context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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. While the majority contends that its decision today affects only Swanner's conduct, not his religious beliefs, Opinion at 283, I do not believe that the Alaska Constitution distinguishes so clearly between religious belief and religious conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 P.2d 1070, 1070",
"parenthetical": "because of the close relationship between conduct and belief, and because of the high value we assign to religious beliefs, religiously impelled actions can be forbidden only where they are outweighed by a compelling governmental interest",... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535-36",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjelief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.\"",
"sentence": "See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535-36, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (\"[Bjelief and action cannot be neatly con... | 10,350,130 | a |
. While the majority contends that its decision today affects only Swanner's conduct, not his religious beliefs, Opinion at 283, I do not believe that the Alaska Constitution distinguishes so clearly between religious belief and religious conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjelief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.\"",
"sentence": "See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535-36, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (\"[Bjelief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 P.2d 1070, 1070",
"parenthetical": "because of the close relationship between conduct and belief, and because of the high value we assign to religious beliefs, religiously impelled actions can be forbidden only where they are outweighed by a compelling governmental interest",... | 10,350,130 | b |
. While the majority contends that its decision today affects only Swanner's conduct, not his religious beliefs, Opinion at 283, I do not believe that the Alaska Constitution distinguishes so clearly between religious belief and religious conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 893, 893",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must therefore be at least presumptively protected by the Free Exer... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "604 P.2d 1070, 1070",
"parenthetical": "because of the close relationship between conduct and belief, and because of the high value we assign to religious beliefs, religiously impelled actions can be forbidden only where they are outweighed by a compelling governmental interest",... | 10,350,130 | b |
We are unable to conclude that the officers in this case reasonably relied on the warrant in their possession -- which on its face explicitly authorized the search of the first-floor apartment -- to conduct a search of the apartment on the second floor. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartm... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.\"",
"sentence": "See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor co... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "\"If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to ... | 3,901,867 | b |
We are unable to conclude that the officers in this case reasonably relied on the warrant in their possession -- which on its face explicitly authorized the search of the first-floor apartment -- to conduct a search of the apartment on the second floor. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartm... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "\"If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.\"",
"sentence": "See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor co... | 3,901,867 | a |
We are unable to conclude that the officers in this case reasonably relied on the warrant in their possession -- which on its face explicitly authorized the search of the first-floor apartment -- to conduct a search of the apartment on the second floor. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartm... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.\"",
"sentence": "See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor co... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their s... | 3,901,867 | b |
We are unable to conclude that the officers in this case reasonably relied on the warrant in their possession -- which on its face explicitly authorized the search of the first-floor apartment -- to conduct a search of the apartment on the second floor. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartm... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their s... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.\"",
"sentence": "See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor co... | 3,901,867 | a |
A notarized waiver in a separation agreement can qualify under ERISA as consent to a change of beneficiary if the waiver specifically refers to the spouse's employee benefit plan. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "913 F.2d 310, 312",
"parenthetical": "waiver was not effective when it did not specifically refer to the spouse's rights as beneficiary in an ERISA plan",
"sentence": "Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 280; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 907 (10th Cir.1991)... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 904, 907",
"parenthetical": "\"we hold that absent any applicable divorce decree dictating otherwise, the beneficiary designation on file controls the disposition of this case\"",
"sentence": "Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 280; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939 ... | 7,404,759 | b |
The court rejects the Commissioner's claim that the court should remand this ease pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g). In consideration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of sentence four in Melkonyan, a remand under this sentence would be impermissible. "Remands pursuant to sentence four follow a subst... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "810 F.Supp. 103, 108",
"parenthetical": "remand under sentence four is inappropriate where the Commissioner seeks remand to correct errors of law",
"sentence": "Tucunango v. Sullivan, 810 F.Supp. 103, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (remand under sentence four is inappropriate where t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1992 WL 367116, at *3",
