instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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I am wondering what concrete computable functions we know that
- are a **permutation** over an integer **interval** of parameterizable size $s$, for relatively small $s$ starting circa $2^{64}$, to perhaps $2^{256}$; without loss of generality we'll translate the interval to $\{0\dots s-1\}$;
- are easily computabl... |
The SBMC comic shared [rules for a new version of tic-tac-toe](https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/tic) today — I'm trying to figure out if there's a mental-poker/zero trustless version which could be played between two untrusting players (without the "monitor").
- Is there a way we can know this is _not_ possible?
-... |
Let $X \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$ be a uniformly distributed random string and $Y \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$ such that $H(Y) = n$.
Does this imply that $Pr(X=Y) = 2^{-n}$? If it's not, is this probability necessarily neglible in $n$?
I've only been able to show that $H(X|Y) \geq n$, but I'm not very sure what it implies about this p... |
Is this probability negligible? |
Are there any password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) algorithms in FIPS standards? |
Does FIPS have any PAKE algorithms? |
> Are there any password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) algorithms in FIPS standards?
Not formally, no. On the other hand, you could cobble together, say, EKE from DH and FPE (both of which has FIPS approved instantiations), and I expect that combination would be FIPS approved... |
In [this paper][1], one of the facts stated was that $\text{IND-CPA} \not\implies \text{EKR}_p$, in which $\text{EKR}_p$ is defined as the property that for a polynomial number accessible of oracles p with p keys, an adversary is not able to determine any key and plaintext pairs within polynomial time. I'm struggling t... |
I'm reading the [article][1] named "Characterizing the qIND-qCPA (in)security of the CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR modes of operation".
An attack on CTR mode is presented in the article. The proof of thm 1 states:
- Adversary prepares the state $|+\rangle$ and makes a query to embedding oracle using it.
- Adversary receiv... |
I tried to recover public key from P256 signature.
With 2 recovery id ( 0, 1 ), signature makes 2 public key.
And I tried to verify signature with public key and verification was succeed all of 2 keys.
Isn’t it correct that only one of the two should succeed?
Or is there some cryptographic knowledge I don't know ... |
As we know in block ciphers, the distinguisher means that despite thousands ciphertexts (and plaintexts), allows an attacker to distinguish the encrypted data from random data. This attack is important because the secret key is ofen applied once related to many ciphertext.
My first question is what does it mean the... |
What does it mean the "Distinguisher" in LWE decision version? |
I'm seeking guidance on mitigating side-channel attacks in a cryptographic application where securely overwriting memory with zeros after use may not always be feasible. While I understand the importance of this practice in preventing memory disclosure vulnerabilities, I'm encountering situations where the secrets stor... |
What could be the side-channel attacks countermeasures other than secure memory overwriting? |
I know that information can be changed by changing the frequency of electromagnetic vibrations.My question is, can I change the frequency according to my encryption algorithm? That way I can get a frequency that doesn't match anywhere. This would increase the reliability of my algorithm. |
My question is, can I change the frequency according to my encryption algorithm? |
> why we have sum over all $x$ here?
The difference here is notational. We use the + operator not to mean 'addition with some group operation', but instead that the state can be represented by a combination of orthogonal base states.
For example, if we have a state where we have two base states `|0>` and `|1>`, ... |
> why we have sum over all $x$ here?
The difference here is notational. We use the + operator not to mean 'addition with some group operation', but instead that the state can be represented by a combination of orthogonal base states.
For example, if we have a state where we have two base vectors `|0>` and `|1>`,... |
> why we have sum over all $x$ here?
The difference here is notational. We use the + operator not to mean 'addition with some group operation', but instead that the state can be represented by a combination of orthogonal base states.
For example, if we have a state where we have two base vectors `|0>` and `|1>`,... |
> why we have sum over all $x$ here?
The difference here is notational. We use the + operator not to mean 'addition with some group operation', but instead that the state can be represented by a combination of orthogonal base states.
For example, if we have a state where we have two base vectors `|0>` and `|1>`,... |
The section 3.1 of the [GHS11](https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/680.pdf) mentions that:
> Given the $q_L$-ciphertext $c = (c_0, c_1)$ (that encrypts a polynomial $a \in F_2[X]/F(X)$), we postprocess it to get $c^\prime = (c_0 + c^*, c_1) \text{ mod } 2^{r + 1}$ as above, and then use the encryption of $s$ from the publ... |
In [this paper][1], one of the facts stated was that $\text{IND-CPA} \not\implies \text{EKR}_p$, in which $\text{EKR}_p$ is defined as the property that for a polynomial number accessible of oracles p with p keys, an adversary is not able to determine any key and plaintext pairs within polynomial time. Here's how the p... |
Can I change the radio frequency according to my encryption algorithm? |
First understand, that the $e$ was acquired through $d$ first, so we have different public keys, can be any number of public keys with different encrypting exponent but same decrypting exponent $d$. Can we recover $d$ in any manner? |
[FRI](https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2017/134/) is not a polynomial commitment scheme *per se*, although it can be coerced into that interface. What FRI is in exact terms, is an interactive protocol for establishing that committed codeword has low degree. It works for a specific class of [Reed-Solomon](https://en... |
First understand, that the $e$ was acquired through $d$ first, so we have different public keys, can be any number of public keys with different encrypting exponent but same decrypting exponent $d$. Can we recover $d$ in any manner?
