instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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I've read [DDLL13] paper and want to understand how the lemma 3.4 is changed for NTRU version of BLISS.
In the naive construction of BLISS, the commitment entropy is bounded in Lemma 3.4 as below[![lemma 3.4][1]][1]
The authors say the commitment entropy of the NTRU version of BLISS is bounded in the same way wit... |
I've read [\[DDLL13\]][1] paper and want to understand how the lemma 3.4 is changed for NTRU version of BLISS.
In the naive construction of BLISS, the commitment entropy is bounded in Lemma 3.4 as below[![lemma 3.4][2]][2]
The authors say the commitment entropy of the NTRU version of BLISS is bounded in the same ... |
since the NTT is a variant of the DFT respectively FFT, it seems possible to implement a recursive algorithm for the NTT of Kyber with a divide-and-conquer concept. This is the reason for my question here, I would be interested in how to recursively realize the NTT from the current Kyber [specification][1]. I am less i... |
secp256k1 Generator:(G_X, G_Y, 0x1),
secp256k1 any public key using affine coordinates : B=(X, Y)
secp256k1 any Public key using jacobian coordinates:BB=(P_X, P_Y, P_Z)
(B's private key)==(BB's private key)
I consider <strike>projective</strike> Jacobian coordinates for secp256k1.
Given any public key B,... |
I am attempting to get a hardware implementation of RSA working but I am having trouble with encryption and decryption. First, I ran these commands to generate the keys:
openssl genrsa -out private-key.pem 2048
openssl rsa -in private-key.pem -pubout -out pubkey-key.pem
I then ran some of my own programs to ge... |
I am attempting to get a hardware implementation of RSA working but I am having trouble with encryption and decryption. First, I ran these commands to generate the keys:
openssl genrsa -out private-key.pem 2048
openssl rsa -in private-key.pem -pubout -out pubkey-key.pem
I then ran some of my own programs to ... |
There are probabilistic algorithms to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$ from $n$, $e$, $d$. It's then easy to rebuild the full private key $(n,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$. One such algorithm is [there][1]. A similar one is in OpenSSL key import, and other libraries. The time it takes in practice is acceptable (comparable ... |
> Any idea what I am doing wrong?
My initial inclination is that you might be interpreting the pem files incorrectly, that is:
- Perhaps the value of the modulus is not what OpenSSL meant
- Perhaps the encryption or decryption exponent you are using is incorrect; it should have $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(... |
There are probabilistic algorithms to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$ from $n$, $e$, $d$. It's then easy to rebuild the full private key $(n,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$. One such algorithm is [there][1]. A similar one is in OpenSSL key import, and other libraries. The time it takes in practice is acceptable (comparable ... |
There are probabilistic algorithms to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$ from $n$, $e$, $d$. It's then easy to rebuild the full private key $(n,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$. One such algorithm is [there][1]. A similar one is in OpenSSL key import, and other libraries. The time it takes in practice is acceptable (comparable ... |
There are probabilistic algorithms to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$ from $n$, $e$, $d$. It's then easy to rebuild the full private key $(n,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$. One such algorithm is [there][1]. A similar one is in OpenSSL key import, and other libraries. The time it takes in practice is acceptable (comparable ... |
There are probabilistic algorithms to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$ from $n$, $e$, $d$. It's then easy to rebuild the full private key $(n,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$. One such algorithm is [there][1]. A similar one is in OpenSSL key import, and other libraries. The time it takes in practice is acceptable (comparable ... |
So I've been learning about RSA for quite a while (mainly by playing around in CTF competitions) and I came across an interesting problem.
The other day I was looking to create a challenge in which I needed $\phi(n)$ to be a perfect square, but under the condition that $p \neq q$.
For very small bitlengths (such... |
> The error they mention is that Kyber has the security level of 2^41 bits, instead of 2^80 bits, but does that make any difference? Isnt 2^80 still not sufficient security level?
I don't see a mention of error with these specific numbers. The 2^80 value is only used in the introduction of the article linked. The ac... |
I am looking for a protocol where each party generates a share such that $\sum_{i\in [n]} s_i =0$ where the shares should remain secret. The adversary may corrupt n-2 parties, and the parties can be malicious. However, it should be verifiable if the sum is not 0. Is there an efficient protocol that achieves this in a d... |
How to distribute share that sums to 0 without a dealer? |
I am currently exploring the workings of the Tor network, specifically how the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is employed to establish shared secret keys between the client and each relay in the circuit.
