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As far as I understand it's possible to issue SSL certificates, which could be used by clients for authentication. So in theory only users with valid certificates would be able to access a certain web service. So is safe to assume, that if SSL client certificate authentication is used, possibly vulnerable, high impact web applications could be exposed to the internet without risk of access by unauthorized persons? How does this compare to using VPN?
I want to setup my application for cloud computing for Software as a Service. There is going to be a lot of data transfer between my server and client, to and fro. The technique I have envisaged is: Even the smallest communication must happen through file transfer. The file must be created in binary at the source whose file format is understood only by my application. The binary file is then encrypted by AES 256 encryption which requires another file for decrypting instead of a string. The generated file is transmitted via SFTP. The client and server applications will communicate with each other using some non-standard port like say 7238 (random) instead of the standard 80. I am looking forward to critical suggestions to my technique as I have little experience in networking applications and encryption. Note: The key file used for encryption is already present at both the server and the client. EDIT: As asked by Steffen here is what I want to protect: 1. Protect the server from getting hacked 2. In case the server is hacked the data stored on the server should be encrypted such that it is useless to the hackers 3. Transfer data to and fro the server and client without leaking it to an eavesdropping hacker
I just moved in a student flat where several students are using the same WiFi connection. A few days ago the internet was very slow and a guy (son of the owner) came in to ask if I was downloading. He could see I was using 'something that looked like a steaming or downloading site'. It really annoyed me, because I believe I just don't want others checking up on me. I've downloaded Tor, but never really used it. Now I wonder how anonymous I am in the local WiFi spot at home if I use it. I think they can check up on IPs or something, he could see I have a Macbook and I'm the only one with a Macbook in the building. I want to know that if I use a secured connection via Tor other within the network can't see what sites I'm visiting, whatever sites that my be. I don't care if the internet provider knows what I'm doing, but rather not my neighbors since its just none of their business.
What security risks do you face when connecting to an (possibly foreign) RDP server? Opening an unsigned RDP file triggers the following warning: RDP is a one way street, right?
I have a 3072 bit RSA key that I generated for use with SSH. Can this key-pair be used with PGP/GPG, or do I need to generate a new pair of keys separately for use in email encryption? Are the two interchangeable, or is there a difference between the two?
i writing all my passwords and users names on my notebook emails,amazons,facebook. and i have really Nosy little's brothers that will probably look at my notebook when i am not around, which encryption methods i can use that will be easy to use. [example] lets say user - iceman. password - 245598504.
I never understood why I have to worry about MITM when I am at home connected to my simple WiFiless modem using an Ethernet cable. I can tell how serious the threat is when you are in an Internet cafe or you have a WiFi network but WiFi is relatively new compared to the existence of SSL. Where/How would the attacker intercept my connection? should I be afraid of my ISP?
Our application has recently gone through penetration testing. The test found one critical security breach, which is essentially: The problem: Attacker sets up a WiFi spot. User enters our site (which is HTTPS). Using a tool like Cain, the attacker either redirects the user to HTTP, or keeps them in HTTPS with a spoofed certificate. (Either way, the user had to go through the "get me out of here"/"add exception" page) User enters her user name and password. The password is posted to the MITM attacker, who can see it. Apparently Cain has a feature to automatically harvest user name and passwords, and our password would be easily caught there. Suggested solution The report recommends encrypting or hashing the password in the client side (using JavaScript), in a way that cannot be replayed (e.g. using one-time pad / time stamp). They could not recommend a specific schema (they did mention client certificates, which might be unpractical for a large application). Is is worthwhile encrypting or hashing the password before posting it? It is common practice?
When you are using services like chat, file sending, exchanging etc., you always have to trust server providing these services. The only way to use services without having to trust third party is to not have third party (server) at all and to perform all actions directly (peer-to-peer). The company providing services can actually encrypt client side so server wouldn't have access to client's data, but any software update can contain changes that would send decryption info along with encrypted data, so server has access to it. Is it possible to make users sure that all their data is completely safe from server itself? So the main question is: Is it possible to keep user data safe without using complete decentralization (p2p)?
I've built a system and have put a ton of work into making sure is super secure. But I have a (potentially irrational) fear that if someone were able to break into my server, they could just change the PHP code I've written and it'd be game over. No feature I could build could withstand someone with access to the server. I do all the right things as far as picking good passwords for my server access, not saving them anywhere, etc... But I got to believe from the constant stream of news reports about mega-companies getting hacked that no matter what I do, there's still going to be some vulnerability somewhere that an experienced hacker can use to get into my system. So what do you think of this plan? Create a file titled something nondescript (we'll say secretFile.php for this example) and bury the file somewhere on the server. Make that file simply return an md5 hash of the directory where all my code is. Sign up for a second, completely separate host, and set up a cron job (cron.php) to call www.mySite.com/secretFile.php every X minutes cron.php records the results of secretFile.php If there's a change from the last time it checked in, send me a notification, trigger a kill switch, call 911, whatever... I realize this plan could be foiled if someone were to also break into my secondary server, or if they knew about secretFile.php on my primary server. But in the name of "every bit of security helps", do you feel like this bit of security would actually help? (Also, I know there are certain extensions that can be installed on my primary server that listen for file changes. But if someone has access to my primary server, I figure they could also just disable that extension too.)
My question is about online brute force attacks, that try to authenticate in the website. 1) For the first case if the requests are coming from the same ip, I think this are relatively easy as after some failed attempts we can block the ip for some time or show a captcha, or increase the delay between login attempts etc. 2) second case, lets consider the attacker is using proxy, making requests from different ip addresses, but targeting a specific account, not sure what is the best practice here, but maybe showing captcha only for this account if there were many failed attempts from different ips, or maybe considering the user's whitelisted ips. Also warning somehow the account owner as well, that were failed logins https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide_to_Authentication#Architectural_Goals 3) Anyway, I think the above 2 attacks are more or less possible to find out. But for the third case if the attacker is using multiple ips(lets say thousands or more) targeting different accounts, but using the same password, as there is a higher possibility that at least one user would have that password. In this case if the attacker is making a few requests per IP during a reasonable time, perhaps he could check thousands of accounts for that chosen password without being noticed/blocked. Now, what are the pros an cons of temporarily, lets say at the level of hours or days, save(in the database) the password hashes of failed login attempts(with a single application - side salt), and if the password was requested a lot during the last x hours/days require a captcha or some other kind of defense, before even checking the password. Also, lets consider that password policies are applied during registration, for example, min 6 or 8 characters long passwords, disallowing the usage of well known passwords. Also, for usual password hashing im using unique salt per user(and using either blowfish or sha512), but want to use single salt for failed passwords and sha 256 or 384 to be faster. thanks
I just bought a certificate from RapidSSL. Looking up the chain, I found GeoTrust who is signed by Equifax. Then I realized that the ”Equifax Secure Certificate Authority” is due to expire on 2018-08-22 at 16:42 GMT. While my certificate is due to expire on 2018-09-01 at 01:32 GMT. GeoTrust is due to expire on 2022-05-21 at 6:00. Giving my new cert a longer lifetime than a certificate further up the chain. What will happen in the last eight days of my certificate? Will it no longer be valid as the chain will be broken? I came across this while assembling the chain to get OSCP working in OpenSSL. OpenSSL spewed out errors when my chain did not contain Equifax whilst browsers and other clients seemed happy with just the GeoTrust certiface without going any further up the chain. (I presume browsers assume GeoTrust to be a top-level CA while OpenSSL is not happy with them.) openssl ocsp -issuer RapidSSL_GeoTrust_Equifax.pem \ -cert my_rappidssl_cert.pem -url http://rapidssl-ocsp.geotrust.com (This also affects nginx when set to OCSP staple certificate. It fails the same way OpenSSL does with an incomplete chain.) Is there anyway I can get the last eight days of my certificate? Or should I ask for a 8-day refund? What will happen with the GeoTrust certificate after 2018?
