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The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558", "parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"", "sentence": "See United ...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of ...
4,124,920
a
The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxation\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of ...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558", "parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"", "sentence": "See United ...
4,124,920
b
The federal government's immunity from state and local taxation is based upon the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, el. 2, and is therefore absolute.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "914 F.2d 151, 153", "parenthetical": "\"Unlike the states' immunity from federal taxation, which is somewhat limited, the United States' immunity from state taxation is a 'blanket immunity.' \"", "sentence": "See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 558 (3d Cir.1992) (...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "958 F.2d 555, 558", "parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of \"the Supremacy Clause, viewing all state taxes on federal entities as insults to national sovereignty and impermissible burdens on federal operations\"", "sentence": "See United ...
4,124,920
b
The extent to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "251 F.3d 267, 267", "parenthetical": "\"The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer's discretion in administering the plan.\"", "sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "71 F.3d 455, 455", "parenthetical": "holding benefit program that entailed a \"purely mechanical determination of eligibility\" and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan", "sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 26...
908,155
a
The extent to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "71 F.3d 455, 455", "parenthetical": "holding benefit program that entailed a \"purely mechanical determination of eligibility\" and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an ERISA plan", "sentence": "See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 26...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "976 F.2d 1323, 1323", "parenthetical": "ruling that a plan requiring \"case-by-case, discretionary application\" of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer's obligation to pay w...
908,155
b
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficien...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345", "parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting th...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of...
4,184,610
a
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficien...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345", "parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting th...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of...
4,184,610
a
Such a threat is considered especially substantial when the administrative agency "ha[s] not disavowed enforcement if [the plaintiffs] make similar statements in the future." Moreover, the threat need not stem from a criminal action: "[A]dminis-trative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficien...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not.\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting that the threat of...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "134 S.Ct. 2345, 2345", "parenthetical": "noting that the threat of administrative proceedings was \"a substantial one\" but declining to \"decide whether that threat standing alone gives rise to an Article III injury\"", "sentence": "SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2345 (noting th...
4,184,610
b
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments not improper if invited by defense counsel's argument", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument...
10,508,456
b
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "765 F.2d 1199, 1204", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's characterization of state's evidence as \"unrefuted and unrebutted\" not error", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense couns...
10,508,456
b
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "692 F.2d 954, 958-59", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense ...
10,508,456
b
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument...
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
10,508,456
a
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument...
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
10,508,456
a
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments on absence of facts in record supporting defendant's theory not violative", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improper if invited by defense counsel’s argument...
10,508,456
b
Many courts have used the rationale of Lockett to uphold prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of the case when the defendant does not testify.
{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "706 F.2d 161, 166", "parenthetical": "prosecutor's remarks that government's evidence was uncontra-dicted reversible error where only defendant could have testified to contrary", "sentence": "But see Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 166 (6th Cir.1983) (prosecutor’s remarks t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "686 F.2d 1163, 1171-72", "parenthetical": "prosecutorial commentary not error where defense counsel told jury he expected defendant to give exculpatory testimony", "sentence": "See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments not improp...
10,508,456
b
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90", "parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"", "sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually ide...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "625 F.2d 433, 444-46", "parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case", "sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflic...
1,938,882
a
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case", "sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a tri...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90", "parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"", "sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually ide...
1,938,882
b
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case", "sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a tri...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90", "parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"", "sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually ide...
1,938,882
b
Because of the imminent threat of a serious conflict, disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90", "parenthetical": "granting motion to disqualify in virtually identical case because of \"high potential for conflicting loyalties\"", "sentence": "See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 88-90 (E.D.Tex.1981) (granting motion to disqualify in virtually ide...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a trial by affecting attorney's presentation of a case", "sentence": "Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (disqualification appropriate when conflict will taint a tri...
1,938,882
a
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.'...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121", "parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. ...
4,260,147
a
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.'...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121", "parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. ...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1...
