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USMC Photo A184276
Brigadier General Karch (center, 1st row) poses with members of his 9th MEB staff at Da Nang. The 9th MEB was shortly afterwards deactivated and replaced by the newly formed III MAF.
A temporary impasse occurred on 9 May when the attempt was made to unload the airfield matting. The first lift, 68 tons, was placed on flatbed trailers and brought ashore by an LCU. The entire unloading came to a complete standstill; the heavily laden trucks could not move in the deep sand without assistance. The movement of the matting to the airfield site took five and a half hours. To try to expedite the process, the Navy beach group decided to break up the causeway installed on the south end of the beach and use the floating sections as makeshift barges. Approximately 200 bundles of matting could be loaded on one 'barge' which could then be floated to a point directly opposite the proposed airfield site, thereby reducing the movement distance. Although this eased the situation, the problem of movement on the beach remained. Finally, on 10 May, the 3d Marine Division provided an additional 2,500 feet of badly needed beach matting which somewhat alleviated the situation.
At noon on 12 May, the amphibious operation
* Colonel Graham was of the opinion that the markers that the Carl party found during their 3 April reconnaissance of Chu Lai may have been left by the civilian soil party, but General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., suggested that the markers may have been placed there during a reconnaissance of the beach area by the Marine 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. Col William M. Graham, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File); Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). See Chapter 11, Reconnaissance Section, for an account of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company's beach surveys of the Chu Lai area.
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officially came to an end. On this date, the first dements of BLT 3/3, arriving in amphibious shipping from Okinawa, assumed defensive positions on the southern flank, relieving the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. During the five-day period, 7-12 May, more than 10,925 tons of equipment and supplies had been unloaded and moved across the beach.
With the completion of the Chu Lai amphibious landing, seven of the nine infantry battalions of the 3d Marine Division, supported by most of the 12th Marines, the artillery regiment of the division, and a large portion of the 1st MAW were in South Vietnam. As a result, the 9th MEB was deactivated and replaced by a new Marine organization, the in Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). *
*In the Pacific, one other change in designation of Marine units occurred during May. On the 25th, the 1st Marine Brigade (Rear) at Hawaii consisting of the brigade support elements under the command of Colonel Jack E. Hanthorn was redesignated the 1st Marine Brigade. Colonel Hanthorn relieved General Carl as brigade commander.
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Noble's skivy shirt, a practice aboard carriers of the Fleet, carried over to our shore-based carrier ops.'23*
Later in the day, on 1 June, four other A-4s from Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Stender's VMA-311 arrived at the field. The Chu Lai-based aircraft flew their first combat sorties that same day. At 1315, the four VMA-225 aircraft, with Lieutenant Colonel Baker in the lead, conducted air strikes in support of ARVN units six miles north of the field.
Although the field was operational, it was still unfinished and soil stabilization would continue to be a problem, espedally during the rainy season. Eventually the field had to be rebuilt. Lieutenant Colonel Baker observed:
Baker exclaimed:
USMC Photo A184616
The SATS concept worked, but as Colonel Hardy Hay, the III MAF G-3, later remarked: '... no one will ever know what the [Chu Lai] project did to men and equipment unless they were there.'25
III MAF in Transition
The ID Marine Amphibious Force and its ground and air components experienced major changes of command within their first six weeks in Vietnam. Generals Collins and Fontana were near the end of their 13-month overseas tours and the Commandant, General Greene, appointed Brigadier General Lewis W. Walt, newly selected for promotion to major general, to replace Collins and Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, also selected for promotion to major general, to be Fontana's replacement.** Walt looked the part of the football lineman that he was in
*General McCutcheon also told the story that General
Krulak had bet Major General Richard G. Stilwell, the MACV Chief of Staff, a case of scotch that a squadron would be operational within 30 days. General Krulak paid off the bet' 'on the basis that a full squadron was not operating there in the forecast time, only half of one.' McCutcheon, 'Marine Aviation in Vietnam, ' p. 129.
**According to Colonel O'Connor, the 1st MAW chief of staff at the time, the question of who was to be CG III MAF was discussed several times. O'Connor recalled that 'General Fontana earnestly desired to have that assignment. He and General Collins were both nearing the ends of their overseas tours, and that General Collins would leave first. He talked to General Krulak about the matter several times ... He [Fontana] even volunteered to extend his overseas tour one year to take command of III MAF. General Krulak was very understanding, but explained that General Greene had already selected General Walt. This did not stop Fontana. He was senior to Walt, and stressed the doctrinal point that either an aviator or a ground officer could be in command . . . Finally he realized that the Commandant's decision would prevail . . . when he realized his time was limited in the Far East, he decided to take his last opportunity to command a wing in combat ... he would go to Da Nang to command the wing until he was forced to leave.' Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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Karch returned to Vietnam as assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Division while Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson assumed command of the 3d Marine Division (Rear) on Okinawa. These changes at the top were followed by rapid adjustments in staff assignments. The new layers of command contrasted sharply with the almost spartan simplicity of the old 9th MEB and could not help but cause some initial confusion. One former member of the 9th MEB staff, Major Ruel T. Scyphers, remembered:
Perhaps these growing pains were most dramatically reflected in the field of communications. During a visit to Vietnam in May, General Krulak remarked: ' 'I have never seen a worse situation than at Da Nang where a message which has immediate precedence has taken as long as 30 hours to get out of country, some incoming messages do not arrive at all."28 According to Colonel Hardy Hay, the IIIMAF G-3:
Colonel Nickerson, who had become the III MAF G-4, later explained that much of the message backlog was due to periodic power shortages ' 'with the down-time of generators" exceeding "uptime.' ' He commented that the number of classified "dispatches that had not been encrypted or decrypted often exceeded 5,000'' and that ' 'manual processing was tedious." Nickerson also remarked on the fact that "higher, comfortable, well-staffed headquarters were firing questions or assigning responsibilities at a prolific rate . .. . "30 Colonel Nickerson praised the efforts and ingenuity of Colonel Frederick C. Dodson, the III MAF communications officer, and the communications section for reducing the backlog to manageable proportions. Finally Nickerson observed:
Communications was only one of the trouble areas caused by the transformation of the command. The troops sent into Vietnam had to be supplied and maintained, and MACV had planned to establish a Da Nang Support Command under the Army's 1st Logistic Command to provide common item supply for III MAF. At the Honolulu Conference in April, this plan was modified and Admiral Sharp directed that the Commanding General, III MAF, in his capacity as Naval Component Commander, would assume the responsibility for common item supply from Marine and Navy sources, as well as the operation of the ports in I Corps. Since the Navy had not yet established a support activity in Vietnam to run the ports, the job had to be done by Marine Corps personnel and equipment. This placed a heavy burden on III MAF.32
Following the Chu Lai landings, Colonel Nickerson, the III MAF G-4, held nightly meetings "as the hectic problems spanned the logistic spectrum." These meetings were "designed for liquidating problems, coordinating efforts and insuring that all had the necessary information to do their jobs."33 On 16 May, Nickerson presented a logistic support concept for the Marine command. While assuming that the Navy would eventually establish a support activity, the concept directed the III MAF to run the ports and at the same time make
*Colonel Rex C. Denny, from the III MAF G-3 Section, recalled that the fact that General Walt was both the 3d Marine Division and III MAF commander "caused some humorous and often confusing staff work. MAF staff and division staff working on same project or MAF staff doing work division staff rightly should." Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant General Leo J. Dulacki, who in 1965 was the III MAF G-2, remarked that "when III MAF was deployed to RVN, it was assumed that the Hqs would be a skeleton Hqs, dependent on the Wing and Division Hqs for substantial personnel support and, in/act, for many of the operational functions." Dulacki pointed out that this concept of organization, which had been accepted as standard for years, was for the first time "put to the test." He noted that the subsequent, "necessary, but agonizingly slow, growth of the III MAF headquarters in order to perform its tasks would indicate that this concept lacks vitality especially in a commitment of forces of long duration." LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft MS, dtd 240ct76 and [Jul] 77 (Vietnam Comment File).
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CHAPTER 4
Reinforcement and Expansion
The Need for Further Reinforcements-The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave-The Attack on the Airfield-Expansion to the South-Further Reinforcements
The Need for Further Reinforcements
Despite increasing U. S. involvement, the major Viet Cong effort bypassed American concentrations during the spring of 1965. Most of the contacts between the Marines and the VC were the results of American initiative. Other than sporadic harassment, the Communists generally left the U.S. troops alone, and reserved their major efforts for the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Apparently the Communist strategy was to finish off the South Vietnamese before more American forces could be deployed to South Vietnam.
In many respects, the moment for concentrated VC action appeared opportune; the South Vietnamese government's war against the Communists was in disarray. According to the government's campaign plan for 1965, the South Vietnamese had established as their objectives the defense of bases and lines of communications, the harassment of VC bases and lines of communications, surveillance of border and coastal areas, and most important, support of the Chieu Thang ('Struggle for Victory') pacification program. Promulgated in early 1964 and based on the 'spreading oil 'concept, the Chien Thang program placed priority on the consolidation of the secure populous area by a combination of military, paramilitary, police, economic, and social reform activities. At the heart of the program was the ''New Life'' hamlet, a variation of the planned community. Although similar in many respects to the abortive 'Strategic Hamlet' program of the Diem regime, the Chien Thang campaign was supposedly better planned and more realistic, in that security was to be 'restored in one area prior to going to another.' These secure areas were then to serve as 'springboards to pacify the areas' which were insecure.1
Once more the South Vietnamese pacification plans proved to be too ambitious. In I Corps, for example, where the 1965 campaign plan called for pacification of the coastal plain inland to the railroad in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces, the situation had deteriorated by the end of March 1965 to the extent that the government controlled only the areas surrounding the provincial capitals. Only in the Saigon region, where the South Vietnamese had begun an intensive pacification campaign in 1964, code named HOP TAC, did the government enjoy a modicum of success in its efforts against the Communists during the spring of 1965.2*
Compounding the difficulties for the South Vietnamese, the government, at the end of May, was in the throes of another internal crisis. Head of State Suu and Prime Minister Quat disagreed over the makeup of the cabinet and were unable to resolve their differences. They both stepped down and handed the reins of power to a military directorate presided over by Generals Thieu and Ky. As one study on pacification concluded, this entire period was marked by governmental instability and 'as a consequence, Saigon's military efforts and related pacification programs sputtered both at the national and local levels,' and there was 'neither the time nor the inclination on the part of the various
* Coincident with the Chien Thang program, the South Vietnamese, at the urging of MACV, launched the HOP TAC (Working Together) campaign in mid-1964 with the aim of linking together the six rural provinces surrounding Saigon. Using Saigon-Cholon as a hub, the provinces were divided into four concentric zones. The idea was to first pacify the closer zones and then move outward until all six provinces were pacified. A special HOP TAC directorate was formed with U.S. advisors to coordinate the military, police, social, and economic activities of the program. In 1965, an effort was made to use the HOP TAC example in other Corps areas. See the Ngu Hanh Sonh section in Chapter 9 for the effects of this effort in I Corps.
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USMC Photo A185826
A Marine Ontos patrols a beach area during Operation STARLITE. The South Vietnamese fishermen go about their business despite the war.
dry crop areas. The Marine commanders noted two suitable amphibious landing sites, one beach between two peninsulas northeast of the Van Tuong Complex (Nho Na Bay) and another beach 4,000 meters to the south, north of the coastal hamlet of An Cuong (l).
While airborne, Colonel Peatross and his commanders selected the amphibious assault landing site, as well as the helicopter landing zones (LZs). They chose the more southerly beach, later designated GREEN Beach, for the landing. A force there would block VC avenues of escape to the south. Three LZs, RED, WHITE, and BLUE, were selected four to five miles east of Route l and roughly one mile inland from the coast. LZ BLUE, about 2,000 meters west of GREEN Beach, was the southernmost of the landing zones. WHITE was 2,000 meters west-northwest of BLUE, while RED was 2,000 meters north of WHITE. From these positions, the Marines were to move northeast to the South China Sea.
Fortunately for the 7th Marines, the ships of Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 7, which had brought the regiment to Vietnam, were at Chu Lai unloading BLT 111 and Da Nang disembarking BLT 3/9. Colonel Peatross later wrote:
On the morning of the 17th, McKinney's staff joined the Marine aviation and ground planners ashore and the plans were completed. Lieutenant Colonel Muir's 3d Battalion was to land across GREEN Beach at 0630,18 August with Companies I and K abreast, K on the right. Company L, the battalion reserve, was to follow as the lead companies swerved to the northwest. The remaining company, Company M, was to make an overland movement from Chu Lai to a ridgeline blocking position in the northern portion of the operations area, four miles northwest of the landing beach and one mile inland from the sea, closing off the VCs' retreat. Soon after H-Hour, UH-34s from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons 261 and 361 were to shuttle Fisher's 2d Battalion into the three LZs. The two battalions were to join forces when Company H from LZ BLUE linked up with Company I outside the hamlet of An Cuong (2), l ,800 meters inland from GREEN Beach.
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USMC Photo A 184946
Marines from Company E, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines move out from LZ WHITE during Operation STARLITE. Shortly after this picture was taken, the company met stiff resistance from Viet Cong entrenched to the right of the photograph.
establish a blocking position there which would prevent the VC from slipping southward. Company M, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was to hold its blocking positions further north. The enemy was to be left no avenue of escape.
On the 19th, the SLF battalion moved into its zone of action which included the area of the fiercest fighting of the day before. The VC were gone. At 0900, Companies I and M of Bodley's battalion left the regimental CP, and moved through An Cuong (2), meeting no enemy resistance. They brought out the supply convoy* and by 1500 had established their assigned blocking position at An Thoi (2).
Although much of the enemy resistance had disappeared, Fisher and Muir still found pockets of stiff opposition when they launched their combined attacks at 0730. The terrain was very difficult. The compartmented rice paddies, ringed by dikes and hedgerows, hindered control, observation, and maneuverability. The VC were holed up in bunkers, trenches, and caves which were scattered throughout the area. Marines would sweep through an area, only to have enemy snipers fire upon them from the rear. In many cases, the Marines had to dig out the enemy or blow up the tunnels. By 1030, Company E had linked up with Company K and the two battalions, continued their advance to the sea. By nightfall, the 2d Battalion had completed its sweep of the Phuoc Thuan Peninsula. Enemy organized resistance had ceased.
The Aftermath
Although the cordon phase of STARLITE had been completed. General Walt decided to continue the operation for five more days so that the entire area could be searched systematically. He believed that some of the enemy had remained behind in underground hiding places. Fisher's and Muir's
*0f the 23 Marines assigned to the convoy, five were killed and several others wounded. Only nine men remained in action throughout the three-hour period they engaged the VC. The enemy left 60 bodies behind.
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USMC Photo A801148
Marines move through a Vietnamese village in Operation HARVEST MOON. Each of the riflemen is carrying two 60mm mortar rounds in additon to his own weapon and ammunition.
then called in Marine air support. Skyhawks from MAG-12 at Chu Lai attacked the Communist positions, while Marine helicopters evacuated many of the casualties. The 1st ARVN Battalion attempted to reinforce the rangers, but was unable to cross the road because of enemy mortar fire and U.S. air strikes. Later in the afternoon, General Lam, using 10 UH-34Ds from Lieutenant Colonel Rex C. Denny, Jr.'s HMM-161, moved the 1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment from Tam Ky to reinforce the surviving rangers. This battalion replaced the rangers and established a night defensive perimeter.
The next morning, the 5th ARVN Regiment command group and its 1st Battalion bore the weight of the VC attack. Although the battalion had been probed during the night, it had not seen heavy action. On 9 December, about 0645, the 60th and 80th VC Battalions struck. In the heavy fighting that followed, both the 1st Battalion and regimental command group were overrun. The ARVN regimental commander was killed and the ARVN force was scattered to the south and east. At about the same time, another VC battalion attacked the 1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment to the northeast, but this ARVN unit managed to hold its ground.
At that point, General Henderson decided to commit his Marines. At 1000, UH-34Ds from Denny's HMM-161 and Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd F. Childers' HMM-361 lifted Utter's 2d Battalion from Tam Ky to a landing zone 5 1/2 miles west of the
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USMC Photo A194489
General Jonas M. Platt {second from the left) discusses plans with III MAF staff officers and officers from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. The objective areas are outlined on the map overlay.
ARVN troops. After the landing, the battalion moved northeast, securing a hill mass 2,500 meters from the landing zone by late afternoon. Utter's Marines encountered only a few Viet Cong and one of his platoon leaders later complained: 'The enemy always seemed one step ahead of us.'10 The same afternoon. General Henderson directed Dorsey's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines to land 1 1/2 miles southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's 1st Battalion and then move to link up with the shattered South Vietnamese unit.
Lieutenant Colonel Dorsey's Marines had left Da Nang by motor convoy that morning and were at the logistics support area (LSA) on Route l, three miles north of Thang Binh. Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261, the SLF helicopter squadron on board the LPH Valley Forge, was assigned the mission of ferrying the battalion into a landing zone southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's command group and its 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion landed at 1400, and an hour and half later, the battalion's lead unit, Company L, made contact with elements of the ARVN battalion and then pushed northwestward toward Hill 43, 1 1/2 miles from the landing zone. Before the Marines could reach the hill, they ran into a force of 200 VC. The firefight raged into the early
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USMC Photo A185789
A South Vietnamese interpreter questions a farmer and his wife about the VC as Marines watch. The hamlet is located in the heavily populated area south of Da Nang.
divisions supported by a reinforced Marine aircraft wing to carry out its mission in I Corps. Furthermore , the IIl MAF commander stated that if he were to be responsible for the entire area from Quang Ngai Province to the DMZ, he would need three more battalions.
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reformed as BLT 2/3 and became the Seventh Fleet SLF ground force in late December, replacing BLT 2/1 which replaced the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Phu Bai.
There were other reinforcements and readjustments in Vietnam during this period. In August, the 7th Engineer Battalion and the rear echelon of the 3d Division headquarters battalion arrived, as well as the 7th Marines. During September, MAG-36, a helicopter group, and the 2d LAAM Battalion were established at Chu Lai. In November, Lieutenant Colonel Utter's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines left Qui Nhon to reinforce Colonel Peatross' 7th Marines at Chu Lai. The return of Utter's unit to III MAF control allowed General Walt to reinforce units at Da Nang by transferring the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines there from Chu Lai.
By the end of December, there were six infantry battalions at Da Nang, five at Chu Lai, and one at Phu Bai. At Da Nang, the 9th Marines controlled the southern and southeastern sectors of the TAOR with four battalions, all three of its own battalions and the attached 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The 3d Marines was responsible for the western and northern portions of the TAOR with two battalions, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. The battalion at Phu Bai also reported to the 3d Marines. At Chu Lai the TAOR was divided between the 4th and 7th Marines. The 7th Marines controlled the southern sector with its own three battalions while the 4th Marines operated to the north with its 1st and 2d Battalions.
In addition to the infantry units, by the end of the year III MAF had a reinforced artillery regiment, eight fixed-wing squadrons, and eight helicopter squadrons. Since the beginning of July, III MAF had
USMC Photo A184953
The village chief of Thuy Phu points out to General Walt an artillery-targeted impact area in the Phu Bai TAOR. Lieutenant Colonel William W. "Woody" Taylor (left) looks on.
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USMC Photo A185986
Sergeant John A. Anderson describes his squad's patrol action. His squad was credited with preventing a major attack on the Da Nang Airbase.
site after dark. By 1945 they had established their positions; only 15 minutes later the Marines heard movement along the trail. The squad leader, Sergeant John A. Anderson, ordered his troops to hold fire until the enemy was at pointblank range. Seven VC had passed the site of the most forward Marine before Anderson triggered the ambush. At this moment, the VC were only six to seven feet away from the Marine's M-60 machine gun position. The machine gunner initiated the engagement with a long burst, followed by heavy fire from all the weapons of the rest of the squad. This volley killed all seven VC.22*
The seven dead were only the advance party for a larger enemy force which moved forward to engage the Marines. Sergeant Anderson fired several M-79 rounds at the muzzle flashes of the approaching VC. The firefight continued for another minute, but then the enemy began to disengage. Sergeant Anderson realized that his troops had to get out of the area; he was outnumbered. The squad leader ordered his men to count the dead VC before leaving; they counted 15. The Marines moved out to their battalion's position, but during the return two squad members were wounded by Viet Cong firing from a dike. Anderson called for fire support and after 60 rounds of 81mm mortar fire hit on the enemy position, the VC stopped firing. At first light the next day, 28 October, Company I sent two platoons to search the ambush site more thoroughly. Of the 15 known VC dead only two bodies were found.23
General Walt and his staff believed that Sergeant Anderson's patrol probably had foiled an attack on the airbase. Apparently the patrol had intercepted a VC company from the same unit that carried out the Marble Mountain attack:
Two days after the airfield attacks, the Viet Cong attempted another probe of the Marine defenses, not at the base area, but against the defensive perimeter on Hill 22, south of the Tuy Loan River, manned by the Marines of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The action began at 0100, 30 October,
*Captain Charles Ward, at the time the 9th Marines S-2, debriefed the Anderson patrol. He recalled that the VC advance party had been preceded by a point element carrying candles and flashlights to give the appearance of villagers returning home. According to Ward, Anderson's men had seen the point men but 'were uncertain as what to do-after all, the men wore villagers' clothing, held lighted candles, and the ambush location was on a well-travelled trail leading to Highway l only 200-250 meters away and was only 100 meters from occupied huts. The question became academic when the main body traipsed into the squad's position. So surprised was Anderson by the unexpected appearance of the column of men on the trail, he almost forgot to give the order to the machine gunner.' Ward concluded his remarks with the observation that 'reportedly this was Sgt Anderson's first combat patrol.' LtCol Charles Ward, Comments on draft MS, dtd 270ct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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when 10-15 VC walked into a squad ambush 1,000 meters south of the hill. The Marines opened fire and killed three of the enemy, but the squad had not been able to maintain communications with the company and was unable to notify the company commander of the contact. All was quiet for about two hours, when suddenly approximately 25 enemy enveloped the Marine squad, killing three and wounding six.
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USMC Photo A185921
A Marine from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines mans a defensive position on top of an old French fort in the Marble Mountain area. The Marines used the fort to store supplies.
bury several bodies, apparently casualties of the Hill 22 fight.30
The VC had planned the operation thoroughly. They hit the critical portions of the perimeter and knew exactly which bunker contained ammunition. American intelligence sources discovered that the VC unit involved in the attack was the R-20 Battalion which had just completed training. The Hill 22 attack was apparently its final training exercise.31*
Base Defense
The enemy attacks on the airfields and on Hill 22 gave added impetus to the improvement of base defenses. After the dissolution of the provisional defense battalion in August, one Marine infantry battalion was kept on the Da Nang Airbase as the airfield defense battalion. On 21 August III MAF assumed direct control of the airfield defense battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Tunnell's newly arrived 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel Clark still retained the position of base defense coordinator. His job, according to his successor, was to collect statistics on Marine 'saturation-type patrolling' and to inform the battalion commander 'where to alternate the emphasis' in the airfield defense battalion's patrolling effort.32
The main physical security problem of the airfield, other than keeping the Viet Cong out, was overlapping American and Vietnamese authority. There was a heterogeneous mixture of U.S. and Vietnamese units at Da Nang, each responsible for its own internal security. The 41st Fighter Wing, VNAF was responsible for its defensive perimeter, while U.S. Air Police and Vietnamese MPs controlled the main gate. This situation was further complicated when the Marble Mountain Air Facility east of the main airfield opened in September. At Marble Mountain, MAG-16, the Seabees, and support troops provided their own security. The various security forces both at Da Nang and Marble Mountain integrated their efforts as much as possible with the plans of the airfield defense battalion. General Walt exercised 'a sort of presuptive authority over the tenants.''33
Obtaining a dear dedsion for relations between the various commands was a continuing problem. On 4 October, the III MAF staff proposed that General Walt ask ComUSMACV for permission to activate a base defense command to exert 'coordinating authority over the internal security provided by the various commands and units at Da Nang.'34
General Walt expanded the authority of the base defense coordinator and appointed Colonel George W. Carrington to this position in place of Lieutenant Colonel Clark. After the enemy attacks at the end of October, the new coordinator visited the Da Nang airfield tenants to ensure that an integrated defense did exist. He also planned the trace of a fence around the airfield. Carrington's duties also included advising, coordinating, and drawing together the defensive measures of the other two Marine enclaves.
According to Colonel Carrington, his responsibility extended to and:
*The enemy battalion also was known as the Doc Lap Battalion. According to General Simmons, it was not ''a new battalion, but one which had just been filled up with new recruits, most from the city of Da Nang, and retrained.'' BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on Shulimson, 'USMC Ops RVN Jul-Dec65,' dtd 12 May 71 (Vietnam Comment File).
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USMC Photo A185856
A VC prisoner leads a Marine squad to a weapons cache. The prisoner claims that the VC are using the Buddhist Pagoda in the picture to store their arms.
Security coordinators were established at all Marine airfields. The commanding officer of the 9th Marines assumed the additional title of Marble Mountain airfield coordinator with the responsibility of overseeing the defense for the helicopter field. After the October raid, the 3d Engineer Battalion, with the assistance of MAG-16 personnel, built a barrier of minefields and barbed wire.36 Similar measures were taken at the other installations.
Each Marine enclave developed its own procedures for providing internal airfield security. At Da Nang, one infantry battalion provided security; each of its four companies was assigned a defensive area from 2,100-3,400 meters wide. The battalion conducted patrols outside the airfield perimeter to add depth to the Marine defense, as well as to prevent the VC from setting up mortar and recoilless rifle firing positions.37 The Vietnamese Air Force defense sector remained separate from the battalion's area of operations. At Chu Lai, the Marines also assigned one infantry battalion to airfield security, but only two of the battalion's companies were deployed on the airfield perimeter. These two companies were reinforced by two provisional rifle companies composed of personnel from MAG-12, the Seabees, and the 2d LAAM Battalion.38 At Phu Bai, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines developed the combined action company to deal with the unique situation existing there.
III MAF experimented with several techniques to ensure the security of the major airbases. These included the use of dogs and sophisticated electronic devices. In August, 11 sentry dogs and their Marine handlers arrived at Da Nang from Japan. After three weeks of intensive training, the dogs were assigned to posts at ammunition supply points, LAAM battery sites, and Marble Mountain. In November, some of the dogs accompanied Marine patrols along the airfield perimeter. The Marines learned that the dogs were most effective when employed in remote areas where few people worked or lived. The dogs were extremely valuable at the LAAM battery site on secluded Monkey Mountain, but proved to be unsatisfactory at the ammunition supply point where Marines worked around the clock. The continuous activity at the latter site only confused the animals.39
In November and December 1965, III MAF received 600 seismic detection sets for perimeter defense. These electronic devices were extremely sensitive to ground vibrations and relayed seismic disturbance signals to Marine-monitored control boxes. These instruments operated well, but, as Colonel Carrington pointed out:
Even so, the Marines found the devices useful. As one battalion commander explained:
* Colonel Carrington recalled one rather humorous use of the seismic device: '... a senior USMC officer was concerned that sappers might be tunneling under our MAF headquarters. Use of seismic detectors to confirm this was inconclusive, but after resort to bull dozers to dig futilely for the assumed tunnel, I was chatised by another senior USMC officer for allowing destruction of a projected, ceremonial parade ground.' Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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Extended Patrolling
Throughout the latter half of 1965, Marine units concentrated on small unit operations. General Walt referred to such actions as the ' 'bread and butter of my command."42 A month-by-month comparison of the number of patrols, ambushes, listening posts, and other activities of Marine platoons and squads shows a steady increase in the tempo of operations. In October 3d Marine Division units at all three enclaves conducted 2,877 patrols and 1,061 ambushes which resulted in 70 contacts with the enemy. In December, the division reported a total of 9,698 offensive operations which resulted in 510 contacts.43* One battalion commander observed that each of his platoons conducted two night patrols and one daylight patrol during an average 24-hour period.44
III MAF developed and modified techniques and tactics for the employment of small Marine units. The Marines experimented with specially trained and equipped sniper teams. Fifty of the best marksmen were selected from each of the regiments. These troops were divided into four-man teams and equipped with Winchester Model 70 rifles and telescopic sights. After training, the teams rejoined their regiments. During November and December, 20-30 teams operated in the Marine TAORs daily. On 23 November, a sniper team at Phu Bai killed two VC and wounded another at a distance of more than 1,000 meters.
Aggressive small unit patrolling continued to pay dividends. On 5 December, a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines surprised 70 VC on the Trung Phan Peninsula, six miles southeast of the Chu Lai airfield. The platoon, operating from its company's combat base, had been assigned the mission of searching the Tuyet Diem (l) hamlet on the banks of the Moi River. The platoon had established an ambush site 2,000 meters south of the hamlet. At 0300, four VC walked into the trap and were killed by a burst of Marine fire. First Lieutenant Charles D. Jones, the platoon commander, fearing that the noise had compromised his position, ordered two of his squads to deploy to the left and right of the village while he led the third squad into the hamlet. At 0600 the 3d squad entered Tuyet Diem (l) and caught the VC completely unaware. According to one report: "At that time it [the hamlet] became alive with VC. They ran into the streets, some of them naked; all of them carrying weapons, and of course the squads on the right and left took them under fire."45
At the same time, the 3d Squad pushed the enemy toward the river where the platoon killed 30 VC and captured seven more. A search of the area turned up a squad leader's diary, three weapons, and a medical kit.46
Several hours later there was a sequel to this action. Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly, the battalion commander, ordered Company A to move into the same area. Kelly believed that there was a good chance that VC might still be there.47 He was correct. The Marines of Company A killed eight VC and captured three more weapons.
Another significant engagement occurred in the Da Nang TAOR on 27 December when a 17-man patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines engaged a large enemy force near the small hamlet of Quang Ha, 11 miles south of the base. As the Marines approached the hamlet they were fired on from a tree line to their front and from their right flank. The first burst killed the patrol's radioman, destroyed his radio, and damaged one of the two M-60 machine guns. The heavy fire lasted about 15 minutes, seven members of the patrol were hit, and one Marine died of wounds.