I have an ISP supplied cable modem/router over which I have almost no control. They can upgrade the firmware remotely, so I assume they can do virtually anything with it. When I transfer data using the switch that is contained within the modem, I think they could look at the data. When I use my own switch which is connected to the ISP modem, will the ISP modem see the traffic that goes through the switch? I know WiFi that is secured with WPA2-PSK can be eavesdropped upon, same as BNC-style network or those old CAT-style hubs I had in 2000. That is the source of my confusion/suspicion.
I looked around everywhere and I can't find the answer to my question. I'm using the latest PHP for server-side scripting and MySQL for my database. The character set is utf8mb4 if that makes a difference. Until now, I have used prepared statements to protect myself from SQL injection. However, since most of my queries are only executed once, the code is really slow. When I use $conn->query() instead, and $conn->real_escape_string() for all my variables, it's faster. However, $conn->real_escape_string() is also slow because there's a roundtrip at each call. But I don't understand why there's a need for a roundtrip because I feel like that escaping function can just be programmed in PHP. From the docs, a function would look like this: Characters encoded are NUL (ASCII 0), \n, \r, \, ', ", and Control-Z. function sanitize($str) { str_replace(array('\\', "\0", "\n", "\r", "'", '"', "\x1a"), array('\\\\', '\\0', '\\n', '\\r', "\\'", '\\"', '\\Z'), $str); } Assuming I made sure it's in the right encoding and that it's not empty. This was posted as a comment in one of the docs. By the way, str_replace works with Unicode. However, I thought of something that makes a little more sense. Looking at this page, I can stretch this a lot further. For a statement like this: $sql = "UPDATE ipsum SET lorem=$str WHERE id=1337"; Can't I just do (and I'm checking beforehand to make sure it's a UTF-8): function sanitize($str) { return "'" .str_replace(array("\\", "'"), array("\\\\", "\\'"), $str) . "'"; } And that will prevent SQL injections? Why not? I can't think of an input for which it will fail. If not, is there a better PHP function that can protect against SQL injection better? Thanks in advance! You can test SQL here. UPDATE: Received the responses I expected. To clarify, I'm not asking for you to give your classic preaches of "prepared statements are the best thing ever do it or die." If I wanted that, I'd ask on Yahoo! Answers and not here. I'd like to know why my method (the second one) is not secure (or if it is). It'd also be nice to include a discussion of what real_escape_string or prepared statements actually do to sanitize the data. Both MySQL and PHP are open source, and I'm sure someone knows what's happening when these functions are called. I simply don't understand why a roundtrip is needed to sanitize strings. How can a method like that not be implemented in PHP? UPDATE 2: I have iterated through all the unicode characters (0x0000 to 0x1F77F, found this on Wikipedia) and noticed that, if real_escape_string() only escapes single characters and not phrases (which according to the docs it does), under utf8mb4 charset, the characters that change are: unicode 0 => \0 unicode 10 =>\n unicode 13 =>\r unicode 26 =>\Z unicode 34 =>\" unicode 39 =>\' unicode 92 =>\\ So even though it's utf8mb4, it isn't different from what the docs say (guess because UTF-8 is standard). So why is this not implementable in PHP? Here's a PHP script which combines all these unicodes and sanitizes them. Here's a SQL fiddle.
Sorry I am just getting into Web Development and trying to learn more about servers and PHP, so I downloaded the LAMP stack on an Ubuntu14 OS and started an apache2 server. tcp6 0 0 :::80 :::* LISTEN - This is the line in my netstat -anltp \| grep LISTEN I am curious about.
Can we generate a public key from a private key?
how I can obtain the latest list of the latest revealed botnets domain list I am looking for the DGA-based botnet in particular I want to collect 1000,000 generated domain list to seed them to my research algorithm
Scenario: a web app with two-factor authentication using username/password and hardware OTP. Once logged into the app, one of the app modules should be used in a tablet or any mobile device without a USB port available. Should the application be able to generate a OTP and pair it with a user then allow the user to log in to the app from the mobile using that code alone? User logs in from a computer. User generates an OTP from the app. User goes to https://example.com/mobile_module/username. User enters password and OTP. User gets authenticated and the OTP is nulled. Is there a better way to approach it?
I found that the characters; < and > are filtered (shown as: < and >), when I pen test for a website. Is there any methods to bypass < and >?
I am having some question regarding captcha and AntiForgeryToken Do I need to use captcha if I am using AntiForgeryToken in an MVC application. Does AntiForgeryToken prevents automated form submission? Can I use AntiForgeryToken as an alternative to captcha?
At work (a huge organisation) I found a server on the LAN that opens SFTP connections to 2 servers across the Internet. I assume the remote hosts are in the other parties DMZ. I know you are not supposed to do this but I am not sure of the associated risks. How much more risky is it to SSH (SFTP) to a remote host from your LAN than from your DMZ. About the only thing I can think of is having the firewall rule that allows it could allow someone on this side to setup a reverse SSH session so they could get on the LAN from the outside with no audit trail. Thanks. sean
I do understand that it is a good security measure to implement HSTS, because it will reduce the number of incidents. Statement 1: If clients IO traffic goes through MITM from the start, can the attacker can just strip Strict-Transport-Security header, even from initial HTTPS connection? I'm aware of the pre-defined HSTS lists that browsers are implementing. This measure does not cover all sites/browsers. Statement 2: Attacker can pass Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0 header at any time, and disable HSTS. If both of these are true, or even number 2 alone, HSTS seems pretty useless. It can't be that easy, where am I wrong?
Differentially private techniques guarantee privacy while often permitting accurate answers ...this is something I have been reading up on lately as a means of preserving user privacy/anonymity. As of yet, however, I haven't found any examples of it being applied in a real-world setting. Instead, I am seeing it in academic papers, and discussed mathematically. Is anyone aware of how exactly this would be applied to real-world data, or indeed, know of any examples? I'm finding it very hard to make the transition from reading about it, to how I might actually go about applying it. If nobody else is applying it then I doubt I have the skills to be the first and so don't want to waste my time flogging a dead horse.
Which shell is more secure, mksh or bash? There has been some discussion pointing into the direction, that mksh is more secure. How to come to that conclusion? By looking which code was more audited and which not? Have there been any professional comparisons of either shell or comparisons of the two? (Asking from perspective of someone who writes shell scripts that parse untrusted input.)
Hypothetically speaking, could an attacker run a targeted attack on a network that would inject information into a victim's cache of recent TLS connections? Specifically, the master-key and sessionID of your existing session you'd maintain with a specific website the victim would likely visit later. When the victim goes to connect to the website over https, the full handshake will be forgone and the client will attempt to renegotiate a session using the injected (and known by the attacker) master key and sessionID. In turn, allowing the attacker to eavesdrop on all following encrypted communications. Is this correct, or is my understanding of TLS implementation incorrect? Of course, injecting the information is a mountain to climb all it's own; but I'm still learning a lot about TLS and asked myself this question.