(Edit)
So Ill add somethings so that we understand clearly:
$d$ is uknown but we kno... |
We are given a number of distinct RSA public keys $(e_i,N_i)$ sharing the same unknown decryption exponent $d$. The $e_i$ were computed from $d$ drawn first, so we have different public keys. Can we recover $d$ in any manner?
(Edit) We also know $d$ is 333-bit. $N$ is the product of $p$ and $q$ which both are 512-bi... |
I have an MD5 hash and need to generate a file that matches it.
There are absolutely no constrains on the contents of said file, it can be binary gibberish.
The only important thing is that it matches the hash.
Is this possible?
I have the original file that produces the hash, but the new file is not allowed ... |
How to generate an arbitrary file matching a given MD5 hash? |
> Is this possible?
This is known as the 'second preimage' problem. Alas, there are no known methods to do it against MD5 that are more efficient than brute force (which, at an expected $2^{128}$ MD5 compression function evaluations, is infeasible). |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
I recently started learning zero-knowledge proofs. I found that in many zero-knowledge arguments, the verifier is required to randomly select a challenge $r\in\mathbb{Z}_q$ and send it to the prover. Afterwards, the prover calculates the form $x_1=x_0+rx$ and sends it back to the verifier.
I noticed that the length... |
In zero-knowledge proof, can the selection of challenge r be non-uniform? |
Refer to an interesting article ([link][1]) on Medium on the subject matter.
To understand more about pRandomValue and vRandomValue.
The article mentioned, "*pRandomValue, on the other hand, is used to hide (contents of purple box) from Veronica*"
(1) But, Veronica already knows (contents of purple box), so ... |
Maybe I miss something, but, does sequence number also work? |
Why (Client/Server)Hello contains random number not sequnce number in TLS? |
> However, I do not know what length I need to have the signature at so when I encode it, it can be that exact size.
Well, base64 uses 4 characters (from an alphabet of size 64) to encode 3 bytes (3 bytes contain 24 bits; `24/4 = 6` bits per base64 character).
Hence, if the signature was 72 bytes long, that would... |
I am confused about padding when using a Message Authentication Code (MAC). [This paper](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00145-004-0016-3.pdf) suggest using a different key, if the message is padded, and otherwise not, which really confused me. An example is the following construction (FCBC MAC):
[![e... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
CBC-MAC is codified by [ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011][1] ([free preview at IEC][2]), which has 4 padding methods. If $\ell$ is the data length in bits and $n$ the block size in bits:
- Padding Method 1: pad with $(-\ell)\bmod n\;=\;n-1-((\ell+n-1)\bmod n)$ bit(s) at `0`
- Padding Method 2: pad with a single `1` bit, then $(-(... |
I know how an Enigma works and that the reflector means a current flow must return by a different route but my question is this. After returning from the reflector and through the rotors, it passes through the plugboard before lighting up a different letter than was entered. Now imagine the ‘a’ key is pressed and retur... |
CBC-MAC is codified by [ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011][1] ([free preview at IEC][2]), which has 4 padding methods. If $m$ is the data length in bits and $n$ the block size in bits:
- Padding Method 1: pad with $(-m)\bmod n\;=\;n-1-((m+n-1)\bmod n)$ bit(s) at `0`
- Padding Method 2: pad with a single `1` bit, then $(-(m+1))\bmo... |
CBC-MAC is codified by [ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011][1] ([free preview at IEC][2]), which has 4 padding methods. If $m$ is the data length in bits and $n$ the block size in bits:
- Padding Method 1: pad with $(-m)\bmod n\;=\;n-1-((m+n-1)\bmod n)$ bit(s) at `0`
- Padding Method 2: pad with a single `1` bit, then $(-(m+1))\bmo... |
I am confused about padding when using a Message Authentication Code (MAC). [This paper](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00145-004-0016-3.pdf) suggest using a different key, if the message is padded, and otherwise not, which really confused me. An example is the following construction (FCBC MAC):
[![e... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
Consider RSA with $p$ and $q$ large distinct secret [safe primes][1] in interval $\bigl(2^{(n-1)/2},\,2^{n/2}\bigr)$, and private key $(N,e,d,p,q,d_p,d_q,q_\text{inv})$ computed as
$$\begin{align}
N&=p\;\!q\\
d_p&=3\\
d_q&=5\\
u&=p-1\\
v&=(q-1)/2\\
d&=u\;\!\left((d_q-d_p)\;\!(u^{-1}\bmod v)\bmod v\right)+d_p\\
... |
CBC-MAC is codified by [ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011][1] ([free preview at IEC][2]), which has 4 padding methods. If $m$ is the data length in bits and $n$ the block size in bits:
- Padding Method 1: pad with $(-m)\bmod n\;=\;n-1-((m+n-1)\bmod n)$ bit(s) at `0`.