"parenthetical": "no remand under sentence four where the court is not conducting an independent review of the record, but rather is only accepting the Commissioner's assertion in his moving affidavit that he may have erred",
"sentence": "Tucunango ... | 7,841,897 | a |
The court rejects the Commissioner's claim that the court should remand this ease pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g). In consideration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of sentence four in Melkonyan, a remand under this sentence would be impermissible. "Remands pursuant to sentence four follow a subst... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "810 F.Supp. 103, 108",
"parenthetical": "remand under sentence four is inappropriate where the Commissioner seeks remand to correct errors of law",
"sentence": "Tucunango v. Sullivan, 810 F.Supp. 103, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (remand under sentence four is inappropriate where t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "785 F.Supp. 47, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "remand appropriate under sentence four where Commissioner admits legal error",
"sentence": "But see Jordan v. Sullivan, 785 F.Supp. 47, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (remand appropriate under sentence four where Commissioner admits legal err... | 7,841,897 | a |
The court rejects the Commissioner's claim that the court should remand this ease pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g). In consideration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of sentence four in Melkonyan, a remand under this sentence would be impermissible. "Remands pursuant to sentence four follow a subst... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "810 F.Supp. 103, 108",
"parenthetical": "remand under sentence four is inappropriate where the Commissioner seeks remand to correct errors of law",
"sentence": "Tucunango v. Sullivan, 810 F.Supp. 103, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (remand under sentence four is inappropriate where t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "783 F.Supp. 474, 478",
"parenthetical": "\"the stipulated remand, in which the parties agreed that further evidence is necessary to fully determine the merits of plaintiff's application, raises the inference that the previous evidentiary proceedings were materially deficient\... | 7,841,897 | a |
The court rejects the Commissioner's claim that the court should remand this ease pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g). In consideration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of sentence four in Melkonyan, a remand under this sentence would be impermissible. "Remands pursuant to sentence four follow a subst... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1992 WL 367116, at *3",
"parenthetical": "no remand under sentence four where the court is not conducting an independent review of the record, but rather is only accepting the Commissioner's assertion in his moving affidavit that he may have erred",
"sentence": "Tucunango ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "785 F.Supp. 47, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "remand appropriate under sentence four where Commissioner admits legal error",
"sentence": "But see Jordan v. Sullivan, 785 F.Supp. 47, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (remand appropriate under sentence four where Commissioner admits legal err... | 7,841,897 | a |
The court rejects the Commissioner's claim that the court should remand this ease pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. SS 405(g). In consideration of the Supreme Court's interpretation of sentence four in Melkonyan, a remand under this sentence would be impermissible. "Remands pursuant to sentence four follow a subst... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1992 WL 367116, at *3",
"parenthetical": "no remand under sentence four where the court is not conducting an independent review of the record, but rather is only accepting the Commissioner's assertion in his moving affidavit that he may have erred",
"sentence": "Tucunango ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "783 F.Supp. 474, 478",
"parenthetical": "\"the stipulated remand, in which the parties agreed that further evidence is necessary to fully determine the merits of plaintiff's application, raises the inference that the previous evidentiary proceedings were materially deficient\... | 7,841,897 | a |
Only then will the public's interest in proper process and in the substantive provisions of the ESA be furthered. Here, AFRC has made a case for vacatur. But missing from the equation is any concession of error by the agency, or even any hint as to how exactly, in FWS's view, the critical habitat designa tion "may" be ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "705 F.3d 463, 463, 466",
"parenthetical": "vacating and remanding provisions of EPA rule based on agency's conceded lack of authority to promulgate those provisions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sierra Club, 705 F.3d at 463, 466 (vacating and remanding provisions of EPA rule based ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Commission's argument that notice and comment requirements do not apply to 'defectively promulgated regulations' is untenable because it would permit an agency to circumvent the requirements of SS 553 merely by confessing that the regulations were def... | 4,232,278 | a |
Only then will the public's interest in proper process and in the substantive provisions of the ESA be furthered. Here, AFRC has made a case for vacatur. But missing from the equation is any concession of error by the agency, or even any hint as to how exactly, in FWS's view, the critical habitat designa tion "may" be ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.Supp.2d 100, 103, 108",
"parenthetical": "vacating critical habitat where \"[a]ll parties, including the responsible agency, agree[d] that the economic analyses used in designating the critical habitats [were] substantively defective\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sierra Clu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Commission's argument that notice and comment requirements do not apply to 'defectively promulgated regulations' is untenable because it would permit an agency to circumvent the requirements of SS 553 merely by confessing that the regulations were def... | 4,232,278 | a |
As a. general rule, a party may not obtain a judicial construction of a penal law through a declaratory judgment action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "440 S.W.2d 61, 63",