I wrote a huffman encoding program that can compress and decompress files. The file contains a header which contains information that allows me to retrieve the huffman tree. I wanted to add a simple encryption/decryption feature to my program. I was wondering which way is better: 1. Encrypt the whole file. The problem with that is that people can figure out my header pretty quickly (relative to the 2nd way), as it is a maximum of about 1KB. 2. Encrypt everything but the header. That way, the attacker has the huffman tree, but it's useless unless he can find the right key to decrypt the content. And how will he do that, he can't just simply see if it's plain text or binary (simplified), he has to decompress it with the huffman tree, which will require more time. I think the second way is better. Is there something I'm missing here? (Please don't tell me to use a modern algorithm or something like that, this is a hobby project and I want to code it myself) Thanks.
So an Evil Twin Wifi hotspot is a hotspot with the same SSID and/or same MAC that when the victim auto-connect to this hotspot, all traffic go through this evil twin and thus the information transferred will not be secured. An evil twin requires the knowing of the password of the original hotspot. However, what if a person created one with the wrong password? This is my theory. The victim might auto-connect to this evil hotspot, and the person logs every attempt. If the evil hotspot has a closer proximity than the original one, the victim is almost 100% will first attempt to connect to the fake one. Since the attempt is logged, the password of the original one could be acquired through this method. I tried setting up two hotspot with two different MAC but same SSID. I first connect my device to the hotspot A, then I turn off the hotspot A, and turn on hotspot B. The device automatically connects to it. It seems the device does not care what the original MAC address is. Both Android and iOS behave the same. This seems to post a security threat, however I only tested the auto-connect part. Will the device actually send the stored password to the fake hotspot if it has the same SSID and encryption method? Does this actually work? What can I do to prevent this from happening?
We heard lots of complaints about hard to use crypto tools, and recent ideas of Google how to fix this. I had another idea about this which seems quite obvious, but couldn't find anything about it on the web. The idea would be to automate the PGP Web-of-Trust by loosening crypto requirements, following the Opportunistic Security idea. The email client would automatically look up the PGP key of all receivers in key stores (first local, then public keyservers, ideally provided by the receiving email provider) and encrypt the mail with these keys. Ideally, we would use trusted keys by regular PGP standards. However, we would fall back to any suitable key with less trust, down to a complete unknown key if required. On the sending side, any email client would automatically create a PGP key locally and publish the public key part on the email provider's keyserver. The client obviously needs to provide a way to define/import our own key for advanced users. By these defaults, we would have more/most emails encrypted, by itself an arguable advantage (to increase surveillance costs). The only "new" idea here would be to automatically manage trust by exploiting social assumptions. The main assumption would be that two parties continuously exchanging emails somehow know each other and can identify each other by the contents of the mails exchanged. With each email exchange, the email clients of both parties would increase their internal trust score for the other party's key. This internal trust score would be applied like traditional Web-of-Trust confidence levels to build up an automated Web-of-Trust. We would keep the internal trust score separate from traditional confidence level for two reasons: The internal trust score needs to be very fine-grained in order to allow automated increments and calculation (e. g. 0..1 range with IEEE-754 double precision). Automatically crated trust scores are better than none, but will never reach the explicit confidence levels of the traditional Web-of-Trust. For me, this seems like a suitable approach for the public part of the key management issue. It does not solve the private part (e. g. getting the private key to all mobile devices). We also inherit all known issues of PGP. I'm pretty sure I'm missing some major issue here. Thanks for pointing it out to me.
The unix read permission is actually the same as the execute permission, so if e.g. one process has write access it's also able to execute the same file. This can be done pretty easily:First this process has to load the content of the file,which shall be executed, into a buffer. Afterwards it calls a function from a shared library which parses the ELF in the buffer and loads it to the right addresses(probably by overwriting the old process as usual, when calling execvp). The code jumps to the entry point of the new program and it's being executed. I am pretty sure Dennis Ritchie and Ken Thompson were aware of that issue. So why did they even invent this permission, what is the intention behind it and what's the sense of it, if it can't prevent any process of any user having read access from executing? Is there even such a sense or is it superfluous? Could this even be a serious security issue, are there any systems, which rely on the strength of rw- or r-- permissions?
I feel like there must be a simple explanation, but I've been looking around haven't found any wholesome answers. Take for example my name is Alice and my best friend Bob and we want to communicate securely. If I write a program that takes my text and obscures it through several dozen filters and can successfully reverse the process, assuming I then wrote the program on a piece of paper and gave Bob my paper in the middle of the desert where he then memorized it and burned it, how would anyone ever possibly crack our code? To elaborate on obscurity take for example I do the following: Take my original string and convert it to binary From there I add the last digit of the year to each number Then I reversed the text Then I added a randomly generated character once every 3 characters And so forth, on and on, until I had several dozens obscurities filtered through. Why wouldn't it be more-or-less impossible to decrypt our message without the program or formula itself (or at least for several years)? Side note: I would understand completely why security through obscurity wouldn't work for people saying things like "I'll just use weird OS and I'll be safe because who the hell understands weird OS!" I am asking purely asking about sending an encrypted message back and forth, that if intercepted by a third party would not be able to realistically crack due to its obscurity.
After some careful looking at one .pcap of my network i would like to undestand why a request appears on the communication like IP [TLS Application Data] Application Data Protocol: http Version TLS: 1.0 Encrypted Application Data: a44a55a5aa6aablabla and then the reply from the destination IP is just a simple TCP packet(Protocol TCP no longer wireshark informs that the connection is ... TLS) with the ACK flag nothing more, what could cause such a strange end of the connection?
Suppose a website is hit by a 500 Mbps DDos, and then the DDos stops for a second or so; does the website recuperate?
I have a question. If you were using a password brute force/dictionary attack utility on a site like yahoo or another site, how long would it take to crack a password like Jah13Wootiang if Wootiang is first name and Jah is last name? This is assuming that attacker knows your name. This is assuming that there is no lock feature.
I wonder where can I find good collections of dictionaries which can be used for MySQL 5 dictionary attack? I just need MySQL 5 word lists / dictionaries. I found a lot of MD5, SHA1, etc. but not MySQL 5 word list / dictionary.
We are a small startup. One of our products is a B2B web service, accessible through its https://service.example.com canonical URL. For testing purposes, that service also runs on different testing/staging/integration environments, such as https://test.service.example.com , https://integration.service.example.com, etc. We also have collaborative tools such as a bug tracker or a wiki. They run also on machines provided by our hosting provider. Their URLs are e.g. https://wiki.example.com, https://bugs.example.com. To keep things simple, we use a single certificate (for example.com), and have added all the URLs above as Subject Alternative Names to that same certificate. All our servers thus use the same certificate. Is there any security issue in doing so that we should be aware of? If yes, what would have been the "correct" way of doing things?
Assume the following sample directory: - / - /images - /28374728127636438 - /css Directory listing is disabled on the server and the directory named 28374728127636438 never linked anywhere on the actual web page. This directory contains the backend of the web site. It is secured by a http auth and php login, but can an attacker still find this directory? Is there some method to force a web server in listing files and directories? Does security through obscurity work in this case? edit Note: I am on shared webhosting. I cannot control anything outside my htdocs folder and only have .htaccess available. All directories that contain PHP or template code have a deny from all in their .htaccess and other folders have an empty index.html along with options -Indexes to avoid listing.
