instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
This is really about key management rather than the AES mode itself, if not you need to supply more details.
What's the goal of your suggestion? The threat model? What are the weaknesses you pointed to mysteriously in the question?
Nothing stops you from having a (strange and in depending on the details of use po... |
Is it possible for XTS to use two different key sizes? |
I am new to cryptography and I am trying to find a way to measure ciphertext entropy of encryption algorithms such as AES, Chacha20, etc for a school project. Is there any way to do it on Python? I read that the scipy library has a section for measuring entropy but I have no idea if this is recommended or even usable.
... |
Is there any way to measure entropy of encryption algorithms in python? |
**A little Introduction to Secp256k1;**
[Secp256k1][1] is a Koblitz curve **with a prime order**
`n = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C
D0364141`
and cofactor $h= 1$
Cofactor $h=1$ also implies that the curve has prime order.
> How does it prevent Pohlig–Hellman attack
Th... |
Consider an Elliptic Curve $E$ over a finite field $K$; $E(K)$ with a generator $G$. We will use standard terminology ; **scalar multiplication** of a point $G$ with a scalar $t$ is adding a point $G$ it self $t$-times
$$ P =[t]G : = \underbrace{G + G + \cdots + G}_{t-times}$$
> why couldn't a man in the middle o... |
A little test with Sagemath for the first 10 integers as the private key;
```
#secp256k1
p = Integer("0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F")
a = Integer("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000")
b = Integer("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000... |
**A little Introduction to Secp256k1;**
[Secp256k1][1] is a Koblitz curve **with a prime order**
`n = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C
D0364141`
and cofactor $h= 1$
Cofactor $h=1$ also implies that the curve has prime order.
>**1. Why doesn't secp256k1 use a prime order su... |
Here's my current understanding of how ECC works.
There is a recipient and a sender - Alice and Bob and each has a public and private key - (Alice's private key is denoted by a and public key is denoted by A and likewise for Bob).
They have a publicly available curve and a publicly available starting point P.
... |
What technique is used in the Off-The-Record protocol to implement authentication and message validation? And what is the difference between this technique and Multi-Designated Verifier Signatures?
---
As far as I understand it, the OTR protocol uses digital signatures and HMAC for authentication for one-to-one c... |
- In the **Ind-CPA** security we give access to the adversary to **the encryption oracle** as a black box.
Ind-CPA also includes the Known-Plaintext Attack, and KPA < IND-CPA
There are historical examples of Ind-CPA attacks. Directly quoting one from [Wikipedia][1]
> In World War II US Navy cryptanalys... |
- In the **Ind-CPA** security we give access to the adversary to **the encryption oracle** as a black box.
Ind-CPA also includes the Known-Plaintext Attack, and KPA < IND-CPA
There are historical examples of Ind-CPA attacks. Directly quoting one from [Wikipedia][1]
> In World War II US Navy cryptanalys... |
IND-CCA is an abbreviation of "Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack" and generally, an adversary carrying out the chosen ciphertext attack is given a decryption oracle only. However, in the IND-CCA game, the adversary is allowed to make both encryption and decryption queries in the pre-querying phase.
... |
I came across the [Solana network][1] utilizing sha256 as a "proof of history". They are using it as a pseudo-VDF (verifiable delay function). The reason it's pseudo is because verification is done by full-effort recompute in parallel using intermediate values.
I am curious whether or not the way sha256 is implement... |
Is the sha256 x86 extension close to optimal in silicon? (as it relates to a VDF) |
The description of bootstrapping in Section 5 of the BFV paper is somewhat challenging to grasp, and I have two specific questions:
1. The author mentions that if the norm of $\mathbf{v}$ is restricted such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|<\Delta / \mu$ for some $\mu>2$, it allows us to largely disregard most of $\operatorname{ct... |
Consider Sponge construction where capacity part of state is feed-forward and xor-ed into next state.
${state}_{i+1} = F({{state}_i}^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity}) \oplus (0^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity})$
1. Would there be any security improvement from this?
2. Would it improve preimage and 2nd preimage... |
According to my previous question the proofs cannot be broken by quantum computation, you cannot obtain the witness of the generated zk-snark proof.
[link to my previous question.][1]
Now if the concern is that the proofs can be forge, we could add difficulty by using chain integrity proofs:
our circuit should... |
can ownership proofs be added to circuits to make them zk-snark resistant to quantum proof forgery attacks? |
According to my previous question the proofs cannot be broken by quantum computation, you cannot obtain the witness of the generated zk-snark proof.
