context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctio... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 385, 415",
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [dist... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] betwee... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 Conn. 515, 527",
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definiti... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctio... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 385, 415",
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [dist... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "207 Conn. 518, 533",
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 2... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "207 Conn. 518, 533",
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 2... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] betwee... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "207 Conn. 518, 533",
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 2... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 Conn. 515, 527",
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definiti... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctio... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "207 Conn. 518, 533",
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 2... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "245 Conn. 385, 415",
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [dist... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "legal concepts of wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] betwee... | 2,630,471 | a |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 Conn. 515, 527",
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definiti... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | 2,630,471 | b |
The District Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] alleges that the [t]own is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by [the town employee] . . . such a claim is precluded by [General Statutes] SS 52-557n, which provides, that'a political subdivision of the state shall not be ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 71... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "'A wilful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.'",
"sentence": "Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n.14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (‘While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctio... | 2,630,471 | a |
First, the "palpable defect" standard is novel, vague, and inconsistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "148 Ariz. 505, 507",
"parenthetical": "suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court's consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 Ariz. 6, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court \"did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive\" and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ari... | 12,310,490 | b |
First, the "palpable defect" standard is novel, vague, and inconsistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "715 P.2d 758, 760",
"parenthetical": "suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court's consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 Ariz. 6, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court \"did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive\" and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ari... | 12,310,490 | b |
First, the "palpable defect" standard is novel, vague, and inconsistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "148 Ariz. 505, 507",
"parenthetical": "suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court's consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court \"did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive\" and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409... | 12,310,490 | b |
First, the "palpable defect" standard is novel, vague, and inconsistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court \"did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive\" and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "715 P.2d 758, 760",
"parenthetical": "suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court's consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 4... | 12,310,490 | a |
' CIMTs involve conduct that is "inherently base, vile, or depraved" and which is done with a criminal intent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "846 F.3d 731, 736",
"parenthetical": "\"To involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential elements:, a culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In a series of published de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "417 F.3d 414, 414",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he hallmark of moral turpitude is a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation.\"",
"sentence": "See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In a series of published d... | 12,277,896 | b |
Our conclusion that the applicable statute of limitations is the three-year limitations period in section 26-10-25 comports with decisions interpreting and applying South Dakota law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the applicable statute of limitations for a victim alleging childhood sexual abuse is the three-year limitations period found in section 26-10-25",
"sentence": "See Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d at 223 (“It is obvious from a plain reading of SDCL 26... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 N.W.2d 223, 223",
"parenthetical": "\"It is obvious from a plain reading of SDCL 26-10-25 and 26-10-29 that the Legislature intended SDCL 26-10-25 to apply to all acts of intentional childhood sexual abuse conduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d at 223 (“It is ... | 936,233 | b |
Our conclusion that the applicable statute of limitations is the three-year limitations period in section 26-10-25 comports with decisions interpreting and applying South Dakota law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "567 N.W.2d 223, 223",
"parenthetical": "\"It is obvious from a plain reading of SDCL 26-10-25 and 26-10-29 that the Legislature intended SDCL 26-10-25 to apply to all acts of intentional childhood sexual abuse conduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d at 223 (“It is ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "329 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1104",