Another question about client or server side password hashing, I know. After reading many other post about this topic I'm still a little confused and not completely sure what is the best, because I read many contrasting opinions. Using a SSL certificate, that is what I'm gonna do, I came to conclusion that it's not worth hash the password in javascript. But anyway rather than send the password in cleartext to the server would make sense 'disguise' the password in javascript, (for example replacing letters and numbers with other based on a customized pattern), and then re-build the original password in the server using the same pattern, then hash the password and store it in the db or this would not add much more security?
Traditionally most Payment providers only provide Hosted Payment Sites via redirect or iframe. But now an increasing number is also supporting payment integration via a Javascript library. I imagine the case in which an attacker is able to inject code into the Web App: the attacker would still not be able to read the iframe's content because of Same-origin policy. On the other hand in the JS lib case, a jQuery 1-liner is enough to send the user's credit card data to some server. Is this view correct? Or are both options equally safe, because once an attacker can inject code, he could do (almost) anything anyway?
This is really bugging me. Up until recently debit cards with an electronic chip were the most popular electronic form of payment available in Poland (I'd wager that in other European countries as well). It does seem pretty safe too - in order to make any kind of purchase (either from an ATM or in a store), the user needs to provide a PIN code. While said PIN isn't particularly long it's there to provide an extra level of security: the first being the card itself. In recent times PayPass (or similar) cards have been gaining popularity and it seems banks are pushing these cards onto the public. These cards can act just like the regular debit cards described above, but you can also use them to make payments using NFC. Here's the big deal: when making a payment through NFC the user doesn't need to input the PIN. It seems to me that with a wireless technology like this, a PIN should be a definite requirement as it feels the technology isn't particularly secure. One example of this is the proxy attack, where one person with a cell-phone gets some items in a store and goes to pay for them, while another person with a cell-phone looks for a PayPass card to read (on a crowded train / bus / station / etc.). Depending on the technology used, those cards can be read from quite a distance away as well. Which brings me back to the matter of PINs... Why aren't PINs always a requirement when paying using NFC? EDIT: I do realize that the amount you can pay for using NFC is limited. However, as far as convenience goes (no need to put the card in / swipe wallet) it seems like we're trading security AND some convenience for... slightly more convenience. What I mean: as it is, you can pay for small things by just swiping the card. Great. But inputting a 4 digit pin after swiping shouldn't be much of a deal, right? And then you wouldn't need to limit the amount you can pay for. You could still keep the card in your wallet, and the whole thing would be just as fast. In fact, ideally, you could have a "PIN-less" limit as it is now but allow NFC transactions over that amount... just require the PIN! Or are there other technical / security concerns with PINs and NFC in general? While it seems that this limit could easily be changed, I haven't heard of a bank (in Poland at least) actually allowing the customer to make such a change. I know I tried calling my bank directly and was informed this is impossible...
If you have already encrypted files, are they still vulnerable to being encrypted a second time by a program like Cryptolocker, or would this protect them?
So I'm trying to solve how to block users from downloading an attachment of a timed WordPress -post before article goes live? Attachments work as uploads on a custom field in an article. My current solution is to use htaccess to block the uploads archive, so visitors cannot browse them and thus see a new file before its released. Also if the client gives a hard-to-guess names to the attachments then users will not be able to get to them without knowing the exact name (right?) .htaccess: Options -Indexes My questions: On a scale of 1-10, how easy my current solution is to hack? Is it possible to make this solution relatively safe Is there another safer solution for this? could a plugin be developed to transfer the file from a safe place when article gets released Can ANY solution where the attachment is on the server/inside WordPress -uploads be a safe solution? Is there a third party solution for this? Like service that could release documents at specific time Thank you very much in advance
Once you have generated your master PGP key, will the "data" in the private key ever change? For instance, if you add another subkey, uid, or any other data to the master key, do these changes need to be "written" to the "secret half of the key", modifying it in any way? Or are all changes made to the "public half of the key", or even some sort of third signed file with the details? That is, can you store the secret key on read-only media such as a CD-ROM, printed on paper, or tattooed onto the shaved head of one of your servants?
I am using and getting my friends to use NoScript, and the argument I usually have to use to convince them is "It prevent website to infect you without you downloading something (by yourself)". But now that I read a bit about malware, I m not so sure anymore about this, and I d like confirmation; With Firefox updated to last version and NoScript, is it possible to get infected by drive-by-download without actively trying to get infected?
What happens to the packets that the exit node sends/receives from the desired web server? Does each response packet get routed back through the Tor circuit (encrypting on the way) individually? If so, does the client need to send acknowledgement of receipt of these packets back to the original web server (routed back through the Tor circuit again)? Or does the exit node simply complete the normal communication with the desired web server and then send the (entire) received data back through the Tor circuit somehow? If this is the case, does each relay receive all the data and then send all that data to the next node only once it has received everything, too?
I'm not very experienced with information security but know some basics about injection attacks and other web based attacks. Is there a tool / crawler to find all forms and input fields of a whole website? I know addons for firefox and chrome showing form details of the current viewed website. What I need is a tool like a security scanner / website crawler that automatically scans the whole website for forms and generates a useful file or shows an overview with forms and their input fields. I use linux and want to check a locally developed website for forms and input fields. edit: I didn't use any security tools before just know some basics from books and articles from the internet
Why is it not possible to use a bearer token from an IdP STS to get ADFS (2.1) to issue a token? All issuedtoken endpoints require a symmetric or asymmetric key in the IdP token. Is there a specific reason for this?
A couple months earlier, I made the mistake of downloading some software over an insecure wireless network and running it without checking its integrity. I am now considering reinstalling my system, as I am worried it might be compromised. Should I consider myself compromised? EDIT: Just to clarify: no credentials were transmitted over the network, except by means of HTTPS connections. The attack I am worried about is that the binaries I installed may have been tampered with. How likely is this? Would you reinstall in this situation?
When Evil McJones develops Virus X and initiates its propagation, what events must transpire for AV companies (and AV testing/validation companies) to recognize Virus X? This answer to this question gives a brief list of high-level ways the virus can be found: Samples are sent in by customers Malware detected by heuristic scanners (i.e. stuff that behaves like a virus) is further analysed Mail blocked as spam can be analysed for malware attachments. "honeypots", which are public servers or email addresses designed to collect malware going undercover in malware writers communities But, what's are the specifics? Are the non-customer initiated means of collecting viruses completely automated? Or, are there N people in a lab trying to contract something? What heuristics / behaviors lead to a more in depth analysis? And what does the more in-depth analysis consist of? What's the "final marker" of a virus? ... And who names the darn thing?
Let's say I were to post my e-mail address and public PGP key to my website. When a client contacts me, they would have to include their PGP public key in the e-mail so that I can respond to them in encrypted PGP format, am I correct? Or is there some other way to reply to them without them having to include their PGP public key in the email?
I'm trying to talk with somebody on Facebook, but after many Facebook privacy scandals, it's a big question. Secondly on OSX, it's giving me the error that “FacebookVideoCalling_v1.6.jar” can’t be opened because it is from an unidentified developer. If I install that software, is there any possibility that somebody can use/hack my microphone or video/camera through that application without my knowledge?
