instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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what are the state-of-the-art TRNGs today? |
**How fast are the fastest ones?**
[Chaotic laser emission][1] is pretty much fastest. That's shoving a laser beam up itself. [This][2] one allegedly can be run at 1.2 Tbit/s:-
[![lasers][3]][3]
That's a start for your further research.
**Which ones have the most entropy?**
If it's a proper TRNG, the... |
> How fast are the fastest ones? Which ones have the most entropy?
This [recent article][1] claims 100 Gbit/s min-entropy, and gives reference to several >10 Gbit/s generators. These are lab experiments, where some quantum phenomenon is converted to digital with an [Analog-to-Digital Converter][2]. Much of the gener... |
##### Summarized Question:
In the context of JWK generation using RSA-PSS 4096bit with SHA-256, where the public exponent is `"e" = 65537`, is there any situation where the prime number **21863** comes in view?
##### Context:
To start, I'm not well versed with the mechanics of the algorithms discussed here, just t... |
> How fast are the fastest [TRNGs][1]? Which ones have the most entropy?
This [recent article][2] claims 100 Gbit/s [min-entropy][3], and gives reference to several >10 Gbit/s generators. These are lab experiments, where some quantum phenomenon is converted to digital with an [Analog-to-Digital Converter][4]. Much o... |
How can I prove with zkp that I have encrypted a message (v + random_number*c) with a given RSA public key? |
I want to create an application in which users can cast vote to blockchain in encrypted form using RSA. The private key will be revealed only after completion of the election.
My major use case is as follows:
- There will be certain number of candidates, $c$. So voter has to choose a number from $1$ to c, lets ... |
Prove with ZKP that I have encrypted a message $v + random\_number\cdot c$ given an RSA public key? |
I was reading the *[Coercion-Resistant Electronic Election][1]* paper and don't understand why the authors chose a modified version of ElGamal.
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
I guess that it was for security reasons. If so, what are the security issues of using a basic ElGamal scheme?
[1]: https:/... |
Why modified version of ElGamal is used on JCJ e-voting scheme? |
Different implementations might use different methods to generate primes. For example, the following answer discusses how to generate primes faster, but might be more vulnerable...
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/52292/what-is-fast-prime?newreg=ca22aff3d8ed4e569272563e90e6d897 |
The [ME-600 key generator][1] was developed in the early 1990s for generating truly random one time key streams. That's not exactly World War 1 or 2. I don't know how long it was used, or whether it still is.
Now with quantum computing on the horizon, people are looking at post-quantum cryptography. We also don't... |
I am trying to solve a CTF challenge based on DES. I attached the code of the challenge to the question. So far I have noticed that the otp used for the encryption is the same for the entire session, and my idea would be the following:
1. Get the OTP by using choice 1
2. Use the obtained OTP to decrypt the cipher... |
I'm currently undertaking the Alchemy course on Blockchain cryptography (https://university.alchemy.com/home). And our first project is to transfer tokens from one wallet to another using client / server application. All mock of course.
This project is using the prescribed https://www.npmjs.com/package/ethereum-cr... |
> Is it possible to apply a pseudo-random permutation (a keyed permutation) to construct a sponge function?
Yes, it is possible to construct a keyed-sponge function $\mathcal{F}_k(x, n)$ using a pseudo-random permutation $\pi$ and a secret key $k$. Here, $x$ refers to the input message, and $n$ to the number of outp... |
I'm currently undertaking the Alchemy course on Blockchain cryptography (https://university.alchemy.com/home). And our first project is to transfer tokens from one wallet to another using client / server application. All mock of course.
This project is using the prescribed https://www.npmjs.com/package/ethereum-cr... |
I am trying to solve a [CTF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture_the_flag_(cybersecurity)) challenge based on DES. I attached the code of the challenge to the question. So far I have noticed that the otp used for the encryption is the same for the entire session, and my idea would be the following:
1. Get the OTP... |
> Is it possible to apply a pseudo-random permutation (a keyed permutation) to construct a sponge function?