[link to my previous question.][1]
Now if the concern is that the proofs can be forge, we could add difficulty by using chain integrity proofs:
our circuit shoul... |
I came across the [Solana network][1] utilizing sha256 as a "proof of history". They are using it as a pseudo-VDF (verifiable delay function). The reason it's pseudo is because verification is done by full-effort recompute in parallel using intermediate values.
I am curious whether or not the way sha256 is implement... |
I came across the [Solana network][1] utilizing sha256 as a "proof of history". They are using it as a pseudo-VDF (verifiable delay function). The reason it's pseudo is because verification is done by full-effort recompute in parallel using intermediate values.
I am curious whether or not the way sha256 is implement... |
I came across the [Solana network][1] utilizing sha256 as a "proof of history". They are using it as a pseudo-VDF (verifiable delay function). The reason it's pseudo is because verification is done by full-effort recompute in parallel using intermediate values.
I am curious whether or not the way sha256 is implement... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected in the decryption process and the decryption is going to fail with an error (Ba... |
Using AEAD as pure MAC with *only* associated data? |
**A little Introduction to Secp256k1;**
[Secp256k1][1] is a Koblitz curve **with a prime order** i.e. the number of points on the curve together with the point at infinity is prime.
`n = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C
D0364141`
and cofactor $h= 1$
Cofactor $h=1$ also implies t... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
**Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)**, such as **AES-GCM**, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is go... |
I am new to lattice-based cryptography, so sorry that this question might seems stupid <br>
May I ask that how can I choose the BGV parameter of ciphertext with plain text in mod 128, and error in gaussian distribution of std 3.19 and secret key in uniform distribution from -1 to 1? Do I need also need to take into ac... |
I am new to Cryptography and I know there are better ways to test a cipher's effectiveness out there but in this case I am trying to test a cryptographic algorithm's(AES,xchacha20,twofish) hamming distance and avalanche effect for a school assignment/paper. Basically encrypting 50 files containing almost the same conte... |
Hamming Distance and Avalanche effect in Cryptography? |
I am new to Cryptography and I know there are better ways to test a cipher's effectiveness out there but in this case I am trying to test a cryptographic algorithm's(AES,xchacha20,twofish) hamming distance and avalanche effect for a school assignment/paper. Basically encrypting 50 files containing almost the same conte... |
Consider Sponge construction where capacity part of state is feed-forward and xor-ed into next state.
${state}_{i+1} = F({{state}_i}^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity}) \oplus (0^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity})$
1. Would there be any security improvement from this?
2. Would it improve preimage and 2nd preimage... |
The description of bootstrapping in Section 5 of the BFV paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/144) is somewhat challenging to grasp, and I have two specific questions:
1. The author mentions that if the norm of $\mathbf{v}$ is restricted such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|<\Delta / \mu$ for some $\mu>2$, it allows us to largely ... |
The description of bootstrapping in Section 5 of the BFV paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/144) is somewhat challenging to grasp, and I have two specific questions:
1. The author mentions that if the norm of $\mathbf{v}$ is restricted such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|<\Delta / \mu$ for some $\mu>2$, it allows us to largely ... |
I read the [Wikipedia Page][1] on ciphertext indistinguishability. Here it gives the following outline of the IND-CPA game:
>1. The challenger generates a key pair PK, SK based on some security parameter k (e.g., a key size in bits), and publishes PK to the adversary. The challenger retains SK.
>2. The adversary may ... |
Is the secret key kept constant in IND-CPA game? |
According to [Wikipedia][1], PRF is an abbreviation for Pseudorandom function family. But [this answer][2] says that PRF means Pseudorandom Function. Does that mean that a Pseudorandom Function is the same as a Pseudorandom function family? Or is the abbreviation PRF used inconsistently?
[1]: https://en.wikipedi... |
On an elliptic curve as used in crypto, we can add any two points $P$ and $Q$ of the elliptic curve, yielding a new point of the elliptic curve: $X\gets P+Q$. It holds $(P+Q)+R=P+(Q+R)$, making $P+Q+R$ unambiguous.
