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FBIS3-22780_0 | Detonation Suggested as Nuclear Waste Disposal Method | Language: Russian Article Type:BFN [Yuriy Lvov report: "Nuclear Waste Will Be Destroyed by Explosions"] [Text] This news is not for those of a nervous disposition: It is possible that in the foreseeable future all Russia's radioactive waste and chemical weapons will be destroyed...by nuclear explosion. By several explosions, to be precise, which will be detonated deep within the permafrost of Russia's only nuclear test site on the island of Novaya Zemlya. This program has been expounded by Major General Vladimir Loborev, academician and chief of the Ministry of Defense Central Physics and Technical Institute, and Aleksandr Chernyshev, deputy director of the Federal Nuclear Center (Arzamas-16), in reports to a closed scientific seminar held at the "Uran" Science and Production Association, which your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent managed to attend. Representatives from our most important organizations in this field attended the seminar: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry, the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Natural Sciences. There are several ways of recycling radioactive waste. The idea of sending waste into space is the most utopian of these schemes, according to Vladimir Loborev. However, the most practical method is plunging the fatal waste into glass and burying it in "deep geological formations." The largest vitrification plant is located in France. It cost $500 million to build. According to Loborev, to destroy all of Russia's waste would require 20 such plants, each of which would have to operate continuously for 10 years. The Russian economy would be unable to bear costs of this magnitude. But the problem is becoming increasingly acute -- obsolete ships with nuclear reactors that can neither be used nor scuttled are piling up at the piers of Severodvinsk and other ports.... A nuclear explosion would be far less costly. And the authors of the plan claim that after the explosion the waste would be buried in accordance with all the regulations -- the extremely high temperature would turn the rock and the radioactive waste housed in underground passageways into an large vitreous mass which would be covered by a thick layer of compacted soil and rubble. Thus embedded, the waste would never be able to "surface"; besides, all around there is permafrost which, according to the specialists, would present no threat for many centuries, even if |
FBIS3-22784_6 | FIS Aide on Proliferation Threat in Neighboring States | Iran, Syria, India, Pakistan, the DPRK and Brazil. It is well known that there are legal loopholes that pave the way for acquisition by Third World countries of necessary technical experience and technologies, such as the fulfilment of subcontracts of Western aerospace firms, the purchase of their shares, the setting up of joint or front companies, invitation of foreign specialists, the training of probationers, etc. Add to this the growth of industrial espionage. Incidentally the special commission of the UN Security Council on Iraq revealed the immense role which Western firms played illegally (or with the blessing of their governments?) in the development of Iraq's ramified missile complex. But it is impermissible to deprive some countries of access to peaceful technologies on the pretext of strengthening control over missile technologies. Specialists (including those in the External Intelligence Service) keep a careful watch over Iran's missile intentions, including the direction of its purchases and its interest in technologies. But the talk about "Iran's strengthening" and "danger emanating from it" sometimes camouflages the striving to deprive that country of access to modern technologies for purposes of development of its peaceful industrial potential. Correspondent: The open report of the External Intelligence Service published in 1993 says that about 100 countries now have an industrial base for making chemical weapons. Gennady Yevstafyev: While the situation with nuclear weapons can be controlled (through combination of space facilities with operational information), this is very difficult to do where chemical weapons are concerned. It is believed that the real requirement of chemical weapons amounts to only 100-200 tons even in a major and prolonged regional conflict. The stocks of chemical weapons are in practice greater than these figures. But it is practically impossible to detect 100 and even 500 tons of hidden chemical weapons. Chemical compounds and agents can be kept in containers smaller than an ordinary barrel. MOSCOW NEWS Commentary It may be presumed that the highly placed Russian intelligence officer has made public only part of the data at his disposal. But the accents made by Gennady Yevstafyev show that the world will soon face a new military-political situation. This was ultimately the factor in Russia's official decision in Nov '93 to reject the thesis of being the first not to use nuclear weapons. The basic points of the military doctrine do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons against states which have not joined |
FBIS3-22830_10 | `Classified' Russian Document on DPRK Nuclear Weapons | be abolished; and that Russia should not help North Korea smuggle its missiles to the third countries. The senior officer also disclosed another astonishing fact. He said: "Concerned over the threat of North Korea, including nuclear attack in the Far East and the Pacific region, Japan's Defense Agency, the Russian Defense Ministry, and the U.S. Department of Defense are conducting meetings to seek a possible tripartite emergency defense system aimed at coping with a North Korean missile attack. "Particularly, they have agreed that it is necessary to urgently come up with measures to deal with ICBM missiles which North Korea is developing secretly. "As far as I know, when the summit was held, (then) Director General of the Defense Agency Nakanishi, who accompanied Prime Minister Hosokawa on his visit to Vancouver, reportedly met with a high-raking official of the U.S. Department of Defense and obtained information on progress in North Korea's nuclear development. "Meanwhile, a high-ranking Japanese Defense Agency official visited Moscow, and his visit was briefly reported by ITAR-TASS saying a meeting was held between Japanese and Russian defense officials. However, in fact, at the meeting, in-depth discussions were held on such topics as progress in North Korea's nuclear development, and its strike capability. "At the meeting, they agreed to hold a Japan-Russia meeting of defense officials in Tokyo around February 1994 (recently the meeting was scheduled for 1-2 February). When the meeting is held, Russia will bring a more detailed, precise report on North Korea's military power. Actually, the Military Strategy Research Center has been ordered to work out a report needed for the meeting." It is true that former Director-General of the Defense Agency Nakanishi was eager to develop a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system jointly with the United States. It is also true that after Prime Minister Hosokawa's visit to the United States for the summit meeting, Japanese ministries and agencies concerned with North Korean issues have started seriously studying possible economic sanctions against North Korea. I think it is time for the Japanese Government to tell the people about how nuclear bombs and missiles are being developed by North Korea because the North Korean issue directly affects the future security of Japan. Meanwhile, the government is seeking a new framework for security. The situation is getting serious, and for Japan, this is no time to be carried away by "Hosokawa's performance." The senior officer also |
FBIS3-22831_1 | Russian Navy's Alleged Role in Iran's Nuclear Program | the international environmental protection organization known as "Green Peace" spotted a Russian TNT-27 oil tanker, flying the flag of the Russian Pacific Fleet, dumping radioactive waste, which was said to be non-concentrated, in the ocean in a place 200 miles off the shore of Japan. Russian military maps call this place "Area 9." The thing which attracted the attention of the Green Peace people was that the Russian ship stopped dumping the radioactive waste as soon as the Green Peace ship approached it, although analyses of the water did not indicate that it contained a high proportion of nuclear materials. This matter caused a crisis between Russia and Japan, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hastened to apologize to Japan while high-ranking government leadership, represented by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, hastened to pacify Tokyo by declaring a ban on the disposal by the Pacific Fleet of radioactive waste materials in the Sea of Japan. The scandal was then considered to be closed and over with, although Admiral Igor Kasatonov, the second-highest commander of Russia's naval forces, said that such procedures were inevitable because the system utilized by the ships require them, and he added that these materials do not harm the water as far as the environment and human beings are concerned. But AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the Russian Ministry of Security has been monitoring some feverish activity being carried out by a group of persons and establishments which have long been interested in the export of concentrated nuclear materials and scrap that can be utilized by plants that use nuclear materials -- export which takes place without licenses, according to Aleksandr Mikhailov, spokesman for the Ministry of Security. In other words, there is a lot of talk going on about the smuggling of these materials. This is something that is big business in present-day Russia, which has adopted the principle of earning profits above all else. Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailov made public a report prepared by one of the departments in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [SVRR], which was tasked with monitoring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report was submitted to the head of the SVRR, Yevgeniy Primakov, on the eve of his meeting with the head of the CIA in Washington, D.C., in June of 1993. The report confirmed that efforts were being made today to smuggle non-concentrated nuclear waste materials utilized by industrial sectors and |
FBIS3-22831_2 | Russian Navy's Alleged Role in Iran's Nuclear Program | harm the water as far as the environment and human beings are concerned. But AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the Russian Ministry of Security has been monitoring some feverish activity being carried out by a group of persons and establishments which have long been interested in the export of concentrated nuclear materials and scrap that can be utilized by plants that use nuclear materials -- export which takes place without licenses, according to Aleksandr Mikhailov, spokesman for the Ministry of Security. In other words, there is a lot of talk going on about the smuggling of these materials. This is something that is big business in present-day Russia, which has adopted the principle of earning profits above all else. Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailov made public a report prepared by one of the departments in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [SVRR], which was tasked with monitoring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The report was submitted to the head of the SVRR, Yevgeniy Primakov, on the eve of his meeting with the head of the CIA in Washington, D.C., in June of 1993. The report confirmed that efforts were being made today to smuggle non-concentrated nuclear waste materials utilized by industrial sectors and scrap that can be utilized by nuclear plants, as well as parts of nuclear warheads that are being dismantled in accordance with the treaty to decrease nuclear weapons -- not the components of nuclear ammunition -- out of Russia. Some of these attempts have been spotted by the security forces, whereas others have gotten through "safely." They are usually carried out by "amateurs" who cannot imagine how dangerous this activity is, even for the businessmen. Nevertheless, the intelligence agencies have noticed a rapid trend toward the establishment of permanent channels for smuggling these materials from Russia to nations which aspire to possess nuclear weapons. We should mention that Russia is the only nation among the nations of the former Soviet Union that has declared that it is monitoring the export of nuclear and strategic materials. However, this declaration is nothing more than a piece of paper, because there has been no announcement of any practical measures that would guarantee translating this declaration into reality. As a result, there is plenty of opportunity for the smuggling of nuclear materials to take place. From the Far East to Iran AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that Russian minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin, during |
FBIS3-22832_1 | Allegation of Iranian-Israeli Nuclear Contacts | Israeli cards to save the regime. Does the new Iranian carrot and stick drive signify a true desire for openness or is it just a blackmailing effort? On 7 November, 1993, Iran's Intelligence and Security Minister Fallahian arrived in Bonn leading a delegation on a top secret visit. Hours after his arrival, he began contacts with top German security officers under Brandt Schmidt Paur [name as published], Helmut Kohl's security adviser. Concurrently, only a few steps away from the conference room, Israeli Government officials and Mosad officers were impatiently awaiting the outcome of the secret German-Iranian session, before they themselves held an even more discreet session with Fallahian and his aides. The Iranian intelligence team's visit to Germany was designed not only to step up security cooperation between Iran and Germany: Already, their cooperation in this area was at an advanced stage. German experts had been to Tehran to oversee the training of Iranian personnel in the latest intelligence techniques. According to the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL, the German Intelligence services presented its Iranian counterpart with sensitive and sophisticated spying equipment. This time the subject of the secret talks had an Israeli connection. Fallahian came to Bonn for negotiations with Israel under German auspices with the advance knowledge and blessing of Iran's President 'Ali Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. The aim was for Iran to help Israel get a satisfactory resolution for the issue of seven Israeli soldiers who went missing in Lebanon, including Ron Arad. The Germans are still puzzled over why Tehran disclosed the presence of Fallahian in Germany, despite its request that the news of the visit be kept a secret. [passage omitted] Israeli relations with the Iranian "Islamic revolution" have never been as hostile as Iran depicts them. Everybody remembers the role played by the Israelis in the Irangate affair and their contribution to Israeli arms sales to Iran. A report by the U.S. judicial authorities has recently revealed important information about the role of Yitzhaq Rabin and Shim'on Peres in concluding these deals between 1985 and 1986 to secure the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. After that, the Israelis have maintained close, secret ties with the Iranians, especially via David Kimche [former Israeli Foreign Ministry director general]. The Jewish community in Iran, especially those people who occupy important posts in the bazaar and in the trade firms, also contributed to |
FBIS3-22833_2 | Alleged German Links With Iranian Weapons Program `They Are Getting Stronger and We Are Talking' by Ya'aqov Erez | West in general, and Israel in particular, the confidence that these armament plans were indeed halted. Iran learned from the experience of its big enemy, Saddam Husayn. In Tehran, they saw how in secret, far from the knowledge of the public, the world media, and the various intelligence entities, Saddam established an impressive infrastructure for the manufacture of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Only the defeat that he suffered in the Gulf War, and the UN inspectors that it brought to the heart of Iraq, halted the ambitious plan of the dictator from Baghdad. Despite considerable economic difficulties -- Iran stands on the verge of bankruptcy, owes billions of dollars to foreign suppliers, and does not even meet the interest payments -- the Iranian leadership is devoting wide-ranging efforts and resources to its armaments plans. Western intelligence experts assert that there are two reasons for the decision of Rafsanjani and his comrades to obtain a nonconventional capability: the trauma of the Iraqi gas attack on Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and the feeling that Iran is isolated in the world, and that in its vicinity there are already states with nuclear capability (Pakistan, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Israel). The Iranians have plenty of experience in secret procurement operations. For example, the SASAD organization, which was established in 1979 by the Khomeyni regime, following the curbs that Washington imposed on shipments of military equipment to Iran. It should be remembered that all of the equipment of the Iranian army at that time had been purchased by the shah in the West, and the blockage from the sources of supply was supposed to bring the Iranians to their knees. That did not happen. From the headquarters of the organization, which, according to Western intelligence sources, is located on Pasadaran Street in Tehran, instructions, money, and agents went out. Mysterious procurement operations, through dummy corporations, bank managers who do not ask too many questions, and corrupt customs officials succeeded in filling the Iranian warehouses. The ayatollahs owe the fact that Iran did not suffer a defeat in the war against Iraq more than a little to the performance of the agents and managers of SASAD. The organization's tasks were changed at the end of the war. The new goal was weapons of mass destruction -- equipment, machinery, installations, and plans related to atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. The system of relations between |
FBIS3-22833_16 | Alleged German Links With Iranian Weapons Program `They Are Getting Stronger and We Are Talking' by Ya'aqov Erez | 4 million. Hundreds of thousands of Volkswagen employees have no choice but to shift to a four-day work week. In Opel, they have announced a wage cut. A sophisticated firm like DASA (Deutsche Aerospace), a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, is going to dismiss 16,000 employees. Siemens has announced the dismissal of 3,000 employees. "Once 300 persons worked for us, now many fewer," Uwe Klassen of the Magnet firm told me. In such conditions, every position is important. That also explains why a serious newspaper such as DIE WELT came out with a headline about Chancellor Kohl's visit to China that announced "contracts worth 2.1 billion marks." The headline in the newspaper the following day was: "Contracts for 7 Million Marks." "Doubtless, most of the commerce with Iran is legitimate commerce, without any connection to this or that armaments," says a Western diplomat in Bonn, "and I do not envy an official who must decide that a certain machine for manufacturing pipes under high pressure is destined for a pharmaceutical plant and, therefore, legitimate for export to Iran, or that we are talking about equipment for a laboratory that manufactures poisonous gases. And it is even more difficult if the official knows that the fate of an entire plant, which is also the main employer in some town in Thuringia or Bavaria, depends on his decision." German companies continue to supply Iran with equipment and systems that can be converted to the manufacture of chemical, biological, and atomic weapons, with the knowledge of German intelligence, which for legal reasons is prevented from acting against these firms. "We are striding with open eyes towards the next political scandal," argue sources in the German intelligence institution. They emphasize that despite the supervision over the activity of German companies in Iran, and over Iranians in Germany, in the area of the development of chemical, atomic, and biological weapons, they are prohibited for legal reasons from passing this information to the police and to the legal authorities. All that is left for the chiefs of the German intelligence community is to share this information with their colleagues in Western intelligence services. Sources in the German intelligence service assert that as of the autumn of 1993, most of the trade with Iran is conducted by small companies, as the large concerns fear getting in trouble with the legal authorities. Most of these small companies are managed by |
FBIS3-22833_18 | Alleged German Links With Iranian Weapons Program `They Are Getting Stronger and We Are Talking' by Ya'aqov Erez | to share this information with their colleagues in Western intelligence services. Sources in the German intelligence service assert that as of the autumn of 1993, most of the trade with Iran is conducted by small companies, as the large concerns fear getting in trouble with the legal authorities. Most of these small companies are managed by former officers of the East German intelligence service, who were unemployed, but have appropriate contacts and know-how for secret transactions. "The problem is that what we do not sell to the Iranians, due to our strict laws, the representatives of Tehran find in nearby countries," a senior source in German industry told MA'ARIV. "Strict laws against exporting to `dangerous states' exist only in Britain and Germany. Until there is a uniform law throughout the community, the Iranians will find what they want in Switzerland, in France, or in Italy. Perhaps not the same quality as the products MADE IN GERMANY, but of a quality that satisfies the Iranian requirements." "The truth is that the Germans are the most decent in Europe. They are at least trying and struggling with the Iranian procurement campaign," a senior Western source sums up. "In world trade, and especially in a period of economic crisis, there is no vacuum. There will always be the supplier who will be ready to shut his eyes, to put aside the ethical issue, and to sell to whomever can pay. It is impossible to halt with legal action the Iranian process of arming with weapons of destruction. It is possible only to slow the pace. The only ones who understand the seriousness of the situation are the Israelis and the American administration. Immediately after them the Germans and the British. All the other European states are rather indifferent. While in Asia, everything is wide open, a real catastrophe." This is affirmed by the fate of the 225 barrels of "insecticide" that were on the ship German Senator. This cargo covered half the globe, and instead of arriving at the orderer from Syria, landed finally in Taiwan. And Taiwan is known as a country that does not scrutinize the documentation of exporters. The main thing is that the goods will be sold. As of November 1993, no one in the West knows what happened to the shipment, and if it did not nevertheless arrive in the end in a dangerous country. Iran, for example. |
FBIS3-22854_0 | IRGC General Says Iran Not for Nuclear Weapons | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Tehran, Feb. 23, IRNA -- Major General Mohsen Rezaie in an interview with the English daily TEHRAN TIMES scoffed at Western media reports claiming Iran was for nuclear weapons. "Political logic, morality, our own culture, and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons." The commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in an interview to be pulished Thursday, also said that political wisdom demands us not to go for the weapons which could cause devastation for humanity. "The eight-year-old Iraqi imposed war is proof of the real nature of our combatants who never violated the internationally recognized norms concerning wars," he added. "That Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons ...is just a baseless rumor," Rezaie said. Commenting on the Persian Gulf he said, the geographical situation of the waterway is such that the deep water is on Iran's side which enables the Islamic forces to keep alien warships under surveillance. Without going into details he said that there was a plot hatched by Britain, Israel and the United States to keep regional tensions high. "I tell my friends in the UAE to listen to my advice as Iran wants to continue friendly relations with all the sheikhdoms," he added. On the post-war role of the IRGC, Rezaie said that the IRGC was busy with extensive construction projects in the country. |
FBIS3-22876_2 | `Growing' Trade in Radioactive Metals Detailed | the Latvian bureau and they reveal that at the last such meeting held in Lyons in September, it was the German representative who expressed extreme anxiety over the sharp increase in the number of such crimes in Germany. At the same time, he drew attention to the fact that in cases where the presence of radioactive elements was suspected, radioactivity was actually detected in relatively few instances (in 1992 -- 18 out of 158 inspections). He stated that material often toted as radioactive, is in being sold by taking advantage of prospect buyer's credulity. Among every case when radioactivity was actually detected, there has not been a single case of material being discovered which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons, which is the most dreaded scenario. In reports delivered at INTERPOL conferences, "Red Mercury," as an example, is most often mentioned. As DIENA has already reported, citing German press reports, this was the material Johann Rimmele supposedly had been planning to buy in China. There are different opinions concerning its usage. INTERPOL experts are of the opinion that "Red Mercury" is a material which can be used as an element in making detonators for plutonium-based bombs. The German and Dutch representatives at INTERPOL directed attention toward Russia as a source of the trade in dangerous materials. The Dutch representative emphasized the participation of former Red Army officers -- it is understood that they are cheating, by selling relatively useless goods as strategic material. [passage omitted] Dzintars Kalnins is the head engineer of the Center for Nuclear Research at the Latvian Academy of Science in Salaspils -- an institution where Latvia's most highly qualified specialists in this field are working. Therefore, the explanations and comments of Dz. Kalnins can evidently be treated as the opinion of a Latvian expert. First of all, it should be stated precisely that the valuable materials involved in the famous Lake Constance episode were not simply rare metals, but enriched isotopes. They are made by growing them in a crystal reticle. Isotopes are applied in precise technologies, in radio electronics, computer techniques, etc., where the respective isotopes -- perfect, precise atom crystals -- are necessary. In Latvia, such isotopes are not being manufactured, due to lack of necessary equipment. As Mr. Kalnins told us, the institutes which possess the special equipment needed to enrich these elements are situated near Moscow. "These institutes are |