Yes, it is possible to construct a keyed-sponge function $\mathcal{F}_k(x, n)$ using a pseudo-random permutation $\pi$ and a secret key $k$. Here, $x$ refers to the input message, and $n$ to the number of outp... |
> How fast are the fastest [TRNGs][1]? Which ones have the most entropy?
This [recent article][2] claims 100 Gbit/s [min-entropy][3], and gives reference to several >10 Gbit/s generators. These are lab experiments, where some quantum phenomenon is converted to digital with an [Analog-to-Digital Converter][4]. Much o... |
How fast are the fastest ones? Which ones have the most entropy? Which ones are the most practical ones?
I tried looking for answers on Wikipedia and also, I tried reading papers, but I am couldn’t find answers to these questions. I was looking for a recent paper that would have compared all the TRNGs, but I couldn’... |
What are the state-of-the-art TRNGs today? |
I am trying to solve a [CTF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture_the_flag_(cybersecurity)) challenge based on DES. I attached the code of the challenge to the question. So far I have noticed that the otp used for the encryption is the same for the entire session, and my idea would be the following:
1. Get the OTP... |
You seem to have gotten pretty far.
Here are my musings.
spoiler: some keys can be weak
```
$ nc desoracle.challs.cyberchallenge.it 9035
1. Encrypt text
2. Encrypt flag
0. Exit
> 2
What key do you want to use (in hex)? FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
4bbe3dbd2af198110b1dba3b8be427a53119b02e2c9872687846c3058a225f77
1. E... |
You seem to have gotten pretty far.
Here are my musings.
spoiler: some keys can be weak
```
$ nc desoracle.challs.cyberchallenge.it 9035
1. Encrypt text
2. Encrypt flag
0. Exit
> 2
What key do you want to use (in hex)? FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
4bbe3dbd2af198110b1dba3b8be427a53119b02e2c9872687846c3058a225f77
1. E... |
You seem to have gotten pretty far.
Here are my musings.
spoiler: some keys can be weak
```bash
$ nc desoracle.challs.cyberchallenge.it 9035
1. Encrypt text
2. Encrypt flag
0. Exit
> 2
What key do you want to use (in hex)? FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
4bbe3dbd2af198110b1dba3b8be427a53119b02e2c9872687846c3058a225f77
... |
How to determine the homomorphic encryption CKKS scheme's parameter bounds for correctness and 128-bit security using some specific floating-point numbers and specific computation metrics like summation or variance?
Any formal proof and theoretical process to decide the parameters like polynomial degree and so on?
|
You seem to have gotten pretty far.
Here are my musings.
spoiler: some keys can be weak
```bash
$ nc desoracle.challs.cyberchallenge.it 9035
1. Encrypt text
2. Encrypt flag
0. Exit
> 2
What key do you want to use (in hex)? FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
4bbe3dbd2af198110b1dba3b8be427a53119b02e2c9872687846c3058a225f77
... |
I'm looking at the following text:
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
Why does CKKS decryption have an approximate correctness requiring that $\|u + e\| < {q / 2}$?
I mean if $\|u + e\| \ge {q / 2}$, how can I prove the CKKS decryption doesn't have approximate correctness?
[1]: https://i.stack.imgu... |
Why does CKKS decryption have approximate correctness? |
Which method will generate stronger secret?
64 character secret generated by nanoid (https://www.npmjs.com/package/nanoid) with characters: 0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_-
e.g.: hNr3COb9fSz5qfZBCQx3GkpLVW-tbVM0E-Nl8xgcf8Js8-l6fqOIfSd6Gk-T_nkE
or
crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('... |
I am trying to solve another CTF challenge. The challenge consists in trying to exploit an oracle that decrypts any hex text we send (see code below). I am kind of stuck on this one as this is not a classical challenge, since the decrypted text is not displayed. My guess would be one should exploit the fact that except... |
I was looking at the security level of instances of sponge construction [on Wikipedia][1] depicted in the following image.
