instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
![enter image description here][1]
[1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/hXR0Y.png
I can't understand what CFB really is.. it said in wikipedia that CFB is same as CBC, but I find that CFB is more difficult than CBC...
Can someone explain to me how CFB process.. like how Initialization Vector(IV) work inside the ... |
Well, with CFB mode, the encryption process is "take the most recent ciphertext block, pass it through the block cipher, and then exclusive-or that with the plaintext block to generate the next ciphertext block". As for the IV, that's used as "the most recent ciphertext block" when encrypting the first plaintext block... |
![enter image description here][1]
I can't understand what CFB really is.. it said in wikipedia that CFB is same as CBC, but I find that CFB is more difficult than CBC...
Can someone explain to me how CFB process.. like how Initialization Vector(IV) work inside the Encryption Algorithm process together with the K... |
![enter image description here][1]
I can't understand what CFB really is.. it said in wikipedia that CFB is same as CBC, but I find that CFB is more difficult than CBC...
Can someone explain to me how CFB process.. like how Initialization Vector(IV) work inside the Encryption Algorithm process together with the K... |
Some cryptographical algorithms are as strong as the size of their key is, while other have some weaknesses that limit their strength (such as SHA-1). How strong is the ECDSA algorithm, and does that strength depend on anything (for example, the curve used and so forth)? |
How strong is the ECDSA algorithm? |
![enter image description here][1]
I can't understand what CFB really is.. it said in wikipedia that CFB is same as CBC, but I find that CFB is more difficult than CBC...
Can someone explain to me how CFB process.. like how Initialization Vector(IV) work inside the Encryption Algorithm process together with the K... |
How is synchronization of counter values achieved in the [HOTP][1] protocol?
As I understand it, the server increments its counter value only if a match (of the OTP value) is found. What happens at client side?
Suppose server verifies 50 successful attempts from client which implies counter value at server is 50... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
It said in wikipedia that "The blocksize has a maximum of 256 bits, but the keysize has no theoretical maximum"
How can I create a key schedule if my key is 136 bits?
I'm confused with this, because I thought, I can limit the key in 16 characters long equals to 128 bits... |
I have a question in Output Feedback Mode...
![enter image description here][1]
[1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/hTbsT.png
It is all about the Initialization Vector, How can I process Initialization Vector Inside the Block Cipher Encryption like in Advanced Encryption Standard? together with the Key? Will I en... |
>Will I encrypt the Initialization Vector like a block of plaintext? to generate keystream and I will XOR it to the plaintext to generate ciphertext?
Yes, for the first block of plaintext. For the subsequent blocks, you use the output of the previous encryption (before XOR) as the input to the cipher (along with the... |
It said [in Wikipedia][1] that:
> [....] Rijndael can be specified with block and key sizes in any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits. The blocksize has a maximum of 256 bits, but the keysize has no theoretical maximum.
How would the key schedule look for these other key sizes, like a 136-bit key?
... |
How does the key schedule of Rijndael looks for keysizes other than 128 bit? |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
just a follow up question with this question..
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/2486/how-does-the-key-schedule-of-rijndael-looks-for-keysizes-other-than-128-bit
A 256-bit key can still encrypt a block of plaintext in 128 bit?
but in this tutorial, to encrypt 128-bit plaintext, It need 128-bit of secre... |
just a follow up question with this question..
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/2486/how-does-the-key-schedule-of-rijndael-looks-for-keysizes-other-than-128-bit
A 256-bit key can still encrypt a block of plaintext in 128 bit?
but in this tutorial, to encrypt 128-bit plaintext, It need 128-bit of secre... |
Assume that you want to compare several cryptographic primitives (say, encryption schemes), and choose one. You need to consider several complexity measures, such as the key length, encryption time, decryption time, etc. In order for the comparison to be fair, all primitives in question must provide the same level of s... |
I found [this question on the game programming site][1] and was intrigued. I came up with an answer off the top of my head but I'm no cryptanalyst so it is probably not water-tight. See the question for my idea.
So would it work? If not, how could it be made secure? Is there some conventional method for solving pr... |
A fair peer-based coin-flipping protocol? |
I found [this question on the game programming site][1] and was intrigued. I came up with an answer off the top of my head but I'm no cryptanalyst so it is probably not water-tight.
This is how my idea goes:
1. each of the two peers generates a random number.
