy requirement of favorable termination as statute-of-limitations bar did not reflect on merits of claim",
"sentence": "See Wong, 772 P... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "723 A.2d 881, 884",
"parenthetical": "dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds does not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution",
"sentence": "See Wong, 772 P.2d at 699 (voluntary dismissal without prejudice in combination with running o... | 240,852 | a |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 234, 244",
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutional... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not uncon... | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not uncon... | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not uncon... | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the C... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 234, 244",
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutional... | 8,957,409 | a |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the C... | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the C... | 8,957,409 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“t... | 1,454,787 | a |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 ... | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“t... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "14 O.O.3d 265, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the... | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "14 O.O.3d 265, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 ... | 1,454,787 | a |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“t... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“... | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 ... | 1,454,787 | a |
But they are wrong to do so. The District Court indisputably had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' suit and that suit had not yet been dismissed when the defendants sought to enforce the settlement agreement that they claimed had been reached. Thus, if the District Court correctly concluded that the part... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"If ... the settlement collapses before the original suit is dismissed, the party who seeks to keep the settlement intact may file a motion for enforcement.\"",
"sentence": "See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir.1999) (“If... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "344 F.3d 47, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "concluding district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to enforce an alleged settlement agreement before proceeding to trial",
"sentence": "See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir.1999) (“If ... the s... | 4,330,394 | a |
P 7 The charging function is inherent in the duties of the district attorney, an elected official, and is governed by the credible facts which, in the judgment of the district attorney, can be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and are consistent with the policies of that office, including relevant standard... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning the district attorney's decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (... | 9,424,032 | b |
P 7 The charging function is inherent in the duties of the district attorney, an elected official, and is governed by the credible facts which, in the judgment of the district attorney, can be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and are consistent with the policies of that office, including relevant standard... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning the district attorney's decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (... | 9,424,032 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 10... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 N.W.2d 756, 756-57",
"parenthetical": "teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (... | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 10... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 N.W.2d 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, bu... | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 10... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Minn. 113, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.... | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 10... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "11 N.W.2d 786, 790",
"parenthetical": "child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2... | 11,887,931 | b |
The third and final public interest factor is the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. It is true that Ohio has a local interest in adjudicating this controversy because defendants are headquarter in Ohio and some of the underlying events took place there. See Defs.' Mem. at 18-19. But the Court is n... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "104 F.Supp.2d 17, 17-18",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to transfer after determining that the decisions surrounding oil and gas leasing in Alaska were of \"national significance\" and not of local interest",
"sentence": "Sheffer, 873 F.Supp.2d at 381 (“[W]hen national ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.Supp.2d 381, 381",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen national significance attaches to a controversy, local interest can sometimes be diminished.\"",
"sentence": "Sheffer, 873 F.Supp.2d at 381 (“[W]hen national significance attaches to a controversy, local interest can som... | 12,270,690 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 N.J. 105, 117-18",
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s ... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 N.J. 105, 117-18",
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s ... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out... | 307,861 | a |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane... | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out... | 307,861 | a |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 712, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinatio... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howel... | 5,532,820 | a |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howel... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated ... | 5,532,820 | b |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howel... | 5,532,820 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975... | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975... | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would... | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowled... | 12,450,503 | a |
Generally, a court "may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, if no appeal has been taken." Included among these exceptional circumstances to Section 5505's jurisdictional time limits is where the court sua sponte corrects an illegal sentence originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an amended order subject to Section 5505's time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute",
"sentence": "See also In the Interest of K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914 (Pa.Super.2004) (finding an amended... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Santone, 757 A.2d 963 (Pa.Super.2000); C... | 8,420,298 | b |
Generally, a court "may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, if no appeal has been taken." Included among these exceptional circumstances to Section 5505's jurisdictional time limits is where the court sua sponte corrects an illegal sentence originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "639 A.2d 1235, 1239",
"parenthetical": "recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Santone, 757 A.2d 963 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an amended order subject to Section 5505's time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute",
"sentence": "See also In the Interest of K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914 (Pa.Super.2004) (finding an amended... | 8,420,298 | a |
