context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.... | 11,575,069 | b |
. Although the 2012 district court did not expressly rely on the Revised PSR in calculating the drug quantity, we may affirm that court's quantity finding "on any ground supported in the record." The fact that the original sentencing court likewise did not adopt the Revised PSR is not problematic either. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 1205, 1217",
"parenthetical": "\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) (resentencing court entitled to rely ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 F.3d 764, 768",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) ... | 4,324,084 | b |
. Although the 2012 district court did not expressly rely on the Revised PSR in calculating the drug quantity, we may affirm that court's quantity finding "on any ground supported in the record." The fact that the original sentencing court likewise did not adopt the Revised PSR is not problematic either. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "694 F.3d 665, 670",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court may examine \"the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 F.3d 764, 768",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) ... | 4,324,084 | b |
The provision mentions a specific, discrete beneficiary group within the statutory text -- the FQHCs. It is "phrased in terms of the persons benefitted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 190, 201-02",
"parenthetical": "finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396r-6, stating that \"each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately prec... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 279, 279, 287",
"parenthetical": "language stating that \"[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records\" was not rights-creating beca... | 9,034,169 | b |
The provision mentions a specific, discrete beneficiary group within the statutory text -- the FQHCs. It is "phrased in terms of the persons benefitted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 190, 201-02",
"parenthetical": "finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396r-6, stating that \"each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately prec... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "language stating that \"[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records\" was not rights-creating because the \"focus is t... | 9,034,169 | b |
Farah contends the Supreme Court did not intend for DeLanney to preclude a fraud cause of action simply because the plaintiff seeks to recover expectancy damages. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "847 S.W.2d 294, 294, 298",
"parenthetical": "negli gent misrepresentation consists of misrepresentation of existing fact rather than promise of future conduct",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. AmWest Sav. Ass’n, 825 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) (attemp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 S.W.2d 552, 554",
"parenthetical": "attempt to recover benefit of the bargain does not transform a fraud into a breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. AmWest Sav. Ass’n, 825 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) (attempt to recover benefit of the ... | 10,017,768 | b |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 U.S. 197, 207",
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful ... | 4,032,208 | a |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful ... | 4,032,208 | a |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L... | 4,032,208 | b |
In this way Bradshaw effectively granted the Bank the power, in the case of HBP's default, to prefer other creditors over the government. While we agree with the district judge that when the Bank iroze HBP's accounts Bradshaw lacked the power to pay the taxes absent the Bank's approval, this lack of power was the direc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 305, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under SS 6672\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "876 F.2d 485, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "\"[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over ... | 11,647,769 | a |
In this way Bradshaw effectively granted the Bank the power, in the case of HBP's default, to prefer other creditors over the government. While we agree with the district judge that when the Bank iroze HBP's accounts Bradshaw lacked the power to pay the taxes absent the Bank's approval, this lack of power was the direc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 305, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under SS 6672\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 240, 240",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditor... | 11,647,769 | a |
Because the Court found that the VRS faced no immediate harm due to uncertainty about the status of that agency's legal representation; because temporary injunctions should be granted only in emergency circumstances; and because injunctions should only be entered against high elected officials with great circumspection... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Va. 182, 184",
"parenthetical": "\"A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.\"",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 10... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit's adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the lik... | 3,933,587 | a |
Because the Court found that the VRS faced no immediate harm due to uncertainty about the status of that agency's legal representation; because temporary injunctions should be granted only in emergency circumstances; and because injunctions should only be entered against high elected officials with great circumspection... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 S.E. 1082, 1083",
"parenthetical": "\"A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.\"",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit's adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the lik... | 3,933,587 | a |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 1184, 1192",
"parenthetical": "\"Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is 'comprehensive and pervasive.' \"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests ar... | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 1184, 1192",
"parenthetical": "\"Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is 'comprehensive and pervasive.' \"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests ar... | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "448 U.S. 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“... | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "448 U.S. 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“... | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interes... | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interes... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9... | 12,174,328 | a |
It is clear from these facts that the class action plaintiff voluntarily abandoned or withdrew his claims against DaimlerChrys-ler. Pennsylvania appellate courts have concluded that such a voluntary dismissal or abandonment of a civil claim could support a cause of action under the Dragonetti Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "701 A.2d 242, 247-48",
"parenthetical": "finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Super.1997) (fi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1996 WL 50632, at * 3",
"parenthetical": "noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Sup... | 11,079,510 | a |
It is clear from these facts that the class action plaintiff voluntarily abandoned or withdrew his claims against DaimlerChrys-ler. Pennsylvania appellate courts have concluded that such a voluntary dismissal or abandonment of a civil claim could support a cause of action under the Dragonetti Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1996 WL 50632, at * 3",
"parenthetical": "noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Sup... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 A.2d 1020, 1020-21",
"parenthetical": "finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent's will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those cl... | 11,079,510 | b |
However, a canine sniff "may impact the determination of whether a search is reasonable if the use of the dog causes a delay." Id. There is no clear-cut rule for determining a reasonably allowable delay pursuant to a traffic stop. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "700 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1045, 1047-48",
