context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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In fact, as plaintiffs' affidavits make clear, none of the plaintiffs ever attempted to file a grievance or asked that a grievance be filed and pursued. Under these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that plaintiffs are excused from first exhausting their remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, i.e., ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. M... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke... | 1,140,585 | a |
In fact, as plaintiffs' affidavits make clear, none of the plaintiffs ever attempted to file a grievance or asked that a grievance be filed and pursued. Under these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that plaintiffs are excused from first exhausting their remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, i.e., ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. M... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke... | 1,140,585 | a |
In fact, as plaintiffs' affidavits make clear, none of the plaintiffs ever attempted to file a grievance or asked that a grievance be filed and pursued. Under these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that plaintiffs are excused from first exhausting their remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, i.e., ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile",
"sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. M... | 1,140,585 | b |
Therefore, the Agreement remains as originally signed, unmodified. "As a matter of elementary contract law, [a party] cannot unilaterally modify the existing agreement." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001",
"parenthetical": "\"If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived\"",
"sentence": "Popovich v. McDonal... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to consider employer's unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed",
"sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.... | 9,369,892 | b |
Therefore, the Agreement remains as originally signed, unmodified. "As a matter of elementary contract law, [a party] cannot unilaterally modify the existing agreement." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "805 So.2d 829, 833",
"parenthetical": "refusing to remake parties' contract when employee rejected employer's offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement's language",
"sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.2002); see als... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001",
"parenthetical": "\"If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived\"",
"sentence": "Popovich v. McDonal... | 9,369,892 | a |
Further, while father may be inconvenienced financially by the order to pay the amount due for the child's past support, we are unable to conclude that an undue hardship or substantial injustice is created merely by enforcing his properly calculated obligation to support his child. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "financial inconvenience caused by a reinstatement of maintenance does not amount to prejudice",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 794 P.2d 1097 (Colo.App.1990) (deviation from the guideline amount of support is not justified by hardship res... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deviation from the guideline amount of support is not justified by hardship resulting solely from application of the guideline, absent other unusual or unique financial circumstances",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 794 P.2d 1097 (Colo.App.19... | 10,349,142 | b |
Under the facts alleged in this case, Secretary Detzner is an appropriate defendant for a Section 5 enforcement action because his office adopted and is responsible for administrating the Database Matching Program. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections",
"sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakot... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1156",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action\" for review of a law passed by th... | 4,275,713 | b |
Under the facts alleged in this case, Secretary Detzner is an appropriate defendant for a Section 5 enforcement action because his office adopted and is responsible for administrating the Database Matching Program. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1156",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action\" for review of a law passed by th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "317 F.Supp. 915, 919",
"parenthetical": "enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors",
"sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting ... | 4,275,713 | a |
With the increased prominence of jet airplanes, noise and vibrations have replaced physical encumbrance as the primary complaint of claimants seeking compensation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance",
"sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs’ ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 F.2d 101, 101",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs' use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise\"",
"sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interferenc... | 969,450 | b |
With the increased prominence of jet airplanes, noise and vibrations have replaced physical encumbrance as the primary complaint of claimants seeking compensation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "161 F.Supp. 597, 600",
"parenthetical": "noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance",
"sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "654 F.2d 101, 101",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs' use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise\"",
"sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interferenc... | 969,450 | b |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "752 F.3d 1271, 1286",
"parenthetical": "\"It is enough [for SS 1591 liability] that [the defendant] 'recruited' the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.\"",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be pr... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here ... | 12,277,114 | a |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "752 F.3d 1271, 1286",
"parenthetical": "\"It is enough [for SS 1591 liability] that [the defendant] 'recruited' the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.\"",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be pr... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. ... | 12,277,114 | a |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.3d 1066, 1073",
"parenthetical": "\"In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of SS 1591.\"",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the oth... | 12,277,114 | b |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 F.3d 1066, 1073",
"parenthetical": "\"In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of SS 1591.\"",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the oth... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. ... | 12,277,114 | a |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 329, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"The knowledge required of the defendant [for SS 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.\"",
"sentence": "A... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here ... | 12,277,114 | a |
Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334",
"parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction",
"sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 329, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"The knowledge required of the defendant [for SS 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.\"",
"sentence": "A... | 12,277,114 | b |
The district court determined that Grigsby failed to state a First Amendment claim because he only alleged isolated instances of delay and possible interference with his mail. However, at this early stage of the proceedings, Grigsby's allegations, liberally construed, present a First Amendment claim based on defendants... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.3d 264, 265",
