instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
It would be possible to implement the [HMAC][1] construction with [(draft) SHA-3][2], leading to HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512 (the last 3 digits are the output size); all that's missing is a definition of the block size, and for this we could use either the output size, or twice it which b... |
It would be possible to implement the [HMAC][1] construction with [(draft) SHA-3][2], leading to HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512 (the last 3 digits are the output size $l$, where $l/8$ is the $L$ parameter in HMAC). All that's missing to apply the familiar
$$\text{HMAC}(K,\text{text})=H(K\op... |
You can use the techniques in the paper you have linked to show that a list of commitments $C_1,\ldots,C_m$ to the elements in $\Sigma$ are elements in $\Psi$ (the commitment scheme of choice are information-theoretically hiding [Pedersen commitments](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commitment_scheme), which are also used... |
Can Skein be used as a secure MAC in format *H*(*k* || *m*)?
I understand it can work with HMAC, but it is fine as a one-pass MAC in the format above and resists length extension attacks. Is this assumption correct?
One of the Skein authors mentions that Skein has another [MAC construction](https://crypto.stackex... |
Can Skein be used as a secure MAC in format H(k || m)? |
I have two quick questions concerning the reduction of the scheme to the approximate gcd problem:
1. In step 4 (recovering p): Where does the $\pi/6$ come from? I'm guessing it has something to do with prime distributions, but I couldn't find anything on google. Also, $\pi/6 \approx 1.6 $ and not $0.6$, so is the f... |
I have three quick questions concerning the reduction of the scheme to the approximate gcd problem:
1. What exactly do the authors mean by $q_p(z_1')$ being the **odd** part of the gcd? (last line of step 3)
2. In step 4 (recovering p): Where does the $\pi/6$ come from? I'm guessing it has something to do with pr... |
I have three quick questions concerning the reduction of the scheme to the approximate gcd problem:
1. What exactly do the authors mean by $q_p(z_1')$ being the **odd** part of the gcd? (last line of step 3)
2. In step 4 (recovering p): Where does the $\pi/6$ come from? I'm guessing it has something to do with pr... |
I am facing this problem in calculating the order of a process which involves ECC point addition: $P+Q$ , scalar multiplication: $aP$, and selecting random points in the group. The group is of prime order say $q$.
What is the time complexity order of these operations? Is it $O(n)$, $O(log(n))$ or something different... |
The question is as per the subject line. Does the fundamental theorem of arithmetic imply (prove?) that if I multiply two primes, then those two primes are the only factors of the product? I.e. 17 x 23 = 391 and the only factors of 391 are 17 and 23. I have searched, but can't find an answer to this precise question. |
Is the product of two primes only factorisable by those two primes? |
I have three quick questions concerning the reduction of the scheme to the approximate gcd problem:
1. What exactly do the authors mean by $q_p(z_1')$ being the **odd** part of the gcd? (last line of step 3)
2. In step 4 (recovering p): Where does the $\pi^2/6$ come from? I'm guessing it has something to do with ... |
I have three quick questions concerning the reduction of the scheme to the approximate gcd problem:
1. What exactly do the authors mean by $q_p(z_1')$ being the **odd** part of the gcd? (last line of step 3)
2. *In step 4 (recovering p): Where does the $\pi^2/6$ come from? I'm guessing it has something to do with... |
It would be possible to implement the [HMAC][1] construction with [(draft) SHA-3][2], leading to HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512 (the last 3 digits are the output size $\ell$, where $\ell/8$ is the $L$ parameter in HMAC). All that's missing to apply the familiar
$$\text{HMAC}(K,\text{text})=... |
I was wondering if a groups like the 1536-bit MODP Group from RFC 3526 was a
Schnorr group?
A Schnorr group must apparently have:
- *p* and *q* being primes
- *p = qr +1*
- 1 < h < p
- h ^ r != 1 (mod p)
And then *g = h ^ r mod p* is the generator.