Plaintiff responds to this argument by citing six appellate decisions--each from a different circuit reaching a result contrary to Ballantine--holding, essentially, that the absence of expert testimony or actuarial or mathematical evidence regarding methods for computing the present value of future earnings does not pr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.2d 665, 669",
"parenthetical": "actuarial and mathematical evidence not prerequisite for recovery of lost future wages",
"sentence": "See Bonura v. Sealand Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.1974) (actuarial and mathematical evidence not prerequisite for recovery o... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 243, 247",
"parenthetical": "court's instruction that jury must reduce future earning award to present value without identifying particular method of present value computation not erroneous",
"sentence": "See Bonura v. Sealand Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.... | 3,995,124 | a |
Moreover, the parties agree that Stewart's medical condition was known by the prison guards. Our review of the summary judgment evidence indicates that Appellees also intentionally disregarded the established treatment plan for Stewart. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 465, 465",
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoner's need for medical treatment but failed to provide it",
"sentence": "See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448",
"parenthetical": "stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner's injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it",
"sentence": "See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 4... | 4,016,777 | b |
Because the parties intended for the covenant to run with the land and because the covenant touches and concerns the land, we conclude that it is a covenant running with the land. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor's aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed ... | 10,350,157 | b |
Because the parties intended for the covenant to run with the land and because the covenant touches and concerns the land, we conclude that it is a covenant running with the land. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor's aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v... | 10,350,157 | a |
Iowa Code section 598.21B prohibits a court from considering a variation from the child support guidelines "without a record or written finding, based on stated reasons, that the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate." Iowa Code SS 598.21B(2)(d). We have repeatedly noted that courts must comply with this requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 N.W.2d 735, 737",
"parenthetical": "explaining a \"court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "487 N.W.2d 331, 333",
"parenthetical": "\"Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a... | 7,253,510 | a |
Iowa Code section 598.21B prohibits a court from considering a variation from the child support guidelines "without a record or written finding, based on stated reasons, that the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate." Iowa Code SS 598.21B(2)(d). We have repeatedly noted that courts must comply with this requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the requirement and that a decree \"fell woefully short of this statutory requirement\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a “court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "487 N.W.2d 331, 333",
"parenthetical": "\"Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a... | 7,253,510 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. D... | 7,052,711 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "190 So. 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 4... | 7,052,711 | b |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "190 So. 461, 463",
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driske... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. D... | 7,052,711 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "190 So. 461, 463",
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driske... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "190 So. 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "... | 7,052,711 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 521, 521",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 S.C. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for dete... | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 521, 521",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 S.E.2d 839, 841",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for de... | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 420, 420",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 S.C. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for dete... | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 420, 420",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 S.E.2d 839, 841",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for de... | 799,467 | a |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 19... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 N.Y.2d 482, 482",
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff... | 9,112,875 | b |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "240 N.Y.S.2d 750, 750",
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaint... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 19... | 9,112,875 | a |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 19... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant r... | 9,112,875 | b |
Ultimately, while acknowledging that it is an extremely close question, the Court concludes that the second element of the Gentry test is met. Consequently, the Court finds that despite the conspicuous opt-out provisions in the 2014 agreements, the Court cannot conclude that the 2014 delegation clauses are without proc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 Cal.4th 451, 451",
"parenthetical": "concluding that arbitration agreement had \"an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an... | 4,365,077 | a |
Ultimately, while acknowledging that it is an extremely close question, the Court concludes that the second element of the Gentry test is met. Consequently, the Court finds that despite the conspicuous opt-out provisions in the 2014 agreements, the Court cannot conclude that the 2014 delegation clauses are without proc... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that arbitration agreement had \"an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an element of proce... | 4,365,077 | b |
The ALJ simply cannot do this. Having rejected the available medical record upon which to base an RFC assessment, the ALJ was then required to call a medical advisor and/or obtain clarification of the record to flesh out what she needed to support her decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "867 F.2d 1040, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he administrative law judge is entitled to give substantial weight to the testimony of a medical advisor even though the advisor has not examined the claimant personally\"",
"sentence": "See DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040, 1043 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 664, 669",
"parenthetical": "sometimes additional development may provide support for treating source's medical opinion that otherwise appears to be lacking",
"sentence": "See also Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004)(sometimes additional developm... | 3,835,448 | a |
A tenant seeking equitable relief from the forfeiture of a lease despite the tenant's breach must generally place the lessor in the position it would have occupied had the breach not occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 A.2d 995, 997-98",
"parenthetical": "stressing equitable discretion of court in weighing relief from forfeiture",