"parenthetical": "stating that prisoners have \"a First Amendment right to send and receive mail\"",
"sentence": "See Witherow v. Paff 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (stating that prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail”... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 957, 961",
"parenthetical": "concluding that temporary delay in delivery of mail did not violate First Amendment where prison officials had come forward with a legitimate penological reason for the delay",
"sentence": "See Witherow v. Paff 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.199... | 4,121,916 | a |
We also note that Mr. Floore is service connected for diabetes with a 20% disability rating, yet, other than mentioning that his peripheral neuropathy is diabetes related, the Board did not discuss the effects of diabetes, if any, occupational or otherwise. Neither party included a medical examination report addressing... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "7 Vet.App. 517, 527",
"parenthetical": "Board's statement \"must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court\"",
"sentence": "See Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995) (Board’s st... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "5 Vet.App. 524, 529",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he central inquiry in determining whether a veteran is entitled to TDIU is whether that veteran's service-connected disabilities alone are of sufficient severity to produce unemployability.\"",
"sentence": "See Allday v. Brown, ... | 4,075,300 | a |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.E... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | 12,176,434 | b |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403",
"parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | 12,176,434 | b |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | 12,176,434 | b |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.E... | 12,176,434 | a |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403",
"parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | 12,176,434 | a |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | 12,176,434 | a |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31",
"parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.E... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | 12,176,434 | b |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403",
"parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | 12,176,434 | a |
Regarding the second prong, IEP disputes are reasonably likely to recur between the same parties--the school district and the parent(s)--because a new IEP evaluation occurs at least annually. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"",
"sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IE... | 12,176,434 | b |
Cordua argues that even if "churrascos" is generic as to "churrasco restaurants" (also known as "churrascari-as"), it is not generic as to all restaurant services. But a term is generic if the relevant public understands the term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "777 F.2d 1561, 1561",
"parenthetical": "affirming the TTAB's determination that BUNDT is generic \"for a type of ring cake\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for... | 5,916,611 | a |
Cordua argues that even if "churrascos" is generic as to "churrasco restaurants" (also known as "churrascari-as"), it is not generic as to all restaurant services. But a term is generic if the relevant public understands the term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for... | 5,916,611 | a |
Cordua argues that even if "churrascos" is generic as to "churrasco restaurants" (also known as "churrascari-as"), it is not generic as to all restaurant services. But a term is generic if the relevant public understands the term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1988 WL 252496, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northlan... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for... | 5,916,611 | a |
Cordua argues that even if "churrascos" is generic as to "churrasco restaurants" (also known as "churrascari-as"), it is not generic as to all restaurant services. But a term is generic if the relevant public understands the term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not un... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271",
"parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2... | 5,916,611 | b |
From all of the above, I conclude that Crawford's statements to law enforcement officials were not preceded by any illegal search or personal seizure or by a violation of Miranda. I conclude also that the conduct of the officers was, as required by Latta, demonstrably reasonable under the "totality of the circumstances... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "521 F.2d 250, 250",
"parenthetical": "A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties",
"sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment",
"sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d a... | 9,237,598 | a |
From all of the above, I conclude that Crawford's statements to law enforcement officials were not preceded by any illegal search or personal seizure or by a violation of Miranda. I conclude also that the conduct of the officers was, as required by Latta, demonstrably reasonable under the "totality of the circumstances... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences",
"sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A par... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "521 F.2d 250, 250",
"parenthetical": "A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties",
"sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 ... | 9,237,598 | b |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded r... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of a... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 ... | 10,529,298 | b |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of a... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded r... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465",
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded... | 10,529,298 | a |
More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency's determination of SAW status in an individual action -- an event comparable to EPA's selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constit... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of a... | 10,529,298 | a |
Defendants point to no charge proffered by them on economic purpose. In any event, Defendants' contention ignores well-established precedent holding that lack of economic motive does not constitute a defense to Hobbs Act crimes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding Hobbs Act conviction of antiabortion activists for threatening doctor to induce him to cease performing abortions",
"sentence": "See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (“there is no exception to the Hobbs Act” permitti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 F.2d 112, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no exception to the Hobbs Act\" permitting extortion \"for a religious purpose\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (“there is no exception to the Hobbs Act” permitting extortion “for a re... | 10,536,169 | b |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72",
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protect... | 12,270,684 | a |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | 12,270,684 | b |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72",
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protect... | 12,270,684 | a |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee... | 12,270,684 | a |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72",
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protect... | 12,270,684 | a |
