instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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I am looking for an alternative to RSA accumulators, and I am wondering if the following option based on function composition might fit the bill. It seems like an obvious tweak on RSA accumulators, which makes me think I'm probably missing something important though.
So I understand that RSA is based on modular expo... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosed as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda(n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosed as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda(n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosed as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda(n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda(n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda(n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
Assume I have a private key, `priv_k`, a public key `pub_key` and a message, `msg`, along with its hash, `hash`. I can produce a ECDSA signature, `S`, of `hash` using `priv_k`, and verify the signature with `pub_key`, `msg` and `S`.
It is possible to split `priv_k` into shares, `priv_share1`, `priv_share2`, such th... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
I am a self learner and tried to learn AES, so I have a book written in my native language. It has some practical examples about finite fields and AES. It has a question that asks me to calculate the byte substitution process in advanced encryption system in GF($2^8$).
The book ask for `10010011`. I know that it is ... |
I am looking for an alternative to RSA accumulators, and I am wondering if the following option based on function composition might fit the bill. It seems like an obvious tweak on RSA accumulators, which makes me think I'm probably missing something important though.
So I understand that RSA is based on modular expo... |
I'm not sure if this question belongs here or to StackOverflow. Please flag it if not.
I'm trying to implement a standalone library for finite field arithmetic of prime and prime power order as a way to learn to write safe code. Afterwards I plan to implement some elliptic curve groups on top of it and then some el... |
How do you securely implement a finite field? |
In my current project we will have to encrypt a lot of S3 objects (a few billions) with AWS KMS.
Our security department requires that we use KMS keys backed by CloudHSM. But since CloudHSM incurs some non-negligible extra charges in terms of pricing and key management (key rotation particularly), I was wondering if... |
Is there any cryptanalysis possible if the cipher itself is deterministically derived from key material?
For example, suppose you have n building blocks (ARX primitives, AES ops, other primitives) and parameters to further modulate them (ex. rotation numbers).
How could you even attempt to cryptoanalyze such a ci... |
Is there any cryptanalysis possible if the cipher itself is deterministically derived from key material?
For example, suppose you have n building blocks (ARX primitives, AES ops, other primitives) and parameters to further modulate them (ex. rotation numbers).
How could you even attempt to cryptoanalyze such a ci... |
I have been exploring Bellare and Micciancio's ["randomize-then-combine"](https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/inc-hash.pdf) paradigm for deriving set homomorphic hashing functions. I am particularly interested in grow-only sets, such that elements can be added but _not_ removed from the underlying set (and hash). Non... |
Grow-only set homomorphic hash function from semigroup? |
I am studying the Goldwasser, Micali, Tong theorem about information leakage in RSA. In every book I have searched, there is the following remark $(c = Enc(x))$:
> Note that $loc(c) = parity(c \cdot Enc(2))$ and $parity(c) = loc(c \cdot Enc(2^{-1}))$
[![enter image description here][1]][1])
I have proven th... |
I am studying the Goldwasser, Micali, Tong theorem about information leakage in RSA. In every book I have searched, there is the following remark $(c = Enc(x))$:
> Note that $loc(c) = parity(c \cdot Enc(2))$ and $parity(c) = loc(c \cdot Enc(2^{-1}))$
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
I have proven the... |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (ecdsa). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce `k`, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the `s` value of the signature is computed as following:
s = r<sub>val</sub> + h(r<sub>val</sub> * G || pub || m) * d
... |
I am studying the Goldwasser, Micali, Tong theorem about information leakage in RSA. In every book I have searched, there is the following remark $(c = \operatorname}{Enc(x))$:
> Note that $\operatorname{loc}(c) = \operatorname{parity}(c \cdot \operatorname{Enc}(2))$ and $\operatorname{parity}(c) = \operatorname{loc... |
I am studying the Goldwasser, Micali, Tong theorem about information leakage in RSA. In every book I have searched, there is the following remark $(c = \operatorname{Enc}(x))$:
> Note that $\operatorname{loc}(c) = \operatorname{parity}(c \cdot \operatorname{Enc}(2))$ and $\operatorname{parity}(c) = \operatorname{loc... |
I want to sign a file called `data.txt` and store its signature in `data.txt.sig`. To create the signature, I want to use an existing RSA private key, stored in the PEM format within the file `RSAPrivate.key`. I use the following openssl command:
openssl dgst -sha256 -out data.txt.sig -sign RSAPrivate.key data.t... |
How to sign a file using OpenSSL? |
I am studying the Goldwasser, Micali, Tong theorem about information leakage in RSA. In every book I have searched, there is the following remark $(c = \operatorname{Enc}(x))$:
> Note that $\operatorname{loc}(c) = \operatorname{parity}(c \cdot \operatorname{Enc}(2))$ and $\operatorname{parity}(c) = \operatorname{loc... |
Why an adversary can guess a secret while we have provided differential privacy? |
How do I instantiate ZK-STARKs using Polynomial Commitments? |
Thanks to @Daniel S, to noting a property of inner product: *looking an inner product as product of a row vector and a column vector*.