"sentence": "See Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., 195 A.2d 744, 746-47 (D.C.1963); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rosen, 188 N.J.Super. 230, 234, 457 A.2d 52,... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing application of equitable relief from forfeiture of lease to chapter 11 debtor",
"sentence": "See Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., 195 A.2d 744, 746-47 (D.C.1963); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rosen, 188 N.J.Super. 230, 234, 457 A.2d 52, 54 (App.... | 6,127,434 | a |
Where, as here, a driver raises no issue concerning the scope or duration of a search to which he consented, only the time period between the initial stop and the driver's consent is relevant to our review of the reasonableness of the duration of the traffic stop. Under these circumstances, a period of detention lastin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[w]here at its inception a traffic stop is a valid one for a violation of the law, we doubt that a resultant seizure of no more than seventeen minutes can ever be unconstitutional on account of its duration: the detention is too short.\"",
... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 F.3d 1277, 1277-79",
"parenthetical": "concluding that 14-minute period between the initial traffic stop and the driver's consent to the search of his car was not unreasonable, where the officer was waiting for the results from a computer background check and had not given th... | 3,664,365 | b |
As noted above, the panel in Carpenter and the Love concurrence found it absurd to imagine that the discretion provided under SS 401 meant that criminal contempt may be punished in the same manner as terrorists or murders. The response of courts for hundreds of years to the same unbounded discretion has not been to con... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 F.3d 42, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "reducing contemnor's sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United St... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85",
"parenthetical": "noting appellate court's responsibility to review district court's sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir... | 3,387,445 | a |
As noted above, the panel in Carpenter and the Love concurrence found it absurd to imagine that the discretion provided under SS 401 meant that criminal contempt may be punished in the same manner as terrorists or murders. The response of courts for hundreds of years to the same unbounded discretion has not been to con... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting appellate court's responsibility to review district court's sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 F.3d 42, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "reducing contemnor's sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United St... | 3,387,445 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to resul... | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating o... | 1,067,683 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to resul... | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear th... | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to resul... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "122 Ga. App. 532, 534",
"parenthetical": "whether the defendant's conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin,... | 1,067,683 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "122 Ga. App. 532, 534",
"parenthetical": "whether the defendant's conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear th... | 1,067,683 | a |
As the trial court found, the statement was made in a hospital -- "the most formal of medical settings" -- after the victim had undergone "diagnostic tests up to and including a CAT scan." In addition, the victim had an existing doctor-patient relationship with Gladstone as she had met with her in Gladstone's medical o... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "986 N.E.2d 255, 265",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurse-examiner for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victim's \"past experience wit... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "143 N.H. 294, 304",
"parenthetical": "noting preexisting relationship between doctor and victim in analysis of whether victim made statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment",
"sentence": "See State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 304 (1999) (noting preexisting relationshi... | 12,460,365 | b |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L... | 11,180,095 | a |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 ... | 11,180,095 | b |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L... | 11,180,095 | a |
Specifically, no charge of CCE murder requires proof that there were other CCE murders, either in the same episode or in a subsequent episode, as required by the "multiple killings" and "killing another after a passage of time" "non-statutory aggravating factors," respectively. Thus, each of these "non-statutory aggrav... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "576 F.3d 870, 870",
"parenthetical": "determining that differences in the factual elements or components of the factors and the offense meant that there was no duplication of constitutional dimensions or otherwise",
"sentence": "Williams, 576 F.3d at 870 (determining that... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 571, 571",
"parenthetical": "considering whether the aggravating factor performed its required function in the penalty process",
"sentence": "See Cox, 133 F.3d at 571 (considering whether the aggravating factor performed its required function in the penalty process); s... | 4,300,614 | a |
On several occasions, our Court has specifically concluded that the protections of Section 9 exceed those in its federal counterpart. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "586 A.2d 898, 898",
"parenthetical": "observing in regard to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that from 1961-1973, this Court \"tended to parallel the cases interpreting the 4th Amendment,\" but \"beginning in 1973, our case-law began to reflect a clear diver... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "664 A.2d 969, 969",
"parenthetical": "addressing immunity and opining that \"Article I, Section 9 is, in fact, more expansive than the Fifth Amendment\" but not so much as to require greater protection than that provided by the relevant statute",
"sentence": "Swinehart, 6... | 4,366,257 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 301, 309",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinar... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 160... | 10,542,884 | a |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 206... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 301, 309",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinar... | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 160... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordin... | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 206... | 10,542,884 | a |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 160... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed... | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 206... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed... | 10,542,884 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 196",
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 16... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be... | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere ar... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be... | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere ar... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be... | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 196",
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 16... | 4,091,740 | a |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere ar... | 4,091,740 | a |
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