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because she has alleged that Defendant Romero used excessive force against Saenz. As a pretrial detainee, Saenz had a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive force, and this right has been clearly established. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ..... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force",
"sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee... | 12,270,684 | a |
Darr also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity based on his contention that it is undisputed that (1) objectively valid reasons existed for his employment actions and (2) the employment actions were actually motivated, at least in part, by the" objectively valid reasons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 1528, 1535",
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations",
"sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 F.3d 1284, 1284-85",
"parenthetical": "extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications",
"sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to def... | 5,722,121 | b |
Darr also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity based on his contention that it is undisputed that (1) objectively valid reasons existed for his employment actions and (2) the employment actions were actually motivated, at least in part, by the" objectively valid reasons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 1528, 1535",
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations",
"sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "219 F.3d 1280, 1296",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations",
"sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed ev... | 5,722,121 | b |
The preclusive effect of the exhaustion doctrine applies equally to cases where some, but not all, of a petitioner's issues were raised in the state forum. We have not adopted a per se rule that complete exhaustion of all claims in a so-called "mixed petition" is necessary before the exhausted issues qualify for consid... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of all claims raised in habeas petitions in Fifth Circuit",
"sentence": "See Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring exhaustion of all claims raised in habeas petitions in Fifth Circuit)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pro se petitioner's claim of conflict of interest considered by federal appellate court although nature of conflict not divulged to either state or federal district court",
"sentence": "But see Brooks v. Hopper, 597 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1979) (pro se pet... | 1,287,827 | a |
However, several district courts have held otherwise, i.e., that the "exceptional reasons" provision of SS 3145(c) is only available to the appellate courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 F.Supp. 507, 509",
"parenthetical": "\"we will not consider Nesser's 'exceptional reasons' argument for bail ..., finding that Congress reserved this task for the court of appeals.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Nesser, 937 F.Supp. 507, 509 (W.D.Pa.1996) (Cindrich, J.) (“we w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress has mandated that the United States Courts of Appeals are the only courts with the jurisdiction to override a SS 3143(a",
"sentence": "See also In re Sealed Case, 242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491 (E.D.Mich.2003) (Gadola, J.) (“Co... | 3,464,431 | a |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16",
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356",
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, ... | 3,703,756 | b |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356",
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 pena... | 3,703,756 | a |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 3... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16",
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion i... | 3,703,756 | a |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 pena... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 3... | 3,703,756 | b |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16",
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 3... | 3,703,756 | b |
We further note that when a penalty scheme set forth in a state statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has considered whether the imposition of mandatory, ever-mounting penalties violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions in a particular case. Th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 3... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 pena... | 3,703,756 | a |
A series of recent Federal Circuit decisions have noted the useful nature of extrinsic evidence like dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises in aiding judicial determinations of ordinary and customary meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particular... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "308 F.3d 1202, 1202",
"parenthetical": "\"dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining\" term meaning",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are part... | 9,506,404 | b |
A series of recent Federal Circuit decisions have noted the useful nature of extrinsic evidence like dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises in aiding judicial determinations of ordinary and customary meaning. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 1325, 1325",
"parenthetical": "\"[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology\"",
... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particular... | 9,506,404 | a |
A series of recent Federal Circuit decisions have noted the useful nature of extrinsic evidence like dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises in aiding judicial determinations of ordinary and customary meaning. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particular... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "288 F.3d 1366, 1366",
"parenthetical": "\"Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term's ordinary meaning\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assis... | 9,506,404 | b |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simp... | 10,517,253 | a |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | 10,517,253 | b |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | 10,517,253 | a |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | 10,517,253 | b |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | 10,517,253 | a |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633",
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 55... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | 10,517,253 | a |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers... | 10,517,253 | b |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers... | 10,517,253 | b |
Moreover, once Kelly produced the .22 cartridges in response to Dixon's query about drugs, Dixon was permitted to pursue the question of the location of the gun under the public safety exception to Miranda's requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect",
"sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 8... | 10,517,253 | a |
Furthermore, this Court has held that Commerce is not required to correct a respondent's errors when erroneous data are reported and not timely corrected. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "797 F. Supp. 994, 994",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[e]ven if Commerce possessed the personnel to identify errors Plaintiffs made in their data base within the statutory deadlines, Commerce would have no basis for deciding which portion of the submission was correct or erroneous.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 F. Supp. 2d 969, 982",
"parenthetical": "\"It is respondent's obligation to supply Commerce with accurate information. * * * In general, Commerce is not required to correct a respondent's errors when erroneous data [are] reported and not timely corrected.\"",
"sentence... | 8,472,130 | a |
