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The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To show his government's legitimacy
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would put pressure on the Taliban
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Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would put pressure on the Taliban
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would put pressure on the Taliban
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He wanted the U.S.President to visit Pakistan
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Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He wanted the U.S.President to visit Pakistan
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The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He wanted the U.S.President to visit Pakistan
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But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
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Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 South Asia
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
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Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 South Asia
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He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 South Asia
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
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Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 Pakistan
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 Pakistan
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He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
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Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 Pakistan
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
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On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA On the president visiting Pakistan
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
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On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA On the president visiting Pakistan
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA On the president visiting Pakistan
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA President Clinton's visit to Pakistan
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA President Clinton's visit to Pakistan
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA President Clinton's visit to Pakistan
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Visiting Pakistan
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Visiting Pakistan
|
They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
|
On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Visiting Pakistan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The State Department
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The State Department
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The State Department
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The envoys were Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The envoys were Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The envoys were Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
|
Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden General Musharraf
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In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden General Musharraf
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." ||||| But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
|
Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden General Musharraf
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan met with General Musharraf
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Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan met with General Musharraf
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The U.S. effort continued. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan met with General Musharraf
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf The possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf The possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
The U.S. effort continued. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf The possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential
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Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential
|
The U.S. effort continued. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential visit
|
Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential visit
|
The U.S. effort continued. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential visit
|
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth
|
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan
|
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, as well as President Clinton
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, as well as President Clinton
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, as well as President Clinton
|
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Michael Sheehan
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Michael Sheehan
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Michael Sheehan
|
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
|
Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan The president
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan The president
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban.
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan The president
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan President Clinton
|
President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan President Clinton
|
He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. ||||| In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban.
|
Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan President Clinton
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan They believed it would risk the President's life and also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan They believed it would risk the President's life and also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan They believed it would risk the President's life and also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It was risky
|
Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It was risky
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
|
Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It was risky
|
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
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Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Pakistan did not earn merit of the presidential visit
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Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
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Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Pakistan did not earn merit of the presidential visit
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While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
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Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Pakistan did not earn merit of the presidential visit
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His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
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When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000
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His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
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When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
|
When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000 and they discussed the tension between Pakistan and India, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Bin Laden
|
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
|
When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000 and they discussed the tension between Pakistan and India, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Bin Laden
|
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000 and they discussed the tension between Pakistan and India, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Bin Laden
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
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Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The State Department felt he should visit Pakistan and the Secret Service and the CIA were against it
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The State Department felt he should visit Pakistan and the Secret Service and the CIA were against it
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The State Department felt he should visit Pakistan and the Secret Service and the CIA were against it
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Musharraf
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Musharraf
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Musharraf
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it State department was for and CIA and Secret Service were against
|
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it State department was for and CIA and Secret Service were against
|
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
|
Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it State department was for and CIA and Secret Service were against
|
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