context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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Recognizing that the Buckley framework might control here, the Unions contend that the most stringent level of review under that framework -- one equal to strict scrutiny -- must apply because the VCA "limits the quantity of political speech." Although the Unions are correct that we apply a standard akin to strict scru... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "\"Although a less stringent standard of review applies to limits on political contributions, we conclude that the standard for expenditure limits operates identically to strict scrutiny review.\"",
"sentence": "Ho- mans, 366 F.3d at 9... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 440, 440",
"parenthetical": "\"Restraints on expenditures generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do.\"",
"sentence": "Ho- mans, 366 F.3d at 906 (“Although a less stringent standard of review applies to limits on poli... | 4,069,722 | a |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same f... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 431, 439",
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the stat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to ... | 4,198,231 | b |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same f... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 899, 904-05",
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the ... | 4,198,231 | a |
See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.Sd 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2000) (commenting that participating states are "granted broad latitude in defining the scope of covered services as well as many other key characteristics of their [Medicaid] programs"). That same f... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1159, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"While the states must live up to their obligations to provide all EPSDT services, the statute and regulations afford them discretion as to how to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up to ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that consent decree at issue represented one choice among \"various ways that a State could implement the Medicaid Act\" to comply with the \"general EPSDT statute\"",
"sentence": "See Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159 (“While the states must live up... | 4,198,231 | a |
. This reading of section 5K1.1 does not insulate the government from judicial review where the government has agreed in a plea agreement to file a motion in return for a defendant's assistance. That situation is, of course, wholly distinct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "905 F.2d 3, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"We can find no legal basis for requiring the government to make a SS 5K1.1 motion when it did not promise explicitly ... to do so, and no such promise need be implied to make the agreement meaningful.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 1073, 1075",
"parenthetical": "\"once the government uses its SS 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th... | 10,521,527 | b |
. This reading of section 5K1.1 does not insulate the government from judicial review where the government has agreed in a plea agreement to file a motion in return for a defendant's assistance. That situation is, of course, wholly distinct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "902 F.2d 1016, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\" a defendant has the right to reserve his assistance unless the government, by plea agreement, commits to seeking a downward departure\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.1991) (“once the gove... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 1073, 1075",
"parenthetical": "\"once the government uses its SS 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the agreement\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th... | 10,521,527 | b |
The first issued raised by the Vessel Owners as been resolved by the Fifth Circuit in Davis's favor. The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that a concession as to the sufficiency of the surety is not a prerequisite to the court imposing a stay of limitation of liability proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1575, 1575",
"parenthetical": "holding that to be sufficient, stipulations must state than no judgment will be asserted in excess of the value of the limitation fund",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991) (explaining that p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "943 F.2d 576, 578",
"parenthetical": "explaining that plaintiffs properly stipulated that no judgment would be enforced above the valuation of the vessel and freight contained in the complaint",
"sentence": "See In re Two “R” Drilling Co., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1991) (expl... | 9,463,186 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 88, 97",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statute... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 88, 97",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statute... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Sta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795",
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Sta... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded \"a sweep as broad as [their] language.\"",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | 5,621,314 | a |
The majority of cases interpreting Title IX, Title VI and section 504 support an expansive reading of the phrase "receiv ing Federal financial assistance." Civil rights statutes such as Title IX generally are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate their remedial purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the scope and purpose of Title IX place it within the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created over the past 110 years",
"sentence": "See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7, 99 S.Ct. at 1952 n.7 (the scope and purpose of Title IX place... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Title VI to be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes to be accorded “a sweep as broad as... | 5,621,314 | b |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also My... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 U.S. 72, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is ... | 3,820,068 | b |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is a practical m... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also My... | 3,820,068 | a |
A defendant sued in his official capacity is a different "legal personage" than one sued in his individual, or personal capacity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] section 1983 suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.\"",
"sentence": "See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also My... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The concept of 'legal personage' is a practical means of identifying the real interests at stake in a lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987) (“The concept of ‘legal personage’ is a practical m... | 3,820,068 | b |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district cou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 U.S. 357, 365",
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject ... | 3,629,397 | a |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district cou... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution\... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in ... | 3,629,397 | b |
Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district cou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 575, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he fact that a charge was used in ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain \"no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution\... | 3,629,397 | a |
Plaintiffs complain of injury resulting from defendant's capping program as a whole. The capping program, in turn, was furthered by defendant's predicate racketeering acts, Complaint 1124; however, it was more than merely a series of violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes. What injured plaintiffs was not any on... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "741 F.2d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves",
"sentence": "Cf., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, supra, 741 F.2d at 517 (racketeering related injury stems from the pattern o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "742 F.2d 413, 413",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury alleged as a result of a pattern of mail and wire fraud",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander Grant, supra, 742 F.2d at 413 (racketeering related injury alleged as a result of a pattern of mail and wire fraud); Bet... | 3,737,057 | b |
Plaintiffs complain of injury resulting from defendant's capping program as a whole. The capping program, in turn, was furthered by defendant's predicate racketeering acts, Complaint 1124; however, it was more than merely a series of violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes. What injured plaintiffs was not any on... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "576 F.Supp. 1061, 1070",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs' injuries the result of a \"pervasive, ongoing and debilitating\" scheme \"not confined to specific monetary losses resulting from discrete acts of mail and wire fraud\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander Grant, supra, 742 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "741 F.2d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "racketeering related injury stems from the pattern of racketeering activity and not the predicate acts themselves",
"sentence": "Cf., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, supra, 741 F.2d at 517 (racketeering related injury stems from the pattern o... | 3,737,057 | a |
However, to fulfill the intent of Congress and to harmonize the application of SS 1930(a)(6) with these sections of the Code, the court believes that the quarterly fees should be considered post-confirmation administrative expenses not specifically addressed in the plan. Consequently, the payment of such expenses shoul... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 385, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, In... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.\"",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. at 228; In r... | 11,849,100 | b |
However, to fulfill the intent of Congress and to harmonize the application of SS 1930(a)(6) with these sections of the Code, the court believes that the quarterly fees should be considered post-confirmation administrative expenses not specifically addressed in the plan. Consequently, the payment of such expenses shoul... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 385, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "remanding case to determine whether allowing a post-confirmation fee would modify a substantially consummated plan",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, In... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "210 B.R. 335, 335",
"parenthetical": "\"A confirmed plan cannot bind the United States as to statutory obligations arising after confirmation.\"",
"sentence": "See In re CF&I Fabricators, 214 B.R. at 19; In re Munford, Inc., 216 B.R. 913, 916-17; In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.... | 11,849,100 | b |
(Tr. at 37-41, 53-58, 494.) This points up the danger of basing a decision on the claimant's mental condition at a particular point in time, rather than considering the entire record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "630 F.3d 710, 710",
"parenthetical": "\"As we have explained before, a person who suffers from a mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single moment says little about her overall condition.\"",
"sentence": "See Punzio, 630 F.3d at 710 (“As we... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "692 F.3d 773, 773",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"when a patient ... is only unpredictably able to function in a normal work environment, the resulting intermittent attendance normally precludes the possibility of holding down a steady job\"",
"sentence": "See Punzio, 6... | 4,322,268 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 U.S. 212, 218",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (... | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 U.S. 212, 218",
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation mark... | 4,073,520 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tie... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal... | 4,073,520 | a |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation mark... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tie... | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 906, 929",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tie... | 4,073,520 | b |
The Indictment charged Mr. Ciocchetti in general terms, indicating that the false statements included the IRS tax returns. This language broadened rather than limited the Indictment, thereby allowing the government to use evidence beyond the IRS tax returns to show the use of false statements without "misle[ading Mr. C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, under an indictment \"drawn in general terms,\" a conviction might rest on a showing of evidence beyond that which is specifically identified in the indictment",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tie... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment may be drafted in general terms so long as it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge against him.\"",
"sentence": "Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921) (internal quotation mark... | 4,073,520 | a |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ru... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 P.3d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for r... | 6,987,752 | b |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 P.3d 1185, 1187",
"parenthetical": "rules governing magistrates do not authorize any motion respecting a magistrate's order except a motion for review",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for r... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 P.3d 1208, 1221",
"parenthetical": "district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsider... | 6,987,752 | a |
A magistrate may not entertain a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief from a judgment under C.R.C.P. 60. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 P.3d 1208, 1221",
"parenthetical": "district court could modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ruling on motion for reconsider... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "929 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "where parties have not filed a motion for modification of parenting time, magistrate cannot unilaterally change parenting time order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Phelps, 74 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo.App.2003) (declaring magistrate's ru... | 6,987,752 | b |