Earlier the patrol leader, First Lieutenant James P. Weller, had sent a fire team to a sandy ridge on his right flank to cover the patrol's approach. The main body of the patrol and the flanking fire team immediately returned fire. The enemy launched a frontal attack. The VC were caught in a crossfire between the main body and the fire team on the right
* These statistics must be used with care. They are reliable for showing general trends, but are not absolutely accurate. As an example, CG FMFPac's staff stated that in October the Marines conducted 3,900 patrols of squad and platoon-size, in addition to 1,361 ambushes which resulted in 323 contacts. III MAF, on the other hand, reported 3,520 small unit actions resulting in 287 VC contacts tor the same period. III MAF ComdC, Oct65 and FMFPac, III MAF, Ops, Oct 65. In the text, the figures provided by the division are used in that it furnished both III MAF and FMFPac with the figures they used. On the general subject of reporting, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons observed that as III MAF G-3 he "spent 60 percent of my time reporting or generating reports (in two directions: Hawaii and Saigon) . . . . " BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Itr to Col George W. Carrington, dtd 2Dec76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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USMC Photo A186015
A Marine guards a Viet Cong prisoner during Operation GOLDEN FLEECE in September 1965. The Viet Cong had taken a percentage of the rice harvest for their own use for years in this area south of Da Nang prior to the arrival of the Marines.
In mid-August, the battalion was released from duty as the airfield defense battalion and was assigned to the area south of Marble Mountain bordering the South China Sea. Operating from a central base area, Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig sent out small patrols to bait the VC. When these units made contact, a mobile reaction force, composed of Marines mounted on tanks, Ontos, and amtracs, sped to the point of contact. At the same time, the battalion commander attempted to enlist each of the four village chiefs in his area of operations to support his efforts against the Viet Cong.13* The chiefs were wary until the Americans proved themselves, which did not take long. On 29 August, the battalion defeated a Viet Cong company, killing 12, capturing 12 more, and dispersing the remainder.
Impressed by this action, Huynh Ba Trinh, chief of Hoa Hai village, contacted the battalion intelligence officer the next day and reported that his villagers had told him that more than 30 of the enemy had been killed in that engagement.** Trinh then asked that the battalion provide security for the villagers when they began harvesting their rice on 10 September. The chief explained that the VC came each year and took what they considered to be their share of the harvest. According to South Vietnamese and Marine intelligence sources, the Viet Cong had already moved one battalion and several companies into the 9th Marines TAOR to accomplish their rice collection.14 Trinh proposed that the Marines help the farmers bring the rice to central collection points where it could be stored in warehouses. He would then give the people receipts for their crops and distribute the rice when the need arose.***
Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig did not believe that the local chiefs could administer such a large undertaking. He suggested that a meeting be held with the four chiefs on 7 September. The battalion commander had lunch that day with the chiefs and proposed that the Marine battalion, through active patrolling, ambushes, and sweep operations, screen the VC from the people, freeing the peasants to harvest their rice. The farmers could keep the rice in their homes and the Marines would try to keep the VC out. The chiefs were agreeable and Ludwig, borrowing from Greek mythology, labeled the operation GOLDEN FLEECE. General Walt cleared the operation with General Thi, the I Corps Com-
*0ne of Ludwig's company commanders was an Australian exchange officer, Captain Michael J. Harris of the New South Wales Light Infantry, who had served with the British forces in Malaya and gladly shared his experiences with the Americans. He suggested the formation of an area security council consisting of the four chiefs, a program which Ludwig later implemented. Ludwig intvw.
**The 9th Marines S-2, Major John A. Buck, commented: 'Regardless of the accuracy of the reported 30 VC KlAs-which is not an improbable total for the action referred to-the fact that the village chief accepts this figure is, in itself, important.' 9th Marines Intelligence Summary No. 54, dtd lSep65, 9th Marines S-2 Section, Journal and Intelligence Summaries, Sep65.
***The 9th Marines intelligence summary of l September indicated the significance of Trinh's proposal: 'Hoa Hai village has a population of over 3,000 and has been considered VC controlled territory. If the villagers are now willing to risk possible VC reprisals by refusing to pay the usual rice tax, it would indicate a confidence and firmness heretofore lacking in this locality.'
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USMC Photo A185777
Navy Lieutenant James R. McMillian, the surgeon for the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, examines a South Vietnamese infant. The child is the 10,000th Vietnamese patient treated by the battalion's medical team.
benevolence; it was to be used as a weapon. General Walt and his staff hoped that American civic action would sever the populace from Viet Cong control and perhaps induce popular loyalty to the government.
The Marines knew that the entire effort could be dissipated through lack of direction. In addition to the III MAF civic action program, several U. S. civilian agencies,* administered by the United States Operations Mission in Vietnam (USOM), dispensed American aid throughout South Vietnam. On 25 August General Walt met with Mr. Marcus J. Gordon, the regional director of USOM in I Corps. He suggested that a council be established to coordinate American participation in the Vietnamese Rural Construction Program.** Mr. Gordon agreed
* These agencies included representatives from AID, JUSPAO, and CIA.
** The South Vietnamese pacification program changed names frequently during 1965-1966. The program was originally known as 'rural pacification' until 5 April 1965 when it was changed to 'rural construction.' In May 1966, the name was changed again to 'revolutionary development.' These were simply other names for 'pacification.'
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and, on 6 September, the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council (JCC) came into being. Both Mr. Gordon and General Walt hoped to bring the South Vietnamese into the council, but only American representatives attended the first session: Mr. Gordon; Colonel St. Clair, the Deputy Senior Advisor to I Corps; and the III MAF Civil Affairs Officer, Major Charles J. Keever.25
Apparently, the Vietnamese authorities took a wait-and-see attitude before joining in the council's deliberations. On 28 September, General Walt visited General Thi and prevailed upon him to send a representative to the next council meeting. The I Corps commander appointed a representative from his staff to attend the October session, and he became a permanent member of the JCC.26*
The I Corps JCC soon became the coordinating hub for "the Vietnamese government's rural construction plan" in the northern five provinces. Most of the important work was done by committees; and by January 1966, six were functioning. These were: public health, education, roads, food distribution, psychological warfare, and the Port of Da Nang. In November, General Walt further underscored the importance of the progress of the council by appointing Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, Deputy Commanding General, III MAF as his personal representative. He was subsequently elected chairman of the council. Mr. Gordon later declared:
During this same period, General Walt also concentrated on internal coordination of the civic action program within III MAF. On 29 October, he changed the designation of his III MAF general staff G-5 Section from plans and programs to civic action. More significantly, the new organizational designation was reflected throughout III MAF with the creation of division and wing G-5 and regimental and battalion S-5 sections.
III MAF developed some tentative conclusions. In October, the Marine command noted that programs of commodity distribution to the people and medical and dental care were most successful in reaching hamlet inhabitants. The emphasis was on short-term, high-impact, low-cost projects. The Marines had perceived that long-term projects, which required continual supervision and large amounts of material, failed to have the desired effect; the people did not see any immediate results.28 One of the most important reasons why the Marines emphasized short-range activities was the fact that the battalions just did not have the time to attempt more ambitious programs.** The Marines primary tactical duties left very little time for action in direct support of the local government or rural construction.29
The Ngu Hanh Son Campaign and the Frustrations of Pacification
During the autumn of 1965, the South Vietnamese revamped their pacification program in I Corps. Earlier in the year, MACV had urged the South Vietnamese to prepare new pacification plans in each corps area based on the HOP TAC campaign in the Saigon region.*** The idea was for each corps commander to select a critical region and develop plans for coordinating and focusing both the military and civilian activities in an intensive pacification campaign in the selected area. At a meeting of South Vietnamese corps commanders in April, the Joint General Staff directed them to make such plans. The following month, at a follow-up meeting. General Thi, the I Corps commander, declared that his pacification efforts would be centered in the area south of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province.30
*Colonel Keever wrote in his comments: "The Vietnamese military leadership (and MACV for that matter) tended to overlook the vital importance of the civil side of pacification. The support of General Thi and GVN military leadership in I Corps for the so-called people-to-people program was the result of General Walt's leadership and persuasive powers." Col Charles J. Keever, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Dec76 (Vietnam Comment File).
** There were some exceptions to the above: the 7th Marines and 4th Marines help in the construction of the "new life" village of Chu Lai; the 9th Marines reconstruction effort at Cam Ne; and the Le My effort in the 3d Marines TAOR. All of these met with varying degrees of success, depending on the degree of security the Marines and the local government could provide.
*** For a description of the HOP TAC program see Chapter 1.
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South Vietnam, the Seventh Fleet, and Okinawa, but no change in the total group strength.
Marine fixed-wing squadrons, as well as the helicopter units, continued to deploy to Vietnam. MAG-11, under the command of Colonel Robert F. Conley and his successor in November, Colonel Emmett O. Anglin, Jr., made three more squadron changes during 1965. On 15 October, VMFA-115 replaced VMFA-513, which rotated back to Japan. VMFA-323 relieved VMFA-542, which also returned to Japan on l December, and on 19 December, a F-8 Crusader squadron, VMF(AW)-312, joined MAG-11 at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Savage, at the time commanding VMFA-542, later commented: 'These rotations were used to refurbish and change aircraft and train new aircrews as overseas tours drew to a close.'2
MAG-12, under the command of Colonel John D. Noble, 16 May-18 September, and later Colonel Leslie E. Brown, 19 September through the end of the year, operated from the SATS airfield at Chu Lai. Three A-4 Skyhawk squadrons, VMA-225, VMA-311, and VMA-214, made up the aircraft group in July 1965. A fourth squadron, VMA-211, joined MAG-12 on 11 October. Although the group remained at basically the same strength, there was a rotation of squadrons between Iwakuni and Chu Lai. The fixed-wing squadrons of MAG-12 engaged in the rotation program during this period were VMA-224 for VMA-225, 30 September-4 October, and VMA-223 for VMA-311, 14-19 December. At the end of the year, Brown's group consisted of VMA-211, VMA-214, VMA-223, and VMA-224.
By the end of 1965, most of the elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived, although a rear headquarters remained in Japan. Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, the assistant wing commander, arrived at Da Nang on 31 August to assist the wing commander, Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, who also was Deputy Commanding General, III MAF. Colonel Harry W. Taylor assumed command of the rear headquarters (1st MAW Rear) at Iwakuni on that date; he still controlled a sizeable organization. MAG-13 with three fixed-wing squadrons remained in Japan, and one helicopter squadron was on Okinawa. One transport squadron, VMGR-152, and elements of a second, VMGR-352 (Fwd), with several service and supply elements of the 1st MAW, also remained under the rear headquarters' operational control. In addition to these units, two Marine helicopter squadrons, one attached to the Seventh Fleet SLF and the other to the U.S. Army's Field Force Vietnam in n Corps, were not available to III MAF. In spite of these exceptions,
USMC Photo A184074
Marine F4B Phantomsfrom VMFA-531 arrive at Da Nang in April 1965. The drag parachute in the foreground helps to slow the aircraft's landing rollout.
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USMC Photo A184307
A Douglas A-4 Skyhawk from VMA-225 makes the first landing at the Chu Lai SATS field. Colonel John D. Noble, Commanding Officer, MAG-12, piloted the aircraft.
top priority was to go to ground troops actually engaged with the enemy. Sharp maintained that such support should be directly responsive to the ground combat units. The directive also noted that 'nothing herein vitiates the prior CinCPac provision that ComUSMACV's Air Force component command shall act as coordinating authority for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control in South Vietnam.'5
After receiving CinCPac's instruction, General Westmoreland ordered that a revision be made to his air support order. The new MACV directive, published on 13 July 1965, reiterated CinCPac's appointment of General Moore as the coordinating authority. In addition, the order charged him with the responsibility of insuring that coordination was established between his service and the other allied commanders. General Walt retained operational control of Marine aviation, but to insure maximum use of all aircraft, the III MAF commander was to notify the 2d Air Division daily of those aircraft available in excess of his requirements so that additional sorties could be allocated.* Finally, Walt, as Naval Component Commander, Vietnam, was charged with preparing joint operating instructions, in coordination with General Moore, to insure an integrated air effort.6
Concurrently, with the revision of MACV's air directive, General McCutcheon met with Major General Moore to coordinate air efforts as related to air defense operations. Moore wanted operational control of all air defense, but McCutcheon pointed out that the F-4B Phantom II was a dual-purpose plane, capable of both close air support and air-to-air defense. To relinquish these aircraft would deprive the Marine ground commanders of an important supporting arm.
Nevertheless, General McCutcheon recognized the necessity of having one overall air defense commander. After several meetings between the generals and their staffs, it was decided to publish a memorandum of agreement to set forth the basic policies, procedures, and responsibilities. Under this agreement, the Air Force had overall air defense responsibility. McCutcheon designated those Marine forces that would participate in air defense. He agreed that the U. S. Air Force had the authority to handle alert aircraft, designate targets, and control HAWK missile readiness status, including firing orders. Generals Moore and McCutcheon signed the document in August 1965.7**
The revised MACV air directive and the memorandum of agreement provided the basic policy for command, control, and coordination of Marine aviation, an arrangement completely satisfactory to General Walt. These arrangements were to remain unchanged until 1968, when General Westmoreland received approval from higher authority to establish a single management system for tactical air control.
Fixed-Wing Operations
The system of close air support which was employed by the Marines in South Vietnam in 1965 was born during the island campaigns of World War II. Since then, Marine air support doctrine had been continuously modified to keep pace with technological advances.
Marine attack aircraft were required to fly close air
*Colonel Roy C. Gray, Jr., the 1st MAW G-3, commented, 'At the wing G-3 level it was always extremely difficult to identify those air assets that were in excess of III MAF needs. Generally both III MAF and the Air Force wanted far more than the wing could muster.' Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).
**Colonel O'Connor recalled that he 'was present at the key meeting of this series in Da Nang.... I observed General McCutcheon cross swords with General Moore. The Air Force general used every argument at his command. He appealed across service lines, as aviator to aviator, enumerating the advantages of centralized control of aviation in a theater of operations. But General McCutcheon held his ground. He had his orders from III MAF and CGFMFPac. He was also buttressed by several policy directives [from] CinCPac. . . .'Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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than Marine units. During the battle of Ba Gia in June 1965, the A-4s of Colonel Noble's MAG-12 took off on their first night launch from Chu Lai to provide support for the embattled outpost 20 miles to the south. For three days, the MAG-12 A-4 Skyhawks and the F-4B Phantom IIs of Da Nang-based VMFA-513 bombed and strafed the enemy positions around the clock. Four months later, the F-4Bs of Colonel Anglin's MAG-11 and the A-4s of Colonel Brown's MAG-12 flew 59 sorties in support of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops at the Plei Me outpost, 20 miles southwest of Pleiku in northwestern II Corps. The attack against the outpost resulted in a major engagement, the Battle of la Drang Valley, in which the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) killed l,238 enemy in 12 days.
In the 3d quarter of 1965, the two Marine air groups flew 4,614 sorties in support of Marine units and 1,656 sorties for the ARVN. Six hundred thirty-five of these sorties in support of the ARVN were dose air support attacks supporting friendly forces engaged in close combat.8 In the month of December, in spite of poor flying conditions, 1st MAW fixed-wing aircraft still flew 119 close air support missions for ARVN troops.9
Marine attack aircraft performed several other duties in addition to their primary task of close air support. Both the F-4Bs and A-4s flew direct air support missions. Similar in some respects to close air support, these strikes were not conducted in the immediate vicinity of friendly lines and did not require integration with the ground unit's fire support plan, although coordination did take place at an echelon of command above that of the maneuver unit. The aim of the direct air support strikes was to isolate the enemy from the battlefield and destroy his troops and support bases.*
USMC Photo A185852
Major General Walt climbs into the back seat o f a Marine F-4B Phantom II jet at Da Nang for a reconnaissance flight. The aircraft is piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Stewart, Commanding Officer, VMFA-515.
The two MAGs also played a vital role in protecting the MAG-36 and -16 helicopters. For a typical helicopter landing zone preparation, Marine jet aircraft, in coordination with other supporting arms, would cover the landing area and surrounding region with bombs, napalm, rockets, and cannon fire. As the transport helicopters approached the LZ, armed UH-lEs, acting as escorts, would take over suppression of light small arms fire. Meanwhile, Marine fixed-wing close air support aircraft would orbit overhead, prepared to attack any enemy offering heavy resistance.10
Besides landing zone preparation, the attack aircraft from Da Nang and Chu Lai were called upon to provide armed escort for helicopters. Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers, who commanded HMM-163 in 1965 and whose squadron developed a close working relationship with VMFA-531, remarked, 'Some people commented that using F-4s to escort helos was like driving tacks with a gold plated sledge hammer. That may be. All I know is that it worked, and worked very well.'11
While most of the combat strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were flown within South Vietnamese air space, Marine pilots also crossed the DMZ. On 6 May, Captain Don K. Hanna led a flight of four F-
* Strictly speaking, this definition of direct air support applies to deep support missions. The Marines used the term direct support, as defined in the text, to differentiate between interdiction missions and ground support missions. Even so, Colonel Gray remarked that the distinction between close air and direct support was at times vague since, 'The powers to be always wanted missions logged as close air support where possible to weigh in the right direction when assessing Marine air support operations.' Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, 28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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USMC Photo A 184097
A Marine-Navy ANGLICO team plots firing targets/or the USS Canberra (CAG 2) lying offshore. The UHF radio and antenna that can be seen in the middle of the picture permits the team to talk with both aircraft overhead and ships offshore.
under fire and 'when gunfire support could be effected with positive assurance that the friendly forces and/or non-combatants would not be harmed.'14
Control of naval gunfire did not pose a problem for III MAF. Each of General Walt's direct support artillery battalions had naval gunfire liaison and naval gunfire spotter teams within its organization to be attached to infantry units as required. In addition, the Marine tactical air observers and reconnaissance personnel had been schooled in the methods for control of naval gunfire support.
To provide control and direction of naval gun support for other American and allied units, a detachment of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), a FMFPac Force Troops unit was ordered to Vietnam.* Led by Lieutenant Colonel George H. Albers, the detachment arrived in Saigon on 21 May. Officially designated Subunit l, 1st ANGLICO, the unit consisted of 11 officers and 103 enlisted men organized into two shore fire spotting teams and four shore fire control parties. The subunit provided a gunfire liaison team for each corps tactical operations center (TOC). These teams provided the personnel and communications necessary to permit the U.S. senior advisor in each corps area to control naval gunfire through the South Vietnamese TOCs.15
In I Corps, the U.S. Air Force was reluctant to allow the use of naval gunfire near Da Nang Airbase for fear of interfering with U.S. air operations. On 8 June, the U.S. Air Force base commander at Da Nang agreed to permit Navy ships to fire at targets beyond a 10-mile radius from the base. The first naval gunfire mission in support of the Marines was not fired until July because of the limited availability of Navy gunfire ships.16
On 9 July, General Krulak recommended to General Walt that the Marines make every effort to increase their use of naval gunfire support. On the 18th the III MAF commander ordered all of his subordinate units to take full advantage of naval gunfire ships. In July, four ships, two cruisers and two destroyers, fired 934 rounds in support of Marine
*The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company is a Marine unit specifically designed to support U. S. Army or allied units. It provides the control and liaison agencies associated with the ground elements of a landing force to control and employ naval gunfire and Navy and Marine close air support in the amphibious assault, or other operations when such support is required. In addition to Marines, ten Navy line officers and four enlisted men are assigned to the company.
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hand, was to "conduct pre-assault and distant post-assault reconnaissance in support of a landing force."21
1st Force Reconnaissance Company, The Early Days
Early beach reconnaissance efforts of Captain David Whittingham's Subunit l, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company were textbook examples of proper employment of the company. On 23-27 February, Subunit l, in conjunction with Underwater Demolition Team 12, operating from the USS Cook (APD 130), accomplished the reconnaissance of RED Beaches l and 2 at Da Nang. As a result, RED Beach 2 was selected as the landing beach for BLT 3/9, the first element of the 9th MEB to land in Vietnam.
The period 15-20 March was devoted to the reconnaissance of the beaches and terrain near Phu Bai. Subunit 1's reports resulted in 3d MEB's decision to send its first BLT to Phu Bai by way of the river approach to Hue and then overland to Phu Bai. The proposed landing beaches were backed by impassable lagoons which made exit almost impossible. For Subunit l, this was its first real test. The VC were active in the area, but the mission was accomplished without loss and with excellent results.
Eight days later. Subunit l undertook the reconnaissance of the beach which was to be the site of the 3d MEB landing, Chu Lai. Its reconnaissance was finished on 30 March, again with excellent results.
On 20 April, 18 days before the Chu Lai landing, the force reconnaissance Marines started a survey of a beach south of the Tra Bong River 10 kilometers southeast of the proposed 3d MEB landing beach. On the 22d the reconnaissance party encountered light resistance. That was not the case the next day. Five Marines on the beach were caught in the crossfire of 25 VC, Corporal Lowell H. Merrell was wounded twice and two sailors in the beach party's LCVP also were hit; all three subsequently died. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company had lost its first Marine to VC fire. In memory, the new force reconnaissance camp would be named Camp Merrell.
In May, Subunit l teams were sent to Special Forces camps to serve as patrol leaders for CIDG patrols. Other teams were assigned to reconnaissance-in-force patrols composed of U.S.- and Australian-led Nungs* which operated from Da Nang. A third mission was to provide quick response patrols to act as security for downed Marine helicopters. Initially, all force reconnaissance reports and debriefings were coordinated by the III MAF G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Gruenler.
On 10 July, another platoon reinforced Subunit l, and during July and August the two platoon subunit operated from the 4th Marines' Chu Lai base. Another force platoon was conducting beach surveys for the Commander, Task Force 76; still another platoon was assigned to the SLF; while the rest of the company was still at Camp Pendleton.
On 11 August, Major Malcolm C. Gaffen, the company commander, arrived and relieved Captain Whittingham as subunit commander. During Operation STARLITE, in August, Subunit l was attached to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and the 3d Platoon, attached to the SLF, landed with BLT 3/7. At the conclusion of STARLITE, Subunit l returned to Da Nang.
The company headquarters and a fourth platoon arrived on 24 October while the subunit was participating in Operation RED SNAPPER with the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines north of Da Nang. At the conclusion of RED SNAPPER, the four platoons were reunited at their Camp Merrell base on China Beach south of Da Nang. The China Beach site had been selected because of its ready access to the ocean for amphibious training and because it provided enough room for parachute requalification.
The arrival at Camp Merrell of two-thirds of the company and the fact that the 5th and 6th Platoons had moved west to Okinawa suggested that soon the company would be operating as an independent force unit carrying out the "distant port-assault reconnaissance" specified in the table of organization.
During the summer and fall, company units had experienced a variety of operational difficulties. Communications problems were rampant. The force
* Nungs are ethnic Chinese, residents of Kwangsi Province, but an appreciable number inhabited northern North Vietnam. They are noted for their martial skills. As such, many served, willingly, under the French, and, for this reason, emigrated to South Vietnam in 1954. At one time after the formation of the Republic, the South Vietnamese Army included a division of Nungs, but it was broken up because of its potential threat to the incumbent government. Nungs, hired on as mercenaries, eventually came under the domain of U.S. Special Forces and other agencies involved in unconventional warfare.
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USMC Photo A184814
Marines from Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion cross the Nong River near Phu Bai in a rubber raft. The reconnaissance company, attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, is supporting a battalion search and clear operation.
platoon with BLT 2/1 during DAGGER THRUST II in September had to be extracted because radio contact could not be established. Another unit was landed from a Coast Guard patrol boat on the relatively secure coast near Hai Van Pass north of Da Nang to test communications and control, and this operation, too, was a 'bust.' The company's vehicles were 'down;' supply problems were legion; and the partially developed MAF staff was not designed to deal with such difficulties.22
General Walt's solution was to transfer Subunit l to the operational control of the 3d Marine Division, which in turn transferred the unit to 'opcon' 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The transfer was effective 30 October; two days later Subunit l, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company became 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) with a strength of nine officers and 103 enlisted men.23
In effect, the force company became a sixth, albeit smaller, company of the reinforced 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Although the 'in country' dements of '1st Force' were assembled at last, the assimilation by 'division recon' was not an entirely satisfactory solution; some knotty problems arose.
3d Reconnaissance Battalion, Opening Moves
When the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang on 8 March, a platoon from Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion attached to BLT 3/9, became the first division reconnaissance element to be 'resident' in Vietnam. Other platoons arrived as attachments to BLTs, a platoon from Company B with BLT 3/4, a platoon from Company D with BLT 1/3, and a second Company D platoon with BLT 2/3. Platoon attachments lasted until 13 April, at which time the four 'in country' reconnaissance platoons were regrouped as a new Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Captain Patrick G. Collins' Company D operated as the brigade reconnaissance company of the 9th MEB until 7 May, when Lieutenant Colonel Don H. 'Doc' Blanchard, his battalion staff, and the rest of the battalion landed at Chu Lai with the 3d MAB. 'Doc' Blanchard did not stay at Chu Lai very long; on the 12th, he, his staff, battalion headquarters, and Companies A and C moved to Da Nang where they were reunited with Company D. Company B remained at Chu Lai. In the process, Companies A and B were brought up to strength by integrating the Company D platoons which had arrived with the battalion at Chu Lai; there were no longer two Company D elements. Company C was detached from Da Nang to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Hue/Phu Bai on 26 May.
On 13 September, Company C moved again, returning to Da Nang, leaving its 3d Platoon at Hue/Phu Bai still attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Battalion integrity was improved somewhat on 19 September by a directive from General Walt which stated that the reconnaissance battalion should be used in general support of the 3d Marine Division.24 Although this measure simplified command and control, the division was still operating from three separate enclaves, and three separate reconnaissance elements were required. On the 19th, reinforcement of division reconnaissance was accomplished by attaching Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, which had arrived in August as an attachment to the 7th Marines.
The new battalion commander since l September, Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Van Cleve, ordered some adjustments on 20 September in order to comply with III MAF's general support order. The new dispositions were: Headquarters, Companies A, C(-), and D at Da Nang; one Company C platoon at Hue/Phu Bai; and newly designated Reconnaissance Group ALPHA, composed of Company B and attached Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, at Chu Lai.25
During this entire period, the reconnaissance
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Reflecting on this situation, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion commander. Lieutenant Colonel Van Cleve, recalled:They were being used for any mission that might come up. If you didn't have somebody else to do it, why. give it to recon. They ended up on some raider-type missions; they ended up as CP security frequently on operations. As a result of this. General Walt decided that the reconnaissance effort should be controlled at the reconnaissance battalion level, and that any request for reconnaissance type missions would come through the Division staff. the Division reconnaissance officer, G-3/G-2, advising, 'Yes. this is a reconnaissance type mission,' or 'No, this is not a reconnaissance type mission.' Division would task reconnaissance battalion to provide to whatever organization was asking for the necessary forces. People were realizing there was a lot of talent in the Recon Battalion that was not being used for strictly recon purposes, and the Divisions and MAF were losing a lot of potentially valuable information.29Were reconnaissance Marines 'fighters' or 'finders'? When the first revision of the provisional M-Series table of organization was published on 20 February 1958, it stated that 'The [Division] Reconnaissance Battalion may be employed as a unit to screen the advance of the Division or execute counter reconnaissance missions.' These were dearly defined fighting missions. The publication of the approved M-1428 (Division Reconnaissance Battalion) Table of Organization, 5 March 1961, reversed this concept stating 'The Reconnaissance Battalion . . . will be employed to gain intelligence,' and 'It is not equipped for decisive or sustained combat .... It is not capable of screening or counter reconnaissance missions,' but, the concept went on to explain, commanders supported by division reconnaissance could, in the event the reconnaissance element was in danger of being 'overwhelmed,' 'reinforce the reconnaissance force, directing that force to destroy the enemy.'30Revision l of 23 September 1963, still in effect in 1965, carried the transition a step further by deleting the 'destroy the enemy' option, and reiterated the 'not equipped for decisive or sustained combat' restriction, but some damage had been done. Misinterpretation of mission and the natural aggressiveness engendered by the demanding physical conditioning program required by reconnaissance units produced a strange analgam of 'fighting' and 'finding' reconnaissance Marines.31Many senior Marines had been members of special units during World War II, notably the raider and parachute battalions, and all Marines were familiar with their legendary exploits. Of the senior commanders in Vietnam in 1965, four were raider battalion veterans: Major General Walt and three of his regimental commanders, Colonels Wheeler, Dupras, and Peatross. There was bound to be some 'raider' thinking, but the Commanding General, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, resolutely insisted that 'Combat assault operations, including amphibious raids, are missions to be conducted by rifle companies, rather than reconnaissance units.'32 Nevertheless, during the summer and fall of 1964, Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had actually trained as the battalion's 'raid' company.33 The die was cast.By 12 March 1965, Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had been reconstituted in Vietnam. It was the 9th MEB's reconnaissance company, and, as such, in April it claimed more VC 'kills' than all of the 'in country' infantry units, even through patrolling beyond the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORS was not authorized until 20 April. The company commander. Captain Patrick G. Collins, recalled: '... surveillance and observation USMC Photo A185989Marines from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion prepare to make camp during Operation TRAILBLAZER in an enemy base area. The VC had used the hut in the background for food storage, class rooms, living area, and as a medical aid station.Page 177(1965: The Landing and the Buildup)
Were reconnaissance Marines 'fighters' or 'finders'? When the first revision of the provisional M-Series table of organization was published on 20 February 1958, it stated that 'The [Division] Reconnaissance Battalion may be employed as a unit to screen the advance of the Division or execute counter reconnaissance missions.' These were dearly defined fighting missions. The publication of the approved M-1428 (Division Reconnaissance Battalion) Table of Organization, 5 March 1961, reversed this concept stating 'The Reconnaissance Battalion . . . will be employed to gain intelligence,' and 'It is not equipped for decisive or sustained combat .... It is not capable of screening or counter reconnaissance missions,' but, the concept went on to explain, commanders supported by division reconnaissance could, in the event the reconnaissance element was in danger of being 'overwhelmed,' 'reinforce the reconnaissance force, directing that force to destroy the enemy.'30
Revision l of 23 September 1963, still in effect in 1965, carried the transition a step further by deleting the 'destroy the enemy' option, and reiterated the 'not equipped for decisive or sustained combat' restriction, but some damage had been done. Misinterpretation of mission and the natural aggressiveness engendered by the demanding physical conditioning program required by reconnaissance units produced a strange analgam of 'fighting' and 'finding' reconnaissance Marines.31
Many senior Marines had been members of special units during World War II, notably the raider and parachute battalions, and all Marines were familiar with their legendary exploits. Of the senior commanders in Vietnam in 1965, four were raider battalion veterans: Major General Walt and three of his regimental commanders, Colonels Wheeler, Dupras, and Peatross. There was bound to be some 'raider' thinking, but the Commanding General, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, resolutely insisted that 'Combat assault operations, including amphibious raids, are missions to be conducted by rifle companies, rather than reconnaissance units.'32 Nevertheless, during the summer and fall of 1964, Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had actually trained as the battalion's 'raid' company.33 The die was cast.
By 12 March 1965, Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had been reconstituted in Vietnam. It was the 9th MEB's reconnaissance company, and, as such, in April it claimed more VC 'kills' than all of the 'in country' infantry units, even through patrolling beyond the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORS was not authorized until 20 April. The company commander. Captain Patrick G. Collins, recalled: '... surveillance and observation
USMC Photo A185989
Marines from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion prepare to make camp during Operation TRAILBLAZER in an enemy base area. The VC had used the hut in the background for food storage, class rooms, living area, and as a medical aid station.