**I just write it for clarity in the case someone is not familiar with basic mathematical concepts.**
We look at vectors as column vectors (so $\vec{v}^{T}$ is a row vector). $\... |
Thanks to @Daniel S, for noting a property of inner product: *looking an inner product as product of a row vector and a column vector*.
**I just write it for clarity in the case someone is not familiar with basic mathematical concepts.**
We look at vectors as column vectors (so $\vec{v}^{T}$ is a row vector). $... |
Thanks to @Daniel S, for noting a property of inner product: *looking an inner product as product of a row vector and a column vector*.
**I just write it for clarity in the case someone is not familiar with basic mathematical concepts.**
We look at vectors as column vectors (so $\vec{v}^{T}$ is a row vector). $... |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (ecdsa). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce $k$, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the $s$ value of the signature is computed as following:
$$s = r_{val} + h(r_{val} \cdot G || pub || m)\cdot d$$
whe... |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (ecdsa). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce $k$, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the $s$ value of the signature is computed as following:
$$s = r_\mathrm{val} + h(r_\mathrm{val} \cdot G \mathbin\| \ma... |
I'm thinking of cryptographic implementations on garbage-collected (gc) languages/runtimes and that the gc process can be potentially dangerous for an implementation even if the implementation has the "constant-time" property. Imagine the following code for example:
```
{
x = {big chunk data that are not refer... |
Has garbage-collection been used for side-channel attacks? |
We have a set of secrets $S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ known to an adversary. Each $x_i \in S$ belongs to user $u_i$ who needs to obfuscate his secret using the notion of $d-$privacy defined in the following.
We assume that we have a numeric function $d(x,x^{\prime})$, giving the distinguishability level between ... |
How to achieving $d-$privacy considering some secrets? |
We have a set of secrets $S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ known to an adversary. Each $x_i \in S$ belongs to user $u_i$ who needs to obfuscate his secret using the notion of $d-$privacy defined in the following.
We assume that we have a numeric function $d(x,x^{\prime})$, giving the distinguishability level between ... |
How to achieve $d-$privacy considering some secrets? |
As you may know, classical ciphers are now often broken with hill-climbing algorithms. The earliest mention of them in cryptography I could find occurs in some [1980s publication][1] mentioning 1979 PhD thesis of M. Hellman's student Dov Andelman titled "Maximum Likelihood Estimation Applied to Cryptanalysis" (availabl... |
Who first applied hill climbing algorithms to cryptanalysis? |
I'm reading inner product from generalized sumcheck in baloo paper (P.13), I'm confused with λ_j (0) = N^−1. Can anyone shed some light?
Here's excerpt from the paper
> The intuition is that for all Lagrange interpolation polynomials {λ_j (X)}_j=1 to N corresponding to a multiplicative subgroup H of size N, we hav... |
How is λ_j(0) = N^-1 for Lagrange polynomials in the Baloo paper's generalized sumcheck? |
We have a set of secrets $S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ known to an adversary. Each $x_i \in S$ belongs to user $u_i$ who needs to obfuscate his secret, i.e. $K(x_i) = o_i$, using the notion of $d-$privacy defined in the following.
