context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the validity of acts in violation of the automatic stay, it does recognize that the stay is intended to provide debtors significant protection. Additionally, courts within this circuit have adopted the majority position. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "206 B.R. 421, 423",
"parenthetical": "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1994) (“Actions by creditors to collect a de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 B.R. 763, 765",
"parenthetical": "\"Bankruptcy Courts have generally held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, and this Court finds no reason to disregard the general rule here.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr.D.S.C. 19... | 6,049,703 | b |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "5 F.3d 747, 747",
"parenthetical": "while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product through labeling are preempted, claims for negligent testing, manufacturing and formulating are not preempted",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claim... | 3,891,987 | b |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447",
"parenthetical": "FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs' claim that defendant failed to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing'of product",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate inform... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claim... | 3,891,987 | a |
The argument is made that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling concerns since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court is unwilling to read the preemption provision so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622",
"parenthetical": "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not preempt claims that relied solely on defendants' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study the pesticides in question",
"sentence": "See Worm, 5 F.3d at 747 (while claims resting on failure to warn or communicate information about product thro... | 3,891,987 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 575, 575-76, 583",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that p... | 6,800,472 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing illicit whiskey from address controlled by the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search wa... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that p... | 6,800,472 | b |
Such a statement generally arises after the informant has been caught in the act. In this case, however, the confidential informant did not make a statement against his penal interest, as was the case in Read, upon which the state relies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 A.2d 686, 686-87, 689",
"parenthetical": "informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search warrant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that p... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "588 A.2d 607, 608",
"parenthetical": "informant implicated himself in a drug-smuggling ring involving the defendant",
"sentence": "See Read, 416 A.2d at 686-87, 689 (informant admitted to purchasing marijuana from the address that police later searched pursuant to a search... | 6,800,472 | a |
The District Court likewise did not err in dismissing Express' Rule 60 motion. It is well established that Rule 60 is not a proper vehicle for extending the time to file an appeal that has been rendered untimely by the expiration of the thirty-day time window provided by Rule 4(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 U.S. 206, 206-07",
"parenthetical": "District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206-07, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "721 F.2d 91, 96",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (“[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this... | 4,166,296 | b |
The District Court likewise did not err in dismissing Express' Rule 60 motion. It is well established that Rule 60 is not a proper vehicle for extending the time to file an appeal that has been rendered untimely by the expiration of the thirty-day time window provided by Rule 4(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206-07, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (District Court lacks authority to extend time for appeal beyond constraints of Rule 4(a))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "721 F.2d 91, 96",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this question have uniformly held that the albeit harsh time constraints of Rule 4(a",
"sentence": "See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (“[T]he courts of appeals who have addressed this... | 4,166,296 | b |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 F.2d 1341, 1350",
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (... | 10,525,011 | a |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state ... | 10,525,011 | a |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report t... | 10,525,011 | b |
As in the case of the November 25, 1986 statement, there is no evidence that rebuts Buddy's affidavit. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling that suit on any of the claims could not be based on the statements of October 10, 1986. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rules gov erning press privileges in House and Senate galleries are \"an integral part of the legislative machinery\" and decisions pursuant thereto are protected",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 368, 372",
"parenthetical": "release of state legislative committee report to news reporting and publishing agencies is legitimate legislative activity",
"sentence": "See Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1980) (release of state legislative committee report t... | 10,525,011 | b |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of pro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 375, 377",
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 7... | 4,353,880 | a |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of pro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 66... | 4,353,880 | a |
The district court dismissed Pappas' complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 656, 662",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider FTCA claim",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (holding plaintiff bears the burden of pro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and \"the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 66... | 4,353,880 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry ... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia-ry ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633",
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary ju... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp.2d 627, 633",