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well equipped to locate an enemy who had already established a reputation for blending into the surroundings, a phantom army which was seldom seen armed and concentrated. Even when VC concentrations were sighted, they were usually on the move, and presented fleeting targets at best. Regular Marine ground formations were too clumsy for this mission; the VC they found generally wanted to be found. General Walt decided that since reconnaissance patrols could find the VC, then the patrols should be provided with a means to destroy the enemy. Accordingly, he allowed patrols to call in air and artillery strikes. Slow clearance procedures hindered this application in the Da Nang TAOR, but the system proved to be successful at Chu Lai. The concept was refined, and in 1966 it was adopted as a standard tactic, then known as STINGRAY.35
Any doubts about the mission of reconnaissance Marines were resolved by General Walt's September directive which restored the division reconnaissance battalion to its general support role. Lieutenant Colonel Van Clove's appreciation of his mission essentially put an end to the 'raider' days, although some experimentation still persisted.
On 18 October, two 3d Reconnaissance Battalion companies hiked into ''Happy Valley" for Operation TRAILBLAZER. Their mission was to determine the size of enemy concentrations in the hills west of the Da Nang TAOR. For six days, 18-24 October, the reconnaissance force prowled the hills. Two VC were killed, but five separate enemy base areas were discovered and a vast amount of trail network information was accumulated. TRAILBLAZER was the last of the reconnaissance-in-force operations conducted by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. A new trend was in motion. By December, the battalion was concentrating on patrolling, sending out more, smaller patrols; a company-size patrol was the exception.
Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged
The force reconnaissance Marines viewed their attachment to division "recon" with trepidation, and the first weeks of the new arrangement were not without some trying moments. During November, 1st Force Reconniassance Company executed division reconnaissance-type patrols in the Da Nang area, but the III MAF planners had not forgotten the force company's capabilities. As a result, on 27 November the 2d Platoon was returned to III MAF operational control and sent to Special Forces Camp A-106 at Ba To, 42 kilometers south-southwest of Quang Ngai. On 7 December, III MAF reassigned another force platoon, the 3d, to Camp A-107, Tra Bong, 27 kilometers southwest of Chu Lai, on the upper reaches of the Tra Bong River. Their mission, code named BIRDWATCHER, was "... to test the feasibility otdeep patrols."36 At last force "recon" was going deep, but the 2d Platoon at Ba To was in for a tough school session.
At 0530, 15 December three reconnaissance teams (20 Marines and CIDG troops), plus a 61-man base defense reaction force, moved out "to determine location, identity, strength, movement, and armament of VC/PAVN units." More than 70 Communists were sighted during the next two days, but the U. S./Vietnamese reconnaissance force had made a serious mistake. The patrol base had not been moved for two nights. The only redeeming feature of this situation was that the base was on a hill, the best defensive terrain in the area.
By 1730 16 December all teams had returned to the patrol base, but the planned move back to Ba To was cancelled when dense fog settled over the camp. The force of 81 Marine, Special Forces, CIDG, and Nung troops was stuck in the same camp site for the third consecutive night.
At 1900 the Viet Cong began walking mortar rounds across the patrol base. The Vietnamese lieutenant in charge of the patrol was mortally wounded and a U.S. Special Forces sergeant was hit. Enemy automatic weapons swept the hill position as the mortar bombardment continued. Then the assault started. Between 150 to 200 Viet Cong attacked. Confusion swept through the mixed force of defenders; they broke up into small groups. The Marines, now led by Gunnery Sergeant Maurice J. Jacques, withdrew into a small perimeter, but of the 13 Marines assigned to the patrol five were already missing. In the perimeter, a Marine was hit, their corpsman was seriously wounded, and a second Marine was killed. Jacques' Marines moved off the hill into the darkness. They hid in a clump of banana trees, formed a defensive perimeter, and waited for the dawn, hoping that aerial observers would spot them in the morning. Of the 13 Marines, 4 were still missing and one was known to be dead.
Dawn came, but the fog persisted. There was no possibility of being seen from the air. The Marines tried to regain the trail back to Ba To, but enemy
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troops firing at what were probably other stragglers drove them back into the bush. After moving about four kilometers they found thicker cover and started moving up a ridgeline; they knew the trail to Ba To was on top of the ridge. At this time they were joined by two CIDG survivors, but the two Vietnamese almost were killed in the process. A Vietnamese with the Marines saved them by causing the Marines to hold fire as they came out of the bushes.
The Marines reached the Ba To trail, but again they were faced with a tough decision. It is a bad practice to use trails in enemy territory, but the Marines had to get away quickly and fog still blanketed the area. Fortunately the wind picked up, and it was so loud that it covered any noise the patrol made, so Jacques decided to 'head for home.' Putting the two Vietnamese stragglers out as the point on the trail, the Marines moved out. They reached Ba To without incident.
An hour after Gunnery Sergeant Jacques' party arrived at the base, another Marine survivor, wounded Lance Corporal Donald M. Woo, was brought in. Determined to survive, Lance Corporal Woo had been captured and escaped twice, and, in turn, captured two NVA soldiers and forced them, at knife point, to carry him to Ba To.
On 21 December the two missing Marines were found, dead. A patrol found 14 bodies: three Marines, the Special Forces sergeant, the Vietnamese lieutenant patrol leader, and nine CIDG troops.
As a result of the Ba To experience, and some other misadventures, a long standing force reconnaissance operational procedure was suspended. Previous training practices had dictated that when a force reconnaissance patrol was discovered it was to split up, each member evading on his own. After Ba To, force patrols went in together, stayed together, and came out together.
The 2d and 3d Platoons were returned to 3d Reconnaissance Battalion control on 24 December. On the 28th, Captain William C. Shaver relieved now Lieutenant Colonel Gaffen who was transferred upon his promotion.
As the year ended, both force and division reconnaissance units could state that their respective situations were much improved. Although 'force' was not pleased with the prospect of remaining under the paternal hand of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, the force company was, at last, able to conduct deep missions, and the company's supply situation was vastly improved. Division reconnaissance was still spread between three enclaves, but it also had room to maneuver; the threat of compromise was vastly diminished. Coordination, cooperation, and understanding of reconnaissance capabilities and limitations were improving. 'Recon' had a clear view of the future.
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Navy Photo K31362
Merchant ships in Da Nang Harbor wait their turn to unload their cargo. At the end of December 1965, 12 ships were in the harbor waiting to be unloaded.
staff and that officer would then become the 'duty expert' and action officer for that matter. Colonel Harold A. Hayes, who became the III MAF G-4 on 26 August, recalled the early morning briefings that he held for General Walt and the rest of the III MAF staff where he had to report on the 'low, low supply levels at different times in aviation gas, artillery ammunition, and even rations.'9
One particularly serious shortage during 1965 was that of aviation ordnance. The data used to forecast aviation ammunition needs in early 1965 failed to reflect the actual combat needs or delivery capabilities of the aircraft deployed to Vietnam.10 Thus, from the very beginning, the F-4B pilots, and later the A-4 pilots, had to conserve ammunition and to make value judgments on the necessity for firing at assigned targets. No targets were left unhit, but the Marines had to employ their resources sparingly and, on at least one occasion, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ordered F-4B squadrons not to expend rockets unless they were being used to support Marines.11 According to Colonel Robert F. Conley, who commanded MAG-11 from July to November 1965: 'Without the Navy's strong support in this field, we would not have been able to function.'12 The aviation ammunition situation, like the rest of the logistic problems that the Marines faced, could not be corrected until a productive pipeline was established and adequate port and storage facilities were built.*
III MAF Naval Responsibilities
In his role as Naval Component Commander (NCC),** the III MAF commander was in the U.S. Pacific Fleet chain of command rather than that of MACV. In this capacity he was responsible for base construction in I Corps and the operation of all ports, beaches, and depots from Quang Ngai to the DMZ. Colonel Nickerson, in his 16 May concept of logistic support for III MAF, projected a Naval Support Activity under the NCC that would carry out the above assignments, as well as provide common item support for all U.S. forces in I Corps, but the Navy did not have the available manpower for the activation of such a unit. In a message to Admiral
*Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, 1st MAW chief of staff until August 1965, observed: 'We discovered that we had dipped deeply into the national war reserve ammunition supplies in the United States. That's what happens when you initiate a war, but try to conduct business as usual in the United States as if no war were going on.' Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, did 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
**As NCC, General Walt did not control all U.S. Naval Forces in South Vietnam. The Naval Advisory Group and CTF 115 remained separate entities.
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Navy Photo K31382
Stacks of cargo crowd the unloading pier at Da Nang. The overcrowded and undermanned Naval Support Activity at Da Nang was unloading 2,505 measured tons a day by the end of 1965.
Sharp on 28 May, Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations, pointed out that a Naval Support Activity could not be formed without the mobilization of certain units of the reserve. McDonald stated that he was asking for more personnel, 'but in the meantime, the task will have to be accomplished within our existing resources.' On 5 June, nevertheless. Admiral Roy L. Johnson, CinCPacFlt, ordered the NCC to take over common item support in I Corps, stating that he and General Krulak, Commanding General, FMFPac, would provide additional personnel and equipment.13
In an evaluation of the NCC responsibility for running the ports and providing logistic support in I Corps, Colonel Nickerson observed on 15 June that 'Port operations continue to be conducted by CG III MAF under the cognizance of the NCC staff'' and that III MAF would have to continue using it own personnel and equipment for this task until the establishment of a Naval Support Activity. Nickerson concluded that until the matter of the Naval Support Activity was 'resolved. Commander Seventh Fleet and the NCC must work together to get the job done.'14
With the complex problems confronting them, the Marines and the Navy attempted to organize their available resources to best carry out the mission of operating port terminals, unloading and moving cargo, and all the other tasks associated with an advance naval base. On 10 July, General Walt formally activated a Provisional Naval Component Support Activity and assigned Colonel Robert W. Boyd as its commander. In effect, Boyd, who had already been acting in this capacity, was the Da Nang port director. On 17 July, the Secretary of the Navy authorized the establishment of a Naval Support Activity, Da Nang and four days later Admiral Johnson promulgated the mission and tasks for the new organization. The Naval Support Activity was to be under the command of Commander, Service
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In I Corps, all shipping was offloaded at Da Nang and then some cargo had to be reloaded on LSTs to support the base at Chu Lai. This created fluctuations in the volume of supplies reaching committed units. The heavy wear and tear on equipment caused by the heat, humidity, and monsoons created additional frustrations.
Solutions had to found. In August, a logistics assistance team from FMFPac arrived at Da Nang to study the situation there. By the 24th, the team had completed its report and made its recommendations.23 General Krulak's headquarters instituted two new programs based on the team's findings, the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC systems.
The first of these, the RED BALL Program, which went into effect on 22 September, sought to identify and solve critical supply shortages throughout the Western Pacific. When an important item of supply or equipment was found to be in short supply it was given a RED BALL designation. This meant that as soon as an item was designated RED BALL, all FMFPac supply echelons were alerted and the status of these items was closely monitored by individual action officers at each intermediary headquarters. It was their responsibility to see that the RED BALL item was shipped to Vietnam in the most expeditious manner possible, including spedally arranged air shipment.24 For an item to be placed on RED BALL, it had to be combat essential and meet specifications determined by FMFPac, which were refined periodically in the light of experience. For example, the 3d Marine Division reported in December:
The second supply innovation, the CRITIPAC Program, was established by FMFPac in November. Under this concept, the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, California automatically furnished, without request, each major Marine unit in Vietnam, usually battalion or Squadron size, one shipment of critical supplies which were normally required on a routine basis. As a result of the first shipment which arrived in November, the 3d Marine Division indicated that 51 combat essential items were removed from deadline. General Walt recommended that some modifications be made in future shipments to include some items which were essential and to delete others which were not.26 Both new additions to the Marine Corps Supply system, the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC, helped to alleviate the III MAF logistic situation.**
The Force Logistic Support Group
The Force Logistic Support Group under Colonel Padalino had grown from 700 personnel who deployed with the 9th MEB to nearly 3,000 officers and men by the end of the year.*** Under the overall control of the FLSG at Da Nang, two force logistic support units (FLSU) had been established at Chu Lai and Phu Bai. Built on the nucleus of the 3d Service Battalion, the FLSG was reinforced by personnel from the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa and from the 1st Force Service Regiment at Camp Pendleton, California. The FLSG at Da Nang centrally controlled all furnished material, assisted by two data processing platoons. Supplies were provided either from one of the three stock points in I Corps, or the requisition was transmitted electronically to the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa. The FLSG was also responsible for first to third echelon
* Category 3 indicated that a unit was marginally capable for combat while Category 4 shows that a unit is unprepared for combat.
** The extent of this relief is a matter of some conjecture. According to FMFPac, the RED BALL and CRITIPAC Programs resulted in a decrease in percentage of deadlined equipment from 15 percent in the fall to 12.5 percent by the end of 1965. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, v.I, p. 8-14. MACV on the other hand reported: "Year end deadline rate for III MAF was: overall, 14 percent; electronic, 11 percent; engineer, 32 percent; motor transport 11 percent; and ordnance, 5 percent." MACV, Comd Hist, 1965, p. 116. In any event there was no doubt that the supply situation was better than in October 1965, when III MAF reported: "Shortage of spare parts affected readiness to the extent that the operation readiness of several units decreased to the marginally combat ready category." III MAF ComdC, Oct65, p. 7.
*** Colonel Robert J. Oddy commanded the Force Logistic Support Group from 6-29 May 1965. Colonel Oddy also continued to command the 3d Service Battalion which left a rear echelon behind on Okinawa. Col Robert J. Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd 250ct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
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engineering units to undertake by themselves. A civilian construction firm worked on the expansion of the main airfield at Da Nang, while the 30th Naval Construction Regiment, Captain Harold F. Liberty, USN, with four Seabee battalions built helicopter facilities at Marble Mountain and Ky Ha. The Marble Mountain facility construction was approved by CinCPac in July and by 25 August MAG-16 was operating from the base. The Seabees also built a 400-bed hospital just west of the Marble Mountain Air Facility, but construction there was temporarily disrupted by the VC attack on 28 October. At Chu Lai, Seabees, assisted by Major Kennedy's Marine Air Base Squadron 36 and Marine engineers, built a second helicopter air facility on the Ky Ha Peninsula. Colonel Johnson's MAG-36 flew its first missions from the new facility on 12 September.40
The experience of the Seabees, who were supported by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's MABS-12 and Marine engineering units at the Chu Lai SATS field, was typical of the frustration that the construction units faced in South Vietnam. On 3 July, the Seabees finished the last portion of the 8,000-foot runway, but only a few weeks later the northern half of the runway had to be closed because of soil erosion under the matting. No sooner had this project been completed than the Marines discovered that heavy rains and sand erosion had caused the foundation of the southern half of the runway to crumble. The matting became wavy and disjointed, unsafe for jet operations.41 On 25 September, the Marines closed the southern portion of the runway and the Seabees applied a soft cement base mixed with sand under the AM-2 matting to try to attain stabilization.42 This work was completed on 10 November, but by that time the northern foundation was eroding again. The Seabees made nightly repairs, but by the end of year it was apparent that the northern half would have to be lifted once more and restabilized with the same cement-sand mixture used on the southern portion. This time the sand was packed without using any other material, and then a light layer of asphalt was applied over the sand. Before replacing the aluminum matting, a thin plastic membrane was installed to keep rain from settling in the soil and undermining the runway.43 These efforts proved successful, and the "tinfoil strip", as the runway became nicknamed, was still in use five years after it had been built. Not even the SATS planners at Quantico in 1955 had envisioned that a SATS field could be constructed in such soil conditions and then used in all types of weather for such an extended period.44
General Walt expressed his appreciation of the engineering effort in the following terms:
The entire Marine logistics and support effort was perhaps summed up best by General McCutcheon's description of the SATS field: "It worked, but it took some doing."46
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USMC Photo A183650
Major Charles 'Uncle Charles' K. Whitfield, artillery advisor (on the left of the picture), and his assistants, Captain Richard J. Coogan (extreme right) and Staff Sergeant Ronald M. Blakely (third from right) supervise gun laying. During 1965, the Vietnamese Marine artillery battalion was converting frorn the 7 5mm pack howitzer to the 105mm howitzer as pictured.
The Marines in the I Corps Advisory Group were assigned to battalion advisory teams consisting of two officers, a noncommissioned officer, and a radioman. Marine captains occupied positions as senior battalion advisors, while lieutenants became assistant battalion advisors. The Marine infantry and artillery noncommissioned officers served as weapons advisors, and the Marine radiomen manned the advisor communications network.
The role of advisor to the Vietnamese Armed Forces during 1965 was a difficult task, but one with many rewards. Major Letfwich, after serving with the Marine Advisory Unit, provided the following advice to future Marine advisors, and indeed any advisor:
Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters in Saigon
On l January 1965, 25 Marines were serving on the MACV staff in Saigon. The senior Marine was General Westmoreland's J-2, Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, who had filled the billet of MACV intelligence officer since January 1964. When
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CHAPTER 15
Conclusion
The 10-month period of March to December 1965 was one of expansion and experimentation for Marine forces in Vietnam. During the year, Marine units from California to Okinawa prepared for deployment to Vietnam. General Karch's 9,000 Marines of the 9th MEB were quickly absorbed by the division-wing force, III MAF. By the end of the year, General Walt had over 42,000 men in ICTZ. Since the landing on 8 March, the Marines had extended their influence from eight square miles around the Da Nang Airfield to three coastal enclaves containing over 804 square miles.
As III MAF's TAORs expanded into the densely populated coastal ricelands, the Marines found the Viet Cong intermingled with the local villagers and turned to a variety of pacification experiments to ferret out the Communists and win back the population. They employed counterguerrilla techniques such as combined action companies and civic action projects such as the GOLDEN FLEECE rice harvesting operations. By the end of 1965, the Marines were still unable to measure many real pacification gains.
General Walt's balanced approach for the elimination of the Communist threat initially stressed the establishment of secure beachheads at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. During the March-June consolidation phase the Marines lost 34 killed and 157 wounded, while killing 270 Viet Cong. By mid-1965 with this phase completed, lII MAF began a two-pronged campaign to destroy main force Communist units, and at the same time root out the Viet Cong infrastructure. Operations STARLITE and HARVEST MOON encountered the Viet Cong in regimental strength. During the last six months of 1965 the Marines suffered 420 killed and 1,936 wounded, while killing 2,295 enemy soldiers and capturing more than 700 weapons.1
There could be no doubt that large-scale, conventional operations were to play a much larger role during the coming year. By the end of 1965, General Westmoreland's intelligence staff estimated that eight regular NVA regiments had arrived in South Vietnam. General Walt had received approval of his request for two full divisions and a reinforced aircraft wing. The 1st Marine Division was scheduled for deployment to I CTZ in early 1966, as were more aircraft squadrons.
Despite the emphasis on troop movement, reinforcement, and engagement of the enemy's larger units, the war was far from conventional. General Krulak cautioned:
As 1965 drew to a dose there was some hope for peace. Both the allies and the Viet Cong agreed to short truces over the Christmas and New Year holidays and President Johnson opened his 'peace offensive.' He ordered the bombing of North Vietnam suspended for an extended period and dispatched American envoys to visit world capitals in an effort to initiate peace negotiations with the other side. Everyone involved in the war in Vietnam talked of peace, but there was no peace. The prediction of a Vietnamese soothsayer would come true; 1966 would be a year of a 'lot of fighting and killing.'3
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Notes
PART I
ESTABLISHING THE ENCLAVES
Introduction
1. MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, General Staff, Hq, USMACV, Comd Hist, 1964, dtd 15Oct65 p. 102.
2. Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, CinCPac, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 95, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War. For a more detailed account see Capt Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR, U, S, Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964 (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1977), Chap. 10, hereafter Whitlow, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64.
Chapter l
The Call for Marines
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, General Staff, Hq, USMACV, Comd Hist, 1965, dtd 20Apr66, hereafter MACV Comd Hist, 1965; 9th MEB ComdD Mar65; MAG-16 ComdD 16Jan-Mar65, dtd 8Apr65; HQMC Msg File; CNO, Flag Plot Msg File, Jan-Mar65 (OAB, NHD), hereafter Flag Plot File; BGen Frederick J. Karch, intvw by Oral HistU, Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 15Jan72 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Karch Intvw; Vietnam Comment File; Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter Pentagon Papers with appropriate section title and book, and section, volume or tab, and page number; LtCol John J. Cahill and Jack Shulimson, 'History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 65,' MS (Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Cahill and Shulimson, 'USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun 65'; Jack Shulimson, 'U. S. Marines in Vietnam, Introduction,' MS, pt l of LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et. al., 'Marines in Vietnam, 1954-May 1968,' MS, 8 pts (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter, Shulimson, 'U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt l.'
Alert and Realert
l. BGen Frederick J. Karch, Presentation to the Command and Staff College, MCS, Quantico, dtd 27May65 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Karch Presentation.
2. See MCCC, Items of Significant Interest for 20 and 31Jan65.
Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HAWKS
3. Washington Post and Times Herald, 8Feb65, p. l.
4. LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Comments on draft MS, dtd 250ct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cook Comments. See also Col George G. Long, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Long Comments.
5. Cook Comments.
6. Ibid.
7. Long comments. See also Capt Ronald G. Richardson, intvw by MCS Quantico, dtd 8Feb66 (No. 50, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
8. Long Comments. See also MajGen Andrew W. O'Donnell and staff, Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Donnell and staff Comments.
9. 'The Rolling Thunder Program Begins,' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. xii-xiv, and pp. 27-47. See also JCS Historical Section, Joint Secretariat, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter JCS History Comments.
Land the Marines
10. Quoted in 'The Rolling Thunder Program Begins,' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, p. 31. See also JCS History Comments.
11. ComUSMACV msg to JCS, dtd9Feb65 (Flag Plot File).
12. JCS Memorandum (JCSM) 100-65, dtd HFeb65 as cited in 'Marine Units Go To Da Nang,' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. ix. See also 'The Rolling Thunder Program Begins,' Ibid., bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. 31-47 and JCS History Comments.
13. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 123, hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; MACV Comd Hist, 1965, p. 30.
14. Quoted in 'Marine Units Go to Da Nang,' Pentagon Papers, bk4, sec. IV-c-4, pp. 2-5.
15. Karch Intvw.
16. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, p. 31.
17. DOD Tlgram 6166, dtd 2Mar65 as cited in 'Marine Units Go to Da Nang,' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. 6.
18. CinCPac msg to JCS, dtd 3Mar65, as cited in Ibid.,pp.7-8.
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The Landing
19. Maj Ruel T. Scyphers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
20. 3/9 ComdD,Mar65,pt II,p. 5.
21. Karch Intvw.
22. 3/9 ComdD, Mar 65, pt III.
23. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, ' 'USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).
24. LtCol Herbert J. Bain, Comments on draft MS, dtd 30Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bain Comments.
25. CTF 76 Sit Rep No. 18, dtd 9Mar65 (Flag Plot File).
26. Bain Comments.
Chapter 2
The 9th MEB in Vietnam
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; 9th MEB ComdDs, Mar-Apr65; HQMC Msg File; Flag Plot File; Vietnam Comment File; Karch Intvw, Karch Presentation; Pentagon Papers, Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt l"; Jack Shulimson "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, May-December 1965," MS, pt2 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam 1954-May1968," hereafter Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt.2"; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965-66," Naval Review, 1968 (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 2-35, hereafter Simmons, ' 'Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66.''
The First Weeks
Additional sources for this section are: BLSG ComdDs, Mar-Apr65; MAG-16 ComdDs, Mar-Apr65.
l. JCS msg to CinCPac, dtd 6Mar65 as cited in "Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. l. Westmoreland quoted in FMFPac, "Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, March-September 1965," n.d., hereafter FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65.
2. BGen Frederick J. Karch Itr to Col Clifford B. Drake, dtd 26Mar65, covering Itr to Karch Presentation.
3. Colonel Robert J. Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd 250ct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
4. Karch Presentation.
5. LtCol George H. Smith, intvw by MCSC Albany, dtd 21Apr66 (No. Ill, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
6. Maj Pat Morgan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
7. BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
8. Karch Presentation.
9. Col Norman G. Ewers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also O'Donnell and staff Comments.
10. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Connor Comments.
11. 3/9 ComdD, Mar65.
12.FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65, p. 21.
13. Karch Presentation.
Estimate of the Situation
Additional sources for this secton are: Dept of the Army, SE Asia Msg File (CMH, DA), hereafter CMH Msg File and Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports.
14. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (CMH Msg File). See also Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. pp. 126-29.
15. See "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp 56-59 for copies of these earlier recommendations.
16. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (CMH Msg File). This message provides a resume of the 26 March MACV "Estimate of the Situation." See also Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 125.
17. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on Shulimson draft MS. "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt l." dtd 11Aug69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, 69.
18. NSAM 328, dtd 6Apr65 as reprinted in "Phase I in the Buildup ot U. S. Forces, the Debate," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5. pp. 124-26. See also Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 130-31.
More Marines Arrive
Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65; FMFPac Deployment SitReps, 1965; 3d MEB Sit Reps. 5-12Apr65; 3d Marines ComdD, Apr65; MAG-16 ComdD, Apr65.
19. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Denny Comments.
20. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 31Mar65 in FMFPac Deployment SitReps 1965.
21. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd lApr65 in Ibid; Col Richard A. Savage, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
22. Denny Comments.
23. ComUSMACV msg to CG9thMEB, dtd 12Apr65 (HQMC Msg File).
24. CGlst MAW msg to CO, VMFA-531, dtd 12Apr65 (Ibid).
25. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS. "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 16Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).
26. Col Otis W. Gorman, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov 76] (Vietnam Comment File).
27. Karch Presentation.
An Expanded Mission
28. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, p. 40.
29. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, 77.
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in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 101.
12. Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). See also "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 26-7; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 144.
The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave
13. Col Charles H. Bodley, Comments on draft MS, dtd 270ct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
14. Ibid.
15. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 2Jul65 (HQMC Msg File).
16. III MAF Op 304-65, dtd 4Jul65, encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Jul65.
The Attack on the Airfield
Additional sources for this section are: 3d Marines ComdC, Jul65; l / 9 ComdC, Jul65; l / 3 ComdC, Jul65; 2 / 3 ComdC, Jul 65; Karch Intvw.
17. III-MAF Intelligence Rept to ComUSMACV, dtd 3 Jul65, Subj: Interrogation of NVA POW.
18. Col Verle E. Ludwig, Comments on draft MS, dtd 80ct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ludwig Comments.
19. Entry for lJul65, 3d MarDiv G-3 Jnl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul65.
20. Walt Comments.
21. Ibid.
22. Resume of Activities, Movements and Results, pt II, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul 65.
23. Ludwig Comments.
24. Hay Comments.
25. Krulak Comments, 77.
Expansion to the South
Additional sources for this section are: HQMC, Cam Ne Report, Aug-Sep65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 9th Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 2/9 ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 AAR 1-65, dtd Aug65; LtCol William H. Clark, intvw by MCB, CamPen, circa Feb66 (No. 63, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
26. Walt Comments.
27. Krulak Comments, 77; Walt Comments.
28. BGen Nguyen Chanh Thi Itr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Jul65, Subj: TAOR of III MAF, end 3, III MAF ComdC, Jul65.
29. Ibid.
30. LtCol William H. Clark memo, dtd 17July65, Subj: Provisional Base Defense Battalion, end 7, LtCol William H. Clark, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Clark Comments.
31. Clark Comments.
32. CO 2/9 memo to CO 9th Marines, dtd 9Aug65, Subj: Debriefing Rept, 2/9 ComdC, Aug65.
33. Maj John A. Buck, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
34. Statements of LtCol V. E. Ludwig and Capt H. B. West in HQMC, Cam Ne Report, Aug-Sep65.
35. LtCol V. E. Ludwig Statement in Ibid.
36. CMC (AH-wwg) memo to Asst SecDef (PA), dtd 9Aug65, Subj: Mr. Morley Safer report of Marine attack on the village of Cam Ne, and Summary of CBS-TV newsbroadcast, evening, 5Aug65 in Ibid. For the Gazette editorial quote, see "The War in Vietnam: Cam Ne (4)," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 49, no. 10 (Oct 1965), pp. 28-30, p. 30.
37. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 7Aug65 in HQMC, Cam Ne Rept, Aug-Sep65.
Further Reinforcements
38. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, pp. 40-42. See also ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 25-31.
PART II
THE BIG BATTLES
Chapter 5
Operation STARLITE: The First Big Battle
Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MACV Comd Hist, 1965; HqFMFPac, "U. S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, March 1965-September 1967," n.d., 2 vols., hereafter FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC, Jul-Aug65; 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65;" Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66"; BGen Oscar F. Peatross, "Application of Doctrine: Victory at Van Tuong Village," Naval Review 1967 (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1967), pp. 2-13, hereafter Peatross, "Victory at Van Tuong"; Col Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 15Jul66 (No. 157, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Peatross Intvw, 1966.
Intelligence and Planning
1. Simmons, "Marines Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 18.
2. MajGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 14May71 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dulacki Comments, 71; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jul 77] (Vietnam Comment File).
3. Col James F. McClanahan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Marines ComdC, Aug65.
4. Dulacki Comments, 71.
5. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 12Apr73 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); Walt Comments.
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weapon to the aviation ordnance arsenal broadened the air support capabilities of the 1st MAW.
12 Aug-The first all-Marine night helicopter assault took place starting at 2400.
14 Aug-The Navy announced four-month involuntary extensions of duty for Navy and Marine Corps enlisted personnel. Coordinating headquarters were established at Chu Lai under the 3d MarDiv ADC, Brigadier General Karch.
15 Aug-The Headquarters of the 7th RLT and 1/7 came ashore at Chu Lai. Colonel Oscar F. Peatross commanded the regiment. At Da Nang, elements of 5/9 came ashore making it the first battalion to be re-introduced into RVN (See 8 March and 17 June 1965 entries).
16 Aug-3/9 relieved 1/9 as the Base Defense Battalion at Da Nang.
17 Aug-2/4 and 3/3 were assigned to the 7th Marines for Operation STARLITE.
18-24 Aug-Operation STARLITE. Three Marine battalions-1/7, 2/4, and 3/3-attached to the 7th Marines, and supported by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, conducted an amphibious-heliborne search and destroy operation in the Van Tuong village complex south of Chu Lai. The purpose of the attack was to eliminate an enemy force-the 1st VC Regiment, reportedly 2,000 strong-which had built up for an attack on Chu Lai. Strong resistance was encountered, requiring the support of BLT 3/7 from the SLF. The USMC units advanced through the objective area in two days, and then were joined for mopping up operations by Vietnamese forces. Casualties were as follows:
USMC: 45 KIA, 6 DOW, 203 WIA
VC: 614 KIA, 9 DOW,
The Viet Cong dead were confirmed by body count. It was estimated that the actual enemy KIA total ran much higher because of the large number of caves and tunnels that were sealed or destroyed. (On 9 September an agent source reported that the VC had suffered 1,430 KIA, in Operation STARLITE).