"parenthetical": "applying section 26-10-25 to victim's allegation she suffered childhood sexual abuse by a priest",
"sentence": "See Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d at 223 (“It is obvious from a plain reading of SDCL 26-10-25 and 26-10-29 that the Legisl... | 936,233 | a |
P 7 While we find no Oklahoma cases on point,other states addressing the issue have recognized that, considering parents' fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children, protection of children from harm constitutes the sine qua non compelling state interest in testing grandparental visitation sta... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power\"",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (1981) (“[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unque... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "best interest of child not a compelling state interest, and grandparental visitation under statute without requirement of harm to child held unconstitutional",
"sentence": "Contra, Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993) (best interest of child not a ... | 11,687,587 | a |
P 7 While we find no Oklahoma cases on point,other states addressing the issue have recognized that, considering parents' fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children, protection of children from harm constitutes the sine qua non compelling state interest in testing grandparental visitation sta... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "best interest of child not a compelling state interest, and grandparental visitation under statute without requirement of harm to child held unconstitutional",
"sentence": "Contra, Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993) (best interest of child not a ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power\"",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (1981) (“[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unque... | 11,687,587 | b |
P 7 While we find no Oklahoma cases on point,other states addressing the issue have recognized that, considering parents' fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children, protection of children from harm constitutes the sine qua non compelling state interest in testing grandparental visitation sta... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "best interest of child not a compelling state interest, and grandparental visitation under statute without requirement of harm to child held unconstitutional",
"sentence": "Contra, Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993) (best interest of child not a ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power\"",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (1981) (“[p]rotecting the best interest of the child is unque... | 11,687,587 | b |
P 7 While we find no Oklahoma cases on point,other states addressing the issue have recognized that, considering parents' fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children, protection of children from harm constitutes the sine qua non compelling state interest in testing grandparental visitation sta... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute granting grandparental visitation premised on best interests of child and proscribing visitation if visitation would endanger the child physically, mentally, or emotionally, held constitutional",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 32... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "best interest of child not a compelling state interest, and grandparental visitation under statute without requirement of harm to child held unconstitutional",
"sentence": "Contra, Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993) (best interest of child not a ... | 11,687,587 | a |
P 7 While we find no Oklahoma cases on point,other states addressing the issue have recognized that, considering parents' fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children, protection of children from harm constitutes the sine qua non compelling state interest in testing grandparental visitation sta... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "strengthening of familial ties and preservation of family/generational contact held of compelling state interest.",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (1981) (“[p]rotecting the best interest of the chil... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "best interest of child not a compelling state interest, and grandparental visitation under statute without requirement of harm to child held unconstitutional",
"sentence": "Contra, Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993) (best interest of child not a ... | 11,687,587 | a |
. The correct standard of proof in cases such as this where consent follows an illegal detention, arrest, seizure, search or other police misconduct is clear and convincing evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no valid consent is established unless state can show, by clear and convincing evidence, an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality between the prior unlawful detention and the purported consent",
"sentence": "State v. Fuksman, 468 So.2d 1067, 1072 (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent antecedent police misconduct, consent to search need only be shown by preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "State v. Fuksman, 468 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (special concurrence, Pearson, Daniel S., J.); see DuBoise v. State, 12 F.L... | 7,568,577 | a |
Although Wife disclosed some of Husband's emails to Cooke and BJR, who allegedly used the emails to obtain additional information about Husband's affair, the SCA does not punish such conduct. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment to Wife, Cooke, and BJR. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "207 F.Supp.2d 926, 926",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts",
"sentence": "See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts); Cardinal Heal... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that civil liability under section 2707 does not extend to those who aid, abet, or conspire with a person or entity engaging in a violation of section 2702",