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary ju... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in ab... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding cross-motions for summary judgment in abeyance, conducting a four-day eviden-tiary hearing, and then disposing of the motions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in ab... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 5512340, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in a... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 5512340, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding evidentiary hearing on defense of judicial estoppel after parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in a... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.Supp. 356, 366",
"parenthetical": "holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "876 F.Supp. 356, 366",
"parenthetical": "holding portions of summary judgment motion in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.2014) (holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentia... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "628 F.Supp. 92, 93",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 27... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "628 F.Supp. 92, 93",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 27... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.201... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court held in abeyance its decision on the FDIC's cross-motion for summary judgment pending an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of actual knowledge of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 64 F.Supp.3d 268, 270-71 (D.Mass.201... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | 4,221,088 | a |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 25932294, at *1",
"parenthetical": "con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-mot... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 25932294, at *1",
"parenthetical": "con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-mot... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "118 B.R. 120, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... \"",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "118 B.R. 120, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... \"",
"sentence": "Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.... | 4,221,088 | b |
The court may hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance, even pending an evidentiary hearing. This practice has long been a common one. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "463 B.R. 445, 452",
"parenthetical": "holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding",
"sentence": "Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion in abey... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "862 F.2d 567, 568",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 5... | 4,221,088 | b |
This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. These decisions are consistent with holdings of circuit courts that changes in roads on R.S. 2477 rights of way across federal lands are subject to regulation by the relevant federal land management agencies. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1513, 1518",
"parenthetical": "holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 1522, 1538",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"regardless whether the trails in question are public highways under R.S.[ ] 2477, they are nonetheless subject to the Forest Service regulations\"",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holdin... | 1,550,565 | b |
This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. These decisions are consistent with holdings of circuit courts that changes in roads on R.S. 2477 rights of way across federal lands are subject to regulation by the relevant federal land management agencies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 638, 642",
"parenthetical": "holding that proposed improvements to an R.S. 2477 route in a National Preserve is subject to regulation by the National Park Service",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1513, 1518",
"parenthetical": "holding that the owner of a patent or common law easement across national forest lands had to apply for a special use permit",
"sentence": "See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “regardless whether the t... | 1,550,565 | a |
If either of these two factors are found, "a substantial increase may be appropriate." The offense level involved here, see U.S.S.G. SS 2B1.2 ("Receiving, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property"), does not reflect the risk of personal injury. That factor, therefore, along with the natur... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant's conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-y... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "30-year departure sentence under SS 5K2.1 not excessive for death of kidnapping victim, who panicked and jumped out of kidnapper's car",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-year departure sentence under § 5K2.1 not ex... | 10,522,661 | b |
If either of these two factors are found, "a substantial increase may be appropriate." The offense level involved here, see U.S.S.G. SS 2B1.2 ("Receiving, Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property"), does not reflect the risk of personal injury. That factor, therefore, along with the natur... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "795 F.2d 1410, 1415-16",
"parenthetical": "pre-Guidelines case, which, in an analogous situation, analyzed whether death resulted from defendant's conduct in terms of cause in fact and proximate cause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989) (30-y... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "872 F.2d 121, 122",
"parenthetical": "upward departure under SS 5K2.1 justified on the basis of \"reckless flight\" of defendant transporting illegal aliens \"and the resulting death and injury which [flight] caused\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5t... | 10,522,661 | b |
As we have explained, we can discern no reason on the current record to support counsel's decision not to call Samee and Robinson as witnesses to testify at trial. Nevertheless, because a determination of whether to grant Branch's petition turns on the reasons why his counsel did not call Samee and Robinson to testify ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "428 F.3d 501, 501",
"parenthetical": "\"Of course, overcoming the strategic presumption does not, in itself, entitle Thomas to relief. It merely gives him the opportunity to show that counsel's conduct fell below objective standards of attorney conduct.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "813 F.2d 664, 672",
"parenthetical": "remanding for evi-dentiary hearing because the record did not reflect whether trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present certain evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir.1987) (r... | 4,159,698 | b |