"parenthetical": "\" 'It is well settled that courts of equity will not interfere with the ordinary enforcement of a criminal statute unless the statute is unconstitutional and its enforcement will result in irreparable injury to vested property rights.\... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "869 S.W.2d 941, 947",
"parenthetical": "\"A civil court simply has no jurisdiction to render naked declarations of 'rights, status or other legal relationships arising under a penal statute.'\"",
"sentence": "Ryan v. Rosenthal, 314 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.... | 12,386,804 | a |
There is no authority to support the proposition that when Hernandez-Hernandez's attorney stipulated to the factual basis supporting the plea agreement the defendant was not bound by the facts contained in that stipulation. In fact, we have repeatedly held that criminal defendants are bound by the admissions of fact ma... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "947 F.2d 1353, 1356",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendant was bound by his attorney's admission during closing argument",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that “when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 832, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by defendant's acknowledged counsel, the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is a... | 9,154,602 | b |
There is no authority to support the proposition that when Hernandez-Hernandez's attorney stipulated to the factual basis supporting the plea agreement the defendant was not bound by the facts contained in that stipulation. In fact, we have repeatedly held that criminal defendants are bound by the admissions of fact ma... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 832, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by defendant's acknowledged counsel, the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "640 F.2d 1139, 1141",
"parenthetical": "holding that attorney's admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners' presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1980) (hol... | 9,154,602 | a |
.If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "1998 WL 622405, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area",
"sentence": "A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing m... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 628, 630",
"parenthetical": "finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs ... | 11,084,338 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. Un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 275, 277-78",
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. U... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 1, 6-8",
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instru... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. Un... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 275, 277-78",
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. U... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 506, 510",
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. Un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Fifth and Sixth Amendments \"require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 52... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 275, 277-78",
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. U... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | 12,265,234 | b |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | 12,265,234 | a |
The fundamental rule when instructing a jury in a criminal case is that the instructions must identify for the jury all elements of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "government conceded failure to instruct jury on essential element of materiality was constitutional error",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (government conceded failure to instruct jury on es... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the * factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements\"",
"sentence": "See Neder v. United States, 527 ... | 12,265,234 | a |
Further, to the extent the Debtor has a right to sue either the Trust or the Petitioners, that chose in action also is property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "676 F.3d 594, 596",
"parenthetical": "recognizing property of the estate to include the estate's chose in action against its auditor",
"sentence": "Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467, 472-73 (7th Cir.1999) (“The phrase ‘legal or equitable interests ... in proper... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "200 F.3d 467, 472-73",
"parenthetical": "\"The phrase 'legal or equitable interests ... in property' includes choses in action and other legal claims that could be prosecuted for benefit of the estate.\"",
"sentence": "Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467, 472-73... | 4,168,585 | b |
. Likewise, any interpretation that is provided or disavowed in the prosecution history also shapes the claim scope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "781 F.2d 861, 867",
"parenthetical": "holding that although term was not limited by the specification, it was \"expressly defined\" in a narrow manner in the prosecution history",
"sentence": "See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93-94 (Fed.Cir.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 F.3d 1146, 1158-59",
"parenthetical": "reviewing statements in the prosecution history in determining that claim term \"elasticity\" required total, not just partial, recovery from deformation",
"sentence": "See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 ... | 11,678,280 | a |
. Likewise, any interpretation that is provided or disavowed in the prosecution history also shapes the claim scope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "228 USPQ 90, 93-94",
"parenthetical": "holding that although term was not limited by the specification, it was \"expressly defined\" in a narrow manner in the prosecution history",
"sentence": "See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93-94 (Fed.Cir... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 F.3d 1146, 1158-59",
"parenthetical": "reviewing statements in the prosecution history in determining that claim term \"elasticity\" required total, not just partial, recovery from deformation",
"sentence": "See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 ... | 11,678,280 | a |