FBIS3-22887_0 | Government To Review How it Disposes of Nuclear Waste | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Charles Clover report: "Nuclear Waste Review Likely To Delay Sell-off"] [Text] Plans for disposing of nuclear waste, much of it in temporary storage at sites around Britain, are to be reviewed, possibly delaying privatisation of the nuclear power industry. The plans were strongly criticised by the Government's chief safety adviser last year. Mr. Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, who has indicated that he wanted to see privatisation before the next election, has been pressing for what some officials call a "short and dirty" review. This would focus narrowly on the potential commercial viability of privatised Pressurised Water Reactors and would report by the summer. But Mr John Gummer, Environment Secretary, is adamant that the review should cover both long-term liabilities from decommissioning nuclear plants -- costing an estimated 20 billion pounds -- and plans for disposing of nuclear power waste. A remit for the waste review, to be carried out by the Department of the Environment, has been long delayed but is now expected within weeks. The review would be expected to take until the end of the year. Yet some industry observers say Mr. Heseltine must take a decision this summer on the sell-off of Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear if privatisation is to happen before the next election. It was uncertainty about the scale of long-term liabilities that led to the nuclear industry being dropped from privatisation in 1989. The waste review is likely to focus on plans of the nuclear waste agency, Nirex, for a 3 billion pound national nuclear waste dump at Sellafield -- and how realistic these are. These plans have slipped from around 2003 to after 2010 while waste continues to mount at Magnox power stations. The review is also likely to look at costs and strategies for decommissioning nuclear power stations, many of them closing in the next 10 years. This alone will cost up to 10 billion pounds. Other liabilities, including disposing of Atomic Energy Authority sites and British Nuclear Fuels, bring the total closer to 20 billion pounds. Final disposal of waste, which environmentalists say has never been properly planned, is expected to cost more than that but has never been fully costed. The recent approval given for the British Nuclear Fuels Thorp plant will probably mean that a lot of extra waste is likely to be generated, with nowhere for it to go. |
FBIS3-22894_0 | Growing European Concern Over Nuclear Smuggling From CIS | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Michael Bond report: "Europe Alert Over Threat of Nuclear Terrorism"] [Text] London -- Security forces in both western and eastern Europe are combining their efforts to tackle the growing menace of nuclear smuggling from countries of the former Soviet Union -- described by NATO as one of the greatest threats to international security since the end of the Cold War. Interpol, the international police agency, has now set up a specialised group, involving police forces in 24 European nations, THE EUROPEAN has learnt. Border guards and Customs officers in Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Sweden have been equipped with radiation detectors and are being taught how to handle radioactive substances. A senior Interpol officer, Hiroaki Takizawa, based at Lyon, said: "There is growing concern in European countries about nuclear smuggling. Our main problem is the lack of information. This is a new sort of crime -- we do not yet know who is smuggling the material, who is buying it, and why." Nuclear smuggling has become an increasingly lucrative business for professional dealers, but for the couriers and those who steal the material it is a dangerous -- even lethal -- game. Several have been caught carrying highly radioactive metals in their shirt pockets or strapped to their bodies. A Polish man died after carrying plutonium powder to Germany in his navel. "Most of the thieves are cowboys," said one investigator working in Moscow. "They have no idea they are dealing with highly dangerous substances." Police in Germany, the country most commonly used to smuggle the material into the West, have registered nearly 350 cases of the illegal export of plutonium and other radioactive substances from the former Soviet Union in the past two years. They blame the burgeoning trade on falling security standards at former Soviet nuclear installations. Interpol says radioactive material has been stolen from a vast range of sources. Russian authorities themselves have reported that during 1993 there were 900 attempts to gain illegal entry to nuclear installations, and a further 700 cases of workers trying to smuggle out materials. An investigator based in Moscow said: "There are wild rumours in Russia that it is possible to make money out of anything if it is radioactive. People are stealing from everywhere from waste dumps to medical laboratories." Though there is no evidence that any nuclear substances have fallen into the hands of |
FBIS3-22902_1 | Philippine Senate Ratifies Technology Treaties With India | nuclear accidents, Ople cited that this international agreement will place the Philippines within the protective umbrella of an international commitment to provide assistance in case of nuclear accidents. The first treaty with India concurred in by the Senate, involves economic and technical cooperation in research and design, delivery and installation of plants, machineries and equipment and technical assistance in the field of industrial research, nuclear energy, engineering, telecommunications, agricultural and industrial research. The other treaty with India ratified by the Senate calls for the scientific and technological cooperation which provide for the exchange of scholars, training programs and information exchange on metallurgy, silkworm culture, textile development, and low level technology which could be applied to countryside development program. Ople said that even before the two treaties were ratified by the Senate, the Philippines and India have already put them into effect when Filipino scholars and trainees went to India to participate in research programs in agriculture, nuclear energy generation, industrial chemicals and health programs. Meanwhile, Ople urged his colleagues at the Senate to also ratify with dispatch the two Conventions related to nuclear accident in the light of dangers it poses to mankind. Ople specifically pointed out the presence of nuclear reactors in neighboring countries of the Philippines within the 500 miles range. These countries, he said, include Taiwan which is 240 kilometers from Laoag, 795 kilometers from Manila with six nuclear reactors in operation and is building two more, Japan has 42 nuclear power plants, including two fueled by "highly dangerous" plutonium; China has one nuclear power plant and 10 research reactors; South Korea has five nuclear reactors, and North Korea with seven nuclear reactors and which continues to resist UN inspection on the real status of its nuclear facilities. Under the two Conventions in which the Philippines is a signatory, the government would be in a position to demand from the erring country, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or its neighbor for technical and technological assistance to prevent the effects of radiation from nuclear accidents. "The early notification would allow us to protect our people and our land from the spreading nuclear poison," Ople pointed out. "It is imperative that we become a party to these two conventions," he stressed. Ople recalled the Chernobyl accident in Russia where radioactive emissions were wind-carried to neighboring countries and demonstrated to the world the horrors of a nuclear accident. |
FBIS3-22914_2 | Experts Consider Rightwing Terror Campaign `Unlikely' | are preparing to defend themselves, "the actual number of people prepared to take up arms and start a war is few." He adds: "On the other hand, you take the IRA. They're only about 300-strong. You don't need an army to cause trouble. "A lot of these people are also ex-military people and you can't ignore that fact. "One can expect an increase in acts of sabotage and terror attacks ... I think they can cause enough trouble, but I don't think they have enough to ensure the election won't take place." Despite the probability of a Freedom Alliance election boycott, Sass says the major right-wing groupings appear to have written off the election as "political action between the NP [National Party] and ANC to put themselves in a better position." He says: "The next step is to keep making their point, making their emphasis with the future government. I don't see a sudden escalation (in right-wing violence). What we are seeing now is not just because of the election -- it's going to continue past the election." Booyse and Sass suggest that a real showdown could be delayed as long as five years after the election -- when the Constitution has to be implemented -- and then only if the formal right wing is not accommodated politically. Sass says that even before resorting to bloodshed, the Right -- because many of its supporters are farmers, miners and electricity supply workers -- has the ability to severely disrupt the country. Although collective campaigns involving white labour unions and agricultural unions -- and possibly the Right's Freedom Alliance partners -- would be difficult to organise, they "could come later." If the Right threw its full weight behind a concerted sabotage campaign, the results could be very costly for the new government. On the strength of the various right-wing para-military formations, Sass says, the AWB could have as many as "5,000 or 6,000 trained men," a relatively well-organised logistical line and, significantly, strong community support. On the other hand, the more significant of the smaller paramilitary groupings would be able to deploy "tens or maybe hundreds" of combatants. In terms of weapons, the organised right wing would have 9 mm pistols and shotguns in abundance and "probably quite a few AK-47s, R-4s and R-5s," Sass says. Also, because of strong support from white miners, they would have access to "a fair amount |
FBIS3-22960_4 | IG Spokesman Abroad--Tourism `Must Be Terminated' | 3. To stress to the IG, represented in my person, that the Egyptian Government does not use the U.S. aid reaching Egypt to strike at the Islamic movement. My answer was to refuse a meeting. We do not meet officials from governments. And for us, the United States is the major enemy, just like Israel. [Mubarak] Why has the IG carried out acts of violence against tourism? [Qasim] There are several reasons for the attacks on tourism: First, tourism represents a massive source of illicit [haram] state revenue. This revenue provides the ruling regime with financial resources that help it to stay in power. We believe the regime should be removed. So, we decided to strike at this activity to deprive the regime of this revenue and hasten its demise. According to statistics, the annual income generated by tourism is £3.2 billion [about $1 billion]. The government's own reports admit that a limited number of operations by the Islamic groups, which cost us nothing, have undermined this illicit revenue. Second, tourism in its current form is pure evil. It is an activity through which prostitution and AIDS are being spread, particularly by female Jewish tourists. It is a despicable source of a host of abominations. Tourism is also a way for foreign intelligence services to collect information about the Islamic movement. So, tourism is a certified evil and must be terminated. [Mubarak] But these acts of violence that you committed involved murder. Tourists were killed. What does the government have to do with this? [Qasim] Some tourists should not be killed. The target of our campaign is tourism, not tourists. We have taken several measures to protect the lives of tourists. We have issued several statements warning tourists against coming to Egypt, where their lives will be endangered. We have said that whoever visits Egypt subjects himself to danger because of our campaign against the tourism sector. We have also sent messages to the competent authorities warning them against inviting tourists for these reasons. Having done all this, those tourists who still visit the country are doing so at their own risk. [Mubarak] You said tourism is pure evil and a source of abomination. This is one of the reasons you cite for the attacks against the tourism sector. But AIDS and drugs are not a result of tourism. There are countries that have no tourism but in which drugs |
FBIS3-23006_1 | NIF Reportedly Threatens To Take Ambassadors `Hostages' | these forces, al-Sanusi unleashed a scathing attack on the so-called global arrogant forces and their Arab and African satellites. One of the Islamic Front militia recruits asked whether the Islamic regime can stand fast to the end in the face of the blockade and its harmful effects on society. The recruit said society is not yet sufficiently conditioned culturally to prevent an all-out popular rebellion, which the opposition forces might exploit to overthrow the regime. Ibrahim al-Sanusi answered: We know very well the strength of the Sudanese opposition and the limits of its strength. In the first days of the "revolution," we offered them samples of the "Islamic" state's methods of dealing with the opponents of the Islamic regime. We hit them hard while we were strong! We then opened the borders to them. They left and became isolated from the society that we are now restructuring according to our Islamic concept. We have not failed in this objective. But we are surprised by a "handful of agents" who are hitting us inside our borders through various forms of conspiracy that threaten to open the door wide to apostasy!! Al-Sanusi added: If the worst happens, as the brother who asked the question warned, it will come as no surprise to us. We have prepared ourselves and have the ability to fire in all arenas. If the signs of this apostasy begin to appear on our land, they must consider their ambassadors and nationals as our "hostages" while we consider that all our brothers residing in their countries are offering sacrifices to God. These brothers know they were born for this purpose, that is, either to be God's servants or strugglers. This speech, which was printed and distributed by the culture and information branch of the People's Defense command, has provoked sharp controversy and a crisis between the security departments and the military intelligence department over whether this speech should be withdrawn and the videotape destroyed. The political command was asked to intervene to implement the decision. Minister of Presidential Affairs Ghazi Salah-al-Din intervened and insisted on keeping this speech in the archives of al-Jihad, belittling the possibility of foreign reaction in the event that it is leaked out. In a telephone conversation with the director of military intelligence, Salah-al-Din said: Let them withdraw their nationals and ambassadors. Have they left any relations requiring the presence of these ambassadors and nationals? |
FBIS3-23018_0 | New Public Prosecutor Compares Right-Wing Extremism, RAF | Language: German Article Type:BFN [Studio interview with the new Federal Public Prosecutor Kay Nehm by Peter Ellgaard in Mainz on 13 February; announced as recorded] [Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Ellgaard] You seem to have years of experience with right-wing extremism. What are the reasons? It is striking that the incidence of right-wing extremist violence have increased since reunification. [Nehm] When I first went to eastern Germany to monitor the public prosecutor there to see what tasks we might be facing, I realized that there was an enormous potential of aggression in the streets. I told the authorities, saying that we might have to deal with something we had not known up to then; and unfortunately this has become true. [Ellgaard] But bans do not seem to elicit the desired results, as we have just heard. What must be done to fight right-wing extremism more efficiently? [Nehm] Bans always have the disadvantage that the structures of those banned are then no longer discernible. The great advantage of openly fighting this form of violence is that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution can get an insight into the structures, can more easily infiltrate them to see what goes on.[passage omitted] [Ellgaard] Are you prepared for possible attacks against this state from the right-wing extremist scene, in the manner of the leftist RAF [Red Army Faction]? [Nehm] There have always been attacks. The difference was that they have not always been directed, in the sense of a particular attitude. With the RAF, the objects were always representatives of the state, industry, etc.. With right-wing violence, it has been violence as such, in order to get attention. Whether this might take other forms, I do not know. But let me come back to our responsibility. If right-wing violence takes forms similar to those of the RAF, we will pursue these things with the same consistency. [Ellgaard] What are your possibilities of becoming active across borders? After all, there is an international network on this scene now. [Nehm] There has always been such a network. Just remember the stickers that came over from America in the 70's. We have always had to keep an eye on what spills over to the Federal Republic. In Belgium, in all the countries around us, this phenomenon can be observed. What is particularly alarming for us is that we experienced the past of the Third Reich with organized |
FBIS3-23018_1 | New Public Prosecutor Compares Right-Wing Extremism, RAF | the incidence of right-wing extremist violence have increased since reunification. [Nehm] When I first went to eastern Germany to monitor the public prosecutor there to see what tasks we might be facing, I realized that there was an enormous potential of aggression in the streets. I told the authorities, saying that we might have to deal with something we had not known up to then; and unfortunately this has become true. [Ellgaard] But bans do not seem to elicit the desired results, as we have just heard. What must be done to fight right-wing extremism more efficiently? [Nehm] Bans always have the disadvantage that the structures of those banned are then no longer discernible. The great advantage of openly fighting this form of violence is that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution can get an insight into the structures, can more easily infiltrate them to see what goes on.[passage omitted] [Ellgaard] Are you prepared for possible attacks against this state from the right-wing extremist scene, in the manner of the leftist RAF [Red Army Faction]? [Nehm] There have always been attacks. The difference was that they have not always been directed, in the sense of a particular attitude. With the RAF, the objects were always representatives of the state, industry, etc.. With right-wing violence, it has been violence as such, in order to get attention. Whether this might take other forms, I do not know. But let me come back to our responsibility. If right-wing violence takes forms similar to those of the RAF, we will pursue these things with the same consistency. [Ellgaard] What are your possibilities of becoming active across borders? After all, there is an international network on this scene now. [Nehm] There has always been such a network. Just remember the stickers that came over from America in the 70's. We have always had to keep an eye on what spills over to the Federal Republic. In Belgium, in all the countries around us, this phenomenon can be observed. What is particularly alarming for us is that we experienced the past of the Third Reich with organized extermination of minorities and other nations, murder organized by the government; and I think we have every reason to be averse to this. And this is the disgraceful thing about these pictures, that people do not seem to have learned a thing from the past. [passage omitted] |
FBIS3-23021_0 | German Paper Reports ARGK Overall Casualty Figures for 1993 | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN ["The 1993 War Balance Sheet" issued by the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan--ARGK--press bureau; date and place of issue not given] [Text] [see previous Terrorism Report, item NC0702215394, for OZGUR GUNDEM's report on ARGK casualty count] 1. ARGK carried out 3,173 separate operations, 284 of them road checks. As a result of these operations: A total of 4,456 soldiers, 171 of them officers, belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces died. Some 1,836 soldiers were wounded, 48 of them officers. Some 868 policemen, counterguerrillas, agents, collaborationists, and civil servants were killed and some 343 were wounded. A total of 1,056 village guards, including 16 village guard chiefs, were killed. Some 674 of them were wounded. Some 881 Turkish special warfare fighters were detained and 36 soldiers were captured. Those detainees who were convicted of crimes by trial were punished; the rest were released. The captured soldiers were released on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the PKK [Kurdish Workers Party]. Some 26 tourists who entered Kurdistan in violation of ARGK regulations were held as guests. Later, in response to initiatives by delegations from their respective countries, they were released. 2. A total of 796 guerrillas -- this number includes bodies that were not captured by government forces -- were martyred in this same period. Some 316 guerrillas were wounded. Twelve of the injured were taken prisoner and were executed on the spot where they were captured. 3. The following are the hardware and provisions seized from the Turkish Armed Forces during 1993: -- 10 anti-aircraft guns -- 70 heavy and medium automatic weapons -- 982 long-barrel rifles -- 57 flame throwers -- 36 rocket launchers -- 9 howitzers -- 3 bomb-throwing [bombaatar] guns -- 3 sniper rifles -- 165 pistols (with 147,289 various caliber bullets) -- 1996 [gun] magazines -- 106 hand grenades -- 145 mines -- 150 kg of dynamite sticks -- 167 rocket shells -- 121 two-way radio sets -- 105 binoculars -- Considerable amounts of gun accessories, ammunition belts, military uniforms, documents, various other military hardware, and 4.58 billion Turkish Lira. -- 17,932 sheep and goats, and 915 cattle In addition, two warplanes, 38 helicopters, 36 tanks, 119 police armored cars, and 864 military and civilian vehicles belonging to the state were destroyed and put out of action. 4. Some 2,138 people resigned as village guards en masse in 178 villages and individually |
FBIS3-23022_0 | PKK Leader Calls For Readiness Against Conflict Escalation | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Part one of a three-part interview with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers Party, PKK, by Huseyin Gul; place and date not given] [Excerpt] KURD-A/Botan--[passage omitted] [Gul] I want to ask a question that interests everybody. What is your assessment of the murder of Mehmet Nabi Inciler and Behcet Canturk, who were Kurds known as godfathers in Turkey? [Ocalan] We could easily state that starting with the murder of DEP [Democracy Party] parliamentarian Mehmet Sincar, these murders of those we could describe as patriotic Kurdish businessmen were done under the direct orders from the highest authority. Nabi Inciler, nicknamed "Inci Baba," and Behcet Canturk were disposed of because of the role they could have played in the Kurdish problem, as they had done in the past. These are intimidation murders aimed at silencing this [patriotic] segment and at encouraging the emergence of a collaborationist segment, such as volunteer village guards, some clan leaders drawn to Ankara, and many such agents. [Gul] The 27 March local elections are approaching. It is expected that the state will conduct large-scale detentions on the eve of the elections. What will be your stance on the elections? [Ocalan] The state is engaged in an "all or nothing" game. It is trying to hold the elections on the principle of the complete destruction of our movement. It is trying to completely disregard the legal foundations. It is trying to reverse a possible referendum situation in Kurdistan. It appears that the state will intensify its activities in this direction. [Gul] What is your assessment of the attack on Zhalah camp and the position of the southern forces [Iraqi Kurdish parties] on this attack? [Ocalan] The Zhalah operation was designed to use the federal government in the south against us or, failing this, to warn that government that Turkey could bomb it out. With the Zhalah operation, the Turkish state is also indicating its "political decisiveness" to resort to bombings if its policy toward the PKK fails. They are resorting to military, political, and diplomatic initiatives. They already did all that was possible in the diplomatic arena. All these initiatives are various aspects of their policy, and indications are that they will further escalate their violence by the spring. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we must look at the situation from a wider perspective, assign duties, and prepare |
FBIS3-23023_0 | PKK Radio Enumerates Clashes, Arson | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Text] Many enemy soldiers were killed or injured as a result of the operation carried out by our guerrilla armed units between Cudi-(Heydar) region [words indistinct] on 8 February. According to information obtained from [words indistinct], the colonialist enemy units laid mines on Cudi-Heydar road. A tractor belonging to patriots hit one of these mines as a result of which the tractor was damaged and one patriot was injured. [Words indistinct] one of our patriots threw a grenade on a police armored car in Cizre. Upon which, the enemy forces opened howitzer fire on Cizre. According to reports, many workshops were damaged. [words indistinct] Situation in Mardin Province: [Passage indistinct] the police building was partially burned and counterguerrilla headquarters was completely burned following a raid by our [words indistinct] in Nusaybin on 6 February. According to information obtained from guerrilla sources, [words indistinct]. The colonialist enemy forces surrounded Nusaybin [words indistinct] on 7 February. A clash ensued between our guerrillas and the enemy forces [words indistinct]. Nine soldiers in an enemy jeep were destroyed. This was reported to our radio by our war correspondents. [Passage indistinct] when we arrived at [words indistinct], the customary barbarism committed against our patriotic people by the enemy. [passage indistinct]. [Passage indistinct] the enemy operations are continuing against Bismil. It is being reported that many patriots have been detained and thus far there has been no information about their fate. The enemy distributed pamphlets in [place-name indistinct] and tried to instigate our patriotic people to organize a march against the PKK [Kurdish Workers Party]. However, the people did not heed their suggestion and turned its back to groups of marchers made up of children and (?Turks). Upon this, the fascist marchers (?canceled) their marches. Thus, the enemy's initiative in this direction came to naught. The colonialist regime's efforts to organize marches in various provinces and districts against our party have so far given no results, and have failed. The fascist enemy army closed down [words indistinct] and is making detentions. It was learned that the colonialist enemy has committed tortures in the villages of Igdir and [place name indistinct]. Even women are being subjected to such tortures. Our radio was informed that there has been a (?popular reaction) against such practices. [passage indistinct; reception fades and jamming begins] |