"parenthetical": "holding that a two-minute delay beyond the conclusion of a traffic stop, which itself lasted twelve to thirteen minutes, was not unreasonable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garrett, 139 Fed.Appx. 720, 723 (7th Cir. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Fed.Appx. 720, 723",
"parenthetical": "stating that if a dog alerted within five to ten minutes of the initial stop, that would likely be a reasonable amount of time, while fifteen or nineteen might be unreasonable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garrett, 139 Fed.Appx. ... | 12,272,330 | b |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejec... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "503 F.2d 430, 440-42",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that \"pattern\" as used in SS 1962(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutional... | 3,801,938 | b |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58",
"parenthetical": "finding defendant's argument that SS 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because \"[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions\" of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejec... | 3,801,938 | a |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejec... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 F.2d 352, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. SS 1961, which defines 'racketeering activity' with reference to specific offenses, 'pattern of racketeering activity' with reference to a definite number of acts of 'racketeering activity' within specifi... | 3,801,938 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "253 Kan. 75, 91",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 Kan. 212, 220-22",
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34... | 342,014 | a |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendan... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "253 Kan. 75, 91",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial... | 342,014 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 Kan. 212, 220-22",
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see... | 342,014 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendan... | 342,014 | a |
Patrolman Bowler testified that Robertson drove up to the main gate of the Dam Neck Base, territory over which the United States Government exercises jurisdiction. That uncontradicted testimony provides a sufficient basis for prosecuting under the Assimilative Crimes Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 639, 641",
"parenthetical": "\"Although defendants are correct in pointing out that the District Judge declined to take judicial notice that the [Blue Ridge] Parkway was so located this court may, and does, take judicial notice of commonly known facts, especially where t... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "magistrate could take judicial notice of distances involved in alleged transportation of explosive devices because \"geographical information is especially appropriate for judicial notice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lavender, 602 F.2d 639, 641 (... | 3,879,364 | a |
The Second Circuit has held that Section 1981 claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.3d 486, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"Both Mr. Ruiz's Title VII Claims and his claims for race and national origin discrimination under Sections 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ...\"",
"sentence": "Ruiz v. Co... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 206, 225",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he factors justifying summary judgment dismissing Patterson's Title VII claim against the municipal defendants for termination of his employment equally support the summary dismissal of his claims for termination brought under 42 U.... | 3,996,307 | a |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "536 N.E.2d 823, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire arti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court re... | 214,306 | a |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "536 N.E.2d 823, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire arti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding poli... | 214,306 | b |
The legislature's purpose in amending the law was to fund the collection of samples and the maintenance and operation of DNA databases, which, the legislature had repeatedly found, were important tools in criminal investigations in excluding individuals who are the subject of investigations or prosecutions, in detectin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "740 F.3d 1128, 1135",
"parenthetical": "$100 annual registration fee imposed on sex offenders convicted in Wisconsin did not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws because the fee was intended to compensate the state for the expense of maintaining the sex offender re... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "895 A.2d 622, 627",
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to punish when it enacted law requiring certain defendants to submit DNA sample and pay mandatory fee of $250 because the intent of the law was \"to promote public safety and more effective law en... | 4,357,529 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Commi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 5... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Commi... | 9,456,429 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Commi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | 9,456,429 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 5... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 16... | 9,456,429 | a |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 120, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is 'too old' to be admissible.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 118... | 4,201,490 | a |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 F.3d 1152, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case's ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 120, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is 'too old' to be admissible.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2... | 4,201,490 | b |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 F.3d 1152, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case's ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 118... | 4,201,490 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "218 So.2d 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "\"By asking for attorney's fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....\"",
"sentence": "Associat... | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "135 So.2d 594, 598",
"parenthetical": "holding that request for attorney's fees (and damages to attached property",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.App.1969) (“By asking for attorney’s fees, the defendant did affirmatively inv... | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court's jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney's fees",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.Ap... | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 P.2d 1178, 1182",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court's jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney's fees",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested... | 7,420,312 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 384, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 8... | 6,512,778 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454",
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866... | 6,512,778 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.198... | 6,512,778 | a |
Other circuits have expressed concern that an attenuated connection between a private defendant and the state risks federalizing large areas of state tort law. The Third Circuit warned that not requiring state action would create a federal cause of action "whenever a white man strikes a black in a barroom brawl." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "839 F.Supp. 1014, 1019",
"parenthetical": "pre-Phillip case following Mahone because \"[extending the 'equal benefit' clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate 'the security of persons and property'... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "564 F.2d 1018, 1029",
"parenthetical": "in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action",
"sentence": "Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3rd Cir.1977) (in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action)."