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
It seems to me that the security level for collision resistance follows the formula $\min(d/2,c/2)$ while for the preimage it is $\min(d,c/2)$. Can someb... |
I'm currently undertaking a course on Blockchain cryptography. And our first project is to transfer tokens from one wallet to another using client / server application. All mock of course.
This project is using the prescribed https://www.npmjs.com/package/ethereum-cryptography
The theory is this as I understand... |
I am a bit confused about Sponge construction and Merkle-Damgard-style ones for hashing. The only advantage I see for sponge construction is that they are secure against length extension attacks. So if the application does not mind about such an attack, Merkle-Damgard should be better, Is that the case?
My intuition i... |
There's a keyed-permutation I'm playing with, $\ell_{i,x} = \pi_i(x_i)$, which is a bijection $X \leftrightarrow X$, where $|X| = 2^{256}$, and whose evaluations on plaintext inputs $x_i$ perfectly fill out a Latin-square, $L$, when an appropriate incrementing function, $\pi_{i+1} = \pi_i\mathrm{.step()}$, is applied o... |
Given $i$ keyed-$PRP$ labels $\ell_{i,x}$ from a $2^{256} \times 2^{256}$ Sudoku (Latin-square), how difficult is it for an adversary to solve? |
Is anyone aware of an in-depth study of algorithms using preprocessing to compute fixed-base exponentiations? Assuming I am willing to do arbitrary computation in the preprocessing phase (but not store an arbitrary amount of data afterward), what is the optimal time/storage tradeoff here?
Note: I have read [this pag... |
Summary: The operation of the Enigma Bombe is well documented. I manage to use it and a candidate checking machine to recover the plugboard pairs and the ring setting for the fast rotor. I struggle to recover ring settings for the slow and the middle rotors.
Question: Where can I find out more technical details on t... |
I am trying to solve another CTF challenge. The challenge consists in trying to exploit an oracle that decrypts any hex text we send (see code below). I am kind of stuck on this one as this is not a classical challenge, since the decrypted text is not displayed. My guess would be one should exploit the fact that except... |
I am trying to solve another CTF challenge. The challenge consists in trying to exploit an oracle that decrypts any hex text we send (see code below). I am kind of stuck on this one as this is not a classical challenge, since the decrypted text is not displayed. My guess would be one should exploit the fact that except... |
There's a keyed-permutation I'm playing with, $\ell_{i,x} = \pi_i(x_i)$, which is a bijection $X \leftrightarrow X$, where $|X| = 2^{256}$, and whose evaluations on plaintext inputs $x_i$ perfectly fill out a Latin-square, $L$, when an appropriate incrementing function, $\pi_{i+1} = \pi_i\mathrm{.step()}$, is applied o... |
Say we have a very limited password space with only a 4 digit PIN, so only 10000 PIN possibilities.
Say also that the attacker has access to the stored form of the PIN.
Can breaking the PIN made reasonably difficult by storing the PIN in a way that makes the reverse computation impossible, as well as the storing it... |
Can limited password/PIN length be compensated by a computationally intensive hashing function? |
I have an application that encrypts files in the following manner (I think I can hear sighs already but bear with me):
- Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
- Loop through both arrays (nested loop) and generate a third array of length l1 * l2 ... |
Long Random Key and XOR - How Secure? |
Consider the construction of "A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function" [[HILL99]](https://www.csc.kth.se/~johanh/prgfromowf.pdf) in Hastad et al.
One way to proof pseudorandomness of this construction is by contradiction.
That is, an assumed PRG distinguisher is transformed into a OWF inverter (usually t... |
> Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
What do you mean with "byte arrays **generated** from random strings? Byte arrays **are octet strings**. Are the byte arrays themselves fully random if the strings are text based strings?
> The aim by this... |
> Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
What do you mean with "byte arrays **generated** from random strings? Byte arrays **are octet strings**. Are the byte arrays themselves fully random if the strings are text based strings?