FBIS3-23024_0 | PKK's Ocalan Reportedly Hiding in Armenia | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Excerpts] Baku (February 11) TURAN -- According to some Western sources, the leader of the Kurdish Working Party (KWP) [Kurdish Workers Party -- PKK], Abdullah Ocalan is presently in Armenia. [passage omitted] In late December 1993, the personal representative of Abdullah Ocalan, Zahir Bardani, met with political leaders of Armenia in Echmiadzin. The representative of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, Levon Melik-Shakhnazarov attended the meeting as well. As a result of the meeting, the KWP headquarters was partially moved to Armenia and 660 Kurdish soldiers appeared in Armenian units fighting against Azerbaijan. But cooperation of Armenians and Kurds began long before the meeting in Echmiadzin. Since 1988, Kurdish soldiers have been training together with Armenian terrorists from "ASALA" [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] in Cyprus. Soon, Abdullah Ocalan gave $1.2 million to build an additional base for the training of Armenian and Kurdish soldiers. Earlier, Western journalists having visited Armenian regions neighbouring Turkey, reported that there were 21 bases training Kurdish soldiers. According to the same sources, the Kurds have been conducting subversive acts in Turkey from those bases. |
FBIS3-23025_0 | Minibus Hits Mine in Southeast, 3 Killed, 9 Wounded | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Announcer-read report over map] [Text] Three people were killed and nine were injured when a minibus hit a mine laid by terrorists near Bismil District in Diyarbakir. The incident occurred between Kugu and Isapinar villages at 1400 today. The wounded were taken to hospitals in Diyarbakir. Meanwhile, 10 members of the PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan], one of them a woman, were caught in Igdir. According to information received from the governor of Igdir, the suspects are from the organization's mountain cadre. The security forces also seized one Kalashnikov, one pistol, and numerous rounds of ammunition. The suspects were involved in various armed clashes, extorted money from citizens, and damaged public buildings. In a shelter pointed out by the suspects, the security forces found large amounts of food, clothing, and medical supplies. Furthermore, two persons were caught in Igdir for bombing the Nationalist Action Party building on 28 January. |
FBIS3-23028_0 | PKK Bombs Istanbul Train Station, Kills Over 40 Cadets PKK Claims Responsibility | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Excerpt] Ankara, Feb 12 (AFP) -- [passage omitted] In Istanbul, the military wing of the PKK claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion Saturday morning in Tuzla, 60 kilometres (38 miles) east of the city, which killed five people and wounded at least 30, according to the latest toll. All of the dead or wounded were army officer cadets. The home-made bomb, hidden in a rubbish bin at a railway station, went off shortly after they were let out for the weekend. A press statement released later by the pro-Kurdish agency Kurd-[H]a said the bombing was carried out by an "underground revenge group" of the Popular Army for the Liberation of Kurdistan. Some 60 people have been killed this month alone in separatist skirmishes in the east and southeast of the country, according to an AFP tally based on official reports. There has been a total of 11,000 deaths, including 3,300 civilians, since the start of the Kurdish rebellion in 1984. |
FBIS3-23030_0 | 10 TKEP/L `Terrorists' Captured in Istanbul | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Istanbul, Feb 13 (AA) -- Ten terrorists from the outlawed leftist TKEP/L [Turkish Communist Toiler Party/Leninist] organization were captured in Istanbul on Sunday. Security officials told AA that the terrorists were responsible for various offenses including, collecting money by force, opening gunfire on people, setting vehicles on fire, and killing a police official. Three weapons and a large quantity of ammunition were seized in safe houses belonging to the terrorists. |
FBIS3-23031_0 | PKK Radio Says Reporters Need Permission To Enter Region | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Text] [Passage indistinct] In a statement issued to the press on the issue, the Botan [area covering Hakkari and Sirnak regions] provincial command said: The national liberation struggle being waged for almost (?15) years has now entered a stage of [words indistinct]. Large areas in our country (?have come) under the control of the guerrilla force, and our military forces are maintaining their superiority in these regions. Therefore, our party, the PKK [Kurdish Workers Party], has authority to give permission to the Turkish reporters to enter and leave these regions. Our (?people) and everyone else now knows that the Turkish press bureaus in Kurdistan act as (?instigators) of the war. [passage indistinct] Botan provincial command adds that this ban [passage indistinct]. Two reporters entered Botan without permission to shoot a film [passage indistinct]. The Turkish Republic sources issued a statement claiming that the two reporters had allegedly been abducted by our party. In this way, the Turkish newspapers proved that they are acting as (?mouthpieces) in the special warfare being waged in Kurdistan. [passage indistinct] |
FBIS3-23033_0 | Southeastern Situation, PKK Stance Viewed on Election Eve | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Article by Sinan Yilmaz] [Text] Ankara -- Turkey will enter into an important phase in March. The important period that begins with the Ramadan Feast of the Muslims, will continue with the Newroz Feast of the Kurds and will finally end with the March 27 local elections which will effect both the Kurds and the Turks. These three important events will take place within one week of each other. The widespread belief held by the public is that the local elections will not be held in a completely safe environment. There are reports already which predict that both the state and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) will exert pressure on each other during the elections. The first example of such pressure was experienced in Cizre. Cizre is a district that is mostly influenced by the PKK and for this reason the state is attaching special importance to this district and taking similar measures in other settlements. The most obvious element of such measures is that suburbs are being evacuated and village guards are being settled there. The communities which are forced out of their settlements during these operations are also missing out on their opportunity to vote. It is reported that about 1.5 million people in southern and southeastern Anatolia are being forced to migrate. The excitement and the tension of the March 27 local elections have already begun. In the western part of the country, almost all parties' candidates are being announced and election campaigns have started. However, there is nobody in southern and southeastern Anatolia who has announced his or her candidature for the mayoral elections as yet. With the exception of one or two, almost every candidate's name is being kept secret. Following the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party's boycott, the political parties are keeping the names of their candidates secret for security reasons. The pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) is also reluctant to announce its candidates for fear of reprisals. The other common element among the parties is that they all feel that the March elections will not be held in a safe environment. The source of this suspicion is the prediction that both the government and the PKK will apply pressure on each other during the elections. It is necessary to point out though that the communities living in this region do not want such pressure or election rigging. Both seem impossible |
FBIS3-23033_8 | Southeastern Situation, PKK Stance Viewed on Election Eve | to have combed the town at random and one child was allegedly wounded in the operation. The tension continued in the following days. On January 27, village guards and security forces staged a march. After police had instructed tradesmen in Cizre to hang Turkish flags on their shops otherwise they would be asked to pay a TL [Turkish lira] 500,000 fine, there was a protest march against the PKK. The number of marchers rose to 600 with the participation of the village guards affiliated to Kamil Atak. It was claimed that certain village guards looted some shops during the march. On January 28, the Nur neighborhood was raided by the security forces and the village guards. On January 30, the body of Ibrahim Danis (19), who was alleged to have been taken into custody during the operation in Kurtulus neighborhood on January 27, was found. Danis's body was alleged to have been put in a house which belonged to a village guard and the house was claimed to have been bombed later. Persons above the age of 10 have started being taken into custody. While it is claimed that people who are taken into custody are tortured and forced to abandon the town, seven of those who were taken in custody were killed and no information about 15 others could be obtained. The names of the people who are claimed to have been killed after being taken in custody are as follows: Ibrahim Danis, Resit Pusal, Selim Ebubekir Duran, Ahmet Yusuf Tun and his son Isa Tun, and Selim and Ahmet whose last names cannot be determined. A total of nine people, two of whom are children, have lost their lives since the intensive clashes broke out. People have become accustomed to the clashes which are experienced almost every day. The clashes began on January 7 with PKK militants throwing hand grenades at a panzer and continued until the next morning. Two individuals were wounded in the clashes and 35 workplaces were destroyed. The latter included buildings of the PTT [Post, Telephone, Telegraph office], Ziraat Bank and the bureau of the daily OZGUR GUNDEM. The fact that heavy weaponry such as antiaircraft, mortar and machine guns are used during the clashes means that serious damage has been caused. Naturally, security of life is the main problem. No one is safe. The people of Cizre have started to pay the price |
FBIS3-23091_0 | Accomplices to Policeman's Attacker Arrested in Cairo | Language: Arabic Article Type:BFN [Text] Cairo, 26 Feb (MENA)--The security forces have arrested two extremists who took part in planning an attack on a police warrant officer who was guarding the Virgin Mary Church in Cairo's al-Sharabiyah District last Wednesday [23 February; see item NC2302110294 in previous Terrorism Report]. The terrorist, Hasan Mustafa, who stabbed the policeman, identified his accomplices in the assault to the police. They turned out to be active extremists who have links to similar individuals in Asyut. According to reports, a terrorist arrested on Thursday [24 February] in a hotel in Cairo's al-'Atabah area was responsible for recent bank bombings. |
FBIS3-23152_2 | Hizballah's Fadlallah on US, Hebron, Peace Talks KEYHAN Interviews Fadlallah | observe that the U.S. foreign policy has encountered many obstructions and complexities in numerous countries in such a manner that it has been unable to implement its policies there. We do not consider the United States to be very versatile in the region. This is because the nations still have freedom of action to the extent that if they cannot defeat the policies of the White House, they can at least disrupt them. In addition, I do not believe that the United States has envisaged the elimination of the Islamic Movement in its current calculations. Instead, it appears that the United States is moving along two lines. The first line is to approach the Islamic Movement and to explore possibilities of establishing contact with it. This is evident from the current efforts being made to establish relations with the Egyptian Islamic movement. The second line involves U.S. efforts to undermine the Islamic Movement for its ultimate disarmament and embargo. This is because the United States is not able to eliminate the Islamic Movement which has such deep roots among the Islamic masses. I believe that the Islamists will gain more popular support as a result of the U.S. pressure and thus the White House's pressure will not be able to undermine the Islamic Movement. [KEYHAN] The people of southern Lebanon are still being subjected to daily attacks by the Zionists. In the event of an accord between the Zionists and Lebanon what will be the fate of southern Lebanon? [Fadlallah] [passage omitted] Obviously, southern Lebanon is suffering from daily savage attacks on southern Lebanon and this is why the Islamic Resistance Movement came into being, that is, in order to prove a firm impediment to the domination of the Zionists on southern Lebanon. If this Resistance Movement had not been active in southern Lebanon, the Zionists would have occupied all of southern Lebanon by various means. [passage omitted] We, in the Arab world, and in the Islamic Republic of Iran, should be very vigilant [passage omitted] because once the Arab-Zionist compromise takes effect, then precise planning for exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran from the economic and security point of view will be carried out. The Arabs may be incited through various means to impose an embargo on Iran. In this regard, the American lackeys, especially the countries in Iran's neighborhood, will be enlisted to put more pressure |
FBIS3-23161_0 | Bomb in Zuq Musbih Church Kills 10, Injures 40 Judge Denies REUTER Report on Arrests in Explosion Case | Language: Arabic Article Type:BFN [Text] Judge Munif 'Uwaydat, public prosecutor at the court of appeals, has denied a REUTER report that four women were arrested in connection with the explosion at the Sayyidat al-Najat Church in Zuq Mikha'il, that initial investigation showed they planted the bomb near the church altar, and that a fifth woman believed to be the leader of the gang has fled abroad. 'Uwaydat said the investigation is secret and continuing. A judicial investigator will be appointed in implementation of the Council of Minister's decision. Commenting on the REUTER report, security sources said the authorities in such cases detain many suspects and witnesses. They added that six women gave testimonies as witnesses and were then released. Another security source has categorically denied REUTER's report, pointing out that the investigation is completely secret and is being conducted by three people supervised by the Lebanese Army's intelligence directorate. The investigation is being shrouded in the necessary secrecy to achieve quick results. Other sources said that the security authorities have detained six people for questioning as witnesses, including three women. According to available information, the pertinent security authorities recently detained a non-Lebanese person married to a woman from Kasrawan district. He frequently visited a religious leader and asked him for help to get Lebanese citizenship. Security sources said that this person informed the religious leader that there was a plan to detonate bombs in various places of worship, including Sayyidat al-Najat Church in Zuq Mikha'il. He said he received the information from a Lebanese man. Instructions were then issued to security forces to keep a close watch on the places named and search them after securing permission from the religious authorities concerned. |
FBIS3-23179_0 | PKK's Ocalan Reportedly Carries Syrian Identity Certificate | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Saygi Ozturk report: "Secret File on PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan"] [Excerpts] The Turkish intelligence units have discovered the truth behind the claim Damascus has made for many years that Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] leader Abdullah Ocalan is not in Syria. The intelligence units have established that Damascus has given Ocalan a Syrian identity certificate and a new name. The Syrian officials maintained during the meetings they held with their Turkish counterparts that Abdullah Ocalan is not in their country. That was correct because no one in Syria is known as Abdullah Ocalan. His name in that country is "Ahmad Jasim Musa." The identity certificate that was issued to him was signed by General 'Ali Duba, chief of the Syrian Intelligence Organization. According to the latest report from the Turkish intelligence units, Ahmad Jasim Musa drives a bullet-proof vehicle that has red registration plates. The registration numbers on Ocalan's vehicle has been conveyed to all the security units and they have been instructed not to stop him. Meanwhile, several members of al-Mukhabarat, Syria's secret service organization, are among Ocalan's bodyguards. They accompany him on his visits to various cities in Syria. [passage omitted] The PKK militants are obliged to inform al-Mukhabarat about their activities. The PKK militants in the Aleppo region are under the control of Brigadier General Hasan Khalluf, deputy chief of military intelligence. The PKK militants in the al-Hasakah and al-Qamishli regions are under the control of Colonel Muhammad Mansur, head of military intelligence in the two areas, and Amn al-Dawlah [state security]. Syrian officials accompany the PKK militants to Tel Kocak, al-Malikiyah, and 'Ayn Diwar on Syria's border with Iraq and help them cross into that country. That is within the knowledge of Mansur and al-Dawla. Meanwhile, Syria issues passports and identification to the PKK militants who wish to travel to Europe. Those who travel from Europe to Syria land in Beirut first. They are then transported in trucks to al-Hasakah and al-Qamashli. |
FBIS3-23180_0 | Ocalan: Tourist, Urban Operations `Could Be Developed' | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Part three of a three-part interview with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of Kurdish Workers Party, PKK, by Huseyin Gul; place and date not given; for part two, see item NC2222110 in previous Terrorism Report] [Excerpts] Botan/KURD-A -- [passage omitted] [Gul] Do you mean to say that there will be an intensification in operations in Turkey? [Ocalan] As an important tactical objective, it is possible to move the guerrillas into Turkey's rural areas. This could lead to important results. Also, operations in Turkey's urban areas could be developed enormously. Operations carried out specifically against tourism and economic targets in cities will further erode the economy. In particular, by rendering tourism wholly inoperative, the financial resources of the special war could be totally dried up. If its financial source is eradicated in this manner, then it will be highly difficult to support the army. [passage omitted] Looking at our history, we can genuinely see that we have reached a stage where we have been getting the best results and asserting our military strength. The military method, which has exhausted itself for the state, has potential for us. Not only could they not inflict military defeat, elimination, breaking of hands, legs, and heads, we are actually living through a process whereby we are able to firmly stand on our feet and make our body and backbone unbreakable. [Gul] Could we speak of the possibility of a cease-fire, or are there any signs of a political solution on the horizon? [Ocalan] It is our existing policy to seek a political solution. The false political solution plan on which they have been working has come to light. It was published in the press too. They have fallen into the pitiable situation of expecting help from the village guards, burned-out Kurdish collaborationists, and some of our critics. [passage omitted] |
FBIS3-23181_0 | Report Says Syria Limiting Ocalan's Activity | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Column by Ertugrul Ozkok: "Critical Decision on Baghdad"] [Excerpt] [passage omitted] The question of Syria is the third point in Turkey's foreign policy that has aroused concern. Developments in domestic politics have overshadowed that problem. In view of that, little attention has been focused on whether or not President Clinton was able to influence President al-Asad when they met some time ago. A high-ranking official has said that President Clinton was able to do so. Intelligence reports Turkey has recently received indicate that Syria has seriously restricted Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] leader Abdullah Ocalan's activities in that country. Restrictions on Ocalan There are various rumors about Ocalan's whereabouts. He is reported to be living in a village between Syria and Lebanon. He has been informed that he must remain indoors during the day and avoid holding political talks. There are reports that the PKK camps in Syria have been closed down and the movement of PKK militants has been restricted. In short, Turkey's pressure seems to have achieved a certain degree of success. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry is worried that Turkey may be subjected to intensive pressure by Western countries on matters related to the Kurdish problem. It seems that the first signs of that pressure have come from the United States. In Germany, a motion on the Kurdish problem has recently been blocked in the Bundestag. Undoubtedly, it will be looked at again if a message is received from the United States. [passage omitted] |
FBIS3-23219_2 | Political Violence Statistics for December 1993 | these incidents involved assaults upon vehicles on highways, another was a confrontation, the fourth was sabotage against high voltage towers, and the last, a selective assassination. Fourth place for attacks was tied between the Jungle and Southern regions, each of which had two acts (3 percent). In the Jungle the attacks declined by six, and in the South they increased by two. Last place for attacks was taken by the Principal region, with one subversive act involving sabotage against electric power facilities. As for victims, the Lima regional committee also ranked first, with 17 persons killed (50 percent). Two of these deaths were selective assassinations of popular leaders: one, a member of the Huayacan patrols, and the other, a general secretary of a human settlement in Chorrillos. However, the incident with the most bloodshed occurred during the attack on the Bank of the Nation branch in El Agustino, in which three policemen, five civilians, and one subversive were killed. Ranking second for victims was the Northern regional committee, with eight (24 percent). Five of these deaths were Shining Path casualties in a confrontation with a police patrol in Mariscal Luzuriaga Province. In an invasion, the subversives assassinated a lieutenant governor as well. The Central regional committee ranked third, with seven victims (20 percent). Six of these deaths occurred during a confrontation between an Army patrol and an MRTA [Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement] group in La Merced. Five subversives and one soldier were killed in the clash. The Jungle region ranked last, with two deaths (6 percent). One of the incidents was the subversives' assassination of the wife of a municipal councilman from Amarilis, and the other was the death of a member of the police at the hands of an MRTA group. Terrorist Attacks By Region: December 1993 (in Percent) - Lima: 65 - Northern: 18 - Central: 9 - Jungle: 4 - Southern: 4 - Principal: 2 Victims By Region: December 1993 (in Percent) - Lima:50 - Northern: 24 - Central: 21 - Jungle: 6 Victims and Attacks By Regions in December Regions Victims Attacks FFAA FFPP Civilians Subversives Total Lima 0 3 12 2 17 37 Northern 1 0 2 5 8 10 Southern 0 0 0 0 0 2 Jungle 0 1 1 0 2 2 Principal 0 0 0 0 0 1 Central 1 0 1 5 7 5 Total 2 4 16 12 34 58 |
FBIS3-23229_1 | Usamah Bin-Ladin Denies `Terrorism' Link | to insult us, was devoted to fighting the communist invasion and raising the banner that reads "There is no other god but God." AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI: In your view, who is responsible for that attack? Bin-Ladin: There are external quarters at which a finger of accusation could be pointed. They are the quarters spitefully hostile to Islam. They do not accept the natural right of Muslims to defend themselves. Our position in Afghanistan caused some of Islam's enemies to try to obstruct our cooperation with Muslims. The world tends to prefer to overlook the oppression and persecution in Bosnia and occupied Palestine and then hasten to accuse Muslims of terrorism if they defend themselves. It wants to keep Muslims weak and incapable of defending themselves. We also know that there are contacts among diplomats, all designed to curb our movement and stop our contacts with our brothers. But we say that cooperation in piety is continuing among Muslims. AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI: What is the nature of your relationship with Saudi Arabia? Bin-Ladin: There is a disagreement because of their rejection of our cooperation with the Islamic awakening, support of Muslim issues, and opposition to their restrictions on the call [al-da'wah] and the preachers. I am accused of supporting fundamentalism, even though everyone knows that this stems from our eagerness to raise the banner that reads "There is no other god but God" and support the Afghan mojahedin camps to fight oppression and communist aggression. I believe that all Muslims adopted this position; or that is what we believe was the case. AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI: And with Egypt? Bin-Ladin: The Egyptian press says that Usamah Bin-Ladin supports fundamentalism. We know that there are domestic problems in Egypt because of the state's violence against Islamists. Obviously there are bound to be reactions to this government policy. Like many other Muslim young men, some Islamists in Egypt gained military experience in the Afghan mojahedin camps. These conditions forced some to take such positions in their countries to defend their religion and themselves. The Egyptians are trying to indicate that I have something to do with the reactions taking place in their country. And they accuse me of posing a threat to them. AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI: And with Yemen? Bin-Ladin: What I said about Egypt I say about Yemen, which I believe is one of the best Arab and Muslim countries in terms of adherence to traditions and |