2. each peer creates a [salted hash][1] of its num... |
**Rijndael** (the algorithm behind AES) is specified with block sizes and key sizes of 128, 160, 192, 224 and 256, in any combination of block and key size. (Thus, Wikipedia is wrong with *the keysize has no theoretical maximum* here, though one could invent extensions of the key schedule algorithm which allow longer ... |
**Rijndael** (the algorithm behind AES) is specified with block sizes and key sizes of 128, 160, 192, 224 and 256, in any combination of block and key size. (Thus, Wikipedia is wrong with *the keysize has no theoretical maximum* here, though one could invent extensions of the key schedule algorithm which allow longer ... |
**Rijndael** (the algorithm behind AES) is specified with block sizes and key sizes of 128, 160, 192, 224 and 256, in any combination of block and key size. (Thus, Wikipedia was wrong with *the keysize has no theoretical maximum* here, though one could invent extensions of the key schedule algorithm which allow longer... |
I would like to create a publicly available tool that is used to generate a password that gives a limited time access to a resource.
My idea is to digitally sign the current date with a private key entered by the user, generating a message that is sent to the resource that verifies it with the public key. If valid, ... |
Several websites ( such as http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/844/is-there-a-secure-cryptosystem-that-can-be-performed-mentally ) briefly mention RC4-52 as a modification of standard RC4.
RC4-52 has only with 52 instead of 256 elements in the state array, so encryption or decryption (or both) can more easily ... |
Has there been any cryptanalysis of RC4-52? |
I've heard of some people with a similar problem, who have come up with a clever solution.
There's a trusted organization that maintains a [suppression list][1] -- a "Do Not Email" list of email addresses,
and that organization wants to tell a few bulk emailers not to send email to any of the addresses on that list... |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
I was not able to understand why we practically need a CPA security in Cipher Block Chaining. (which insist on having a random IV), let say if the encryption is not CPA secure i.e , the adversary can identify two cipher-text are same and conclude the two plain-text would have been same. of what use this information is ... |
Repeatedly encrypting the same message to the same ciphertext is full of practical attacks. Encryption is supposed to leak no information about the content of the message other than its length, and there are very real ways to exploit the information leakage you mention. Some of them have to do with the fact that plaint... |
I run a baseball league and would like to do silent auctions for free agents. This would require teams to enter their highest bid and the highest bidder at the end of the auction period would win. Unfortunately, my league, my code, my server, I have access to the information if I choose to look at it. I'd like to no... |
Can I encrypt user input in a way I can't decrypt it for a certain period of time? |
<br />
i'm trying to implement parameters generation for ECDSA according to SEC1 v2.0:<br />
`Input: The approximate security level in bits = t is {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}`<br />
`Output: Elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp: T = (p, a, b, G, n, h)`
<br />
Here's the 2nd step of the algorithm:
<br />
<br />2... |
Can n=pq be part of two different pairs of RSA keys?
If such keys exist say (e1,n) and (e1,n); how are they related?
What will be the security concerns for the 2 users?
|
Can two different pairs of RSA key have the same n? |
Can $n=pq$ be part of two different pairs of RSA keys?
If such keys exist say $(e_1,n)$ and $(e_2,n)$, how are they related?
What will be the security concerns for the 2 users?
|
I run a baseball league and would like to do silent auctions for free agents. This would require teams to enter their highest bid and the highest bidder at the end of the auction period would win. Unfortunately, my league, my code, my server, I have access to the information if I choose to look at it. I'd like to no... |
When we want to combine two (or probably more) keys to create a single encryption key that relies on all of them, what is the proper method for doing that? Simple XOR? Using hash functions? ...
I personally used this: md5( key1 || key2 )
Note: || means concatenation.
I used md5 because i use 128 bit encryption... |
I have written a C implementation of the [Berlekamp-Massey algorithm][1] to work on finite fields of size any prime. It works on most input, except for the following binary GF(2) sequence:
$0110010101101$ producing LFSR $\langle{}7, 1 + x^3 + x^4 + x^6\rangle{}$
i.e. coefficients $c_1 = 0, c_2 = 0, c_3 = 1, c_4 =... |
What is the complexity of ECB in terms of Time and Memory?
and also in OFB? I can't find it in the internet, so I decided to ask it in here. |
What other attack can avoid by the used of Output Feedback in an algorithm?
|
Although this has been extensively discussed around here, I'm curious whether my approach makes sense, or I should just stick to "the standard version".