We assume that we have a numeric function $d(x,x^{\prime})$, giving the distinguish... |
Is it possible to consider a mechanism without adding noise to provide differential privacy? |
I'm reading inner product from generalized sumcheck in baloo paper (P.13), I'm confused with $\lambda_j(0) = N^{-1}$. Can anyone shed some light?
Here's excerpt from the paper
> The intuition is that for all Lagrange interpolation polynomials $\{\lambda_j(X)\}_{j=1}^{N}$ corresponding to a multiplicative subgroup ... |
How is $\lambda_j(0) = N^{-1}$ for Lagrange polynomials in the Baloo paper's generalized sumcheck? |
### Context
I've used OpenSSL to encrypt some socket communications.
I am however using some functionality from the windows API that prevents me from using OpenSSL's opaque builtin sockets, so I am buffering through their `BIO_s_mem` interfaces - that requires 4 extra copies for all data passing through (`socket->r... |
Greetings from a newbie and crypto ignaramus. I hope that this is an appropriate forum for this question - please advise if not, or feel free to move it to another SE section.
First heard of chaffing years ago when government agencies were trying to ban PGP etc. from civilian use, especially internationally. With co... |
LLM-AI useful in chaffing? |
Briefly, your approach has following problems that are solved in TLS (see details [here](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/97998/27923).):
1) It allows man-in-the-middle attacks (TLS doesn't)
2) It allows replay attacks (TLS doesn't)
3) It doesn't provide forward secrecy (TLD does)
4) It doesn't provide key revoca... |
Unconditional zero-sharing was presented in the following paper
> [Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/799), by Vladimir Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu
Unconditional zero-sharing allows all parties to obtain a sh... |
What's actually the difference between a (noisy) CVP and LWE? It seems to me that both are the same.
With the definition of LWE:
$$A * s + e = b$$
solving for secret vector **_s_** is the same than solving for the coefficients of the CVP, or do i understand something completely wrong? |
I am currently working on a project involving RSA-PSS (Probabilistic Signature Scheme) for digital signatures. While researching potential vulnerabilities, I came across the well-known Bleichenbacher attack, which primarily targets PKCS1 v1.5 padding.
My understanding is that the Bleichenbacher attack is not applica... |
Is Bypassing Padding Verification in RSA-PSS Dangerous? |
I am a professional developer with a mathematics background, but know next to nothing related to cryptography. I would like to know if the following scenario is even possible.
Let's say Alice and Bob each have a bitstring of length n. Alice sends her (encrypted) bitstring to a (maybe vulnerable) server where it is s... |
There is a two-party computation protocol based on 2-out-of-2 additive secret sharing in Figure 1. Party $P_0$ holds secret shares $[a]_0, [b]_0$, and party $P_1$ holds secret shares $[a]_1, [b]_1$ where $[a]_0 + [a]_1 = a$ and $[b]_0 + [b]_1 = b$. We assume that $P_0$ and $P_1$ have obtained Beaver's triples $([u]_i, ... |
Imagine a simple auction made with Pedersen commitments rather than sealed envelopes.
Participant 1 commits their bid, $b_1$, choosing a blinding factor $x_1$ and using publicly known G and H generators. As they do so, the commitment value $C_1$ appears on a public website.
Participant 2 does the same. Again, as ... |
Imagine a simple auction made with Pedersen commitments rather than sealed envelopes.
Participant 1 commits their bid, $b_1$, choosing a blinding factor $x_1$ and using publicly known G and H generators. As they do so, the commitment value $C_1$ appears on a public website.
Participant 2 does the same. Again, as ... |
Suppose that $(\mathrm{Gen},\mathrm{Enc},\mathrm{Dec})$ is a secure encryption scheme. Encryption scheme is ***secure*** if for any two sequences $\{a_{n}\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}},\{b_{n}\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ of messages such that $|a_{n}|=|b_{n}| = p(n)$ $\mathrm{Enc}(k,a_{n})$ and $\mathrm{Enc}(k,b_{n})$ are computationally... |
Is this particular encryption algorithm secure? |
Let $G$ be a secure PRG and let $s$ be a private key. We can define $\mathrm{Enc}(s,m) = G(s)\oplus m$. As long as we know only one encrypted message this scheme is secure, since $G(s)\oplus m \sim r\oplus m \sim r$, where $r$ is a random string. I have several questions:
- If we know two encrypted messages $G(s)\o... |
How many encrypted messages can we know, so that scheme is secure? |
I'm trying to write a C++ program to solve the shortest vector problem. The program is given a basis of a vector space V and needs to find the shortest non-zero vector in V.