The first two claims amount to little more than disagreeing with the weight that the sentencing judge afforded to certain aspects of the sentencing factors. This exercise, however, is peculiarly within the sentencing court's discretion, and Gallardo offers no meritorious reason to interfere with that judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"",
"sentence": "See Ga... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 U.S. 51, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court",
"sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to th... | 6,051,736 | b |
The first two claims amount to little more than disagreeing with the weight that the sentencing judge afforded to certain aspects of the sentencing factors. This exercise, however, is peculiarly within the sentencing court's discretion, and Gallardo offers no meritorious reason to interfere with that judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court",
"sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the review... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"",
"sentence": "See Ga... | 6,051,736 | a |
The first two claims amount to little more than disagreeing with the weight that the sentencing judge afforded to certain aspects of the sentencing factors. This exercise, however, is peculiarly within the sentencing court's discretion, and Gallardo offers no meritorious reason to interfere with that judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"",
"sentence": "See Ga... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "637 F.3d 26, 31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"judgment calls\" on the weight to be given various relevant factors \"are for the sentencing court, not for this court\"",
"sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial van... | 6,051,736 | b |
This is not always an easy task, because there are "inherent line-drawing problems associated with distinguishing among artwork with presumptively expressive content (such as [paintings, photographs, prints, and sculptures]), merchandise with potentially expressive content (such as 'the crafts of the jeweler, the potte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 F.3d 1011, 1011-12",
"parenthetical": "holding that nonprofit corporations' sales of \"T-shirts imprinted with various philosophical messages\" were \"within the ambit of the First Amendment\"",
"sentence": "Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 85 (quoting and citing Bery, 97 F.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1064, 1064-65",
"parenthetical": "holding that religious and political groups' sale of merchandise and literature was fully protected",
"sentence": "Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 85 (quoting and citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 696). Moreover, some objects are otherwise uti... | 3,971,541 | b |
Under subsection (6), the first determination to be made is "the suitability or nonsuitability for adjudication and commitment of the child to the [Department." SS 985.433(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). This Court has recognized that subsection (6) gives wide discretion to the trial court in determining whether to commit a chi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930",
"parenthetical": "finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court's initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department's recommendation as to the appropri... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 So.3d 961, 967",
"parenthetical": "holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court's initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department's recommendation of probation in favor of commitment",
"sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d ... | 12,353,255 | b |
Under subsection (6), the first determination to be made is "the suitability or nonsuitability for adjudication and commitment of the child to the [Department." SS 985.433(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). This Court has recognized that subsection (6) gives wide discretion to the trial court in determining whether to commit a chi... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 So.3d 961, 967",
"parenthetical": "holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court's initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department's recommendation of probation in favor of commitment",
"sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court's nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department befo... | 12,353,255 | a |
Under subsection (6), the first determination to be made is "the suitability or nonsuitability for adjudication and commitment of the child to the [Department." SS 985.433(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). This Court has recognized that subsection (6) gives wide discretion to the trial court in determining whether to commit a chi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930",
"parenthetical": "finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court's initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department's recommendation as to the appropri... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930",
"parenthetical": "\"Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child 1/8 lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.' \"",
"sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (... | 12,353,255 | b |
Under subsection (6), the first determination to be made is "the suitability or nonsuitability for adjudication and commitment of the child to the [Department." SS 985.433(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). This Court has recognized that subsection (6) gives wide discretion to the trial court in determining whether to commit a chi... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930",
"parenthetical": "\"Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child 1/8 lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.' \"",
"sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court's nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department befo... | 12,353,255 | a |
Liability under this legal theory is generally limited to unauthorized use in connection with the promotion or advertisement of a product or service and not, as is the case here, for use in a magazine story. This is true even if the article was arguably motivated by The Surfer's Journal's desire for profits or tangenti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 Cal.3d 860, 867",
"parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"",
"sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23",
"parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and pr... | 5,756,669 | b |
Liability under this legal theory is generally limited to unauthorized use in connection with the promotion or advertisement of a product or service and not, as is the case here, for use in a magazine story. This is true even if the article was arguably motivated by The Surfer's Journal's desire for profits or tangenti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"",
"sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23",
"parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and pr... | 5,756,669 | b |
Liability under this legal theory is generally limited to unauthorized use in connection with the promotion or advertisement of a product or service and not, as is the case here, for use in a magazine story. This is true even if the article was arguably motivated by The Surfer's Journal's desire for profits or tangenti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23",
"parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and pr... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"",
"sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the de... | 5,756,669 | a |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 F.Supp. 897, 902",
"parenthetical": "\"It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys' fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365",
"parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceiv... | 7,800,354 | a |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "411 F.Supp. 897, 902",