If an attacker on the network attempts to use ARP poisoning (spoofing) in order to redirect traffic to his own machine, what mechanisms and techniques are available for tracking the spoofed ARP messages to their source? Are these techniques effective even when the attacking machine is using a spoofed MAC address (a likely scenario)?
If I had to store a text file with some confidential information on the cloud, would encrypting the file multiple times (say, 3) with different passwords using WinRAR (AES with a 256 bit key) provide more security than encrypting it just once? Assumptions: I'm assuming that someone will eventually break into this service or my account on the cloud service and gain access to the encrypted data. I'm also assuming that the current version of the software used (WinRAR 5.11) is secure and doesn't have any vulnerabilities that can be exploited to make password bruteforcing easier (e.g. under 1 hour for WinZip 8 and earlier versions) EDIT: I checked the linked question, but I'm not referring to the key derivation function (KDF) used. If I understand correctly, in the linked question, the password is only used once and KeePass does a few things to slow down a bruteforce attack using rainbow tables with the KDF. What if all the three passwords that I use for each of the 3 rounds of encryption are fairly strong and different from each other? And even if KDF is used here (seems like it is), it's used separately on each of the three different passwords. (e.g. AES256(password3, AES256(password2, AES256(password1, data))))) Does that make it more or less secure if hardware 'accelerator' beasts like this one try to attack it?
I'm writing a web app that already uses TLS encrypted connections (HTTPS), Secure; HttpOnly session cookie, HMAC-SHA1 CSRF token, requires correct Referer header to avoid Login CSRF and changes session id during login to avoid basic session fixation attacks. However, I cannot use HSTS because the same domain needs to serve some HTTP content for historical reasons. I'm failing to understand how to avoid MitM attack that accomplishes session fixation in practice: Attacker navigates to https://example.com/login and receives a new anonymous session-id cookie and corresponding HMAC-SHA1 csrf-token embedded in login form. Attacker completes login and the server overwrites the session-id cookie for the new user id. Attacker saves the value of session-id cookie. Victim navigates to example.com using HTTP and the attacker initiates MitM attack that modifies the response to have Set-Cookie: session-id=<value-from-attacker-session> and Location: https://example.com/whatever. Victim's browser now completes full TLS handshake with example.com and does GET /whatever with Cookie: session-id=<value-from-attacker-session>. In practice, this is a completion of session fixation attack because Victim is now running the session shared with the Attacker. Granted, this is not an easy attack because it requires active MitM attack and the Victim needs to use initial HTTP connection to example.com. In addition, this only allows for session fixation, not session hijacking. Is HSTS the only way to avoid this attack? Is there any way to avoid cookies set via HTTP connection being visible on HTTPS connection looking identical to Secure; HttpOnly cookies? Update 2014-09-04 I'm assuming following claims are true: TLS connection is secure and the UA has a sane list of trusted CAs. End user is able to avoid sslstrip-like attacks where browser chrome contains incorrect URL. example.com is not on the preloaded HSTS list. The guard cookie suggested by Steffen Ullrich would fix the issue except for the fact that it cannot detect if attack is done during initial connection. Implementing guard cookie would still avoid attack switching the session on-the-fly. Currently MitM Attacker could overwrite the original Secure; HttpOnly cookie called session-id with a regular HTTP cookie any time in the future he can get the UA to access any HTTP URL for the same domain. (This can be pretty easy because the Attacker can redirect any HTTP connection from the same browser session.) I'm still failing to see any way to really fix this without any assistance from UA. If UAs only had a way to tell which cookies have been set over TLS connection instead of plain old HTTP... (As a side not I have to say that all the suggestions to detect sslstrip-like attacks by server side like described in the answer linked by Steffern Ullrich seem vain because all suggestions require sending JavaScript files that do the detection and sslstrip is strictly about MitM attacker able to modify files on the fly. As such, the Attacker can easily make any JavaScript detection to always return "ok".) Related links: 1. Cookie forcing 2. Login CSRF
I´m building a enterprise application and I need to create a secure communication between android and a server. What is the most secure way to do End-to-End communication? Should I use HTTPS or VPN? There are better options?
I have a dead tree document. In order to reduce the risk of being compromised, I would like to digitize and encrypt the document, and then destroy the physical copy. Let's assume my computer itself is secure (since if not, this discussion becomes moot). Let's further allow that I am very paranoid and suspect the scanner as the weak link in the chain. Is it common for scanners to somehow cache or log documents they scan (on the scanner machine itself)? Does scanner driver/software often have temporary folders which end up leaving a trace of the document? Can a networked scanner maliciously or accidentally distribute the file to third parties (over the LAN/WAN or the internet)? What steps can be realistically taken to minimize the risk?
1) To what extent is OAuth2 more secure than JSON authentication (both over SSL)? The context is a client (one server) querying another server (via API) within a local network using RESTFul. Prior to the server sending a JWT, the client sends a password for authentication (over SSL). 2) So is there a justification, security-wise, to use instead OAuth2?
Our product is comprised of two servers. We would like to authenticate one server to the main server by means of client certificate. I assume that we should ask the customers (who purchase the product) to use their own CA to generate a certificate for the main server. 1) Would that be an intermediate CA certificate? Then, I assume that the main server should generate a client certificate and send it to the subordinate server. 2) What would be a secure way to pass the client certificate from the main server to the sub server? 3) Is this all supported by OpenSSL? Thanks. {Already asked this question earlier but my new user was unavailable.}
Hi need some help here. I am trying to exploit an unsanitized file upload with a PHP backdoor. Basically the file uploads successfully and I can see my backdoor inside the web applications /images/ directory but when I click on the file to execute it I am give an error stating 'permission denied'. (This is because only admin logins can access it). Is there a way of uploading the file to another directory using a file inclusion vulnerability, so that my user can execute the file? I've search Google etc. but all examples and tutorials involve being able to access the file and execute it with normal privileges. Note: This is a Web application I have permission to test. Thanks
I am using Retina via BeyondInsight 5.2.0.410 to scan my network. Occasionally, I get the error message "You do not have the required permissions to scan the entered range" which doesn't make sense because within BeyondInsight my account has every permission. Any pointers on where to look?
Just to make sure, is there is a reason for shredding any type of data cables? Is it OK to throw them away just as they are? Thanks.
I'm curious since I discovered the nature of how browsing works in Opera Mini. A URL request is sent to Opera's servers, they download the page then compress it to lower bandwidth. They use a file format that is only used by Opera Mini. I like to visit websites like reddit's WTF and I don't think my university network admins would appreciate seeing that in the history.
I have to write some login module for Java EE application. Previously i was using JBoss security - provided login and password, called HttpServletRequest with login method and JBoss security did the magic. That authentication uses Hash - SHA. Right now i'm thinking about salting passwords. I have got jbcrypt library. It provides hashing and checking. But i dont know (mayby yet:) ) how to use it with HttpServletRequest. And that leads to question what if i simply hash password, and compare it in code with hashedPassword.equals(databasePassword)? Is it bad option comparing to JBoss security? I want to use BCrypt.checkpw(candidate, hashed) and it can tell me if password is matched. Can i do that in code or it is better to use HttpServletRequest?