26 Aug-In response to a CG III MAF request made in June, 11 sentry dogs and handlers arrived as the initial element of the 1st Provisional Dog Platoon, which was planned to consist ultimately of two squads, a sentry dog squad and a patrol dog squad.
28 Aug- l /1 arrived at Da Nang to relieve l / 3.
31 Aug-President Johnson called for "a new and mighty people-to-people program to bring American aid to victims of the war in RVN." The total III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees was broken down as follows:
I Sep-1/3 departed RVN for Okinawa, where it was relieved by BLT 3/5, and then returned to CONUS. A total of 10,919 personnel of FMFPac remained in Okinawa and Japan.
7-10 Sep-Operation PIRANHA. Following the decisive Marine Corps victory over the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in Operation STARLITE (18-24 August), intelligence information disclosed that other VC forces were building up on the Batangan Peninsula, still farther south of Chu Lai. Operation PIRANHA, another regimental-level amphibious-heliborne attack, was executed to clear the area. It exacted at least 163 Viet Cong killed and served notice once again upon the VC of the hazards of concentrating their forces. Subsequently they reverted to small unit operations in I Corps area.
11 Sep-BLT 2/1, which arrived on Okinawa 27 August from CONUS and subsequently embarked as the SLF, assumed a position within six-hours reaction time of Qui Nhon, prepared to land and provide security, if required, for debarkation of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
18 Sep-The first elements of the Army's 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division landed at Qui Nhon.
23 Sep-The Defense Department said that General Westmoreland had the authority to permit use of tear gas.
28 Sep-The total III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees by area was as follows:
14 Oct-The CG, I Corps approved extension of the Chu Lai TAOR. A USMC sniper team was formed in the Hue-Phu Bai TAOR. The team used Winchester Model 70 rifles with 8-Unertl telescopic sights and killed two Viet Cong at a range of more than 700 yards in the first exercise of the new tactic. Later, M-1D rifles with telescopic sights were utilized.
18 Oct-Operation TRAIL BLAZER, a six-day deep patrol and series of ambushes by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, began from a patrol base about 15 miles southwest of Da Nang. The purpose of the operation was to determine the extent of VC concentration in the main valleys leading from the mountains into the Da Nang TAOR and to determine the probability of enemy attack from that area.
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The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to
CORPORAL ROBERT E. O'MALLEY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
for service as set forth in the following
CITATION:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the communist (Viet Cong) forces at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Squad Leader in Company "I", Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), near An Cu'ong 2, South Vietnam, on 18 August 1965. While leading his squad in the assault against a strongly entrenched enemy force, his unit came under intense small arms fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Corporal O'Malley raced across an open rice paddy to a trench line where the enemy forces were located. Jumping into the trench, he attacked the Viet Cong with his rifle and grenades, and singly killed eight of the enemy. He then led his squad to the assistance of an adjacent Marine unit which was suffering heavy casualties. Continuing to press forward, he reloaded his weapon and fired with telling effect into the enemy emplacement. He personally assisted in the evacuation of several wounded Marines, and again regrouping the remnants of his squad, he returned to the point of the heaviest fighting. Ordered to an evacuation point by an officer. Corporal O'Malley gathered his besieged and badly wounded squad and boldly led them under fire to a helicopter for withdrawal. Although three times wounded in this encounter, and facing imminent death from a fanatic and determined enemy, he steadfastly refused evacuation and continued to cover his squad's boarding of the helicopters while, from an exposed position, he delivered fire against the enemy until his wounded men were evacuated. Only then, with his last mission accomplished, did he permit himself to be removed from the battlefield. By his valor, leadership, and courageous efforts in behalf of his comrades, he served as an inspiration to all who observed him, and reflected the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
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The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to
FIRST LIEUTENANT HARVEY C. BARNUM, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
for service as set forth in the following
CITATION:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Forward Observer for Artillery, while attached to Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against communist forces at Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 18 December 1965. When the company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy fire and was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over five hundred meters of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties mounted rapidly, Lieutenant Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle company commander mortally wounded and radio operator killed, he, with complete disregard for his own safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with two armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a successful counter-attack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion's objective. His gallant initiative and heroic conduct reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
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Off
Enl
Off
Enl
TOTAL
12. 3d ReconBn (DA NANG)
21
302
1
17
341
a. H&SCo
9
99
1
6
115
b. Co A
4
66
4
74
c. Co C
4
68
3
75
d. Co D
4
69
4
77
13. Recon Group Alpha (CHU LAI)
8
132
5
145
a. Co B (-) (Rein), 3d ReconBn
4
63
2
69
(l) H&SCo
(2) 1st Pit
(3) 2d Pit
b. Co C (Rein), 1st ReconBn
4
69
3
76
14. 1st Force ReconCo (DA NANG)
9
128
5
142
15. 3dMTBn (-) (DA NANG)
10
154
8
172
a. H&SCo
7
84
8
99
b. Co A (-) (15 M-35, 2 1/2-ton trucks)
2
39
41
c. 2dPlt, CoB (15 M-35, 2 1/2 ton trucks)
1
31
32
16. IstAmTracBn (-) (Rein), FMF (DA NANG)
26
639
2
13
680
a. H&SCo (12 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC-1, l LVTR-1)
17
319
2
11
349
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Pit (6 LVTH-6)
2
74
2
78
c. Co B (Rein) (54 LVTP-5,4 LVTC-1, l LVTR-1)
7
246
253
17. 3d T/aBn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG)
23
489
1
11
524
a. H&SCo (-) (2 M48A3 Tks)
15
267
1
7
290
b. Co A(-) (Rein) (12 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)
3
89
2
94
c. Co B(Rein) (17 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)
5
110
2
117
d. 1st Pit, Co C (5 M48A3 Tks)
23
23
18. 3d Shore Party Bn (-) (DA NANG)
22
438
1
25
486
a. H&SCo
12
184
1
10
207
b. Co A
3
86
5
94
c. Co B
4
82
5
91
d. Co C
3
86
5
94
19. Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn (CHU LAI)
5
126
1
10
142
20. 3d Dental Co (DA NANG)
8
35
43
H. First Marine Aircraft Wing
1086
8332
40
147
9605
l. MWHG-1
267
2159
12
50
2488
a. H&HS-l(DANANG)
141
803
10
28
982
b. MASS-2
19
119
138
(l) Det A (CHU LAI)
4
18
22
(2) Det B (DA NANG)
4
19
23
(3) Det C (CHU LAI)
3
13
16
(4) DASC (DA NANG)
7
19
26
c. MACS-7
23
221
2
246
(l) Det A (PHU BAI)
3
17
20
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DA NANG)
31
481
1
10
523
e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI)
32
449
1
10
492
2. AfAG-n(DANANG)
178
1817
5
21
2021
a. H&MS-11
34
416
450
b. MABS-11
13
490
3
16
522
c. VMFA-115
41
274
1
2
318
d. VMFA-323
43
278
1
2
324
e. VMCJ-1
29
222
251
f. VMF (AW)-312
18
137
1
156
3. MAG-22 (CHU LAI)
166
1654
6
26
1852
a. H&MS-12
41
364
405
b. MABS-12
19
519
3
22
563
c. VMA-211
29
179
2
210
d. VMA-214
24
176
1
201
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9e16202e95b81845b6f8387e8259c9a9 | https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/1965/0250 | Page 250 | Page 250
Off
Enl
Off
Enl
TOTAL
e. VMA-223
27
178
1
2
208
f. VMA-224
22
176
1
199
g. MATCU-67
4
62
66
4. MAG-16
240
1407
9
21
1677
a. H&MS-16 (DA NANG)
31
281
312
b. MABS-16 (DA NANG)
13
441
5
6
365
c. Det MABS (PHU BAI)
12
12
d. Det MABS (QUANG NGAI)
2
2
e. DET MABS (QUANG TRI)
2
2
f. SU l, MABS-16 (DA NANG)
10
61
1
72
g. HMM-161 (PHU BAI)
50
178
1
3
232
h. HMM-263 (DA NANG)
46
175
1
3
225
i. HMM-361 (DA NANG)
51
158
1
3
213
j. VMO-2 (DA NANG)
33
136
1
5
175
k. MATCU-68 (DA NANG)
6
61
67
5. MAG-36
235
1295
8
29
1567
a. H&MS-36 (CHU LAI)
34
315
349
b. MABS-36 (CHU LAI)
14
342
4
26
386
c. HMM-362 (CHU LAI)
53
160
1
214
d. HMM-363 (QUI NHON)
54
176
2
3
235
e. HMM-364 (CHU LAI)
54
152
1
207
f. VMO-6 (CHU LAI)
26
150
176
I. Force Logistics Support Group
98
3195
32
218
3543
l. Force Logistics Support Group (DANANG)
52
1649
4
31
1736
a. H&SCo (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn
22
373
3
15
413
b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn
22
750
1
16
789
c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn
6
399
405
d. Truck Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn
2
127
129
2. Force Logistic Support Unit-1 (CHU LAI)
38
1308
19
130
1495
a. FLSU Headquarters
24
871
8
903
(l) H&SCo (Provisional)
11
197
8
216
(2) Supply Co (Provisional)
7
326
333
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)
6
348
354.
b. Shore Party Group (Provisional)
4
136
1
10
151
(l) CoC.lstSPBn
4
136
1
10
151
c. MT Group (Provisional)
10
268
4
282
(1) CoA(-),7thMTBn
3
84
2
89
(2) 2dPlt,CoC,9thMTBn
1
27
28
(3) CoC(-)lstMTBn
3
81
1
85
(4) CoC,3dMTBn
3
76
1
80
d. Co B, SdMedBn (Rein)
33
18
108
159
3. Force Logistic Support Unit-2 (PHU BAI)
8
238
9
57
312
a. FLSU Headquarters
6
190
4
200
(l) H&SCo (Provisional)
3
40
4
47
(2) Supply Pit
62
62
(3) Maint Pit
3
88
91
b.CoB,3dMTBn(-)
2
37
39
c. CoA,3dMedBn
11
9
53
73
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3f78b43d39cab6ff903fd00e3bb6a41b | https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/acae | U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964 | U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964
Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR
Chapter 1--Background to Military Assistance
Chapter 2--The Formative Years
Chapter 3--Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency
Chapter 4--An Expanding War
Chapter 5--SHUFLY at Soc Trang
Chapter 6--SHUFLY Moves North
Chapter 7--The Laotian Crisis, 1962
Chapter 8--The Marine Advisory Effort
Chapter 9--SHUFLY Operations
Chapter 10--Marines Meet the Challenge
Chapter 11--Spring and Summer Fighting
Chapter 12--Fall and Winter Operations
Chapter 13--Prelude to Escalation
NOTES
Appendix A: USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954-1964
Appendix B: Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964
Appendix C: Glossary of Acronyms
Appendix D: Chronology
Appendix E: List of Reviewers
THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA
1954-1964
Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D.C.
1977
Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051
PCN 190 003064 00
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)
Stock Number 008-055-00094-7
Foreword
This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history-the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.
The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972). Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and 26 awards of the Air Medal.
E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Reviewed and Approved:
15 September 1976
Preface
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964 is a narrative account of the initial decade of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The monograph had two immediate forerunners, both classified studies prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major James M. Tingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the first of these was entitled 'United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1954-1963.' The second, entitled 'United States Marine Corps Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,' was authored by Major Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, these studies served as important sources for the material contained in this text. Otherwise, this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records, the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the comment files of the division, and appropriate historical works. Of particular value in its compilation have been the command diaries of the various Marine organizations involved.
Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early Marine advisory program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, that portion of the text which deals with those areas has been reconstructed from interviews with various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance, however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources. Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited to submit pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.
This monograph has not been the product of a single individual's labor. A comment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons, most of whom were directly associated with the described events. (A list of these contributors appears as Appendix E.) Their remarks have been of immense value in reconstructing with accuracy the origin, nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and the preparation of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript typist for the division, performed valuable services in typing and proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul A. Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. dark, also members of the History and Museums Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts. Unless otherwise credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps files.
ROBERT H. WHITLOW Captain,
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Table of Contents Page
Foreword.............................................................. iii
Preface................................................................ v
Table of Contents...................................................... vii
PART I THE WATERSHED. ......................................... 1
Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance............................ 3
The Geographic Setting............................................. 3
The People........................................................ 6
Vietnam's Recent History........................................... 9
Post-Geneva South Vietnam......................................... 12
The American Response............................................. 14
Chapter 2 The Formative Years......................................... 15
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. ....................... 15
Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance.................................... 16
Political Stabilization and Its Effects. ................................ 18
Reorganization and Progress......................................... 20
Summing Up Developments......................................... 25
Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency............. 26
Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency............................... 26
Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps......................... 31
Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands........................ 39
American Decisions at the Close of 1961.............................. 42
Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962..................................... 44
The War's New Context............................................ 44
Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division..................... 46
The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962.................................. 49
Some Conclusions.................................................. 53
PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR...................... 55
Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang....................................... 57
The Decision....................................................... 57
Deployment to Soc Trang........................................... 59
Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations............................ 65
Preparations and Redeployment...................................... 73
Accomplishments.................................................. 74
Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North. ..................................... 75
Arrival at Da Nang................................................. 75
I Corps Tactical Zone............................................... 76
Military Situation, September 1962................................... 79
Initial Helicopter Operations........................................ 80
Marine People-to-People Program.................................... 85
SHUFLY Operations in I Corps...................................... 85
vii
Vlll CONTE!
Page
Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962..................................... 86
Genesis of the Problem. . .......................................... 86
The American Response............................................. 88
The Marine Corps Role............................................. 88
Marine Participation: A Summary..... .............................. 94
PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963........................ 97
Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort.................................. 99
The Political Climate............................................... 99
The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations........................ 100
Accomplishments................................................... 110
Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations......................................... Ill
Development of the Compound Continues............................ Ill
Combat Support Operations......................................... 113
The Situation in Vietnam........................................... 121
PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR. 1964...................... 125
Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge................................. 127
New American Decisions............................................ 127
A Restructured Military Assistance Command......................... 130
Changes in Marine Leadership....................................... 130
Redesignation and Reorganization................................... 131
The Vietnamese Marine Brigade..................................... 132
Additional Marine Activities........................................ 138
Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting................................ 144
The Monsoons..................................................... 144
The Weather Breaks................................................ 148
Sure Wind 202..................................................... 152
Operations Elsewhere in I Corps..................................... 154
Changing the Watch............................................... 156
Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations.................................. 157
Dry Weather Fighting.............................................. 157
Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations................................ 159
Changes and Improvements.......................................... 162
Action as the Year Ends............................................ 164
Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation....................................... 166
NOTES. .............................................................. 169
APPENDICES......................................................... 175
A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954-1964...................... 175
B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964. .................... 176
C. Glossary of Acronyms........................................... 178
D. Chronology..................................................... 179
E. List of Reviewers............................................... 182
INDEX. .............................................................. 184
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Douay, and said how he would have reason of Gaunt. And anon after the death of John Lyon all they of Gaunt advised how they could not be long without captains. Then they ordained of the aldermen of the crafts and of the cinquanteniers of the ports' four of them according to their advice, most hardy and cruel persons of all other. First they chose John Pruniaux, John Boele, Ralph de Herselle and Peter du Bois,2 and all the other people sware to maintain and obey them as their captains, on pain of their heads that did the contrary, and the captains sware again to keep and maintain the honour and franchises of the town. These four captains stirred them of Gaunt to go to Ypres and to [the] Franc, to have obeisance of them or else to slay them all. So these captains and their people departed from Gaunt in good array they were a twelve thousand clean armed, and so came to Courtray. They of Courtray suffered them to enter into their town without danger, for it pertained to the franchise of Gaunt, and there took their ease two days and the third day departed and went to Ypres, and took with them two hundred 3 men of arms with the cross-bows of Courtray, and so took the way to Thourout. And when they came there, they rested and took counsel, and advised to send thither a three or four thousand of their men and the captain of the white hats with them, to treat with them of Ypres, and the great battle to follow after to comfort them, if need required. As it was ordained, so it was done, and so came to Ypres : and when they of Ypres, and especially they of the mean crafts, knew the coming of them of Gaunt, they armed them and took the market-place, and they were a five thousand: so there the rich men of the town had no puissance. The knights that were there in garrison, set by the earl, went ordinately to the gate of Thourout, whereas the Gauntois were without, desiring to have free entry : the knights and squires were ready ranged before the gate and shewed good defence, nor indeed the Gauntois had never entered without great damage, but that the ancient crafts of the town against the knights' 1 The better reading is ' paroches,' ' parishes.'
2 The true name is Van den Bossche.
3 A better reading is 'twelve hundred.'
will would that the Gauntois should enter.' The men of the town went out of the market-place and so came to the gate, the which the knights kept, and said ` Sirs, open the gate : let our friends and neighbours of Gaunt enter : we will they shall enter into our town.' The knights answered that they should not enter, and said how they were stablished there by the earl of Flanders to keep the town, the which they would do to the best of their powers, saying how it lay not in the puissance of Gaunt to enter there. Insomuch that words multiplied in such wise between the gentlemen and them of the town, that at last they cried : ` Slay and beat down them : they shall not be masters of our town.' There was a sore scrimmish and long endured in the streets. The knights were not of sufficient force to resist against them of the town, so that there were five knights slain, whereof two were sir Roubaix and sir Hovard de la Hovarderie, the which was great damage, and there was in great danger sir Henry d'Antoing. With much pain some of the rich men of the town saved him and divers other : but the gate was set open and the Gauntois entered and were lords and masters of the town without damage of any hurt.' And when they had been there two days and taken surety of them of the town, who sware in like manner and form as they of Bruges, of Courtray, of Grammont and of Damme had done, and delivered hostages for the same intent, then they departed right courteously and so went again to Gaunt.
CHAPTERS CCCLIII-CCCLV
SUMMARY.-The men of Ghent with those of Bruges, Ypres and other towns besieged Oudenarde in great force, and also sent a body of men to Termonde, where the earl was, and attacked it both by land and water. Being unable to take it, these retired to Oudenarde, where the siege continued
2 'Without doing any damage in it.'
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eaae45e5dff39efc951c06d50d31cc59 | https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0003 | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0003 Chapter I. OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C. | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0003 Chapter I. OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C.
[Telegram.]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Adjutant-General's Office, December 27, 1860.
Major ANDERSON, Fort Moultrie:
Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. Explain the meaning of this report.
J. B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.
[Telegram.]
CHARLESTON, December 27, 1860.
Honorable J. B. FLYD, Secretary of War:
The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns from being used against us.
If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight.
ROBERT ANDERSON,
Major, First Artillery.
Numbers 12.] FORT SUMTER, S. C., December 27, 1860.
(Received A. G. O., December 31.)
COLONEL: I had the honor to reply this afternoon to the telegram of the honorable Secretary of War in reference to the abandonment of Fort Moultrie. In addition to the reasons given in my telegram and in my letter of last night, I will add as my opinion that many things convinced me that the authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act. Under this impression I could not hesitate that it was my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we could not probably have held longer than forty-eight or sixty hours, to this one, where my power of resistance is increased to a very great degree. The governor of this State sent down one of his aides to-day and demanded, "courteously, but peremptorily," that I should return my command to Fort Moultrie. I replied that I could not and would not do so. He stated that when the governor came into office he found that there was an understanding between his predecessor and the President that no re-enforcements were to be sent to any of these forts, and particularly to this one, and that I had violated this agreement by having re-enforced this fort. I remarked that I had not re-enforced this command, but that I had merely transferred my garrison from one fort to another, and that, as the commander of this harbor, I had a right to move my men into any fort I deemed proper. I told him that the removal was made on my own responsibility, and that I did it because we were in a position that we could not defend, and also under the firm belief that it was the best means of preventing bloodshed. This afternoon an armed steamer, one of two which have been watching these two forts, between which they have been passing to and fro or anchored for the last ten nights, took possession by escalate of Castle Pinckney. Lieutenant Meade made no resistance. He is with us to-night. They also
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f2a9e501ca395cbcbf5477280fb308b3 | https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0005 | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0005 Chapter I. OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C. | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0005 Chapter I. OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C.
reduced towards the end of the investment to thirty-five, were made very effective in preparing for a vigorous defense.
The armament of the fort was mounted and supplied with maneuvering implements; machicoulis galleries, splinter-proof shelters, and traverses were constructed; the openings left for the embrasures of the second tier were filled with brick and stone and earth, and those in the gorge with stone and iron and lead concrete; mines were established in the wharf and along the gorge; the parade was cleared, and communications opened to all parts of the fort and through the quarters.
The fort was bombarded on the 12th and 13th of April by the rebels, and evacuated by Major Anderson's command on the 14th of April. During the bombardment, the officers' quarters were set on fire by hot shot from the rebel batteries, and they, with the roofs of the barracks, were entirely consumed. The magazines were uninjured by the fire. The bombardment dismounted one gun, disabled two others, and ruined the stair towers and the masonry walls projecting above the parapet. No breach was effected in the walls, and the greatest penetration made by successive shots was twenty-two inches. Nearly all the material that had been obtained to construct the embrasures of the second tier, to flag this tier and the remainder of the first tier, and to finish the barracks, was used up in the preparations for defense.
Fort Moultrie, Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.-The work of preparing this fort for a vigorous defense commenced in August, 1860, and was diligently prosecuted up the day of its evacuation, December 26, 1860. In this time the large accumulation of sand, which overtopped the scarp wall on the sea front, was removed to the front and formed into a glaciis; a wet ditch, fifteen feet wide, dug around the fort; two flanking caponieres of brick built, to flank with their fire the three water fronts; a bastioned for musketry constructed at the northwest angle; a picket fence built around the fort, bordering the ditch, and protected by a small glacis; merlons constructed on the whole of the east front; communication opened through the quarters, a bridge built, connecting them with the guard-house, and the latter looppholed for musketry, so as to serve for a citadel.
Means were also furnished to transport Major Anderson's command, and such public property as could be removed before the occupation of Fort Moultrie by the rebels, to Fort Sumter. Before evacuating the fort, the guns were spiked, the gun carriages on the front looking towards Fort Sumter burned, and the flagstaff cut down. A considerable quantity of Engineer implements and materials were unavoidably left in the fort.
Respectfully submitted.
J. G. FOSTER,
Captain, Engineers.
Numbers 3. Reports of and correspondence with Ordnance Storekeeper F. C. Humphreys, U. S. Army, in reference to seizure of Charleston Arsenal.
CHARLESTON, December 28, 1860.
Captain WM. MAYNADIER,
Ordnance Bureau:
A body of South Carolina military now surround the arsenal, outside, however, of the inclosure, but denying ingress or egress without
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b6324009ddc37b6aee82c7ec590b5956 | https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0062 | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0062 OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C. Chapter I. | War of the Rebellion: Serial 001 Page 0062 OPERATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C. Chapter I.
HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL FORCES, C. S. ARMY,
Charleston, S. C., April 15, 1861.
SIR: We have the honor to submit the following report of our visit to Fort Sumter on the 13th instant for the information of the brigadier-general commanding:
After reporting to the general the execution of the orders with which we were charged for Morris Island, and in company with Colonel Wigfall reporting the surrender of Fort Sumter, and also its dangerous condition from the fire occasioned by the hot shot from Fort Moultrie, we proceeded, by order of the brigadier-general commanding, immediately to Southern Warf, where we embarked on board the steamer Osiris for Fort Sumter, accompanied by the chief of the city fire department, Mr. Nathan, with a fire engine and its company. On our arrival at Fort Sumter we were met by Dr. Crawford, surgeon of the fort, who directed us to avoid the wharf, as it was in danger of blowing up at any moment from its mines. The doctor conducted us into the presence of Major Anderson, on the opposite side of the fort from the wharf, we entering the fort through an embrasure. We found the barracks totally destroyed by fire, occasioned by our shells and hot shot. We stated to Major Anderson that we had been sent to Fort Sumter by General Beauregard with a fire engine, to offer assistance to extinguish his fire and to render any other assistance he might require, and also Surgeon-General Gibbes, of South Carolina, and assistants were present to administer to any wounded he might have. The major replied that he thanked the general for his kindness, but hat this fire was almost burned out, and that he had but one man wounded, and he not seriously. We asked him if the magazine was safe. He replied he thought the lower magazine safe, though it was amid the burning ruins, and that he had thrown about one hundred barrels of powder into the water from the upper magazine during the action, for the safety of his command. We again asked him if he did not think it best to use the engine which accompanied us on he steamer, which lay out in the stream. He replied no-that he thought everything had been consumed that would burn.
Major Anderson expressed great satisfaction when we told him that we had no casualties on our side, and again asked us to thank General Beauregard for his kindness; and, on leaving, the major accompanied us himself as far as our small boat. We returned to the city and reported the result of our visit to General Beauregard 7 p. m.
All of which is submitted for the information of the brigadier-general commanding.
JAMES CHESTNUT, JR.,
JOHN L. MANNING,
Aide-de-Camp.
A. R. CHISOLM,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
Major D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant-General Provisional Forces, C. S. A.
HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL, C. S. A.,
Charleston, S. C., April 15, 1861.
MAJOR: On friday, April 12, we received orders from General Beauregard to carry dispatches to General Dunovant, commanding on Sullivan's Island. We were directed to communicate the purport of the dispatches, which were open, to Captain Martin, in command of the floating battery and the Dahlgren-bun battery; to Captain Hallonquist,
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in command of the enfilade battery and a masked mortar battery near the same spot; and to Colonel Ripley, in command of fort Moultrie-all of them posts on Sullivan's Island. We set out on our mission at 9 o'clock a. m. and proceeded in a boat to Mount Pleasant. After communicating with Captain Martin we reweld over to and landed on the floating Iron battery. We found Lieutenant yates actively engaged in returning the fire from Fort Sumter, which was then specially directed against his battery. The latter had been repeatedly hit, but had successfully resisted all the shot (32-pounders) which had struck it, with the exception of one, which had passed through the narrow, angular slope just below the roof.
After spending some time in this battery we proceed to the Dahlgren-gun battery, where Captain Hamilton was commanding in person. Both the floating battery and the Dahlgren gun were directing their special attention to the dismounting of such of the guns en barbette upon Fort Sumter as the batteries could be brought to bear upon. The fire from both batteries was effective and well sustained. We next visited Captain Hallonquist's enfilanding battery, which was doing some admirable shooting. After remaining here a short time we proceeded to Captain Hallonquist's mortar battery, and from thence to Fort Moultrie. Here we found an active, regular, well-sustained, and well-directed firing going on, which was being most vigorously returned by Fort Sumter. The quarters were pretty well ridden, and the finance for hot shot twice struck, but not materially inured.
After carefully watching the firing for some time we visited Captain Butler's mortar battery, where we found General Dunovant and delivered our dispatches. We then returned to Fort Moultrie, and after spending about na hour there proceeded back to the convey, where our boat was awaiting us, and touching at the floating battery for a communication for headquarters we rowed over once more to Mount Pleasant, for the purpose of delivering a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley (by request) to Captain Martin. We then returned to the city, which we reached about half-past 4 p. m. and immediately reported verbally at headquarters to the brigadier-general commanding.
We cannot conclude our report without expressing the extreme pleasure and gratification which we felt at the coolness, spirit, skill, and alacrity which we witnessed at all points among the officers and men.
Very respectfully,
WM. PORCHER MILES,
JOHN L. MANNING,
Aides to Brigadier-General Beauregard.
Major D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Provisional Forces, C. S. A.
HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL ARMY, C. S. A.,
Charleston, April 15, 1861.
SIR: We have the honor to submit the following report of our visit to Fort Sumter on the 13th instant:
Informed about 1 o'clock that no flag was waving over Fort Sumter, General Beauregard detached us immediately to proceeded to the fort and say to Major Anderson that his flag going down and his quarters in flames we were sent to inquire if he needed any assistance. When about half-way from the city to Fort Sumter we observed that the United States flag had been raised again. At once we determined to go back to the city, but had not proceeded far in return when, discovering a white flag floating form the ramparts of Sumter, we again directed
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the fleet. Major Anderson requested us to take Lieutenant Snyder down to the fleet for the purpose of arranging the matter. This Captain Hartstene undertook to do.
We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,
D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WM PORCHER MILES,
R. A. PRYOR,
H. J. HARTSTENE, C. S. N.,
Aides-de-Camp.
Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,
Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A.
Numbers 27. Medical report of Surg. General R. W. Gibbes, South Carolina Army.
HEADQUARTERS SURGEON-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT,
Charleston, April 16, 1861.
SIR: From the returns received from the various posts I have the unexampled and happy privilege of stating that no serious casualty has occurred during the vigorous action of thirty-three hours, in reducing Fort Sumter. Four trifling contusions are reported at Fort Moultrie, but none at other posts, and it is a subject of equal gratification that even in the management of heavy ordnance by new recruits and unpracticed volunteers no accident to life or limb has occurred.
Immediately upon the flag of Fort Sumter being struck I proceeded to that fortress to tender my assistance and hospital at Mount Pleasant to Major Anderson, and received from his the pleasing intelligence that only four cases of slight injuries had resulted to his men. On Sunday a sad casualty occurred in saluting hi flag, when the explosion of some loose cartridges beneath a gun struck down seven men. One was instantly killed, and another so seriously wounded that he died soon after reaching my hospital in Charleston; one remaining in the hospital, doing well under the care of Prof. G. G. Chisolm, of the medical college of the State, and four were removed with the garrison. The precipitation suddenly of several regiments upon me during the past few days, totally without any preparation of their surgeons, has required a large supply of medicines, instruments, hospital stores, &c., but I am happy to say they have received promptly all their requisitions.
Respectfully,
R. W. GIBBES, M. D.,
Surgeon-General South Carolina Army.
Adjutant-General JONES.
Numbers 28. Report of Commander H. J. Hartstene, C. S. Navy, concerning the transportation of Major Anderson and his command from Fort Sumter to the U. S. fleet off Charleston Bar.
HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL FORCES, C. S. A.,
Charleston, S. C., April 16, 1861.
MAJOR: On the afternoon of the 13th instant, shortly after the surrender of Fort Sumter, I was placed on board the steamer Catawba to convey to the fort, in connection with Major Jones, Captains Miles and Pryor (aides to Brigadier-General Beauregard), to arrange with Major
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ance. I mailed a copy of the governor's order, &c., this morning at Chattahoochee, but finding that it would not be forwarded on account of the excitement-they have taken all the public property in spite of all I could do-I refused giving up the keys, but the governor telegraphed to the commanding officer to insist on the delivery of the same, and I was compelled to give them up. I would be pleased to receive advice as to what disposition I shall make of myself and men.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. POWELL,
Ordnance Sergeant, U. S. Army.
