context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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|---|---|---|---|---|
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sente... | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | 4,253,235 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sente... | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | 4,253,235 | b |
In the absence of an agreement with the government, the Does would have neither a false history nor an expectation of governmental aid. If the government owed the Does any duty at all, the source of that duty must be the alleged contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 647, 647",
"parenthetical": "finding claim contractually based where \"[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract\"",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 372, 377",
"parenthetical": "finding that the parties' dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Au... | 9,131,193 | a |
In the absence of an agreement with the government, the Does would have neither a false history nor an expectation of governmental aid. If the government owed the Does any duty at all, the source of that duty must be the alleged contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 647, 647",
"parenthetical": "finding claim contractually based where \"[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract\"",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.Supp.2d 160, 160",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a former covert employee's argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Au... | 9,131,193 | a |
Most of Count I can be disposed of summarily. AJi's complaint indicates that she has suffered discrimination on the basis of several protected characteristics, but she pursues only Title VII race discrimination in her brief. Her failure to support the remaining claims with legal argument or authority waives them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "975 F.2d 1336, 1341",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff waived disparate impact claim alleged in complaint because she did not fulfill her \"minimal responsibility of identifying the applicable law and arguing why the facts ... fit into the parameters of that law.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 302, 305",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have no obligation to consider an issue that is ... not developed [ ] in a party's brief.\"",
"sentence": "See Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir.1992) (plaintiff waived disparate impact claim alleged i... | 1,286,553 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers sea... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parol... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"own... | 11,894,423 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers sea... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 N.W.2d 482, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (19... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"own... | 11,894,423 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers sea... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74",
"parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee's apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee's mother may not have consented to the search",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 51... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"own... | 11,894,423 | a |
. The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific s... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... ... | 4,301,096 | b |
. The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific s... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inhe... | 4,301,096 | b |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 1291, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\"",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "899 P.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language .... | 6,934,264 | b |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "899 P.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language .... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 P.2d 319, 321",
"parenthetical": "noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no s... | 6,934,264 | a |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 1291, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\"",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899... | 6,934,264 | a |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 P.2d 319, 321",
"parenthetical": "noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no s... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver... | 6,934,264 | b |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue tho... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 861, 895",
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s auth... | 11,109,737 | a |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue tho... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to defin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding th... | 11,109,737 | b |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue tho... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to defin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding th... | 11,109,737 | b |
"[R]egardless of whether the de-clarant is available at trial for cross-examination, a hearsay statement is not ordinarily admissible as substantive evidence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining the abrogation of the \"Patterson Rule\" that allowed admission of a declarant's out-of-court statement as substantive evidence so long as the declarant was available at trial for cross-examination",
"sentence": "Warren v. State, 725 N.E.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "578 N.E.2d 649, 652-654",
"parenthetical": "overruling the Patterson Rule and adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d",
"sentence": "Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 835 n. 1 (Ind.2000) (explaining the abrogation of the “Patterson Rule” that allowed admission of a declaran... | 7,140,643 | a |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 1032, 1049",
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049... | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469,... | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469,... | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 U.S. 143, 145",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Lon... | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 103... | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 103... | 3,851,018 | b |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 419, 437",
"parenthetical": "\"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police\"",
"sentence": "See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 1500, 1504",
"parenthetical": "\"Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,\" prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for su... | 2,823,760 | b |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 1500, 1504",
"parenthetical": "\"Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,\" prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for su... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "396 Mass. 590, 596-599",
"parenthetical": "in some circumstances, prosecutor \"should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence\" not in possession of prosecutor or police",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 596-599 (1986) (in some c... | 2,823,760 | a |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "396 Mass. 590, 596-599",
"parenthetical": "in some circumstances, prosecutor \"should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence\" not in possession of prosecutor or police",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 596-599 (1986) (in some c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 419, 437",
"parenthetical": "\"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police\"",
"sentence": "See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“th... | 2,823,760 | b |
Raul's arguments that Texas law does not allow offset against child support obligations and that the obligations here lack mutuality also fail. Raul did not timely raise these arguments before the bankruptcy court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 413, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"Since this issue was not properly presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Galaz I, 480 Fed.Appx. 790 at 792-94 (holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 Fed.Appx. 790, at 792-94",
"parenthetical": "holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court",
"sentence": "See Galaz I, 480 Fed.Appx. 790 at 792-94 (holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument by failing to raise i... | 12,272,679 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so'... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so'... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so'... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply ... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply ... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 1... | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, ... | 12,458,997 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 596, 602",
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasi... | 6,047,325 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3... | 6,047,325 | b |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasi... | 6,047,325 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasi... | 6,047,325 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 7, 34",
"parenthetical": "bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any e... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 31, 40",
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past",... | 4,197,810 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sent... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 7, 34",
"parenthetical": "bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any e... | 4,197,810 | b |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 138, 143",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because \"any error in the district court's calculation ... was harmless\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 31, 40",
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past",... | 4,197,810 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 138, 143",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because \"any error in the district court's calculation ... was harmless\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sent... | 4,197,810 | a |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "461 B.R. 244, 244",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 ... | 12,269,618 | b |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "261 B.R. 22, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn't persuade this Court.\" (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 18... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 ... | 12,269,618 | b |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1959, 1959-60",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan,... | 12,269,618 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the po... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 81, 81",