FBIS3-23248_5 | Qasim Clarifies Positions, Recent Interview | given an interview to the newspaper in question. It is a fabrication. al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah printed a communique warning foreigners against going to Egypt out of concern for their safety, because they are in confrontation with the government. It is every Muslim's duty to ensure the safety of visitors, and that safety cannot be guaranteed at the moment. Therefore it would be unwise to travel to Egypt." "Would a tourist be likely to go on holiday to Sarajevo, Mogadishu, or Baghdad? It is the same in Egypt today. Egypt is involved in a violent confrontation and it would not be safe for tourists to go there." He also finds it "difficult to imagine good Muslims being involved in attacks on innocent tourists." Instead, he accuses forces within the Egyptian Government of being behind the attacks on tourists which until now have cost seven foreigners their lives and wounded dozens of others. The purpose of this, according to Qasim, is to justify the brutality used against the Islamic opposition and to discredit it. Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim thinks that there is one good explanation for the furor caused by a series of articles on him. "Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, Islamophobia, the fear of Islam, has spread like wildfire. I cannot understand why people here in the West are so keen to create a boogieman. It only serves as a provocation." Qasim wants to see more objectivity in the descriptions of what is happening in the Islamic world. Asked whether he is unable to understand Danes' fear of Islam, when they have the deaths of foreign tourists in Algeria and Egypt as well as the bloody Iranian revolution at the back of their minds, he answered: "Yes, I can well understand that. But then the Danes must also appreciate how ordinary Egyptians feel. The Egyptians can be compared to a dove in a cage. Normally doves are very peaceful animals, but if they are put into a cage it is only natural that they peck your finger. When the Muslims in Egypt shake off the dictatorship and introduce an Islamic system, people will see that there is nothing to be afraid of." When the Islamic forces take over power in Egypt, which, according to Qasim will happen "before most people expect it," foreigners will again be welcome and assured of their safety in Egypt, he promised. |
FBIS3-23268_0 | `First Time' Wahhabis Publicly Blamed for Violence | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Tehran, March 8 (AFP)--Sunni Muslim militants planted two bombs which exploded in the town hall and Shiite Muslim mosque of the Iranian town of Zahedan, the daily KAYHAN said Tuesday. The paper did not say if the March 2 attack in the Sunni-majority town of southeast Iran close to the border with Pakistan caused any casualties or damage. But it said security forces had arrested several members of the group "Sahab army" who had admitted responsibility for the attacks. It was the first time that the fundamentalist Wahhabi group, which has close links to Saudi Arabia and is based in Pakistan, has been publicly blamed by Iranian authorities for an attack in Iran. Numerous attacks on the Shiite community in Pakistan have been attributed to the group. Zahedan, with 350,000 inhabitants, is one of the main Sunni towns in Iran, a country where 80 percent of the population is Shiite. At least six people were killed in violent clashes between Sunni demonstrators and security forces in Zahedan last month during a protest against the destruction of a Sunni mosque in northeast Iran, reliable sources said. The Iranian media has since January warned of the risk of attacks in the region by Wahhabi fundamentalists, charging that they were backed by Iran's main armed opposition movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq. |
FBIS3-23270_4 | Remaining Terrorists Wanted by IDF Discussed | and other logistical support--such as automobiles and safe houses or contact men and helpers. The 15 wanted men operate in small squads of three to four terrorists each. As a general matter, they do not stay long in any one hide-out. They shift from area to area, usually from one part to another of the Gaza-Hebron-Ramalla triangle. They generally travel in stolen Israeli automobiles bearing yellow Israeli license plates. It is known from a number of sources that the terrorists often have stuck on their stolen cars stickers proclaiming slogans associated with the settlers, such as: "The people are with the Golan." On many occasions, they have walked the streets wearing skull caps or wigs on their heads. Each of the wanted men apparently has a forged identity card. Usually, the card belongs to a Hamas supporter, the original holder's photo has been removed and the wanted man's picture affixed in its place. Some of the wanted men have more than one false identity card, some have Israeli identity cards provided by residents of east Jerusalem. Thanks to the stolen cars and the identity cards, they roam the roads. Their guns are always close at hand in case of a problem at one of the checkpoints. To prevent surprises, they are careful to travel with assistance from helpers and contact men, who usually travel the route that the wanted men plan to take and make sure it is free of patrols, checkpoints and other IDF activities. Only then do the terrorists set out. They usually travel with protection. Helpers drive ahead of the wanted men to warn of any possible danger or provide assistance as needed. The wanted men sometimes travel by taxi or bus. Such trips are usually considered safe in areas far from their homes where they are not known and unlikely to be identified. The wanted men generally shuttle between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The trip is made through various ruses. The main problem is getting past the Gaza checkpoint. Entry into the Gaza Strip is usually easier because the Israelis are more careful with exit inspections. Reports reveal that in a number of instances, wanted Gazans operating in the West Bank have managed to get past the Erez checkpoint with their weapons hidden among crates of vegetables. They find hiding places--leased apartments, a room with an activist in the organization, a room in |
FBIS3-23301_1 | Diplomat on Western Military Intervention, Mosque Attack | have some political motivation. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: Why was the mosque attacked? Al-Mahdi: The objective of the attackers was to foment agitation, unrest, and instability. [passage omitted] JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: Do you see any foreign hands behind this attack? Al-Mahdi: The remarks by Government officials indicate that foreign hands were involved, but the complete report on the investigation has not been released. The issue is being followed up. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: Sudan is currently facing the hostile stance of the United States and the West. How do you assess the attitude of the West and the United States toward Sudan? Al-Mahdi: The West and the United States cannot bear to hear calls for liberation. They are seeking to plunder and pillage the wealth of the people of the world. They wish to strangle every cry for freedom; and this is the policy they follow. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: What is Sudan's stance toward the world's Islamic movements? Al-Mahdi: Our message to the Muslim nations is--and we hope that they get this message--we approve of all acts in the service of Islam. The powers of world arrogance have besieged the nations. Thus it is the duty of Islamic movements that they all should join hands; and our relations with these movements are strong. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: The Egyptian and Algerian regimes have accused Sudan of giving refuge to the Arab Muslims who fought in Afghanistan. They say that Sudan is giving them military training. What are the objectives of these regimes in making such accusations? Al-Mahdi: Sudan has no problems with Egypt and Algeria and our relations with their people are cordial. However we believe in differentiating between the people and the governments. The lackeys are the ones leveling such baseless charges against Sudan. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: Who are these lackeys? Al-Mahdi: The Western lackeys who rule over these governments and are at loggerheads with their own people. They wish to label Sudan in order to cover up their own weakness. They are pitted against their own people, not against terrorism. They cannot face reality and therefore are using Sudan as a pretext. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: How are relations between Sudan and the Egyptian Government? Al-Mahdi: The Egyptian Government has occupied the area of Hala'ib and is seeking to avoid talks on this subject. It continues to plot against us. The Egyptian mass media have started a propaganda war against Sudan. However we believe that the Egyptian people are |
FBIS3-23312_0 | PKK Said Shifting Activities to Italy, Greece | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Report by Kemal Yurteri: "Drug Trafficking Shifts to Ports"] [Excerpts] Ankara--Developments in the Balkan countries and the Caucasus have forced the drug traffickers to make significant changes in the routes they use to transport their narcotics from Turkey to Western Europe and from Western Europe to North America. While narcotics were smuggled into Turkey from Iran and Syria in the past, the drug traffickers are also bringing in supplies from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan at the present time. It is common knowledge that they used the "Balkan route" to transport their narcotics to Europe in the past. However, the recent use of ports in drug trafficking has drawn attention. It has been reported that even the Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] has complied with the changes in transportation routes and moved to intensify its activities in Italy and Greece. [passage omitted] Regarding the PKK, the report said: "It has been ascertained that the PKK will maintain its underground activities, intensify its drug trafficking operations, take harsh steps to continue to extort funds, and shift its activities from wherever it is banned to neighboring countries (particularly to those that have a coastline). The obstruction of PKK's activities in the countries in which that organization is banned will be impossible if its members are not expelled." |
FBIS3-23313_0 | German Sentences PKK Members for Terrorist Offenses | Language: German Article Type:BFN [Text] Dusseldorf (DDP/ADN) -- In the marathon trial of members of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court today sentenced two of the four accused to life imprisonment. They were charged with attempted joint murder, several counts of joint murder, and in one case of being the ringleader of a terrorist organization. Another defendant was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for three counts of joint unlawful detention and membership of a terrorist organization. The fourth defendant received a six-year prison sentence for membership of a terrorist organization. The charges of joint murder against these two defendants were dropped by the court. The trial began in October 1989. |
FBIS3-23317_0 | Number of Political Murders Expected To Increase in Berlin | Language: German Article Type:BFN [Peter Scherer report: "Office for the Protection of the Constitution Fears Political Murders"] [Text] Berlin -- The Berlin security authorities are preparing for a "hot and bloody" spring. According to a confidential analysis of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, an escalation of violence is imminent in the German capital. Above all an increase in the number of political murders has to be expected, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution warned the Berlin Senat and the police. The background of the alarming assessment of the situation is the formation of a new "trend" in the autonomous scene in Berlin. According to information of DIE WELT, it "is offensively advocating that the killing of fascists be deliberately accepted now when they are attacked." The authorities fear massive riots, particularly in connection with the international soccer match between Germany and England. It is supposed to take place in Berlin on 20 April, Adolf Hitler's birthday. In the scene paper INTERIM (no. 274) it is stated that the match planned "on the Fuehrer's birthday in the stadium built by the Fuehrer in the capital of the Fuehrer's Reich" is a provocation. INTERIM takes the view that the politically responsible persons want to use the opportunity to provoke riots "for the benefit of the 'law-and-order' policy in the election year." As the homes of refugees had to burn after the abolition of the asylum-law, Berlin has to burn now. It continues literally: "There must not be such an unspeakable alliance with a concentration of fascist groups of thugs, hooligans from the FRG and England who are prepared for violence, thousands of heavily armed cops, and riots in the surroundings of the stadium and far beyond it: Let us prevent the match!" Independently of these calls, extreme-left "groups of migrants" are currently also canvassing for an FRG-wide demonstration in Berlin on 20 April. They want to "strike back" against the "Nazis." And this is the definition of their terrorist position: "We are living in hostile surroundings. It is not surprising that a fascist might also be killed in a climate that it politically heated by racist pogroms and oppression." The authorities estimate the number of autonomous persons who are prepared for violence at more than 5,000 in the FRG. They continue to be concentrated in the conurbations of Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt/Main, and the Ruhr area. |
FBIS3-23322_0 | PKK Official Calls on Candidates To Withdraw or Face Death | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Text] With the approaching local elections, the colonialist Turkish regime has infinitely escalated its violent genocidal and oppressive actions. Our people cannot have the opportunity to express their free will in the elections in such an atmosphere of violence. We will not permit elections to be held in an atmosphere of genocide, intimidation, and special warfare measures put into effect by the colonialist regime. Yes, dear listeners, in a statement issued on 1 March, our party PKK [Kurdish Workers Party] announced its policy on elections [words indistinct]. In a statement on behalf of our party, ERNK's [National Liberation Front of Kurdistan] representative in Europe Kani Yilmaz said that we do not regard the elections to be held in Kurdistan as legal, and for this reason we are boycotting the elections. Therefore, in our view, DEP's [Democracy Party] decision is the one preferred by the Kurdish people and is also a correct decision that must be supported. Had there been democratic conditions, then the will of the people in Kurdistan would have been revealed. Our leader stated this fact many times over. To prevent the expression of the people's will, the Turkish state is using its army and its crime syndicate, the counterguerrilla, [words indistinct]. As long as the war continues in Kurdistan, we will take a clear stand against an election to be held outside the will of the Kurdish people. We will not accept these elections. Our people will definitely not go to these elections. I am particularly stressing: The candidates from the other parties must immediately withdraw from the elections. I am repeating: They must immediately withdraw from the elections. If they do not withdraw, as of today they are the targets of ARGK [People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan] and will be shot dead. The fascist Turkish state is detaining and (?torturing) those persons and candidates who do not share its ideology, and those engaged in election propaganda are being shot dead, the mayors are being removed from their posts, and party headquarters are being bombed. The voting boxes will be opened at military garrisons. These boxes are being handed over to the special teams and village guards. There cannot be any talk of elections under these conditions. This is a complete farce. [Words indistinct] Our ERNK spokesman in Europe added: The political parties must immediately withdraw their candidates; otherwise, the candidates will be |
FBIS3-23323_0 | Interior Minister Says PKK, DEP Collaborating | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Diyarbakir, Mar 5 (A.A) -- Interior Minister Nahit Mentese said on Saturday that coalition government was resolved to eradicate the outlawed separatist terrorist organization. Mentese visited Anadolu Ajansi office in southeastern Diyarbakir Province. During the visit he said lifting the immunity of the Democracy Party [DEP] deputies was a judicial thing. Mentese said the government did its utmost for the region however that separatist terrorist organization tried to hamper the development activities. Recalling the DEP Deputy Leyla Zana's words that lifting the immunities would cause more bloodshed in the region, Mentese said DEP and the separatist terrorist PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan] organization were one inside the other. |
FBIS3-23324_0 | PKK Reportedly Vows to Escalate `Violence' in Southeast | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Diyarbakir/Ankara--Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [Kurdish Workers' Party], has vowed to upgrade violence in Turkey's Southeast in mid-March and said the region "will turn into hell." According to a reliable source with well-placed connections to the PKK Central Committee, Ocalan said this in a recent meeting with his commanders in charge of terrorist activities against Turkey. Ocalan's instructions to the commanders were to upgrade violence in the region until the celebrations for the March 21 Kurdish new year of Nevroz and beginning as of that day, "start a people's uprising." His instructions, said the source, were similar to those in 1992 and implied that the consequences of the Nevroz this year could be similar as well. In March 1992, Ocalan ordered a Kurdish uprising in Turkey and called for the establishment of "liberated zones." A total of 103 demonstrators were killed in clashes with security forces. Local sources in Diyarbakir said, meanwhile, that the PKK's instructions related to Nevroz celebrations had not yet been relayed to anyone but heightened activity and public demonstrations were possible. They note that the recent troop buildup in the region is not only a measure to maintain electoral security but also to insure peace on March 21. According to one security source who asked not to be identified, "if the PKK decides to do anything this year, there will be much bloodshed. But it will be the loser." The general concern among political party executives in Diyarbakir is that Turkey may be preparing for an all-out showdown with the PKK and that any terrorist activity in late March could trigger this "operation." |
FBIS3-23325_0 | PKK Radio Says Pipelines Bombed To Halt `Pillaging' of Oil | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Text] On 4 March our People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan [ARGK] forces once again bombed the BOTAS [Turkish pipelines company] oil pipeline between Idil-Cizre. It was learned that the fire that resulted from the bombing is still raging and the enemy's economy has suffered a major loss. As is known, our recent attacks on oil pipelines have occurred near Idil, Cizre, Batman, Silopi, and Diyarbakir. So far, numerous pipelines have been bombed by our army units. The ARGK press service announced after the latest operation that the pillaging of the oil, which is the most important wealth of Kurdistan, will not be allowed. Our attacks against oil [words indistinct] will continue until the fascist [words indistinct]. Our guerrilla forces fired a (?rocket) at enemy forces who came to repair the (Rufet) bridge, which had been destroyed by our guerrillas. Four enemy tanks and two armored vehicles were hit, and they were forced to retreat without repairing the bridge. Our army attacked [words indistinct] station. Four soldiers were killed during the attack. The colonialist regime's lackeys bombed [placename indistinct] for one and a half hours [words indistinct]. [Place name indistinct] was bombed by the warplanes of the colonialist fascist forces. [passage indistinct] |
FBIS3-23330_0 | DEP Candidate Among Nine PKK Captured in Ankara | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Announcer-read report over video] [Text] Nine members of the PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan] terrorist organization, among them a Democracy Party [DEP] candidate for the Adana mayorship, were captured in Ankara. Among the captured is also the organization's responsible for the provinces of Ankara, Yozgat, Kirsehir, Konya, Kirikkale, and Kayseri. It was determined that the persons, who were captured in operations conducted by teams belonging to the Ankara and Kirsehir Security Directorates, were preparing to perpetrate actions in Ankara, Kirikkale, and Kirsehir. Ensuing the suspects' interrogation, it was determined that they participated in the following acts: burning the forest opposite the Turkish Grand National Assembly lodges in Ankara and throwing bombs at the Nationalist Action Party provincial headquarters in Ankara and True Path Party District headquarters in Cankaya. It was also reported that the suspects perpetrated actions such as throwing bombs, attacking, and extorting money on behalf of the organization in Kirsehir, Diyarbakir, and Bingol. In searches conducted of the safe houses and work places indicated by the suspects, two long-range automatic rifles, six magazines for these automatic weapons, 156 flares, three revolvers of various calibers and four magazines belonging to them, material used in the manufacture of bombs, and organizational documents were seized. According to a statement issued by the Ankara Security Directorate, the head DEP official for Ankara Province is being sought. Meanwhile the captured answered reporters' questions and stated that they were penitent, calling on everybody to resist violence. The suspects further explained that the terrorist organization is planning on transferring its violent perpetrations to metropolitan areas and for that reason they were also transferring their cadres to big cities. |
FBIS3-23332_1 | Major Airlines Fail Heathrow Bomb Detection Test | electric wires. The tests last month were part of a campaign to improve security at the busiest international airport. American, United and KLM Royal Dutch also failed the test, conducted by Transec (transport security) officials working for the Department of Transport, after a complaint about security loopholes from a former security employee at the airport. The devices were recovered by Transec inspectors minutes before they were due to be loaded into holds. A block of Semtex the size of a bag of sugar blew up a Pan Am Boeing 747 over Lockerbie in Scotland five years ago, killing 270 people, many of whom had boarded at Heathrow. Security experts said yesterday that the dummy devices posed no threat to passengers because the Semtex was chemically inert. Harry Ditmas, the Transec director, recently reported to ministers that travellers using Britain's airports were still facing an "unacceptable" risk from terrorism. He said he regarded security standards as getting better but still depressingly poor. Last year, Transec inspectors identified at least one significant security lapse a month, any one of which could have allowed terrorists to slip through the "ring of steel" promised by successive transport ministers. Standards vary, from Glasgow, where all baggage is screened, to Norwich, where Transec has issued a warning to managers to strengthen security. Last year even El Al, the Israeli airline widely regarded as the most security-conscious airline in the world, was criticised by Transec. "Overall, the implementation of security measures is still patchy," said Ditmas, a defence ministry official seconded to Transec after the Lockerbie tragedy. United Airlines, one of the world's biggest, has dismissed an employee after the Heathrow tests. "We have tightened up procedures," the airline said. "But we do not feel the test was fair. Transec does not allow for `profiling' -- identifying terrorists by passport-checks and other methods -- and anyway the device would have been picked out before being loaded on to a plane because we reconcile all bags with passengers. British airlines do not have to do that until 1996." Virgin Atlantic said it was investigating "an incident" and would review safety procedures. KLM confirmed it had failed the test on January 20, but said it would have stopped a bomb getting on to an aircraft by baggage reconciliation. Other airlines tested during the week-long Transec campaign are believed to have detected the bombs, but officials declined to identify them. |
FBIS3-23333_1 | IRA Gasworks Bombers Handed Long Sentences | to Warrington. He was jailed for 20 years for possessing Semtex. Mr Justice McCullouch told MacFhloinn: "I have no doubt, as far as you are concerned, the bigger the explosion, the better." The judge told Denis Kinsella he accepted he would not have participated "unless you had been persuaded to do so by another member of your family, perhaps two members, whose requests you would have found it difficult to refuse." The jury heard that Kinsella's father, also called Denis, introduced him to MacFhloinn. But the judge said: "You were not as helpless and dim as the picture you sought to give to the jury. You had sufficient strength of character to say no." MacFhloinn and the escaped terrorist, known only as Michael Timmins from Ireland, made up the Semtex bombs in a room in Denis Kinsella's home in Manvers Street, Nottingham. Kinsella drove them in a battered old Mazda van on the 87-mile journey to the works on the A49, one mile from Warrington town centre. After planting the devices, they drove off through Warrington but were stopped by a diligent patrol officer, Pc Mark Toker, 25, who thought they might be drunk. Kinsella tried for 25 minutes to talk his way out of the questioning by Pc Toker. The officer ran a police computer check on the van and a breath test on Kinsella, both proved negative. But he want he wanted to search Kinsella and his two colleagues. They could not risk his discovering their gun and so MacFhloinn fired five bullets at him, at close range from the back of the van. Pc Toker was hit in the stomach, thigh and buttock and was left bleeding in the road as the trio escaped. But he had the presence of mind to relay descriptions of the trio and van on his radio. The bombers abandoned their van in the Cheshire village of Lymm and forced 19-year-old Lee Wright to stop his Ford Escort, Kinsella putting him in the boot. The motorist then endured a 25-minute journey as the trio drove to the Trafford Park area of Manchester. There, a policeman thought they might be "ramraiders" and gave chase. They out-manoeuvred him and the pursuit was taken up by Pc Andrew Mackay in his Ford Cosworth. He saw the front passenger, Timmins, lean out to throw a brick or video recorder at his car, a common tactic of |
