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This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 a.m
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The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 a.m
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At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 in the morning
|
This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 in the morning
|
The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27 in the morning
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Just before 9:30
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This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Just before 9:30
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The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Just before 9:30
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At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 After having been in the air for 45 minutes
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This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 After having been in the air for 45 minutes
|
The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 After having been in the air for 45 minutes
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27am EST
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This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27am EST
|
The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 9:27am EST
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
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At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Transmission from the Cleveland Center controller
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This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Transmission from the Cleveland Center controller
|
The flight never turned off its transponder. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time was the FAA's last normal communication with United Airlines flight 93 Transmission from the Cleveland Center controller
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Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta 1989
|
The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta 1989
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin."
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta 1989
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Flight 1989
|
The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Flight 1989
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin."
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Flight 1989
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin."
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin."
|
Which flight did both the command center and FAA headquarters watch, thanks to a call from Boston Center to NEADS Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta 1989
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta 1989
|
It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. ||||| But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta 1989
|
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. ||||| But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Delta Airlines flight 1989
|
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. ||||| But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
Which flight did NEADS think was hijacked right after the Pentagon was hit Transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Delta 1989
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Delta 1989
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Delta 1989
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Within seconds
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Within seconds
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble Within seconds
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A 767 jet
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A 767 jet
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble A 767 jet
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He asked if someone called Cleveland
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He asked if someone called Cleveland
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
How did the Cleveland controller respond to a transmission that seemed to signify trouble He asked if someone called Cleveland
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 9:41 AM
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 9:41 AM
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 9:41 AM
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 After
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 After
|
Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it.
|
Did Boston Center call NEADS regarding Delta 1989 before or after problems were identified on United 93 After
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center controller
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center controller
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland Center controller
|
United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. ||||| At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
|
Which air traffic center communicated with United 93 Cleveland
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA
|
This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas Cleveland Center
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas Cleveland Center
|
This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas Cleveland Center
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA's Cleveland Center
|
Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA's Cleveland Center
|
This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas FAA's Cleveland Center
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American 11
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American 11
|
NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American 11
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack Delta 1989
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack Delta 1989
|
NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack Delta 1989
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack The American 11 heading south
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack The American 11 heading south
|
NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack The American 11 heading south
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American Airlines flight 11
|
During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. ||||| United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American Airlines flight 11
|
NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. ||||| Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
|
What was the first flight erroneously reported as a hijack American Airlines flight 11
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD 9:41
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD 9:41
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD 9:41
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD AM
|
At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. ||||| It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD AM
|
Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." ||||| The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
|
At what time Boston Center called the NEAD AM
|
NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. ||||| Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
|
Fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan intercepted a plane that took off from which airport Logan Airport
|
NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. ||||| The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
|
Fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan intercepted a plane that took off from which airport Logan Airport
|
After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. ||||| This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
|
Fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan intercepted a plane that took off from which airport Logan Airport
|
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport.
|
Which buildings that were hit by aircraft World Trade Center
|
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. ||||| The flight never turned off its transponder.
|
Which buildings that were hit by aircraft World Trade Center
|
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