Captain W. MAYNADIER,
Washington, D. C.
Numbers 2. Report of Ordnance Sergeant Henry Douglas, U. S. Army, of the seizure of Fort Marion, Saint Augustine.
SAINT AUGUSTINE, EAST FLORIDA, January 7, 1861.
SIR: I am obliged to perform what is to me a painful duty, viz, to report to the Chief of Ordnance that all the military stores at this place were seized this morning by the order of the governor of the State of Florida. A company of volunteer soldiers marched to the barracks and took possession of me, and demanded peaceable possession of the keys of the fort and magazine. I demanded them to show me their authority. An aide-de-camp of the governor showed me his letter of instructions authorizing him to seize the property, and directing him to use what force might be necessary.
Upon reflection I decided that the only alternative for me was to deliver the keys, under protest, and demand a receipt for the property. One thing certain, with the exception of the guns composing the armament of the water battery, the property seized is of no great value. The gentleman acting under the governor's instructions has promised to receipt to me for the stores.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY DOUGLAS,
Ordnance Sergeant, U. S. Army.
Colonel H. K. CRAIG,
Chief of Ordnance Department, U. S. Army.
Numbers 3. Reports of Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, First U. S. Artillery, of the transfer of his command from Barrancas Barracks to Fort Pickens, and subsequent events (to February 5, 1861) in Pensacola Harbor.
BARRANCAS BARRACKS, FLA., January 8, 1861.
SIR: There are rumors that the citizens of Florida and Alabama intend taking possession of the fortifications in this harbor. They have already taken those at Mobile and Savannah. I am stationed with one company (G, First Artillery) at Barrancas Barracks, having also Fort
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Immediately on its reception, accompanied by Lieutenant Gilman, I called on Commodore Armstrong to consult with him. He hands received orders to co-operate with me. We decided that with our limited means of defense we could hold but one fort, and that should be Fort Pickens, as it commanded completely the harbor and the forts, and also the navy-yard, and, in case of necessity, could be more readily re-enforced than either of the others, and presented the best means of defense. In order to act on this decision, the commodore premised to send the U. S. steamer Wyandotte at 1 o'clock p. m. to take us over, to give us all them men he could possibly spare, and to allow the steamer Wyandotte and the steamer Wyandotte and the store ship Supply to anchor under the guns of the fort, in order to protect the land approach.
At 10 o'clock a. m. I came with the greater part of my command, Company G, First Artillery, to Fort Pickens to mount guns and make necessary preparations for defense, leaving Lieutenant Gilman at Barrancas Barracks with the remainder to make the necessary arrangements for removal. At 1 p. m. Lieutenant Gilman, seeing no signs of the promised assistance, called to see the commodore, and was informed by him that the only assistance he could afford would be to furnish some provisions and take the command over, which fact Lieutenant Gilman reported to me at Fort Pickens. I immediately stopped all work, sent the men back, and with Lieutenant Gilman went to see the commodore. I scanted that I had been deceived by him; that he had promised me men and the co-operation of the two vessels of war, besides the mere fact of giving us provisions and taking us over; that with my command, only 46 strong, I should never dream of defending so large a work, calculated for upwards of 1,200 men; that I had been at work on that promise, and had thus lost a day's time in the preparation of Fort Barrancas for defense; that he had distinctly promised me what I asseverated. The commodore then sent for Commander Ferrand, Lieutenant Renshaw, and Lieutenant-Commander Berryman, and gave instructions for carrying out the original design.
Captain Berryman, of the steamer Wyandotte, promised to be ready to leave his wharf at 5 p. m., at which time all should bed in readiness at the Barrancas wharf for removal. I immediately returned to Barrancas Barracks to make preparations. As time was very limited all means were used to place the public property on the wharf for removal. Night came, and yet no signs of assistance. The company labored until 12 m., when a heavy fog coming in rendered it highly improbable that the steamer would come that night. At 8 a. m. on the 10th a flatboat was sent to the wharf, which was loaded, as well as all the small boats which could be had. We were landed at Fort Pickens at about 10 a. m. On the way over, Captain Berryman turned over to me thirty ordinary seamen from the yard, without arms or equipments of any kind. We labored all day until night carrying up the stores to the fort, and arranging for its defense. I directed that all the powder in Fort Barrancas should be taken out and rolled to the beach, for transportation if possible; if not, for destruction. Nearly all the powder and all the fixed ammunition for the field battery was brought over that day. All the guns bearing on the bay were spiked by my orders, in position, as I had neither means nor time to dismount them. The provisions required were, by agreement with the commodore, to be drawn from the Supply as they were wanted, instead of sending them from the yards; yet, almost the instant we landed the master of the yard came with some small stores in a barge, bringing with him an order from Commodore Armstrong to land the stores immediately and proceed to anchor off the
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battery of two brass 12-pounders, unlimbered, which were not over one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty yards from us, but the gunners had abandoned the battery. If I had not been so entirely at the mercy of the guns of the fortifications at Newport News (only about six hundred yards off), I should certainly have burned the whole encampment, for it is my firm impression the whole regiment ran into the works and abandoned everything.
Captain Philips, I must say, proved upon theirs occasion that he was a man of consummate coolness and bravery,and his men are of that kind of metal which can be relied upon under any and all circumstances. Lieutenants Cary and Harrison were prepared for anything, and I am convinced would have followed to any place where their horses could have leaped.
In making the approach I went by New market Bridge and St. Clair's Steam Mill, but upon returning I took a new road through the woods, fearing the troops from hampton had formed and ambuscade for my reception. I returned to Bethel by 6 o'clock without damage, and then joined my command on Poguosin River.
I am, sir, yours, respectfully,
W. H. WERTH,
Captain Chatham Grays, Virginia Volunteers.
Colonel J. B. MAGRUDER, Commanding Division.
JUNE 10, 1861. - Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel, or Bethel Church, Va.
REPORTS, ETC.
Numbers 1. - Major General Benjamin F. Butler, U. S. Army.
Numbers 2. -Brigadier General Ebenzer W. Pierce, Massachusetts Militia.
Numbers 3. -Colonel Frederick Townsend, Third New York Infantry.
Numbers 4. -Colonel John E. Bendinx, Seventh New York Infantry.
Numbers 5. -Captain Judson Kilpatrick, Fifth New York Infantry.
Numbers 6. -Letter from Confederate Secretary of War transmitting reports.
Numbers 7. -Colonel Jond B. Magruder, C. S. Army.
Numbers 8. -Colonel D. H. Hill, First North Carolina Infantry.
Numbers 9. -Lieutenant Colonel William D. Stuart, Third Virginia Infantry.
Numbers 10.-Major George W. Randolph, Howitzer Battalion, C. S. Army.
Numbers 11.-Major E. B. Montague, Virginia Battalion.
Numbers 12.-Captain W. H. Werth, Chatham Grays, Virginia Cavalry.
Numbers 1. Reports of Major General B. F. Butler, U. S. Army.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Fortress Monroe, June 10, 1861.
GENERAL: Having learned that the enemy had established an outpost of some strength at a place called Little Bethel, a small church about eight miles from Newport News, and the same distance from Hampton, from whence they were accustomed nightly to advance both on Newport New and the picket guards of Hampton, to annoy them, and also from whence they had come down in small squads of cavalry and taken a number of Union men, some of whom had the safeguard
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move up towards Charlestown and effect a junction in that direction. As soon as provisions arrive he will advance to Winchester, if the foe have not evacuated that place. At present only small parties are known to be in our vicinity, hovering about to pick up stragglers and careless pickets.
If you have information which, in your judgment, renders the movement directed above injudicious or hazardous, you are desired to communicate your information and act upon it till you hear from him again. When the force in front is scattered he designs moving east towards Leesburg. He wishes you to be cautious in all your movements, that no check to the execution of your plans may result.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. J. PORTER, A. A. G.
Colonel CHARLES P. STONE,
Commanding Rockville Expedition, en route to Martinsburg, Va.
I am informed the enemy, 15,000 strong, are in front, this side of Winchester, Joe Johnston commanding.
POINT OF ROCKS, July 6, 1861.
COLONEL: I have written by mail, but do not altogether trust the post-office here. New York Ninth, Pennsylvania Twenty-fifth, and Pennsylvania First are on their way to General Patterson. New Hampshire First will move from Sandy Hook this afternoon, when the wagon train reaches there. I expect to be in Williamsport to-night or to-morrow morning. Have left much of the baggage, &c., to march light; have to leave one company to guard at Sandy Hook and two companies here. I respectfully urge a re-enforcement to these companies before it is known generally on the other side that they are so few in numbers here.
Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,
CHAS. P. STONE,
Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.
Lieutenant Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.
POINT OF ROCKS, July 6, 1861.
COLONEL: I have come down here on the locomotive to take a look at the rear before moving on myself. I started off this morning toward General Patterson the Pennsylvania Twenty-fifth, the New York Ninth, and Pennsylvania First Artillery, less one company, left to guard baggage. I have to leave two companies here to guard baggage and look out for the railroad, so that the communication may not be cut off with the baggage and provisions above. It was necessary to lighten the wagons much to make a quick march.
I regard it of great importance to re-enforce those small guard, and would respectfully recommend that a regiment be sent to Sandy Hook. Two wounded and a few sick men have to be left there.
The New Hampshire regiment's train will overtake it this evening, and it (now opposite Harper's Ferry) will push on to be at Williamsport to-morrow morning. I shall get there (Williamsport) to-night or early in the morning.
Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,
CHAS. P. STONE,
Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.
Lieutenant-Colonel TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.
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Numbers 3. Report of Lieutenant Becker, Eighth Battalion D. C. Militia, of skirmish at Great Falls, Md.
HEADQUARTERS 8TH BATTALION D. C. VOLS.,
(Received July 7, 1861, from Chain Bridge.)
Have been fighting all day; fighting when I left at 7 o'clock this p.m. One man killed on our side. We want re-enforcements. Are not strong enough to hold our position. We want a surgeon. Please answer.
BECKER, Adjutant Eighth Battalion.
General MANSFIELD.
JUNE 13, 1861.- Descent of Union Troops on Romney, W. Va.
Report of Colonel Lew. Wallace, Eleventh Indiana Infantry.
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH REGIMENT INDIANA,
Camp McGinnis, June 14, 1861.
DEAR SIR: Having been notified that several hundred rebel troops were quartered at Romney, Hampshire County, Virginia, drilling there, impressing Union men, and in other ways oppressing loyal citizens, I determined to disperse them, if possible. For that purpose I left Cumberland at 10 o'clock on the night of the 12th instant, with eight companies, in all about five hundred men, and by railway went to New Creek Station, twenty-one miles distant.
A little after 4 o'clock I started my men across the mountains, twenty-three miles off, intending to reach the town by 6 o'clock in the morning. The road was very fatiguing and rough, leading along high bluffs, and narrow passes, which required great caution in passing, so much so, indeed, that with the utmost industry I did not get near Romney until about 8 o'clock. In a pass a mile and a half this side the town my dashed ahead and alarmed the rebels. In fact, I afterwards learned that they had notice of my coming full an hour before my arrival.
In approaching the place it was necessary for me to cross a bridge over the South Branch of the Potomac. A reconnaissance satisfied me that the passage of the bridge would be the chief obstacle in my way, although I could distinctly see the enemy drawn up on the bluff, which is the town site, supporting a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep the road completely. I directed my advance guard to cross the bridge on the run, leap down an embankment at the farther entrance, and observe the windows of a large brick house not farther off than seventy-five yards. Their appearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fire opened from the house, which the guard returned, with no other loss than the wounding of a sergeant. The firing continued several minutes. I led a second company across the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them into a position that soon drove the enemy from the house and into a mountain to its rear.
My attention was then turned to the battery on the hill. Instead of following the road, as the rebels expected, I pushed five companies in skirmishing order, and at double-quick time, up a hill to the right, intending to get around the left flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. Hardly had my companies deployed and started forward, and got within rifle range, before the rebels limbered up and put off over
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dislodging the rebel forces from their entrenched position at camp Garnett, on Rich Mountain.
After the armed reconnaissance was over, by direction of the major-general I ordered the Eighth Indiana to bivouac in advance of the camp at Roaring Creek, and the Tenth and Thirteenth into camp. About 10 p. m. I came to the headquarters with a plan for turning the enemy's position. The general having considered it, and heard the information on which it was based, was pleased to direct me to carry it out, and for that purpose ordered Colonel Sullivan, of the Thirteenth Indiana, and Burdsal's cavalry, temporarily attached to the brigade, and that the movement should begin at daylight of the next morning. The troops were ordered to parade in silence, under arms, without knapsacks, with one day's rations in their haversacks, and their canteens filled with water. By inadvertence, the assembly was sounded in the Nineteenth Ohio Regiment, and lights put in several tents. When I discovered it, they were promptly extinguished. The pickets relieved, the regimental camps and guards, with the sick and a few men of each company remaining, orders were given that the reveille should be beaten at the usual hour, and the column formed and moved forward in the following order and strength:
1. Eighth Indiana, under Benton........................242 strong.
2. Tenth Indiana, under Manson.........................425 "
3. Thirteenth Indiana, under Sullivan..................650 "
4. Nineteenth Ohio, under Beatty.......................525 "
Total infantry....................................1,842
5. Burdsal's cavalry....................................75
Aggregate.........................................1,917
Colonel Lander, accompanied by the guide, led the way through a pathless forest, over rocks and ravines, keeping far down on the south-eastern declivities of the mountain spurs, and using no ax, to avoid discovery by the enemy, whom we supposed would be on the alert, by reason of the appearance of unusual stir in our camp, and the lateness of the hour. A rain set in about 6 a. m. and lasted until about 11 o'clock a. m. with intermissions, during which the column pushed cautiously and steadily forward, and arrived at last and halted in rear of the crest on the top of Rich Mountain. Hungry, and weary with an eight hours' march over a most unkindly road, they laid down to rest, while Colonel Lander and the general examined the country. It was found that the guide was too much scared to be with us longer, and we had another valley to cross, another hill to climb, another descent beyond that to make, before we could reach the Beverly road at the top of the mountain. On this road we started at 2 o'clock, and reached the top of the mountain, after head of the column, in rectifying which the Tenth Indiana took the advance.
Shortly after passing over the crest of the hill, the head of the column, ordered to be covered by a company deployed as skirmishers, was fired on by the enemy's pickets, killing Sergeant James A. Taggart and dangerously wounding Captain Christopher Miller, of the Tenth.
The column then advanced through dense brushwood, emerging into rather more open brush-wood and trees, when the rebels opened a fire of both musketry and 6-pounders, firing some case shot and a few shells. The Tenth advanced and took position at A, Plan Numbers 1,* with one
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* The "plans" refereed to in this report are not found.
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company deployed as skirmishers covering its front. The Eighth advanced, and halted in column of fours at B. The Thirteenth advanced to C, in an old road, where it was ordered to occupy the heights with three companies at d d d, and skirmish down the hill, keeping strong reserves on the top. Three companies were ordered back to E, to cover the debouche up the valley on the left. The companies of the remainder were to fill the space in the line marked # # #, the remaining two companies standing in column at t. The nineteenth Ohio came down the road and halted in column at h.
owing to misunderstanding orders, Colonel Sullivan occupied the hill with his whole regiment, and it took forty minutes to correct the error and get into the proper position, as indicated. The command " Forward " was then given, and another company from the right of the Tenth deployed as skirmishers, leaving an interval through which the Eighth could pass in column and charge the rebel battery on the left of their position at Z as soon as our fire had told properly. At the same time Colonel Sullivan was to take his four companies and charge around the road on the left.
After an advance of fifty yards and some heavy firing from our line, the enemy showed sings of yielding, and I gave orders to the Eighth, and sent them to the colonel of the Thirteenth, to charge in column. The Eighth made a mistake and got into line at B, where, in consideration of their abundant supplies of ammunition, I left them. The Thirteenth went into column at D, Plan 2. Seven companies of the Nineteenth Ohio deployed into line at H, and delivered two splendid volleys, when the enemy broke. Meanville I rode round to the Thirteenth, and drove them into charge up across the road, as shown at I. the tenth charged by fours at J. The Eighth came down and carded upon the rebel front at K.
The battle was over, the enemy dispersed; one piece of cannon taken at A, another at B, and their dead and wounded scattered over the hillside.
Learning from a captive that the forty-fourth Virginia and some Georgia troops and cavalry were below, and finding it too late to continue the operations against the rebels' position that evening with troops as much exhausted as were ours, and threatened, too, succors, the troops were bivouacked in the position shown on Plan Numbers 2, Lieutenant-Colonel Hollingsworth going down on the ridge with six companies to the position mentioned within half a mile of the rebel pickets.
The two brass 6-pounder s captured were put in order, and, under command of Captain Konkle, Nineteenth Ohio, placed, one looking down the Beverly road at C, the other at D, looking towards Camp Garnett. During that rainy night our men bivouacked cheerfully, and turned out with great promptitude whenever the rebels by their movements alarmed our pickets.
About 3 o'clock in the morning of the 12th our pickets brought in a prisoner from the rebel camp, from whom I learned their forces were disorganized and probably dispersing. This determined the disposition for the attack on the camp. I ordered Colonel Beatty, with all the Nineteenth, to proceed along the bridge and take their position on the south side of the road, and directed Burnsal's cavalry, accompanied by one company of the Tenth Indiana, to reconnoiter down the road. Colonel Sullivan, with the Thirteenth, was to follow the movement promptly, and by his skirmishers to clear the hillside north of the road.
These orders were obeyed, and, finding the position abandoned, Burdsal's cavalry and Company C, Tenth Indiana Regiment, entered the camp about 6 o'clock a. m., where they found and took prisoners
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the river, and then retreat behind the Twenty-third Virginia Regiment, which was ordered to take position and defend the train until the Georgia troops had formed again in some defensible position.
By the time the Georgians had crossed the river, and before some of the companies of that regiment who were thrown out to ambuscade the enemy could be brought over, the enemy appeared in sight of our troops, and immediately commenced firing upon them. This was briskly returned by the Georgia regiment, who after some rounds retired, in obedience to the orders received. The Twenty-third Virginia retired, in obedience to the orders received. The Twenty-third Virginia and the artillery were halted about three-quarters of a mile below the crossing, and were ordered to occupy a hill commanding the valley through which the enemy would have to approach an a wood which commanded the road. This position they held until the Georgia regiment was formed some distance in advance; then the former command retired and again reformed in advance of the Georgians. This system of retiring upon eligible positions of defense admirably selected by Captain Corley, adjutant-general to General Garnett, was pursued without loss on either side, a few random shots only reaching us, until we reached Carrick's Ford, three and a half miles from Kaler's. This is a deep ford, rendered deeper than usual by the rains, and here some of the wagons became stalled in the river and had to be abandoned.
The enemy were now close upon the rear, which consisted of the Twenty-third Regiment and the artillery; and as soon as this command had crossed Captain Corley ordered me to occupy the high bank on the right of the ford with my regiment and the artillery. On the right this position was protected by a fence, on the left only by low bushes, but the hill commanded the ford and the approach to it by the road, and was admirably selected for defense. In a few minutes the skirmishers of the enemy were seen running along the opposite bank, which was low and skirted by a few trees, and were at first taken for the Georgians, who were known to have been cut off; but we were soon undeceived, and a hearty cheer of President Davis having been given by Lieutenant Washington, C. S. Army, reiterated with a simultaneous shout by the whole command, we opened upon the enemy. The enemy replied to us with a heavy fire from their infantry and artillery. We could discover that a large force was brought up to attack us, but our continued and well-directed fire kept them from crossing the river, and twice we succeeded in driving them back some distance from the ford. They again, however, came up with a heavy force and renewed the fight. The fire of their artillery was entirely ineffective, although their shot and shell were thrown very rapidly; but they all flew over our heads without any damage, except bringing the limbs of trees down upon us. The working of our three guns under Lieutenants Lanier, Washington, and Brown was admirable, and the effect upon the enemy very destructive. We could witness the telling effect of almost every shot.
After continuing the fight until early every cartridge had been expended, and until the artillery had been withdrawn by General Garnett's orders, and as no part of his command was within sight our supporting distance, as far as I could discover, nor, as I afterwards ascertained, within four miles of me, I ordered the regiment to retire. I was induced, moreover, to do this, as I believed the enemy were making and effort to turn our flank, and without support it would have been impossible to have held the position, and as already nearly thirty of my men had been killed and wounded. The dead and severely wounded we had to leave upon the field, but retired in perfect order, the officers and men manifesting decided reluctance at being withdrawn. After march-
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Numbers 33. Abstract from the report of the Confederate and State forces commanded by Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, at Charleston, Va. [W. Va.], dated July 8, 1861.*
Present for
duty.
Infantry. Cavalry.
Troops. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total Aggregate
present. present.
General ....... ....... ....... ....... 12 12
staff
First 68 1,332 ....... ....... 1,422 1,483
and
Second
Kanawha
Regiments.
Kanawha 26 427 ....... ....... 453 459
Battalion
Independent 27 425 ....... ....... 508 535
companies (7)
Mounted ....... ....... 11 170 204 216
Rangers, &c.
(3
companies.)
Total 121 2,184 11 170 2,599 2,705
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*The imperfect returns of the Department of the Ohio for July, 1861, do not indicate the Union strength in West Virginia.
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Numbers 34. Abstract from return of the C. S. troops in Northwest Virginia, Brigadier General R. S. Garnett commanding, July 8, 1861.*
Present for duty.
Total
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. present.
Troops. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
Command at 178 2,666 6 131 4 92 209 3,351
Laurel
Hill
Command at 38 694 3 52 5 85 49 859
Rich
Mountain
Command at 20 311 2 58 ..... ..... 34 375
Beverly
Total 236 3,671 11 241 9 177 292 4,585
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*See note to Numbers 33.
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JULY 12, 1861.-Skirmish near Newport News, Va.
REPORTS, ETC.
Numbers 1.-Major General B. F. Butler, U. S. Army.
Numbers 2.-Lieutenant Louis Schaffner, Adjutant Seventh New York Infantry.
Numbers 3.-Lieutenant Colonel E. Kapff, Seventh New York Infantry.
Numbers 4.-Brigadier General John B. Magruder, C. S. Army.
Numbers 5.-Major John B. Hood, C. S. Army.
Numbers 6.-Congratulatory letter from General R. E. Lee, C. S. Army.
Numbers 1. Report of Major General B. F. Butler, U. S. Army.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Fortress Monroe, July 19, 1861.
SIR: It will be seen by the inclosed reports, which I have waited for in order that east knowledge might be imparted, that a party which
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await further orders from me. The officer in command of the regiment at that time, Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens [Colonel McConnell being unwell, but on the ground], immediately executed that order, and put his regiment in close column. I went to another part of the field, and on returning found this regiment deployed in line of battle, and in another position. I inquired of Colonel Stevens the reason of their position being altered. He told me that Colonel Miles had directed this movement. I asked him why. Colonel Stevens replied, "I do not know, but we have no confidence in Colonel Miles." I inquired the reason, and Colonel Stevens replied, "Because Colonel Miles is drunk." that closed thee conversation. I sent Colonel Stevens back with his regiment to form close column by division, as at first. I then reported to Captain Alexander that I had been interfered with in my disposition of the troops during the day, and I could not carry out General McDowell's orders as long as I was interfered with by a drunken man. Captain Alexander then said that General McDowell now rested the whole disposition of the troops with me, and that I must use my own judgment. I went to place another battalion in line, when I was met by Colonel Miles, who ordered me to form that regiment in another direction. I replied that I should obey no more orders that he might see fit to give me. Colonel Miles then said, "Colonel Richardson, I shall put you in arrest." I told him I never should obey his arrest, and that he never could put me in that position. Colonel Miles answered that he "did not understand this." I made no reply, and went on with the further disposition of the forces, which was done according to the inclosed diagram.*
As soon as the line of battle was well formed the enemy's cavalry made his appearance on the Centreville and Manassas road. I ordered Lieutenant Benjamin to open his rifled cannon upon them, which he did, and the cavalry disappeared after a few shots. It was now nearly dark, and the troops encamped in their present position. About 10 o'clock General McDowell informed me that a retreat was resolved upon; that the troops must be started on the road to Fairfax as soon as possible, and ordered me to move last and cover the retreat of the Army with my brigade. I told the general I would do so, and would stand by him as long as any man would. I left with my brigade at 2 o'clock a.m., after all the other regiments and batteries had retired. On reaching Fairfax I found it abandoned by our troops, and I covered the rear, bringing up my brigade in good order, the New York regiment in front, then the Massachusetts regiment, the two Michigan regiments in rear of the whole. Arrived at Arlington at 2 o'clock p.m. on Monday after the action.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
I. B. RICHARDSON,
Colonel, Commanding Fourth Brigade.
My brigade in general behaved itself nobly, and always stood firm. Of my staff, Mr. Eastman, first lieutenant, U. S. Army, did his duty to my satisfaction. Lieutenant Brightly, U. S. Army, was sick and unable to perform much duty, but did all he could. Cadet John R. Meigs, U. S. Military Academy, acted as my volunteer aide, carried my orders promptly, and a braver and more gallant young man was never in any service. I most earnestly recommend him to be appointed at once a
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*Not found.
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to the right and left, and ordered to lie down and await the approach of the enemy, who by this time were closing up in apparently overwhelming numbers. I now directed the gunners to prepare shrapnel and canister shot, and in case the enemy persisted in his advance not to lose time in sponging the pieces-for minutes were now of more value than arms-but to aim low, and pour in a rapid fire wherever the men were thickest or were seen advancing.
The enemy having by this time completed his preparations and driven in our skirmishers, now rushed forward and opened a heavy musketry fire on the battery, ;but from the shortness of range, or from aiming upwards as they ascended the ravine, their shot mostly passed over us. The command was then given to the battery to commence firing. Under the directions of Lieutenants Platt and Thompson, Second Artillery, and Edwards, Third Artillery, commanding sections, the most rapid, well-sustained, and destructive fire I have ever witnessed was now opened. The men took full advantage of the permission to omit sponging, yet no accident occurred from it. The guns were all of large caliber [two 20-pounder Parrott rifle guns and four light 12-pounders], and they swept the field with a perfect storm of canister. No troops could stand it, and the enemy broke and fled in every direction, taking refuge in the woods and ravines; and in less than fifteen minutes not a living man could be seen on the ground which so recently had swarmed with them. The infantry regiments had not found it necessary to fire a single shot.
Believing now there was no support on our left [original rear], I executed a flank movement, so as to bring the left of the battery close to the wood and in front of the lateral road by which it had reached the ground. This movement threw the regiment on our left into the wood, and thus secured its possession. The fire was now reopened, the rifled guns throwing shell and the others round shot, so as to sweep the woods and search the ravines into which the enemy had been driven. In a few minutes orders were given to retreat, and I sent an officer to Colonel Davies to inquire if such were his directions; that the enemy were defeated, and that they would be unable to reform. The answer returned was "to retire at once on Centreville." The pieces were limbered up, and, Lieutenant Edwards' guns leading, moved off.
Scarcely was the column fairly in the road when a scattering fire was opened on the rear, doubtless by those who, having taken refuge in the woods, observed the withdrawal of our troops. The cry to the battery to "trot" was now clamorously raised from the rear, and confusion was fast spreading, when I directed a deliberate walk should be maintained, and pushed forward myself to the place where the ambulances and wagons were standing in the main road. The teamsters had taken the alarm from the rapid firing and the cries, and a panic was rapidly growing, when my assurance of our having beaten the enemy, and that there was no necessity for hurry, together with the appearance of the head of the battery emerging at a walk from the wood, reassured them and calmed the excitement.
The whole column now retired in good order, and was formed, together with all the disposable field artillery, in front of Centreville, under the immediate direction of General McDowell in person, and in so imposing an attitude as to deter the enemy from any advance in that direction, and to hold him completely in check.
During the night the troops were put in motion for their former camps on the Potomac. Barry's battery, under Lieutenant Tidball, and my own were the last we could perceive on the ground. Just as I was
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leaving I received aa message from Colonel Richardson, stating that his brigade was drawn up in column on the road, and that he wished me to pass him with the battery, but to remain near him, and that we would constitute the rear guard. This was accordingly done, but a mass of stragglers collected around the guns, and could not be prevailed upon to pass them or move without them. I was thus constrained to move forward until some 2,000 or 3,000 men interposed between us, when I received a message from Colonel Richardson, stating that a force of the enemy's cavalry and horse artillery was in our rear and threatening an attack. I now drew up at the side of the road-to turn back in such a crowd was impossible-and only by representing that the rear was about being attacked could I urge them forward. On Colonel Richardson's coming up, he stated that the demonstration of the enemy was very feeble, and we saw them no more. It is but just to say that the disorder and mob-like mixture of the volunteers did not appear to proceed from fear, but from sheer fatigue. They were footsore, lame, hungry, and tired, but seemed to be in good heart, and on my representing that it was important that a certain position in our advance should be occupied, some of Blenker's German and of Montgomery's New Jersey regiments formed in good order and took the position indicated. Had we been attacked by any force, I have little doubt that a stout resistance would have been made.
The officers of the battery [Lieuts. E. R. Platt and James Thompson, Second Artillery, commanding sections] performed all the duties devolving upon them with promptness, skill, and gallantry. Their labors in bringing the battery into good condition had been untiring, and to the thoroughness of the instruction they had imparted to their sections before they were dismounted in Texas is mainly attributable the efficiency with which the pieces were served on the field and the successful result of the action.
First Lieutenant Presley O. Craig, Second Artillery, on sick leave on account of a badly-sprained foot, which prevented his marching with his own company, having heard of the sickness of my second lieutenant, volunteered for the performance of the duties, and joined the battery the day before it left Washington. He was constantly and actively employed during the night preceding and on the day of the battle, and his services were very valuable. When the enemy appeared he exerted himself in perfecting the preparations to receive him, and conducted himself with the greatest gallantry when the onset was made. He fell early in the action, whilst in the active discharge of his duty, receiving a shot in the forehead, and dying in a few minutes afterwards. This was the only casualty in the battery.
Cadet John R. Meigs, of the U. S. Military Academy, being in Washington on furlough, also volunteered his services, and was employed actively from the time he joined at Washington until the close of the battle. On the death of Lieutenant Craig, Cadet Meigs performed his duties until the close of the action with spirit and intelligence, and was very useful, after the affair was over, in conveying orders, observing the enemy, and rallying our troops.
Lieutenant Edwards commanded his section with skill and efficiency, and I can indorse the favorable report he makes of his lieutenants, Benjamin and Babbitt, and of the conduct of his men.
