document
stringlengths 29
1.23k
| summary
stringlengths 19
538
|
|---|---|
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| The Arabic name for "place of many springs," variously recorded as Magerit, Mayrit or Magrit, eventually evolved into Madrid.
|
After what year did the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid 1308
|
The Moors were expelled from the town, but they remained in control of southern Spain for almost four centuries. ||||| The Arabic name for "place of many springs," variously recorded as Magerit, Mayrit or Magrit, eventually evolved into Madrid.
|
After what year did the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid 1308
|
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good hunting
|
From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good hunting
|
If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. ||||| The Romans built their most advanced outpost on the Iberian peninsula, but left nothing of consequence in Madrid.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good hunting
|
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Because the air was invigorating and the hunting was excellent
|
From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Because the air was invigorating and the hunting was excellent
|
If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. ||||| The Romans built their most advanced outpost on the Iberian peninsula, but left nothing of consequence in Madrid.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Because the air was invigorating and the hunting was excellent
|
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good air
|
From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good air
|
If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. ||||| The Romans built their most advanced outpost on the Iberian peninsula, but left nothing of consequence in Madrid.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good air
|
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid An early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town, the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent
|
From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid An early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town, the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent
|
If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. ||||| The Romans built their most advanced outpost on the Iberian peninsula, but left nothing of consequence in Madrid.
|
Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid An early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town, the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history The romans left nothing of consequence in Madrid
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| The first solid references to this obscure settlement on the Castilian plateau, guarded by the looming Guadarrama mountain range, appear in the 9th century.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history The romans left nothing of consequence in Madrid
|
Over centuries of struggle, the defending Moorish army built a full-scale fort, or Alcázar, on the heights of Madrid commanding the Manzanares valley. ||||| During a counter-offensive in 1109, the town was overrun by the Moors, but the Christianized fortress held.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history The romans left nothing of consequence in Madrid
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history No record of it remains
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| The first solid references to this obscure settlement on the Castilian plateau, guarded by the looming Guadarrama mountain range, appear in the 9th century.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history No record of it remains
|
Over centuries of struggle, the defending Moorish army built a full-scale fort, or Alcázar, on the heights of Madrid commanding the Manzanares valley. ||||| During a counter-offensive in 1109, the town was overrun by the Moors, but the Christianized fortress held.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history No record of it remains
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history History of raids
|
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| The first solid references to this obscure settlement on the Castilian plateau, guarded by the looming Guadarrama mountain range, appear in the 9th century.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history History of raids
|
Over centuries of struggle, the defending Moorish army built a full-scale fort, or Alcázar, on the heights of Madrid commanding the Manzanares valley. ||||| During a counter-offensive in 1109, the town was overrun by the Moors, but the Christianized fortress held.
|
Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history History of raids
|
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Asking Pakistan to help the USA
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Asking Pakistan to help the USA
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Asking Pakistan to help the USA
|
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Meeting with General Musharraf
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Meeting with General Musharraf
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Meeting with General Musharraf
|
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include President Clinton offered the moon in terms of better relations with the United States
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include President Clinton offered the moon in terms of better relations with the United States
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include President Clinton offered the moon in terms of better relations with the United States
|
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Paper checks
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Paper checks
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Paper checks
|
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Persuading Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban by dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Persuading Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban by dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Persuading Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban by dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden The department of counterterrorism
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden The department of counterterrorism
|
The U.S. effort continued. ||||| While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden The department of counterterrorism
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Mullah Omar
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Mullah Omar
|
The U.S. effort continued. ||||| While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds.
|
Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Mullah Omar
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No, the CIA felt it would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No, the CIA felt it would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No, the CIA felt it would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 25, 2000
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The U.S. effort continued.
|
On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 25, 2000
|
Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 25, 2000
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It was dangerous
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It was dangerous
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It was dangerous
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It risked his life
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It risked his life
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It risked his life
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan "Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit" and "visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life."
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan "Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit" and "visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life."
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan "Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit" and "visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life."
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 President Clinton
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 President Clinton
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 President Clinton
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 Bill Clinton
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 Bill Clinton
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 Bill Clinton
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The president could die
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The president could die
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The president could die
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The visit would put the President's life at risk and Pakistan had not done enough to merit the visit?
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The visit would put the President's life at risk and Pakistan had not done enough to merit the visit?
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The visit would put the President's life at risk and Pakistan had not done enough to merit the visit?
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Risked his life
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Risked his life
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Risked his life
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Due to the possibility of getting a presidential visit in march
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Due to the possibility of getting a presidential visit in march
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Due to the possibility of getting a presidential visit in march
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden For talks against nuclear proliferation
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden For talks against nuclear proliferation
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden For talks against nuclear proliferation
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To show his government's legitimacy
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To show his government's legitimacy
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.