The Supreme Court has also indicated that where the impact of a serious constitutional defect is subject to pure speculation, the defect constitutes structural error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 256, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that when \"the scope of a violation ... cannot be discerned from the record, any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S.Ct... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the use of a \"single, inflexible criterion\" for determining structural error and instead finding that structural error occurred in light of the pure speculation involved in determining what would have happened but for the error",
"sentence": "... | 12,277,144 | b |
The Supreme Court has also indicated that where the impact of a serious constitutional defect is subject to pure speculation, the defect constitutes structural error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 1797, 1797",
"parenthetical": "stating that when \"the scope of a violation ... cannot be discerned from the record, any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the use of a \"single, inflexible criterion\" for determining structural error and instead finding that structural error occurred in light of the pure speculation involved in determining what would have happened but for the error",
"sentence": "... | 12,277,144 | b |
The Supreme Court has also indicated that where the impact of a serious constitutional defect is subject to pure speculation, the defect constitutes structural error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the use of a \"single, inflexible criterion\" for determining structural error and instead finding that structural error occurred in light of the pure speculation involved in determining what would have happened but for the error",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 256, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that when \"the scope of a violation ... cannot be discerned from the record, any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S.Ct... | 12,277,144 | a |
The Supreme Court has also indicated that where the impact of a serious constitutional defect is subject to pure speculation, the defect constitutes structural error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 1797, 1797",
"parenthetical": "stating that when \"the scope of a violation ... cannot be discerned from the record, any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 126 S... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the use of a \"single, inflexible criterion\" for determining structural error and instead finding that structural error occurred in light of the pure speculation involved in determining what would have happened but for the error",
"sentence": "... | 12,277,144 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 420, 431",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | 3,965,944 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | 3,965,944 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | 3,965,944 | a |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 420, 431",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | 3,965,944 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | 3,965,944 | a |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | 3,965,944 | a |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 420, 431",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | 3,965,944 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | 3,965,944 | b |
. In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be \"legitimated\" by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (... | 3,965,944 | a |
We do not discuss the admbsibility of any hearsay that might be contained in the test protocols prepared by Dr. Gibbs, since we hold the court had sufficient grounds to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony when Clifford's attorney refused to produce the protocols for inspection by the government prior to Dr. Smith's testimony... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause if declarant is unavailable and it \"bears adequate 'indicia of reliability\"'",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (holding that hea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "566 F.2d 541, 545",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness' opinion should be admissible if ... the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not n... | 9,053,680 | a |
We do not discuss the admbsibility of any hearsay that might be contained in the test protocols prepared by Dr. Gibbs, since we hold the court had sufficient grounds to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony when Clifford's attorney refused to produce the protocols for inspection by the government prior to Dr. Smith's testimony... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause if declarant is unavailable and it \"bears adequate 'indicia of reliability\"'",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (holding that hea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "566 F.2d 541, 545",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness' opinion should be admissible if ... the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not n... | 9,053,680 | a |
We do not discuss the admbsibility of any hearsay that might be contained in the test protocols prepared by Dr. Gibbs, since we hold the court had sufficient grounds to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony when Clifford's attorney refused to produce the protocols for inspection by the government prior to Dr. Smith's testimony... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "566 F.2d 541, 545",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness' opinion should be admissible if ... the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not n... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause if declarant is unavailable and it \"bears adequate 'indicia of reliability\"'",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (holding that hea... | 9,053,680 | b |
We do not discuss the admbsibility of any hearsay that might be contained in the test protocols prepared by Dr. Gibbs, since we hold the court had sufficient grounds to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony when Clifford's attorney refused to produce the protocols for inspection by the government prior to Dr. Smith's testimony... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1101, 1101",