This Court's precedent clearly prohibits lack of remorse as evidence of an aggravating factor. However, this Court has permitted evidence of lack of remorse to rebut proposed mitigation, such as remorse and rehabilitation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 So.2d 970, 978",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that lack of remorse is admissible to rebut evidence of remorse or other mitigation such as rehabilitation\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 978 (Fla.2001) (holding “that lack of remorse is admissible to reb... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "581 So.2d 31, 36",
"parenthetical": "finding that although lack of remorse is permitted to rebut evidence of remorse or rehabilitation, the trial court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of lack of remorse before the defense presented any testimony",
"sentence": ... | 8,343,685 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2082, 2082",
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was t... | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 U.S. 810, 810, 813",
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other potential crimes was the real motive.\""... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 128, 138",
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circum... | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed... | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed... | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we w... | 4,211,380 | b |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | 4,211,380 | a |
[S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because a traffic violation provides an objective basis for the initial stop of an automob... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a traffic violation arrest would not be unconstitutional if it were \"a mere pretext for a narcotics search\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanimous opinion [in Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813,116 S.Ct. 1769] held that we w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 Fed.Appx. 712, 715",
"parenthetical": "indicating that an officer's subjective motivations for stopping a car are irrelevant when \"there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a traffic violation\"",
"sentence": "See al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2082 (“Our unanim... | 4,211,380 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se in... | 7,414,567 | b |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; ... | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 624, 624",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Grat... | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se ... | 7,414,567 | b |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2019, 2024",
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; ... | 7,414,567 | a |
A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori illegitimate. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2535, 2535",
"parenthetical": "characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se invalid",
"sentence": "See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist purpose as virtually per se ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "invalidating legislation with legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be accomplished \"by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] from the national economy\"",
"sentence": "Id. 437 US. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536; see also Fort Grat... | 7,414,567 | a |
Moreover, I believe that this suspicion reasonably warranted the three-minute time intrusion imposed on appellant while Officer Beauchamp investigated further by conducting an open-air canine search of the exterior of the rental car. Therefore, I would hold that appellant's continued detention did not cross the sometim... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 200, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "holding that officers' third pat-down search of appellant almost thir ty-five minutes into traffic stop violated Fourth Amendment",
"sentence": "Compare Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 (recognizing that officers’ continued detention of app... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "947 S.W.2d 245, 245",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that officers' continued detention of appellant because he did not look like someone on a business trip was not based on articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity",
"sentence": "Compare D... | 9,461,053 | b |
Wahl cannot use a request for evidentiary hearing to overcome deficiencies in his pleadings. An evidentiary hearing on a motion to set aside a default judgment is not a matter of right, but requires first that- the- motion meet the pleading requirements of Rule 74.05(c). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 S.W.2d 531, 532",
"parenthetical": "defaulting party entitled to a hearing where she filed an affidavit, a proposed answer with her motion to set aside, and requested an evidentiary hearing",
"sentence": "See id. at 26; Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank v. Krider, 802 S.W.2d 531, ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "790 S.W.2d 490, 493-94",
"parenthetical": "no evidentiary hearing necessary because inclusion of an unverified police report with motion, while sufficient to raise inference that loss was caused by arson, it was insufficient to support alleged meritorious defense that the ars... | 12,176,493 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51",
"parenthetical": "permitting consideration of contractual documents that were \"central to [plaintiff's] claims\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting consideration of contractual document... | 4,126,771 | b |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "862 F.Supp.2d 1, 8",
"parenthetical": "reviewing membership bylaws where \"plaintiffs' claim revolve[d] around whether payment of [a] special assessment was required for membership\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to... | 4,126,771 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "842 F.Supp.2d 215, 218",
"parenthetical": "reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff's entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to... | 4,126,771 | a |
Unlike in the cases cited by USCIRF, GhoriAhmad is not suing on these documents, or basing her claim on any rules or agreements set forth therein. See Prince George's Hasp. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "613 F.2d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the district courts \"virtually exclusive reliance on the contract language as indicative of appellant's employment status\" and requiring review of \"all of the circumstances surrounding Spirides' work relationship\" in addition to... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing benefit plan documents where \"plaintiff's entire complaint centers on the retirement benefits that he contends he is entitled to receive\"",
"sentence": "Ctr. v. Advantage Health Plan, Inc., 865 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.D.C.2012) (permitting c... | 4,126,771 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Kan. 670, 680",
