instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
Why does OpenSSL RSA signing process need the public exponent? |
In the paper "Efficient Pseudorandom Correlation Generators: Silent OT Extension and More (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8)" Boyle et. al. proposed subfield vole.
For standard vector oblivious
linear evaluation correlation one has, $\vec{v}+\vec{w}=\vec{u}*x$ ($v_i, w_i, u_i, x \in \mathbb{F}_p$).
An... |
Is it secure to do subfield vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) over a Ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$? |
I am trying to solve a challenge regarding a RSA oracle which allows me to encrypt/decrypt any plaintext/ciphertext I want, but there are a few checks that I have to bypass, and my goal is to decrypt the given flag. The strategy I am using is basically trying to get the N by making the oracle encrypt some small numbers... |
Let $n$ be the derived modulus and $ct$ be the encrypted flag.
You can derive $n$ using the method described here: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/65965/determine-rsa-modulus-from-encryption-oracle?noredirect=1
You might want to use some large primes, otherwise you might run into issues. If you use $3$ t... |
Let $n$ be the derived modulus, $ct$ be the encrypted flag and $m$ the plaintext flag.
You can derive $n$ using the method described here: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/65965/determine-rsa-modulus-from-encryption-oracle?noredirect=1
You might want to use some large primes, otherwise you might run into ... |
Let's imagine two entities: Bob and Alice. Bob's public key is $B = G*b$. Alice's public key is $A = G*a$.
Alice encrypts her number $n$ with Bob's public key so Bob could decrypt it ($n$ is small enough to be brute-forced):
$$E = G*n + B*r$$ $$R = G*r_0$$ where $r_0$ is a random nonce. Alice sends $(E, R)$ to Bo... |
I have implemented a ring signature in a Python program, To keep it simple, I have Alice and Bob. Based on this ring equation:
$$ v = E_k(y_s⊕E_k(y_i⊕v))$$
I will get:
$$ y_s = E_k^{-1}(v)⊕E_k(y_i⊕v) modn_s$$ where $y_i$ is the private key of the ring signer
However, after calculating, I did not get a ... |
I have implemented a ring signature in a Python program, To keep it simple, I have Alice and Bob. Based on this ring equation:
$$ v = E_k(y_s⊕E_k(y_i⊕v))$$
I will get:
$$ y_s = E_k^{-1}(v)⊕E_k(y_i⊕v) \pmod{n_s}$$ where $y_i$ is the private key of the ring signer
However, after calculating, I did not ge... |
There are attacks that can extract some information from lookup table access that depends on a secret value, e.g. if we access `a[0]` or `a[255]` depending on some property of the secret, and `a[255]` causes a cache miss. But what if only the order of access changes depending on the secret value? E.g. we could have the... |
Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack? |
For the NTT I know the following preconditions, which must be fulfilled for the primitive $N$-th root of unity:
$$ \omega^N \equiv 1 $$
$$ \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \omega^{ik} \equiv 0 \quad k=1,...,N-1 $$
These are derived from the DFT and adapted to the modular arithmetic of the NNT. So far clear.
But what about th... |
For the NTT I know the following preconditions, which must be fulfilled for the primitive $N$-th root of unity:
$$ \omega^N \equiv 1 $$
$$ \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \omega^{ik} \equiv 0 \quad k=1,\ldots,N-1 $$
These are derived from the DFT and adapted to the modular arithmetic of the NNT. So far clear.
But what about... |
The [JSON Web Encryption RFC 7516](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7516#section-5.1) says:
> Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the
> RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 [or RSAES-OAEP] algorithm to produce the JWE
> Encrypted Key.
Assuming a client/server architecture here where the server generates J... |
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Key Wrapping Fundamentals - How To Encrypt Content Encryption Key? |
In slightly more detail, the condition for fast NTT multiplication in the ring
$$\mathbb{Z}_q[x] / (x^{n}+1)$$
where $n = 2^k$ is that $q\equiv 1\bmod 2n$.
Your other question seems to be "what happens when $n\equiv 0\bmod q$?".
This will essentially never happen, because in essentially all applications $q = \m... |
My question is very basic one. Suppose there are two independent boolean variable $X_1$ and $X_2$. It is given that $X_1$ is biased towards $0$ and $X_2$ is biased towards $1$ with same amount of bias. Now will their XOR variable be biased or unbiased ?