I am lead dev on a team of five people. Only three are coders. And only the coders are really technical enough to do a roll-out of our application to a production server. Our app is pretty successful and we have attained some high profile clients. These clients typically put us through pretty brutal security audits. For the most part, we pass these audits. But one area that trips us up is separation of duties. e.g. They want one person/team to handle dev environments, while one person/team handles the production environments. And furthermore, sometimes they even want the person who does the work (like pushing to production) and who monitors/supervises/approves the work to be separate roles as well. The problem with only having three tech people is that we can't keep our bus factor high while keeping our separation of duties that some clients require. Thoughts? Solutions? Have you faced similar resource problems? p.s. Tried to tag this devops and bus-factor, but I don't have enough rep to create new tags.
I have a multipart form data where I am suspecting one of the multipart form fields (parameter named htmlbevt_id), to be vulnerable to SQLi. To test for the same I captured the request using Burp and saved it in a file, say myFile. Now on SQLMap I ran the following command: sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/myFile -p htmlbevt_id I get the following error message: unable to connect to the target URL or proxy. sqlmap is going to retry the request Am I missing something? Am I required to login to the application before I run the above query? If so, how do I make SQL recognize the login? I mean is it that I need to login to the application from the browser and then run the above query (in which case I am not certain how exactly would SQLMap get to know that I am already logged into the application), or is there a different way to do this ? Through some further googling i learned that --cookie needs to be used to replay the session authentication in SQLmap. Also since the request is a POST, some forums suggest the usage of --data as well, which I did. None of this has however been useful so far. I tried -v 6 to debug and see what was going wrong. And SQLmap reports "not a valid WebScarab log data". Not sure if this is the cause of the error. Ok, a lot of the problem was solved. So now with the help of CO2 extension for Burp I was able to replay the entire traffic of the multipart POST request, along with all the session cookies, through SQLMap. But now there is a different problem that I am facing. While I check for the application in the browser the session is still alive. But while scanning the SQLi injectable suspected parameter with SQLMap (I set verbose level to 3) I found that the server was returning a HTTP 400 session time out. What could be going wrong and is there a way to keep the session maintained while SQLMap does the scanning ?
What is the best course of action when you discover that a non-administrator Linux account has gotten owned, and a single foreign process is running, making all sorts of networking connections? For example, how would one take a complete snapshot of the process for future analysis? Take into consideration that the executable itself might have been deleted, so, even the binary itself you'd have to find through an inode with something like debugfs, but there's also the question of preserving other evidence.
I have an application that runs on some host machine and generates logs. Later in the day those logs are securely transmitted to my machine. The problem is that while the logs are being generated I dont have any access to the host machine whereas some users have full access to it and may want to forge the logs to their benefit. Is there a way to detect (or better yet prevent) such forgeries. The log generating application may be modified to encrypt or insert MACs in the logs but encrypting/signing keys have to be on the same machine. Given that the malicious users may also have access to source code of the application, how do I go about protecting those keys? Or are there other better techniques to tackle this scenario. TIA
Today at work I was asked to test our anti-virus software on our Linux servers. I attempted to create a text file containing the EICAR Virus Test signature. The file was deleted instantly, indicating the real-time virus scan was working. However, this got me thinking... since this is a relatively short string of ASCII printable characters, this could be easily inserted into many forms of user-input. So depending on how the Anti-Virus software handles this, you may be able to use this to force a deletion of a file if you are able to append this to it. For example, let's say a Web server logs all the requests you send it, and you insert this EICAR virus signature into a request and it gets logged into a file, and the file then gets deleted. I tried searching google for malicious use of the EICAR virus test but wasn't able to find any examples of misuse of this in the wild. Anyone know if this has been done before? It's an interesting idea that an Anti-Virus software ironically could be a threat to what would otherwise be non-threatining. Thoughts? [EDIT] In conclusion, if implemented correctly in the AV software, the EICAR Test appended to a log file would not be detected (which is good). However, I found out that this is not always implemented correctly. Therefore, some anti-virus software may wrongfully take action if this were to be appended to a log file. See my analysis done below: Anti-Virus software that accurately detects the EICAR Test signature by itself in a file: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/56606ad869484ccbb4d012f46c9c73ea9b20f9863351741aab96763345209564/analysis/1409779284/ Anti-Virus software that detects the EICAR test signature even if it's been appended to a file (this violates the EICAR Test rule, and thus was not implemented in the AV software according to Protocol): https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f5b88459f4b2c6425bdfc5c8f4f17027e0bfcc65a4c39dbb48f96c81ce17369c/analysis/1409779665/ [/EDIT]
Everyone want security for their pc/laptops... NO DOUBT... So we protect them by some password. 'Longer password, more security' this is the tag line. But what if our computer can change our account's password? For better security, can we design an OS which is able to change our passwords with specific duration of time??? It means our password will vary with that given duration of time... It will make a cycle between our passwords... When anyone try to break the password he prefers to use different different combinations, by changing passwords time to time will lowers the probability of finding the correct combination. Will it be useful for security purposes?
I am uncertain about how public malware detection rulesets are? By a "ruleset" I mean the rules, usually written in Yara, that malware detection engines use to determine whether a file or memory sequence is potentially malware. I know that different detectors definitely use different rulesets, because if you use Virus Total or some similar service, you can see that for a given binary some of the vendors will flag the binary and others will not. I would expect a vendor's ruleset to be "secret sauce" that they would not release publicly. Nevertheless, I can't see how it would be secret. For example, I have Symantec Endpoint running on my desktop, so in theory it has a file somewhere it is reading which has the ruleset in it. Therefore, getting the rules should be as simple as finding that file. Of course, there is the possibility that the ruleset on my desktop is different than the one Symantec has on its servers. So, on the desktop I might just be getting the "old" stuff that everybody knows, and all the really valuable rules are only on their servers and thus inaccessible. So, are these rulesets considered "secret" or are they publicly available or somewhere in between?
I was involved in this project where development got outsourced to a consulting company, but to seal the deal the consulting company had to set up a room in their office with restricted access so that only consultants working on our projects could enter, and bunch of functions were disabled from workstations to prevent data leakage. Is there a standard name for such a setup - would it be called a safe room or secured room or other ?
I plan to build an Android/iPhone app. The app will contain a few forms and status screens. One of the screens will ask the user for their card details. Once they'll click submit they'll be sent over to a third-party via a secure channel (https); but not stored at all in the application. Update: We will not be taking payments through the app, just provide a form for users to register their cards. Future request to the third-party include the userId and an authorization field. Do I need PCI compliance in this case?
an xt-commerce-based online shop from a friend of mine got hacked recently. The attacker mailed that the shop is vulnerable, he showed the extracted data (basically he dumped the databases and cracked the md5 hashes, which were not salted) and asked for some bitcoins. My friend engaged a security company, which performed a (rather bad) webapp scan using accunetix web scanner. The output was almost unreadable as it contained almost 98% false positives (spread over some 40-50 pdf pages). So he asked me to perform a second scan and I found 4-5 SQL injections and some XSS, an outdated version of Apache as well as PHP and MySQL. The SQL injections were patched and I verified the patches, as I couldnt perform any SQLi anymore. Now, the users of the shop were informed about the breach and were asked to change their password. However, some hours ago, the hacker managed to place a fake order in xt-commerce. I wonder what the owners of the shop could do now? The did not enable MySQL logging as this would fill memory quickly. I asked them to inspect the Apache logs to see what happened during the point of time were the fake order was placed. I asked them to look for PHP/Web-Shells, which might have been placed on the webserver. I wonder if it is possible to somehow scan the contents of the database for abnormalities? Of course there is the possibility of still having security holes in the web app. If the attacker chose to exploit the webserver, php-daemon or the mysql server, we would have a hard time to trace this back, right? Should we thus turn on filesystem logging? Could you suggest me what further steps to take or maybe just tell me your gut feeling about this situation?