I'm implementing some homomorphic encryption primitives (Paillier, Okamoto–Uchiyama etc) and, at the moment, I'm using GMP as the big number library (this may chang... |
If you consider each SSN as kind of like a (low-entropy) password,
what you are trying to do seems very similar to what
people implementing [zero-knowledge password proof][1] are trying to do.
Would the source code at any of these locations help?
ZK-SSH - A Zero Knowledge Implementation for OpenSSH
http://zk-s... |
Let's say I have a long sentence, like "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog." Let's further say that I need to keep this string encrypted, so I use an HMAC. Let's further further say I want to be able to do prefix searches for this string, so I also store all possible prefixes of this string, like HMAC("T"), H... |
From [Dogbert's blog][1]:
> Sony has a line of laptops ("Vaio") which compete mainly in the high value market segments. They implemented a master password bypass which is rather sane in comparison to the rest of the bunch:
>
> * The randomly generated master password is only stored in RAM, e.g. it's lost after t... |
I am considering attacks on Two-Key Triple-DES Encryption assuming $2^{32}$ known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (that's a mere 32 Giga Bytes of ciphertext) by the method devised by [Paul C. van Oorschot and Michael J. Wiener][1], or another published method not requiring significantly more DES computations.
As a synthe... |
I am considering attacks on Two-Key Triple-DES Encryption assuming $2^{32}$ known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (that's a mere 32 Giga Bytes of ciphertext) by the method devised by [Paul C. van Oorschot and Michael J. Wiener][1], or another published method not requiring significantly more DES computations.
As a synthe... |
I am considering attacks on Two-Key Triple-DES Encryption assuming $2^{32}$ known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (that's a mere 32 Giga Bytes of ciphertext) by the method devised by [Paul C. van Oorschot and Michael J. Wiener][1], or another published method not requiring significantly more DES computations.
As a synthe... |
I have a question about Biclique attack...
The [abstract](http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/cryptanalysis/aes.aspx) claims:
> The first key recovery attack on the full AES-128 with computational complexity $2^{126.1}$.
What does $2^{126.1}$ mean in this context? And where does this value come from? |
Public/private key algorithms such as RSA encrypt a message with a private key but only decrypted with another (mathematically related) key.
Can the public key decrypt the messages encrypted with the private key and the private key decrypt messages encrypted with the public key?
If the algorithm is based on mult... |
Does public/private pairs work both ways? |
Do public/private pairs work both ways? |
I have a challenge about RSA:
Using small keys improves performance.
However, it has been shown (Wiener, 1990) that if d<=0.25 log(N), the private exponent d can be reconstructed from the public key (N,e).
Smart, Inc. uses special private keys designed such that they are:
Larger than the minimum bound recomme... |
Is there a known non-trivial system with plausibly secure public key encryption where:
<br><br><br>
1. $\;\;$ the $\:$ time $\:$ function is efficiently computable
<br>
2. $\;\;$ [pubkey,privkey] $\:$ pairs are generated with $\:$ time(privkey) = 0
<br>
3. $\;\;$ when encrypting under $\:$ pubkey $\:$, $\:$ the e... |
Is there a known non-trivial system with plausibly secure public key encryption where:
<br><br><br>
1. $\;\;$ the $\:$ time $\:$ function is efficiently computable
<br>
2. $\;\;$ [pubkey,privkey] $\:$ pairs are generated with $\:$ time(privkey) = 0
<br>
3. $\;\;$ when encrypting under $\:$ pubkey $\:$, $\:$ the e... |
This is a replication of [this question on Stack Overflow][1]. There's `class Random` in .NET runtime which is designed for use as a cheap fast source of pseudo-random numbers for simulation - very fast, seed can be passed in explicitly, emits easily reproducible sequences.
This class is often misused for generating... |
How do I demonstrate that a PRNG not designed for cryptography is not suitable for generating passwords? |
The rate of 6,000,000 guesses per _day_ you report in [your SO post](http://stackoverflow.com/questions/10428059/how-do-i-demonstrate-that-net-class-random-is-not-suitable-for-generating-passw) seems extremely low — that's only 70 per second!
Are you perhaps trying to [generate a whole set of 10,000 strings](h... |
A = hash("blue" + X);
B = hash("pink" + X);
If A and the literals are known and X is unknown, are there attacks on B aside from the attacks on directly on hash()? In other words, is B safe?