Right now I'm using the Ajtai-Kumar-Sivakumar (AKS) algorithm described [here](https://sp2.uni.lu/wp-content/uploads/sites/66/2019/06/AKS-Vitor... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p$ = 11, $q$ = 13, then $n = pq$ = 143.
(2) $\lambda (n)$ = $\lambda (143)$ = lcm(p-1, q-1) = lcm(10, 12) = 60.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, let $e$ = 7, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, t... |
Imagine a simple auction made with Pedersen commitments rather than sealed envelopes.
Participant 1 commits their bid, $b_1$, choosing a blinding factor $x_1$ and using publicly known G and H generators. As they do so, the commitment value $C_1$ appears on a public website.
Participant 2 does the same. Again, as ... |
in this paper <https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/399.pdf>
[![enter image description here][1]][1]
[1]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/Y94Ph.jpg
how to make the lattice? |
Consider the definition of the dual lattice for a lattice $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}_{m\times n})\in\mathbb{R}^{m}$ where $\mathbf{B}\in\mathbb{R}^{m\times n}$ and $n\leq m$ [[sp2 Seminar][1], Luxembourg 2019, [DualitySlides][2], page 5]:
$$ \mathcal{L}^{\vee}=\{\vec{v}\in span_{\mathbb{R}}(\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B})): \l... |
I'm currently testing the randomness of using SHA-256 in Hash_DRBG mechanism based on [this research][1]. The result is as follows.
| Test | n-tuple | p-samples | p-value | Assessment |
|:-----|:--------|:----------|:--------|:-----------|
| diehard_birthdays | 0 | 100 | 0.43249977 | PASSED |
| diehard_operm5 | 0... |
I'm currently testing the randomness of using SHA-256 in Hash_DRBG mechanism based on [this research][1]. The parameters used in the testing are the default parameters, except for when the PRNG fails a certain test, the p-sample is doubled in a subsequent test. The result is as follows.
| Test | n-tuple | p-samples ... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p = 11, q = 13$, then $n = pq = 143$.
(2) $\lambda (n) = \lambda (143) = lcm (p-1, q-1) = lcm (10, 12) = 60$.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, choose $e = 7$, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, ... |
(1) $p$ and $q$ is chosen as: $p = 11, q = 13$, then $n = pq = 143$.
(2) $\lambda (n) = \lambda (143) = lcm (p-1, q-1) = lcm (10, 12) = 60$.
(3) Find $e$ that $gcd(e, \lambda(n)) = 1$, which means $e$ is coprime with $\lambda(n)$, choose $e = 7$, for 7 and 60 has no common divisors other than 1.
(4) Find $d$, ... |
Suppose that $(\mathrm{Gen},\mathrm{Dec},\mathrm{Enc})$ is a ***semantically secure*** public-key encryption scheme. I define $E' = (E(e,m)\oplus m)\parallel (E(e,m)\oplus e)$. Clearly, this is now not secure, since knowing $e$ allows to know $E(e,m)$ (applying XOR with $e$ to the second half) and, consequently, leaks ... |
There is an algorithm called EIG (Extra Information Gathering) protocol for byzantine agreement of a bit over n parties. The protocol has t+1 rounds. Can anyone help me understand how the time complexity of the algorithm is $\mathcal{O}(n^{t+1})$?
|
We have a set of secrets $S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ known to an adversary. Each $x_i \in S$ belongs to user $u_i$ who needs to obfuscate his secret using the notion of $d-$privacy defined in the following.