In RFC3526's 1536-bit MODP, there's a prime:
2^... |
Are the RFC3526 MODP groups Schnorr groups? |
I was wondering if a groups like the 1536-bit MODP Group from [RFC 3526][1] was a
[Schnorr group][2]?
A Schnorr group must apparently have:
- $p$ and $q$ being primes
- $p = q\cdot r+1$
- $1 < h < p$
- $h^r\not\equiv 1\pmod p$
And then $g = h^r\bmod p$ is the generator.
In RFC3526's 1536-bit MODP, ther... |
You can use the techniques in the paper you have linked to show that a list of commitments $C_1,\ldots,C_m$ to the elements in $\Sigma$ are elements in $\Psi$ (the commitment scheme of choice are information-theoretically hiding [Pedersen commitments](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commitment_scheme), which are also used... |
You can use the techniques in the paper you have linked to show that a list of commitments $C_1,\ldots,C_m$ to the elements in $\Sigma$ are elements in $\Psi$ (the commitment scheme of choice are information-theoretically hiding [Pedersen commitments](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commitment_scheme), which are also used... |
I was wondering if a group like the 1536-bit MODP Group from [RFC 3526][1] was a
[Schnorr group][2]?
A Schnorr group must apparently have:
- $p$ and $q$ being primes
- $p = q\cdot r+1$
- $1 < h < p$
- $h^r\not\equiv 1\pmod p$
And then $g = h^r\bmod p$ is the generator.
In RFC3526's 1536-bit MODP, there... |
Let's say we have a timestamping scheme of the following characteristics:
The hashes of the documents we are trying to timestamp are xor'ed…
- …with "events" whose time of occurrence are very publicly known (for example, the hash of the latest block on the blockchain) and…
- …the hash of the previous timestamp... |
I have non-negative integers $x,y,z$. I'm going to give you commitments $C(x),C(y),C(z)$ to them. Then, I would like to prove in zero knowledge that $xy=z$. I can choose the commitment scheme to make the zero-knowledge proof easy, if that helps. What protocol should I use? Is there a highly efficient protocol for ... |
In standard RSA, the modulus $n=p_1 p_2$ is a product of two primes $p_1,p_2$ of the same size. Suppose we construct the modulus as a product of multiple primes $p_1,\dots,p_k$, i.e., $n=p_1 p_2 \cdots p_k$, where all the primes are of about the same size. I'm wondering how much this reduces the security of RSA, for ... |
Multiple-prime RSA; how many primes can I use, for a 2048-bit modulus? |
I'm implementing the Camenish-Lysyanskaya dynamic accumulator. It seems to me that the accumulator is provably secure because the trapdoor is unknown to the attacker.
The risks should be the fact that, given the Euler theorem, I can forge an element that is was not accumulated but still passes the test, namely:
$... |
Can I publish the accumulator trapdoor and still keep it secure? |
It would be possible to implement the [HMAC][1] construction with [(draft) SHA-3][2], leading to HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512 (the last 3 digits are the output size $\ell$, where $\ell/8$ is the $L$ parameter in HMAC). All that's missing to apply the familiar
$$\text{HMAC}(K,\text{text})=... |
I'm implementing the Camenish-Lysyanskaya dynamic accumulator. It seems to me that the accumulator is provably secure because the trapdoor is unknown to the attacker.
The risks should be the fact that, given the Euler theorem, I can forge an element that is was not accumulated but still passes the test, namely:
$... |
Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is
as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES
CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last plaintext block, we
apply Single-DES CBC with key K1 and for the last one, we apply 2-key Triple-DES
CBC-MAC using keys (K... |
CBC MAC and DES combined question? |
Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is
as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES
CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last plaintext block, we
apply Single-DES CBC with key K1 and for the last one, we apply 2-key Triple-DES
CBC-MAC using keys (... |
I guess you are missing something.