My try:
Since their bias is same, probability that $X_1$ takes... |
While working with serial division/remainder method of finding factors, I have found that using knowns such as the known factors of a comparative number, or the difference between a number to be factored and its comparison number, then dividing into each number with the knowns and summing the remainders, the two origin... |
Does anyone understand why summing the chinese remainders and recursively performing the operation would provide factors of two compared numbers? |
My question is very basic one. Suppose there are two independent boolean variable $X_1$ and $X_2$. It is given that $X_1$ is biased towards $0$ and $X_2$ is biased towards $1$ with same amount of bias. Now will their XOR variable be biased or unbiased ?
My try:
Since their bias is same, probability that $X_1$ takes... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation. Portably avoiding secret-dependent timing requires that memory access patterns (including array indexes) are not secret-dependent.
On ... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation. Portably avoiding secret-dependent timing requires that memory access patterns (including array indexes) are not secret-dependent.
On ... |
Given a password as a seed for a Psuedo Random number generator and Fisher Yates Algorithm to shuffle bytes of a string to random places like `Hello World` to `ldWoeHor ll`, is it practically / theoretically impossible to break such cipher if plaintext contains enough words like >100?
Like for example, a string is s... |
Is this transposition cipher unbreakable? |
Given a password as a seed for a Psuedo Random number generator and Fisher Yates Algorithm to shuffle bytes of a string to random places like `Hello World` to `ldWoeHor ll`, is it practically and/or theoretically impossible to break such cipher if plaintext contains enough words like >100?
Like for example, a string... |
Given a password as a seed for a Psuedo Random number generator and Fisher Yates Algorithm to shuffle bytes of a string to random places like `Hello World` to `ldWoeHor ll`, is it practically and/or theoretically impossible to break such cipher if plaintext contains enough words like >100?
Like for example, a string... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation (this may allow attack, or not, depending on context). Avoiding secret-dependent timing in a portable way requires that memory access patt... |
I need to enable hybernation to the LUKS-encrypted drive. My /boot partition is unencrypted hence it stores all kernel images as well as kernel parameters in unencrypted form. For hybernation to work I should specify where the swap file starts off on my drive where the system can write hybernated data to. For this Linu... |
May specifying the position of swapfile help defeat LUKS encryption? |
Let's imagine two entities: Bob and Alice. Bob's public key is $B = bG$. Alice's public key is $A = aG$.
Alice encrypts her number $n$ with Bob's public key so Bob could decrypt it ($n$ is small enough to be brute-forced):
$$E = nG + r_0B$$ $$R = r_0G$$ where $r_0$ is a random nonce. Alice sends $(E, R)$ to Bob. ... |
While working with serial division/remainder method of finding factors, I have found that using knowns such as the known factors of a comparative number, or the difference between a number to be factored and its comparison number, then dividing into each number with the knowns and summing the remainders, the two origin... |
Why does sum of remainders of numbers divided by known factors, and repeating the process over and over, give factors of the two starting numbers? |
While working with serial division/remainder method of finding factors, I have found that using knowns such as the known factors of a comparative number, or the difference between a number to be factored and its comparison number, then dividing into each number with the knowns and summing the remainders, the two origin... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation (this may allow attack, or not, depending on context). Avoiding secret-dependent timing in a portable way requires that memory access patt... |
In the proof that RSA successfully decrypts the message $x$, we show that $x^{e^{d}}\equiv x \pmod N$. However, I am wondering whether it is a problem that we don't recover $x$ exactly, but merely a number congruent to it in mod $N$. Does this cause problems as far as decrypting the message successfully?
Also, the... |
RSA: does it matter that we recover something congruent to x rather than equal to it? |
> Does it matter that we recover something congruent to $x$ rather than equal to it?
It would matter, but to avoid that issue we insure that $0\le x<N$.
RSA textbook encryption has plaintext and ciphertext in the set $\{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}$. Encryption of $x\in\{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}$ goes $c:=x^e\bmod n$, with by defini... |
In an application, a curve25519 private key is the only stable identifier for an individual. I don't have readily have access to the corresponding public key.
Would it be safe to generate a public identifier by hashing this private key? E.g.