FBIS3-23386_0 | Iranian Ministries Incriminated in Bakhtiar Assassination | Language: French Article Type:BFN [Unattributed report: "Bakhtiar Affair: Public Prosecutor's Charge Is Crushing for the Mullahs] [Excerpt] This has never happened before: A state is directly implicated, with incriminating evidence, in a judicial terrorism dossier. A finger has been pointed at Iran in Shapur Bakhtiar's murder, the shah's former prime minister, who was assassinated on 6 August 1991 in his peaceful villa Suresne, on the outskirts of Paris. This ultrasensitive dossier, which after two years of investigation consists of several thousand pages, should soon come to a conclusion. Within the next few days, the Chamber of Accusation of the Paris Court of Appeal, which met last Monday, will make a decision: Either to remand the suspects accused in the assassination of the Tehran regime's opponent to the Assize Court; to request more information; or to simply shelve the case on the basis of a nonsuit ruling. In theory, nine suspects, all Iranians or of Iranian origin, could be called to the dock. In theory, because only three of them were arrested and imprisoned in France. Of all the members of the commando unit that, on 6 August 1991 evaded the vigilance of the CRS [Republican Security Police] and entered Bakhtiar's residence, the police could catch only Ali Rad Vakili [name as published] after a long chase through Paris, Lyon, Sallances, Valence, Annecy, and Lake Geneva. The other defendants, against whom international warrants for arrest have been issued, are still on the run or back in Iran. Judge Bruguiere's preliminary investigation and the 177-page final charge by the public prosecutor link the Tehran mullahs. The document of the antiterrorist section abounds with details. It incriminates no fewer than three Iranian ministries: the Telecommunications Ministry, an adviser of which allegedly helped two of the murderers get visas; the Foreign Ministry, one of whose officers, Zeynal Sarhadi [name as published], is accused of having supervised the commando members' escape from France; and the Intelligence and Security Ministry, which is mentioned several times in the public prosecutor's report. [Information Minister] 'Ali Fallahian himself, vice minister at the time of the murder, appears to have been one of those who ordered Bakhtiar's murder. His name and his private telephone number were found in the diary of one of the defendants imprisoned in France, a former journalist and correspondent in Paris. The conclusions of the Public Prosecution, written down black on white in its charge, are |
FBIS3-23402_0 | Report Details Kakh Activity Against Arabs, Others | Language: Hebrew Article Type:BFN [Report by Nicole Krau] [Excerpts] Last Sunday, when the decision to define all right-wing movements as terror organizations was announced, Kakh's Tel Aviv branch closed down. The branch had been located on Hanegev Street in the old Central Bus Station in the past 12 years, having moved there from Dizengoff. "We seem to be closed," one of the movement's leading figures says, "but in practice, the branch's entire activity has been moved to a safe apartment in downtown Tel Aviv, in which an activist family lives. The location of the branch will be changed occasionally to prevent exposure by the security forces." The activist's remarks reveal that Kakh activists use five safe apartments in the Tel Aviv area. The apartments are situated mainly in south Tel Aviv, Hatiqva neighborhood, Bat Yam, and Ramat 'Amidar in Ramat Gan. The activist adds that the movement has hundreds of activists and supporters in the Dan District. According to Kakh activists, Kakh and EYAL [Irgun Yehudi Lohem] leaders and the heads of Kahana Hay have recently discussed consolidation. [passage omitted] One of the Kakh leaders in the Dan District has said that the movement would suspend its activities until the High Court of Justice rules on the movement's appeal against the orders outlawing it. They plan later "to start taking care of the Arab problem in Yafo." At first they will distribute in Yafo leaflets demanding that the Arab residents leave the city, and later they will proceed to damage property. "We will burn their cars and houses, but we will not attack people for the time being," he said. In addition, the Kakh people plan to act against the moderate right wing and the left-wing organizations in the city and to attack Meretz centers and the Labor building. The activist says that reporters, who attack the movement in media, will receive life threats. According to Kakh activists, they expect to receive weapons soon. They maintain that the weapons will be smuggled in by movement activists who are due to immigrate to Israel from the United States -- people whose political views are unknown to the security services. "We are defined as a terrorist organization, and as such, we have nothing to lose. We feel as if we were ETZEL and LEHI [pre-state underground organizations], and we will use their methods in our operations," the activist sums up. The police |
FBIS3-23417_0 | Government Agrees to Scottish Trial of Lockerbie Suspects | Language: French Article Type:BFN [Text] For the first time, Libya has announced that it has agreed that the two suspects in the Lockerbie attack be tried by the International Court of Justice of The Hague in the presence of Scottish judges. The two men are accused of involvement in the attack against the Pan Am plane which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. |
FBIS3-23418_0 | MENA Reports Agreement | Language: Arabic Article Type:BFN [Text] Paris, 23 Mar (MENA) -- Libya has announced that it agrees to hand over two of its citizens suspected in the Lockerbie downing for trial at the International Court of Justice in The Hague with the participation of judges from Scotland. This was announced by Sa'd Mujbir, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the General People's Congress in Libya, in a speech he delivered at the meeting of the International Parliamentary Union currently being held in Paris. Sa'd Mujbir said that "to you and through you, we declare to the whole world that we officially accept the proposal by Mr. Black, professor of law in Scotland, for the Libyans to be tried before the International Court of Justice in The Hague with the participation of judges from Scotland". It is worth noting that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the Libyan revolution, has previously agreed for the two Libyans to be tried at the International Court of Justice without mentioning Scottish participation, but this was rejected every time by the United States and Britain. |
FBIS3-23423_4 | Update on Al-Turabi's Health, Canada Visit Head Injury Effects | and that his train of thought is affected if he takes part in a long conversation or in a public event that requires one to stand and concentrate for a long time. Feeling of Exhaustion In a press interview in the wake of the incident, al-Turabi said that he felt exhausted. Moreover, the physician who treated him at Civic Hospital in Canada told the court which considered Hashim Badr-al-Din's case last year that the patient (al-Turabi) had not regained his normal condition when he left the hospital. On top of this, the medical report that was submitted to the court noted that al-Turabi may need treatment in a "special unit" in the United States or Switzerland to regain his fitness. It is not known to date whether al-Turabi has received such special treatment, keeping in mind that he has not visited the United States since the Ottawa incident and that it has not been announced or learned that he has visited Switzerland since that date, even though rumors were circulated in Sudanese circles last year about a "secret visit" al-Turabi made to Switzerland. Extent of Injuries Al-Turabi (62) suffered a brain concussion, lost his speech, and experienced extreme weakness on the right side of his body as a result of the incident. A Canadian police officer is reported to have said in the wake of the incident that the blow al-Turabi received from Badr-al-Din did not cause much damage and that the main injury resulted when al-Turabi's head collided with the ground when he fell. That collision caused a nearly two-inch long wound on the right side of the back of his head. The wound did not need to be surgically stitched but it caused a brain concussion, which began as minor but intensified by the third day, according to the report of Dr. Vasco da Silva, the physician who treated al-Turabi at Civic Hospital. Before the court considering Badr-al-Din's case, da Silva described al-Turabi's injuries as follows: "The injuries can be described as three parts: al-Turabi suffered a superficial wound to the scalp, and this is the first part. The second part is the slight concussion which basically manifests itself in a passing or transient loss of consciousness lasting between 15 to 20 minutes. The more serious injury, which represents the third part, was suffered in what can be characterized as a brain concussion. "As a result of these |
FBIS3-23423_12 | Update on Al-Turabi's Health, Canada Visit Head Injury Effects | produce adverse results and reflect the regime as a regime experiencing void or weakness because of al-Turabi's absence. 'Ali 'Uthman's argument did not convince the NIF's "old generation" who saw that 'Uthman was trying to gain sole control of the decisionmaking and to succeed al-Turabi "even while he is still alive." The feelings of annoyance among the ranks of the "old generation" began to appear in what this generation's men said in their private sessions. Some of them talked about endeavors by 'Ali 'Uthman to marginalize others and about 'Uthman's efforts to gain control of affairs and to impose his tendencies on the NIF and on the regime. It is to be noted that the majority of the Sudanese speak of 'Ali 'Uthman as the planning head behind the 30 June 1989 coup and as the real director of numerous domestic affairs, especially since al-Turabi is inclined to devote a large part of his time to working and planning with the other movements connected with the NIF in the region. It has been noticed that since the assault on al-Turabi, 'Ali 'Uthman has begun to figure more prominently in the political arena, has begun to assume ministerial positions, and has begun to expand his powers and to enlarge the sphere of his influence by giving positions to the Front's "young generation" and by marginalizing the "old generation" that can dispute his leadership of the NIF action. Even though al-Turabi has begun to exercise his leadership tasks since his return and, to a large degree, his recovery, some sort of division of roles has surfaced between him and 'Ali 'Uthman, with al-Turabi devoting most of his attention and time to the foreign movement and contacts and to coordination with other fundamentalist movements through the facade of the Islamic Arab Popular Conference. Meanwhile, 'Ali 'Uthman takes charge of domestic executive action, with the role of grand "master" and guide maintained by al-Turabi in the domestic arena as well. Many in the NIF and outside it realize that it will be difficult for 'Uthman to fill the void created in case al-Turabi disappears. This is because 'Uthman lacks al-Turabi's long experience and his extensive network of foreign relations. 'Uthman is not even known to many beyond Sudan's border, and some view him as more of a political figure than a religious leader. This is why NIF cohesion and unity seem to be tied |
FBIS3-23432_1 | Antiterrorism Department Chief Views Situation, Problems | is typically considered as a terrorist act in their political or religious struggle were reported in Ukraine. However, a kindling ground for this is now being cultivated in the state, abetted by the flawed legislation and the ever increasing legal nihilism on the part of both specific individuals and entire public groups. In 1993, 172 cases of terrorist threats and attempts on the lives of government officials, deputies, and judges were reported, compared to 110 in 1992. Attempts by criminals and ultraradical individuals to acquire firearms, ammunition, and explosives, with which 762 aggravated crimes were committed, became very frequent. Given the danger to society posed by illegal possession of firearms and ammunition as well as their possible use in staging terrorist acts and other crimes, the SBU and the Interior Affairs Ministry [MVS] conducted several joint operations in 1993 resulting in the seizure of 1351 units of firearms, including 79 grenade launchers, 10 machine guns, 111 assault guns, 103 rifles, 451 hand pistols, 2517 grenades -- a substantial increase since last year. Correspondent: Could you give examples of specific cases that were successful? Burlakov: Last year in January, agents from our administration, in conjunction with the SBU Chief Administration, foiled a conspiracy by one of the Middle East terrorist organizations to prepare in Ukraine a terrorist act against a foreign embassy based in Moscow. As a result, we confiscated grenades and explosives. We also prevented another foreign terrorist organization from purchasing in Ukraine equipment for conducting terrorist acts in other regions of the world. We have some evidence that due to its poorly patroled borders and some other factors, international terrorism has already "zeroed in" on Ukraine. In late 1992, much attention was attracted by the case of V. Yukhno, deputy of the Kherson City Council and head of the Ukrainian Democratic Party Kherson-based organizations, who was severely beaten by unidentified individuals, and died in the hospital on 1 December, 1992. Some media and public organizations, prior to completion of the investigation, classified this tragedy as a terrorist act, accusing government institutions, the SBU, and MVS of inaction. Some even went as far as to suggest that law enforcement agencies abetted perpetrators of that murder. A special commission that included experienced agents from the Internal Affairs Administration and the Security Service Administration in Kherson Oblast was established to investigate the case. As a result of the commission's investigation, the culprits |
FBIS3-23433_0 | BfV Deputy President Says RAF Assists Turkey's PKK | Language: German Article Type:BFN [Text] Augsburg -- According to Peter Frisch, deputy president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BfV], the extremist Kurds of the banned Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) receive massive help from the terrorist Red Army Faction (RAF). In an interview with AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE, Frisch said that one must assume that "the PKK gets financial, logistical, and personal assistance from RAF sympathizers, maybe also from the commando echelon." There have been several "solidarity actions" for the PKK by the RAF scene, Frisch said. |
FBIS3-23439_0 | Chairman of Solidarity Committee With Kurdistan Murdered North Paper on Murder | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Text] Theofilos Yeoryiadhis, the head of the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office [PIO] Turkish Department, was shot and killed outside his house at midnight last night. Yeoryiadhis, 37, was fired on by two people on motorbikes. He was hit five times in various parts of his body, including his head, and he died on the spot. Greek television network ET-1 and Greek Cypriot television networks Logos and Antenna dropped their regular programming to report the incident. They reported at 0130 that Greek Cypriot officials were at the scene investigating the incident. As well as heading the Greek Cypriot PIO Turkish Department, Yeoryiadhis chaired the Greek Cypriot Committee of Solidarity with Kurdistan. He had direct links with the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party [PKK]. He visited the PKK camps in the al-Biqa' valley on various occasions and coordinated the campaigns organized in south Cyprus to support the PKK. Theofilos Yeoryiadhis was known as a fanatical enemy of the Turks. |
FBIS3-23442_0 | Chairman of Solidarity Committee With Kurdistan Murdered Kurds Kill 12 Troops in Revenge | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Excerpts] Nicosia, Mar 22 (CNA) -- [passage omitted] The Committee for Solidarity with Kurdistan announced Tuesday that Kurdish guerrillas in eastern Turkey staged an attack against Turkish troops and killed twelve in retaliation of Yeoryiadhis' murder. |
FBIS3-23443_1 | Chairman of Solidarity Committee With Kurdistan Murdered Turkish Paper Reports Victim's PKK Activities | it said: "The murder was planned by the Turkish National Security Council and carried out by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization's agents." The front also claimed that it will definitely retaliate. Yeoryiadhis Acted Like a Militant Theofilos Yeoryiadhis, who was known for coordinating PKK activities in south Cyprus, established the Committee of Solidarity With Kurdistan in 1988. As a Turkologist who spoke Turkish very well, he worked as a member of the Greek Cypriot secret service organization until he was appointed head of the PIO Turkish Department. Yeoryiadhis visited the PKK camp in the al-Biqa' Valley together with several Greek Cypriot deputies in 1990. In a statement made in that camp, he claimed that the Kurds and the Greek Cypriots shared a similar fate. As the head of the Committee of Solidarity With Kurdistan, Yeoryiadhis was invited to attend the PKK's activities in Europe as a "guest of honor." He leveled serious accusations against Turkey when he addressed the "Kurdish festivals" in Bochum and Frankfurt. Yeoryiadhis organized campaigns on the Greek Cypriot side to support the PKK several times. He also opened bank accounts for donations to provide funds for the PKK. Yeoryiadhis refused to be interviewed by the Turkish newspapers for a long time. However, he agreed to make a statement to HURRIYET in December 1993. Stelios Vervirakis, HURRIYET correspondent in Athens, interviewed him at the time. Some of the views he expressed were as follows: 1. The PKK will definitely destroy the Turkish State. 2. The Cyprus problem can be resolved only after the Turkish State is destroyed. Meanwhile, the Armenians will be relieved. 3. I have problems with the Cyprus Government because of my links to the PKK and other Kurdish organizations. The Turkish Cypriot newspapers have declared war against me. 4. A PKK camp does not exist in Cyprus. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan has not visited the island. I would have been the first to be informed of his arrival. Turkish and Kurdish refugees cross from north Cyprus to south Cyprus. However, a provision on "refugee status" does not exist in south Cyprus. So, they are returned or dispatched to Syria or sent to prison. 5. Abdullah Ocalan is a great leader. He travels to wherever he wishes to go. He has fascinating capabilities. He is definitely not a stupid person. I can help anyone who wishes to talk to him, that is, if he agrees. |
FBIS3-23446_0 | `Secret' Report Tallies Terrorist Attacks by Foreigners | Language: German Article Type:BFN ["rv" report: "Political Terrorism: Increasing Number of Attacks"] [Text] Germany -- the country of terrorism: Of 22,870 politically-motivated crimes, 1,402 (in 1993) are credited to foreigners. This is revealed by a secret report for the Federal Government. There were 99 attacks on individuals; eight people were killed. Furthermore, there were 86 arson attacks and five bomb attacks. The constitutional protection authorities estimate that 39,800 of about 6.5 million foreigners who live in Germany belong to extremist associations. According to the report, the most dangerous of these organizations is the PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan], which is banned in Turkey. |
FBIS3-23448_0 | German Analysis on Increasing Security for Jewish Facilities | Language: German Article Type:BFN [Report by Peter Scherer: "Warning of Islamic Attacks"] [Excerpts] German security services have strengthened their protection of Jewish and Israeli facilities in the Federal Republic. The reason for this is the massacre of more than 30 Arabs by a Jewish settler in Hebron. [passage omitted] The Office for the Protection of the Constitution has produced an analysis warning the federation and the laender of a "medium to long-term increased risk to security in Germany." The analysis says that "because the terror potential is incalculable and arbitrary, attacks by opponents to the PLO-Israeli agreement could spread beyond the region at any time, possibly to Germany as well." Therefore in Western Europe there is a particular danger of "spontaneous actions by fanatical lone-wolves from the Islamic region." This also applies to the Federal Republic where, according to the experts in the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, violent actions by "irrational individuals" are also to be expected in the short term. Jewish and Israeli facilities are considered primary targets for such actions. But, says the analysis, the Islamic organizations active in Germany, the ones most expected to carry out acts of violence, still do not have the necessary infrastructure to carry out a rapid and organized strike. According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, there are some 1,640 supporters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Shi'ite extremist Party of God (Hizballah) active in Germany. Just like the dissident organizations that oppose the PLO, these groups want to revert to an armed struggle with Israel. |
FBIS3-23454_0 | Ocalan Allows Operations on Nevruz; Discusses Elections | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Telephone interview with Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party, PKK, by an unidentified correspondent; date not given -- the correspondent is based in Cologne but Ocalan's whereabouts are not specified] [Text] Correspondent: Your party issued a statement on this year's Nevroz celebrations. You said: "Nevroz will be celebrated in homes." What concrete measures will be taken in this direction. Ocalan: Most probably, people will be called upon to stay at home during the day. They should light fires and gather at night. They could also fire guns if that poses no danger. The guerrillas too might carry out particular operations. This too is a form of celebration. Besides, it is not our position that "there must necessarily be a major explosion" on Nevruz. For us, every day is Nevruz. For us, Nevruz is disciplined, tactical work. We are not trying to turn particular days into days of special demonstrations. There are drawbacks in that. People must show understanding of our position, which aims at preventing massacres. A few massacres were committed when an effort was made to mark 1 May [Workers Day] as a tradition in Turkey. Our decision is a precaution. That is how it should be seen. But the activities of the guerrillas will continue. Correspondent: Tansu Ciller made a statement in connection with Nevruz. She said: "We were late this year but next year Nevruz will be declared a national holiday." The SHP [Social Democrat Populist Party] and MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] supported this proposal. What is the motive behind this proposal? Ocalan: [Motherland Party leader] Mesut Yilmaz said: "It is an election bribe." Apparently, this assessment is near the truth. I do not think it came from a serious thought or as a sign of a new process. The elections are nearing and she needs votes. It might have been made with this in mind. Correspondent: There will be local elections a week after Nevruz. The DEP [Democracy Party] announced that it will have no part in these elections. How would you assess those who are trying to get the votes that would have gone to the DEP? Ocalan: There are interesting developments in this regard. The DEP has vote-winning potential, on the basis of which a game is being played. In particular, [SHP leader and Deputy Prime Minister] Murat Karayalcin is engaged in a ploy. After the DEP's |
FBIS3-23459_0 | PKK Calls For Calm Nevruz, `Expanded' Resistance Later | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Excerpts] KURD-A/Botan -- Noting that this year Nevruz's active resistance will be mostly executed by the guerrillas, the PKK [Kurdish Workers Party] called on the people not to go into the streets, refrain from going to work, and celebrate Nevruz in their homes. The PKK indicated that mass and radical activities could also be held where conditions permit, but such activities must only be held with the support of ERNK [National Liberation Front of Kurdistan] and ARGK [People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan]. A statement signed by the PKK Central Committee and distributed in Kurdistan noted that Nevruz, which has centuries of tradition in uprisings, is now being celebrated by the Kurdish people under new conditions. The statement noted that Nevruz played a historic role in protecting the national existence in Kurdistan and, particularly in recent years, it has become a means of resurgence of the national liberation struggle under the guidance of PKK. Noting that "1994 Nevruz is being welcomed by endeavors to freely reconstitute our country" and that the present stage is one of securing a political and military balance between the state and the PKK, the PKK statement says: "In some parts of our country this balance has been achieved and many areas are under the control of our armed forces. The Turkish Republic's political authority was considerably eroded with the recent decision to boycott the elections. As a result of heavy losses, particularly in 1993 and the winter months, the Turkish Army has gradually retreated into the cities. The PKK has started to create free areas and administrations in places cleared of Turkey's fascist Army. Parallel with efforts to develop active warfare against the enemy, work is going ahead on setting up a National Assembly and provincial assemblies, electing leaders, and forming a war economy as a foundation for a people's regime." [passage omitted] Pointing out that the 1994 Nevruz is being marked under very different circumstances, the statement says: "Nevruz, which is historically the source of our freedom and strength and which fulfilled its appropriate role every year with the blood of hundreds of martyrs, will also play its deserving role this year, on which we have pinned great hopes, and will glorify the resurgence in 1994. Nevruz will again be celebrated with all the splendor. This year Nevruz's independence and freedom fire will enlighten our cities and mountains. Our people will |