For any integer $k>0$ and point $P$, that lets us _define_ $k$ times $P$, noted e.g. $k\times P$, as t... |
I read the [Wikipedia Page][1] on ciphertext indistinguishability. Here it gives the following outline of the IND-CPA game:
>1. The challenger generates a key pair PK, SK based on some security parameter k (e.g., a key size in bits), and publishes PK to the adversary. The challenger retains SK.
>2. The adversary may ... |
Consider Sponge construction where capacity part of state is feed-forward and xor-ed into next state.
${state}_{i+1} = F({{state}_i}^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity}) \oplus (0^{rate} || {{state}_i}^{capacity})$
1. Would there be any security improvement from this?
2. Would it improve preimage and 2nd preimage... |
This field only has one group so you haven't "crossed over". You are still in the same group. Addition is just a description. You went from N-1 to 2G. To go from 5G to 3G, do you "crossover"?
5 + (N-2) = 5 - 2 = 3
And your example...
3 - 1 = 2
|
It seems to me that your requirements are such that you can't solve the problem as it appears to be stated.
* You only have AES.
* You have no AES key.
And that's an issue. Without a key, then AES is just some function that emits pseudorandom, but guessable numbers.
However, you also have this secret ECDH ke... |
I am attempting a to simulate an 'Enigma M3' machine. As I understand it, the M3 is internally wired as:
|Name|ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ|Notch|
|---|---|---|
I | EKMFLGDQVZNTOWYHXUSPAIBRCJ | Y
II | AJDKSIRUXBLHWTMCQGZNPYFVOE | M
III | BDFHJLCPRTXVZNYEIWGAKMUSQO | D
UKW-B | YRUHQSLDPXNGOKMIEBFZCWVJAT
**NO... |
Why isn't my Enigma simulator working? |
I am attempting a to simulate an 'Enigma M3' machine. As I understand it, the M3 is internally wired as:
|Name|ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ|Notch|
|---|---|---|
I | EKMFLGDQVZNTOWYHXUSPAIBRCJ | Y
II | AJDKSIRUXBLHWTMCQGZNPYFVOE | M
III | BDFHJLCPRTXVZNYEIWGAKMUSQO | D
UKW-B | YRUHQSLDPXNGOKMIEBFZCWVJAT
**NO... |
How can a hash function be suitable for hashing passwords, but not for deriving encryption keys, and vice versa? |
AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message) AES key could be "wr... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
On [Wikipedia][1], they give the following definition of PRF:
>A family of functions,
>$f_s: \{0,1\}^{|x|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda(|x|)}$,
>with $x\in \{0,1\}^*$ and
>$\lambda:\mathbb N \rightarrow \mathbb N$,
>is pseudorandom if the following conditions are satisfied:
>1. Given any $s$ and $x$, there alwa... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead use a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-message... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a *fixed* IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-mes... |
On [Wikipedia][1], they give the following definition of PRF:
>A family of functions,
>$f_s: \{0,1\}^{|x|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda(|x|)}$,
>with $x\in \{0,1\}^*$ and
>$\lambda:\mathbb N \rightarrow \mathbb N$,
>is pseudorandom if the following conditions are satisfied:
>1. Given any $s$ and $x$, there alwa... |
During one of the seminars at my university on Cryptography, the presenter said that while computing x/y over Finite Rings Z_{2^l}, there exist some problems such as:
1. (y)^{-1} may not exist as over the ring Z_{2^l}, only odd numbers have inverses and even numbers don’t.
--- I understand this is required as ... |
During one of the seminars at my university on Cryptography, the presenter said that while computing $x/y$ over Finite Rings $\mathbb Z_{2^l}$, there exist some problems such as:
> 1. $y^{-1}$ may not exist as over the ring $\mathbb Z_{2^l}$, only odd numbers have inverses and even numbers don’t.
I understand thi... |
How would knowing a clear byte value of the decrypted data affect a brute force attack on an AES-128 encrypted message ?
i.e. If I knew the 1st byte should decrypt to 0xff
OR I knew that every 100 Bytes should decrypt to 0xff ?
OR I knew every 100 2 bytes should decrypt to 0xff00 ? |
During one of the seminars at my university on Cryptography, the presenter said that while computing $x/y$ over Finite Rings $\mathbb Z_{2^\ell}$, there exist some problems such as:
> 1. $y^{-1}$ may not exist as over the ring $\mathbb Z_{2^\ell}$, only odd numbers have inverses and even numbers don’t.
I understa... |
The question is mainly stated in the title. I had to do a refreshment on public key cryptography. The algorithms are pretty straightforward however, I always stumbled upon this question. Is it in order for the same message to be able to be signed with a different signature each time, like some kind of nonce?