"sentence": "See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defenda... | 3,868,058 | a |
Although Wife disclosed some of Husband's emails to Cooke and BJR, who allegedly used the emails to obtain additional information about Husband's affair, the SCA does not punish such conduct. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment to Wife, Cooke, and BJR. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an ISP was not liable under sections 2511 and 2520 of the ECPA for aiding and abetting defendants who intercepted and disclosed oral communications",
"sentence": "See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "207 F.Supp.2d 926, 926",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts",
"sentence": "See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts); Cardinal Heal... | 3,868,058 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 A.D.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "115 Misc.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR §... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 A.D.2d 25, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR ... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 A.D.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "115 Misc.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR §... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 A.D.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "115 Misc.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR §... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR ... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 A.D.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "115 Misc.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR §... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"an undertaking is discretionary where a temporary restraining order is granted ... since such order should only last for a brief period of time\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 3... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 A.D.2d 835, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "357 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544",
"parenthetical": "holding that a TRO is vacated \"upon the disposition of the motion for the preliminary injunction\"",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "115 Misc.2d 398, 400",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR §... | 11,233,580 | a |
The order was entered in Suffolk County Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' application to Justice Robert A. Lifson on May 17, 2000, as part of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. The TRO apparently contained no provision specifying its date of expiration, although the rule under New York state law is that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222",
"parenthetical": "declining to find defendant in contempt for violating terms of a TRO granted two and a half years earlier because such a period \"is clearly not within the 'earliest possible' time requirement of CPLR SS 6313(a",
"sentence": "CPLR ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"by its very nature\" a TRO expires upon issuance of a preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "CPLR § 6313; Stubbart v. Monroe County, 58 A.D.2d 25, 29, 395 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (4th Dep’t 1977), app. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 808, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1... | 11,233,580 | b |
Under plain error review, we may vacate special conditions of supervised release only if the record reveals no basis for the conditions. If the record reveals a basis, there is no reasonable probability that but for the error the defendant's sentence would be different and thus the proceeding's fairness was not impacte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "775 F.3d 1224, 1224-25",
"parenthetical": "concluding district court's failure to make requisite findings before imposing special condition affected defendant's substantial rights and undermined fairness, integrity, or reputation of proceedings because, but for failure, to a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "681 F.3d 1143, 1172",
"parenthetical": "holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object, we review for plain error",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1172 (10th Cir.2012) (hol... | 4,331,539 | b |
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present are personal to him or her; they generally cannot be waived through counsel, unless the defendant and counsel have previously discussed the matter and agreed upon the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "271 Kan. 119, 132",
"parenthetical": "waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant's right without discussion",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Lopez, 271 Kan. 119, 132, 22 P.3d 1040 (2001) (waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant’s righ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 Kan. App. 2d 996, 1001",
"parenthetical": "\"While an attorney may malee representations to the court which bind the client, defense counsel can only waive the rights of clients as long as those rights are not inherently personal, fundamental rights.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | 12,417,510 | a |
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present are personal to him or her; they generally cannot be waived through counsel, unless the defendant and counsel have previously discussed the matter and agreed upon the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "271 Kan. 119, 132",
"parenthetical": "waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant's right without discussion",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Lopez, 271 Kan. 119, 132, 22 P.3d 1040 (2001) (waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant’s righ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While an attorney may malee representations to the court which bind the client, defense counsel can only waive the rights of clients as long as those rights are not inherently personal, fundamental rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Larraco... | 12,417,510 | a |
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present are personal to him or her; they generally cannot be waived through counsel, unless the defendant and counsel have previously discussed the matter and agreed upon the waiver. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 Kan. App. 2d 996, 1001",