- Padding Method 2: pad with a single `1` bit, then $(-(m+1... |
CBC-MAC is codified by [ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011][1] ([free preview at IEC][2]), which has 4 padding methods. If $m$ is the data length in bits and $n$ the block size in bits:
- Padding Method 1: pad with $(-m)\bmod n\;=\;n-1-((m+n-1)\bmod n)$ bit(s) at `0`.
- Padding Method 2: pad with a single `1` bit, then $(-(m+1... |
Can I generalize trapdoor information to trapdoor functions for one-way function? |
A simplified diagram of the Enigma (with less letters) is:
[![Simplified circuit diagram of a 3-wheel Service Enigma][1]][1]
<sub>Source: [Cryptomuseum.com][2], used with permission.</sub>
The key and light for a given letter share the same connection to the plugboard (Stecker). The current going thru a key enters... |
We know that, for one-way function $y=f(x)$, it's hard to compute $x=f^{-1}(y)$, but there exists an efficient algorithm $A(y,t)=f^{-1}(x)$ once we know the trapdoor information $t$.
I'm wondering, whether or not this property can be generalized to function of functions. i.e.
Is there a trapdoor one-way function ... |
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pls read carefully-**
I am looking for a **function/formula/algorithm** that can be applied on any curve, *say for e.g.* *y^2 = x^3 + 2* with *prime = 1097, largest subgroup order(J) = 1098 and subgroups = 1098, ... |
Let's have two integer-vectors v1 and v1 that are encrypted by McEliece public key. An intermediate node between the sender and receiver receives the two encrypted vectors E(v1) and E(v2) and it needs to add v1 to v2, what will be the best choice in terms of computation cost, assuming that privacy is not important. sho... |
Let's have two integer-vectors $v_1$ and $v_2$ that are encrypted by McEliece public key. An intermediate node between the sender and receiver receives the two encrypted vectors $\text{E}(v_1)$ and $\text{E}(v_2)$ and it needs to add $v_1$ to $v_2$.
What will be the best choice in terms of computation cost, assuming... |
Maybe I miss something, but, does sequence number also work?
As fgrieu pointed out, sequence number is predicatble, then, is it problem or not in TLS 1.3?
Of course I assume it is problem because the protocol uses random numbers, but, I cannot explain why. Please teach me. Thank you. |
Why (Client/Server)Hello contains random number not sequence number in TLS 1.3? |
Maybe I miss something, but, does sequence number also work?
As fgrieu pointed out, sequence number is predictable, then, is it problem or not in TLS 1.3?
Of course I assume it is problem because the protocol uses random numbers, but, I cannot explain why. Please teach me. Thank you. |
let $l=2^{128}$ and let $x$ be a random integer satisfying $0\le x \le l$
Let $\oplus $ be the XOR operator and $E_k$ an AES encryption with $key=k$
Let the signature of a string $M=m_{1}||m_{2}\dots||m_{n} $ where $||$ denotes concatenation of strings where $m_i $ is a binary string of $128$ bits
Now assume ... |
Why does TLS 1.3 (Client/Server) Hello require a random number? Wouldn't a sequence number also work?
I do understand that a sequence number is predictable but I don't see why this would be a problem in TLS 1.3.
|
Why does TLS 1.3 (Client/Server) Hello require a random number? |
The assignment I have is as follows:
Let $l=2^{128}$ and let $x$ be a random integer satisfying $0\le x \le l$
Let $\oplus $ be the XOR operator and $E_k$ an AES encryption with $key=k$
Let the signature of a string $M=m_{1}||m_{2}\dots||m_{n} $ where $||$ denotes concatenation of strings where $m_i $ is a bi... |
> Why does TLS 1.3 (Client/Server) Hello require a random number?
There are two ways to interpret this question.
The first is "what are the reasons why the TLS 1.3 RFC requires the client random value and the first 24 bytes of the server random value (in the Hello messages) to be, well, random?"
Well, I belie... |
Oded Goldreich in his book [[Foundations of Cryptography][1], 2004, Section 3.2.3] proves a theorem by polynomial number of hybrids.