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that aff... | 1,753,185 | b |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 81, 81",
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that aff... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the po... | 1,753,185 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the pos... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the po... | 1,753,185 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the pos... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the po... | 1,753,185 | a |
The fact that the trust is not self-settled does not necessarily mean that it is a spendthrift trust. Courts also focus on "the amount of 'dominion and control' exercised by the debtor over the trust property" in deciding whether the plan sets up a spendthrift trust. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 22, 25-26",
"parenthetical": "court found spendthrift trust where debtor had no direct control over any aspect of the plan and had very restricted access to the account",
"sentence": "Cf. In re West, 81 B.R. 22, 25-26 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (court found spendthrift trust w... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "97 B.R. 577, 577",
"parenthetical": "court found no spendthrift trust where employee was integrally involved in the decision-making process of the plan and was not restricted from drawing on the account",
"sentence": "Kaplan, 97 B.R. at 577 (court found no spendthrift tru... | 10,391 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive pros... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 U.S. 464, 467-69",
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the fac... | 3,839,887 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive pros... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts",
"sentence":... | 3,839,887 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive pros... | 3,839,887 | a |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 317, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 31... | 702,838 | b |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.C... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party m... | 702,838 | a |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.C... | 702,838 | b |
The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1480, 1488",
"parenthetical": "finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants' affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions",
"sentence": "See Westminst... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 So.3d 842, 842",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was \"hotly contested\" at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less ... | 4,065,352 | b |
The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1480, 1488",
"parenthetical": "finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants' affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions",
"sentence": "See Westminst... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "610 So.2d 528, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and \"liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (holding that th... | 4,065,352 | b |
[P 11] Finally, we reject Amile's argument that gratuitous conveyances may be set aside on the basis of a unilateral mistake of fact or law, even in the absence of any inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia and conclude that a deed of gift may not be refo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 A.2d 1114, 1116",
"parenthetical": "ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 59, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "grantor's motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Be... | 11,851,231 | a |
[P 11] Finally, we reject Amile's argument that gratuitous conveyances may be set aside on the basis of a unilateral mistake of fact or law, even in the absence of any inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia and conclude that a deed of gift may not be refo... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 59, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "grantor's motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Be... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "543 A.2d 367, 368",
"parenthetical": "ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when o... | 11,851,231 | b |
. The dissent disagrees with our reading of Dodds and argues that the Arkansas courts have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. Even if we were to agree with the dissent's reading of Dodds, however, Stipcich nonetheless still counsels that we take uberrimae fidei to be the law of Arkansas because the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 U.S. 318, 318",
"parenthetical": "\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.\"",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritati... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.2d 63, 66",
"parenthetical": "following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative loc... | 3,550,767 | a |
. The dissent disagrees with our reading of Dodds and argues that the Arkansas courts have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. Even if we were to agree with the dissent's reading of Dodds, however, Stipcich nonetheless still counsels that we take uberrimae fidei to be the law of Arkansas because the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.\"",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decisi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.2d 63, 66",
"parenthetical": "following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative loc... | 3,550,767 | a |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 Or.App. 305, 310-11",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp.... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | 4,358,607 | a |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp.... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp.... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 Or.App. 305, 310-11",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-7... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-7... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-7... | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-7... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on ... | 4,358,607 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 312, 312, 314",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "433 U.S. 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 ... | 3,720,413 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 2808, 2808-09",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 312, 312, 314",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at ... | 3,720,413 | b |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1077, 1077, 1078",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "433 U.S. 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 ... | 3,720,413 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1077, 1077, 1078",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 2808, 2808-09",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett,... | 3,720,413 | a |
However, if, despite its protection, bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection and remedy remained under the Bankruptcy Act."). Because the Supreme Court has instructed that SS 1673 does not provide for an exemption in bankruptcy, that statutory provision has no bearing on this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 B.R. 513, 518",
"parenthetical": "\"Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 B.R. 832, 838-39",
"parenthetical": "relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor's claim that SS 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protectio... | 3,752,445 | a |
However, if, despite its protection, bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection and remedy remained under the Bankruptcy Act."). Because the Supreme Court has instructed that SS 1673 does not provide for an exemption in bankruptcy, that statutory provision has no bearing on this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 B.R. 513, 518",
"parenthetical": "\"Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 B.R. 832, 838-39",
"parenthetical": "relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor's claim that SS 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protectio... | 4,058,921 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (notin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 372, 386",
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008)... | 4,049,960 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (notin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “... | 4,049,960 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (notin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “... | 4,049,960 | a |
We have jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3742(b). Whether the district court had jurisdiction to resentence Diaz-Clark is a legal question subject to plenary review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 1212, 1215",
"parenthetical": "'Whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular case is a question of law subject to plenary review.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sjeklocha, 114 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir.1997) (“The question whether the district court ha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1085, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"The question whether the district court had the authority to resentence the defendant under former Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sjeklocha, 114 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir.1997) (“The question whether the district... | 9,420,711 | b |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 P.2d 326, 326-27",
"parenthetical": "applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over p... | 10,309,842 | a |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 Colo. 219, 223",
"parenthetical": "regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions con... | 10,309,842 | a |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 P.2d 954, 956",
"parenthetical": "regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions cont... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled... | 10,309,842 | b |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on n... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 Wash. 2d 451, 465",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"entrepreneurial\" test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"... | 205,264 | b |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on n... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adopting \"entrepreneurial\" test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practition... | 205,264 | a |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on n... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 Wash. App. 822, 827",
"parenthetical": "relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state's consumer protection act because \"[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital's business, such as billing, were not implicated... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"... | 205,264 | b |
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