"parenthetical": "stating that expert's recounting of statements by codefendants did not violate confrontation clause because statements were not introduced for truth of matter asserted and declarant testified at trial",
"sentence": "See Ohio v. Roberts, 4... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "566 F.2d 541, 545",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness' opinion should be admissible if ... the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not n... | 9,053,680 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 28, 36-37",
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 719, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, ... | 3,644,853 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 28, 36-37",
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | 3,644,853 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 28, 36-37",
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 ... | 3,644,853 | b |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 719, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, ... | 3,644,853 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | 3,644,853 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | 3,644,853 | a |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 719, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | 3,644,853 | b |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | 3,644,853 | b |
Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime",
"sentence": "See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986... | 3,644,853 | b |
Victim's testimony that the worst of her injuries--inflicted on March 5th (a Thursday)--lasting well into the middle of the following week, was sufficient to show her impairment was protracted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 S.W.3d 246, 246",
"parenthetical": "protracted impairment depends not just on the length of time the effects of the injury last, but also on the nature and seriousness of a dysfunction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 939 S.W.2d at 19 (“Seven days without the use of a leg... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 S.W.2d 19, 19",
"parenthetical": "\"Seven days without the use of a leg or foot is sufficient to constitute protracted impairment.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 939 S.W.2d at 19 (“Seven days without the use of a leg or foot is sufficient to constitute protracted impairm... | 12,385,613 | b |
Indeed, each generic Defendant specifically "carved-out" the pertinent indication (e.g., "adjunctive treatment for major depressive disorder") from their respective generic Ability(r) labels, affirmatively relinquishing the right to actively promote use of their aripiprazole products with any antidepressants, including... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 S.Ct. 1677, 1677",
"parenthetical": "noting that, following the FDA's acceptance of the carve-out label, the generic company may \"place its drug on the market, (assuming the [applicant] meets other requirements), but only for a subset of approved uses -- i.e., those not cove... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "676 F.3d 1316, 1322-23",
"parenthetical": "generally noting that the applicable FDA regulations prohibit generic pharmaceutical companies from implying or suggesting that the generic product has indications .or uses other than those approved by the FDA",
"sentence": "See C... | 5,925,414 | a |
This was not an unreasonable application of the Court's precedents, as fairmind-ed jurists could have reached the same result. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 72, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (hold... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "468 U.S. 559, 571",
"parenthetical": "holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an “intervening change in law ... can itself justify an incr... | 4,194,746 | a |
This was not an unreasonable application of the Court's precedents, as fairmind-ed jurists could have reached the same result. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 72, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (hold... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an “intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence ... | 4,194,746 | a |
This was not an unreasonable application of the Court's precedents, as fairmind-ed jurists could have reached the same result. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 72, 77",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (hold... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an “intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence ... | 4,194,746 | a |
[16] Applying that case law here, the notice provision in the instant lease was a condition precedent to Coordinated Health's exercise of either option term. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 N.E.2d 278, 278",
"parenthetical": "\"where the lease gives the privilege of renewal[,] the lessee, by some affirmative act, must indicate his- election to exercise the option prior to the expiration of the lease\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fragomeni, 96 N.E.2d at 278 (“wher... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 N.E. 643, 643",
"parenthetical": "\"an option of a renewal would seem to -imply that the parties contemplated some affirmative act by way of the creation of an additional term.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fragomeni, 96 N.E.2d at 278 (“where the lease gives the privilege... | 6,876,136 | a |
The second factor, whether payment of benefits is triggered by a single, unique event or on a recurring basis, also favors the finding of an ERISA plan. Payment of severance benefits under the SAP is not premised upon a single event, such as a plant closing, as was at issue in Fort Halifax. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "39 F.3d 235, 237-38",
"parenthetical": "holding that although the employer had discretion to make a for cause determination, the employment contract between the former president/chief executive officer and the defendant employer did not constitute an ERISA plan because admin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 12, 12",
"parenthetical": "holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme",
"sentence": "See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218 (holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a sin... | 1,291,861 | b |