While I understand how the client exchanges keys with the entry node, I am seeking clarity on how the... |
In GRR3,we make the first row of the Garbled table to be zero by choosing a special value of $C_1$.
Why don't we make the second row also zero by choosing a special value of $C_0$?
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
[1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/q9BRU.png |
I am trying to argue about the hardness of LWE, but in a setting that is different from the standard one.
Consider the task of learning the LWE secret $s$ from noisy samples. The specifications of the problem are an $m \times n$ matrix $A$, a $n \times 1$ vector $s$, and a Gaussian noise vector $e$. By a noisy samp... |
Depending on the point/permute bits (color bits), the 1st and 2nd ciphertexts might involve the same $C_i$ value.
For example, imagine the point/permute bits are such that the basic garbled truth table is:
$$\begin{aligned}E(C_0) \\ E(C_0) \\ E(C_1) \\ E(C_0) \end{aligned}$$
Once you choose $C_0$ to make the fir... |
I've read [\[DDLL13\]][1] paper and want to understand how the lemma 3.4 is changed for NTRU version of BLISS.
In the naive construction of BLISS, the commitment entropy is bounded in Lemma 3.4 as below:
$$ \text{Pr}[\mathbf{A}(y = t; \; y \leftarrow D_{\sigma}^m)] = \text{Pr}[y_1 = (t - \bar{\mathbf{A}}_{y_0}); ... |
let $F$ be a finite field, $E(F)$ an elliptic curve of order $n$, $r$ a factor of $n$, $k(r)$ for the embedding degree of $E(F)$ with respect to $r$.
Then why the full $r$-torsion group contains $r^2$ many elements and consists of $r+1$ subgroups? |
Depending on the point/permute bits (color bits), the 1st and 2nd ciphertexts might involve the same $C_i$ value.
For example, imagine the point/permute bits are such that the basic garbled truth table is:
$$\begin{aligned}E(C_0) \\ E(C_0) \\ E(C_1) \\ E(C_0) \end{aligned}$$
Once you choose $C_0$ to make the fir... |
I am currently exploring the workings of the Tor network, specifically how the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is employed to establish shared secret keys between the client and each relay in the circuit.
In this lesson from Nick Mathewson (https://youtu.be/OgGTJIgNewE?si=ft3a0Y0Brgtuj5eF&t=2035) it is ex... |
> The error they mention is that Kyber has the security level of 2^41 bits, instead of 2^80 bits, but does that make any difference? Isnt 2^80 still not sufficient security level?
I don't see a mention of error with these specific numbers. The 2^80 value is only used in the introduction of the article linked. The ac... |
When designing the search LWE problem, how do you set the dimensions of the A matrix? Or under what circumstances can I use very few matrix dimensions to achieve 128-bit security? Up to noise level? Or some other way? |
I'm working on a project where we have three different software systems—let's call them A, B, and C.
Systems A and B handle user data identified by phone numbers and want to send user actions to System C for tracking purposes. The goal is to achieve user tracking across systems while maintaining privacy through the us... |
since the NTT is a variant of the DFT respectively FFT, it seems possible to implement a recursive algorithm for the NTT of Kyber with a divide-and-conquer concept. This is the reason for my question here, I would be interested in how to recursively realize the NTT from the current Kyber [specification][1]. I am less i... |
I was told in passing that (key, plain) pairs could be chosen to produce a zero state in AES encrypt in some middle round (say 5). [The application here being to side-channel leakage assessment.] However, I can't find any reference. I assume such a thing could be constructed from various attacks on reduced-round AES... |
since the NTT is a variant of the DFT respectively FFT, it seems possible to implement a recursive algorithm for the NTT of Kyber with a divide-and-conquer concept. This is the reason for my question here, I would be interested in how to recursively realize the NTT from the current Kyber [specification][1]. I am less i... |
What's the lattice dimension of the uSVP for attacking CRYSTALS-Dilithium-128? |
If entropy is hashed with sha 256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much entropy is reduced after hashing due to collision? Is there any reference that explains how to calculate this? |
how much entropy is lost due to collision? |
If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much entropy is reduced after hashing due to collision? Is there any reference that explains how to calculate this? |
How much entropy is lost due to collision? |
Dears,
In RFC 2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", its mentioned there are four available authentication methods for IKE, there are different calculations for SKEYID for each method and hence we get HASH_I & HASH_R which seems it has one calculation way but the SKEYID gets engaged on its calculation.