"parenthetical": "\"It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys' fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showe... | 7,800,354 | a |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "546 F.2d 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365",
"parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceiv... | 7,800,354 | a |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "546 F.2d 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showe... | 7,800,354 | a |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365",
"parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceiv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65",
"parenthetical": "surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees",
"sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is... | 7,800,354 | b |
Voluntary production of documents prior to a final judgment ordering their production does not allow the government to avoid a fee award. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65",
"parenthetical": "surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees",
"sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is... | 7,800,354 | b |
This resolution of the facial conflict by recognizing reasonable spheres of respective applicability gives effect to each set of terms and gives the parties and the drafters of the documents credit for coherent thinking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.\"",
"sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and the probable inten... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 300, 302",
"parenthetical": "stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that \"[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons\"",
"sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mas... | 12,276,674 | a |
This resolution of the facial conflict by recognizing reasonable spheres of respective applicability gives effect to each set of terms and gives the parties and the drafters of the documents credit for coherent thinking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 N.E.2d 248, 251",
"parenthetical": "\"Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.\"",
"sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "247 F.3d 300, 302",
"parenthetical": "stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that \"[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons\"",
"sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mas... | 12,276,674 | a |
P 11 On appeal, we presume the trial court exercised its discretion by considering all the relevant factors to determine whether to forfeit the entire bond amount or only a portion thereof. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 35, 37",
"parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in j... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32",
"parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record",
"sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court ... | 4,041,324 | b |
P 11 On appeal, we presume the trial court exercised its discretion by considering all the relevant factors to determine whether to forfeit the entire bond amount or only a portion thereof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32",
"parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record",
"sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "643 P.2d 738, 740",
"parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in ... | 4,041,324 | a |
P 11 On appeal, we presume the trial court exercised its discretion by considering all the relevant factors to determine whether to forfeit the entire bond amount or only a portion thereof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 P.3d 876, 883",
"parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record",
"sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court kn... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 Ariz. 35, 37",
"parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in j... | 4,041,324 | a |
P 11 On appeal, we presume the trial court exercised its discretion by considering all the relevant factors to determine whether to forfeit the entire bond amount or only a portion thereof. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "643 P.2d 738, 740",
"parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 P.3d 876, 883",
"parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record",
"sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court kn... | 4,041,324 | b |
Defendants do not dispute that treatment for HCV is a serious medical need. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 628784, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"It is well-established that Hepatitis C qualifies as a serious condition for purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See Pabon v. Wright, 2004 WL 628784, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2004) (“It is well-established that... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "385 F.3d 1133, 1137",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with district court's determination that although HCV infection was a serious medical need, the issue was whether inmate had serious medical need for immediate interferon treatment",
"sentence": "Cf. Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 11... | 2,792,026 | a |
The government fails to respond to this argument. The Court's own research found that California courts recognize a duty may arise from a promise, if the defendant has reason to believe the plaintiff will rely on the promise to his detriment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576",
"parenthetical": "Auto club's undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.",
"sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsu... | 3,603,208 | b |
The government fails to respond to this argument. The Court's own research found that California courts recognize a duty may arise from a promise, if the defendant has reason to believe the plaintiff will rely on the promise to his detriment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576",
"parenthetical": "Auto club's undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.",
"sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.\"",
"sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 2... | 3,603,208 | a |
These undisputed facts demonstrate that the District's sexual harassment policies and response to Harper's complaint were "both reasonable and vigorous." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 278, 286-87",
"parenthetical": "employee's admitted knowledge of employer's policy prohibiting sexual harassment and complaint procedure and employer's prompt investigation of complaint showed that employer \"exercised reasonable care to prevent and, if not prevente... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "169 F.3d 969, 971",
"parenthetical": "school district's anti-discrimination policy, swift response to harassment complaints, and acceptance of harasser's resignation was sufficient to establish first prong of affirmative defense",
"sentence": "Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. S... | 62,014 | b |
On appeal, Noel seeks to challenge the denial of CAT relief and also argues that he is entitled to asylum as a matter of discretion based on being subjected to an atrocious form of persecution. We cannot address these arguments, however, because Noel failed to raise them with the BIA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that we lack jurisdiction to review an issue an alien fails to raise before the BIA",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring an alien to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review); Fernandez-Bern... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 F.3d 1239, 1253",
"parenthetical": "explaining that to properly raise an issue before the BIA, the alien must mention the issue in his brief and discuss its merits or the basis for the IJ's decision",
"sentence": "See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring a... | 5,683,643 | a |
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