"parenthetical": "\"While an attorney may malee representations to the court which bind the client, defense counsel can only waive the rights of clients as long as those rights are not inherently personal, fundamental rights.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant's right without discussion",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Lopez, 271 Kan. 119, 132, 22 P.3d 1040 (2001) (waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant’s right without discu... | 12,417,510 | b |
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present are personal to him or her; they generally cannot be waived through counsel, unless the defendant and counsel have previously discussed the matter and agreed upon the waiver. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant's right without discussion",
"sentence": "Compare State v. Lopez, 271 Kan. 119, 132, 22 P.3d 1040 (2001) (waiver ineffective when counsel purported to waive defendant’s right without discu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While an attorney may malee representations to the court which bind the client, defense counsel can only waive the rights of clients as long as those rights are not inherently personal, fundamental rights.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Larraco... | 12,417,510 | a |
The fact that the government loses the underlying litigation is not dispositive of the determination that its position had no reasonable basis in law and fact. Rather, that fact remains a factor for the Court's consideration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 F.Supp.2d 777, 780",
"parenthetical": "finding that government's position was substantially justified even though its \"position may not have been correct.\"",
"sentence": "See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 2541; Gibbs v. U.S., No. 96-685, 1998 WL 226773 at *2 (D.N... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "1998 WL 264736, at *3",
"parenthetical": "stating that government's loss at summary judgment stage \"does reveal something regarding the merits of the government's position.\"",
"sentence": "See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 2541; Gibbs v. U.S., No. 96-685, 1998 W... | 9,179,516 | a |
Clavel-Ramirez alleges past harm and fears future extortion and harm by gang members in El Salvador if returned. Substantial evidence supports the IJ's conclusion that Clavel-Ramirez failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution in El Salvador on account of a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person seeking withholding of removal must prove not only that his life or freedom will be threatened in his home country, but also that the threat is 'because of one of the five [protected grounds].\"",
"sentence": "See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 F.3d 1125, 1131",
"parenthetical": "to demonstrate membership in a particular group, \"[t]he applicant must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within t... | 12,405,573 | a |
In any event, at a minimum, Detective Kanehl is entitled to qualified immunity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 625, 634",
"parenthetical": "stating that in the context of a qualified immunity defense, the defending officer need only show \"arguable\" probable cause",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that in the context of a qualif... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "336 F.3d 76, 76",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]rguable\" probable cause exists \"if police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000) (stating th... | 1,025,702 | a |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579",
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 64... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1... | 9,495,744 | a |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579",
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 64... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | a |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the United States Constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 105... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the United States Constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 105... | 9,495,744 | b |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "549 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the United States Constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 57... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1... | 9,495,744 | a |
Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "549 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the United States Constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 57... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317",
"parenthetical": "\"[a] defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that is exculpatory ... may require the admission of evidence that would ordinarily be inadmissible\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575... | 9,495,744 | a |
Thus, the students have not cited, and we have not found, a single North Carolina case permitting unrelated third party victims of a patient to sue the patient's health care providers for medical malpractice, or even suggesting that such claims are possible. Instead, North Car olina courts have emphasized the policy re... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provided by a medical provider to a patient",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctor-patient relationship",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party cl... | 9,433,352 | a |
Thus, the students have not cited, and we have not found, a single North Carolina case permitting unrelated third party victims of a patient to sue the patient's health care providers for medical malpractice, or even suggesting that such claims are possible. Instead, North Car olina courts have emphasized the policy re... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provided by a medical provider to a patient",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 S.E. 356, 359",
"parenthetical": "holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctor-patient relationship",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a... | 9,433,352 | a |
