instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
Are USB TRNGs still useful given the recent /dev/(u)random merger? |
In target app users are equivalent to adversaries. They are allowed to pick chosen keys. \
If we use standard AES (in ECB mode)
$$c = AES(m,k) $$
Every user $u$ gets a cipher $c_u$. Two users $u_1, u_2$ have the goal to find a suitable key $k_u$ which leads to a common message $m$ (any 128-bit number) with
$$m = ... |
In target app users are equivalent to adversaries. They are allowed to pick chosen keys. \
If we use standard AES (in ECB mode)
$$c = AES(m,k) $$
Every user $u$ gets a cipher $c_u$. Two users $u_1, u_2$ have the goal to find a suitable key $k_u$ which leads to a common message $m$ (any 128-bit number) with
$$m = ... |
In target app users are equivalent to adversaries. They are allowed to pick chosen keys. \
If we use standard AES (in ECB mode)
$$c = AES(m,k) $$
Every user $u$ gets a cipher $c_u$. Two users $u_1, u_2$ have the goal to find a suitable key $k_u$ which leads to a common message $m$ (any 128-bit number) with
$$m = ... |
In target app users are equivalent to adversaries. They are allowed to pick chosen keys. \
If we use standard AES (in ECB mode)
$$c = AES(m,k) $$
Every user $u$ gets a cipher $c_u$. Two users $u_1, u_2$ have the goal to find a suitable key $k_u$ which leads to a common message $m$ (any 128-bit number) with
$$m = ... |
In target app users are equivalent to adversaries. They are allowed to pick chosen keys. \
If we use standard AES (in ECB mode)
$$c = AES(m,k) $$
Every user $u$ gets a cipher $c_u$. Two users $u_1, u_2$ have the goal to find a suitable key $k_u$ which leads to a common message $m$ (any 128-bit number) with
$$m = ... |
Some projects (e.g., https://zkpass.org/) are claiming that interactive ZKPs can be more efficient than non-interactive ZKPs. What is the rationale behind this? |
I am asking it again because no one answered my previous question with more clarity. I have deleted that question
One more co-CDH in Type three pairing groups $G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$: means given a generator $g_2$ in $G_2$, $A = g_2^a$ with random $a$ and an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ which which accepts query $Q \in G_1... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security. My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion on Crypto Stack Exchange](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls).
Here is my new ECDSA method: (the notation I'm using alig... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion on Crypto Stack Exchange](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls).
Here is my new ECDSA method: (the... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls).
Here is my new ECDSA method: (the notation I'm using align... |
If I was to use AES-NI as a high performance 128-bit permutation/PRF would AESDEC offer faster/better diffusion than AESENC? The reason I ask is because both instructions have the same cost, but the inverse MixColums step of AES has a more complicated matrix, so it appears to me as if there are more operations being pe... |
When using AES-NI as a high-speed permutation, does AESDEC offer better diffusion? |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls).
Here is my new ECDSA method: (the notation I'm using align... |
Given public key $pk$, message $M$ and its signature $\sigma$, is it possible to get another $pk'\not =pk$, $M'$ with the totally same signature $\sigma$? In other word, the following ones are both satisfied: verifySig$(pk,M,\sigma)=1$ and verifySig$(pk',M',\sigma)=1$.
I am uncertain whether all signature schemes po... |
Can signature be repurposed? |
I'm referencing Jason A. Donenfeld's Random number generator enhancements for Linux 5.17 and 5.18 available [here][1]. In summary:-
>significant outward-facing change is that /dev/random and /dev/urandom are now exactly the same thing, with no differences between them at all...
So entropy is collected at boot, Ch... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls).