The second factor, whether payment of benefits is triggered by a single, unique event or on a recurring basis, also favors the finding of an ERISA plan. Payment of severance benefits under the SAP is not premised upon a single event, such as a plant closing, as was at issue in Fort Halifax. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "39 F.3d 235, 237-38",
"parenthetical": "holding that although the employer had discretion to make a for cause determination, the employment contract between the former president/chief executive officer and the defendant employer did not constitute an ERISA plan because admin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2218, 2218",
"parenthetical": "holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme",
"sentence": "See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218 (holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of ... | 1,291,861 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1386, 1386-87",
"parenthetical": "foreign bank issuing letter of credit payable at Missouri confirming bank for benefit of Missouri citizen was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank i... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1386, 1386-87",
"parenthetical": "foreign bank issuing letter of credit payable at Missouri confirming bank for benefit of Missouri citizen was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank i... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1386, 1386-87",
"parenthetical": "foreign bank issuing letter of credit payable at Missouri confirming bank for benefit of Missouri citizen was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank i... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 F.2d 1110, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "Swiss bank's failure to issue letter of credit in favor of Florida beneficiary for purchase of assets in Florida was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Florida under Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Moog World ... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 F.2d 1110, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "Swiss bank's failure to issue letter of credit in favor of Florida beneficiary for purchase of assets in Florida was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Florida under Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Moog World ... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 F.2d 1110, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "Swiss bank's failure to issue letter of credit in favor of Florida beneficiary for purchase of assets in Florida was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Florida under Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Moog World ... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 735, 737",
"parenthetical": "defendant was \"not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oregon simply because it issued a letter of credit in favor of an Oregon beneficiary\"",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank issuing letter of cre... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 735, 737",
"parenthetical": "defendant was \"not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oregon simply because it issued a letter of credit in favor of an Oregon beneficiary\"",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank issuing letter of cre... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 735, 737",
"parenthetical": "defendant was \"not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oregon simply because it issued a letter of credit in favor of an Oregon beneficiary\"",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank issuing letter of cre... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 1148, 1150-53",
"parenthetical": "Egyptian bank issuing letter of credit payable at confirming bank in New York for the benefit of Michigan beneficiary was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan because of lack of minimum contacts",
"sentence": "See Moog Worl... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 1148, 1150-53",
"parenthetical": "Egyptian bank issuing letter of credit payable at confirming bank in New York for the benefit of Michigan beneficiary was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan because of lack of minimum contacts",
"sentence": "See Moog Worl... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 1148, 1150-53",
"parenthetical": "Egyptian bank issuing letter of credit payable at confirming bank in New York for the benefit of Michigan beneficiary was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan because of lack of minimum contacts",
"sentence": "See Moog Worl... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 878, 880-81",
"parenthetical": "letter of credit issued by Illinois bank on behalf of Illinois customer payable to California resident for purchase of Colorado property did not subject Illinois issuing bank to personal jurisdiction in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog W... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 878, 880-81",
"parenthetical": "letter of credit issued by Illinois bank on behalf of Illinois customer payable to California resident for purchase of Colorado property did not subject Illinois issuing bank to personal jurisdiction in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog W... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 878, 880-81",
"parenthetical": "letter of credit issued by Illinois bank on behalf of Illinois customer payable to California resident for purchase of Colorado property did not subject Illinois issuing bank to personal jurisdiction in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog W... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "Rhode Island bank's issuance of letter of credit for Rhode Island customer payable in Rhode Island did not subject issuing bank to jurisdiction of Pennsylvania where beneficiary resided",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "Rhode Island bank's issuance of letter of credit for Rhode Island customer payable in Rhode Island did not subject issuing bank to jurisdiction of Pennsylvania where beneficiary resided",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at ... | 9,085,983 | b |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 F.2d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "Rhode Island bank's issuance of letter of credit for Rhode Island customer payable in Rhode Island did not subject issuing bank to jurisdiction of Pennsylvania where beneficiary resided",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 F.Supp. 564, 568",