Thus, the students have not cited, and we have not found, a single North Carolina case permitting unrelated third party victims of a patient to sue the patient's health care providers for medical malpractice, or even suggesting that such claims are possible. Instead, North Car olina courts have emphasized the policy re... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 S.E.2d 30, 33",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provided by a medical provider to a patient",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party claim of harm based on... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctor-patient relationship",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party cl... | 9,433,352 | a |
Thus, the students have not cited, and we have not found, a single North Carolina case permitting unrelated third party victims of a patient to sue the patient's health care providers for medical malpractice, or even suggesting that such claims are possible. Instead, North Car olina courts have emphasized the policy re... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 S.E. 356, 359",
"parenthetical": "holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctor-patient relationship",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 S.E.2d 30, 33",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provided by a medical provider to a patient",
"sentence": "Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party claim of harm based on... | 9,433,352 | b |
Although plaintiffs IQ test results from both Dr. Taylor and Dr. Cash and the application of section 12.05 were addressed during the administrative hearings, the ALJ never explicitly addressed those issues in his decision. The ALJ's silent disregard of the verbal IQ obtained by Dr. Cash was error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 631, 633-634",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding for consideration of whether the claimant met section 12.05 where the claimant's IQs \"obtained during psychological testing by two clinical psychologists ranged from a high of 76 to a low of 69, thereby satisfying... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 821, 830-831",
"parenthetical": "stating that an examining physician's opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, and \"[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evi... | 4,023,836 | b |
Although plaintiffs IQ test results from both Dr. Taylor and Dr. Cash and the application of section 12.05 were addressed during the administrative hearings, the ALJ never explicitly addressed those issues in his decision. The ALJ's silent disregard of the verbal IQ obtained by Dr. Cash was error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 F.3d 821, 830-831",
"parenthetical": "stating that an examining physician's opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, and \"[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1178, 1184",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a valid verbal scale IQ test administered by a qualified professional using the WAIS may be sufficient to establish\" mental retardation under the first prong of section 12.05C",
"sentence": "See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 8... | 4,023,836 | a |
Summers contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G SS 3B1.2 because the district court misinterpreted and misapplied the sentencing guidelines. We conclude that the district court, not having the benefit of our decision in Rojas-Millan, erroneously... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "13 F.3d 1381, 1386",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court must determine whether defendant's role and culpability in larger context of his offense were sufficiently minor or minimal compared to other participants",
"sentence": "Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d at 473... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "234 F.3d 473, 473-474",
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant's culpability should be evaluated relative to all participants in a criminal scheme",
"sentence": "Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d at 473-474 (concluding that defendant’s culpability should be evaluated relative t... | 212,769 | b |
Moreover, any such "invalidity" was cured by the searching officers' good-faith reliance on the warrant containing the clerical error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 421, 423-24",
"parenthetical": "applying good-faith exception where warrant was \"defective because of clerical error\" of omission of list of items to be seized, finding \"nothing to be gained by laying fault for this apparent clerical error at [IRS agent's] feet\"",
... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 766, 769",
"parenthetical": "noting, in ruling that failure of magistrate judge to sign jurat on warrant affidavit did not negate probable cause for warrant, that the exclusionary rule does not apply \"to clerical mistakes by judges\"",
"sentence": "See United Stat... | 9,190,102 | a |
Moreover, any such "invalidity" was cured by the searching officers' good-faith reliance on the warrant containing the clerical error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 766, 769",
"parenthetical": "noting, in ruling that failure of magistrate judge to sign jurat on warrant affidavit did not negate probable cause for warrant, that the exclusionary rule does not apply \"to clerical mistakes by judges\"",
"sentence": "See United Stat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "911 F.2d 72, 77-78",
"parenthetical": "applying good-faith exception to uphold search conducted pursuant to warrant which lacked address of premises to be searched",
"sentence": "See United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 421, 423-24 (5th Cir.1992) (applying good-faith exception wh... | 9,190,102 | b |
Moreover, any such "invalidity" was cured by the searching officers' good-faith reliance on the warrant containing the clerical error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 867, 867",
"parenthetical": "\"Even assuming that the search warrant was invalid due to the omission of the address, the evidence was properly admitted under the good faith exception to the warrant requirement.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 42... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 766, 769",