Here is my new ECDSA method: (the notation I'm using align... |
In vitalik's post [here][1] the below is mentioned,
> This is the pairing. Mathematicians also sometimes call it a bilinear map; the word “bilinear” here basically means that it satisfies the constraints:
* $e(P, Q + R) = e(P, Q) * e(P, R)$
* $e(P + S, Q) = e(P, Q) * e(S, Q)$
Whereas the textbook definition ... |
I was reading [this paper](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/swifft.pdf), and there, they use the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{\large p}[\alpha]/(\alpha^{\large n}+1)$ for all their operations. And that looks like a construction of finite field $\mathbb{F}_{\large p^{\Large n}}$ as the quotient ring of the polynomial ring... |
I was reading [this paper](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/swifft.pdf), and there, they use the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{\large p}[\alpha]/(\alpha^{\large n}+1)$ for all their operations. And that looks like a construction of finite field $\mathbb{F}_{\large p^{\Large n}}$ as the quotient ring of the polynomial ring... |
>But then I am thinking, since any element $X \in \mathbb{F}_{\large p^{\Large n}}$ can be thought of as a polynomial, can you "evaluate" that polynomial at some point $s \in \mathbb{F}_{\large p}$? I mean obviously you can in the sense that you can just compute $X(s)$:
$$\mathbb{Z}_{\large p} \ni X(s) = {\sum_{\large... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls). In my application, the main focus is on keeping the signature... |
I'll only address your comment
> And in the paper they use $n=2^k$ and $q−1=2n$, which makes $\alpha^n+1$ the cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{2n}(\alpha)$ (which makes polynomial multiplication more efficient because Chinese remainder theorem? I'm not too sure),
namely I'll explain the last part briefly.
This is a ... |
I'll only address your comment
> And in the paper they use $n=2^k$ and $q−1=2n$, which makes $\alpha^n+1$ the cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{2n}(\alpha)$ (which makes polynomial multiplication more efficient because Chinese remainder theorem? I'm not too sure),
namely I'll explain the last part briefly.
This is a ... |
I read the paper "Provable Security Evaluation of Structures against Impossible Differential and Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis" - author: Bing Sun. In this paper proof of theorem 2 mentioned that from 1 difference in input state spreads to all other differences in other state after R_1(P) round, where R_1(P) is... |
Why need characteristic matrix positive so that from 1 difference in input state spreads to all other differences in output state after R rounds? |
I read the paper "Provable Security Evaluation of Structures against Impossible Differential and Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis" - author: Bing Sun. In this paper proof of theorem 2 mentioned that from 1 difference in input state spreads to all other differences in other state after R_1(P) round, where R_1(P) is... |
Alice and Bob have a shared symmetric key k ∈ {0, 1}^256, which Alice
uses to identify herself to Bob, who holds a database of usernames and
shared keys. The identification protocol they use begins when Alice
sends her username, Bob responds with a challenge c ∈ {0, 1}^256, and
Alice chooses a response r ∈ {0, 1}^∗... |
I was reading [this paper](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/swifft.pdf), and there, they use the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{\large p}[\alpha]/(\alpha^{\large n}+1)$ for all their operations. And that looks like a construction of finite field $\mathbb{F}_{\large p^{\Large n}}$ as the quotient ring of the polynomial ring... |
I have two statements which I think are correct:
1) $\beta, s$ are unknown.
Only $g^\beta$ is known to the prover but not any of $g^{\beta s^i}$ for $i \ge 1$.
If the prover is able to find group elements $A$ and $B$ such that $e(A, g^\beta) = e(B, g)$ then the prover knows a field element $a$ such that $A = g^a$... |
I am exploring a modification to ECDSA to produce shorter signatures, even though it compromises security (in a controllable way). My rationale behind this change is in [this discussion](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/110942/creating-a-weak-bls). In my application, the main focus is on keeping the signature... |
I would like to know how many combinations per second we are able to brute-force today with a powerful server farm. Can someone give me some info on that? Also what would be the rental costs? TIA |
I think I roughly understand how the RSA algorithm works.
However, I don't understand why we need the $N$, which we use as a modulus, to be $pq$ for some large primes $p, q$.