One may certainly question the wisdom of Ms. Lounds's approach in light of our precedent. Specifically, our caselaw indicates that explicitly race-based conduct should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether a workplace environment is sufficiently polluted with racially offensive harassment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that \"if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "684 F.3d 960, 960",
"parenthetical": "\"Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerne... | 4,086,628 | b |
One may certainly question the wisdom of Ms. Lounds's approach in light of our precedent. Specifically, our caselaw indicates that explicitly race-based conduct should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether a workplace environment is sufficiently polluted with racially offensive harassment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "noting as to behavior that is not explicitly gender-based that \"if it reasonably could be inferred that the conduct was related to gender or arose out of a context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred, then it is for... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "397 F.3d 833, 833",
"parenthetical": "\"Conduct that appears [race]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 684 F.3d at 960. Indeed, as we discerne... | 4,086,628 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarett... | 4,329,796 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarett... | 4,329,796 | b |
. In Winters, the Fifth Circuit combined and considered together the "acting under" and "causal nexus" prongs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting under\" direction of federal officer in light of federal laws, rules, and regulations governing labeling requirements on cigarettes",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarett... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 Fed.Appx. 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the \"acting under\" sub-part was satisfied, but the \"causal nexus\" requirement was not satisfied",
"sentence": "See Watson, 551 U.S. 142, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (cigarette manufacturers were not \"acting... | 4,329,796 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a def... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "163 Ariz. 126, 130",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a def... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defe... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 P.2d 977, 981",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977,... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition ... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18",
"parenthetical": "\"The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition ... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a def... | 75,260 | b |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 Ariz. 278, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a def... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defe... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 57, 57-58",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action ... | 75,260 | a |
P 6 Accordingly, the "appropriate vehicle" for Wilson to have sought review was special action, not appeal. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "725 P.2d 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "when judgment previously had been entered, appellate court had jurisdiction under former SS 13-4033(2",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 P.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.\"",
"sentence": "See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defe... | 75,260 | b |
The privilege is construed narrowly and the party asserting it has the burden of establishing all of its essential elements. On this motion, PBGC argues that IH waived any privilege as to the documents it seeks. Because the court believes that IH's treatment of the communications at issue is inconsistent with any inten... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1302, 1314",
"parenthetical": "affirming an order allowing newspapers access to corporation's special litigation committee report where the report was used as evidence in a motion to terminate a shareholder's derivative suit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lawless, 709 F.2d ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 487, 487",
"parenthetical": "transmission of information for use in preparing a tax return destroys any expectation of confidentiality that might otherwise have existed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487 (transmission of information for use in preparing... | 7,403,393 | b |
The .legality of simply owning, possessing, carrying, or concealing the knives was irrelevant. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 P.2d 781, 784",
"parenthetical": "trial court \"should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles u... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "988 P.2d 657, 663",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal... | 8,993,669 | a |
The .legality of simply owning, possessing, carrying, or concealing the knives was irrelevant. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough the instruction was an accurate statement of the law, it was superfluous and should not be given\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles unr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "928 P.2d 781, 784",
"parenthetical": "trial court \"should not instruct on abstract legal principles unrelated to the issues in controversy\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Montoya, 928 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.App.1996) (trial court “should not instruct on abstract legal principles u... | 8,993,669 | b |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "799 So.2d 243, 248",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"it would not be good public policy for the legislature to punish those with families to support less than those without families\"",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it wou... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good p... | 8,988,778 | a |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "738 So.2d 962, 963",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[w]hile we are not unsympathetic to the trial judge's concern that incarcerating Bray may place the burden of caring for the child on the taxpayers of this state, such a consideration cannot be employed in determining whether one d... | 8,988,778 | b |
Florida courts have consistently held that family support concerns are not valid reasons for downward departure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 906, 907-08",
"parenthetical": "noting the court had previously rejected the defendant's need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it would not be good p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "629 So.2d 1014, 1015",
"parenthetical": "listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure",
"sentence": "See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding “it wo... | 8,988,778 | b |
A court's determination of whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive is not as clear as one would hope and is not as objective as one would think. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "279 F.3d 1135, 1142",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"Entrepreneur\" is merely descriptive as the name of a magazine because an \"entirely unimaginative, literal-minded person\" would understand its meaning",