"parenthetical": "noting, in ruling that failure of magistrate judge to sign jurat on warrant affidavit did not negate probable cause for warrant, that the exclusionary rule does not apply \"to clerical mistakes by judges\"",
"sentence": "See United Stat... | 9,190,102 | a |
In sum, because the District Court's referral order does not necessarily bring an end to the federal litigation, it is not a final order for purposes of section 1291. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "236 F.3d 615, 619",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that although the foreign action would resolve a central issue in the federal case, because \"termination of the [foreign] case [would] not necessarily end the [federal] litigation,\" the district court's stay order was not f... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "953 F.2d 1443, 1443",
"parenthetical": "noting that, unlike the typical primary jurisdiction case, abstention orders are final because they end the federal courts' role in the litigation",
"sentence": "See Rickman Bros., 953 F.2d at 1443 (noting that, unlike the typical primary... | 4,354,872 | b |
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits also appear to disapprove of the wholesale adoption of the McDonnell Douglas formulation in jury instructions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "832 F.2d 194, 200",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he district court was correct in using the [McDonnell Douglas ] framework in the instructions to the jury\" because \"[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is intentional discrimination\"",
"sent... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 1003, 1016-18",
"parenthetical": "explaining that, while the phrase \"prima facie case\" and other \"legal jargon\" need not be read to the jury, whether jury instructions should include \"the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas-type prima facie case (properly tailore... | 8,476,075 | b |
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits also appear to disapprove of the wholesale adoption of the McDonnell Douglas formulation in jury instructions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "832 F.2d 194, 200",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he district court was correct in using the [McDonnell Douglas ] framework in the instructions to the jury\" because \"[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is intentional discrimination\"",
"sent... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 340, 343",
"parenthetical": "\"Once the judge finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum necessary demonstration (the 'prima facie case'",
"sentence": "See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016-18 (1st Cir.1979) (explaining that, while the phrase \"prima facie c... | 8,476,075 | b |
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits also appear to disapprove of the wholesale adoption of the McDonnell Douglas formulation in jury instructions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "832 F.2d 194, 200",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he district court was correct in using the [McDonnell Douglas ] framework in the instructions to the jury\" because \"[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is intentional discrimination\"",
"sent... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "903 F.2d 1306, 1308",
"parenthetical": "\"The McDonnell Douglas inferences ... are of little relevance to the juiy.\"",
"sentence": "See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016-18 (1st Cir.1979) (explaining that, while the phrase \"prima facie case” and other \"legal jargon”... | 8,476,075 | b |
Under Schedler's view, aggrieved parties could sue the state agencies, the DCFS and the DHH, but not the Secretary of State. But the NVRA's centralization of responsibility counsels against such buck passing. Furthermore, similar to providing for a private cause of action, see NVRA SS 11, requiring states to assign enf... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 850, 850",
"parenthetical": "Missouri and its Secretary of State \"may not delegate the responsibility to conduct a general program to a local official and thereby avoid responsibility if such a program is not reasonably conducted.\"",
"sentence": "See Harkless, 5... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "545 F.3d 452, 452",
"parenthetical": "expressing concern that the state could escape responsibility for NVRA violations if the chief elections officer lacked enforcement power",
"sentence": "See Harkless, 545 F.3d at 452 (expressing concern that the state could escape responsib... | 4,290,900 | b |
Rather, we hold the uniform rule is ... that of 'good moral character.'"). Courts have also endorsed using federal, instead of state, standards to interpret federal laws regulating immigration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 211, 214-15",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the general rule that federal law governs the application of congressional enactments in the absence of a directive to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir.1995) (acknowledging the gene... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "531 F.2d 693, 696-97",
"parenthetical": "using state law to define \"adultery\" in the absence of a federal definition, and suggesting that \"[arguably, Congress intended to defer to the state in which an alien chooses to live for the precise definition ... for it is that par... | 11,086,821 | a |
Rather, we hold the uniform rule is ... that of 'good moral character.'"). Courts have also endorsed using federal, instead of state, standards to interpret federal laws regulating immigration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "214 F.3d 1128, 1132-33",
"parenthetical": "using a federal common law definition of \"burglary\" to determine if petitioner had been convicted of a deportable offense",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir.1995) (acknowledging the general rule that feder... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "531 F.2d 693, 696-97",
"parenthetical": "using state law to define \"adultery\" in the absence of a federal definition, and suggesting that \"[arguably, Congress intended to defer to the state in which an alien chooses to live for the precise definition ... for it is that par... | 11,086,821 | a |