4,260,147
b
Having dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, the district court acted within its discretion in granting Defendants' application for attorneys' fees. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were objectively unreasonable, "as the profound dissimilarity between their works and Heroes was indeed 'obvious.'...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "approving of the district court's consideration of a party's \"objective unreasonableness\" when exercising discretion in award-' ing attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "240 F.3d 116, 121", "parenthetical": "\"Subsequent to FogeHy, several other circuits have accorded the objective reasonableness factor substantial weight in determinations whether to award attorneys' fees\"", "sentence": "See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. ...
4,260,147
a
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726", "parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state cl...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726-27", "parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues...
1,626,315
b
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ......
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726-27", "parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues...
1,626,315
b
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims.
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially pre...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "383 U.S. 726, 726", "parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state cl...
1,626,315
a
. When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ......
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals\"", "sentence": "Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (\"if it appears that the state issues substantially pre...
1,626,315
b
Even if the phrase were ambiguous, both Jones and the government agree that they intended Jones to be sentenced to the lowest number in the applicable Guideline range. In light of the evidence of the parties' intent before the district court at the sentence hearing, the court clearly erred when it imposed a sentence co...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "381 F.3d 1105, 1105-06", "parenthetical": "noting that we look to the parties' intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement", "sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852", "parenthetical": "noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant \"would not have reasonably understood ... that the Cour...
3,894,547
a
Even if the phrase were ambiguous, both Jones and the government agree that they intended Jones to be sentenced to the lowest number in the applicable Guideline range. In light of the evidence of the parties' intent before the district court at the sentence hearing, the court clearly erred when it imposed a sentence co...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "991 F.2d 1527, 1532-33", "parenthetical": "reversing where the district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement", "sentence": "See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105-06 (noting that we look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United States ...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "463 Fed.Appx. 849, 852", "parenthetical": "noting that, if a plea agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant \"would not have reasonably understood ... that the Cour...
3,894,547
a
We agree with defendant that, on the record here, the court committed plain error in imposing attorney fees in the absence of evidence that defendant "is or may be able" to pay them.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court committed plain error under similar circumstances", "sentence": "See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (the burden is on the state to prove that a defendant is or may be able to pay costs, an...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "260 Or App 714, 716", "parenthetical": "the burden is on the state to prove that a defendant is or may be able to pay costs, and it is plain error to impose such costs in the absence of evidence of ability to pay", "sentence": "See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 ...
12,413,845
b
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "543 U.S. 499, 509-10", "parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial str...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302", "parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S....
4,215,327
b
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302", "parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S....
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on thi...
4,215,327
a
Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell's approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that Turner did not \"cast doubt on\" the Court's previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on thi...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "541 F.3d 1302, 1302", "parenthetical": "declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground", "sentence": "See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S....
4,215,327
b
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "314 F.3d 262, 265", "parenthetical": "\"We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
6,045,956
a
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "304 F.3d 616, 618", "parenthetical": "stating that \"jurisdictional issues,\" including an Eleventh Amendment defense, must \"be addressed prior to reaching the merits\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address th...
6,045,956
b
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "301 F.3d 482, 489", "parenthetical": "\"As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Treasurer and the Administrator are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address ...
6,045,956
b
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "215 F.3d 561, 570", "parenthetical": "\"We first address Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because this defense raises a question of federal jurisdiction.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address t...
6,045,956
b
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "891 F.2d 591, 592-93", "parenthetical": "\"We are required to decide [the Eleventh Amendment] issue before we decide the merits.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“We must therefore address the jurisdictional [Eleventh Amendment] q...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
6,045,956
a
Both before and after Kovacevich, we have issued several opinions saying that we must address the sovereign-immunity issue first.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "1991 WL 33133, at *4", "parenthetical": "\"In view of the District Court's disposition of the claims on eleventh amendment grounds, the District Court was without jurisdiction to make the alternative ruling on the merits.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d ...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 797, 799", "parenthetical": "\"Although Ohio couches its Eleventh Amendment argument as an alternative basis for dismissal, the Court addresses jurisdictional arguments first.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir.2002) (“W...
