context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose p... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointme... | 9,295,385 | a |
There may have been many reasons, some potentially bearing on the disposition of Rosado's application, as to why Dr. Spillman may have reported that she could not make these determinations. The ALJ, however, made no effort to determine what the reasons were and how otherwise to obtain that vital information. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73",
"parenthetical": "\"The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant's treating physician.\"",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“T... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 79, 79-80",
"parenthetical": "stating that the ALJ may not rely on sparse notes nor conclusory assessments from the treating physician",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is pa... | 9,050,017 | a |
The mere fact that the sentenced offense is not technically a sex offense "does not make the imposition of the special condition[s] inconsistent with the [Sentencing Guidelines'] policy statement." The mere fact that Dr. Miles has no history of sex offense convictions is not dispositive as to whether the sentencing cou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442",
"parenthetical": "leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly pro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant's history and characteristics",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not ex... | 4,098,945 | a |
The mere fact that the sentenced offense is not technically a sex offense "does not make the imposition of the special condition[s] inconsistent with the [Sentencing Guidelines'] policy statement." The mere fact that Dr. Miles has no history of sex offense convictions is not dispositive as to whether the sentencing cou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442",
"parenthetical": "leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly pro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "417 F.3d 54, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant's journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge's belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a thre... | 4,098,945 | a |
. In the instant case, notwithstanding that the challenged AFP procedures were revised within three months after the filing of the pro se complaint, Domegan does not contend that an informal alteration in the parties' legal relationship was occasioned by the litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 281, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"'the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice' to engage the gears of the catalyst test.\"",
"sentence": "See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (“We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an importan... | 1,871,505 | a |
The trial court, however, did not consider whether Nikzad's disclaimer of ownership itself may have been tainted by his ineffective consent to the police interview. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 407, 410",
"parenthetical": "if defendant's arrest were illegal, his subsequent denial of ownership of luggage would have been inadmissible",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1976) (if defendant’s arrest were illegal, his subsequent... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that defendant's disclaimer was not caused by illegal police action",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d at 697 n. 3 (finding that defendant’s disclaimer was not caused by illegal police action); United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d... | 654,401 | a |
If Fullerton had been convicted on the murder counts after a full trial, there would be no question that the jury's factual finding that he killed intentionally would satisfy the full-and-fair-litigation prong of the test for issue preclusion. Texas law collaterally estops an insured who has suffered a conviction for m... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 968, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the existence of a higher standard of proof and greater procedural protection in a criminal prosecution, a conviction is conclusive as to an issue arising against the criminal defendant in a subsequent civil action.\"",
"s... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "841 S.W.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "imposing sanctions for frivolous litigation on an insured who sought to recover benefits after a murder conviction",
"sentence": "Francis v. Marshall, 841 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex.App.— Houston 1992) (imposing sanctions for frivolous litiga... | 509,021 | b |
Plaintiff attempts to avoid making this showing by asserting that the violation of his constitutional rights is alone sufficient to prove irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. This statement is overbroad in that it must be tempered by the general rule that monetary injury is not a sufficient basis for... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "868 F.2d 69, 73",
"parenthetical": "\"Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutiona... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "933 F.Supp. 738, 754",
"parenthetical": "\"When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When... | 11,992,113 | b |
Plaintiff attempts to avoid making this showing by asserting that the violation of his constitutional rights is alone sufficient to prove irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. This statement is overbroad in that it must be tempered by the general rule that monetary injury is not a sufficient basis for... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "868 F.2d 69, 73",
"parenthetical": "\"Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutiona... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32",
"parenthetical": "\"Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violat... | 11,992,113 | b |
Pis.' Post-Trial Br. at 58-59. The court, however, does not have jurisdiction to award relief for future infringements. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "\"[R]elief for future infringements is beyond the power of the court by declaratory judgment or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784 (1981) (“[R]elief for future infringements is beyond th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. SS 283 is not available to a patent owner in a [Section] 1498 action.\"",
"sentence": "De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784 (1981) (“[R]elief for future infringements is beyond the power of the co... | 12,322,667 | a |
Plaintiffs have simply not alleged enough context specific details and facts to plausibly support a disparate impact claim based on these vague facts. Furthermore, there is no allegation that these remarks were made by decisionmakers or that they are contemporaneous in time as to the underlying action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 63, 69",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Sjstray workplace remarks,' as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discrim... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 323, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made eit... | 4,177,499 | a |
Plaintiffs have simply not alleged enough context specific details and facts to plausibly support a disparate impact claim based on these vague facts. Furthermore, there is no allegation that these remarks were made by decisionmakers or that they are contemporaneous in time as to the underlying action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 63, 69",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Sjstray workplace remarks,' as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discrim... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "983 F.2d 509, 545",
"parenthetical": "\"Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remark... | 4,177,499 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of t... | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of t... | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of t... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Bo... | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Bo... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Bo... | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "Se... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "Se... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "... | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any pra... | 1,825,669 | b |
Departures pursuant to Section 5K2.0 do not hinge upon a Government's motion in support thereof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "296 F.3d 192, 195",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court had authority to grant Section 5K2.0 downward departure despite Government's opposition",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); United States v. Domin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "159 F.3d 810, 813",