If you know that the accumulator value is $v^x$ and you know the factorization of $n$, then it is easy to find for any arbitrary $y$ (and you can nearly "freely" choose $y$, if it doesnt work out you could factorize $n$ - although you know the factoization already - this will only... |
I guess you are missing something.
If you know that the accumulator value is $v^x$ and you know the factorization of $n$, then it is easy to find for any arbitrary $y$ (in practice you "freely" choose $y$, i.e., all $y$ that are coprime to $\varphi(n)$ will work and you have to restrict accumulated values to be pri... |
I guess you are missing something.
If you know that the accumulator value is $v^x$ and you know the factorization of $n$, then it is easy to [find](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruence_theorem) for nearly any arbitrary $y$ (in RSA accumulators you accumulate primes) a value $k$ such that $y\cdot k \equiv ... |
Strange question maybe, but say I want to specify a protocol that complies with NIST SP 800-108. This lists a whole set of key based key derivation functions, with a very loose set of parameters.
How should I identify the KDF used? It seems that the KDF's in this document have neither a name, an OID nor an ASN.1 mod... |
I guess you are missing something.
If you know that the accumulator value is $a=v^x$ and you know the factorization of $n$, then it is easy to for any arbitrary $y$ relatively prime to $n$ (in RSA accumulators you accumulate primes) a value $k$ such that $y\cdot k \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ as the value $\varphi(n... |
I guess you are missing something.
If you know that the accumulator value is $a=v^{\prod_i x_i} \bmod n$ to a set of values $x_i$ and you know the factorization of $n$, then it is easy to for any arbitrary $y$ relatively prime to $n$ (in RSA accumulators you accumulate primes) a value $k$ such that $y\cdot k \equiv... |
Let's say we have a timestamping scheme of the following characteristics,
- The hashes of the documents we are trying to timestamp are XOR'ed with *"events"* whose time of occurrence are very publicly known (i.e. the hash of the latest block on the blockchain),
$$M_{i}=(D_{i} \oplus B_{t_{i}})$$
Where,
$M_... |
Let's say we have a timestamping scheme of the following characteristics,
- The hashes of the documents we are trying to timestamp are XOR'ed with *"events"* whose time of occurrence are very publicly known (i.e. the hash of the latest block on the blockchain),
$$M_{i}=(H_{D_{i}} \oplus B_{t_{i}})$$
Where,
... |
Use the exponential variant of ElGamal, where the plaintext is encoded in the exponent. Elliptic curve ElGamal is fine. In fact, any public key cryptosystem which allows raising ciphertexts to a power such that this operation corresponds homomorphically to multiplication for the plaintext.
Your commitments are $c_x ... |
I have non-negative integers $x,y,z$. I'm going to give you commitments $C(x),C(y),C(z)$ to them. Then, I would like to prove in zero knowledge that $xy=z$. I can choose the commitment scheme to make the zero-knowledge proof easy, if that helps. What protocol should I use? Is there a highly efficient protocol for ... |
Actually, that wikipedia article you mention in your question already answers your question:
> It is moderately common for companies and sometimes even standards bodies as in the case of the CSS encryption on DVDs – to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some argue this "security by obscurity" makes the pro... |
I am trying to design a file exchange protocol for learning purposes, inspired by PGP, but fixing some of its shortcomings.
Assuming the machine where the creation and decryption of the file happens are secure, the threat is a passive (reading file) or active (manipulating file) attacker on the line.
These attrib... |
I am trying to design a file exchange protocol for learning purposes, inspired by PGP, but fixing some of its shortcomings.
Assuming the machine where the creation and decryption of the file happens are secure, the threat is a passive (reading file) or active (manipulating file) attacker on the line.
These attrib... |
Use the exponential variant of ElGamal, where the plaintext is encoded in the exponent. Elliptic curve ElGamal is fine. In fact, any public key cryptosystem which allows raising ciphertexts to a power such that this operation corresponds homomorphically to multiplication for the plaintext.