```
ID = argon2id(K_curve25519_private)
``` |
Is it safe to create a public ID by hashing a private key? |
just a quick question that I would like to ask, What's the exact meaning of 'Argon2 uses BLAKE2b'? Does it based on BLAKE2b? like chacha20 based on salsa20 kind of meaning or Does Argon2 use the BLAKE2b with 12 rounds hash function at the end to generate a hash value? thank you. |
İs Argon2 based on BLAKE2b or İs it using the BLAKE2b at the end? |
> Does it matter that we recover something congruent to $x$ rather than equal to it?
It would matter, but to avoid that issue we insure that $0\le x<N$.
RSA textbook encryption has plaintext and ciphertext in the set $\{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}$. Encryption of $x\in\{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}$ goes $c:=x^e\bmod n$, with by defini... |
> Would it be safe to generate a public identifier by hashing this private key?
It depends on the hash.
If the hash is SHA-512 applied on the private key formatted as a 256-bit (32-byte) string, that's a security disaster, because in [EdDSA][1] all operations involving the private key $k$ actually use some bits o... |
> Would it be safe to generate a public identifier by hashing this private key?
It depends on the hash.
If the hash is SHA-512 applied on the private key formatted as a 256-bit (32-byte) string, that's a security disaster, because in [EdDSA][1] all operations involving the private key $k$ actually use some bits o... |
What's the exact meaning of 'Argon2 uses BLAKE2b'? Does it based on BLAKE2b? like chacha20 based on salsa20 kind of meaning or does Argon2 use the BLAKE2b with 12 rounds hash function at the end to generate a hash value? thank you. |
Is Argon2 based on BLAKE2b or is it only using the BLAKE2b at the end? |
In the paper: "[Universal One-Way Hash Functions and their Cryptographic
Applications](https://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/uowhf.pdf)". The following is proven: "If 1-1 one-way functions exist, then the one-way based signature scheme described above is secure." For a signature scheme defined in the paper, w... |
In the paper: "[Universal One-Way Hash Functions and their Cryptographic
Applications](https://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/uowhf.pdf)". The following is proven: "If 1-1 one-way functions exist, then the one-way based signature scheme described above is secure." For a signature scheme defined in the paper, w... |
I want to construct a non-interactive ZK proof of that in a set of pairs of group (where the DDH-assumption holds true) elements:
$(g_1, Y_1), (g_2, Y_2), ..., (g_n, Y_n)$
, the prover knows at least one private key $x_i$ such that $g_i^{x_i} = Y_i$. The proof should also not reveal $i$.
The protocol would be ... |
I want to construct a non-interactive ZK proof that in a set of pairs of group (where the DDH-assumption holds true) elements:
$(g_1, Y_1), (g_2, Y_2), ..., (g_n, Y_n)$
, the prover knows at least one private key $x_i$ such that $g_i^{x_i} = Y_i$. The proof should also not reveal $i$.
The protocol would be bas... |
I want to construct a non-interactive ZK proof that in a set of pairs of group (where the DDH-assumption holds true) elements:
$(g_1, Y_1), (g_2, Y_2), ..., (g_n, Y_n)$
, the prover knows at least one private key $x_i$ such that $g_i^{x_i} = Y_i$. The proof should also not reveal $i$.
The protocol would be bas... |
I want to construct a non-interactive ZK proof that in a set of pairs of group (where the DDH-assumption holds true) elements:
$(g_1, Y_1), (g_2, Y_2), ..., (g_n, Y_n)$
, the prover knows at least one private key $x_i$ such that $g_i^{x_i} = Y_i$. The proof should also not reveal $i$.
The protocol would be bas... |
What are the cryptographic standards for #3 used for? (request for source)
EdDSA was recently stadardized by NIST ([FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final), chapter 7)
Which combination is the most popular/widely used?
I believe that most widely used is the Ed25519 (disregarding NIST P-256... |
I have a vector of $n$ elements where each entry is a non-negative integer. Neighboring vectors differ in one element where the absolute value difference between the elements that differ is $1$. I want to release the entire vector differentially privately. We can do this easily using the Laplace mechanism with sensitiv... |
> Would it be safe to generate a public identifier by hashing this private key?
It depends on the hash.