6,045,956
a
Finally, he admonished the jury to find the defendant guilty of those crimes. The remark, "the community enforces the law, you represent the community, you decide," was not improper in this context.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "414 F.3d 954, 960", "parenthetical": "reasoning even if the district court failed to sustain an objection to the single improper use of a word, defendants' substantial rights would not have been so affected as to deprive them of a fair trial", "sentence": "See United States v. ...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "547 F.2d 1030, 1036-37", "parenthetical": "finding a plea to the jury to be the conscience of the community is not impermissible unless it is calculated to inflame, and an appeal to the jury to be the \"public's last shield\" did not \"exceed permissible bounds of advocacy\...
1,618,059
b
As to the plaintiffs' retention argument, an employer replaces an employee by hiring or reassigning someone "to perform the plaintiffs duties." In considering the charge that the defendant reassigned younger employees to perform the plaintiffs' duties, "the relevant inquiry concerns the functions which the terminated e...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "6 F.3d 846, 846", "parenthetical": "employee \"not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiffs duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work\"", "sentence": "Shenker ...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "145 F.3d 986, 992", "parenthetical": "ADEA plaintiff \"effectively replaced by many individuals adopting his duties may still be able to establish that he was the object of impermissible discrimination related to his age\"", "sentence": "Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders Inc., 9...
11,542,053
a
Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding nonresident's statement that he had committed no torts in Texas was properly excluded as conclusory", "sentence": "See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substanti...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "164 S.W.3d 703, 703-04", "parenthetical": "affirming trial court's exclusion of nonresident's statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs' claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant's activities in Texas, affiant did not ...
7,093,044
b
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient ...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "390 U.S. 544, 551", "parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural d...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467", "parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226...
8,893,156
a
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467", "parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226", "parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural...
8,893,156
b
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient ...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122", "parenthetical": "holding procedural due process requires that \"[t]he charge must be known before the proceedings commence\"", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holding procedural...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467", "parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226...
8,893,156
a
Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "79 S.W.3d 458, 467", "parenthetical": "finding no due process violation when defendant given pretrial notice of prosecution's intent to seek enhanced sentence and of factual basis for enhancement", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "5 S.W.3d 147, 150", "parenthetical": "\"Due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.\"", "sentence": "See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (holdi...
8,893,156
b
Given the unusually intrusive nature of computer searches, confirmation of the validity of third-party consent is worth the additional time and effort even during the pressures of arrest and investigation.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "720 F.3d 436, 446-47", "parenthetical": "where \"property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the particularity requirement [for search warrants] assumes even greater importance\" because the \"potential for privacy violations ... is enormous\"", "sentence": "See United St...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "573 F.3d 859, 861-62", "parenthetical": "\"[C]omputers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 231 (2d Cir. 2016) (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Virtually ...
12,271,031
b
Oregon appellate courts have not previously considered the issue youth now raises -- i.e., whether the award of restitution in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is "civil" or "penal" in nature. In the adult criminal context, though, the Supreme Court has held restitution to be a sentencing device, not a "quasi-civil re...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "299 Or 128, 138-39", "parenthetical": "analyzing whether the same restitution statutes entitled the defendant to a jury trial", "sentence": "See State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 180, 637 P2d 602 (1981) (analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977)); see also Sta...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "292 Or 172, 180", "parenthetical": "analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977", "sentence": "See State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 180, 637 P2d 602 (1981) (analyzing the penal nature of ORS 137.103 to 137.109 (1977)); see also State v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 138-39, 699 ...
4,219,885
b
(Ex. A to Horbatiuk Aff. at LINA 1242.) Plaintiff did not receive the ACF until discovery, despite earlier requests for his entire claim file, and defendant has not attempted to show that the ACF complied with the amendment rule.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2011 WL 4102143, at *4", "parenthetical": "holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable because it was \"neither attached to nor endorsed on the policy\"", "sentence": "See Francis, 2011 WL 4102143, at *4 (holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable b...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2010 WL 5300537, at *2", "parenthetical": "finding ACF not a plan document where it was not attached to the policy or part of the claim file plaintiff was provided", "sentence": "See Francis, 2011 WL 4102143, at *4 (holding in the alternative that the ACF was unenforceable...
4,310,011
a
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reciting that the Supreme Court \"has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,\" and citing cases", "sentence": "Id.; ...