Your commitments are $c_x ... |
Your diagram is not very clear, but XOR is not a good combiner function to use for timestamping, as it may allow backdating in some circumstances. For instance, see the "time travel" attacks in Section 3.3 of the following paper (e.g., pp.179-180): [Cryptanalytic Attacks on Pseudorandom Number Generators](http://www.c... |
Is there any advantage of TTH over any other hash function organized as the Merkle tree? Are there any properties of TIGER that, say, SHA2 does not have? And in general, what's the point of chosing TTH over anything else? |
Is there any advantage of using Tiger Tree Hash over any other hash function organized as the Merkle tree? Are there maybe any properties of TIGER that, say, SHA2 or BLAKE in Merkle tree do not have?
And in general, is there any point of chosing Tiger Tree Hash over anything else in modern applications for file shar... |
Given $i, j \in GF(2^q)$ and $i \neq j$,
is that possible to have $i^n=j^n$ for some $n$, $0 < n < 2^q$?
I am looking for a proof if the answer is *no*, and for a method to find $n$ if the answer is *yes* (I guess the answer is always *no*). |
Given $i, j \in GF(2^q)$ and $i \neq j$,
is that possible to have $i^n=j^n$ for some $n$, $0 < n < 2^q$?
I am looking for a proof if the answer is *no*, and for a method to find $n$ if the answer is *yes* (I guess the answer is always *no*).
**Edit:**
Assume that $i, j \neq 0$.
I also made a mistake:
$n=2^q-1... |
Let $i, j \in GF(2^q)$ and $i \neq j$ and $i,j\neq0$.
Is that possible that $i^n=j^n$ for some $n$ such that $0 < n < 2^q-1$?
I am looking for a proof if the answer is *no*, or for a method to find $n$ if the answer is *yes* (I guess the answer is always *no*). |
I'm implementing the Schnorr Identification protocol as part of a larger protocol. In a large percentage of cases, around 20%, my test fails. I don't think it's a code problem, although possible, but I think it's a problem with my understanding of the protocol.
Here's how I currently perform Schnorr Identification:
... |
Schnorr Identification protocol sometimes wrong? |
I'm implementing the Schnorr Identification protocol as part of a larger protocol. In a large percentage of cases, around 20%, my test fails. I don't think it's a code problem, although possible, but I think it's a problem with my understanding of the protocol.
Here's how I currently perform Schnorr Identification:
... |
**Background**
When defining protocol compliant with [NIST SP 800-108](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf), you just need to pick suitable options, which work well with your protocol.
If there is a need to be compatible with a specific pre-existing protocol, you may want to take a lo... |
Verifiable to someone who already has the correct answer
--------------------------------------------------------
Verifiable to whom? Someone else with the correct answer? Then you may be able to get away with a salted bcrypt hash; e.g., you can easily say make a cryptographically strong one-way hash of an answer... |
Before my answer, I would like to review the original [binary GCD algorithm @wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary_GCD_algorithm). Roughly speaking, this algorithm replaces division with binary shifts and subtraction.
For two positive integers $u$ and $v$, the following identities hold:
1. $\gcd(0,v) = v... |
According to the paper [“GQ and Schnorr Identification Schemes: Proofs of Security against Impersonation under Active and Concurrent Attacks”](http://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2002/24420162/24420162.pdf) by Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio, the Schnorr identification scheme is secure under an active adversary who cha... |
I'm looking for help in understanding why the algorithm described here would not deliver adequate protection of confidentiality. We don't care about other criteria such as authenticity or integrity. In other words, we only want to make sure our key material is secret.
Given a key **K** that is **l** bits long, a h... |
Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality? |
I know that the AES MixColumn step is calculated as follows
$b(x) = (a(x)c(x)) \mod l(x)$
with $a(x)$ being the column to encode, $c(x)$ the fixed polynomial $c(x) = 3x^3 + x^2 + x + 2$ and $l(x) = x^4+1$ which is reducible over $GF(2^8)$ since $x^4 + 1 = (x+1)^4$.