If the hash is SHA-512 applied on the private key formatted as a 256-bit (32-byte) string, that's a security disaster, because in [EdDSA on Curve25519][1] all operations involving the private key $k$ actually u... |
> 1. Are the following two methods roughly equivalent ways of authenticating that the section of key material $k$ is associated with the section of message material $m$?
> $$H_k(k \oplus m) \tag{a}$$
> $$H_k(m) \tag{b}$$
The question of association in this context isn't well-defined. It would be better to ask ques... |
> 1. Are the following two methods roughly equivalent ways of authenticating that the section of key material $k$ is associated with the section of message material $m$?
> $$H_k(k \oplus m) \tag{a}$$
> $$H_k(m) \tag{b}$$
The question of association in this context isn't well-defined. It would be better to ask ques... |
I have a question on how to interpret test results of NIST test suit.
first, when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean? I thought it means the random sequence fails the test. However, some p-values are more than 0.01 and it appears
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
second, some tests... |
> Would it be safe to generate a public identifier by hashing this private key?
It depends on the hash.
If the hash is SHA-512 applied on the private key formatted as a 256-bit (32-byte) string, that's a security disaster, because in [EdDSA on Curve25519][1] all operations involving the private key $k$ actually u... |
I'm making a peer-to-peer game client using an already existing protocol where messages are broadcasted to all people on the network, and messages are already proven to be from a given user. One of the games I want to add is UNO, and I found [this paper](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a066331.pdf) from the s... |
How secure is this modified RSA (SRA / Mental Poker) algorithm? |
**The intend is that `*` appears after the proportion when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the number of failed tests alone.**
The [nice manual][1] tells about the `37/41` that
> is the proportion of binary sequences that passed
We mu... |
**The intend is that `*` appears after the proportion when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the number of failed tests.**
The [nice manual][1] tells about the `37/41` that
> is the proportion of binary sequences that passed
We must tur... |
I have a question on how to interpret test results of NIST test suite.
First, when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean? I thought it means the random sequence fails the test. However, some p-values are more than 0.01 and it appears
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
second, some test... |
**The intend is that `*` appears after the proportion when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the number of failed tests.**
The [nice manual][1] tells about the `37/41` that "is the proportion of binary sequences that passed".
We must tur... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The intend is that `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" te... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The intend is that `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" te... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The intend is that `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" te... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The intend is that `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" te... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The intend is that `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" te... |
I'm making a peer-to-peer game client using an already existing protocol where messages are broadcasted to all people on the network, and messages are already proven to be from a given user. One of the games I want to add is UNO, and I found [this paper](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a066331.pdf) from the s... |
The protocol as in the question or \[SRA1981\] is insecure as described, but can be modified to be secure.
A serious security issue is that the encryption used is such that for any message $m$ (e.g. the description of a card) and any prime factor $p$ of $n$ (i.e. $p=n$ when $n$ is prime), ciphertext $c=m^e\bmod n$ ... |
The protocol as in the question, \[SRA1979\] or \[SRA1981\] is insecure as described, but can be modified to be secure.
A serious security issue is that the encryption used is such that for any message $m$ (e.g. the description of a card) and any prime factor $p$ of $n$ (i.e. $p=n$ when $n$ is prime), ciphertext $c... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" tests, and the de... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation (this may allow attack, or not, depending on context). Avoiding secret-dependent timing in a portable way requires that memory access patt... |
The protocol as in the question, \[SRA1979\] or \[SRA1981\] is insecure as described, but can be modified to be secure.
A serious security issue is that the encryption used is such that for any message $m$ (e.g. the description of a card) and any prime factor $p$ of $n$ (i.e. $p=n$ when $n$ is prime), ciphertext $c... |
In the paper: "[Universal One-Way Hash Functions and their Cryptographic
Applications](https://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/uowhf.pdf)". The following is proven: "If 1-1 one-way functions exist, then the one-way based signature scheme described above is secure." For a signature scheme defined in the paper, w... |
The protocol as in the question, and \[SRA1979\]/\[SRA1981\], are insecure as described, but smalls modifications can make it secure.