I vaguely know it has something to do with factorization, but I am kind of lost. So, hypothetical questions.
- What would happen if the ... |
How to find p and q in RSA algorithm in python? |
RFC8446 states that: `the full encoded TLSInnerPlaintext MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 1 octets`
It also states:
```length: The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record, which is the sum of the lengths of the content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type, plus any expansion added b... |
RFC8446 states that:
> the full encoded TLSInnerPlaintext MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 1 octets
It also states:
> length: The length (in bytes) of the following `TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record`, which is the sum of the lengths of the content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type, plus any expansion a... |
PBKDF2 should only be used to generate a larger output than the hash function it uses if the output is used in such a way that it has a flat keyspace. As far as I am aware, XTS does not have a flat keyspace, and the first half of the input is far more sensitive than the second half, which is only the tweak key. Am I co... |
I’ve a signature scheme as follow for 1024‒Bits rsa with a 65537 exponent :
> 760‒Bits fully_user_controlled_message_content+8 Bits incremental nonce+sha256(fully_user_controlled_message_content+Nonce)
So that checking the resulting signature is correct is as follow :
* the nonce in the remainder must be ++pre... |
I’ve a signature scheme for 1024‒Bits rsa with a 65537 exponent. The signed message is as follow :
> 760‒Bits fully_user_controlled_message_content+8 Bits incremental nonce+sha256(fully_user_controlled_message_content+Nonce)
So that checking the resulting signature is correct is as follow :
* the nonce in the ... |
How do I find decryption algorithm and key using a encrypted version of a file and a decrypted version of a file? I have 4 files, 2 encrypted and 2 decrypted, I think the contents are the same if the encrypted one would be decrypted, I'm a noob at this and don't know what to do, so can someone do this for me or help me... |
I'm no mathematician but when thinking about block ciphers such as AES I find it much easier to think of them as a mathematical function $f$ (rather than an 'algorithm') such that $c=f(m,k)$ with $c$ the cyphertext, $m$ the plaintext and $k$ the key.
When I think about breaking such a cipher the first thing I think ... |
I'm no mathematician but when thinking about block ciphers such as AES I find it much easier to think of them as a mathematical function $f$ (rather than an 'algorithm') such that $c=f(m,k)$ with $c$ the cyphertext, $m$ the plaintext and $k$ the key.
When I think about breaking such a cipher the first thing I think ... |
When directly invoking the ntt and invntt function in Dilithium's code with any polynomial $a \in R_q$, I get a unexpected running result: $NTT(a) \neq iNTT(NTT(a))$.
And in the test code of Dilithium(\test\test_mul.c), if want get an correct running, we need multiple the coefficients with -114592 before invoking the... |
I’ve a signature scheme for 1024‒bit RSA with a 65537 exponent. The signed message is constructed as follows:
> 760‒Bits fully_user_controlled_message_content+8 Bits incremental nonce+sha256(fully_user_controlled_message_content+Nonce)
Verification then consists of:
* the nonce in the remainder must be ++prev_... |
When directly invoking the ntt and invntt function in Dilithium's code with any polynomial $a \in R_q$, I get a unexpected running result: $NTT(a) \neq iNTT(NTT(a))$.
And in the test code of Dilithium(\test\test_mul.c), if want get an correct running, we need multiple the coefficients with -114592 before invoking the... |
I’m interested in the tradeoffs of signing individual files vs. signing a manifest of cryptographic hashes and file names.
Let’s say I do some work that results in a handful of files (10s to hundreds), and then I send all that work out for someone else to look at and maybe pass on to others. Later, I may wish t... |
I understand that the secp256k1 key space is 2^1 all the way upto 2^256.. So now let's assume that my private key is not 256 bit and it's only 100 bits **example private key:- 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000f1c7de58b4064936a6dc50ee8** so now this **037a5952fa338291f2219b451500f13f6a887a023f332937fcd74483ed778... |
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