} | 1,461,646 | b |
Other circuits have expressed concern that an attenuated connection between a private defendant and the state risks federalizing large areas of state tort law. The Third Circuit warned that not requiring state action would create a federal cause of action "whenever a white man strikes a black in a barroom brawl." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pre-Phillip case following Mahone because \"[extending the 'equal benefit' clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate 'the security of persons and property' \"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "564 F.2d 1018, 1029",
"parenthetical": "in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action",
"sentence": "Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3rd Cir.1977) (in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action)."
} | 1,461,646 | b |
Instead, the facts in this case resemble those in State v. Riemer and Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, cases in which takings claims survived a plea to the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "921 S.W.2d 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundation's property",
"sentence": "See State v. Riemer, 94 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 200... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.W.3d 103, 109",
"parenthetical": "holding that allegations that State's lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation",
"sentence": "See State v. Riemer, 94 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.)... | 8,398,788 | b |
Courts generally look at a number of factors in making this determination. In Hener, the court considered the time when each group began their labors, the duration of each groups' tangible salvaging activity, the comparative skill and quality of the competing groups, the salvors' investments in capital and labor, and t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 F.Supp. 1107, 1107",
"parenthetical": "relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs \"near-term ability to salvage the wreck,\" his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that \"the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved\" is an important consideration in granting a salvage award",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 83... | 7,782,815 | a |
Courts generally look at a number of factors in making this determination. In Hener, the court considered the time when each group began their labors, the duration of each groups' tangible salvaging activity, the comparative skill and quality of the competing groups, the salvors' investments in capital and labor, and t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp. 1363, 1363",
"parenthetical": "requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 836 F.Supp. at 1107 (relyi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that \"the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved\" is an important consideration in granting a salvage award",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 83... | 7,782,815 | a |
This continuing duty of district courts to consult the Guidelines is statutory. Although the Court in Booker excised the mandatory aspects of the Guidelines in 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), it left the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act intact to "function[] independently." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "'Without the 'mandatory' provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.\" (citing SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is ... | 881,153 | b |
This continuing duty of district courts to consult the Guidelines is statutory. Although the Court in Booker excised the mandatory aspects of the Guidelines in 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), it left the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act intact to "function[] independently." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 1085, 1085-86",
"parenthetical": "addressing district court's procedural error in calculating defendant's base offense level because \"the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense\" even in the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative... | 881,153 | a |
This is not an either-or proposition. The fact that some states, like Ohio, delegate the administration of public assistance programs to counties or municipalities should not mean that those states are free of all statutory obligations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.Supp.2d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.\"",
"sentence": "See New Yo... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "331 F.3d 261, 286",
"parenthetical": "holding that New York could not avoid its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services",
"sentence": "See New York, 255 F.Supp.2d at 79 (“It would be plainly unreas... | 3,859,067 | a |
With regard to this aspect of her testimony, there is "simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Untested hypotheses, even if plausible, are insufficient to satisfy Rule 702. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 665, 670",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a \"working hypothesis\" is not \"admissible scientific knowledge\"",
"sentence": "Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.2002) (“The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the insp... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "295 F.3d 1194, 1202",
"parenthetical": "\"The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort.\"",
"sentence": "Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.2002) (“The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even... | 4,163,072 | b |
We begin our analysis with Rod-man's claim that the court erred by not invalidating the 2007 Will in its entirety since Turpin "neither read nor did anyone read to him, the portions of the will which made Aristide Jude a beneficiary" and "was not aware that Aristide Jude was listed as a beneficiary in his will." There ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Md. 466, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. ... | 7,282,623 | a |
We begin our analysis with Rod-man's claim that the court erred by not invalidating the 2007 Will in its entirety since Turpin "neither read nor did anyone read to him, the portions of the will which made Aristide Jude a beneficiary" and "was not aware that Aristide Jude was listed as a beneficiary in his will." There ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Md. 466, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 P.2d 13, 16",
"parenthetical": "\"It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.... | 7,282,623 | a |
Since the statute is derogatory of the traditional powers of the Court to administer a class action, it should be construed strictly and consistent with its plain meaning. The Order sought to be appealed is not prohibited by the statute, and must therefore be within the Court's discretion to make. No evidence of an abu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38",
"parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (“Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matt... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "313 F.2d 431, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b",
"sentence": "See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp.... | 348,798 | a |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervas... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 775, 788",
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & ... | 4,324,340 | a |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive cond... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervas... | 4,324,340 | b |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervas... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.... | 4,324,340 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York... | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S... | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York... | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22... | 6,930,173 | a |
In this case, Sears was indicted for kidnapping Ms. Wilbur and inflicting bodily injury upon her by striking her with brass knuckles, and stabbing her to death with a knife. There is no basis for Sears' contention that the stabbing could not constitute part of the bodily injury in the kidnapping charge. As a matter of ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "261 Ga. 720, 720",
"parenthetical": "victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "267 Ga. 249, 250",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720... | 74,804 | a |
In this case, Sears was indicted for kidnapping Ms. Wilbur and inflicting bodily injury upon her by striking her with brass knuckles, and stabbing her to death with a knife. There is no basis for Sears' contention that the stabbing could not constitute part of the bodily injury in the kidnapping charge. As a matter of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "267 Ga. 249, 250",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "238 Ga. 701, 701-702",
"parenthetical": "victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State,... | 74,804 | b |
. Defendants argue that plaintiff's allegation of breach of duty amounts to a negligence claim that is insufficient under CUTPA. (Dkt. #45, at 9-10). Connecticut case law admittedly is unclear as to whether negligence is sufficient to constitute a CUTPA violation on its own. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 Conn. 17, 34",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to suppor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\... | 11,615,134 | a |
. Defendants argue that plaintiff's allegation of breach of duty amounts to a negligence claim that is insufficient under CUTPA. (Dkt. #45, at 9-10). Connecticut case law admittedly is unclear as to whether negligence is sufficient to constitute a CUTPA violation on its own. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA clai... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\... | 11,615,134 | a |
Plaintiff Rosemarie Howell also refers to Brian Howell as her husband in an e-mail, which was included in the filings submitted to the court, asking for Brian Howell's pension information. This court has held that a spouse is considered immediate family when considering the ability of a pro se litigant to represent the... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "81 Fed.Cl. 234, 234",
"parenthetical": "defining \"immediate family members\" as a person's parents, spouse, children, and siblings",
"sentence": "See Kogan v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09 (2012) (referring to an order granting defendant’s wife, who is not an att... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09",
"parenthetical": "referring to an order granting defendant's wife, who is not an attorney, the ability to represent defendant pursuant to RCFC 83.1(a)(3",
"sentence": "See Kogan v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09 (2012) (referring to an order gr... | 4,340,282 | b |
To the extent that the majority appears to believe that someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is, ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any self-incriminating admissions made during his testimony, I disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction between the mere act of testifyi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: \"Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.\"",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in \"virtually every\" such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of... | 4,158,220 | b |
To the extent that the majority appears to believe that someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is, ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any self-incriminating admissions made during his testimony, I disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction between the mere act of testifyi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in \"virtually every\" such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: \"Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.\"",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th ... | 4,158,220 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist's letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was \"untimely\" as well as unreasonable",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see al... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had ... | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist's letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was \"untimely\" as well as unreasonable",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see al... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.... | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 891, 894",
"parenthetical": "finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that \"she knew would mandate her discharge\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx... | 5,863,860 | b |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 891, 894",
"parenthetical": "finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that \"she knew would mandate her discharge\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.... | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the \"danger\" of \"permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey,... | 5,863,860 | b |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the \"danger\" of \"permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey,... | 5,863,860 | b |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] w... | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 467, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] w... | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee]... | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] w... | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 467, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] w... | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee]... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant re... | 882,734 | b |
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