A serious security issue is that the encryption used is such that for any message $m$ (e.g. the description of a card) and any prime factor $p$ of $n$ (i.e. $p=n$ when $n$ is prime),... |
I am currently reading "A Decade of Lattice Cryptography"
At page 30, section 4.3.2, it descrip left multiplication by any fixed ring element a <br/>
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
[1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/ScBnC.png
It mention something about curcilant matrix whose first column is the coefficie... |
> Does a secret-dependent order of access of a lookup table create a possibility for a timing attack?
At least it creates a the possibility of a secret-dependent timing variation (this may allow attack, or not, depending on context). Avoiding secret-dependent timing in a portable way requires that memory access patt... |
If I have three integers $x,y,z\in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$,
How do I convert the modulo addition operation into conjunctive normal form (CNF)?
$$
(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z
$$ |
How to convert a Modular addition to conjunctive normal form (CNF)? |
The protocol as in the question, and \[SRA1979\]/\[SRA1981\], are insecure as described, but smalls modifications can make it secure.
A serious security issue is that the encryption used is such that for any message $m$ (e.g. the description of a card) and any prime factor $p$ of $n$ (i.e. $p=n$ when $n$ is prime),... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" tests, and the de... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" tests, and the de... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" tests, and the de... |
I read that to mitigrate BEAST attack openSSL tried to inject empty TLS record before each real TLS record. and by doing that there is no opportunity to execute an attack but i dont understand way?
what the diffrence between normal TLS? the attacker can still xor the block he want to guess with the last block to disab... |
how 0/n split prevent BEAST attack against TLS? |
The expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\bmod$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\bmod$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\bmod$ (as typeset by `\pmod` in LaTex, and in the question), standard notation is that$\... |
The expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\bmod$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\bmod$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\bmod$ (as typeset by `\pmod` in LaTex, and in the question), standard notation is that$\... |
The expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\bmod$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\bmod$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\bmod$ (as typeset by `\pmod` in LaTex, and in the question), standard notation is that$\... |
The question's expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\mod{}$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\mod{}$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\mod{}$ (as in the question, typeset using `\pmod` in LaTex), standard notat... |
The question's expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\mod{}$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\mod{}$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\mod{}$ (as in the question, typeset using `\pmod` in LaTex), standard notat... |
The question's expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\mod{}$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\mod{}$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of$\mod{}$ (as in the question, typeset using `\pmod` in LaTex), standard notat... |
The question's expression $(x+y)\pmod{2^n-1}=z$ is ill-formed when it comes to the use of$\mod{}$, and independently is ambiguous as to what $+$ and$\mod{}$ are in the context.
When there is an opening parenthesis immediately on the left of a$\mod{}$ (as in the question, typeset using `\pmod` in LaTeX), standard not... |
> when the asterisk mark appear on the report, what does it mean?
**The `*` shown in the question appears when we should reject the hypothesis of true uniform random input with low probability of false rejection, based on the fraction on the left**, where the numerator is the number of "successful" tests, and the de... |
From [this source](https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-11277.html) I extract
~~~
Short Benchmark for the RTX 4090
CUDA API (CUDA 11.8)
* Device #1: NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090, 23867/24252 MB, 128MCU
Benchmark relevant options:
* --optimized-kernel-enable
* --workload-profile=4
* Hash-Mode 1700 (SHA2-512)
Speed.#... |
From [this source](https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-11277.html) I extract
~~~
Short Benchmark for the RTX 4090
CUDA API (CUDA 11.8)
* Device #1: NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090, 23867/24252 MB, 128MCU
Benchmark relevant options:
* --optimized-kernel-enable
* --workload-profile=4
* Hash-Mode 1700 (SHA2-512)
Speed.#... |
From [this source](https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-11277.html) I extract
~~~
Short Benchmark for the RTX 4090
CUDA API (CUDA 11.8)
* Device #1: NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090, 23867/24252 MB, 128MCU
Benchmark relevant options:
* --optimized-kernel-enable
* --workload-profile=4
* Hash-Mode 1700 (SHA2-512)
Speed.#... |
From [this source](https://hashcat.net/forum/thread-11277.html) I extract
~~~
Short Benchmark for the RTX 4090
CUDA API (CUDA 11.8)
* Device #1: NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090, 23867/24252 MB, 128MCU
Benchmark relevant options:
* --optimized-kernel-enable
* --workload-profile=4
* Hash-Mode 1700 (SHA2-512)
Speed.#... |
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