> The aim by this... |
> Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
What do you mean with "byte arrays **generated** from random strings? Byte arrays **are octet strings**. Are the byte arrays themselves fully random if the strings are text based strings?
> The aim by this... |
Christel Bach's [elliptic curve calculator](http://www.christelbach.com/ECCalculator.aspx) has the coordinates for the "point at infinity" be $(0,0)$. Is that just a stand-in? |
Are (0,0) the coordinates of the "point at infinity"? |
> Is that just a stand-in?
Yes, it is. The "point at infinity" doesn't actually correspond to a solution to the underlying equation, but instead is an artificial point we add to make the group operation complete.
That said, if we need to express that point in a software package, we need to have some encoding of ... |
> How many labels $\ell_{i, x}$, with unknown $x_i$, does an adversary need for $L$ to be at all uniquely solvable?
J. H. Van Lint and R. M. Wilson's [_A course in combinatoric_][1] show that the number $L(n)$ of latin squares of order $n$ verifies
$$L(n)>\frac{(n!)^{2n}}{n^{(n^2)}}$$
That approximation is very mu... |
> How many labels $\ell_{i, x}$, with unknown $x_i$, does an adversary need for $L$ to be at all uniquely solvable?
J. H. Van Lint and R. M. Wilson's [_A course in combinatoric_][1] show that the number $L(n)$ of latin squares of order $n$ verifies
$$L(n)>\frac{(n!)^{2n}}{n^{(n^2)}}$$
That approximation is very mu... |
> Can breaking the PIN made reasonably difficult by storing the PIN in a way that makes the reverse computation impossible, as well as the storing itself really time-intensitive?
Well, yes, you can encrypt or hash the PIN using a secret / key but that would require you to keep a secret and be able to use it securely... |
Welcome to the site but yes, here it is: "Sigh" :-)
>Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
Primes aren't that random. There's a list of little ones [here][1], and some bigger ones [here][2]. Other's are tricky to make - see [primality test][3]... |
> How many labels $\ell_{i, x}$, with unknown $x_i$, does an adversary need for $L$ to be at all uniquely solvable?
J. H. Van Lint and R. M. Wilson's [_A course in combinatoric_][1] show that the number $L(n)$ of latin squares of order $n$ verifies
$$L(n)>\frac{(n!)^{2n}}{n^{(n^2)}}$$
That approximation is very mu... |
The effectiveness of hash function attacks is typically measured in $x$ broken rounds of $N$ total designed rounds. And some constructs containing iterated hash functions include proof of work schemes, blockchains and key derivation functions. Constructs like $H^i(...)$.
What is the predicted effect on $x$ as $i$ i... |
Is hash function cryptanalysis the same or more difficult for iterated hashing, as H(H(H(H(H))))? |
I am currently playing around with some of the FHE libraries and found out that, e.g. TenSeal (SEAL) is able to perform "only" 8 ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications on the same ciphertext (c1 = c1*c2 in a loop) before the noise threshold is surpassed and decryption fails.
The parameters I set for this are: poly_mo... |
Is it possible to perform an unlimited amount of multiplications on the same ciphertext in fully homomorphic encryption? |
I am currently playing around with some of the Python FHE libraries and found out that, e.g. TenSeal (SEAL) is able to perform "only" 8 ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications on the same ciphertext (c1 = c1*c2 in a loop) before the noise threshold is surpassed and decryption fails.
The parameters I set for this are: ... |
I am currently playing around with some of the Python FHE libraries and found out that, e.g. TenSeal (SEAL) is able to perform "only" 8 ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications on the same ciphertext (8x1 Vector) (c1 = c1*c2 in a loop) before the noise threshold is surpassed and decryption fails.
The parameters I set f... |
Are FPGAs faster than microcontrollers in cryptography? |
A best attempt at answering my own question, provided for archival purposes.