While searching on Google I found a website that shows one set of content to the Google Bot and an other to users (by redirecting to a new domain), and also a very suspicious Javascript file. Maybe it's a tracking cookie or a virus/malware, I don't know, so I am asking here if someone can help explain the code? If the site is "safe" why does it redirect a search engine to a normal website, and users to a blank page by loading this .js file? Why should it have a getpassword.asp hosted on the second redirected domain (from sucuri scan) ? document.write ('<a href="" target="_blank"><img alt="51.la 专业、免费、强健的访问统计" src="" style="" /></a>\n'); var a1156tf="51la";var a1156pu="";var a1156pf="51la";var a1156su=window.location;var a1156sf=document.referrer;var a1156of="";var a1156op="";var a1156ops=1;var a1156ot=1;var a1156d=new Date();var a1156color="";if (navigator.appName=="Netscape"){a1156color=screen.pixelDepth;} else {a1156color=screen.colorDepth;} try{a1156tf=top.document.referrer;}catch(e){} try{a1156pu =window.parent.location;}catch(e){} try{a1156pf=window.parent.document.referrer;}catch(e){} try{a1156ops=document.cookie.match(new RegExp("(^\| )a1156_pages=([^;])(;\|$)"));a1156ops=(a1156ops==null)?1: (parseInt(unescape((a1156ops)[2]))+1);var a1156oe =new Date();a1156oe.setTime(a1156oe.getTime()+60601000);document.cookie="a1156_pages="+a1156ops+ ";path=/;expires="+a1156oe.toGMTString();a1156ot=document.cookie.match(new RegExp("(^\| )a1156_times=([^;])(;\|$)"));if(a1156ot==null){a1156ot=1;}else{a1156ot=parseInt(unescape((a1156ot)[2])); a1156ot=(a1156ops==1)?(a1156ot+1):(a1156ot);}a1156oe.setTime(a1156oe.getTime()+3652460601000);document.cookie="a1156_times="+a1156ot+";path=/;expires="+a1156oe.toGMTString();}catch(e){} try{if(document.cookie==""){a1156ops=-1;a1156ot=-1;}}catch(e){} a1156of=a1156sf;if(a1156pf!=="51la"){a1156of=a1156pf;}if(a1156tf!=="51la"){a1156of=a1156tf;}a1156op=a1156pu;try{lainframe}catch(e){a1156op=a1156su;} a1156src='(0-a1156d.getTimezoneOffset()/60)+'&tcolor='+a1156color+'&sSize='+screen.width+','+screen.height+'&referrer='+escape(a1156of)+'&vpage='+escape(a1156op)+'&vvtime='+a1156d.getTime(); setTimeout('a1156img = new Image;a1156img.src=a1156src;',0);
The way I have set up my email system allows me to put the name of a company (that say I am buying a book from) in front of the @ and my domain name.net after it. So, when I get an email from amazon@**.net, and it's from a different company, I would know that Amazon have sold my email address or their email address book has been stolen. This has happened today with groupon.co.uk who tell me that it's not their fault that I have received a nasty spam email addressed to groupon@**.net, it's probably come from a cookie which I have on my computer. Is that possible?
I am a student of information technology and I am doing a project on avoiding MAC spoofing by using MAC encryption. My goal is to encrypt the MAC address inside the packet and send that packet to the router over the WiFi network. On the router side, I want to decrypt the MAC address from the packet and store it in such a way that no unauthorized user can see that MAC address, thus avoiding MAC spoofing. I want to know whether is it possible to encrypt MAC address and if it is possible to decrypt that MAC address at the router side?
Today most of the home WIFI/Routers are vulnerable from a security perspective, with various backdoors, UPnP issuses and more. What should I look for when I as a home user want to get a secure solution at decent price? Do I need to look for enterprise products or should I go for any hardware supporting OpenWrt?
There have been wars fought over RSA, DSA, and I'm sure other public key encryption algorithms, and usually the arguments are "Algorithm A is faster to encode, but algorithm B is faster to decode". However, from what I understand, the slow asymmetric encryption is only used to encrypt a single hash, after which point symmetric encryption is used. See Public Key, Private Key, Secret Key: Everyday Encryption This leads me to wonder, in practice, does it actually matter which encryption algorithm is slower or faster than the other when they do the slow asymmetric encryption once and in a fraction of a second, and then proceed with fast symmetric encryption algorithms for the rest of the session?
I started to show interest in information security few months ago, the more I read the more I think it's all about mathematics not information techonolgy. I mean the whole thing is based on encryption and the latter is just a set of complicated mathematical equations. To be more specific why do we see IT gurus in conventions talking about how they developed strong encryption .. etc when it only the work of math scientists? and when someone says that NSA can break X encryption it means they have a team of mathematicians who have came up with an equation that breaks the first one. What am I missing here?
I was thinking about SYSTEM account on windows 7 and while researching about it, I came to know that it is predefined account used by service control manager (SCM),The account is not recognised by security subsystem what does it mean? I want to know if this account has a profile name on windows 7, 8, 8.1 etc., why can't we login into that account, why is the account not associated with any logged in user account? If we do anything under SYSTEM account like rename a file is it logged in event manager? Does this account has a password or username? Almost everyone knows that we can run windows explorer under SYSTEM account and explore the SYSTEM profile but when I did it I often have difficulty like deleting, renaming etc why?
Is it at all possible to detect all air type signals for a given location? For example, if I wanted to get a list of all air signals (i.e. wifi, bluetooth, radio, 3g, 4g, and all other air type signals, gps etc) going into and out of a building, is that possible?
I was just wondering if I can generate couple of PGP key pairs and save them for later use or backup. In addition can I be sure that other wont generate and use some of my key pairs in the meantime. I mean is there any guarantee that anyone anywhere in the world haven`t generated the same keys?
I work from home and use a VPN to connect to work. Can my company tell which time I'm using my laptop and which time I am using my PC? Is this something easy for them to check? The VPN is through Citrix.
Over the past few weeks I have noticed that there is a mystery contact showing up in my text message history: When I click into this message there is nothing in the history. I went to the domain associated with the text message and found the Chinese news site: hxxp://21cn.com/. I've noticed that the day associated with the text ("Monday" in the image above) will update once a week or so. Has anyone heard of anything like this? Has my phone been compromised?
Cloud scanners are becoming more common these days. Pricing is a lot cheaper than on premise scanners. My concern with cloud scanners is that they store sensitive information on 3rd party network. (I am not sure if the sensitive information only include scan result). Is there any other information cloud scanner may store besides scan result? I know when I was taking cyber law and compliance classes, I remember some of them(HIPPA, SOX, PCI) required different set of rules for transferring personal information to another site. Should I be concerned with this when using Cloud web application scanner whether it is SAST or DAST? What are you experiences and thoughts on cloud scanners vs on premise ones?
Is it a good practice to recreate the CSRF Token once its been used (basically create a new taken after a post request is sent)? Or it an unnecessary measure to take? My current system is recreating the token after each post/delete/put request and currently its causing me some serious trouble with a part of my code where I need to make multiple POST requests one after another, and since the system restarts the token as it starts the POST request, the other requests get "Invalid Token" error.