FBIS3-23460_0 | Report Details Greek `Support' for PKK | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Unattributed report: "PASOK and PKK Cooperate"] [Text] The Greeks have created opportunities for militants of the Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] to carry out their activities in Greece. They have also provided funds for the PKK and supported that organization in the international domain. Many Greeks participated in the rally the PKK militants organized in Germany for "Freedom to Kurdistan" and carried banners of the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK]. They chanted slogans against Turkey, which they described as the "common enemy." Meanwhile, it is common knowledge that the Greeks facilitate efforts by PKK militants to escape from Turkey through the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. It will be recalled that several Greek deputies and generals visited PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in the al-Biqa' Valley some time ago. They informed him that they will give every kind of support to PKK's "justified" struggle against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Greeks are trying to establish a radio for the PKK in Greece. The PKK radio will be in an area close to the Turkish border and will broadcast on the FM band. Furthermore, they have allowed the PKK to open an office in central Athens. It has been reported that relations between the Greek Cypriot side and the PKK go far beyond the visit of Greek Cypriot deputies to PKK camps and the opening of a PKK base in south Cyprus. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the Colt [as published] firm some time ago to convey the serial numbers of M-16 rifles the Turkish security forces impounded from PKK militants and ask for information on the country that purchased them from that firm. The officials responded by disclosing that the rifles in question were sold to south Cyprus. |
FBIS3-23461_2 | PPK Reportedly Targetting MHP Candidates | the turnout of voters in the region will be relatively low and this will benefit the MHP. They believe that those who had intended to vote for the Democracy Party (DEP) will not vote for any other party now that the DEP has withdrawn from the elections. Many voters take the threats by the PKK very seriously and will not risk voting for another party. Voters will also experience difficulties in reaching polling stations due to unfavorable weather conditions. Added to this is the number of people who have moved away from the area since they were registered on the electoral roll. These factors will result in a low turnout which will be to the MHP's advantage. Based on the belief that MHP supporters are actively engaged in warfare with PKK terrorists, commentators say that the MHP and its young nationalist members are being set up for a bloody confrontation with the PKK. Chairman of MHP, Alpaslan Turkes, is reported to have said that his party was very reluctant to have anything to do with an outlawed group such as the PKK which worked against the state. Turkes also said that it was the government's responsibility to take the necessary measures otherwise any act by the MHP might be regarded as provocation. Observers also believe that the supporters of the MHP are inadvertently pushing the party into the eye of the storm, into open clashes with PKK terrorists. "Let us assume that MHP candidates are successful in some of the provinces" observers say, "The PKK will definitely kill these candidates, even though there is no active anti-PKK campaign in the region. They will owe their success to the support of the armed forces once they are elected. In the event that the PKK does kill the MHP candidates, not only will they succeed in causing havoc in the region, they will draw the members of the MHP into the centre of the Kurdish problem. The irony of the situation is that the PKK will finally set the MHP against itself even though the MHP has always succeeded in avoiding a confrontation with the PKK." The MHP is well known for its willingness to be actively involved in the Azeri-Armenian and Bosnian conflicts, but does not want to have any dealings with the PKK. They may not be able to avoid the consequences of the recent political developments in the region. |
FBIS3-23463_0 | Moscow Reportedly Promised Weapons to PKK Figure | Language: Italian Article Type:BFN [Interview with Democracy Party Deputy Nizammettin Toguc by Guido Olimpio in Italy; date not given: "Turkey: Six Kurdish Deputies May Face Capital Punishment" -- first two paragraphs are CORRIERE DELLA SERA introduction; all Kurdish names as published] [Excerpts] Olimpio: What do you think of the upcoming local elections? Toguc: If these had been free elections, we would have supported them wholeheartedly. However, in order to prevent us from taking part in the vote, the state has attacked the DEP. Dozens of activists have been arrested, bombs have been planted in the various parties' headquarters, and candidates have been intimidated. This is why the DEP has decided not to take part in the elections, and has requested the people to abstain. [Toguc ends] An even harder line was adopted by the PKK, which warned candidates not to stand in the elections: "Those who do not obey this order will pay a high price," came the message. The resistance's dictate was accompanied by a diplomatic offensive which led PKK leader Abdullah Farhat's [name as received; presumably Abdallah Ocalan] brother Farhat Ocalan to Moscow. According to Lebanese sources, Farhat was received by head of foreign counterintelligence Primakov, who promised to provide support and weapons. |
FBIS3-23464_0 | PKK Leader Reportedly Leaves Syria for Azerbaijan | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Ankara -- Reliable Kurdish sources in the Middle East reported this week that outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan had moved out of Syria and was currently in Lachin, a part of Azerbaijan which is currently under Armenian control and also inhabited by Kurds. The sources said Ocalan had travelled to Lachin earlier this month from his residence in the town of al-Qardahah in Syria's Latakia province. The PKK leader had been living for nearly a decade in Damascus and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's hometown of al-Qardahah. According to information received by the TDN, [TURKISH DAILY NEES] Ocalan is currently in contact both with Armenian officials and influential Kurdish circles in Lachin. They said that he aims to establish a major training base in the Lachin corridor, which connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, opened by the Armenians in 1992 and since then the main artery supplying the enclave from Armenia. The exact date of Ocalan's travel to Lachin was not made clear, although it has been confirmed that he was outside Syria earlier this month when Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani visited that country. Despite Turkish press reports that Talabani had contacted Ocalan and was seeking to press him for a new cease-fire, sources said the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] leader -- who also travelled to al-Qardahah -- did not find him there. Talabani has denied the reports saying he had no contact with Ocalan. In a meeting he held with Turkish gendarmerie commanders last week near the Iraqi border, Talabani informed Turkey of this as well. The sources, who usually know of Ocalan's whereabouts, told the TDN on Thursday that there was also speculation that the PKK leader had recently travelled to Russia. Once the camp in Lachin is set up, they said, there could be more terrorist activity in eastern Turkey. The PKK has in the past denied Ocalan's previous trips outside Syria. The PKK's European representative and Ocalan's political advisor, Kani Yilmaz, said in January that he would even meet the press but no journalist has seen Ocalan for the past seven months. |
FBIS3-23466_0 | Grenade Attack on Party Offices Wounds 17 | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Text] Ankara, March 19 (AFP) -- A grenade attack against the local offices of a Turkish government coalition party left 17 wounded in Diyarbakir, in the mainly Kurdish south-east of the country, police said Saturday. One of the two men responsible was arrested after the attack Friday evening on the offices of the Social Democratic Populist Party, they said. No one has claimed responsibility but police attribute the attack to the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has called for a boycott of next Saturday's local elections and threatened reprisals against participants. Offices of the centre-right True Path party, a coalition partner, and the opposition Motherland Party have also been attacked and a candidate of the centre-left Republican People's Party was killed Thursday in nearby Kayapinar by unknown assailants. More than 10,000 people have been killed since the PKK in 1984 launched its armed struggle to take the southeastern region out of Turkey. |
FBIS3-23470_0 | Seventeen Injured in SDPP Diyarbakir Headquarters Bombing | Language: Turkish Article Type:BFN [Announcer-read report over video] [Text] The Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] election headquarters in Diyarbakir has been bombed. According to initial estimates 17 persons were injured, one of them seriously. One of the assailants was captured immediately after the incident. According to information obtained by a Turkish Radio and Television correspondent, two unidentified persons threw hand grenades at the SDPP office in Surici quarter around 2100. The explosion injured 17 persons, one of them seriously. The building sustained heavy damage. The security forces captured one of the assailants in an operation launched immediately after the incident. Operations are continuing to capture the second one. The injured are being treated at the Diyarbakir State and Social Security Hospitals. |
FBIS3-23471_0 | Prosecutor Reveals Phone Taps on PKK Leader | Language: English Article Type:BFN [Excerpts] Ankara, Mar. 18 (A.A.) -- State Security Court Chief Prosecutor Nusret Demiral said today that recordings of tapped phones of the separatist terrorist organization show that the illegal organization has formed a political flank in parliament. Demiral, together with Ankara Security Director Orhan Tasanlar, showed to journalists, the room where six deputies, who were arrested a day before, had stayed and the room in which they were interrogated. [passage omitted] Demiral said that the deputies were questioned on violating Provision 125 of the Penal Code. `Under Provision 125, crimes against the state do not necessarily have to be armed attacks,' Demiral said. `The illegal organization has a political flank and a military flank.' Demiral refuted the claim of DEP defense attorneys that all party telephones were tapped. `This is not true,' he said. `Those that were tapped are the ones that were used to communicate with PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan] head Abdullah Ocalan and the organization's members.' |
FBIS3-23473_1 | Editor's Note: The FBIS Terrorism Desk welcomes suscribers' comments and suggestions at (703) 733-5512. | of the FBIS Terrorism Report include: Albania The Albanian press agency reports that bombs are being found in homes of those "who have taken part in the democratic changes." Algeria The Armed Islamic Group took credit for killing a French businessman and his son in Birkhadem. Azerbaijan On 19 March, at least 12 were killed as a bomb went off inside a Baku metro car pulling into 20 January station. A presidential spokesman has blamed the Armenians. Belgium/Iran The "Iranian Socialist Center" called Brussels police on 24 March, saying that a bomb would explode at the Central Train Station at 1440 GMT. Cyprus Theofilos Yeoryiadhis, chairman of the Committee of Solidarity with Kurdistan, was murdered in Nicosia. The local press is blaming "Turkish agents," and police reportedly have a suspect. Egypt An official security source says that the electric circuits found at recent bank bomb sites were made in Afghanistan, the timers in China, and the explosives in Russia. Germany/Syria AFP reports that Germany has demanded that Syria extradite fugitive terrorist Carlos and a "collaborator" in connection with the 1983 bombing of the French cultural centre in West Berlin. Iran/France PARIS MATCH reports that French investigations have linked least three Iranian ministries with the 1991 assassination of former Iranian prime minister Bakhtiar. Jordan Security forces defused a bomb at the Forte Grand hotel in Amman on 23 March. Jordan/Palestinians AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI reports details of the relationship between Abu-Nidal's Fatah-The Revolutionary Council and Jordanian religious extremist groups. Lebanon/Jordan Lebanon has passed the death sentence against 16 men convicted of killing Jordanian diplomat Na'ib al-Ma'ayitah in January. The indictment said that Abu-Nidal's top man in Lebanon was involved, and named Yusuf Sha'ban as the trigger man. Lebanon AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI reports that Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are training fighters of various nationalities in al-Hirmal, "Ja'farite scientific seminaries," Hanta, and Beirut's southern suburbs. Nigeria The government issued a statement asking citizens to ignore any pamphlets from "Islamic Jihad International Organisation of Nigeria." The pamphlets contained threats to attack government edifices and places of worship. Thailand The Thai press and police report that at least two suspects in the truckbomb found 17 March are from the "Middle East." The press speculates that the suspects are linked to the World Trade Center bombings. Ukraine UKRAYINA MOLODA interviews the head of the national counterterrorism office on foreign terrorists in Ukraine, previous terrorism incidents, and statistics. |
FBIS3-23501_1 | Mathematical Modeling Assists Investigations of Flight Accidents | recording list. Most importantly, not one kind of BUR can determine the trajectory of aircraft movement, and it is the last leg of a flight (before an aircraft hits the ground), after all, that is of the greatest practical interest in the investigation of a flight accident. The MSRP-12-93 magnetic flight recording system, installed on the An-12, An-26, Tu-95 and Tu-22 aircraft and Mi-6 helicopter in particular, records only 12 analog parameters of a flight, including the barometric pressure and indicated airspeed, vertical G-forces, angles of deflection of the controls, angles or angular velocities of pitch and roll and two or three diagnostic parameters of the operation of the power plant. The SARPP-12 optical recording system employed on the MiG-23 aircraft and Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters puts only six analog parameters onto photographic film. They are insufficient, in both cases, for an analysis of the development of an emergency situation and the establishment of the causes for an LP. It also happens that the information medium is destroyed, lost or stolen. A representation of the trajectory and nature of the movement of an aircraft on the last leg of its flight is formulated in such cases according to indirect indications (sketch maps, ground objects destroyed, the results of study of the aircraft hardware, the indications of witnesses and the like). Mathematical modeling of the dynamics of a flight thus proves to be useful and necessary, both with the availability of information from flight data recording systems and, the more so, in the absence of it for any reason. When investigating a flight accident it allows, by way of example, computation of the parameters of aircraft movement according to a known initial flight mode and assumed destabilizing factors. The legitimacy of versions that are put forth with reference to the circumstances of the flight accident is analyzed, in that case, according to the results of mathematical modeling of the dynamic reaction of the aircraft to the effects of disturbances caused by the failures of the aircraft hardware or erroneous controlling actions of the pilot that are being considered. Tasks of the second type (the reciprocal task of flight dynamics) are also posed and resolved in those cases when, according to the objective data (information from the on-board recording devices, radar plotting of the flight route), the trajectory of movement and the angular position of the aircraft are known, with unknown destabilizing |
FBIS3-23502_6 | Summer Conditions Pose Particular Aircraft Servicing Problems | operating mode of the power plant that establishes an equilibrium, which is maintained by a minimal consumption of fuel. The engine is thus more sensitive to changes in the state of the elements in its flow portions. It is possible to ascertain in a timely fashion, by monitoring the rate to reach revolutions and temperatures in idle mode, such problems as damage and destruction of compressor and turbine blades, cracks in the combustion chamber, and the destruction of fuel feed lines to the nozzles of the main combustion chamber. The likelihood of deviations in the structural elements of the aircraft from increased discharges of static electricity increases appreciably in the summer, creating the danger of a discharge during fueling and a subsequent fire. The reliable grounding of both the aircraft and the refueling equipment is therefore essential, especially after the return of aircraft and helicopters from dense clouds and areas of thunderstorm activity. The specific features of servicing runway equipment during the summer include regular monitoring of the air in pneumatic tires. The point is that when the temperature of the surrounding air increases by 15C, the pressure in the tires increases by 10--12 percent, leading to increased likelihood of their rupture in sharp braking. Summer also requires increased attention toward ensuring the protection of engines against the entry of dust and small foreign particles from the surfaces of the airfield. Erosive wear and damage to parts of the air-gas duct by foreign particles leads to a reduction in the reserves of gas-dynamic stability and the formation of nicks--concentrations of stresses that are often the centers for the formation of fatigue cracks. Constant monitoring should thus be performed--both when preparing for flights and when making them--of the cleanliness of the areas where the engines are started and tested, as well as the taxiways and runways. The likelihood of the entry of foreign objects into the air intakes is increased when the rules for aircraft taxiing are violated (high speed, high engine RPMs) and when the moving row of aircraft is blown by gas streams. The trajectory of the movement of particles in the operation of helicopter power plants has its own specific features. The dust raised by the inductive flow of the main rotor moves to the periphery of the area swept by the main rotor, is sucked up into the zone of rarefaction under it, and then is thrown |
FBIS3-23505_3 | Sloppy Preparations Undermine 1990 MiG-29 Ferry Flight to Iran | did not fulfill his promise to help, and an F-5 that was in reserve for such a situation did not go up. The pair of MiG-29s loitered for forty minutes over Iranian territory. Nikulin suddenly lost sight of the lead aircraft on one of their turns, after which he independently made the decision to look for the nearest airfield. The wingman was lucky. The captain unexpectedly saw a runway right on his heading and landed safely--now with almost no fuel in the tanks--at the Savi airfield. "I was born lucky," he commented laconically at the time on his good fortune. But Yermakov, who had waited unsuccessfully for a guide aircraft, tried to land on a highway, but was hindered by the heavy vehicle traffic. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, he ejected after an hour and fifty minutes of flying. "There was no damage on the ground. The pilot was unharmed," were the notations in the report. Maybe so, but we know how to give a good spanking. So they exhaustively investigated the sad results of a generally ordinary flight, and the measures taken, judging by the official documents, were the strictest. Major Yermakov was relieved of his duties and dismissed from flight work, and the "lucky" Nikulin was disciplined as well. All's well that ends well. Nonetheless, in my opinion, the materials from the investigation did not reflect the main causes that led to the flight accident. One of them was the unsatisfactory preparation and support of the ferry flight. The regimental command did not know the concrete date of the ferry flight to fill out the necessary documents until the very day of departure of the pilots for Moscow. The fliers (called back the day before from leave, by the way) were given just seven days instead of the required 20 to prepare for the performance of this task. Communications specialists had appealed more than once to higher-ups on the question of providing reliable radar control of the aircraft being transferred, but that was not resolved either. It turned out that the organizers of the flight had simply not stipulated in the agreement the necessity for the receiving side to turn on its tracking stations, or the amount of payment for their operation either... They economized themselves into disaster. And here is a fact that is quite interesting, although it was not taken into account in the final |
FBIS3-23506_1 | Baykonur Support Troops Commander Recalls Highlights of Service | by their superior officers. Imagine Baykonur in the forty-degree heat without water. It is not for nothing that they say in the water battalion that they pump the blood through the arteries of the cosmodrome. And there is no exaggeration there. It is in fact the life's blood of Baykonur. The sergeants and soldiers have recently been receiving, for these heavy labors, pay that is 200--300 times less than that of their civilian colleagues. But weather and climatic calamities remain the most terrible of all for the support battalions. July of 1988. The winds around the main substation of the cosmodrome seemed enough to blow all of Kazakhstan away. The wind speeds were more than forty meters a second, lightning was flashing constantly, the peals of thunder were rocking the broad expanse of the steppe. The hurricane winds, in a wild dance, even bent, twisted, broke off and twisted into a "ram's horn" the huge and strong towers for the electric-power lines as if they were made of nothing. The roofs of substation buildings were torn off, and windows and doors were knocked out. Powerful concrete towers were toppled like matches. I and German Stepanovich Titov, at the time the first deputy chief of the space units, got through with difficulty to the stricken substation so as to check out the situation at the scene. There was so much rain water that it poured over the door sills of the Volga and flooded the passenger compartment. It felt like the car was floating rather than driving down the concrete road. This was in the desert! No one would believe it. The cosmodrome and city of Leninsk were left without electricity and water. In the disaster area they scraped up some vehicles and brought in the power battalion of Major S. Fedorenko. The battle with the natural disaster lasted almost the entire day. The first two towers were restored, and the city received a partial supply of water and light. Power was supplied to all the facilities on the cosmodrome after five continuous days of hellish labors. They slept for four or five hours right at the work sites, because they understood that a cosmodrome without power was a dead cosmodrome. Captain O. Godlevskiy and Senior Warrant Officer P. Gonzilovskiy stayed up in the rebuilt towers of the power lines for 18 hours a day, installing insulator strings passed to them |
FBIS3-23515_1 | Layout, Facilities of Plesetsk Cosmodrome | passes over the lightly settled terrain of Arkhangelsk Oblast, which makes it simpler to provide for safety along the flight path of the rockets and choose the areas where the spend stages fall (northern Tyumen Oblast and Taymyr Peninsula). The proximity of the cosmodrome to the country's scientific and production centers was also taken into account. The city of Mirnyy, not shown on many maps, is located seven kilometers from the Plesetsk station on the Northern Railroad. The test personnel live there. The population of the city and the residential compounds of the centers for the preparation of launch vehicles and spacecraft for launch varies from 40,000 to 60,000 people. The infrastructure of Mirnyy meets all contemporary requirements. The city is provided with heat, water, electric power, foodstuffs and industrial goods mainly by servicemen. The sights, aside from monuments to prominent figures in space science, include memorials to the tragic events that have occurred at the cosmodrome and memorable dates on the occasion of the launches of the Kosmos-500, Kosmos-1000 and Kosmos-2000 satellites, among others. There is an instrument-building technical school, a branch of the Novator VNII [All-Union Scientific-Research Institute] of Electronic Machine Building and the Pero airfield. There is an engineering site next to the city for the launch preparation of light (from 800 to 3,000 kg [kilograms]) spacecraft and their launch vehicles. Testing of satellites (aside from military ones) in the Kosmos, Interkosmos, Okean and Nadezhda series, among others--about 20 types of spacecraft in all--is conducted in the installation and testing wings. The stages of the Kosmos launch vehicle are also joined and tested here before being brought out to the launch complex. There are servicing areas for each craft and launch vehicle with sets of ground testing equipment. The check-out processes are highly automated. Some spacecraft, such as the Meteor, can be delivered by aircraft to the Baykonur cosmodrome for launch into heliosynchronous orbits after they are checked out. Rockets for space purposes (the rocket and spacecraft covered by a cowling) that are prepared for launch are delivered on transport and placement units to the launch pad located 50 km from Mirnyy, where they are placed on the launcher and are located inside a movable service tower during pre-launch preparations. This structure is 100 meters high, with an area of 2,000 m[.sup]2[/] at the base and a weight of 450 tonnes. The tower is retracted from the |