**Preliminary research insights:**
- Regarding these [findings][1], without fully understanding how to translate them:
**A.** If the problem is massaged into one without sub-grid constraints, it can be represented by $(|X| \times ... |
Welcome to the site but yes, here it is: "Sigh" :-)
>Start with two byte arrays generated from random strings of lengths l1 and l2 (fwiw, l1 and l2 are primes)
Primes aren't that random. There's a list of little ones [here][1], and some bigger ones [here][2]. Other's are tricky to make - see [primality test][3]... |
> Or simply, can we still break $x$ rounds of $H$ no matter how many times it's iterated within one construct?
Largely, yes; let's go through the various security assumptions:
- If we are breaking collision resistance, then yes, it is the same level of effort.
What we do is simply find a collision $H(a) = H(b)... |
The effectiveness of hash function attacks is typically measured in $x$ broken rounds of $N$ total designed rounds. And some constructs containing iterated hash functions include proof of work schemes, blockchains and key derivation functions. Constructs like $H^i(...)$.
What is the predicted effect on $x$ as $i$ i... |
I am trying to solve another CTF challenge. The challenge consists in trying to exploit an oracle that decrypts any hex text we send (see code below). I am kind of stuck on this one as this is not a classical challenge, since the decrypted text is not displayed. My guess would be one should exploit the fact that except... |
A best attempt at answering my own question, provided for archival purposes.
**Preliminary research insights:**
- Regarding [ERT12][1], without fully understanding how to translate the findings:
**A.** If the problem is massaged into one without sub-grid constraints, it can be represented by $(|X| \times 2... |
I'm designing a cipher which has key-dependent S-boxes. The procedure is like this:
1. Transform the key (a string of bytes) into 96 16-bit words (the high bits are ignored, but make a difference when these 96 numbers are reshuffled to make the other two S-boxes).
2. Start with the identity permutation [0..255].
... |
Which reordering should I use for an 8-bit S-box? |
Given the following conditions:
- The encryption program, which uses some algorithm resembling AES-128 but with unknown modifications to real AES-128.
- It uses a fixed key and IV.
- It is written in Rust WITH debugging symbols but no source code is provided.
- One is able to provide an input and get the encryp... |
Is it possible to reverse engineer an encryption algorithm derived from AES-128 given these conditions? |
> Decrypt let's say 48 bytes of ciphertext by just using a known 4 character crib?
I'm reading this as trying to use the encryption executable as a black box without reverse-engineering it, and iteratively modifying the plaintext so that it matches more and more of the given 48 bytes of ciphertext.
It's unclear w... |
> Decrypt let's say 48 bytes of ciphertext by just using a known 4 character crib?
I'm reading this as trying to use the encryption executable as a black box without reverse-engineering it, and iteratively modifying the plaintext so that it matches more and more of the given 48 bytes of ciphertext.
It's unclear w... |
> Decrypt let's say 48 bytes of ciphertext by just using a known 4 character crib?
I'm reading this as trying to use the encryption executable as a black box without reverse-engineering it, and iteratively modifying the plaintext so that it matches more and more of the given 48 bytes of ciphertext.
It's unclear w... |
> Decrypt let's say 48 bytes of ciphertext by just using a known 4 character crib?
I'm reading this as trying to use the encryption executable as a black box without reverse-engineering it, and iteratively modifying the plaintext so that it matches more and more of the given 48 bytes of ciphertext.
It's unclear w... |
One common area of application of FPGAs in cryptography is cryptanalysis, for things like [password cracking][1] (that's a small underground industry, [apparently][2]) or solving the DLP in some group.
Another could be very high speed symmetric encryption for e.g. a fiber optic link.
Yet another could be fast imp... |
There's a much simpler way to make key dependent S boxes.