The behavior of the men of my battery was all that could be desired. They were cool, collected, prompt, and obedient, and not an instance of misconduct or neglect occurred during the action in the whole battery.
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seventh took direction more to the left, and the Fourteenth followed upon the trail of the battery, all moving up at a double-quick step. The enemy appeared drawn up in a long line, extending along the Warenton turnpike from a house and haystacks upon our extreme right to a house beyond the left of the division. Behind that house there was a heavy masked battery, which, with three others along his line on the heights beyond, covered thee ground upon which we were advancing with all sorts of projectiles. A grove in front of his right wing afforded it shelter and protection, while the shrubbery along the road, with fences, screened somewhat his left wing. Griffin advanced to within a thousand yards, and opened a deadly and unerring fire upon his batteries, which were soon silenced or driven away. Our right was rapidly developed by the marines, Twenty-seventh, Fourteenth, and Eighth, with the cavalry in rear of the right, the enemy retreating with more precipitation than order as our line advanced.
The Second Brigade [Burnside's] was at this time attacking the enemy's right with, perhaps, too hasty vigor. The enemy clung to the protecting wood with great tenacity, and the Rhode Island Battery became so much endangered as to impel the commander of the Second Brigade to call for the assistance of the battalion of regulars. At this time I received the information through Captain W. D. Whipple, A. A. G., that Colonel Hunter was seriously wounded, and had directed him to report to me as commander of the division; and in reply to the urgent request of Colonel Burnside. I detached the battalion of regulars to his assistance. For an account of its operations I would respectfully beg a reference to the inclosed report of its commander, Major Sykes [No. 35].
The rebels soon came flying from the woods towards the right, and the Twenty-seventh completed their rout by charging directly upon their center in the face of a scorching fire, while the Fourteenth and Eighth moved down the turnpike to cut off the retiring foe, and to support the Twenty-seventh, which had lost its gallant colonel, but was standing the brunt of the action, with its ranks thinning in the dreadful fire. Now the resistance of the enemy's left was so obstinate that the beaten right retired in safety.
The head of Heintzelman's column at this moment appeared upon the field, and the Eleventh and Fifth Massachusetts Regiments moved forward to the support of our center, while staff officers could be seen galloping rapidly in every direction, endeavoring to rally the broken Eighth; but this laudable purpose was only partially attained, owing to the inefficiency of some of its field officers.
The Fourteenth, though it had broken, was soon rallied in rear of Griffin's battery, which soon took up a position farther to the front and right, from which his fire was delivered with such precision and rapidity as to compel the batteries of the enemy to retire in consternation far behind the brow of the hill in front. At this time my brigade occupied a line considerably in advance of that first occupied by the left wing of the enemy. The battery was pouring its withering fire into the batteries and columns of the enemy whenever they exposed themselves. The cavalry were engaged in feeling the left flank of the enemy's positions, in doing which some important captures were made-one by Sergeant Sacks, of the Second Dragoons, of a General George Steuart, of Baltimore. Our cavalry also emptied the saddles of a number of the mounted rebels.
General Tyler's division was engaged with the enemy's right. The Twenty-seventh was resting in the edge of the woods, in the center, covered by a hill, upon which lay the Eleventh and Fifth Massachusetts,
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No. 46. Report of. Colonel O. B. Willcox, First Michigan Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division.
DETROIT, MICH., September 3, 1862.
GENERAL: My brigade, the Second, of Heintzelman's division, marching in rear of Franklin's brigade, arrived at the Sudley Ford at about 12.30 p.m., July 21, 1861. The brigade now consisted of the First Michigan, Eleventh New York (Firew Zouaves), Thirty-eighth New York, and Arnold's battery. The Fourth Michigan had been left at Fairfax Station and Fairfax Court-House by the order of General McDowell. Halting for rest and water, I obeyed the general's orders to post Arnold's battery on a hill commanding the ford, with the First Michigan for support, and at 1 o'clock pushed forward with my two remaining regiments up the Sudley and Brentsville road. We marched about two miles, and came upon the left of what I supposed to have been Franklin's line, near the junction of the Warrenton and Sudley roads. The troops on our left were engaged in a desultory fire with the enemy, posted in the thicket and ravine across the Warrenton road, not far from the Robinson house. The Thirty-eighth New York was quickly formed in order of battle, and the zouaves were hastening into line, when I received an order to detach a regiment for the support of Rickett's battery (of Fraklin's brigade), posted on a hill a quarter of a mile to our right and front, near Dogan's house. I led up the zouaves for this important service, leaving the Thirty-eighth under its gallant and experienced colonel, Hobart Ward. Ricketts was soon ordered to take a new position near the Robinson house. The zouaves followed in support, and finally formed line on the right flank of the battery, with two companies in reserve.
Up to this time the enemy had fallen back, but now he formed the remains of his brigade engaged with Hunter in the morning, viz, Bee's, Barton's, and Evans', in a new line, upon Jackson's brigade of fresh troops, making altogether 6,500 infantry, 12 pieces of artillery, and Stuart's Cavalry, according to General Beauregard's report. This force was posted in the belt of woods which skirted the plateau southwardly, and lying in the angle formed in that direction, between the Warrenton and Sudley roads, about a mile from the Warrenton road, and with its left resting on the Brentsville and Sudley road.
Ricketts' battery had crossed the Sudley road from its post near Dogan's house, and was within musket-range of the woods, which stretched from that road around from his right towards his front, and forming a pocket, which almost enveloped the battery, with its support.
The enemy were first discovered by Colonel Heintzelman lining the woods in our front. He ordered up the zouaves, commanded by Colonel Farnham. The ground was slightly rising before us, and the enemy opened a heavy but not destructive fire as we reached the crest. The zouaves returned the fire, but immediately fell back, bewildered and broken. Stuart's Cavalry charged upon them from the woods on the right, but were scattered by a fire from the two reserve companies, with a loss (ascertained from the Southern papers) of twenty-nine killed and wounded. Meantime Rickett's cannoneers were being joined off. With Colonel Heintzelman's approval, and a promise of re-enforcements, I collected some one hundred zouaves, and, with Captain Downey and others of their officers, made a dash into the woods on our right, and killed, wounded, and captured about thirty of the enemy. Returning in a few minutes, I found the field cleared of both friends and foe, except
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He opened fire, which was handsomely returned. In this affair three of the Sixteenth New York Volunteers were wounded. The skirmishers report the force of the enemy greatly damaged by Greene's battery. I made no other no other attempt on this ford, my orders being on no account to get into a general engagement.
As I was again returning to Blenker's position, I received the notice to telegraph to Washington, which I found had been done by Lieutenant Mendell, topographical engineer, on my staff, and who was compelled by Illness to remain at my headquarters. It was at this time the order was received to post two brigades on the Warrenton turnpike at the bridge. I without delay sent a staff officer to order forward Davies' brigade, but whilst this officer was executing my instructions Davies sent word he wanted a reserve regiment forward - that the enemy, some 3,000, was attempting to turn his flank. The staff officer, therefore, properly suspended the giving of my order, and immediately reported the fact to me, and this caused me to advance by the one brigade (Blenker's) to the position on the Warrenton pike. Blenker's advance to that point was soon impeded by fugitives from the battle-field. When these were passing my headquarters I endeavored to rally them, but my efforts were vain.
The attack on Davies' position caused painful apprehension for the safety of the flank of the Army, and deeming if of the first importance that my division should occupy the strongest position, I sent instruction to Davies and Richardson to have their brigades fall back on Centreville. I then followed Blenker's brigade to see if it was in position, when I was informed the commanding general had passed. I then returned to Centreville, and found Davies' and Richardson's brigades arriving, and commenced placing them in position - Richardson's brigade, with Greene's battery, being placed about one-half mile in advance of Centreville heights, his line of battle facing Blackburn's Ford. In rear of Richardson's I posted two regiments behind fances as a support for the first line, and still farther in rear and on the heights I placed Hunt's and Edward's batteries, two of Davies' regiment being in reserve to support these. I then followed Blenker; found Tidball's battery in admirable position, supported by the Garibaldi Guard, Blenker, with three remaining regiments and the Fourth Pennsylvania Battery,* being in advance. Having great confidence in his judgment and troops, I returned to Centreville heights to await events, when I found all my defensive arrangements changed. Not knowing who had done this, and seeing Colonel Richardson giving different positions to my troops, I asked by what authority he was acting, when he told me he had instructions from my superior officer. I soon thereafter met the commanding general, and complained of this change. The generals' arrangements were completed, and left me without further control of the division. At the time the attack was made on Davies' flank the regiment of the brigade engaged performed their duty gallantly. The batteries of Hunt and Edwards, opening fire, did great damage to the advancing troops of the enemy, soon repulsing them. I am grieved that in this engagement a brave and accomplished young officer, Lieutenant Presley O. Craig, of the Second Regiment Artillery, and who was attached to Hunt's battery, was almost instantly killed. Several of the New York volunteers were wounded. I have not the reports relative thereto.
Blenker's brigade, whilst on the Warrenton road, was charged by cavalry, but by a prompt and skillful fire he emptied several saddles, and relieved himself from further annoyance. This summary embraces the operations of my division up to the evening of the 21st.
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*See note on p.424.
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on Thursday, July 18, I have the honor to report that during the night of the 16th of July I was informed by letters that my batteries might be required on the following day, to be distributed according to the following order:
Distribution of Major Battalion, July 15, 1861.
Second Brigade, General Ewell, in advance of Union Ford, two 12-pounder howitzers, two rifled guns; Third Brigade, General Jones, at McLean's Ford, one 6-pounder howitzer; Fourth Brigade, General Longstreet, at Blackburn's Ford, two 6-pounders; Fifth Brigade, Colonel Early, at or near Union Mills Ford, one 12-pounder howitzer, one rifled gun; position of Union Ford, one 6-pounder; total number of pieces, 11.
THOS. JORDAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Subsequently, on the morning of the 17th of July, I was instructed, through Captain Ferguson, your aide-de-camp, to send immediately, via Camp Walker to the farm house on the hill just this side of the encampment of the company then holding Union Mills Ford, the pieces of my battalion designated for the brigades of Ewell and Early and the one for the defense of said ford, and entre into communication with General Ewell and Colonel Early and await their orders. The other parts of my battalion, and my command it was ordered should take post at or near McLean's farm, and await orders. In obedience to these instructions I at once, upon receipt of the last orders, moved my whole command to the positions indicated, and reported to the officers of the brigades respectively. A battery of four guns, two 12-pounder howitzers and two rifled guns, under command of Lieutenants Rosser, Lewis, and Slocomb, were sent to Union Mills Ford, and reported to General Ewell. A section of a battery-one rifled 6-pounder and one 12-pounder howitzer-under Lieutenant Squires, commanding, and Lieutenant Richardson reported to Colonel Early near Union Mills Ford. The other parts of my battalion, 6-pounder guns and one 12-pounder howitzer, under my immediate command, took position on McLean's farm, commanding McLean's Ford, there awaiting your further orders. About 6 o'clock p.m. 17th ultimo I received from yourself in person orders to go at an early hour in the morning to Union Mills Ford with one 12-pounder howitzer in addition to the battery I had previously ordered to that position upon the road.
Whilst crossing Camp Walker I encountered Colonel Early, in command of his brigade, who communicated to me an order to exchange two rifled guns of Rosser's battery for two howitzers, one of Squires' section and one I was conducting to Union Mills Ford, which was promptly accomplished. The distribution of the batteries and command then was as follows:
Four 12-pounder howitzers, Lieutenant Rosser, Union Mills Ford; three 6-pounder rifled guns, Lieutenant Squires, with Colonel Early's brigade; two 6-pounders, under Lieutenant Whittington and Lieutenant Squires, with Colonel Early's brigade; two 6-pounders, under Lieutenant Whittington and Lieutenant Adam, at McLean's farm house; two 6-pounders, under Lieutenant Garnett, at Blackburn's Ford; two 6-pounders, under Captain Miller, at McLean's Ford.
Subsequently the two 6-pounders of Lieutenant Garnett and the two of Lieutenant Whittington were joined with the three rifled guns of Lieutenant Squires, making his command seven guns, which were all of the battalion of the Washington Artillery actually engaged in the action of the 18th ultimo. The two guns under Captain Miller, with
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In the execution to these orders the two Mississippi regiments of my brigade, while advancing to recross McLean's Ford, were exposed to a dangerous and demoralizing fire of rifle shot and shell from the enemy's batteries, placed at or near Grigsby's barn. Upon reaching my intrenchments General Ewell sent me an order he had received from General Beauregard, upon which was the following indorsement, viz:
The general says this is the only order ho has received. It implies he is to receive another. Send this to General Beauregard if you think proper.
FITZ. LEE
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Shortly after this I was requested by General Longstreet to make a demonstration in this favor on my front, followed by an order from General Beauregard, borne by Mr. Terry, 11.30 a. m., to advance upon the enemy up Rocky Run, co-operating with General Eweel on my right and General Longstreet on my left.
I recrossed the ford, my men much fatigued by the morning's march, many just convalescing from the measles, and retraced my route to the position I had occupied in the morning, and thence endeavored to communicate with General Ewell. Failing in this, I notified General Longstreet that I was advancing to the assault, and proceeded westwardly through the woods to the eastern elevation of Rocky Run Valley. My regiments were pushed forward by a flank movement through a ravine in the northeastern corner of Croson's field, with instructions to from into line after crossing the follow in the following order, viz: Colonel Jenkins, Fifth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, on the right, his right wing resting on the woods; Colonel Burt, Eighteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, supporting my artillery, protected by a company of infantry and Captain Flood's small troop of cavalry, to be posted on the brow of a hill well to the left-the only point from which it could be used at all-in order to distract the enemy's fire from my advancing lines of infantry. This arrangement of my two pieces of artillery, I regret to state, was impracticable, by a vigorous converging fire from the enemy's filed guns and an advance of his infantry before my infantry company could be thrown forward to protect the pieces, and I was compelled to withdraw them.
Colonel Jenkin's regiment advanced through a galling fire and over exceeding difficult ground across the hollow. The Mississippi regiment followed, but to the great difficulties of the ground, which were not apparent in my reconnaissance, and to the murderous shower of the shot, shell, and canister which was poured upon the brigade from a masked battery, as well as from that in front, faltered, and with the exception of Captain Fontaine's company, fell back. I rallied them in the woods to the rear at a point to which I had previously withdrawn the artillery and cavalry. While the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiments was endeavoring to from into line its right became lapped behind the left of the Fifth, upon which its fire told fatal effect. The latter regiment (the Fifth), notwithstanding the heavy fire of the enemy in front and the unfortunate fire of friends in the rear, advanced to the opposite slope, and then formed into line of battle, prepared to make the charger. Being isolated by the falling back of the supporting regiments it maintained its position for nearly three-quarters of an hour, its two right companies in the mean time thrown into the woods with well-directed volleys, driven the already retreating foe precipitately from the field. After I had dispatched three separate orders to withdraw, there being
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STATE OF MARYLAND, EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, Annapolis, April 20, 1861.
Honorable S. CAMERON:
SIR: Since I saw you in Washington last I have been in Baltimore City laboring, in conjunction with the mayor of that city, to preserve peace and order, but I regret to say with little success. Up to yesterday there appeared promise, but the outbreak came; the turbulent passions of the riotous clement prevailed; fear for safety became reality; what they had endeavored to conceal, but what was known to us, was no longer concealed, but made manifest; the rebellious element had the control of things. We were arranging and organizing forces to protect the city and preserve order, but want of organization and of arms prevented success. They had arms; they had the principal part of the organized military forces with them, and for us to have made the effort, under the circumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly element. They took possession of the armories, have the arms and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline (for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry.
With great respect, I am, your obedient servant,
THOS. H. HICKS.
WASHINGTON, April 20, 1861.
Governor HICKS:
I desire to consult with you and the mayor of Baltimore relative to preserving the peace of Maryland. Please come immediately by special train, which you can take at Baltimore; or, if necessary, one can be sent from hence. Answer forthwith.
LINCOLN.
BALTIMORE, April 20, 1861.
To Governor HICKS:
Letter from President and General Scott. No troops to pass through Baltimore, if, as a military force, they can march around. I will answer that every effort will be made to prevent parties leaving the city to molest them, but cannot guarantee against-acts of individuals not organized. Do you approve?
GEO. WM. BROWN.
ANNAPOLIS, April 20, 1861.
To the MAYOR OF BALTIMORE:
Your dispatch received. I hoped they would send no more troops through Maryland, but as we have no right to demand that, I am glad no more are to be sent through Baltimore. I know you will do all in your power to preserve the peace.
THOS. H. HICKS.
BALTIMORE, MD., April 20, 1861.
To President LINCOLN:
Every effort will be made to prevent parties leaving the city to molest
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It is "left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to the bombardment of their cities, and in the extremes necessity suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."
In the absence of the undersigned, the foregoing instructions are turned over to Brigadier General B. F. Butler, of the Massachusetts Volunteers, or other officer commanding at Annapolis, who will carry them out in a right spirit; that is, with moderation and firmness. In the case of arrested individuals notorious for their hostility to the United States, the prisoners will be safely kept and duly cared for, but not surrendered except on the order of the commander aforesaid.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Numbers 4.
Washington, April 26, 1861.
I. From the known assemblage near this city of numerous hostile bodies of troops it is evident that an attack upon it may be expected at any moment. In such an event, to meet and overwhelm the enemy, it is necessary that some plan of harmonious co-operation should be adopted on the part of all the forces, regular and volunteer, present for the defense of the capital-that is, for the defense of the Government, the peaceable inhabitants of the city, their property, the public buildings, and public archives.
II. At the first moment of an attack every regiment, battalion, squadron, and independent company will promptly assemble at its established rendezvous (in or out of the public buildings), ready for battle, and wait for orders.
III. The pickets (or advance-guards) will stand fast till driven in by overwhelming force; but it is expected that those stationed to defend bridges-having every advantage of position-will not give way till actually pushed by the bayonet. Such obstinacy on the part of pickets so stationed is absolutely necessary to give time for the troops in the rear to reach their places of rendezvous.
IV. All advance guards and pickets driven in will fall back slowly and delay the advance of the enemy as much as possible before repairing to their proper rendezvous.
V. On the happening of an attack the troops lodged in the public buildings and in the navy-yard will remain for their defense, respectively, unless specially ordered elsewhere, with the exceptions that the Seventh New York Regiment and the Massachusetts regiment will march rapidly towards the President's square for its defense, and the Rhode Island regiment (in the Department of the Interior) will make a diversion or detachment to assist in the defense of the General Post-Office building, if it be necessary.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
By command:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Informal assignments.
The following assignment was informally made before the arrival of any volunteer regiments from the North. The officers passed the night
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WASHINGTON, May 7, 1861.
Brigadier General B. F. BUTLER,
Or the Commanding Officer at Annapolis, Md.:
Send a steam propeller, armed if practicable, to Perryville, to receive Sherman's battery of light artillery and five companies of U. S. Third Infantry, supposed to be at Perryville, together with any well-equipped companies of volunteers to fill up the steamer. Land at the transportation depot of the and Ohio Railroad near Fort McHenry. Instruct the commanding officer on the Susquehanna River, Colonel Dare, to send troops provisioned to this city, and with orders that they come direct to this city. A steamer, in addition, will go from Baltimore to Perryville for the troops.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1861.
Brigadier General B. F. BUTLER, Commanding, &c., Relay House:
GENERAL: The General-in-Chief directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, and to say in reply that in regard to the arresting of persons who commit acts of hostility to the Government you are clothed with the same authority which has been conferred upon him, and he has confidence in your discreet exercise of it.
In relation to the surveillance of trains passing into Virginia, the General approves it, and only regrets the supplies contraband of war, entrenching tools included, were not detained.
An officer of Engineers has been ordered to report to you.
The General does not desire you to remain longer at the Relay House than you deem your presence there of importance.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1861.
Major-General PATTERSON, U. S. A., Commanding, &c.:
SIR: An arrangement has been made with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company by which Mr. Falls will send a steamer from Baltimore to Perryville this evening to receive troops at the latter place tomorrow morning, and bring them to Baltimore immediately to be loaded at the railroad transportation depot near Fort McHenry, and brought through that city to Washington.
The mayor and police of Baltimore will co-operate to prevent any disturbance. A transport is ordered from Annapolis to unite with the steamer in bringing troops. This or any other now at Perryville may be used. It is important that this movement be promptly executed, that the troops may arrive at Baltimore and come through by daylight. If no volunteers are at Perryville ready to come forward, send some companies to-day or to-night from Philadelphia, and if necessary to complete equipment use Frankford and Schuylkill Arsenals.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
P. S.-This is the opening of daily communication between Philadelphia and Washington for public travel, including U. S. troops.
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CIRCULAR.] HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Chambersburg, Pa., June 12, 1861.
The commanding general directs the following movements to take place on Saturday morning:
The First Brigade, Colonel Thomas commanding, will march by the Williamsport and Greencastle road, leaving Hagerstown to the left, and establish its camp near Williamsport, but far enough from the river to be free from the enemy's shot. He will hold Williamsport and protect the for artillery.
The Fourth Brigade, Colonel Miles commanding, will follow the First Brigade, and locate its camp temporarily on stream in the rear and on the right of First Brigade.
The Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Williams commanding, will take the Hagerstown turnpike and the direct road to Sharpsburg, and establish its camp near head of stream. This brigade will throw a large picket towards Sharpsburg.
The Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Wynkoop commanding, will proceed by rail to Hagerstown and march on the Frederick turnpike to vicinity of Funkstown.
The Fifth Brigade, Brigadier-General Negley commanding, will move by rail as rapidly as possible, and be established on the Hagerstown and Williamsport turnpike.
The quartermaster will provide wagon transportation in Hagerstown for this and the preceding column.
Each brigade will port its guards and sentinels so as to secure a continuous line from camp to camp, and place its pickets far enough in advance and on the flanks to secure against surprise.
Each brigade will protect the adjoining one, and in case of attack go to its assistance.
The Fifth Brigade will, in addition to being the reserve, provide the guards for the store-houses, hospitals, &c., in the vicinity of Hagerstown.
In selecting camps, the commanding officers will have a regard for defense and drill and healthy locations.
General Cadwalader will see to the location of the camp of each brigade and administration of affairs.
General Keim will see to the execution of orders in this vicinity, until the departure of his division, when he will join it in front of Hagerstown.
Immediately on arrival of a train in Hagerstown the regiments will be formed and marched through town and be located on its ground in line of battle, its pickets thrown out and guards established.
The men must be kept in camp ready at all times for instant action, and be drilled in the school of the company and regiment.
By order of Major-General Patterson:
F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1861.
General MCCLELLAN, U. S. A., Cincinnati, Ohio:
Your telegram of yesterday is received. There has been a misapprehension somewhere. The Secretary of War approves your policy of mustering Western Virginians to defend Western Virginia. Proceed in this at your discretion.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
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Reports of the enemy having returned to Harper's Ferry and had driven the occupants to this shore reached me yesterday. I immediately dispatched a strong force to take position in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and protect all parties on this side of the river, and drive back any force which may attempt to cross.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.
[Inclosure.]
HAGERSTOWN, MD., June 21, 1861.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington City:
The telegram of the General-in-Chief of yesterday was received at midnight. To carry out proposed plan I think involves a change of depot to Frederick and evacuation of Williamsport and Hagerstown. With an enemy close at had, a move suddenly, with present amount of transportation, necessitates sending a large mass of stores back to Harrisburg or their abandonment.
Maryland Heights can be secured, and Frederick also, and a strong force of infantry, some cavalry, and artillery sent via Frederick to Leesburg to sweep the enemy from that point to Alexandria. If no blow is to be struck here, and this meets the views of the General-in-Chief, I will at once commence moving, and be in position to act at the earliest practicable moment. I send a regiment to-day to Frederick at the urgent solicitation of the governor. I shall write in full by mail. Reconnaissance of heights being made. Send your telegrams via Harrisburg, Chambersburg, &c. Frederick line cannot be relied upon.
R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Hagerstown, Md., June 21, 1861.
General McCall,
Harrisburg, Pa.:
Place send the following to Colonel Wallace:
Five thousand cartridges and six thousand caps for rifle (caliber .54 inch) and eight thousand extra carps were dispatched to you on Tuesday at noon. Yesterday Jerome Closson was sent to report the condition of the country east of Cumberland. The force you specially wish is not here. The commanding general now wishers you to join this force, partly in anticipation of immediate active operations, and in part to be relieved of constant anxiety for you when it is impossible to render you relief, and leaves the route to your judgment.
F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HAGERSTOWN, MD., June 21, 1861.
Colonel SAMUEL YOHE,
First Regiment Pennsylvania Vols., near Funkstown, Md.:
COLONEL: The commanding general directs you, on arrival at Frederick, to notify Governor Hicks of the presence of yourself and regiment, prepared to aid in the execution of the laws and to maintain order. You will carefully guard against your men being induced to commit acts of violence, or in any manner taking part in redesign private wrongs,
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and discountenance and punish improper conduct on their part, so that the citizens may see that you go to protect and not to oppress.
If bodies of men, unlawfully armed,are in your vicinity, and in any manner threaten the palace of the country or the safety of the loyal in inhabitants of the State, or are arrayed with hostile intent against the Government, you will disarm them, using such a force that the issue of such a collision shall not be doubtful.
The commanding general desires you to communicate by every opportunity the state of feeling in your vicinity, and all matters and points you may deem of interest or importance. Should the deputy quartermaster-general, Colonel Crosman, call for your wagons, you will send them to him with a proper guard.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Wheeling, Va., June 21, 1861.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
SIR; Reliable information has been received at this department, from various parts of this State, that large numbers of evil-minded persons have banded together in military organizations with intent to overthrow the government of the State, and for that purpose have called to their aid like-minded persons from other States, who, in pursuance of such call, have invaded this commonwealth. They are now making war on the loyal people of the State. They are pressing citizens against their consent into their military organizations, and seizing and appropriating their property to aid in the rebellion.
I have not at my command sufficient military force to suppress this rebellion and violence. The legislature cannot be convened in time to act in the premises. It therefore becomes my duty, as governor of this commonwealth, to call on the Government of the United States for aid to suppress such rebellion and violence. I therefore earnestly request that you will furnish a military force to aid in suppressing the rebellion and to protect the good people of this commonwealth from domestic violence.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
FRANCIS H. PEIRPOINT,
Governor.
HEADQUARTERS TYLER'S BRIGADE, Camp McDowell, June 22, 1861.
To Brigadier-General McDOWELL,
Commanding Department N. E. Virginia:
GENERAL: Your intimation yesterday that we might be ordered to fall back to Ball's Cross-Roads took me so by surprise, that I went at once to your headquarters to see if there was no some mistake in the matter, and, not finding you, returned immediately back.
Since I have been in my present position I have used every possible means to connect it with our present line of operations, and also with the probable movements of the enemy, and I am satisfied that to abandon it would be the greatest mistake we could commit, and for the following reasons:
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the column exposed to attack from their advanced positions, and on getting as far to the right as Vienna, have our line exposed to interruption, for Vienna is nearer to the enemy than it is to Falls Church or the camps on the Georgetown road.
To go farther to the right could not safely be done, even by a force superior to that the enemy can bring against us. I think a glance at the map will show this. Any reverse happening to this raw force, pushed farther along, with the enemy on the flank and rear and an impassable river on the right, would be fatal. I do not think, therefore, it safe to risk anything from this position in the direction of Leesburg farther than Vienna, seven miles by the Leesburg turnpike from Falls Church, and even togo there the force should be large. Vienna could be supplied or re-enforced-
1st. By the Leesburg road from Falls Church.
2st. By the railroad from Alexandria.
3rd. By the dirt road from Ball's Cross-Roads.
The first two are liable to interruption unless strongly guarded, and the third is an indifferent road and a long one. The force, then, to go as far as Vienna should be large enough to hold the position for several hours, and should be well supplied with artillery and cavalry and strengthened by such defenses as could be readily thrown up. Vienna being held in force, and offensively, would cover the country from the Difficult Creek well towards Goose Creek from any force of the enemy operating from Manassas Junction or its dependencies, and I have never heard of there being over 500 men, mostly local troops, at Leesburg. As it would be constantly liable to be attacked by all the available force of the enemy and is only a few hours' march from him, it would be necessary to have strong reserves ready at either Falls Church or the camp of the Ohio brigade.
The force sufficient to hold Vienna cannot well be stated, because of the changes which are taking place in front of us. I do not think it prudent to go there with less than 8,000 infantry, a battery of field regular rifled artillery, with some guns in position, and six companies of cavalry, and the line from Fort Corcoran to General Tyler to be held as strong as at present, and a reserve on that line of 3,000 men; some of the force to be organized into small field brigades, as heretofore proposed, under regular colonels.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
IRVIN McDOWELL,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA, Arlington, June*-, 1861.
Lieutenant Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters of the Army:
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following plan of operations, and the composition of the force required to carry it into effect, in compliance with the verbal instructions of the General-in-Chief:
The secession forces at Manassas Junction and its dependencies are supposed to amount at this time to-
Infantry......................................... 23,000
Cavalry.......................................... 1,500
Artillery........................................ 500
25,000
*About June 24, 1861?
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BEVERLY, July 17 [1861].
Lieutenant General WINFIELD SCOTT:
Will a movement of mine on Staunton facilitate your plans?l If so, I can probably take that position. I do not know your plans of operation, but can move on Staunton if you desire.
Please reply at once.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, July 18, 1861.
General McCLELLAN,
Beverly, Va.:
Your suggestions in respect to Staunton would be admirable, like your other conceptions and acts, with support. McDowell yesterday drove the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. He will attack the entrenched camp at the Manassas Junction to-day. Beaten there, the enemy may retreat both upon Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, where Patterson is doing nothing. He will lose eighteen regiments by discharges in about a week. I may re-enforce him in that time sufficiently to enable you, with him, to bag Johnston in that valley if the latter has not been permitted to send his principal force to Beauragard. If you come to Staunton, and McDowell's victory at the Junction be complete, he may, with Patterson, give you a hand about Winchester. I will telegraph you again to-day.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 18, 1861.
Governor CURTIN,
Harrisburg, Pa.:
The Pennsylvania troops were expected to have joined the forces going into battle this week. I trust there will be no delay to prevent them sharing the honors of the expected battles this week. Hasten them forward.
SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.
GENERAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. DEP'T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,
Numbers 18.
Fairfax Court-House, July 18, 1861.
It is with the deepest mortification the general commanding finds it necessary to reiterate his orders for the preservation of the property of the inhabitant of the district occupied by the troops under his command.
Hardly had we arrived at this place when, to the horror of every right-minded person, several houses were broken open and others were in flames by the act of some of those who, it has been the boast of the loyal, came here to protect the oppressed and free the country from the domination of a hated party.