FBIS3-23524_0 | U.S. Rapid Deployment Force | OFFICIAL USE ONLY 94UM0236A Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE Language: Russian Article Type:CSO [Article by Lieutenant Colonel D. Kurguzov] [Text] In the late 1970's the U.S. military-political leadership concluded there was a need to form a specially trained Armed Forces contingent for emergency use in areas of "vital national interests" with the appearance of crisis situations there. Formations and units assigned to it from the Armed Services were supposed to have high combat readiness and strategic and operational mobility and be capable of performing combat missions in any region of the world as applied to specific situations. That conclusion was preceded by an in-depth analysis of prospects for development of the world military-political situation, above all in areas of the Near and Middle East -- sources of oil production and areas strategically important to the United States -- and also Southeast Asia. In this connection, in July 1977 the U.S. Secretary of Defense prepared and submitted a special document to Congress entitled "PRM (Presidential Review Memorandum)-10." Along with an analysis of the world military-political situation, it contained a substantiation of the need for establishing a "Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force." In the course of a thorough study and discussion of this problem, the U.S. Congress approved proposals submitted by the Secretary of Defense and decided to finance a program for establishing a Rapid Deployment Force, [RDF],[.sup]1[/] which President J. Carter announced on 1 October 1979. Development of the optimum version of an RDF structure as well as of forms and methods of its combat employment began simultaneously on staffs of the Armed Services. In the first phase this work was headed by the Army Staff, inasmuch as it was believed that the ground component would play the key role in a future RDF. Korea, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf initially were included in the RDF operational mission area. But important world events which occurred in subsequent years, including the Islamic revolution in Iran, beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, introduction of Soviet troops to Afghanistan and a sharp exacerbation of relations between Israel and neighboring Arab states forced the U.S. military-political leadership to partially revise the missions and geographic regions of responsibility of the RDF being established, while retaining its overall organizational development concept. Thus, in this period the entire Near East and Northeast Africa were included additionally in the RDF operational mission area. In March 1980 the Defense Department |
FBIS3-23524_4 | U.S. Rapid Deployment Force | in implementing the concept of U.S. "forward presence," carried out to protect U.S. national interests on a global and regional scale. In this connection, operational plans for RDF employment are drawn up by their staffs directly in forward areas and approved by the JCS. The annual report of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to Congress cites geographic areas of responsibility of these five unified commands, which include the following regions: - Atlantic Ocean area--Atlantic Ocean (west of 17 east longitude), Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean area (east of 92 west longitude), excluding South America; - Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and Red Sea; - European area--Europe (including Eastern European countries), Great Britain and Ireland, Mediterranean Sea waters, a portion of the territory of the Near East (Israel, Lebanon, Syria) and the African continent (less Northeast Africa); - Pacific Ocean area--Pacific Ocean (except for waters included in the area of responsibility of the unified Atlantic Command), Indian Ocean, Japan, Korea, China and other countries of Southeastern Asia; - Central and South America area--Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Territories of states of the former USSR, Canada, Mexico and the continental United States are not included in areas of responsibility of unified commands. The following are primary missions of unified commands in forward areas: - monitoring the military-political situation, conducting reconnaissance, security and defense of U.S. military and civilian installations; - operational direction, training, and combat and logistic support of U.S. troops (forces stationed in their areas of responsibility on a permanent or temporary basis); - planning and immediate direction (in case of a crisis) of operational deployment and combat employment of Armed Forces groupings (including RDF components) and support of operational coordination with allied forces; - evacuating U.S. citizens from zones of military conflicts or natural disasters; - fulfilling functions of U.S. Armed Forces representation in states and international organizations within the area of responsibility and directing measures for giving military aid to friendly countries. In the estimate of U.S. military experts, this geostrategic allocation ensures continuous monitoring of the development of the world military-political situation by the U.S. leadership, and if necessary enables influencing the situation in its own interests on an emergency basis by a show of military might or the direct use of armed forces. The list of RDF functional missions was expanded considerably in the early 1990's in |
FBIS3-23524_16 | U.S. Rapid Deployment Force | determined by national naval strategy presently in effect which provides for the constant presence of groupings of U.S. naval forces in strategic regions most important to the United States -- in the Atlantic (Second Fleet), Mediterranean (Sixth Fleet), Indian Ocean and Western Pacific (Seventh Fleet), and Central and Eastern Pacific (Third Fleet). In connection with this, the makeup of the RDF grouping established with the appearance of a crisis in one of the forward areas will include naval components which are in immediate proximity to the center of conflict, and if necessary also moved in from adjacent areas. Activity of the U.S. Navy composite task force performing combat missions in the Persian Gulf is most indicative in this respect. It has been operating there since the time of the war against Iraq. Its makeup increased from 8 to 20 combatant ships in different stages of the escalation of tension in the region. There are 1-2 carrier battle groups and an amphibious group (with a Marine expeditionary battalion aboard) constantly present in it (by rotation). Ships of this task force took part in delivering air and cruise missile strikes against Iraq during the U.S. Armed Forces Operation Desert Sting (January 1993), and they delivered the missile strike against Baghdad on 26 June 1993. According to press reports, the type makeup of a carrier battle group may include 6-11 ships (including one carrier), 1-2 guided missile cruisers, 2-3 guided missile destroyers and frigates, 1-3 destroyers and frigates and 1-2 nuclear powered multipurpose submarines (SSN's). The type makeup of deck-based aviation of a carrier battle group includes over 80 combat aircraft and helicopters, of which 34-40 are nuclear weapon platforms. In some cases a missile battle group may be established and used instead of a carrier battle group. It can have 5-8 ships, including up to 2 guided missile cruisers, 3-5 destroyers and frigates and an SSN. Arming missile battle group ships with Tomahawk cruise missiles, intended for delivering precision strikes against shore targets and forces of surface ships, gives them the capability of effectively supporting ground troops operating on coastal axes, and in some areas performing some of the missions assigned to a carrier battle group. A ship striking force (3-4 ships) may include a guided missile cruiser and 2-3 destroyers armed both with antiship cruise missiles as well as with Tomahawk cruise missiles for firing against ground targets. An amphibious group, |
FBIS3-23524_21 | U.S. Rapid Deployment Force | regularly in the continental United States. Their training background conforms to particular exacerbations of the military-political situation in various regions of the world. According to foreign military press reports, despite reduced appropriations for military purposes, the United States continues to work actively to create new and modernize existing models of weapons, military vehicles and means of logistic support for troops. Thus, tests of a new tank to be supplied to "light" formations of the RDF presently are being conducted on a competitive basis. The following are the main tactical and technical specifications for it: Crew of four, combat weight not over 20 tons, air-transportability, possibility of being parachute-landed, armament consisting of a 105-mm gun and two machineguns (7.62-mm and 12.7-mm), computerized fire control system, and top speed of at least 70 km/hr. Great importance also is attached to outfitting units and subunits with qualitatively new intelligence and EW assets, night vision devices, devices for determining coordinates, and highly mobile computer-based C[.sup]3[/] systems. This equipment is being created with consideration of requirements placed on the RDF such as high strategic mobility and probability of use in theaters of military operations with difficult physical-geographic conditions and poorly developed infrastructure. The U.S. command gives special attention to questions of developing forms and methods of RDF combat employment. During 1991-1992 the Army Training and Doctrine Command completed development of a new concept of combat employment of general purpose forces and their most combat-ready element, the RDF. It was titled "Air-Land Operations." Articles presently are being published in Defense Department central publications in which its basic provisions are being actively studied and discussed. The concept represents the aggregate of U.S. Army and Air Force leadership views on the nature and methods of operations by U.S. General Purpose Forces throughout the spectrum of possible military conflicts and wars of modern times, and under special conditions of peacetime. Assessments of prospects for development of the world military-political situation and U.S. Armed Forces organizational development for the next decade as well as an analysis of the experience of their combat operations against Iraq and involvement in other local conflicts of recent years have been made its basis. The essence of the new concept is as follows. The U.S. Armed Forces command proceeds from the assumption that, with the disintegration of the USSR, a large-scale military conflict in Europe with classic combat employment of large U.S. Armed Forces groupings |
FBIS3-23529_1 | Aggressor EW Aircraft | -- FEWSG (Fleet Electronic Warfare Support Group) with headquarters in Norfolk -- was established on a permanent basis directly in the structure of U.S. Naval Aviation. It is made up of three squadrons of EW aircraft (VAQ-33, VAQ-34 and VAQ-35) based at the Key West (Florida), Lemoore (California) and Whidbey Island (Washington) naval air stations, as well as subunits responsible for preparing exercise areas and deploying monitoring and measuring equipment and data collection and processing points in them. The squadrons are equipped with EA-6B Prowler, EF/A-18 Hornet, and EP-3E and J Orion EW aircraft as well as a group of NKC-135A, EC-24A and Learjet 35 aircraft on a five-year lease from McDonnell Douglas. In addition to the squadrons, the FEWSG includes two subunits servicing eight AN/ULQ-13 ground-transportable systems (they simulate ground or shipboard radars) and also ELINT and ECM sets. The NKC-135A and EC-24A aircraft have AN/ALT-40 and AN/ALT-28 ECM sets with an operating band of 0.1-18 GHz and the AN/ALR-75 warning receiver with attached OE-320/A direction finder. These aircraft are capable of flying at altitudes around 11,000 m at up to Mach 0.8 for at least six hours. The U.S. Air Force command currently does not have a similar group at its disposal. FEWSG Aircraft as well as aircraft of auxiliary and combat aviation equipped with suspended pods with EW gear are leased for exercises and drills in using EW equipment. Procedures and methods of using various weapon systems are rehearsed, problems of improving capabilities of EW equipment are solved and scientific research is conducted in the course of the exercises. In addition, actions of flight and ground personnel (officers of tactical air control centers, communications and EW specialists, weapon system operators, air traffic control center controllers) are evaluated under jamming conditions. The training drill of flight and ground personnel in a period of escalating tension in any region of the world and preparation for delivering a strike acquires special significance. Thus, from August 1990 through January 1991 FEWSG crews took an active part in U.S. Navy exercises in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf (Operation Desert Shield), simulating emissions of Iraqi Armed Forces electronics. In the mid-1980's an MEWSG (Multi-Service EW Support Group) for simulating the electronic environment, stationed at Yeovilton Air Base (UK), was established to support drills and exercises of subunits of NATO Allied Forces Europe (above all of the Allied Air and Naval Forces). Its |
FBIS3-23530_8 | Radar Early Warning and Control Aircraft | E-3 AWACS radar early warning and control systems until 2010-2015. The E-3 aircraft is costly and operates from runways of great length, and so its purchase is accessible only to certain countries. The E-2C is approximately three times cheaper than the E-3, but has half the patrol time and worse radar characteristics. In view of this, in organizing zones of lengthy patrolling, it is necessary to activate at the very least two E-2C's in place of one E-3. Foreign specialists realize the requirement for the appearance of a radar early warning and control aircraft occupying an intermediate position in capabilities and cost between the E-3 and E-2C. In Great Britain, the Nimrod with AN/APY-920 radar could have become that aircraft, but after lengthy work and expenditure of considerable funds the country's Ministry of Defence in 1986 (already in the process of acceptance tests) was forced to give up further development and make the decision to purchase the U.S. E-3 Sentry. This was due to the fact that the radar (two antenna systems installed in the fuselage nose and tail to provide a circular scan) and data processing equipment did not meet demands being placed on them. In the 1980's, the U.S. firm Lockheed began to study versions of installing the E-2C Hawkeye aircraft system radar in its own medium-size aircraft intended for other missions. In 1981 a model of the C-130 military transport aircraft (reduced 10 times), with the fairing of this radar antenna located on a shortened tail fin, underwent wind-tunnel testing. A version of the airborne early warning and control system was created in 1984 on a P-3 Orion land-based patrol aircraft with the dome of the AN/APS-125 radar, rotating together with the antenna, accommodated on a pedestal above the fuselage (similar to the E-2C and E-3). In 1985 this aircraft with dome, but without radar gear, was demonstrated at an aerospace exhibition in France. After unsuccessful tests of the radar early warning and control system on the Nimrod-AEW.3, Lockheed suggested installing its radar on a C-130, which would permit a 40 percent increase in payload weight and a 25 percent increase in volume of space for the operations team (compared with the Nimrod). In 1988 development was completed on the radar early warning and control system with AN/APS-125 radar for the P-3 AEW aircraft (Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced]), given the company designation of Sentinel. It was |
FBIS3-23540_17 | Wages, Social Protection of Civilian Defense Workers | of second mechanic is equivalent in pay to the position of senior captain's assistant. This was done not by lowering the pay grades for captains' assistants, but by raising the pay grades for the mechanics. The positions of other support ship crew members have been standardized. Substantial changes have been made in wages for divers. Instead of three specialization groups, divers have been assigned pay grades four through eight, with grade eight reserved solely for Defense Ministry divers. Additional pay for skill ratings have been maintained for them. For the first time, the question of wages for nonstaff divers on sea (roadstead) ships for time spent working underwater has been resolved. [Yurkin] There is one other category of Russian Armed Forces civilian personnel that we have not touched on--employees of district, fleet, and army staffs. Please explain how they will be paid. [Rudik] The UWS wage principles do not extend to state administrative agencies. Wage terms for these employees will be set forth in the Russian Federation Law "On State Service." In the meantime, the decree of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and Government "On Regulating Wages for Employees of Representative and Executive Government Agencies" is in effect, together with the Russian defense minister's Order No. 129 of March 8 of this year. The provisions of defense minister Order No. 130 apply fully to the civilian employees of military administrative agencies as concerns the procedure for calculating and confirming wage funds, providing percentage-based additional pay for uninterrupted service and regional coefficients, and providing material incentives to such employees; up to six monthly wage funds (based on a one-year period) may be used for these purposes. Now that I have described the special features of wages for various categories of civilian personnel of the Russian Armed Forces, I consider it necessary to call attention to the certification of directors, specialists, and technical execution personnel for the purpose of making sure that the employee is qualified for the position he holds and determining his wage grade in accordance with the UWS. This certification is quite different from previous ones and is designed to ensure effective measures to improve these employees' material situations and to reinforce their wages' incentive role, based on social justice principles. I want to emphasize that certification will be required for all directors, specialists, and technical execution personnel (including those working on a part-time basis) of military units, institutions, |
FBIS3-23561_22 | Forward 1.5. Preserving the Significance of Military Power as an Important Safeguard of National Interests Part 2 - The CIS--A New Form of Association of Sovereign Countries 2.2 Formation of Approaches to Collective Security and to Cooperation of CIS States in the Military Area | is characterized by opposite trends. A process of transition from an authoritarian political-economic system to a pluralistic system is occurring in Eastern Europe. Disintegration of the soviet-centrist system which existed in the region is breaking the stable structure of foreign-policy interaction of countries located here and giving it a transitional nature. This circumstance is superimposed on internal instability, which creates a field of potential conflict in the region. The developing situation increases the possibility of frictions and conflicts, especially among countries with national-territorial claims (Albania-Yugoslavia, Greece-Bulgaria, Hungary-Yugoslavia, Hungary-Romania, Hungary-Slovakia, Bulgaria-Turkey, Bulgaria-Romania). The course and outcome of the war in Yugoslavia are of special importance for prospects of Eastern Europe's development. The sequence of mutually generated national-state conflicts and attempts at recarving the European map strengthen fears of this region's "Balkanization." On the whole, the trend toward formation of national states in Eastern Europe was given powerful impetus and evidently will be determining for cultural-historical development for the foreseeable period. The processes occurring in Western Europe contribute to creating a region unified in cultural-historical terms and to identifying the population as inhabitants of a unified continent. Development of the European Economic Community became the chief factor which led to this process in the last decade. The Maastricht Agreements created a basis on which a unified European government can be formed and a common foreign and military policy developed. The presence of a European market will have a very strong effect on forms and methods of economic and other relationships of Western Europe with other regions of the world, since each country will be interested in the strong positions of other European countries. Western European independence in the future presumes creation of its own security system and realization of its own military policy. Four interrelated directions are being used in this connection: - bilateral cooperation; - use of European Community [EC] bodies to deepen military integration; - strengthening of WEU influence in development of foreign and military policy; - use of NATO as a ready-made command structure. The perceptible strengthening of ties between Paris and Bonn gives very strong impetus to Western European cooperation in the military area. The Franco-German initiative on deploying a joint corps in France based on the Franco-German brigade opens up the path to practical progress toward an independent European defense. In the future, confrontation may grow stronger between proponents of a European and an Atlantic security model. |
FBIS3-23561_37 | Forward 1.5. Preserving the Significance of Military Power as an Important Safeguard of National Interests Part 2 - The CIS--A New Form of Association of Sovereign Countries 2.2 Formation of Approaches to Collective Security and to Cooperation of CIS States in the Military Area | of communications and provision for on-line consumer access to needed information are beginning to have a substantial effect on policy formation. Governments cannot help but reckon with the fact that they are incapable of ensuring a state monopoly on information about the economy, society, resources and defense. One aspect of national sovereignty essentially is eroding, since it has become possible for consumers to obtain information regardless of state boundaries and in the shortest possible time periods. Another aspect of information support is automation of processes of intellectual activity and the significant increase in effectiveness of all kinds of management occurring on this basis. This typically does not require fundamental transformation of existing management structures. As a result of technical retooling of existing systems, they are drawn as it were into the makeup of structures of a higher level of management. As a result, with strong aspects of decentralized management systems preserved, the state obtains an opportunity to effectively influence the processes taking place from the standpoint of unified approaches and criteria. The role of technologies based on new materials and biotechnology is growing along with information technologies. Achievements in these areas are leading to revolutionary changes in the development of weapon systems, which in turn can fundamentally alter the nature of armed forces, methods of warfare, ways of ensuring security, as well as the place of states in the world hierarchy. Progress in information technologies ensures preferential development of sophisticated systems based on achievements of electronics. Outstripping progress in the direction of weapon development connected with command and control, reconnaissance, communications, and electronic warfare [EW] systems has been achieved as a result. They are being unified into integrated systems for various purposes which support continuous collection, processing and distribution of data among forces and assets at all levels right up to a theater of military operations and in near-real time. In addition, Persian Gulf war experience showed the importance of the direction of weapon development involving conventional precision weapon systems capable of confidently hitting targets at a great distance under all weather conditions and at any time of day in armed conflicts of varying levels in any region of the planet. A combination of these two directions opens up an opportunity for achieving a fundamentally new level of integration of means of warfare within the scope of global and regional multipurpose and specialized systems for conducting combat operations. Progress in |
FBIS3-23561_42 | Forward 1.5. Preserving the Significance of Military Power as an Important Safeguard of National Interests Part 2 - The CIS--A New Form of Association of Sovereign Countries 2.2 Formation of Approaches to Collective Security and to Cooperation of CIS States in the Military Area | line was drawn between a state of war and a state of peace. This was the so-called "total" approach to wars. The experience of the Korean War (1951-1953) and recognition of the fact that with opposing sides possessing nuclear weapons a war between the two blocs threatened mutual destruction led to an expansion of the indirect use of military force in forms of deterrence, pressure and coercion and to establishment of the idea of its measured direct use. Although military force continued to be perceived as one of the important components of a country's might, wars were divided into nuclear and conventional, and the former ceased to be interpreted as a normal form of attaining political objectives (although aberrations also were observed in this respect, especially in the period of the first Reagan administration). At the same time, conventional wars were viewed as a natural component of the political process. In accordance with the concept of "general war and limited wars" which predominated in that period, a general war no longer presumed the enemy's unconditional surrender, and inflicting that damage on the enemy which would deprive his political system of the ability to survive began to be viewed as a criterion of victory. A limited war presumed laying down a strict framework from the standpoint of political objectives, means used and spatial scope. Measured use of force proceeded from the assumption that there was no clear line between a state of war and a state of peace and that transitional stages were leveled. The beginning of formation of a new approach to wars and armed conflicts was marked by the circumstance that realization of the idea of "measured" use of military force, above all during the war in Southeast Asia (1964-1973), produced insignificant results. This served as a basis for the appearance and strengthening in the West of the thesis of the reduced role of military force in contemporary international relations. The conclusion was argued by two premises: First of all, about the unacceptability of using nuclear weapons as a means of achieving political objectives and, secondly, by automatic prolongation of the effect of the bipolar world's "rules of the game" to the period following the end of the "cold war." The contemporary development of events shows the inadequacy of these theses to realities of the international system that is forming. Results of numerous studies devoted to climatic and biological |