Referr... |
How IKE authentication happens? what's the role of HASH_I & HASH_R, and how it gets verified by each parties? and where SKEYID_a gets engaged? |
I'm trying to implement a simple 1o2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Ailice let's say are 7,9, Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrect?
m0=7, m1=9
p: 3 q: 5 phi: 8
coprime e: 3
d1:... |
I'm trying to implement a simple 1o2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Ailice let's say are 7,9, Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrect?
m0=7, m1=9
p: 3 q: 5 phi: 8
coprime e: 3
... |
I'm trying to implement a simple 1o2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Ailice let's say are 7,9, Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrect? Am I missing Mod n somewhere?
m0=7, m1=9
p: 3... |
First of all, you are discussing the older version of IKEv1; the current version (known as IKEv2) does this entirely differently.
Anyways, to answer your questions:
> I don't see SKEYID_a got engaged in the calculation of HASH_I, where it should get engaged in the authentication process?
It's not what SKEYID_a... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153…$ bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input that c... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153…$ bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input that c... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input that c... |
I'm trying to implement a simple [1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA][1]. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Alice let's say are 7,9, Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrect? Am I missing Mod n somewhere?
m0=7, m... |
since the NTT is a variant of the DFT respectively FFT, it seems possible to implement a recursive algorithm for the NTT of Kyber with a divide-and-conquer concept. This is the reason for my question here, I would be interested in how to recursively realize the NTT from the current Kyber [specification][1] which is def... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our encrypted MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
But the addition at the last step of a new IV1, make any change?.
Supposed NO, but how can prove it.
[![EMAC][1]][1]
Can you evaluate t... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input t... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input t... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random function, and input t... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes. That constant applies for any unbroken cryptographic hash aiming at unifor... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes. That constant applies for all unbroken cryptographic hashes wide enough fo... |
First of all, you are discussing the older version known as IKEv1 (which is really only of historic interest); the current version (known as IKEv2, which is what everyone should be using instead) does this entirely differently.
Anyways, to answer your questions:
> I don't see SKEYID_a got engaged in the calculati... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random oracle or a random fu... |
First of all, you are discussing the older version known as IKEv1 (which is really only of historic interest); the current version (known as IKEv2, which is what everyone should be using instead) does this entirely differently.
Anyways, to answer your questions:
> I don't see SKEYID_a got engaged in the calculati... |
## Problem ##
I'm working on an AES implementation in C++, and I have been testing the performance of my code, and its functions. I've noticed a significant performance slowdown in my 'addRoundKey' function. The time it takes to complete the 'addRoundKey' function seems to scale linearly, i.e. if I give it 1mb it take... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random oracle or a random fu... |
## Problem ##
I'm working on an AES implementation in C++, and I have been testing the performance of my code, and its functions. I've noticed a significant performance slowdown in my 'addRoundKey' function. The time it takes to complete the 'addRoundKey' function seems to scale linearly, i.e. if I give it 1mb it take... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The [wikipedia page is no... |
Are all doubled points on an elliptic curve even, meaning if you compress the point, it will have '02' plus the $x$ coordinate? If not, what distinguishes a doubled point from a point resulting from point addition?
|
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The [wikipedia discriptio... |
> Are all doubled points on an elliptic curve even, meaning if you compress the point, it will have '02' plus the $x$ coordinate?
**No**.
Assuming an elliptic curve group on a prime field $\mathbb F_p$, such as [secp256k1][1] or [secp256r1][2], being "even" is a characteristic of the $y$ coordinate after reductio... |
> Are all doubled points on an elliptic curve even, meaning if you compress the point, it will have '02' plus the $x$ coordinate?
**No**.
Assume an elliptic curve group of prime order $n$ on a prime field $\mathbb F_p$, such as [secp256k1][1] or [secp256r1][2], and consider points other than the point at infinity... |
> Are all doubled points on an elliptic curve even, meaning if you compress the point, it will have '02' plus the $x$ coordinate?
**No**.
Assume an elliptic curve group of prime order $n$ on a prime field $\mathbb F_p$, such as [secp256k1][1] or [secp256r1][2], and consider points other than the point at infinity... |
BLAKE2 uses a message schedule I did not see before. It uses permutations of pieces of the message block.