12,317,030
b
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reciting that the Supreme Court \"has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,\" and citing cases", "sentence": "Id.; ...
12,317,030
b
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "342 U.S. 337, 342", "parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
12,317,030
a
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32", "parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffm...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
12,317,030
a
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "indicating that a \"knowingly\" mens rea requirement \"does much to destroy any force in the argument\" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U....
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
12,317,030
a
The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that i...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "841 F.3d 721, 728-29", "parenthetical": "summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance", "sentence": "Id.; see also H...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265", "parenthetical": "relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute", "sentence": "Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the...
12,317,030
a
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "411 U.S. 389, 397", "parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have i...
4,358,040
a
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating f...
4,358,040
a
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating f...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
4,358,040
b
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "348 U.S. 26, 31", "parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"", "sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were no...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
4,358,040
b
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"", "sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other t...
4,358,040
a
The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.\"", "sentence": "See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "977 F.2d 8, 8", "parenthetical": "\"If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority a...
4,358,040
b
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "83 F.3d 934, 938", "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding tha...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establ...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "924 F.2d 612, 613", "parenthetical": "holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); Unit...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1034, 1034", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establ...
238,082
b
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "83 F.3d 934, 938", "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding tha...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36", "parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that de...
238,082
b
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36", "parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that de...
238,082
b
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36", "parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that de...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36", "parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that de...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the government proposes a plea agreement, when the defendant accepts it and when the district court enforces it, there must be a meeting of minds on all of its essential terms.\"", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant mu...
238,082
a
In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a "meeting of the minds."
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "709 F.2d 35, 36", "parenthetical": "holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendant's testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that de...
{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "924 F.2d 612, 613", "parenthetical": "holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds", "sentence": "See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement); Unit...
238,082
a
This is because any reliance on post-1995 amended portions of chapter 51 did not inordinately burden the Bairs' property "apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being amended." SS 70.001(12). Rather, the reliance on those amended portions of chapter 51 was part of the City's overall decision to require comp...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "120 So.3d 27, 29", "parenthetical": "noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town's actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property", "sentence": "See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "370 So.2d 368, 370", "parenthetical": "explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist", "sentence": "See Landers v. Milton,...
6,783,131
b
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299", "parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"r...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484", "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygrap...
1,745,499
b
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484", "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygrap...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508", "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant'...
1,745,499
a
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fai...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "54 Wn. App. 479, 484", "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygrap...
1,745,499
b
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299", "parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"r...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
1,745,499
b
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508", "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant'...
1,745,499
a
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fai...
1,745,499
a
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "55 Wn. App. 299, 299", "parenthetical": "erroneous admission of expert testimony under ER 702 is not of constitutional magnitude", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"r...
1,745,499
a
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "59 Wn. App. 501, 508", "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant'...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
1,745,499
b
The decision to admit or exclude opinion testimony generally involves the routine exercise of discretion by the trial court under, among other rules, ER 401, 403, 701, 702 and 704. These rules govern evidentiary questions that do not necessarily implicate constitutional rights.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "errors under ER 403 are not of constitutional magnitude and cannot be raised under RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fai...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "contention that admission of polygraph evidence violated defendant's \"right to a fair trial\" insufficient to invoke RAP 2.5(a", "sentence": "See State v. Trader, 54 Wn. App. 479, 484, 774 P.2d 522 (contention that admission of polygraph evidence violate...
1,745,499
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulati...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 2...
7,849,272
a
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29,...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulati...
7,849,272
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "394 U.S. 618, 629", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulati...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (...
7,849,272
a
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 2...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or reg...
7,849,272
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29,...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or reg...
7,849,272
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or reg...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (...
7,849,272
a
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "383 U.S. 745, 757", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 2...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unrea...
7,849,272
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29,...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unrea...
7,849,272
b
Specifically, Shanks alleges that Defendants' ban on motorcycles infringes upon his fundamental rights of interstate and intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unrea...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"the constitutional right to travel from one state to another ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.\"", "sentence": "See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (...
7,849,272
a
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have also declined to apply the first-to-file rule when a declaratory judgment action is filed before a coercive action involving the same parties and issues.