"parenthetical": "noting that district court granted defendant's SS 5K2.0 departure, without mention of Government support or opposition thereto",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); United... | 2,190,431 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 65, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of... | 3,754,119 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of... | 3,754,119 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1... | 3,754,119 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Gri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v... | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 4... | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Gri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v... | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v... | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286",
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Gri... | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286",
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’... | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Gri... | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.... | 157,428 | b |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his pet... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997... | 11,227,051 | a |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518",
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitio... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997... | 11,227,051 | a |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his pet... | 11,227,051 | b |
Eastern conceded at oral argument, however, that our recent decision in West Virginia CWP Fund v. Bender forecloses that contention. Our precedent also readily dispatches Eastern's complaints about the ALJ's consideration of the preamble to the 2000 Final Rule in evaluating the opinions of Drs. Rosenberg and Renn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "718 F.3d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "explaining that ALJ \"may consider\" regulatory preamble \"in assessing medical expert opinions\"",
"sentence": "See Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 678 F.3d 305, 314-16 (4th Cir.2012) (concluding that ALJ did not err in invoking regu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.3d 305, 314-16",
"parenthetical": "concluding that ALJ did not err in invoking regulatory preamble in assessing medical expert's credibility",
"sentence": "See Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 678 F.3d 305, 314-16 (4th Cir.2012) (concluding that ALJ did not err in invokin... | 4,356,820 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 985, 985",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s den... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 985, 985",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s den... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (re... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (re... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1170, 1171",
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reve... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1170, 1171",
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reve... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the distric... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the distric... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the distric... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the distric... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1099, 1102",
"parenthetical": "granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant's testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broad... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1099, 1102",
"parenthetical": "granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant's testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broad... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "vacating a defendant's conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 3... | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "vacating a defendant's conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 3... | 4,076,298 | b |
In addition to making it difficult to ascertain the factual allegations that correspond to each claim, shotgun pleadings also fail to specify which defendant is responsible for each act alleged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "921 F.2d 1465, 1518",
"parenthetical": "dismissing shotgun complaint that made \"factual allegations that could not possibly be material to any of the causes of action.\"",
"sentence": "Beckwith, 146 Fed.Appx. at 373 (“It is virtually impossible to ascertain what factual a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "146 Fed.Appx. 373, 373",
"parenthetical": "\"It is virtually impossible to ascertain what factual allegations correspond with each claim and which claim is directed at which defendant.\"",
"sentence": "Beckwith, 146 Fed.Appx. at 373 (“It is virtually impossible to ascerta... | 5,701,083 | b |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "475 F.2d 497, 501",
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to contr... | 10,535,261 | b |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” s... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right ... | 10,535,261 | a |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” s... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right ... | 10,535,261 | a |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” s... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right ... | 10,535,261 | a |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that his income was more than wife's during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-suppo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Ro... | 8,352,598 | a |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Ro... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that his income was more than wife's does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. ... | 8,352,598 | b |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Ro... | 8,352,598 | a |
. Young's statement that Alexander "[has] a gun on him now" is not rendered inadmissible simply because it was made in response to the dispatcher's question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "192 F.3d 767, 767",
"parenthetical": "fact that declarant answered dispatcher's questions, rather than giving spontaneous narrative, did not disprove excitement",
"sentence": "See Joy, 192 F.3d at 767 (fact that declarant answered dispatcher’s questions, rather than giving spon... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.2d 191, 194",
"parenthetical": "\"Declarations relating to the circumstances of a violent crime, made by the victim shortly after its occurrence ... may be admissible although made in response to an inquiry.\"",
"sentence": "See Joy, 192 F.3d at 767 (fact that declar... | 3,719,662 | a |
Once a witness voluntarily has revealed an incriminating fact, "the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 1210, 1210-11",
"parenthetical": "witness's disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant's trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (co-defendant’s submission to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1113, 1117",
"parenthetical": "co-defendant's submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (c... | 7,627,225 | b |
Once a witness voluntarily has revealed an incriminating fact, "the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1113, 1117",
"parenthetical": "co-defendant's submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.Supp. 262, 265",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir... | 7,627,225 | a |
HDC commissioners do not enjoy the insulation from political influence that comes from lifetime or long-term tenure. Once appointed, a commissioner is entitled to serve, by law, for a term of either five years (regular members) or three years (alternates). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "344 F.3d 292, 298",
"parenthetical": "assuming, in part because the health commissioner was entitled to serve a finite term, \"that the commissioner is not removable at will [by the governor] and that such insulation from political influence weighs in favor of a grant of absolute... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "Department of Correctional Services' \"control over the hearing officers' terms of employment\" undermines the officers' insulation from political influence",
"sentence": "See id. § 12-4(C). That said, there is no indication that HDC co... | 12,271,680 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 741",
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Boo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Boo... | 5,736,367 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Boo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, ... | 5,736,367 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Boo... | 5,736,367 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Boo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churne... | 5,736,367 | a |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and complete... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 F.2d 226, 234-35",
"parenthetical": "noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"sho... | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and complete... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "474 F.2d 336, 341-47",