P.S. I'... |
What is the purpose of $k \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$ in ElGamal signatures on ${\mathbb{Z_{p}^{*}}}$? |
If I convert a long sentence (>50 characters) to sha512 and use the result (128 hex characters) as a password, how secure is it? |
I am currently reading [Homomorphic Encryption Standard][1]. <br>May I ask that for table 1 in the link, why increasing the security level will yield a smaller ciphertext size (log q)?
<br>I attach a screenshot below
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
Thanks a lot!
[1]: https://projects.csail.mit.edu/HEW... |
**Sentence from all books (Bad Way)**
First some statistics. Let's assume that
1. We have a total of [156264880][1] printed books and that is $< 2^{24}$.
2. The a[verage word usage is around 15][2]
3. The [average word size is 5.1][3].
4. There are 15 such sentences on average (no ref).
5. There are an averag... |
I've been checking the NIST PQC documents to find the requirements about the minimum required numbers of signatures to be generated with a signature scheme:
* [NIST call for proposals][1]
* [Call for Additional Digital Signature Schemes][2]
I think the other schemes don't have this limitation, but Hash Based Sig... |
**Sentence from all books (Bad Way)**
First some statistics. Let's assume that
1. We have a total of [156264880][1] printed books and that is $< 2^{24}$.
2. The [average word usage in a sentence is around 15][2]
3. The [average word size is 5.1][3].
4. There are 15 such sentences on average per page (no ref).
... |
question:in the Kyber Algorithm specifications document,chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$,one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension d=m+kn+1, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ o... |
question:in the Kyber Algorithm specifications document,chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$,one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension d=m+kn+1, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ o... |
In the Kyber Algorithm specifications document, chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:
> Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$, one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension $d=m+kn+1$, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ ... |
If I convert a long sentence (>50 characters) to c and use the result (128 hex characters) as a password, how secure is it? |
**Sentence from all books (Bad Way)**
First some statistics. Let's assume that
1. We have a total of [156264880][1] printed books and that is $< 2^{24}$.
2. The [average word usage in a sentence is around 15][2]
3. The [average word size is 5.1][3].
4. There are 15 such sentences on average per page (no ref).
... |
**Sentence from all books (Bad Way)**
First some statistics. Let's assume that
1. We have a total of [156264880][1] printed books and that is $< 2^{24}$.
2. The [average word usage in a sentence is around 15][2]
3. The [average word size is 5.1][3].
4. There are 15 such sentences on average per page (no ref).
... |
Deepfake technology has become very difficult to tackle due to sophisticated machine learning algorithms. Now, even when a journalist or bystander provides photo or video evidence, the culprit denies it, claiming that it is the result of deepfake manipulation. Can TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) cryptography techno... |
in Homomorphic Encryption Standard, why in the LWE increasing security level yields smaller ciphertext? |
The best standard cryptography has to offer is that a photo can be signed by whoever attests that it is original. If we trust the signer and their ability to use their private key wisely (that is not let others use that key, and use it only to sign what they attest is original), and we trust the certification authority... |
Is there a many-to-one reduction from GapSVP to GapCVP? |
Why make things more complicated than necessary? Just have the server remember the last time the API call was allowed. If it's less than 12 hours ago, reject the call.
The attacker doesn't need to compute your expensive signature - he will just flood the server with wrong signatures, and make the server validate the... |
I'm learning about the scheme of a distributed data clean room. It appears to be similar to an MPC (Multi-Party Computation) framework. What is the difference between them, and why does it run faster than a normal MPC?
https://www.snowflake.com/blog/distributed-data-clean-rooms-powered-by-snowflake/ |
How does a distributed data clean room work? |
In the Kyber Algorithm specifications document, chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:
> Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$, one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension $d=m+kn+1$, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ ... |
In the Kyber Algorithm specifications document, chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:
> Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$, one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension $d=m+kn+1$, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ ... |
In the Kyber Algorithm specifications document, chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that:
> Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$, one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension $d=m+kn+1$, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ ... |
I have three numbers x, a, and c, where both a and c are odd numbers. The number x is the output of the following function:
$$
x = a^b\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\mod{c}
$$
I am attempting to determine whether the input exponent, b, was an odd or even number based on the knowledge of the three values, a, c, and x. Is the... |
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