We assume that we have a numeric function $d(x,x^{\prime})$, giving the distinguishability level between ... |
I'm working on an idea for a backend data store that stores encrypted data that is zero knowledge/trust, however is shareable to a number of parties. I don't want the backend service to know anything about the data or manage keys, so if the data was ever compromised then it would be meaningless to an attacker. Theref... |
Zero Knowlege/Trust Architecture with shared encryption keys (maybe Shamir's secret sharing?) |
I want to concretely understand how exactly choice of error distribution effect the security of KEM in the context of Lattice Based Cryptography.
For example, I would like to know the concrete analysis of CBD used in Kyber. How Kyber justiify the use of CBD from the security point of view.
Could someone please ... |
In my current project we will have to encrypt a lot of S3 objects (a few billions) with AWS KMS.
Our security department requires that we use KMS keys backed by CloudHSM. But since CloudHSM incurs some non-negligible extra charges in terms of pricing and key management (key rotation particularly), I was wondering if... |
I am using a cryptography system in which the Feistel structure and permutation cipher are combined. I am amazed by the result; decryption is so much faster than encryption. My system is working properly. Anyone can explain why this is happening. Why is decryption faster than encryption? |
Is it faster to decrypt than to encrypt in all cryptography systems? |
When I learned about the inner workings of the TLS protocol and what exactly it protects a connection against, I was surprised to learn that even asymmetric encryption can be defeated by a MITM attack - as all the attacker has to do is replace the certificate with their own. This is why CAs exist, as a form of authenti... |
How does SMB authentication work? |
When I learned about the inner workings of the TLS protocol and what exactly it protects a connection against, I was surprised to learn that even asymmetric encryption can be defeated by a MITM attack - as all the attacker has to do is replace the certificate with their own. This is why CAs exist, as a form of authenti... |
Well the answer was in the linked post [Samba SMB Encryption - How safe is it?][1]. More concretely, the microsoft article linked within: [Encryption in SMB 3.0: A protocol perspective][2].
I couldn't really read it before as I was quite out of context. Only after finding out about the existence of [password-based ... |
Well the answer was in the linked post [Samba SMB Encryption - How safe is it?][1]. More concretely, the microsoft article linked within: [Encryption in SMB 3.0: A protocol perspective][2].
I couldn't really read it before as I was quite out of context. Only after finding out about the existence of [password-based ... |
Well the answer was in the linked post [Samba SMB Encryption - How safe is it?][1]. More concretely, the microsoft article linked within: [Encryption in SMB 3.0: A protocol perspective][2].
I couldn't really read it before as I was quite out of context. Only after finding out about the existence of [password-based ... |
For context, I want to see how far I can go using YouTube as a (bad) cloud storage solution just because of sheer curiosity and kicks and giggles. In said journey, I came across the problem of properly encrypting the files I upload to YouTube. In a perfect world, I would like to allow for file sharing as close as I can... |
"Offline" Revocable Encryption, or something similar to it? |
In [Pass's lecture notes](https://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs6830/2009fa/lecnotes.pdf) 2.13 section, a universal OWF is constructed. But I have some confusion about:
>Let $M_g$ be the smallest machine which computes function $g$. Since $M_g$ is a uniform algorithm it has some constant description size $|M_g|$. Thu... |
About Levin's constructure of universal OWF, why $\log n$ bits TM can work? |
In AES Key Wrap, we apply 6n AES encryptions for an input of n 64-bit blocks. Informally speaking, we wrap the key 6 times. What is the motivation behind 6? Why not 4 or 10? Is there something like a treshold or trade-off coming from security vs efficiency concerns? |
Why is s=6n in AES Key Wrap? |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (ecdsa). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce $k$, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the $s$ value of the signature is computed as following:
$$s = r_\mathrm{val} + h(r_\mathrm{val} \cdot G \mathbin\| \ma... |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (ecdsa). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce $k$, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the $s$ value of the signature is computed as following:
$$s = r_\mathrm{val} + h(r_\mathrm{val} * G \mathbin\| \mathrm... |
I've got a question regarding the signing algorithm on elliptic curves (EdDSA). In ed25519 signature scheme there is no nonce $k$, instead every message has its own different hash. From what I know the $s$ value of the signature is computed as following:
$$s = r_\mathrm{val} + h(r_\mathrm{val} * G \mathbin\| \mathrm... |
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