"parenthetical": "holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldw... | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and complete... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51",
"parenthetical": "finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate\" to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co... | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and complete... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 F.R.D. 412, 416",
"parenthetical": "finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 2... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | 9,102,920 | a |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco,... | 8,665,092 | b |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106",
"parenthetical": "owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to con... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See ... | 8,665,092 | a |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 So.2d 368, 371",
"parenthetical": "veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that leg... | 8,665,092 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by aut... | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 P.3d 637, 639",
"parenthetical": "holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not pr... | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay)... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | 7,082,039 | a |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 754, 755-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automati... | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 P.2d 795, 797",
"parenthetical": "stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | 7,082,039 | a |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 561, 564",
"parenthetical": "concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohi... | 7,082,039 | b |
In the School Committee case, the parents were statutorily entitled to the cost of the special education their child never received, and for which they expended their own money. Unlike Hubbard, they, like the State of Massachusetts in Bowen, met all the pre-existing legal obligations to receive a cash entitlement from ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Burke, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2002, 2002",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided",
"sentence": "See id. at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002... | 36,488 | b |
In the School Committee case, the parents were statutorily entitled to the cost of the special education their child never received, and for which they expended their own money. Unlike Hubbard, they, like the State of Massachusetts in Bowen, met all the pre-existing legal obligations to receive a cash entitlement from ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Burke, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2002, 2002",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided",
"sentence": "See id. at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002... | 36,488 | b |
The Application Note gives the examples of an attorney serving as a guardian who embezzles funds from a client and a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme. In determining whether an enhancement for an abuse of a position of trust is appropriate, we look "to the nature of a defendant's relationship to the victims and ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 763, 763",
"parenthetical": "enhancement appropriate where assistant vice president of bank proposed to split commissions from bank loan insurance policies with insurance broker",
"sentence": "Strang, 80 F.3d at 1220 (enhancement appropriate where defendants befrie... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "80 F.3d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "enhancement appropriate where defendants befriended victims in order to persuade them to invest in phony scheme",
"sentence": "Strang, 80 F.3d at 1220 (enhancement appropriate where defendants befriended victims in order to persuade ... | 11,969,577 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1243, 1243",
"parenthetical": "\"We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184",
"parenthetical": "pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because \"[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy ou... | 3,552,029 | a |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 156, 164",
"parenthetical": "\"HLF's complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1243, 1243",
"parenthetical": "\"We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in... | 3,552,029 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184",
"parenthetical": "pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because \"[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy ou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 202, 202, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "\"We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,\" which \"is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive\"",... | 3,552,029 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 156, 164",
"parenthetical": "\"HLF's complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 202, 202, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "\"We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,\" which \"is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive\"",... | 3,552,029 | b |
One statutory exclusion from course and scope is implicated in this case: "transportation to and from the place of employment." Id. SS 401.011(12)(A). This exclusion is commonly referred to as the "coming and going" exclusion. If .an employee's ultimate destinations are home and work, despite any intermediate stops in-... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "330 S.W.3d 239, 246",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'coming and going' rule developed ... specifically for travel between home and work.\"",
"sentence": "Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Tex.2010) (“The ‘coming and going’ rule developed ... specifically for... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 S.W.3d 724, 727-29",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the \"coming and going\" exclusion because the travel was between work and home even though the injury occurred while the employee was first on his way to pick up a co-worker and then to a mandatory work conference in another c... | 4,048,530 | a |
An employee may establish a causal connection "by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the [retaliatory] action took place shortly after that activity." Courts in this District have held that a gap of even two months is too remote to infer any casual, connection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap b... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 364, 369",
"parenthetical": "Eight or nine month gap \"far too long\" to establish causal link",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate... | 4,346,753 | a |
An employee may establish a causal connection "by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the [retaliatory] action took place shortly after that activity." Courts in this District have held that a gap of even two months is too remote to infer any casual, connection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap b... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection\" in this Circuit",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month g... | 4,346,753 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 675, 685",
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer wh... | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 675, 685",
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer w... | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer wh... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 ... | 12,259,019 | b |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer w... | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer wh... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 ... | 12,259,019 | b |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer w... | 12,259,019 | a |
The state argues that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. See New York State's Memo at 8. Although, as discussed above, plaintiff asserts that there are no time-bar defenses to this action, and that application of such a defense would be violative of both the separation of powers doctrine and the S... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 1256, 1256-57, n. 16",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that application of laches to bar Indian land claims is inappropriate",
"sentence": "See County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 261-73, 105 S.Ct. at 1265-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (wherein Justice Stevens offered a det... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 261, 261-73",
"parenthetical": "wherein Justice Stevens offered a detailed explanation of, and approval to, application of the doctrine of laches to ancient land claims",
"sentence": "See County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 261-73, 105 S.Ct. at 1265-72 (Stevens, J., dissenti... | 7,393,879 | b |
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