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That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone wi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, ... | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone wi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, ... | 7,616,197 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the feder... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17,... | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the feder... | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the feder... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17,... | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is... | 3,878,035 | b |
The court can determine class members' consent through class-wide proof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 F.R.D. 292, 299",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to strike class claims as immature because discovery would reveal whether proposed class members' claims are susceptible to generalized proof",
"sentence": "See Buonomo v. Optimum Outcomes, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 292, 299 (N.D.Il... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 318, 329",
"parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's class certification because the defendant had \"culled fax numbers from a variety of sources over a period of time, such that class-wide proof of consent [wa]s not possible\"",
"sentence": "See Buonomo v. Optimum... | 12,310,254 | a |
There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 S.W.2d 262, 264",
"parenthetical": "construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that b... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that builder's hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen is not enforce... | 8,395,598 | b |
There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "18 S.W. 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "holding that builder's hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 S.W.2d 262, 264",
"parenthetical": "construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that b... | 8,395,598 | a |
The defense did not offer the evidence under the first or second exceptions. We hold that the evidence did not qualify under the third exception because it was not relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reputation and opinion evidence about victim's past sexual behavior \"are not relevant indicators\" of consent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, w... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 MJ 174, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "alleged victim's sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oi consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is \"so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant's version\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44... | 431,937 | b |
The defense did not offer the evidence under the first or second exceptions. We hold that the evidence did not qualify under the third exception because it was not relevant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 MJ 174, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "alleged victim's sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oi consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is \"so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant's version\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 F.2d 1528, 1533",
"parenthetical": "reputation and opinion evidence about victim's past sexual behavior \"are not relevant indicators\" of consent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to is... | 431,937 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.198... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.198... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 P.2d 1234, 1235",
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234,... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 P.2d 1234, 1235",
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234,... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into \"victim\" category",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 13... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into \"victim\" category",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 13... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a de... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a de... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 A.2d 406, 409",
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expend... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 A.2d 406, 409",
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expend... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 N.W.2d 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"se... | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 N.W.2d 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"se... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape... | 11,104,231 | a |
Addressing the gravamen-of-the-offense factor in Ervin, the State asserts that the focus of the indecency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct, which shows that the Legislature intended for the State to be able to punish a criminal defendant multiple times. To support its argument, the State cites three relat... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33",
"parenthetical": "holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 S.W.3d 848, 848",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct -- that is, the offense is a 'nature of conduct' crime-- then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the f... | 7,093,520 | b |
Addressing the gravamen-of-the-offense factor in Ervin, the State asserts that the focus of the indecency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct, which shows that the Legislature intended for the State to be able to punish a criminal defendant multiple times. To support its argument, the State cites three relat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "235 S.W.3d 711, 717",
"parenthetical": "holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of con... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33",
"parenthetical": "holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature o... | 7,093,520 | a |
Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 N.W.2d 860, 860",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 N.W.2d 425, 425",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous",
"sentence": "See Wynkoop, 574 N.W.2d at 425 (recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to det... | 7,065,919 | b |
Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 N.W.2d 860, 860",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 N.W.2d 283, 286",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.\"",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law ... | 7,065,919 | b |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "28 F.3d 565, 570",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt pol... | 5,737,284 | b |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt pol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police... | 5,737,284 | a |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt pol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police... | 5,737,284 | a |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt pol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police... | 5,737,284 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3100, 3100",
"parenthetical": "ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys' fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (or... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent na... | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3100, 3100",