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. K... | 4,254,696 | a |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board o... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board o... | 4,254,696 | a |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Kan. 670, 680",
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. K... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board o... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | 4,254,696 | b |
Moreover, the district court concluded that none of the statutory amendments eliminated the nonuniform provisions of the KC-PMC, possibly giving rise to an exception to home rule authority. We agree and note that Subsection (c)(4) of the Home Rule Amendment specifically states that a charter ordinance "may be repealed ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting legislature amended Local Retailers' Sales Tax Act uniformly applicable after Court of Appeals decision in Home Builders, 22 Kan. App. 2d 649",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board o... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legislative amendment of statute at issue operated to repeal charter ordinance where amendment eliminated nonuniform provisions",
"sentence": "Compare Bigs, 271 Kan. at 460 (otherwise disapproved by State ex rel. Kline v. Board of Comm’rs of Unified... | 4,254,696 | b |
The plain language of the immunity provision indicates that its purpose is to grant persons who comment about a judicial officer absolute protection from civil or criminal liability, even .when criticism leveled against a judge is a false statement of fact that damages the judge's reputation. Thus, the provision would ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "882 P.2d 1293, 1299",
"parenthetical": "the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern",
"sentence": "See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo.1994) (the First Amendment does not confer ab... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 P.2d 104, 109",
"parenthetical": "proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive \"fundamental rights\" unrelated to these procedural changes",
"sentence": "See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d... | 11,715,205 | a |
To the extent that Wade attempts to challenge summary judgment on his claims for supervisory SS 1983 liability and negligence, Wade waived the right to appeal these issues by failing to file timely objections to the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation regarding summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to object to determinations reviewed de novo is a factor to be weighed in favor of finding waiver on appeal",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to object to determinations reviewed de novo is a f... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "628 F.2d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "appellant who failed to object to magistrate judge's findings and did not raise the issue until reply waived the issue on appeal",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to object to determin... | 3,478,886 | a |
It follows a fortiori from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail. In United Haulers, we explained that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1796, 1796",
"parenthetical": "\"Laws favoring local government ... may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism\"",
"sentence": "See id., at 343,127 S.Ct., at 1796 (“Laws favoring local government ... may be directed toward any num... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1796, 1796",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[w]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere ... under the guise of the Commerce Clause\" where a local government engages in a traditional government function",
"sentence": "See id., at 343,127 S.Ct., at 1796 (“L... | 3,616,500 | a |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 623, 627",
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | 8,577,610 | a |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 623, 627",
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | 8,577,610 | b |
Therefore, we hold that the requirement contained in West Virginia Constitution art. VIII, SS 7, that candidates for the office of circuit judge must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State for five years prior to their election advances the State's compelling interest in securing and maintaining a judic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "city charter provision that a corporation counsel candidate must have been practicing law in City of Seattle at least four years held to be reasonable requirement",
"sentence": "See Bullock v. State of Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1979) (similarly con... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equal protection clause does not prohibit adoption of more rigorous standards for assuring excellence in the judiciary than for other elective offices",
"sentence": "See also Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U... | 8,577,610 | a |
Applying this principle, courts have "held that information which is to be communicated to the public or others is not privileged." Similarly, "[documents which merely communicate information obtained from independent sources are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "816 F.2d 403, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"business documents sent to corporate officers and employees, as well as the corporation's attorneys, do not become privileged automatically\"",
"sentence": "See also Simon, supra, 816 F.2d at 403 (“business documents sent to corporat... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "91 F.R.D. 5, 5",
"parenthetical": "\"Funneling papers past corporate counsel will not shield the communications from disclosure\"",
"sentence": "Sneider, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 5 (“Funneling papers past corporate counsel will not shield the communications from disclosure”)."... | 7,792,760 | b |
Second, Agent Knoll's testimony about the "in furtherance of' element of the alien smuggling statute was permissible under Rule 702(a). Although Agent Knoll's testimony could be read to suggest that any movement away from the border "furthers" an alien's illegal presence in the country, his commentary was neither an in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 1285, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] factfinder may consider any and all relevant evidence bearing on the 'in furtherance of element (time, place, distance, reason for trip, overall impact of trip, defendant's role in organizing and/or carrying out the trip",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1110, 1113-14",
"parenthetical": "reversing judgment of acquittal on \"in furtherance of' element where evidence showed defendant drove semi-truck, in which checkpoint officials discovered several undocumented aliens, from the border town of El Paso to the permanent... | 4,151,056 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 971, 976",