The property of this people is at the mercy of troops who we right-fully say are the most intelligent, best-educated, and most law-abiding of any that were ever under arms. But do not, therefore, the acts of yesterday cast the deeper stain upon them?
It has been claimed by some that their particular corps were not
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, July 20, 1861.
Colonel D. E. SICKLES,
Staten Island, N. Y.:
Lieutenant-General Scott desires that as many of the regiments under your command as are accepted, mustered into service, armed and ready, be without delay put en route to Harper's Ferry, and there join the army under General Patterson in the valley of the Shenandoah.*
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. DEP'T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,
Numbers 37.
Centreville, July 20, 1861.
The general commanding has learned with regret that the term of service of the Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers is about to expire. The services of this regiment have been so important, its good conduct so general, its patience under privations so constant, its state of efficiency so good, that the departure of the regiment at this time can only be considered an important loss to the Army.
Fully recognizing the right of the regiment to its discharge and payment at the time agreed upon when it was mustard into the service, and determined to carry out literally the agreement of the Government in this respect, the general commanding, nevertheless, requests the regiment to continue in service a few days longer, pledging himself that the postponement of the date of muster out of service shall not exceed two weeks. Such members of the regiment as do not accede to this request will be placed under the command of proper officers to be marched to the rear, mustered out of service, and paid as soon as possible after the expiration of their terms of service.
By command of General McDowell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. DEP'T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA, Numbers 39.
Centreville, July 20, 1861.
1. The Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, having completed the period of its enlistment, is herb honorably discharged from the service of the United States. The regiment will, under command of the lieutenant-colonel, take up the march to-morrow for Alexandria, and on its arrival at that place will report to General Runyon to be mustered out of the service.
2. Colonel Hartranft, Fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, having volunteered his services, is assigned to duty on the staff of Colonel Franklin, commanding brigade.
3. Captain Varian's battery of light artillery, attached to the Eighth Regiment New York State Militia, having completed the period of its enlistment, is honorably discharged from the service of the Union States, and will march to Alexandria and report to General Runyon to be mustered out of the service.
The material of the battery will be turned over to the ordnance officer of this command.
By order of General McDowell:
JAMES B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
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*Destination changed to Washington.
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front of Williamsburg. I have not had a moment's time to examine the country farther than within the circumstance of seven or eight miles. I therefore have not been to Williamsburg. I am perfectly satisfied, however, that if the enemy land in force at either of the places on the James River above mentioned and march upon Williamsburg, it will fall, unless strongly re-enforced, or unless I march to operate on his flank and rear while he is making the attack, in which case I should leave this point entirely uncovered and expose it to an attack in its rear from Fort Monroe. This place carried, Gloucester Point is commanded, and the enemy's ships enter York River. In case of such an alternative, I should decide to defend this place to the last, unless I was satisfied that I could march upon the enemy, beat him, and return in time to meet an attack from the neighborhood of Fort Monroe. Anticipating before I left Richmond that the landing places below Jamestown Island would soon become insecure, I wrote from the depot to the Quartermaster-General a note, begging him to send some lighters of an appropriate kind to ply between Jamestown Island and the mainland on the road to Williamsburg, to enable the commanding general to throw rapidly into the latter place, if he thought proper, the necessary troops and supplies. I do not know if this has been done. It is absolutely necessary that the facilities of both rivers should be used to the utmost to carry on vigorously military operations in the country embraced between them. I know the troops are needed on every line, but I believe I cannot overrate the importance of preserving a numerical superiority of all arms over the enemy on the line of operations between this place and Jamestown, the lowest defensible points on the two rivers, while the works between Queen and College Creeks are being erected. I would respectfully represent, therefore, that the line from Yorktown to Jamestown be occupied by from eight to ten thousand men, and the defenses at the extremities - that is, at mouth of York River and Jamestown Island, be strengthened in every conceivable manner. I wanted Colonel Ewell to cause to be collected the most combustible materials at the wharfs at the landings below Jamestown Island, and to cause these wharfs to be burned whenever the enemy, in great force, makes an unmistakable demonstration to land. I close for fear of detaining the steamer. The second navy gun is in position, and I hope the third will be to-morrow night.
Major Cary and his command have just arrived, confirming the report of a large collection of troops at Newport News, and the presence, near that point, of a large fleet, destination unknown. I beg leave to call the attention of the General-in-Chief earnestly to the fact that there are but fifty rounds of ammunition for the navy batteries, the shells being without fuses, and, if four guns were mounted, there would be only about twelve rounds each. The navy officers reports a coil of heavy rope needed to make wads with. Please also direct one hundred rounds of ammunition to be sent for a 6-pounder gun, brought in by Major Cary, and one hundred rounds for a 12-pounder howitzer, likewise brought in by him. The formal requisition will be sent afterwards.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,
Colonel, Commanding Hampton Line.
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no other conditions than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated. Believing myself prepared to enforce this demand, one-half hour's time, before doing so, will be allowed for your compliance therewith.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON,
Captain, Second Infantry, Commanding Troops.
General D. M. FROST, Commanding Camp Jackson.
Numbers 2. Protest of Brigadier General Daniel M. Frost, Missouri State Militia.
SAINT LOUIS ARSENAL, MISSOURI, May 11, 1861.
SIR: In accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri, which have been existing for some years, and in obedience to the orders of the governor, on Monday last I entered into an encampment with the militia force of Saint Louis County, for the purpose of instructing the same, in accordance with the laws of the United States and of this State.
Every officer and soldier in my command had taken, with uplifted hand, the following oath, to wit:
You, each, and every one of you, do solemnly swear that you will honestly and faithfully serve the State of Missouri against all her enemies, and that you will do your utmost to sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this State against all violence, of whatsoever kind or description, and you do further swear that you will well and truly execute and obey the legal orders of all officers properly placed over you whilst on duty; so help you God.
Whilst in the peaceable performance of the duties devolved upon me and my command under these laws, my encampment was yesterday surrounded by an overwhelming force of armed men, acting under the command of Captain N. Lyon, Second Infantry, U. S. Army, and called upon by him through a written command (marked A) accompanying this.*
To which communication I replied in the following terms, to wit:
CAMP JACKSON, MO., May 10, 1861.
SIR: I never for a moment having conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army, I am wholly unprepared to defend my command rom this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forces to comply with your demand.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. M. FROST,
Brigadier General, Commanding Camp Jackson, M. V. M.
Captain N. LYON, Commanding U. S. Troops.
My command was, in accordance with the above, deprived of their arms, and surrendered into the hands of Captain Lyon. After which, whilst thus disarmed and surrounded, a fire was opened upon a portion of it by his troops, and a number of my men put to death, together with several innocent lookers-on-men, women, and children.
My command was then marched as prisoners of war in triumph to this place. I am now informed, as I was at the time of the surrender, by the captain, that my command may be released upon the officers
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*See inclosure B to report Numbers 1, p. 6.
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and men giving their parole "not to take up arms or to serve in a military capacity against the United States during the present civil war."
Against the whole proceeding of Captain Lyon, as well as against the terms of release, I most earnestly protest, for the following reasons:
That, line addition to the obligation of loyalty which rests upon every citizen, every man of my command now held as a prisoner has voluntarily taken an oath to sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States.
That, when my camp was attacked in this unwarrantable manner, and during the previous days of it existence, the only flags that floated there were those of the United States, with all the stars, and its fellow, bearing alone the coat of arms of the State of Missouri.
That, in addition to all this, on the morning before this attack was made, I addressed to Captain Lyon a communication, informing him of the proffer of services I had previously made of myself and of all my command, and, if necessary, the whole power of the State of Missouri, to protect changed those views or opinions, either of my own volition or through any orders emanating from my constitutional commander.*
Under all these circumstances I appeal to you, as the chief representative of the United States in this department, for justice on behalf of those loyal citizens who are now held as prisoners of war, captured under and marching to their place of confinement with the flag of the Union flying over their heads. I ask that you will not put upon the command the additional indignity of requiring us to give our parole, when we have already given our oath in support of the Constitution, but that you will order our restoration to the liberties of which we have been illegally deprived, as well as of the property of the State and individuals, as the large portion of the equipments have been purchased with the private funds of the individuals of my command, both officers and men.
I trust that such as have been so purchased will at least be restored to the proper owners.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. M. FROST,
Brigadier-General, Missouri Volunteer Militia.
General WILLIAM S. HARNEY, U. S. A.,
Commanding the Department of the West.
Numbers 3. General Harney's letter transmitting General Frost's protest.
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST,
Saint Louis, Mo., May 18, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a communication [Numbers 2.] addressed to me under date of the 10th instant, by Brigadier General D. M. Frost, Missouri Volunteer Militia, in relation to the capture of his command at Camp Jackson, near this city, May 10-, 1861, by the U. S. troops, under the command of Captain N. Lyon, Second Infantry.+
I respectfully request the instructions of the Government respecting
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*See inclosure A to report Numbers 1, p. 5.
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+See also Harney to Townsend, May 13, in "Correspondence, etc.," post.
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light battery, under Captain Totten, Second Artillery; Company B, Second Infantry (my company); two companies of recruits for the regular service, under Lieutenant W. L. Lothrop, Fourth Artillery; First Regiment Missouri Volunteers, under Colonel F. P. Blair, jr.; nine companies Second Regiment Missouri Volunteers, under Colonel Henry Boernstein, and advanced by boats to Jefferson City, where I arrived on the 15th about 2 o'clock p. m., and found the governor had fled and taken his forces to Booneville, where, so far as I could then learn, a large force was gathering.
Leaving Colonel Boernstein at Jefferson City, with three companies of his regiment, I proceeded on the following day (16th) towards this place, and reached a distance of about fifteen miles below here that night; and starting again early next morning, I came to within about eight miles, and then landed nearly all my forces, leaving one 8-inch howitzer, with an artillery party and Captain Richardson's company, First Missouri Volunteers, as guard to the three boats, and this party had instructions to advance within range for the siege howitzer of what was understood to be the position of the rebel camp, and to fire upon it. This was done with good effect. In the morning two companies of the Second Regiment Missouri Volunteers, under Major Osterhaus, Companies A and B, Captains Schadt and Kohr, were thrown forward as skirmishers with excellent effect. Company B, Second Infantry, under Sergt. Wm. Griffin; Captain Totten's battery, two companies of recruits, regular service, under Lieutenant Lothrop; Colonel Blair's First Regiment, and four companies of the Second Missouri Volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel Schaeffer, formed the order of column in march.
After about two miles' march we met an advanced party of the rebel forces, which opened fire upon us, but soon fell back. To meet this resistance, the skirmishers already forward were collected to the right of our road. Company B, Second Infantry, was thrown out to the left, and opened fire. Two pieces of Captain Totten's battery were brought into play, and several shots fired. In advancing from this point, Lieutenant Lothrop, with a company of artillery recruits, Captain Yates' Company H, Missouri Volunteers, and one additional company from the Third Missouri Volunteers, were thrown forward to the right of the road, and in line with our advance.
After proceeding about one mile, the enemy was discovered in force. Company B, Second Infantry, on the left, was now supported by Company B, First Missouri Volunteers, Captain Maurice. The enemy, having shelter of a house (owned by Wm. M. Adams) and a thicket ot wood behind it, held their position for a while, during which time our approach brought us on to high and open ground, and here most of our casualties occurred. Captain Totten's battery here did effective service, and our troops on both flanks steadily advanced. Captain Burke's company, K, First Regiment Missouri Volunteers, now came forward on the left, and engaged the enemy. In falling back the enemy took advantage of sundry points to deliver a fire and continue retreating. This continued till we arrived above their camp, which was situated to our right, near the river, and which was situated to our right, near the river, and which about this time was taken possession of by Captain Cole, with his company, E, First Regiment Missouri Volunteers, who had been sent to the right to extend our front.
Companies C, Captain Stone; A, Captain Fuchs; F, Captain Gratz; G, Captain Cavender, took part in skirmishing and relieving those first engaged. Two pieces of artillery were taken (iron 6-pounders). Considerable camp equipage and about 500 stand of arms of all sorts were taken. About 60 prisoners taken were released upon oath to obey the
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2,000 strong, with eight pieces of artillery, then advancing to attack us. Accordingly I arranged the brigade in order of battle, Colonel Graves on the right, the artillery in the center, and Lieutenant-Colonel O'Kane on the left. At this time Colonel Hurst was 3 miles in the rear with his regiment, which, having marched since 4 o'clock in the morning without breakfast, had, with my authority and of necessity, stopped to prepare a meal. I immediately dispatched a courier to the rear for him, and directed him to come forward at speed and take position on the right of Colonel Graves. You, general, with the remainder and greater portion of your command (composed principally of mounter men), while I was deploying, took position on the extreme right of the Army of Missouri. On the line thus taken by your division the other divisions formed as they successively came on the ground.
The engagement was begun about 8.30 o'clock a. m. by the enemy's artillery, which opened a heavy fire of round shot, shell, spherical case shot, and grape. This was promptly responded to by the artillery of General Parsons's division, four 6-pounders, which had unlimbered in gallant style immediately on the left of my brigade. Captain Bledsoe then opened upon the enemy a steady and well-directed fire, by my direction, aiming at the densest of the enemy's masses, ceasing fire whenever the enemy, driven from their ranks, took refuge in depressions on the plains so as to be out of sight, and reopening upon them as they again showed themselves in masses, notwithstanding the fire from the enemy's artillery was rapid and well directed, and continued for forty minutes. Our loss, owing to the fact that our line presented no depth to them, was small.
At this point Major Murray, of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Kane's battalion, had his horse shot under him by grape shot. The enemy then slowly retired for about 200 yards, halted, and commenced the engagement, when I advanced the whole line of the brigade in battle order, and reopened fire upon him by Captain Bledsoe's guns, General Parsons' artillery having by this time retires, as I learn, for want of ammunition. At this time the cavalry of your division, under your immediate command, was closing on the enemy's left flank, and at the same time a large body of cavalry from some of the other divisions ws threatening his right flank, and the enemy, after cannonading us but a few minutes, again retired under over of the fire of his artillery, passing though the timber which skirted its banks, crossed Bear Crek, one of the tributaries of Spring River, about 1 1/2 miles in rear of their second position.
Up to this time the engagement had been in the open prairie, without shelter for the infantry or artillery of my brigade, who, being immediately in front of the enemy and in his line of attack, received the great severity of his fire. I cannot too much commend to your favorable notice the steadiness, worthy of disciplined troops, displayed by infantry and artillery of the brigade. Before the enemy returned the second time, Colonel Hurst, with his regiment, came forward from the rear at double-quick time, and took the position assigned him on the right of Colonel Graves. I again advanced in battle order the whole line of the brigade.
As I neared the timber, proceeding along the road I discovered the enemy though the openings through which the road passed posted in force on the brow of the hill on the opposite bank of the creek, distant about 400 yards, and only to be seen through the opening. At this exposed point I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Rosser to have the artillery unlimbered and to open fire upon the enemy, and at the same time I directed the infantry on either wing of the brigade to pass into and
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as promptly as they could. The river being deep, and the men wearied from their long exertion, I turned my carriage back to ford them over the stream. Immediately thereafter I ordered them to the front at as quick a pace as I thought they were able to march. About this time i heard cannonading in Carthage, about one mile in advance. Hurrying up with my infantry, I arrived in town, and found there a body of cavalry. I ordered them to the front immediately. Passing to the east of the town I found my artillery engaged with the enemy at a mile distant, the enemy having occupied the wood at my left, about 400 yards distant. By this timber, Colonel Kelly having arrived with my infantry, I ordered him to advance immediately and take possession of the wood to my left. After a few minutes' sharp firing the enemy was again dislodged and in full retreat across the prairie.
It is due to Major Dills, of the infantry, and to Captain Alexander, of the mounted service, to say that they and their commands acted with great discretion and bravery in driving the enemy from this last position.
At this position it is with retreat that I report to your excellency that one of my braves and best officers fell at the head of his command, viz, Captain McKinzie, of the Clark Township Southern Guards. Your excellency will pardon me for the digression when I state that this valuable officer was my orderly sergeant through Doniphan's campaign in Mexico, when we were striving to uphold the very flag which now floats at the head of the menials that attempt to oppress us. I deem this testimonial of my regard for him as due on account of our long association together in defense of our country.
Our army at this time (it being sunset) having driven the enemy beyond the mills east of Carthage, which it was my original intention to occupy, and having ordered my commissary, Colonel Roberts, to move forward with a detachment to take possession of a considerable quantity of flour which I had ascertained was in the mill, I then directed my infantry and cavalry and artillery to retire into camp about one-quarter of a mile to the east of Carthage.
While it is due that I should say to your excellency that my artillery and cavalry acted with the greatest bravery and precision; and, without any intention to detract from the merits of any other officer upon the field, it is due that I should call to your excellency's especial notice the ability and daring of Colonel Kelly, of my regiment of infantry, and all the officers under his command; also Major Dills and the battalion under his command, and also Captain Guibor and Lieutenant Barlwo, of the artillery. I might recount several instances of personal valor of the two last-mentioned officers which came under my own observation, but it is sufficient to say that by their prowess the artillery of my division won a position upon the field. I will also state that I was gallantly sustained upon the field by all my staff.
My casualties were as follows: Killed, Captain McKinzie, wounded, Jesse Gilfillan, second lieutenant, Colonel Kelly's regiment; Thomas Doyle, William D. Hicks, and Garret Scott. Captain Lucius Gaines, of Major Dill's battalion; B. F. Asbury, of Captain Crews' company, and R. E. Baber, of Captain Livingston's company, were slightly wounded. The number of the enemy killed and wounded in the field has, I presume, been already reported to you by the proper authorities.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
M. M. PARSONS,
Brigadier-General.
Gov. C. F. JACKSON,
Commander-in-Chief Missouri State Guard.
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and Lieutenant Agniel, all under command of Major Halderman, having been posted on the right of Totten's battery as support, where they suffered severely from a constant fire from the enemy's lines, were here ordered to the front, where they aligned upon the remnant of the six right companies, which had thus far borne the brunt of the battle. With but slight and immaterial chances of position the First Kansas occupied this ground for over two hours, repulsing or cutting to pieces one regiment after another as it was brought to the front.
While thus employed, Captain Cheneweth, Captain Clayton, and a portion of Captain Mcfarland's company, under Lieutenant Malone, were ordered to charge the enemy with their commands, which order they executed with great promptness, driving the enemy inside their encampment lines at the base of the hill, and returning to the main force, when threatened by a flank movement, at their own imminent peril and with considerable loss of life, While leading this charge Colonel Deitzler had his horse shot under him and was himself severely wounded.
About this time the Second Kansas Regiment was ordered to the front, but when at a point in rear of that occupied by the First Kansas they were fired upon by the enemy from an ambuscade, by which General Lyon was killed and Colonel Mitchell severely wounded, both of whom were at the column. Here, too, many officers and men of the Second were killed and wounded.
After this the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, fell back in order to the brow of the hill, where it formed, and at which place the remaining companies of the First Kansas formed upon their left, three companies having been posted on the brow of the hill and on the right of the battery.
After a short cessation of the volley firing it was recommenced by the enemy with great fury, and so continued for at least ten minutes, when our whole line opened upon them a most destructive fire, at which they broke and fled down the hill towards their encampment. At this time, by command of Major Sturgis, who throughout the engagement had acted with the utmost courage and self-possession, we retired from the field in good order, proceed by the ambulances containing our wounded. With scarcely any material change of position the First Kansas stood under fire; maintained every ground assigned it, without once turning its back upon the foe, for the five long hours during which the battle raged.
With about 800 men we marched upon the field; we left it with but 500.
The regimental commander deems it hardly necessary to say that all the officers and men of this command fought with a courage and heroism rarely, if ever, equaled. The list of killed, wounded, and missing, hereto attached, id the strongest witness for the valor of the living as well for the memory of the gallant dead.*
I am, sir, very respectfully, yours,
JOHN A. HALDERMAN,
Major, First Regiment Kansas Volunteers, Commanding.
Captain G. GRANGER, Acting Adjutant-General.
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* See return of casualties on p. 72.
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Colonel Carroll's cavalry was engaged in a part of the field away from my view, and I herewith submit his report in full. I am informed that the officers and men of his regiment did efficient service in charging the battery of the enemy. The Fourth Infantry, Colonel Walker, was placed in a trying position, especially for new troops, grape shot, shell, and minie balls flying around them and no chance of returning the fire. Much praise is due Colonel Rector for the coolness displayed in remaining in position, as well as to the officers of the regiment for their efforts to the same effect, for at this part of the field was supposed would be the main fight, and on my return to this part of the field, finding the artillery withdrawn from the height, I ordered General Parson's battery to take position formerly occupied by Captain Reid's battery, and an advance movement to the east of half a mile by the fourth and third companies of the Fifth, supported by Captain Carroll's company of cavalry, to give the enemy battle, should he desire it; but the Louisianians, under Colonel Hebert, had fully satisfied Colonel Sigel, and he retreated without giving us another chance at him. Colonel Carroll's regiment, though badly fatigued, was ordered to proceed on the Springfield road in pursuit of the enemy, which duty he performed with his usual promptness and ability.
My thanks are especially due to the officers of the several regiments for the promptness and ability with which they obeyed, and to the men for the determined manner in which they executed, all my orders. To particularize I would have to send in a full roster. I am particularly indebted to Colonel Rector for the ability displayed during the engagement; to Commissary-General Grace, who was with me when I led the Third into action and remained in the thickest of the fight, aiding and urging the men on the victory; also to my aide, Major Cline, who was by my side in the thickest of the fight; also to Mr. Samuel Mitchell, Messrs. Brown, Taylor, and Dawson, for conveying orders during the engagement as volunteer aides; also to Surgeon-General Smith, and to the surgeons of the regiments for their kind attention to the wounded.
Our loss has been heavy, but a great victory is ours. Peace to the ashes of the dead and immortality to the names of the defenses of the lovely South. Early in the action Captain Jefferson was sent to reconnoiter the enemy and was taken prisoner, and is still in their hands.
I respectfully call the attention of the general to the praiseworthy conduct of Colonels Gratiot, Carroll, and Dockery; also to Lieutenant-Colonels Neal and Provence, the former of whom was badly wounded and the latter was continually in the midst of the battle; also to Majors Ward and Featherston.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
N. B. PEARCE,
Brigadier General, Commanding First Division, Army of the Arkansas.
General McCULLOCH.
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[Inclosure.]
Consolidated report of casualties in the Arkansas State forces in the action of August 10, 1861.
Command. Killed Wounde Missin Aggreg Remarks.
d g ate.
Second [First] 5 18 2 25
Cavalry
Third Infantry,
Woodruff's 25 84 1 110
battery
Fourth Infantry - - - - Not engaged.
Fifth Infantry 3 11 - 14
General staff - - 1 1 Captain
Jefferson
captured.
Total 33 113 4 150
A. H. CLINE,
Major and A. D. C.
Numbers 33. Report of Colonel John R. Gratiot, Third Arkansas Infantry.
BATTLE-GROUND UPON WILSON'S CREEK, MO.,
August 11, 1861.
SIR: Early upon the morning of the 10th of August my regiment was summoned by the reports that the enemy had taken us by surprise and were upon us. As soon as the regiment was formed it was ordered to an adjacent hill, occupied by Captain Woodruff's battery, to support it, where it remained some hours under a fire of shot and shell. At about 11.30 o'clock a.m. yourself in person gave orders for my regiment to move on the scene of action and attack a battery and a large force then forming on the north side of Wilson's Creek, on the ridge, and in the woods. I proceeded to execute the order under a heavy fire of shot and shell from the enemy's batteries, crossed the creek, and marched up the ridge by a flank movement and in column of fours. I advanced until we came near the enemy. We then faced toward them, and marched in line of battle about fifty paces, when we were attacked by a large force of the enemy in front and on the left flank.
At this moment a battery commenced playing upon our left flank, enfilading the entire regiment with grape, canister, and shell. So terrific was the fire, that my regiment was obliged to lie down, and then commenced firing in that position. We remained in this attitude for about thirty minutes, firing with deadly effect, silencing the fire of the artillery and infantry upon our left and driving the enemy in front. We remained upon the ground long after the enemy had fled and all firing ceased.
During the action, I am sorry to say, we were very much annoyed, and some of the casualties hereafter mentioned are to be attributed to the fire of our own friends, who formed behind us and lower down upon the hill, and fired through my ranks after the fire had ceased from the enemy. Attached herewith find a report of casualties, which will show the heavy fire under which we were placed.*
Of my regiment I must speak in the highest terms for their coolness, prompt obedience, and daring courage, and although but few of them
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*See inclosure to report Numbers 32.
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had ever been upon a battle-field, they maintained their position for thirty minutes one of the most galling fires ever delivered upon a regiment by 1,500 or 2,000 Federal troops, besides being enfiladed by a heavy battery. They stood their ground, delivering their fire with deadly effect and extreme rapidity.
I must here mention in terms of high approbation the conduct of my lieutenant-colonel, David Provence, for his coolness, skill, and gallant bearing during the whole action, his example having a powerful influence in keeping the men steady and cool. Major Ward behaved with great gallantry; also Captain Sparks and his company; Captain Hart and company; Captain Brown, up to the time of his death, and Lieutenant King, afterward in command of the company; Captain Bell, up to the time of his death. These companies bore the heat of the action, and distinguished themselves by their gallant conduct, and the conduct of the officers and men throughout was so universally gallant and courageous, that it is hard to make personal distinctions.
After my regiment had silenced all firing upon the north side of Wilson's Creek, fears were entertained that the enemy were collecting in force with a view of attacking Woodruff's battery, which yet remained upon the ground that it had occupied during the day. My regiment was again ordered to the support of this battery, where we remained until ordered into camp by General McCulloch. As Captain Woodruff's battery was attached to my regiment, I feel it my duty to say something in reference to the services of Captain Woodruff and his battery. The execution which this battery did in the enemy's ranks was prodigious, and its influence was sensibly felt in achieving the fortunes of the day, men and officers behaving with great coolness and courage.
JOHN R. GRATIOT,
Colonel Third Regiment Arkansas Volunteers.
Brigadier-General PEARCE.
Numbers 34. Report of Colonel J. D. Walker, Fourth Arkansas Infantry.
IN CAMP ON WILSON'S CREEK, MO., August 11, 1861.
The Fourth Regiment, on the morning of the 10th, was placed under the command of Adjutant-General Rector, who remained in command during the day. This regiment was not brought into immediate action, being stationed upon the hill for the protection of Reid's battery, and although exposed to danger from the fire of the enemy, all the officers and men of the regiment behaved with the greatest promptness and coolness in all their movements during the day. There were none killed or wounded in the Fourth Regiment.
I have the honor to be, respectfully, &c.,
J. D. WALKER,
Colonel Fourth Regiment Arkansas Volunteers.
Brigadier-General PEARCE.
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Numbers 36. Report of Colonel De. Rosey Carroll, First Arkansas Cavalry.
CAMP ON WILSON'S CREEK,
Greene County, Mo., August 11, 1861.
DEAR SIR: In obedience to your order of this morning, I have the honor to submit to you the following report, to wit:
The number of killed, wounded, and missing from my regiment on yesterday is as follows:
Captain Lewis' company: 2 killed, 5 wounded. (Two of Captain Lewis' company wounded thought to be mortally so.)
Captain Park's company: 1 killed, 3 wounded, 1 missing.
Captain Walker's company: 4 wounded, 3 missing. (Captain Walker wounded, but will recover.)
Captain Withers' company: 2 killed.
Captain Perkins' company: 4 wounded, 4 missing.
Captain McKissick's company: 4 wounded, 2 missing.
Captain Kelly's company: 1 missing.
Captain Armstrong's company: 1 wounded, 8 missing.
Recapitulation: 5 killed, 22 wounded, 19 missing.
Prisoners: 4 private and 1 officer brought in and turned over to headquarters.
In closing this report, the most pleasing part of it now remains to be given you; that the officers and men acted well their part in the hard battle of yesterday, for a while supporting the Missouri Infantry amid a shower of balls from the enemy's infantry, mixed with grape from their batteries, hurled thickly around us; then in the charge by flank on the Totten battery; and the execution done in the charge shows how cool and bravely all behaved; and where all did so well, there can be no discrimination. They drove the enemy in retreat from the battery, and it became easy for the infantry to march on it (Colonel McRae's infantry). The Texas regiment flanked to the left on the charge. I had been ordered to flank with it, which we did in short range for our arms, which were discharged into the enemy. I am sure that our conduct will meet the approval of our country.*
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
DE ROSEY CARROLL,
Colonel First Cavalry Regiment, Arkansas Volunteers.
Brigadier General N. B. PEARCE.
Numbers 37. Report of Captain Charles A. Carroll, Arkansas Cavalry.
CAMP ON WILSON'S CREEK, August 11, 1861.
GENERAL: On the morning of the 10th, going to General McCulloch's quarters per orders, learned the enemy was advancing in considerable force to attack us on the north, whereupon General McCulloch ordered me to have my men in the saddle at once. Returning to your quarters to notify you, found my men mounting, they having learned of an
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*A statement of ammunition on hand, omitted from above report, shows that the several companies averaged less than eight rounds per man.
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General Grant telegraphs from Cairo that the first gun is in position at Fort Holt, Kentucky.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.
Numbers 2. Report of Brigadier General John Pope, U. S. Army.
HUNNEWELL, September 10, 1861.
I marched on Green at dark Sunday. Reached his camp at daylight in morning. As usual, he had received notice of our approach, but, in consequence of night marches, few hours before I reached there. Is force, about 3,000, scattered in every direction, leaving much baggage, provisions, and forage, as also the public property captured at Shelbina. The infantry of my command was, of curse, unable to pursue after a forced night march of 23 miles. The few horsemen followed the train for 10 or 15 miles until it scattered in various directions. The bulk of his force has crossed the North Missouri road at Renick, and are making for woods of Chariton. i go west with Sixteenth Illinois and Third Iowa immediately in pursuit.
Moore's force proceeded by land to Canton, and will there organize. Four hundred of Bussey's cavalry are in Northeast Missouri, but I think not doing much. As soon as I can run down Green's force I will go to Keokuk. Please send Colonel Tindall back to Brookfield immediately; he went down for his arms to Saint Louis, and can now be of much service.
Glover and Moore will organize their regiments I hope in a few days. Green's force is mounded, and infantry cannot do much in overtaking them.
The railroad east of Brookfield is open, and I think no more secession camps will be made within 20 miles.
JOHN POPE,
Brigadier-General.
Major-General FREMONT.
SEPTEMBER 8-10.-Reconnaissances from Cairo, Ill., and engagements at Lucas Bend, Mo.
REPORTS.
Numbers 1.-Colonel G. Waagner, Chief of Artillery, of reconnaissance, September 8.