Would it be better to reverse the concatenation?
A = Hash(X + "blue");
B = Hash(X + "pink");
If it ... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Further, computing $x^d\bmod n$ by proxy of $x^{d\bmod (p-1)}\bmod p$ and $x^{d\bmod (q-1)}\bmod q$ and the [Chinese Remainder Theorem][5] allows a q
... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Also, the proposed technique, assuming $d>n^{1/3}$, requires a minimum of $\lceil log_2(n)/3\rceil$ modular multiplications for the sparsest $d$ conceivab... |
I was wondering how many possibilities of private/public keys there are? If a million people for whatever reason tried to generate 5keys each in the same minute (on the same date and time) is there a high chance of collision? I believe GUID would suffer from that problem as many bits are reversed for date/time (, guid ... |
How many RSA keys before a collision? |
I want something like this but in a digital sense.
You and others walk into a room. Everyone knows who each of you are and everyone is doing their best to figure out what piece of paper each person is taking. Fortunately the all the paper is in a box. You bring your own envelope shuffle the papers blindly and put on... |
Is it possible take a peice of data in secret? |
I want something like this but in a digital sense.
You and others walk into a room. Everyone knows who each of you are and everyone is doing their best to figure out what piece of paper each person is taking. Fortunately the all the paper is in a box. You bring your own envelope shuffle the papers blindly and put on... |
I want something like this, but in a digital sense:
> You and others walk into a room. Everyone knows who each of you are and everyone is doing their best to figure out what piece of paper each person is taking. Fortunately the all the paper is in a box. You bring your own envelope, shuffle the papers blindly and pu... |
Is it possible take a piece of data in secret? |
Is there a known non-trivial system with plausibly secure public key encryption where:
<br><br><br>
1. $\;\;$ the $\:$ time $\:$ function is efficiently computable
<br>
2. $\;\;$ [pubkey,privkey] $\:$ pairs are generated with $\:$ time(privkey) = 0
<br>
3. $\;\;$ when encrypting under $\:$ pubkey $\:$, $\:$ the e... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Also, the proposed technique, assuming $d>n^{1/3}$, requires a minimum of $\lceil log_2(n)/3\rceil$ modular multiplications for the sparsest $d$ conceivab... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Also, the proposed technique, assuming $d>n^{1/3}$, requires a minimum of $\lceil log_2(n)/3\rceil$ modular multiplications for the sparsest $d$ conceivab... |
From [Dogbert's blog][1]:
> Sony has a line of laptops ("Vaio") which compete mainly in the high value market segments. They implemented a master password bypass which is rather sane in comparison to the rest of the bunch:
>
> * The randomly generated master password is only stored in RAM, e.g. it's lost after t... |
From [Dogbert's blog][1]:
> Sony has a line of laptops ("Vaio") which compete mainly in the high value market segments. They implemented a master password bypass which is rather sane in comparison to the rest of the bunch:
>
> * The randomly generated master password is only stored in RAM, e.g. it's lost after t... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Also, the proposed technique, assuming $d>n^{1/3}$, requires a minimum of $\lceil log_2(n)/3\rceil$ modular multiplications for the sparsest $d$ conceivab... |
[Wiener's result][1] has been [improved][2] [several][3] [times][4], and it is hard to tell how big the private exponent must be to be safe from further progress.
Also, the proposed technique, assuming $d>n^{1/3}$, requires a minimum of ${1\over3}\cdot log_2(n)$ modular multiplications for the sparsest $d$ conceivab... |
Is there such an algorithm that would allow to upgrade the encryption of a RSA-encrypted message without revealing the old private key?
Basically, such an algorithm would probably be split in two parts.
1. The algorithm would take the **old private key** and the **new public key** and generate a sort of **interm... |
Is there such an algorithm that would allow to upgrade the encryption of a RSA-encrypted message without revealing the plaintext to the untrusted user?
Basically, such an algorithm would probably be split in two parts.
1. The algorithm would take the **old private key** and the **new public key** and generate a ... |
I don't understand how disk encryption (e.g. TrueCrypt) is supposed to resist frequency analysis.
If blocks can be randomly accessed (which they can), doesn't that mean that frequency-domain information (e.g. contiguous free space) is exposed?