Rather, we hold the uniform rule is ... that of 'good moral character.'"). Courts have also endorsed using federal, instead of state, standards to interpret federal laws regulating immigration. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "531 F.2d 693, 696-97",
"parenthetical": "using state law to define \"adultery\" in the absence of a federal definition, and suggesting that \"[arguably, Congress intended to defer to the state in which an alien chooses to live for the precise definition ... for it is that par... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1412, 1415",
"parenthetical": "interpreting the term \"family ties\" as a factor to be considered in granting discretionary relief from deportation, and holding \"the Board must apply a flexible, uniform standard that reflects the federal policies underlying SS 212(c",
... | 11,086,821 | b |
Rather, we hold the uniform rule is ... that of 'good moral character.'"). Courts have also endorsed using federal, instead of state, standards to interpret federal laws regulating immigration. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "514 F.2d 179, 181",
"parenthetical": "interpreting \"adultery\" for the purpose of eligibility for voluntary departure, and holding that \"the appropriate approach is the application of a uniform federal standard.\"",
"sentence": "See Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "531 F.2d 693, 696-97",
"parenthetical": "using state law to define \"adultery\" in the absence of a federal definition, and suggesting that \"[arguably, Congress intended to defer to the state in which an alien chooses to live for the precise definition ... for it is that par... | 11,086,821 | a |
The officer testified that (1) the gun was recovered in a different condition than when it was being pointed at him; and (2) when it was pointed at him, the slide was open less than a quarter of an inch. Thus, the officer's observations would support a conclusion that the gun had been jammed in two different positions.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prohibition on \"a searching examination of physical evidence under conditions disclosed by the evidence in the case\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1974)(no prohibition on “a searching examination of physica... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n experiment or demonstration is proper when conducted by the jury with the use of exhibits properly submitted to it for the purpose of testing the truth of statements made by witnesses\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 ... | 8,898,307 | a |
The officer testified that (1) the gun was recovered in a different condition than when it was being pointed at him; and (2) when it was pointed at him, the slide was open less than a quarter of an inch. Thus, the officer's observations would support a conclusion that the gun had been jammed in two different positions.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prohibition on \"a searching examination of physical evidence under conditions disclosed by the evidence in the case\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1974)(no prohibition on “a searching examination of physica... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "647 P.2d 1281, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n experiment or demonstration is proper when conducted by the jury with the use of exhibits properly submitted to it for the purpose of testing the truth of statements made by witnesses\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 16... | 8,898,307 | a |
The officer testified that (1) the gun was recovered in a different condition than when it was being pointed at him; and (2) when it was pointed at him, the slide was open less than a quarter of an inch. Thus, the officer's observations would support a conclusion that the gun had been jammed in two different positions.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 P.2d 1115, 1120",
"parenthetical": "no prohibition on \"a searching examination of physical evidence under conditions disclosed by the evidence in the case\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1974)(no prohibition on “a searching exami... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n experiment or demonstration is proper when conducted by the jury with the use of exhibits properly submitted to it for the purpose of testing the truth of statements made by witnesses\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 ... | 8,898,307 | a |
The officer testified that (1) the gun was recovered in a different condition than when it was being pointed at him; and (2) when it was pointed at him, the slide was open less than a quarter of an inch. Thus, the officer's observations would support a conclusion that the gun had been jammed in two different positions.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 P.2d 1115, 1120",
"parenthetical": "no prohibition on \"a searching examination of physical evidence under conditions disclosed by the evidence in the case\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 164 Mont. 415, 524 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1974)(no prohibition on “a searching exami... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "647 P.2d 1281, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]n experiment or demonstration is proper when conducted by the jury with the use of exhibits properly submitted to it for the purpose of testing the truth of statements made by witnesses\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Thompson, 16... | 8,898,307 | a |
. We find no fault per se with the court's imposition of a deadline for Hemphill to decide whether to accept the plea offer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "283 F.3d 641, 645",
"parenthetical": "indicating that giving the defendant \"a relatively short time to decide\" whether to accept a plea agreement was not coercive",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court’s stri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 F.2d 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's strict adherence to plea bargaining deadline as part of district court's control and management of its docket",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court’s... | 5,887,696 | b |
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