Numbers 2.-Brigadier General U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, of reconnaissance, September 10.
Numbers 1. Report of Colonel G. Waagner, of reconnaissance, September 8.
ARTILLERY DEPARTMENT,
Cairo, Ill., September 8, 1861.
SIR: In consequence of your order received yesterday, I started this morning at 5 o'clock on the gunboat Lexington, commanded by Captain
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HEADQUARTERS,
Saint Louis, September 20, 1861.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City:
How many carbines and how much ammunition can you furnish?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, Commanding.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
The guns I have are those issued to Colonel Nugent's Missouri cavalry. I don't know the number, but I can arm a regiment some way or other. The colonel, when he left, told me there was a full supply of ammunition.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier-General.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Saint Louis, September 20, 1861.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City:
Concentrate a force strong enough, in your judgment, at Georgetown, and push forward to relieve Mulligan. I trust that you can take provisions for two days with the means of transportation which you have. Order back your boats to Jefferson City, and send provisions and troops by them to Lexington. Two hundred wagons will be sent from here to-night to Syracuse, which will follow you. Troops are going from here. Answer.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, Commanding.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
I will send on the troops as fast as possible. Two days' provisions from Syracuse won't answer to reach lexington and engage an enemy. I will attempt it, however.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier-General.
Major-General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 20, 1861.
Acting Brigadier General JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City:
Dispatch received. Take as much provisions as will answer. Never let the men go into action without food. We, on our part, intend to move promptly from here. Use your judgment for details.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, Commanding.
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coupled with the fact that my men had been fasting for more than twenty-four hours, constrained me to abandon the idea of pursuing the enemy that day. My infantry and artillery having come up, we encamped at Warrensburg, whose citizens vied with each other in feeding my almost famished soldiers.
An unusually violent storm delayed our march the next morning [September 12] until about 10 o'clock. We then pushed forward rapidly, still hoping to overtake the enemy. Finding it impossible to do this with my infantry, I again ordered a detachment to move forward, and placing myself at their head, continued the pursuit to within two and a half miles of Lexington, when, having learned that the enemy were already within town, and it being late and my men fatigued by a forced march and utterly without provisions, I halted for the night.
About daybreak the next morning [September 13] a sharp skirmish took place between our pickets and the enemy's outposts. This threatened to become general. Being unwilling, however, to risk a doubtful engagement,when a short delay would make success certain, I fell back 2 or 3 miles and awaited the arrival of my infantry and artillery. These having come up, we advanced upon the town, driving the enemy's pickets until we came within a short distance of the city itself. Here the enemy attempted to make a stand, but they were speedily driven from every position and forced to take shelter within their entrenchments. We then took position within easy range of the college, which building they had strongly fortified, and opened upon them a brisk fire from Bledsoe's battery, which, in the absence of Captain Bledsoe, who had been wounded at Big Dry Wood, was gallantly commanded by Captain Emmett MacDonald, and by Parsons' battery, under the skillful command of Captain Guibor.
finding, after sunset, that our ammunition, the most of which had been left behind on the march from Sprinfield, was nearly exhausted, and that my men, thousands of who had not eastern a particle in thirty-six hours, required rest and food, I withdraw to the fair ground and encamped there. My ammunition wagons having been at last brought up, and large re-enforcements having been received, I again moved into town on Wednesday, the 18th instant, and began the final attack on the enemy's works.
Brigadier-General Rains' division occupied a strong position on the east and northeast of the fortifications, from which an effective cannonading was kept up on the enemy by Bledsoe's battery, under command, except on the last day, of Captain Emmett MacDonald, and another battery, commanded by Captain Churchill Clark, of Saint Louis. Both these gentlemen, and the men and officers under their command, are deservedly commended in accompanying report of Brigadier-General Rains. General Parsons took a position southwest of the works, whence his battery under command of Captain Guibor, poured a steady fire into the enemy. Skirmishers and sharpshooters were also sent forward from both of these divisions to harass and fatigue the enemy, and to cut them of from the water on the north, east, and south of the college, and did inestimable service in the accomplishment of these purposes.
Colonel Congreve Jackson's division and a part of General Steele's wee posted near Generals Rains' and Parsons' are a reserve, but no occasion occurred to call them into action. They were, however, at all times vigilant and ready to rush upon the enemy.
Shortly after entering the city on the 18th Colonel Rives, who commanded the Fourth Division in the absence of General Slack, led his
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Numbers 2. Report of Commander Henry Walke, U. S. Navy.
U. S. GUNBOAT TYLER,
Cairo, Ill., October 7, 1861.
GENERAL: Agreeable to your order of this morning, I proceeded down the river with the U. S. gunboat Tyler and the Lexington, under Commander Stembel, for the purpose of reconnoitering the position of the enemy as far as practicable. When approaching the head of Ion Bluffs we saw the rebel steamer Jeff. Davis, but could no get near enough ot be of effective service. proceeding on till we came in sight of their batteries, about 2 miles above Columbus, we opened on them, and succeeded in drawing the fire of five of their batteries, some of which proved to be mounted with rifled cannon. Four of their shots passed over us, one of them coming within fifty feet of the bow. Not feeling ourselves strong enough to contend with their rifled cannon, we rounded to, and returned to Cairo. When near the foot of Lucas Band the Lexington and ourselves fire several shell into Camp Belmont, from which they fired several rounds from their batteries; and on our return, just above Norfolk, we brought away two glad-boats, which we deliver subject to your order.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. WALKE,
Commander, U. S. Navy.
Brigadier General U. S. GRANT, Commanding S. E. Dist., Cario.
OCTOBER 12-13, 1861.-Skirmish near Cluntinville and on the Pomme de Terre, Mo.
Report of Brigadier General Monroe M. Parsons, commanding Sixth Division Missouri State Guard (Confederate).
HEADQUARTERS, CAMP ON CEDAR CREEK,
October 14, 1861.
GENERAL: General Harris' division and my own camped on Smith's farm, 5 miles from Clintonville, about 12 o'clock on Saturday last. About 3 o'clock in the evening of that day the pickets of General Harris were fired upon by a few jayhawkers in ambush, who killed 1 man and wounded 3 others. The cavalry was immediately sent out in force, and scoured the country for miles around, bringing in 5 prisoners, but we have no positive evidence that they were of the party were of the party that fired upon our troops.
On yesterday, about sunset, I received intelligence that another party of jayhawkers, about 20 in number, fire upon 7 of our party, who were over on the Pomme de Terre, about 20 miles distant, foraging for wheat. Two of our men were wounded. The forces that I had at Richie's Mill, about 20 in number, immediately started in pursuit. I also dispatched from this camp 50 men, under Captain McCarey, with instructions to proceed immediately to the mill and occupy it in the absence of the other troops, or, if necessary, move on to their relief. Sufficient time has not ye elapsed for any further report from them.
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FREDERICKTOWN, MO., October 22, 1861.
CAPTAIN: I beg leave to submit the following remarks supplementary to my report upon the engagement yesterday:
The embarrassing relations existing between Colonel Plummer and myself respecting the command induced me to confine my report to the operations of my own troops from Pilot Knob, leaving Colonel Plummer to do justice to his troops. Being senior by commission to Colonel Plummer, I claimed the command, but Colonel Ross, Seventeenth Illinois Volunteers, senior to both, had decided to claim command if Colonel Plummer had been superseded by me. To avoid the vast injury to our cause resulting from such a dispute, it, was arranged between Colonel Plummer and myself that one of us should hold this place, with a force sufficient to protect the wounded and to keep communication with Pilot Knob, as well as a support for the main force if it had to fall back. In deference to the greater experience of Colonel Plummer I chose to remain here, and detached from my command the Twenty-first and Thirty-third Illinois Volunteers, five companies First Indiana Cavalry, and Schofield's artillery, to accompany him in pursuit of the rebels. My own regiment, three companies of cavalry, and two 24-pounder howitzers constitute the force at this place.
In a note to you on the 21st I informed you that the enemy had left for Greenville, but a few hours afterwards the cannonading on the Greenville road notified me that they had moved to a new position, where they were met by Colonel Plummer's advance guard, which had just taken up its march in pursuit of the enemy. The battle was entirely unexpected by Colonel Plummer as well as myself.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. P. CARLIN,
Colonel Thirty-eight Illinois Volunteers.
Captain C. McKEEVER,
A. A. G., Western Department, Saint Louis, Mo.
HEADQUARTERS,
Pilot Knob, Mo., October 25, 1861.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report my return to this place with the last of my force from Fredericktown, excepting Captain Hawkins' cavalry company, which I left there to procure transportation for a few sick men and to bring them in. In my last reported I informed you that I had detached the Twenty-first and Thirty-third Illinois Volunteers, the First Indiana Cavalry, and Schofield's artillery, to accompany Colonel Plummer in pursuit of Thompson. After one day's march the colonel decided to discontinue the pursuit, and returned on the 23rd to Fredericktown. On the 24th I sent the same force above mentioned into this place, remaining at Fredericktown with my regiment, two companies of cavalry, and two 24-pounder howitzers, all of which I brought in to-day with the exception mentioned.
The prisoners not wounded were delivered to Colonel Plummer, who took them to Cape Girardeau to work on the fortifications. The wounded prisoners I left at Fredericktown in the hands of competent physicians, and well provided for generally. They are under oath to deliver themselves to me on recovery. There are 34 sick and wounded prisoners, and near 40 with Colonel Plummer. During the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th we were burying the dead and bringing in the wounded of the enemy. The longer we remained the nearer we could approach to accurate estimate
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The loss of the enemy in killed alone, from the statement of citizens, scouts, and prisoners, was at least 106. How many wounded have since died I have no means of knowing, as they removed them in the night with wagons. Twenty-three of their dead were buried by the Body-Guard. We took 27 prisoners, $4,040 in gold, and about 60 stand of arms. Inclosed I send you a detailed account of our loss, with names.*
Major White's command left me at the beginning of the action and before my first charge, and I saw no more of them until the next day at 10 o'clock. Captain Naughton and Lieutenant Conolly, who followed part way down the lane, were both wounded, the latter mortally, whereupon their company turned and followed the other two in spite of the efforts of the sergeant. Major White himself was made a prisoner before the battle, and placed with others in the enemy's front rank, but escaped uninjured.
In conclusion, I beg to urge the necessity of new clothing, arms, and horses for my command. Forty-five horses are killed or unfitted for use. Uniforms, haversacks, and extra clothes carried in the haversacks are so riddled with bullets as to be useless. Revolvers are also seriously damaged by the enemy's bullets.
Very respectfully,
CHAS. ZAGONYI,
Commanding Body-Guard.
Colonel J. H. EATON, Acting Asst. Adjt. General, Springfield.
No. 3. Report of Captain P. Naughton, commanding "Irish Dragoons."
SAINT LOUIS, MO., December 18, 1861.
GENERAL: In accordance with the privilege granted me of making a personal report to your headquarters of the part taken by my company in the charge at Springfield on the 25th of October last, I respectfully represent that-
1st. Gross injustice, after several solicitations on my part, and a forbearance extending even several weeks, has not been atoned for in any even the slightest manner.
The proof of my first accusation against Major Zagonyi consists in this: That, from a personal knowledge, he was aware of a portion of my command being connected with his own in the charge on and pursuit of the enemy's cavalry; that from information drawn from his officers he was cognizant of the participation of the rest of my company, assisted by some dismounted Body-Guards, in three successive assaults on the enemy's camp, and that having confessed this much in the presence of different officers of his command, he deliberately withheld all credit therefor, and even perverted a temporary and purely accidental connection with Major White's command, so that the public might conclude my company - as stated, whether truly or not, of Major White's- was not in the fight.
The proof of my second accusation against Major Zagonyi consists in this: That with the knowledge of the untruth implied in his report, and well knowing by letter and otherwise from me how grievously we felt
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*Not found.
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At the same time I was notified that similar instructions had been sent to Brigadier General C. F. Smith, commanding Paducah, Ky., and was directed to communicate with him freely as to my movements, that his might be co-operative.
On the 2nd of the same month, and before it was possible for any considerable preparation to have been made for the execution of this order, the following telegraphic dispatch was received:
SAINT LOUIS, November 2, 1861.
Jeff. Thompson is at Indian Ford of the Saint Francois River, 25 miles below Greenville, with about 3,000 men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from Pilot Knob. Send a force Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas.
By order of Major-General Fremont:
C. McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Brigadier-General GRANT.
The forces I determined to send from Bird's Point were immediately designated, and Colonel R. J. Oglesby, Eighth Illinois Volunteers, assigned to the command, under the following detailed instructions:
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, Cairo, November 3, 1861.
You will take command of an expedition, consisting of your regiment, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three companies of cavalry from Bird's Point [to be selected and notified by yourself], and a section of Schwartz' battery, artillery, and proceed by steamboats to Commerce, Mo. From Commerce you will strike for Sikeston, Mr. Cropper acting as guide. From there you will go in pursuit of a rebel force, understood to be 3,000 strong, under Jeff. Thompson, now at Indian Ford, on the Saint Francois River.
An expedition has already left Ironton, Mo., to attack this force. Should they learn that they have left that place it will not be necessary for you to go there, but pursue the enemy in any direction he may go, always being cautious not to fall in with an unlooked-for foe too strong for the command under you.
The object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion, believing it better not to trammel you with instructions. Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' rations and four or five days' forage. All you may require outside of this must be furnished by the country through which you pass.
In taking supplies you will be careful to select a proper officer to press them, and require a receipt to be given, and the articles pressed accounted for in the same manner as if purchased.
You are particularly enjoined to allow no foraging by your men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make open enemies where they would not otherwise exist.
Yours, &c.,
U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.
Colonel R. J. OGLESBY,
Commanding, &c., Bird's Point, Mo.
Colonel J. B. Plummer, Eleventh Missouri Volunteers, commanding Cape Girardeau, was directed to send one regiment in the direction of Bloomfield, with a view to attracting the attention of the enemy.
The forces under Colonel Oglesby were all got off on the evening of the 3rd.
On the 5th a telegram was received from headquarters Saint Louis, stating that the enemy was re-enforcing Price's army from Columbus by way of White River, and directing that the demonstration that had been ordered against Columbus be immediately made. Orders were accordingly at once given to the troops under my command that remained at Cairo, Bird's Point, and Fort Holt. A letter was also sent to Brigadier
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No. 4. Reports of Brigadier General John A. McClernand, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
CAIRO, November 8, 1861.
The expedition of which I advised you on the 6th landed yesterday morning 5 miles this side of Columbus, my command consisting of Twenty-seventh, Colonel Buford; Thirtieth, Colonel Fouke; Thirty-first, Colonel Logan; Captain Dollins' company of cavalry, and Captain Taylor's battery of six pieces, all Illinois volunteers; the Twenty-second Illinois and Seventh Iowa, and Captain Delano's company of cavalry, under Colonel Dougherty. Within 2 miles from Belmont, opposite Columbus, the enemy met us in superior force. We beat them, fighting all the way into their camp immediately under the guns at Columbus; burned their encampment, took 200 prisoners, a large amount of property, spiked two or three guns, and brought away two. During the action several thousand men were thrown across from Columbus. They formed a heavy column in our rear. We fought the same ground over, and after defeating them returned to our boats. Colonel Buford's regiment and Dollins' cavalry, becoming separated from the main body, made a circuit and came to the river above the landing after the boats had left. I returned with transport boats and gunboats, and brought them late at night. General Grant was in chief command. The battle was a terrible one, lasting several hours, and the loss on both sides heavy-probably 300 killed, wounded, and prisoners on our part. The enemy much greater. Many officers are lost. Captain Bielaski, of my staff, killed; Colonel Dougherty missing; Colonel Lauman wounded. Our force was about 3,500 strong-the enemy double that number. Prisoners say it was more. A flag of truce goes down to-day to provide for the dead and wounded. I will report at large by mail.
JOHN A. McCLERNAND,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Major-General McCLELLAN.
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Camp Cairo, November 12, 18611.
SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the forces under my command in the action before Columbus, Ky., on the 7th instant. These forces consisted of a portion of my own brigade, viz: the Twenty-seventh Regiment, Colonel N. B. Buford; the Thirtieth, Colonel Philip B. Fouke; the Thirty-first, Colonel John A. Logan, including one company of cavalry, under Captain J. J. Dollins; the strength of the Twenty-seventh being 720 rank and file; that of the Thirtieth, 500; that of the Thirty-first, 610, exclusive of 70 mounted men, making in all 1,900 rank and file. To this force you added, by your order of the 6th instant, Captain Delano's company of Adams County cavalry, 58 men, under Lieutenant J. K. Catlin, and Captain Ezra Taylor's battery of Chicago Light Artillery, consisting of four 6-pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and 114 men; the total disposable force under my command being 2,072 rank and file, all Illinois volunteers.
Having embarked on the steamer Scott with the Thirtieth and Thirty-first Regiments, on the evening of the 6th instant I left Cairo at 5 o'clock,
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Columbus. [See inclosures marked B and C.]. This movement was made in concert with one to be made by Brigadier-General Grant from Cairo, to threaten Belmont and other points west of the Mississippi, his orders being similar to those received by me to threaten but not attack Columbus. [See again inclosure marked A.]
My special instructions to Brigadier-General Paine and Colonel Sanderson [see inclosures marked D and E] were of the most precise character: to move to a certain point and return by another road; not to make battle unless pressed thereto from necessity; to make a demonstration by the march.
The reports made to me by General Paine [see inclosures marked F and G] show that he transcended my orders, as he was fully aware of the object for which the detachment was made, for I had communicated to him verbally the nature of my instructions from Major-General Fremont, and that General Grant had similar instructions, and as no circumstance had occurred he might not reasonably have anticipated, such as the cannonading in the direction of Columbus, I regard his movement to Milburn and consequent non-return by the Lovelaceville and Blandville road as an unjustifiable departure from my orders. His distinct assertion in both reports that he would in a certain contingency have moved to the attack of Columbus exhibits to my mind a fixed purpose from the start to attempt to gain notoriety without reference to the public interests or his plain duty as a soldier. Had he by chance carried out his avowed purpose, I am satisfied, from what we know of the strength of the garrison and the inland defenses of Columbus, he would have been entirely unsuccessful and his command probably cut up in its retreat, thereby greatly imperiling the safety of this post, which is deemed of much importance.
On its return his command was, as is generally asserted, totally demoralized as a military body, some of the regiments without order or discipline straggling loosely along the road and committing great excesses. This I attribute to a large extent to the broken-down condition of the men by increasing the length of the march by going to Milburn and injudicious marching altogether. [See inclosures marked H and I.]
In view of what is above set forth, I think the conduct of Brigadier-General Paine and that of the regimental commanders should be investigated for the want of discipline exhibited during the expedition, that of the former especially, for his departure from my orders; also that of the enlisted men, to ascertain who committed the excesses imputed to them.
I have, therefore, to request that application may be made for a court of inquiry to sit at an early date to sift this whole matter.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Hdqrs. Dept.of the West, Saint Louis, Mo.
[Inclosure A.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, Saint Louis, Mo., November 1, 1861.
General SMITH, Paducah, Ky.:
SIR: In order to occupy the enemy in the Mississippi Valley and prevent his throwing the greater part of his forces into Northwestern Ar-
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rienced an occasional reverse, these reverses were soon repaired and the results of the day proved beyond all doubt the superiority of our troops in all the essential characteristics of the soldier.
To Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Blake, C. S. Army; Lieutenant Dixon, C. S. Army Engineers; Captain Champne, Ordnance; Lieutenant Snowden, C. S. Army Topographical Corps; Major H. W. Winslow acting aide-de-camp, all members of my staff, I feel indebted for their promptness and activity in the execution of my orders and for their support in directing the operations or the day.
In a conflict continued through so many hours and so hotly contested the list of casualties must be expected to be large. Our loss in killed was 105; wounded, 419; missing, 117. Total, 641.
The number of prisoners taken by the enemy, as shown by their list furnished us, was 106, all of whom have been returned by exchange.
Of the enemy's loss we have no means of accurate information, but from all the sources open to us, the condition of the field, the list of prisoners taken by us, the report of those returned to us, and the reports of the enemy, I am satisfied it cannot fall short of 1,500; fourteen-fifteenths of that number must have been killed, wounded and drowned.
After making a liberal exchange of the captured with the enemy 100 of their prisoners remain still in my hands. I have also a stand of colors, a fraction over 1,000 stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military stores.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. POLK,
Major-General, Commanding.
Colonel W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.
GENERAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. FIRST DIV., WESTERN DEP'T, Numbers 20.
Columbus, Ky., November 12, 1861
The major-general commanding, with profound acknowledgment of the overruling providence of Almighty God, congratulates the officers and soldiers under his command on the glorious victory achieved by them at Belmont, on the 7th instant. The battle began in the morning, under disadvantages which would have been discouraging to the most veteran troops, yet the obstinate resistance offered by a handful of men to an overwhelming force must long be a lesson to them, and the closing scenes of the day, in which a routed enemy was vigorously pursued and attacked in their gunboats, will ever be remembered in connection with that spirit of our people which has proclaimed in triumphant tones upon every battle-field, "We can and we will be free."
By command of Major-General Polk:
E. D. BLAKE,
Captain, C. S. Army, Act. Asst. Adjt. General
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Bowling Green, November 8, 1861.
[Major-General POLK:]
I was rejoiced this morning by news of your glorious victory. Expecting fuller dispatches from moment to moment, I delayed my con-
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tered into my determination and influenced my final conclusion to retire from the service.
It was a painful step, but as I was reluctant to trouble the Government by complaint at a time of great peril to the country and inasmuch as I knew General Polk possessed the full confidence of the President, and as I had never, as I felt, been recognized by the Government, I felt it my duty to silently retire, not even assigning in my resignation any cause, and the same motives would have induced me to remain silent except for the call for an explanation in your dispatch.
After my resignation was delivered to General Polk he sent for me; asked for an explanation of the cause of my resignation.
I at first declined giving any, but upon his insisting I yielded, and gave him the substance of this communication in explanation of my course.
He said our last interview had been the subject of anxious thought; that he believed I was right about the staff; that he would restore my staff and modify his orders, and asked my forgiveness (which I granted), and then asked me to withdraw my resignation, which I declined.
It is proper further to say that after I had reached the depot on my way home I received his order restoring such members of my staff as still remained at Columbus.
Since I reached my residence I am informed that the army, deeply distressed at my departure, were engaged addressing a respectful petition, to the President, expressive of their confidence in me, and requesting him to order me back, when Major-General Polk issued an order intended to suppress this respectfully appeal to the President thus stifling the honest convictions of the army and the sympathy so naturally arising from his injustice to me.
I have seen that order, and though the article of regulations referred to had no application to the case, yet it had the effect designed. This last act of his is a deeper wrong and has done more to shake my confidence in the sense of justice of General Polk than had proceed it.
I have enjoyed an intimate friendship for General Polk for about twenty-five years. As a zealous patriot I admire him, as an eminent minister of the gospel I respect him, but as a commanding general I cannot agree with him.
If I were transferred to another field of duty I would be overshadowed and ranked by the very staff who earned their reputation under me as their chief in the Mexican war, and who are now nearly all distinguished general officers. I must therefore retire. Would to God it were otherwise.
My reasons may not be satisfactory to some but I trust they will be sufficient to protect my reputation against the charges of indifference to the cause of our independence and of a want of patriotism.
I have the fullest confidence in the success of our cause and in the wisdom and judgment of the President; so much so, that I believe be is chosen of God for the work of our national deliverance; but I cannot have the honor of continuing one of his humble instruments in the glorious work.
I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
GID. J. PILLOW,
Brigadier-General, C. S. A.
(Referred to General Polk January 30, 1862.)
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from their boats; and all accounts from Cairo, and from persons who were with the boats during our fire, represent the fire on the enemy huddled on the transports was more destructive than that of any part of the battle. A captain of one of the transports of the enemy's expedition represents the loss to be 1,800 or 2,000 men. With these sources of information, and all the light these afford, I think the enemy's loss could not be less than 2,000 men.
GID. J. PILLOW,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.
E. D. BLAKE, Captain, C. S. Army, Act. Asst. Adjt. General
COLUMBUS, November 12, 1861.
Major MACKALL, Assistant Adjutant-General:
I am prepared to put my division in motion. My loss in the battle of Belmont from my division was 530 men, this bringing my effective force to about 2,700; no other force has been ordered to move with me. I will start the advance this evening or in morning. General Polk is pretty well recovered from the shock.
GID J. PILLOW,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.
Numbers 16. Report of Colonel J. Knox Walker, Second Tennessee Infantry, comdg. First Brigade, First Division, transmitting Lieutenant W. J. Hunt's statement.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
December 2, 1861.
GENERAL: I transmit herewith, as supplemental to my report* of the engagement at Belmont, on the 7th ultimo, an account of the recapture of one of the guns of Beltzhoover's battery, made by Lieutenant W. J. Hunt, of Company B, Second Regiment.
I should have mentioned it in my report to you of the incidents of that day, but the fact was not then known to me.
Lieutenant Hunt was at the time of the capture painfully wounded by a spent grape shot, and behaved with great gallantry during the day.
Respectfully,
J. KNOX WALKER,
Colonel, Commanding First Brigade, First Division.
Brigadier General GIDEON J. PILLOW, Commanding, &c.
[Inclosure.]
DEAR SIR: I learn to-day from Major Strockey, that you regretted not knowing that it was myself who captured our battery, the Jeff. Davis, on the day of the battle, that you might have referred to it in your official report. The facts connected with the capture are these: After passing through the corn field our men became scattered in every direction. I, commanding a squad of 10 or 15 men, saw the enemy passing
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*Not found.
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In the mean time the enemy had landed a large force on the Missouri shore, and soon after engaged the forces sent to re-enforce Colonel Tappan, under the command of Brigadier-General Pillow. The enemy finally succeeded in reaching the river below Belmont, and planted a battery that played upon our boats. The gunboats again dropped down the river. About the same time I received information from the general commanding that a large force was on their side of the river. I saw that the plans of the enemy were to prevent re-enforcements from crossing the river. I sent an order to Lieutenant Humes to advance Captain Bankhead's battery to the shore and drive the Federal battery and troops from the position they had taken, but this had been effected, by an order already given by the major-general, by Captain Smith's battery and the rifled gun in the fort. The gunboat after an hour's conflict again retired, after having come low enough down the river to throw shell into the works.
At about 11 o'clock I was informed that Colonel Marks' regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Barrow, Colonel Marks commanding First Brigade, was ordered to cross the river, Colonel Marks commanding. I saw with pride and pleasure the noble and decisive part their regiment played in the action. I send inclosed Colonel Marks' report. Towards the close of the day, by order of the major-general, I sent Colonel Neely's (Fourth Tennessee) regiment and Colonel Scott's Twelfth Louisiana Regiment across the river, commanded by Colonel Neely. These regiments crossed too late to take an active part in the action. The heaviest fire from the gunboats was against the batteries of Captain R. A. Stewart and Captain S. H. D. Hamilton, resulting from their advanced position. They and their men deserve credit for the effective service rendered. The heavy battery under the command of Major A. P. Stewart rendered effective service both against the gunboats and the enemy across the river. It is proper here to state that I advanced Colonel E. W. Gantt's Arkansas regiment, not properly belonging to my division, upon the Milburn road, to report any attack from that quarters, in the execution of which order Colonel Gantt came very near losing his life from the bursting of a shell.
I take pleasure in commending the gallant conduct of my staff, Lieutenant Balt. Barrow, acting assistant adjutant-general; Major George W. McCown, aide-de-camp; Major E. W. Dyer, quartermaster; Lieutenant G. P. Smart, adjutant artillery, who remained with me during the day, and Captain George T. Moorman, acting aide-de-camp, who were much exposed in the line of their duty-Major McCown and Captain Moorman on both sides of the river.
I regretted that I was deprived of the service of Major Bradford, adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Henry S. Foote, jr., aide-de-camp, who was absent under orders. Sergt. E. M. Ross was much exposed, and useful in bringing me accurate information.
Major Butler, of the Eleventh Regiment, fell mortally wounded in advance of his regiment. Lieutenant J. R. Alexander was killed, gallantly leading his men. Lieuts. R. R. Denninson and James Miller were wounded.
I send a list of the killed and wounded.* I am happy to say that all my command, wherever employed, exhibited coolness and decision.
Very respectfully submitted.
J. P. McCOWN,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.
Captain E. D. BLAKE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
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*Not found.
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23 R R-VOL III
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posted a section at the end of each of the three roads by which our camp could be approached, and when you came out with your regiment you gave me a company to support each section. We stood as thus placed until the arrival of Brigadier-General Pillow, who ordered your companies back to the regiment, and united my battery at the edge of the woods and the bend of the right-hand road from the usual landing of the enemy's gunboats. There we stood doing our best until the whole line retreated to the river. At the river I formed in battery again, although I had no ammunition, and so remained until carried down the bank by the force of retreating troops. My loss is 2 killed and 8 wounded and missing; 45 horses killed; 2 guns missing.
I feel bound to mention, for your favorable notice, Lieutenant C. P. Ball, than whom a braver or more accomplished officer cannot be found, and Privates White and Frederick. I am afraid Lieutenant Ball is seriously wounded by being run over by a caisson.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. BELTZHOOVER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Watson Battery.
Colonel TAPPAN,
Thirteenth Arkansas.
No. 38. Report of Major Henry Winslow, Aide-de-Camp.
COLUMBUS, KY., December 1, 1861.
GENERAL: I herewith communicate for your information the occurrences preceding and during the battle of Belmont:
ON the morning of November 7, at 2.10 a.m., I was awakened by a messenger bearing dispatches from General Thompson, who was introduced into your room by me, and at daylight another messenger arrived, informing me that the Federals were landing troops on the Missouri side above Columbus. I immediately communicated the information to you, and was directed to proceed to the quarters of Brigadier-General McCown, and inform him of this fact, and also to direct him (General McCown) to send a strong force of infantry and cavalry in that direction on this side of the river. Having performed this duty, I proceeded up the river to obtain such information by personal observation as I deemed might be useful. With an excellent glass I watched their movements until I was satisfied as to their numbers and intention, which was reported by me to yourself.
About 10 a.m. I was directed by you to cross the river and carry some orders to General Pillow. This I did, finding him about 100 yards in advance of his line of battle (which was formed in an open field), returning from reconnoitering the enemy's position. General Pillow requested me to say to you that he wished a regiment sent across and held in reserve on the bank of the river and a section or two of artillery. I immediately recrossed the river and made known to you his wishes.
The firing commenced when I was about half-way across the river. I suggested to you that a squadron of cavalry might be used to advantage, and was directed by you to order two companies from Colonel Logwood's battalion to proceed at once across the river. Captains Jackson's and Polk's batteries were also ordered across.
About 12 m. I was ordered by you to recross the river and ascertain
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