Simply seed a long random number generator (e.g. Xoroshiro128+ ). Then shuffle the identity permutation with Fisher-Yates. You should expect one fixed point in every permutation $P$ you make. Alternatively, there is a brute force method. Sample the RNG and a... |
**Scenario:**
Consider a scenario where *Server 1* stores a 600-800 KB ebook encryption with a certain private key. *Server 2*, a computation-purpose server, holds this private decryption key and get access to the encrypted file. Its task involves decrypting the file and re-encrypting it with a public key using a sp... |
**Scenario:**
Consider a scenario where *Server 1* stores a 600-800 KB ebook encrypted with a certain private key. *Server 2*, a computation-purpose server, holds this private decryption key and get access to the encrypted file. Its task involves decrypting the file and re-encrypting it with a public key using a spe... |
> Can breaking the PIN made reasonably difficult by storing the PIN in a way that makes the reverse computation impossible, as well as the storing itself really time-intensitive?
Well, yes, you can encrypt or hash the PIN using a secret / key but that would require you to keep a secret and be able to use it securely... |
I am currently reading the paper ["A 2-round anonymous veto protocol"][1] and have run into some trouble verifying the claims made about the zero knowledge proofs presented within. My knowledge of ZKPs is relatively elementary so I am looking for guidance as to where I may be going wrong in my understanding.
The re... |
Is it possible to forge valid proofs in this Schnorr signature-based ZKP system for proving knowledge about discrete logarithms? |
Using Fiat-Shamir, an interactive 3-round sigma protocol can be compiled into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof in the random oracle model.
A NIZK through Fiat-Shamir is not UC-Secure due to rewinding. There are some straight-line-extractable compilation techniques, and to the best of my knowledge, the most ef... |
> E.g. let $r\in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$, we can construct a "proof" \{$g^v, r$\} by taking $g^v = g^r(g^{x_i})^h = g^r g^{x_i h}$ despite not knowing the value of $v$ or $x_i$.
That doesn't work. What value do you use for $h$?
Remember, $h$ is computed as $h = H(g, g^v , g^{x_i})$, that is, it depends on $g^v$ and you ... |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any "nonces" (or "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use the $IV$ as the "key" instead? For exam... |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any "nonces" (or "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use the $IV$ as the "key" instead? For exam... |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any "nonces" (or "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use the $IV$ as the "key" instead? For exam... |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any "nonces" (or "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use that ***random IV*** also as the "key" ... |
Can anyone point me to techniques for efficient computation of modular multiplication/exponentiation modulo a *square*, as comes up, e.g., in the context of Paillier encryption? The standard references don't seem to have anything relevant, probably because they tend to focus on RSA and/or elliptic-curve cryptography wh... |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any "nonces" (or "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use that ***random IV*** also as the "key" ... |
$1)$ Why no exponentiation provided?
$A)$ Exponentiation is multiplication.
$5^4 = 5\star5\star5\star5$ (4 times)
So any exponentiation can be done using the multiplication gate
-----
$2)$ How do scalar misapplication in elliptic curves using the addition & multiplication gates?
$A)$ First of all, t... |
$1)$ Why no exponentiation provided?
$A)$ Exponentiation is multiplication.
$5^4 = 5\star5\star5\star5$ (4 times)
So any exponentiation can be done using the multiplication gate
-----
$2)$ How do scalar multiplication in elliptic curves using the addition & multiplication gates?
$A)$ First of all, t... |
Can anyone point me to techniques for efficient computation of modular multiplication/exponentiation modulo a *square*, as comes up, e.g., in the context of Paillier encryption? The standard references don't seem to have anything relevant, probably because they tend to focus on RSA and/or elliptic-curve cryptography wh... |
I have a Windows 10 laptop with an algorithm that creates a random number using the PRNG CryptGenRandom. According to [Wikipedia][1]:
> Because CryptGenRandom is the de facto standard CSPRNG in Win32 environments, its security is critical for Windows users.
However,
> The specifics of CryptGenRandom's algorith... |
Can I predict CryptGenRandom on my own device? |
Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any special "nonces/counters" (or any "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers can execute known-plaintext-attacks if there is a collision in the keystreams used for encryption.
But, what if we just simply use that ***random IV*... |
ECDSA and EdDSA both require the generation of a single-use value. Are there any elliptic curve signature schemes in existence which don't require nonce and maintain the usual security strength equal to half the key size? |
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