"parenthetical": "corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered \"engaged in farming\" only if family members of debtor \"take an active role in the operation\"",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "57 B.R. 648, 656",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (... | 10,537,714 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 971, 976",
"parenthetical": "corporate debtor which leases farmland to tenant under crop share arrangement considered \"engaged in farming\" only if family members of debtor \"take an active role in the operation\"",
"sentence": "See In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr... | 10,537,714 | b |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 B.R. 280, 285",
"parenthetical": "though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "57 B.R. 648, 656",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (... | 10,537,714 | a |
At oral argument debtor urged us to consider these conversations illustrative of debtor's "conducting" the farming of its acreage. The courts below rejected this suggestion, and so do we. In order for debtor to be characterized as "conducting" the farming of its acreage within the meaning of SS 101(17)(B), some member ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 B.R. 280, 285",
"parenthetical": "though corporate debt- or leased all of its farmland in crop year 1987, debtor eligible for Chapter 12 relief because it, through its principals, had planted and harvested crops in 1986, the year in which it filed its petition",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 151, 151",
"parenthetical": "corporation receives income from a farming operation if income is \"derived from its own farming or production efforts as opposed to the farming or production efforts of others\"",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 656 (... | 10,537,714 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 162, 167-68",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. C... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the righ... | 9,334,986 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the righ... | 9,334,986 | a |
Again based on the limited record before us, Wilford's Sixth Amendment claim may not have merit. Even though Wilford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to other charges, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may not have been initiated in regard to the charges of this case at the time he was interrogated... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses\"",
"sentence": "See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "699 So.2d 629, 639",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 16, [Florida Constitution,] is offense-specific\"",
"sentence": "See also Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 639 (Fla.1997) (stating that “the righ... | 9,334,986 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 663, 667",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendants are \"estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate's ability to utilize grievance procedures\"",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (v... | 2,922,427 | b |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (v... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "318 F.3d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate's allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms",
"sente... | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 656, 656",
"parenthetical": "vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (v... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "explaining that grievance process \"is not an 'available' remedy under SS 1997e(a",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence... | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense wher... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 663, 667",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendants are \"estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmate's ability to utilize grievance procedures\"",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant o... | 2,922,427 | a |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "318 F.3d 523, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court erred in dismissing inmate's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmate's allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense wher... | 2,922,427 | b |
If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners' grievances",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense wher... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 736, 740",
"parenthetical": "explaining that grievance process \"is not an 'available' remedy under SS 1997e(a",
"sentence": "See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence... | 2,922,427 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties ca... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117",
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A mo... | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsidera... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties ca... | 11,530,070 | b |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties ca... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsidera... | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties ca... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsidera... | 11,530,070 | a |
A comparison of the Commonwealth's memorandum in support of its original motion with that of its motion for reconsideration reveals that the latter simply rehashes the arguments set forth in the former. This is not enough to merit reconsideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A party's failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form of a motion to amend.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsidera... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "142 B.R. 7, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties can rehash previously made arguments.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wedgestone Fin., 142 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a means by which parties ca... | 11,530,070 | b |
If the Court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have the power to decide defendant's motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 187, 194",
"parenthetical": "\"Because a holding that the district court lacked removal jurisdiclion would end our inquiry, we first address the district court's denial of [plaintiff's] motion to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 286614, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the issue of proper removal involves this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, it must be decided prior to [defendant's] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).\"",
"sentence": "See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.... | 4,268,785 | a |
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