I wondered about the purpose of the reducibil... |
Why is the polynomial in AES MixColumns multiplied modulo a reducible polynomial? |
I'm looking for a cryptographic technique that instead of permuting a cleartext, would add noise to the cleartext to obfuscate the true text among a bunch of garbage. For example, a list of 10 numbers would be combined with a list of 90 random ones with the goal of making the true set of numbers difficult to recover.... |
Paper about this secure P2P idea? |
I'm implementing the Schnorr Identification protocol as part of a larger protocol. In a large percentage of cases, around 20%, my test fails. I don't think it's a code problem, although possible, but I think it's a problem with my understanding of the protocol.
Here's how I currently perform Schnorr Identification:
... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
I'm looking for help in understanding why the algorithm described here would not deliver adequate protection of confidentiality. We don't care about other criteria such as authenticity or integrity. In other words, we only want to make sure our key material is secret.
Given a key $k$ that is $l$ bits long, a hashi... |
I'm looking for help in understanding why the algorithm described here would not deliver adequate protection of confidentiality. We don't care about other criteria such as authenticity or integrity. In other words, we only want to make sure our key material is secret.
Given a key $k$ that is $l$ bits long, a hashi... |
I'm looking to implement modular exponentiation (for RSA) in constant time, but most of the examples I've found are more mathematical descriptions of the operations. Are there any descriptions in psuedocode, or which are otherwise understandable (and implementable!) by someone without much a math background? |
I know that the AES MixColumn step is calculated as follows
$b(x) = (a(x)c(x)) \mod l(x)$
with $a(x)$ being the column to encode, $c(x)$ the fixed polynomial $c(x) = 3x^3 + x^2 + x + 2$ and $l(x) = x^4+1$ which is reducible over $GF(2^8)$ since $x^4 + 1 = (x+1)^4$.
I wondered about the purpose of the reducibil... |
I'm currently testing one among those many interesting cryptographic protocols based on bilinear maps.
It's quite hard to understand the underlying fundamentals, especially since there are several types of pairing and different underlying algorithms like Weil, Tate and Ate (again with subtypes?). Although I understand... |
Is pairing based cryptography ready for productive use? |
Type-1 (symmetric pairings) are dead for curves over fields of small characteristic. Over prime fields of large prime characteristic they are not really dead, but as they only offer small embedding degrees ($k\leq 6$), they are not really attractive from a performance point of view. You have to choose very large curves... |
I am interested in making a PRNG which, after being initially seeded, can accept and incorporate client data as the *only* ongoing source of "entropy". It is not directly for a cryptographic purpose, but I wish to get a sense of how much the resulting system might compromise the integrity of the generator.
A simpli... |
Can I make a PRNG that is secure even when state can be modified by user? |
I am interested in making a PRNG which, after being initially seeded, can accept and incorporate client data as the *only* ongoing source of "entropy". It is not directly for a cryptographic purpose, but I wish to get a sense of how much the resulting system might compromise the integrity of the generator.
A simpli... |
I am interested in making a PRNG which, after being initially seeded, can accept and incorporate client data as the *only* ongoing source of "entropy". It is not directly for a cryptographic purpose, but I wish to get a sense of how much the resulting system might compromise the integrity of the generator.
A simpli... |
On the theory that the quickest way to get the right answer to a question on the Internet is to provide a wrong one, and wait a few New York Minutes until someone corrects you, here's my understanding based on a laughably cursory examination of the Wikipedia entry and the two RFCs.
basically your phone and the serve... |
I am interested in making a PRNG which, after being initially seeded, can accept and incorporate client data as the *only* ongoing source of "entropy". It is not directly for a cryptographic purpose, but I wish to get a sense of how much the resulting system might compromise the integrity of the generator.