The BLAKE2 book did not state the rationale for such a choice and how it contrasts with the message schedule of SHA2 for example.
If the BLAKE2 key schedule is sound why wasn't such an approach taken with SHA... |
Rationale for BLAKE2 message schedule? |
Is a prime shifting method for RSA modulus generation safe? |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The [wikipedia descriptio... |
It is not quite difficult to understand the idea of differential cryptanalysis applied to a standalone block cipher. The method investigates, how differences of plaintext evolve while going through rounds of the cipher.
But several sources mention the analysis of a block cipher in a mode of operation. But, for insta... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The [wikipedia descriptio... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The [wikipedia descriptio... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [current question][1].
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our encrypted MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
But the addition at the last step of a new IV1, make any change?.
Supposed NO, but how can prove it.
[![EMAC with IV-IV2][1]][1]
Can yo... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [current question][1].
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [current question][1].
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.... |
Or, you don't.
This question is predicated on the notion that such a break though is made by an academic (as was Schnorr). And also that it would be _"catastrophic"_. To whom?
Since we're dealing with alternative realities, can I suggest an alternative to your alternative? The brightest and best cryptographers w... |
I'm trying to implement a simple 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Alice, let's say, are $m_0 = 7$ and $m_1 = 9$. Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrectly? Am I missing Mod n somew... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [question][1].
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decryption, is to be reduced modulo $N$. That final reduction is necessary to always get the correct result. The other reductions are necessary to avoid information leak.
The ... |
I'm trying to implement a simple 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer with RSA. I was checking the code and tried to work it step by step. The 2 messages by Alice, let's say, are $m_0 = 7$ and $m_1 = 9$. Bob's decryption turns out to be -8. Can you please help me understand what I'm doing incorrectly? Am I missing $\bmod N$ s... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [question][1], for $m_0+k_0$, $m_1+k_1$ (even though they do nothing for the parameters used), and the final $17−22=−8$, which after reduction modulo $N=15$ yields the expected $m_b=7$.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decrypt... |
Yes, reductions modulo $N$ are missing in the [question][1], for $m_0+k_0$, $m_1+k_1$ (even though they do nothing for the parameters used), and the final $17−22=−8$, which after reduction modulo $N=15$ yields the expected $m_b=7$.
Except for the public key $(e,N)$, everything that's exchanged, and the final decrypt... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random oracle or a random fu... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Shannon entropy is then reduced by $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes.
That's rigorously derived for a model of SHA-256 as a random oracle or ... |
Is generating Keccak-256 hashes with timestamp + nonce (ensured to be unique for each run), and taking its most significant 16 bytes sufficient to generate random V4 UUIDs?
Obviously the 13th hex character will be made 4, and 17th character will be made one of 8,9,a,b after the random generation. But I believe this ... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Then Shannon entropy is reduced by _at most_ $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes, and exactly by $\eta$ if in addition the input can take exactly ... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
Then Shannon entropy is reduced by _at most_ $\eta=0.827245389153$… bit for all practical purposes, and exactly by $\eta$ if in addition the input can take exactly ... |
Recently, I read some security proofs about the secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol, which includes statements about *information leakage*, such as the security proof below from the paper CWL+20$^{1}$, but I'm confused about the "security with information leakage".
> (Section 4.4 Security Proof from CWL+20... |
What is the standard security and leaky security, and the relation between the standard/leaky security and the leakage function? |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
As long as there is more than say 200 bits of entropy in the input distribution, and we can computationally sample from that distribution, then it's computationally... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
As long as there is more than say 200 bits of entropy in the input distribution, and we can computationally sample from that distribution, then it's computationally... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
As long as there is more than say 200 bits of entropy in the input distribution, and we can computationally sample from that distribution, then it's computationally... |
> If entropy is hashed with SHA-256 for example, and the input has exactly 256 entropy bits, how much is entropy reduced after hashing due to collision?
With more than say 200 bits of entropy in an input distribution that we can computationally sample, it's computationally impossible to distinguish the output of SHA... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our encrypted MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-iv][1]
[htt... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our encrypted MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-iv][1]
[h... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
Ok we know when we add a random IV in our "modified encrypted" MAC became useless and the IV can be forgery, then our encryption scheme becomes vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks.
According those proves :
[https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/90070/finding-iv-for-forgery-of-aes-cbc-mac-with-non-fixed-i... |
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