For PCI compliance I was required to protect our server against BEAST attacks. While I have correctly configured the apache / openssl settings to pass a scan, these settings have effectively limited the client browsers that can securely transact on the sites https side. We are using Cenots 6.5 Final, OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013 I cannot find any information on how to update or add either specific or all ciphers to OpenSSL. Are cipher suites distributed within the OpenSSL program OR are ciphers suites add-ons?, if they are add-ons how do you update them?
I feel like this isn't the best place to ask this (since there's no single right answer), but I can't think of a better place. If you have a better recommendation, could you please recommend it and I can move the question rather than just having it closed outright? I'm teaching a class of high-school students about general Linux security. At a high level I want them to be able to take a given Linux server and know how to harden it against common security issues - e.g. closing old accounts, using a strong pw hashing algorithm, make sure no strange processes are running or run at boot. Their skill-level is a broad range, and I'm looking for ways to motivate them to use what we've been discussing (e.g. look at crontab; look at users and group configurations; look at open ports). I have been given $200 to hold a competition to encourage them, and I thought maybe I could purchase a bunch of Amazon gift cards in $10 increments. The idea would be to "hide" the redemption codes in various places on our sandbox server for the kids to find. For example, I could store the passwords in plaintext, and have one of the example user accounts assigned a password of one of the codes. Or maybe I could set up a cron job to log one of the codes to a system log every 30 seconds. What I'm looking for is places/methods to hide these codes such that someone looking to secure the server would stumble across them. Thanks!
I'm trying to fully understand the report of the SSL Labs server test. Can someone explain the term 'TLS version intolerance'? I cannot find any documentation of this term, even not on the forums of SSL labs or their SSL Server Rating Guide. For example, for the SSL report of mijn.ing.nl (dutch banking site) it states: TLS version intolerance: TLS 1.3 TLS 1.98 TLS 2.98 Intolerance sounds bad, but is it in this case? I'm also unaware of the TLS versions 1.98 and 2.98. Update: nowadays the TLS version intolerance is fixed for mijn.ing.nl (stated as "No" in the report)
I've been researching BREACH, and while I can understand how it might work if you have access to the the browser (to send crafted requests) and the wire (to capture compressed response length), I haven't seen a way to do this without access to the wire, aside from a fragile timing attack on response time. You can get Content-length with this code, but it only works if the site enabled CORS and isn't used a chunked Content-length. var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.open('GET', document.location, false); req.send(null); req.getAllResponseHeaders().toLowerCase(); There's also an iframe approach, but I'm not aware of a way to get the Content-length for an iframe, and again, this fails if it's chunked. Am I missing something? I there a technique I haven't covered for getting the Content-length? It doesn't seem to be a viable attack without both access to the browser and access to either that, or to the wire.
My team at work was recently working on encrypting some hard drives using Microsoft's BitLocker on Windows 7 hosts. The initial encryption for the 2TB drives took several hours to complete. This is all fine and dandy. What is concerning me however, is that upon changing the password, the process was instantaneous. This doesn't make sense to me, since I assumed that BitLocker was using my provided password (or some hashed derivative) to actually perform the encryption. If that were the case, then the drive should require complete decryption followed by re-encryption (a several hour process, right?). So how does BitLocker actually encrypt the data? Does it use some secret value hidden in the depths of the Windows code to perform the encryption? And if so, is my password merely a check to see if Windows will permit decrypting? If so, what protection am I really getting from BitLocker, since a stored encryption key is a breakable encryption key...
I'm looking for some informed perspectives on the growing 'casual' use of finger/thumb print scanners in for instance schools, for library use, cashless cafeteria payments, registration. The security around such use is much, much lower than for e.g. holding credit card data where PCI-DSS gives a defined standard, process and QA program. Indeed, the security process appears to me to amount to, "The sales pitch says it is secure". Yet the actual value of the biometric data is unknown; and may in future decades be very high. You can cancel a credit card account but you keep your fingerprints for life. So it looks to me that the risk involved in owning or being enrolled on such a database is unknown-but-we-should-accept-it-might-be-high. Is there some convincing evidence that fingerprint data will not have any value during the rest of our lifetimes? or that these systems, when managed in schools (that is, by non-professionals) are so secure that the risk of data loss is negligible?
Definition of virus is (from Wikipedia): A computer virus is a malware program that, when executed, replicates by inserting copies of itself (possibly modified) into other computer programs, data files, or the boot sector of the hard drive; when this replication succeeds, the affected areas are then said to be "infected" And the main difference with Trojan is that virus can replicates itself by inserting copies of itself. Thus, if we assume that after user installs it, the application does malicious activities without interaction with user in a unrooted Android system: Should it be classified as virus or as trojan? When should such malware classified as virus or trojan? Is it possible to create a virus according to this definition in unrooted Android system?
I'm learning about web security. I understand that passwords are hashed with salt. Why aren't the salts encrypted with same user's password? Cloudn't this make password cracking much harder? Generating generate salt encrypt it with AES using user's password as key save the encrypted salt and hash Retriving decrypt salt using supplied password hash salt + password compare to saved hash
I have installed 2 VM's on my Windows 7 machine: Backtrack (kali) and Metasploitable. When I run a nmap scan on metasploitable from metasploitable VM itself, it shows that 3306 port is open. But when I run the scan from Kali all ports show closed. Also when both are in NAT network configuration, their IP is the same. Is this some issue with the network adaptors?
nowadays some vendors offering web filtering based on cloud security , where your web traffic will be forwarded to vendor cloud to be filtered and controlled at the vendor proxy , the vendor will provide you with management interface to define your own we browsing policy, comparing to having your own web proxy with web filtering capabilities , what is the cons and the pros of this solution ?
I'm working with a Luna SA HSM through PKCS11 and i have the following scenario: I have created a master key pair for key wrapping and i want to bring a key wrapped with the master public key into the HSM. So, i search for the master private key and then use it to unwrap the wrapped key. I then use the unwrapped key for a decryption process. After that, i destroy the unwrapped key. My question is this: If after destroying the unwrapped key i unwrapped it again, will the HSM treat it as a new key or it has some internal mechanism to cache keys? Thanks in advance.
just want to ask whether company IT can monitor the websites that I open using the company-issued laptop but on my personal wifi network? Offhand, I can see Symantec endpoint protection and Websense as installed 3rd party security softwares. A couple of details, I usually use private browsing windows and go to https sites. From time to time, I connect the laptop to our office LAN network. Just want to have a sense of the extent of privacy available to me. Thanks!
I'm worried about camfecting (webcam hacking). The camera light on my mac (running OSX) is not on, but it isn't hard wired so that doesn't say a lot. I've ran a virus scan but no signs. Now my idea was to watch outbound traffic in activity monitor. If there is live streaming (most likely when camfecting is occurring?) the outgoing traffic can't be under 1 kB/s right? Or will such traffic be invisible for the total data traffic in activity monitor?
Is it risky to open the SSH service on a web server (even with a strong password or with RSA keys) ? What are good practises to connect to a web server for maintenance ? Thank you !
I have read that BREACH was a side channel compression attack against TLS however focuses on HTTP response compression. If a site has disabled support for TLS compression does that still mean it can be compromised by an attack such as CRIME, BREACH, etc...using HTTP compression/HTTP responses? Also, does this type of attack require compression support from both the browser and the server to be successful?

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