The only safeguard I know against this is chaining, but if they use ch... |
How can disk encryption systems (like Truecrypt) resist frequency analysis when they allow random access? |
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/2402/how-to-solve-mixcolumns
this question is related to this, Mixcolumn for encryption, but how about decryption?
what will I do?
because it said that I will used this:
During decryption the Mix Column the multiplication matrix is changed to:
0E 0B 0D 09
09 0... |
I got an answer in the related question about [Mixcolumn for encryption][1], but how about decryption?
what will I do?
Because it said that I will used this:
> During decryption the Mix Column the multiplication matrix is changed
> to:
>
> 0E 0B 0D 09
> 09 0E 0B 0D
> 0D 09 0E 0B
> 0B 0D ... |
Suppose Alice sends messages to Bob by encrypting the messages with Bob's public key.
Eve knows that the data is encrypted using RSA, but does not know the public key. Can Eve figure out the public key just by observing the encrypted messages?
And if so, approximately how much data would it take for Eve to discov... |
How can we find Public key have only 8 or 16bits? How many messages does Eve need to know the Public key in RSA? |
Suppose Alice sends messages to Bob by encrypting the messages with Bob's public key.
Eve knows that the data is encrypted using RSA, but does not know the public key. Can Eve figure out the public key just by observing the encrypted messages?
And if so, approximately how much data would it take for Eve to discov... |
Wikipedia has a nice section regarding the speedup of the RSA decryption using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [here][1]. I need to understand the implementation of a similar speedup for the encryption algorithm of a more complex homomorphic encryption scheme ([DGK][2]) and, for some reason, I'm unable to get my head aro... |
Wikipedia has a nice section regarding the speedup of the RSA decryption using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [here][1]. I need to understand the implementation of a similar speedup for the encryption algorithm of a more complex homomorphic encryption scheme ([DGK][2]) and, for some reason, I'm unable to get my head aro... |
Wikipedia has a nice section regarding the speedup of the RSA decryption using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [here][1]. I need to understand the implementation of a similar speedup for the encryption algorithm of a more complex homomorphic encryption scheme ([DGK][2]) and, for some reason, I'm unable to get my head aro... |
I try to get the full reasoning behind the above statement. First, after reading articles here and [at wikipedia][1] i understand that using an IV only once is good practice.
For stream ciphers not doing so will result in compromising security because of
Cipher1 xor Cipher2 = Plain1 xor Plain2
For block c... |
I try to get the full reasoning behind the above statement. First, after reading articles here and [at wikipedia][1] i understand that using an IV only once is good practice.
For stream ciphers not doing so will result in compromising security because of
Cipher1 xor Cipher2 = Plain1 xor Plain2
For block c... |
**Background**
In both, bitstrings are interpreted as a polnomical over GF(2) and they each can be used to implement a hash over a sliding window. The definitions of each are as follows:
Rabin Fingerprint: $M(x) = Q(x) \cdot G(x) + R (x)$
CRC: $M(x) \cdot x^{n} = Q(x) \cdot G(x) + R (x)$
Where $M(x)$ is mes... |
The [original article][1] neglects the cost of DES computations (there are less than $2^{90}$) and everything except memory accesses to its _Table 1_ and _Table 2_. I go one step further: considering that _Table 1_ is initialized only once and then read-only, it could be could be in ROM, and I neglect all except the ac... |
I am considering attacks on Two-Key Triple-DES Encryption assuming $2^{32}$ known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (that's a mere 32 Giga Bytes of ciphertext) by the method devised by [Paul C. van Oorschot and Michael J. Wiener][1], or another published method not requiring significantly more DES computations.
As a synthe... |
The [original article][1] neglects the cost of DES computations (there are less than $2^{90}$) and everything except memory accesses to its _Table 1_ and _Table 2_. I go one step further: considering that _Table 1_ is initialized only once and then read-only, it could be could be in ROM, and I neglect all except the ac... |
The [original article][1] neglects the cost of DES computations (there are less than $2^{90}$) and everything except memory accesses to its _Table 1_ and _Table 2_. I go one step further: considering that _Table 1_ is initialized only once and then read-only, it could be could be in ROM, and I neglect all except the ac... |
The [original article][1] neglects the cost of DES computations (there are less than $2^{90}$) and everything except memory accesses to its _Table 1_ and _Table 2_. I go one step further: considering that _Table 1_ is initialized only once and then read-only, it could be could be in ROM, and I neglect all except the ac... |
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