"parenthetical": "North Carolina court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Illinois bank that issued letter of credit that benefitted North Carolina resident",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank iss... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "735 P.2d 747, 752-53",
"parenthetical": "jurisdiction over Tennessee bank that confirmed letter of credit issued by Florida bank in favor of Alaska resident was constitutionally allowable in Alaska",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank ... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 F.Supp. 564, 568",
"parenthetical": "North Carolina court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Illinois bank that issued letter of credit that benefitted North Carolina resident",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank iss... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d a... | 9,085,983 | a |
Neither the Virginia state courts nor the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of defining personal jurisdiction over entities engaged in letter of credit transactions. Nevertheless, several federal circuit courts and other courts have addressed the issue and the consensus appears to be that the beneficiary's status... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 425, 426",
"parenthetical": "Kansas issuing bank subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado when it issued letter of credit on behalf of its Kansas client for the benefit of a Colorado resident purchasing property in Colorado",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 F.Supp. 564, 568",
"parenthetical": "North Carolina court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Illinois bank that issued letter of credit that benefitted North Carolina resident",
"sentence": "See Moog World Trade Corp., 90 F.3d at 1386-87 (foreign bank iss... | 9,085,983 | b |
.Some jurisdictions that consider otherwise excluded inheritances as deviations from presumptive child support guidelines have identified an approach that should be helpful in assuring that all applicable factors are fairly considered in the analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting first a calculation under the guideline formula before deviating when strict application produces an unjust result",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Connell, supra, 712 A.2d at 1269-70 (explaining that child support should be calculated first util... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "712 A.2d 1269, 1269-70",
"parenthetical": "explaining that child support should be calculated first utilizing the parties' gross income as defined in the child support guidelines before undertaking an analysis of statutory factors for deviation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Connell... | 7,279,300 | b |
.Some jurisdictions that consider otherwise excluded inheritances as deviations from presumptive child support guidelines have identified an approach that should be helpful in assuring that all applicable factors are fairly considered in the analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "712 A.2d 1269, 1269-70",
"parenthetical": "explaining that child support should be calculated first utilizing the parties' gross income as defined in the child support guidelines before undertaking an analysis of statutory factors for deviation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Connell... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting first a calculation under the guideline formula before deviating when strict application produces an unjust result",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Connell, supra, 712 A.2d at 1269-70 (explaining that child support should be calculated first util... | 7,279,300 | a |
The court of appeals for this circuit has an established tradition of leniency towards pro se petitioners, especially where summary judgment is sought by the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"due to the pro se petitioner's general lack of expertise, courts should review habeas petitions with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.... pro se complaints must be liberally constructed\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that pro se petitioners need not raise issues \"in INS terms\" but may raise them \"as they may have understood\" them",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.1983) (“due to the pro se petitioner’s general lack of expert... | 9,452,423 | a |
. The State does not argue that rational basis scrutiny, as used in LaRue, applies. Even if it had, we agree'with the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all concluded that 44 Liquormart's reaffirmation of LaRue's holding suggests that the La-Rue regulations would have, and must have, survi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 F.2d 1268, 1273-74",
"parenthetical": "stating that where the First Amendment is implicated, courts' review must be \"more intense\"",
"sentence": "See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (5th Cir.1988) (stating that where the First Amendment is implicated,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "459 F.3d 555, 555",
"parenthetical": "noting that intermediate scrutiny \"routinely\" applies to regulations of SOBs generally",
"sentence": "See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (5th Cir.1988) (stating that where the First Amendment is implicated, cour... | 3,866,689 | a |
Sanctions are not appropriate when the plaintiffs' pretrial inquiries into the factual and legal bases of the complaint are sufficient. The district court, recognizing the difficulty in proving conspiratorial agreement, did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were reasonable at that time ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 439, 446",
"parenthetical": "discussing difficulty in direct proof of conspiracy and suggesting courthouse door not be barred for those needing discovery for proof of allegations",
"sentence": "See id. (recognizing difficulty in proving conspiracy); see also Smith... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 319, 329",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a finding of a failure to state a claim does not invariably mean that the claim is without arguable merit\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1834, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (stating that... | 10,515,164 | a |
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