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "16 Fed. Appx. 437, 437", "parenthetical": "\"A plaintiff, even one who files first, does not have a right to bring a declaratory judgment action in the forum of his choosing.\"", "sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a stri...
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 F.3d 791, 791", "parenthetical": "\"In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.\"", "sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, t...
5,605,728
b
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have also declined to apply the first-to-file rule when a declaratory judgment action is filed before a coercive action involving the same parties and issues.
{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "386 F.3d 791, 791", "parenthetical": "\"In any case, the first-to-file rule is not a strict rule and more often than not gives way in the context of a coercive action filed subsequent to a declaratory action.\"", "sentence": "AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 791 (“In any case, t...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "1999 WL 33237054, at *6", "parenthetical": "\"Cases construing the interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that a first filed declaratory judgment action should b...
5,605,728
a
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868", "parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income", "sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spo...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "142 So.3d 603, 614", "parenthetical": "\"Because ... the trial court implicitly relied ... on the wife's erroneous estimation of the husband's net monthly income, we reverse the periodic-alimony award and remand the cause to the circuit court to reconsider the alimony award....
6,915,860
a
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868", "parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income", "sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spo...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "51 So.3d 1058, 1068", "parenthetical": "using the responding spouse's net income as the basis for evaluating the financial impact that the alimony payment would have", "sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s abil...
6,915,860
a
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868", "parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income", "sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spo...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "770 So.2d 635, 637", "parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's judgment that required the husband to pay $1,150 in alimony because the judgment \"eripple[d] him financially,\" leaving him with $80 per month after his living expenses and court-ordered financial obligation...
6,915,860
a
For purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay, and for purposes of calculating an appropriate amount of periodic alimony, the trial court should ordinarily use the spouse's net income as the starting point for these evaluations.
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "567 So.2d 867, 868", "parenthetical": "evaluating the responding spouse's ability to pay based on the responding spouse's net income", "sentence": "See Ex parte Jackson, 567 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1990) (evaluating the responding spouse’s ability to pay based on the responding spo...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "709 So.2d 1283, 1285", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court exceeded its discretion because its judgment created financial obligations for the husband that, after deducting the wife's periodic-alimony award from the husband's net income, exceeded his remaining inco...
6,915,860
a
We conclude that they were not. Instead, we find that, as in Hyder, the assignments at issue specifically provide for the allocation of post-production costs based on the manner in which the royalty is taken--in-kind or in cash. In particular, the plain language of the assignments unambiguously provides that, when the ...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 S.W.3d 690, 699", "parenthetical": "\" 'Proceeds' or 'amount realized' clauses require measurement of the royalty based on the amount the lessee in fact receives under its sales contract for the gas.\"", "sentence": "See Hyder, 483 S.W.3d at 873 (noting, with respect t...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "483 S.W.3d 873, 873", "parenthetical": "noting, with respect to the 25% gas royalty owed to the Hyders, that \"the price-received basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the lessors from bearing post[-]production costs,\" and that such a clause is often r...
12,376,947
b
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-bas...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630", "parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted d...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "512 U.S. 622, 642", "parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"", "sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a parti...
3,735,909
b
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-bas...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"", "sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulatio...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630", "parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted d...
3,735,909
a
In November 2005, the case law from this Court and the Supreme Court was ambiguous concerning whether asking demonstrators to remove such signs would be an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights. For example, there was no clear holding concerning whether such restrictions might be deemed content-bas...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.\"", "sentence": "See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular regulatio...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "469 F.3d 625, 630", "parenthetical": "noting the fine distinction between a restriction to alleviate traffic concerns that is content-neutral if due to the distracting presence of pro testers with such signs, but content-based if the message was what angered and distracted d...
3,735,909
a
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot connect any of their losses to E & Y on a materialization of the risk theory, whether those losses purportedly arose out of the 6/30/99 AOL Opinion or out of any other allegedly false audit opinions. In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of th...
{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "476 F.3d 157, 157-58", "parenthetical": "risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion", "sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was no...
{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09", "parenthetical": "risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs' losses", "sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not co...
5,702,798
a