A simpli... |
I am interested in making a PRNG which, after being initially seeded, can accept and incorporate client data as the *only* ongoing source of "entropy". It is not directly for a cryptographic purpose, but I wish to get a sense of how much the resulting system might compromise the integrity of the generator.
A simpli... |
I'm implementing the Schnorr Identification protocol as part of a larger protocol. In a large percentage of cases, around 20%, my test fails. I don't think it's a code problem, although possible, but I think it's a problem with my understanding of the protocol.
Here's how I currently perform Schnorr Identification:
... |
Type-1 (symmetric pairings) are dead for curves over fields of small characteristic. Over prime fields of large prime characteristic they are not really dead, but as they only offer small embedding degrees ($k=2$), they are not really attractive from a performance point of view. You have to choose very large curves (wh... |
Start with “Shamir's Secret Sharing” concepts…
> Abstract. In this paper we show how to divide data D into n pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k - 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information about D. This technique enables the construction of robus... |
Start with “Shamir's Secret Sharing” concepts…
> Abstract. In this paper we show how to divide data D into n pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k - 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information about D. This technique enables the construction of robus... |
I'm looking for help in understanding why the algorithm described here would not deliver adequate protection of confidentiality. We don't care about other criteria such as authenticity or integrity. In other words, we only want to make sure our key material is secret.
Given a key $k$ that is $l$ bits long, a hashi... |
If you took 1 as an example, the match would be somewhere in the range of 2 to 2^128, I'm just wondering if anyone has worked anything like this out before?
The collision example given at http://www.mscs.dal.ca/~selinger/md5collision/ shows two different strings with a tiny amount of data changed to give the same md... |
Are there any two numbers found that have the same md5? |
What is the MD5 collision with the smallest input values? |
I'm trying to understand the logic of CAs, trust and client certificates. I have a general understanding but am having a tough time bridging some gaps.
In a hypothetical situation a software system might be composed of `n` machines. I want to generate a custom CA for this system and have it self signed. The CA woul... |
I found the [accepted answer](http://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/12291/13271) above a bit unhelpful -- it basically just says: "read these two RFCs". So, on the theory that the quickest way to get the right answer to a question on the Internet is to provide a wrong one, and wait a few New York Minutes until someone cor... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
As we know that in DH key exchange, both Alice and Bob would agree on the parameter $p$ and $g$. Next, Alice would choose a secret key $A$ while Bob would choose a secret key $B$. Alice would compute $g^A\mod p$ and Bob would compute $g^B\mod p$. They would exchange these computed values and each side would rise their ... |
As we know that in DH key exchange, both Alice and Bob would agree on the parameter $p$ and $g$. Next, Alice would choose a secret key $A$ while Bob would choose a secret key $B$. Alice would compute $g^A\mod p$ and Bob would compute $g^B\mod p$. They would exchange these computed values and each side would rise their ... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
If we consider an RSA modulus $N$ of $n$ bits ($n=2048$ in the question) product of $k$ primes of about $n/k$ bits, how high can be $k$? That's [a problem studied even before Multiprime-RSA was named][1], with no definitive answer other than: **we can't err on the unsafe side with $k=2$**.
### Why would we want $k>2... |
How can I validate my implementation of Ansi 9.19? |
As we know that in DH key exchange, both Alice and Bob would agree on the parameter $p$ and $g$. Next, Alice would choose a secret key $A$ while Bob would choose a secret key $B$. Alice would compute $g^A\mod p$ and Bob would compute $g^B\mod p$. They would exchange these computed values and each side would raise their... |
From today's standpoint, most people would claim RSA to be secure. However, to my knowledge, this is purely based on the speculation that no one knows a computational feasible way to find a $d$ for given $n$ and $e$, s.t. $ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n)$ - which can be reduced to the factorization problem.
However, it ... |
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