"sentence": "Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1114; Lahoti, 586 F.3d at ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While not determinative, dictionary definitions are relevant and often persuasive in determining how a term is understood by the consuming public ... \"",
"sentence": "Zobmondo Entm’t, 602 F.3d at 1114; Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1197. The dictionary definitio... | 12,270,812 | b |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encom... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others”... | 11,662,594 | b |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encom... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others”... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not i... | 11,662,594 | a |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encom... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others”... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not i... | 11,662,594 | a |
P 33 The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is persuasive and provides additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encom... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.2d 634, 636",
"parenthetical": "concluding that phrase \"to others\" as contained in Restatement SS 413 does not include employees of independent contractors",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others”... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to Restatement SS 427",
"sentence": "See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1967) (concluding that phrase “to others” as contained in Restatement § 413 does not i... | 11,662,594 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 U.S. 572, 575",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New Yor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 U.S. 572, 575",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New Yor... | 4,291,018 | b |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United Sta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United Sta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | 4,291,018 | a |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United Sta... | 4,291,018 | b |
Finally, the State argues that the Transitional Reinsurance-Program runs afoul of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine -- an older creed that once counseled against the federal and 'state governments taxing one another. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing historical sources and contours of the Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine",
"sentence": "See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (“[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of the other early led to the assumption that there was a reciprocal immunity of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the. other.\"",
"sentence": "See New York v. United Sta... | 4,291,018 | b |
Some of the contents of P-10 (the three-ring binder sent by Brown & Connery to Green) are clearly confidential and not subject to disclosure. The selection process used to assemble P-10, and the grouping of the photographs and documents represent the mental impressions of Plaintiffs counsel and are protected work produ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 F.R.D. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "170 N.J.Super. 73, 73",
"parenthetical": "the expert \"was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel\"",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential docume... | 7,851,833 | b |
Some of the contents of P-10 (the three-ring binder sent by Brown & Connery to Green) are clearly confidential and not subject to disclosure. The selection process used to assemble P-10, and the grouping of the photographs and documents represent the mental impressions of Plaintiffs counsel and are protected work produ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 F.R.D. 280, 280",
"parenthetical": "noting that the information passed on to the expert did not involve the theories of the party seeking disqualification",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the expert \"was privy to confidential documents as well as the mental impressions, opinions and legal theories of counsel\"",
"sentence": "Conforti, 170 N.J.Super. at 73, 405 A.2d 487 (the expert “was privy to confidential documents as well as the ... | 7,851,833 | b |
The instant situation is but one of the complications resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby. Accordingly, we urge the Alabama Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Kirby, particularly that portion relating to the right to appeal Kirby motions, in light of the fact that a question exists as to whether ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "severely limits the issues this Court will consider on the appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider a sentence",
"sentence": "See also Prestwood v. State, 915 So.2d 580 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (severely limits the issues this Court will consider ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "669 So.2d 239, 239",
"parenthetical": "granting probation is discretionary with the circuit court and not subject to appellate review",
"sentence": "Compare Gilmore v. State, 669 So.2d 239, 239 (Ala.Cr.App.1995) (granting probation is discretionary with the circuit court ... | 8,427,698 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534... | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 374",
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits o... | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | 11,083,941 | a |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding workers' immigration status did not affect entitlement to temporary disability payments",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenshi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | 11,083,941 | b |
In this context, the legislature's creation of a residency requirement in subsection (4)(d)(4) of section 627.736 must be read narrowly as a pure residency requirement and not a requirement that includes elements of either domicile or citizenship. The legislature did not intend the receipt of PIP benefits and the corol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding claimant's status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for work-related injury",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (finding welfare laws conditioning benefits o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing durational residency requirement on aliens violative of equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (findin... | 11,083,941 | b |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "439 U.S. 282, 287-89",
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among priso... | 276,364 | a |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners ... | 276,364 | b |
First, "|j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State." Second, courts have upheld transfers of inmates to private out-of-state facilities. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in criminal matters, concept of full faith and credit is articulated through Extradition Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, SS 2, cl. 2",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state’... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"It is a popular myth among prisoners that a state's authority over a prisoner ends at the state's geographical border.\"",
"sentence": "See Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706, 711 (W.D.Tenn.2000) (“It is a popular myth among prisoners ... | 276,364 | b |
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