"parenthetical": "ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys' fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (or... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys... | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent na... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ord... | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ord... | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ord... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent na... | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ord... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys... | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent na... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1551, 1551",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 ... | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1551, 1551",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 ... | 519,620 | b |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly state... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence"... | 3,730,402 | b |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly state... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as ... | 3,730,402 | a |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly state... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not ... | 3,730,402 | a |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly state... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as ... | 3,730,402 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 118, 129",
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common l... | 11,564,217 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section ... | 11,564,217 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sente... | 11,564,217 | b |
Schmitt's attorney submitted an itemized bill. It appears most, if not all, of the charges were made in pursuit of a change of venue. On remand, the district court should consider this billing request, as well as time spent on taking this appeal, in awarding Schmitt attorney fees and costs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 N.W.2d 278, 278",
"parenthetical": "remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award of appellate attorney fees",
"sentence": "See Bankers Trust, 326 N.W.2d at 278 (remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "814 N.W.2d 215, 233",
"parenthetical": "remanding to allow the district court to evaluate the amount of attorney fees that should be awarded",
"sentence": "See Bankers Trust, 326 N.W.2d at 278 (remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award o... | 6,806,859 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 P.2d 378, 381",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that on... | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 P.2d 378, 381",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that on... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalti... | 11,613,150 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs' \"suddenly discovered affection for arbitration\" came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 43; see als... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties ha... | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs' \"suddenly discovered affection for arbitration\" came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 43; see als... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indic... | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.2d 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties ha... | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.2d 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (... | 11,474,007 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties ha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 221, 221",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable di... | 11,474,007 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 221, 221",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable di... | 11,474,007 | b |
Another tactic is to characterize a case as involving equitable claims rather than damages, or artfully pleading, in bad faith, an amount of damages less than the $50,000.00 minimum jurisdictional amount. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand should have been granted where complaint did not allege injuries \"facially likely\" to exceed $50,000.00",
"sentence": "See e.g., Marcel v. Pool Company, 5 F.3d 81 (5th Cir.1993) (remand properly denied where complaint “facially apparent” that dam... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand properly denied where complaint \"facially apparent\" that damages could easily exceed $50,000.00",
"sentence": "See e.g., Marcel v. Pool Company, 5 F.3d 81 (5th Cir.1993) (remand properly denied where complaint “facially apparent” that damages cou... | 3,860,098 | b |
That is not to say that non-discriminatory laws insulating a group of primarily local companies from competition do not have a negative impact on interstate commerce. Such laws, though, are best reviewed under the undue burden test, and are not subject to strict scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 F.3d 49, 49-50",
"parenthetical": "a local law that does not give an advantage to local companies over out-of-state competitors is reviewed under the undue burden test",
"sentence": "See also Town of Southold, 477 F.3d at 49-50 (a local law that does not give an advant... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1797, 1797",
"parenthetical": "nondiscriminatory local laws \"which treat instate private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not 'discriminate against interstate commerce' \" and are subject to the undue burden test",
"sentence": "See United ... | 3,768,058 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 260, 260",
"parenthetical": "qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 53... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 260, 260",
"parenthetical": "qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 53... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2... | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting tha... | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2... | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was remo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (... | 5,899,811 | b |
App., Vol. 3, at 313. We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that this provider's form supports, and does not contradict, the ALJ's RFC finding. Thus, we find no reversible error in the ALJ's failure to discuss this opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.3d 578, 578-79",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n ALJ's failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ's assessment of residual functional capacity.\"",
"sentence": "See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "379 F.3d 945, 947",
"parenthetical": "\"When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant's RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.\"",
"sentence": "See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to weigh a medic... | 4,196,875 | a |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "835 F.3d 670, 676",
"parenthetical": "\"We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.\"",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court jud... | 12,267,983 | a |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "749 F.3d 671, 685",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under SS 1106 qualifies for an exemption under SS 1108.\"",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismi... | 12,267,983 | b |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 1215, 1215",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish th... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismi... | 12,267,983 | b |
Thus, taken as a whole, the record evidence shows that the plaintiffs primary duty was to make sales. See Olivo v. GMAC Mortg. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that MLOs who sell mortgage loan packages fulfill the sales requirement of the outside sales exemption",
"sentence": "Corp., 374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550 (E.D.Mich.2004) (in determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson, “[c]ourts have c... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550",
"parenthetical": "in determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson, \"[c]ourts have considered whether the employee: (1",
"sentence": "Corp., 374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550 (E.D.Mich.2004) (in determining whether an employee is an outside sale... | 3,884,285 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual hara... | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual hara... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual hara... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment oppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual hara... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.... | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.... | 11,575,069 | b |
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