----------
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
----------
In rather recent years, Marc Fischlin and Arno Mittelbach published a paper [FM21, [IACR 2021/088][3]] and consider... |
Is Goldreich's proof with polynomial number of hybrid arguments wrong? |
I am confused about padding when using a Message Authentication Code (MAC). [This paper](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00145-004-0016-3.pdf) suggests using a different key if the message is padded, and otherwise not, which really confused me. An example is the following construction (FCBC MAC):
[![e... |
Oded Goldreich in his book [[Foundations of Cryptography][1], 2004, Section 3.2.3] proves a theorem by polynomial number of hybrids.
----------
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
----------
In rather recent years, Marc Fischlin and Arno Mittelbach published a paper [FM21, [IACR 2021/088][3]] and consider... |
> what does it mean the distinguisher in LWE problem in which the secret key changes constantly for each ciphertext and plaintext pair?
this isn't true, so if you have a particular source that is claiming that and leading to your confusion you should probably link it. The correct definitions are below.
The LWE pr... |
Oded Goldreich in his book [[Foundations of Cryptography][1], 2004, Section 3.2.3] proves a theorem by polynomial number of hybrids.
----------
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
----------
In rather recent years, Marc Fischlin and Arno Mittelbach published a paper [FM21, [IACR 2021/088][3]] and consider... |
Oded Goldreich in his book [[Foundations of Cryptography][1], 2004, Section 3.2.3] proves a theorem by polynomial number of hybrids.
----------
[![enter image description here][2]][2]
----------
In rather recent years, Marc Fischlin and Arno Mittelbach published a paper [FM21, [IACR 2021/088][3]] and prove le... |
In my company we want to switch from PKCSv1.5 to PSS for RSA signing. This is because of the [marvin attack vector](https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/).
My question is, if an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both schemes, does this have an adverse effect on security?
If so, are... |
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
That extends to messages that an adversary chooses entirely. For RSASSA-PSS _alone_, we have a proof that if this was ... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 checksum of the private key.
I searched on the internet and I am... |
Read the next section for why it's likely not necessary to make any change. But let's answer the question anyway.
> If an adversary can see many similar messages that were signed with both ([RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5][4] aka PKCSv1.5 and [RSASSA-PSS][5] aka PSS), does this have an adverse effect on security?
**No**.
T... |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 checksum of the private key.
I searched on the internet and I am... |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 checksum of the private key.
I searched on the internet and I am... |
In Bitcoin, how, given a public key and half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key? |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 hash of the private key.
I searched on the internet and I am sur... |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key as well as the public key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 hash of the private key as well as the pu... |
Given the following two preconditions:
1) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker only has one half of the private key as well as the public key.
2) It is almost impossible to reconstruct a bitcoin private key if an attacker has an SHA512 hash of the private key as well as the pu... |
I have an issue about AES whitebox protection as it is possible to decrypt data and get the whitebox encryption and decryption logic even without the ability to extract the original key. In my knowledge, until now there is no unbroken implementation of AES whitebox. My question is: is there any option to hide/obfuscate... |
> In Bitcoin, how, given a public key and half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring forming an [ECDSA][3] private key for curve [secp256k1][4... |
In Bitcoin, given half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key? |
> In Bitcoin, how, given a public key and half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring forming an [ECDSA][3] private key for curve [secp256k1][4... |
We must first wonder if the preconditions hold, in particular 1; that is:
> In Bitcoin, given half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring for... |
We must first wonder if the preconditions hold, in particular 1; that is:
> In Bitcoin, given half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring for... |
I'm trying to understand if using non-injective encodings for Elliptic Curve ElGamal encryption is dangerous.
A standard probabilistic encoding defined by [Koblitz][1] for elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_p$ works roughly as follows (see [this answer][2] for details):
- Fix some value $\ell < bitlength(p)$
-... |
Is injective encoding of a message important for Elliptic Curve ElGamal? |
We must first wonder if the preconditions hold, in particular 1; that is:
> In Bitcoin, given half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring for... |
We must first wonder if the preconditions hold, in particular 1; that is:
> In Bitcoin, given half the 52-character private key in WIF format, is it possible to reconstruct the whole private key?
The [WIF format][1] is essentially a 52-characters encoding per [Base-58][2] of the nearly random 256-bit bitstring for... |
Does the following variant of functional encryption exist? |
I have been playing around with implementing a three-tier PKI recently. My PKI structure is as follows:
* Root CA
- Intermediate CA 1 (Name constraint: DNS .example.com, Email: .example.com, pathlen 1)
- Intermediate CA 2 (Name constraint: DNS: .example.org, Email: .example.org, pathlen 1)
- VPN ... |
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