FBIS3-23561_77 | Forward 1.5. Preserving the Significance of Military Power as an Important Safeguard of National Interests Part 2 - The CIS--A New Form of Association of Sovereign Countries 2.2 Formation of Approaches to Collective Security and to Cooperation of CIS States in the Military Area | reform was dictated above all because maintaining an army of four million did not equate to conditions of the end of the "cold war." Tasks of reducing the numerical strength of armed forces and arms, social protection of servicemen, professionalization of the army and its structure, and other tasks shifted to a practical plane. A reduction in the armed forces of a half-million persons was accomplished within the channel of realization of these tasks; the structure of armed forces large strategic ground formations was rationally reorganized in a defensive spirit with an unprecedentedly abrupt reduction in the proportion of tanks by 20-40 percent; a defensive grouping began to be established within USSR borders with the withdrawal of all military contingents from abroad; intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles were mutually eliminated with the United States; treaties were concluded on strategic offensive arms reduction (START) and on conventional armed forces in Europe; and extensive work was done on real confidence-building measures. The army reform process accelerated sharply after August 1991. The party was eliminated from the armed forces and the system of military-political bodies was abolished. The previous armed forces structure conformed less and less to the new political situation with the growth of disintegrative processes which encompassed the defense sphere as well. At the same time, the state and armed forces leadership continued to proceed from the assumption that a unified economic space had to be ensured by a unified defensive space and unified armed forces. The importance of armed forces unity also was dictated by international aspects. Noncompliance with the USSR's treaties with other states and a change in the regime of involvement in multilateral agreements could negatively affect the international security system. Much spoke in favor of that choice. The USSR Armed Forces were built as unified armed forces with a rigidly centralized command and control and a unified system of support and military infrastructure. They were stationed throughout USSR territory, but the most sizeable groupings were concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe and in the western and eastern parts of the country. Strategic nuclear forces were stationed in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Army and Air Force were stationed in all republics, and very unevenly, since attack groupings had been established on the western axis. The uneven stationing of USSR Armed Forces on the territory of republics in 1991 is evident from Table 2. Table 2 - Stationing |
FBIS3-23562_2 | Funding of Military Research and Development | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Management and support |7.5($2.9 billion) | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Modernization of systems that are in |29.4($11.4 billion) | |the inventory | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |Note: There are no trends toward the reduction of appropriations. On the con-| |trary, the ratio of this item in the U.S. DoD budget is increasing up to 15.4| || ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is not unlike an axiom. It is known and followed throughout the world. By way of illustration, during the last 35 years, the United States has been steadily allocating from 35-45% of the resources allocated for all military R&D for "basic research" and facilities. And even right now, when military expenditures are being substantially reduced and the American organs of state rule are accomplishing the task of changing the strategy of development of the national defense technological and industrial base, the overall principle of allocating resources remains unchanged. A preference is being assigned to the future -- to the development of defense technologies and next generation equipment. In Russia, reduction of defense appropriations began in 1988. Is it not paradoxical, with a reduction of budget expenditures for science? And first of all, for basic and exploratory research and for development of facilities. These expenditures were reduced by a factor of 2.5 in 1992 alone. The degradation of the research process that supports the development of the scientific-technical reserve makes an even bigger impression in a percentage ratio, from 10% in 1989 to 0.5% in 1993. This situation will result in entirely predictable consequences: In the near future, we will not be able to develop future weapons systems. We will not be able to, unless the state -- and today Russian science has no other customer or other source of financing, besides the state budget -- sends the required amount of resources for the conduct of basic and exploratory scientific research work, the development of high technologies and dual-use technologies, and the development of the scientific-technical reserve. The question arises: What figure is being designated as the "required amount of resources"? We have already explained that the Americans spend up to 45% of R&D money. Experts, specifically, Goskomoboronprom [State Committee for the Defense Industry] Main Administration for Scientific-Technical and Conversion Programs Deputy Chief Vladislav Fadeyev, assert that our expenditures should not be lower than 30%. All the more so right now when the budget has not been executed for three years (1991-1993) and we have significantly |
FBIS3-23567_1 | Strategic Missile Launch Postures Examined | relations between Russia and the United States cannot in an instant transfer relations between the two countries to a fundamentally new level. This will take time. The effective model of the composition, structure, and functioning of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, therefore, will be constructed on the basis of a policy of deterrence of the United States. We would note that, as this condition is fulfilled, any other potential enemy is deterred also. Nuclear weapons are not regarded as weapons of war here, and their sole rational function is deterrence. The future composition and structure of Russia's strategic nuclear forces will be determined by several basic factors: the present composition of the nuclear forces; the status of the nuclear arsenals of other states; the limitations imposed on the strategic nuclear forces by the Russian-American agreements; states' economic possibilities; strategic concepts in respect to the use of strategic nuclear forces. As we all know, the operational use of strategic nuclear forces is possible by of the delivery of: - a first or preemptive strike; - a launch on warning [otvetno-vstrechnyy udar]; - a launch under attack [otvetnyy udar]. During the Cold War period the main form of operational use of strategic nuclear forces in the event of a conflict was considered the delivery against the aggressor of a launch-on-warning strike, that is, a firing of missiles prior to the moment of impact of enemy warheads on the territory of the USSR. A particular role was performed here by the high operational readiness of the strategic nuclear forces and their flexibility [operativnost] and the dependability of the system of operational command and control and communications and also the efficiency and dependability of the missile-attack warning system. The particular relevance of this form of combat operations for the Soviet strategic nuclear forces was determined by the great relative significance of ground-based ICBM's and their relatively low survivability in the event of a nuclear attack against them. At the same time, on the other hand, this concept increased the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict arising, primarily as a consequence of the less-than-absolute dependability of the warning systems. The strict time limit at the disposal of our country's leadership in the event of a signal having been received from a missile-attack warning system (10-12 minutes in the case of an attack by submarine-launched ballistic missiles--SLBM's) creates a difficult stress situation. A study of various crisis |
FBIS3-23597_0 | Conversion and National Security | Language: Russian Article Type:CSO [Article by Colonel A. Piskunov, candidate of economic sciences, senior instructor, Frunze Military Academy, under rubric "Military Economics"] [Text] The cessation of global confrontation of the two superpowers is noteworthy in the fact that assurance of national security today is linked to a large extent with resolution not so much of military as of economic problems. The concept of economic security has appeared in this connection; its content encompasses a wide spectrum of purely economic phenomena affecting survivability, strengthening of society's social and political stability, and strengthening of the state's international positions. Military, technological, raw material, ecologic and sociopolitical components of Russia's security largely form under the influence of government economic policy and of processes occurring in the national economy (see the functional diagram of conversion). Therefore it is quite an obvious fact that conversion also may substantially affect both national security as a whole as well as its components. The problem is to ensure that transformations in the defense sector contribute most effectively to realization of Russian Federation national-state interests. Functional Diagram of Conversion It may appear that a reduction in military production that is forced (not so much politically as economically) will entail an inevitable weakening of national military might, but let us recall that it was this might that for decades undermined the foundations of the civilian economy, which was not only administrative-bureaucratic, but also simply poorly developed and technologically backward. Under these conditions a very important requirement of economic security is that reduced military production volumes be compensated through modernization and growth of the civilian sector of the economy by concentrating the "conversion potential" in those sectors of the national economy which set the tone for S&T progress and determine prospects for society's industrial and social development. Let us recall that we began conversion with neither a serious theoretical foundation nor substantiated plans and programs. This determined the complexity of its practical implementation. In essence, our conversion strides ahead of theory with but one purpose--to close gaping breaches in the economy as quickly as possible and at any cost. But we already are seeing a transition from general euphoria concerning the socioeconomic capacities of conversion to more weighed assessments of the costs of its implementation, its speed and its depth. Calculations show that it is implausible to expect a serious return in the next 2-3 years. Costs of renovating and changing the |
FBIS3-23603_10 | Kokoshin: Preparing for Local Wars, Terrorism | state command and control entities. By virtue of this, EW equipment development programs become even more important, both for suppressing enemy electronics and weapons and for protecting our own weapon systems and data collection and transmission systems. Today supremacy of the air waves is at the very least equivalent to the factor of air supremacy in wars of the middle of the century, and in many cases today EW is no longer a secondary means. A new concept, the electronic-fire strike, has appeared. Modern EW assets are capable not only of "blinding" the enemy for a certain time interval, but also putting some of the most important elements of his systems completely out of commission. [SEGODNYA] What are the main directions in development of strategic nuclear forces? [Kokoshin] This is the topic of a special conversation requiring its own place in print and time to cover all problems caused by the present geopolitical situation. But I will answer briefly that in deployment of strategic nuclear deterrence forces we are placing more and more emphasis on upgrading the battle management system with respect to improving its reliability, and the same thing goes for the missile attack warning system. [SEGODNYA] To what extent are the "Basic Directions" approved on 19 January supported by budget financing? [Kokoshin] This is a tough question. Prices on raw materials, equipment and basic supplies are continuously rising in the country, transportation costs are increasing, and expenditures for communications services, for paying the labor force, and so on are growing. As a result, the cost of fulfilling any kind of program is almost impossible to plan precisely. Many economists assumed the situation would stabilize on reaching the level of world prices, but in many instances now our copper, aluminum and silicon, for example, are being sold at a price considerably above the world price. For the second year the Ministry of Defense has not been financed as befitting a major state client of "goods and services" making up the basis of effectiveness and efficiency of any country's foreign and defense policy. And it is not just a matter of volumes, but also of the financing mechanism. In 1993 the Ministry of Finance allocated funds to us 56 times, while in previous years they would be allocated once every two months and in fully specific amounts. Therefore, we are forced to plan different scenarios for fulfilling defense programs in |
FBIS3-23604_4 | Weapons Loss Due to Lack of Discipline, Weak Security | criminals and servicemen. Of those persons convicted of this, about 10 percent are officers, of which one out of two commits the gross violation of his service duty for personal gain. Alas! A flawed passion destroys the conscience and clouds the mind even in the case of officials of fairly high rank, those whose duty it is to personally organize the storage and security of weapons. Major I. Shchegolev, chief of the RAV service of a Far Eastern Military District regiment, was charged with his personally committing the theft and sale of 256 PM pistols. To date, 86 pieces are still missing. And, who knows, it may be that some of the weapons passed to the outside world by the major may already have taken their bloody toll. One can spend much time being disturbed over the moral deficiency of some servicemen and make an appeal for more thorough cadre and educational work in units, but I nonetheless was pleased that at the assemblies this was not chosen as the plan of attack, with the recommendations instead favoring the much more reasonable approach of casting doubts on the usefulness of exhorting adults of not doing naughty things. Persons afflicted with moral flaws, as we all know, are always considerably fewer in number compared to normal people. And so, the majority are able to simply adhere to principles which serve as substantial blocks to the manifestation of the worst of human characteristics. In the Army, this kind of principle is considered to be that which is required by the regulations. It is precisely in this area that we have prospects for resolving many problems presently plaguing us. For in the last few years, unfortunately, in many military units the requirements as set down in the regulations and in other normative documents have been relegated to the category of some kind of relative or highly conditional rules. They are desireable of execution, but far from mandatory, so to speak. How and why this phenomenon has become widespread is a topic of another and more detailed discussion. I would now like to cite the words spoken by General Bogdanchikov relative to the situation existing among troops in the aspect of its generating contempt for regulations. "I find it necessary to state," said Valentin Alekseyevich, "that, in principle, it has become pointless in the case of a number of military units to speak of |
FBIS3-23608_6 | Legal Status of Forces Deployed in Near Abroad | forth positions on social and material guarantees for the service personnel and the members of their families taking into account the specific nature of the places where they are deployed. For it is no secret that with the introduction of national currencies the living standard of our military people in service in the armed forces of former Soviet republics declined dramatically, although there are corresponding bilateral agreements in this respect. It is therefore expedient to work out a mechanism for their realization and to provide for sanctions in the event that the agreements are not fulfilled. In the preparation of documents of this kind, it is desirable to appeal to the experience of foreign armies. Nor should one ignore the experience in the negotiations on the conditions for the stay and withdrawal of Soviet forces from the countries of Eastern Europe, putting into effect formulas that have already been developed. In foreign circles, the motives for the preservation of our military presence in the states of the CIS are perceived in different ways. Apparently, the politicians and analysts there do not have a clear notion of the special role of the Russian Army, whereas some are simply suspicious of Moscow's noble intentions to establish conditions of stability along the entire perimeter of the Russian borders. It is important to realize that these bases do not threaten anyone. They are called upon to protect the interests of the contracting states and peacemaking actions. There is therefore scarcely any need to attribute nonexisting "imperial ambitions" to Russia in the geopolitical territory of the former USSR. The establishment of Russian military bases fits very well into the framework of the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS as well as other bilateral agreements. Today it is merely a matter of the implementation of the corresponding positions. The legal basis for the deployment of Russian forces abroad is the Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense," which permits the stationing of troops and naval forces beyond its borders with the consent of parliament. In addition, a fundamental principle of their basing is the mutual interest of the sides, which does not contradict Article 51 of the UN Charter providing for the right of a state to individual or collective self-defense. The experience of postwar Europe shows that this can have a stabilizing influence on the situation in some country or other and in the region. |
FBIS3-23610_3 | Specifications of Su-33 Fighter | an aerial refueling system. The wing, tail plane panels, and tail and nose fairings are folded upward to decrease the aircraft's dimensions in the parking area. The fighter aircraft has a very high thrust-to-weight ratio -- greater than one. Two AL-31F bypass turbojet engines that were developed under the leadership of A.M. Lyulka have been installed on it. Aircraft take-off from the ship's deck is carried out using a ski jump from one of three positions equipped with gas-deflecting shields and special restraining devices which are retracted after the engine reaches the ChR mode (emergency power mode). Even from the shortest distance, a length of 105 meters, the fighter aircraft easily takes-off with a full fuel load and a full weapons load. There are glidepath beacons, a radar landing system, and also an optical landing system installed on the ship to support landing on a ship which can be accomplished both in the automatic, directed, or manual modes. The fighter aircraft descends along a very steep glidepath and carries out a landing without the traditional leveling off. After touching the ship's deck, the arresting hook engages one of the arresting gears, which ensures rapid braking and stops the aircraft. A special emergency barrier can be utilized in non-standard situations. The aircraft's landing gear has been reinforced as a result of the fact that take-off and landing are carried out at adequately high G-loads. In the event the arresting hook does not engage the arresting gear, the aircraft has the capability to safely circle around a second time. The Su-33 is designed to defend Naval ships from air attack weapons --aircraft and helicopters, cruise missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, and also to destroy ground-based and surface targets and to support amphibious assault landings. The weapons control system consists of a powerful pulse-Doppler radar that is capable of carrying out search while tracking targets in the background of the earth and water surface and an optical-electronic radar with a helmet-mounted target designation system. At the present time, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently reported, the mastery of the Su-33 is being conducted at an accelerated rate by Northern Fleet Aviation personnel. Not only test pilots but also line pilots are already successfully carrying out landings on the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov Heavy Aircraft-Carrying Cruiser. Soon, long ocean cruises await the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser and, therefore, the Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft. |
FBIS3-23613_8 | `Self-Service' Maintenance Guarantee for Submarines | that situation... That is why people are increasingly leaving the navy. "We had Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Matrosov -- commander of the mine-torpedo department -- on our submarine. A hard to find kind of specialist. And he served well and he showed great promise but, having written his request for release, he departed. Acoustic Team Commander Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Vasilevich is also planning to leave for the civilian sector. You could say he is going nowhere, he doesn't have any rear services support but even that, in his opinion, is better than continuing to serve. Right now it is not prestigious to be a submariner and the material position obviously does not correspond to the labor spent and to those dangers and deprivations that seamen experience. It's not surprising that, at the slightest opportunity, officers and warrant officers are leaving the navy for business. Yes, that's what I'm saying! My son finished school but he doesn't want to hear about any advantage whatsoever about becoming a submariner and I myself do not wish his fate to repeat mine with the possibility of finding himself left with nothing..." Having been silent for a while, Sergey Anatolyevich considered it necessary to add: "But then again, no matter how much we in the crew argue or are indignant, or how much we discuss, when the ship puts to sea -- everything else becomes secondary. For the time being, duty and the Fatherland is not an empty sound for people. The question is -- for how long? The social experience of the older generations is not passing without a trace and if today much is being maintained in the old mode, it's hard to say what will happen tomorrow..." The cause of that concern is understandable; already right now the cadre shortage is tenaciously grasping the throat. The loss of the Baku and Sevastopol naval schools hit the Russian submarine fleet especially hard. The shortage of people naturally is reflected in the combat readiness of ships; before putting out to sea, they have to be brought up to full strength with the required specialists, having immediately activated several crews. The number of temporary duty personnel sometimes reaches one fourth of the assigned strength! And, in violation of the requirements of guiding documents, replacements and transfers are being conducted until the very last moment. Commenting on the situation, Nuclear Submarine Task Force Commander Vice-Admiral A. Shevchenko stated |
FBIS3-23613_13 | `Self-Service' Maintenance Guarantee for Submarines | More precisely, there aren't resources for its full-fledged maintenance. Maybe the seamen could also help but they themselves, as they say, have deficiency after deficiency. What resources can reach the village right now, say, if we can't always manage to paint the submarines? Degrading poverty, like rust, is eating away all of the pores of the navy organism. It would seem that the nuclear submarines that are at the piers would be provided with the complete standard of high pressure air, feed water, steam and electricity... That is in theory. In fact, the submariners frequently have to count on only their own resources, more precisely, on the ship's service life. Mechanisms are wearing out much earlier than they should and numerous breakdowns are becoming inevitable. "There are submarines," says Nuclear Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank M. Ivanisov, "that have fired `bubbles' for an entire year due to the shortage of practice torpedoes. Torpedo training schools and the struggles for survival of the ship are being lost..." "Recently, the intensity of cruises, including combat service, has been reduced by a factor of 2-2.5," says another Nuclear Submarine Commander Captain 1st Rank O. Gorelov. "The cruise time per year for any crews does not exceed 2-3 weeks. And actual sea cruises are the primary type of training for us." "Today we are striving to resolve on shore part of the problems associated with the limited number of times ships put to sea -- by training crews in simulators. But we need to improve the MTB [logistic and technical support facilities]; that is, to once again invest resources to do that," Northern Fleet Headquarters Department Chief Captain 1st Rank M. Kolbunov comments on the situation. "But where do we get the resources? There is primarily obsolete equipment at the task forces' training centers and we can't even talk about computers. And in order to acquire them -- you yourself can imagine what kind of resources we need to invest. We don't have money for ordinary light bulbs. Previously there was a powerful training center in Estonia's Paldiski where crews underwent between-cruise training twice a year. Now the center is not functioning. They plan to withdraw all of its equipment which is very complicated and terribly expensive." Currently all the problems of basic support of the navy's vital activities have deteriorated to the maximum extent possible. Say, we need to reload torpedoes but, as |
FBIS3-23614_4 | Naval Press Center Statement on Nuclear Dumping | products of nuclear detonations. An expeditionary study of waste dumping areas in the Karsk Sea was conducted on the "Kovrayskiy" OIS [Experimental Research Ship] to assess the impact of radioactive wastes on the naval environment during the period from 16 August through 10 September 1993. The expedition's work was conducted by experts of Russian Federation profile scientific-research institutes ("Radiyevyy Institute" NPO and "Kurchatovskiy Institute" RNTs) and of a number of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense institutions. At the present time, the initial processing of samples is being conducted and an express-report has been prepared based upon the expedition's results. The amount of research accomplished permits us to arrive at the conclusion that the radioecological situation in the areas studied is without anomalies and can be characterized as normal. There have been no cases detected of radionuclides leaking into the environment from dumped containers. The yield of gamma radiation doses on the surface of the water area, on land surrounding the bays and on the ground does not exceed background levels and is 4-12 microroentgens per hour. Concentrations of Cesium-137 in seawater do not exceed the sensitivity of instrument measurement methods (2x10[.sup]-12[/] Curies per liter). An international expedition that operated on the "Akademik Mstislav Keldysh" NIS [Scientific Research Ship] obtained similar results. Final data on the content of radionuclides in seawater, algae, ground and sea organisms will be reported after radiochemical and spectrometric research has been conducted in the laboratories of the institutes that participated in the expeditionary research. Two international expeditions (Russian-Norwegian -- on the "Viktor Buynitskiy" NIS and on the Jigofs [Transliterated] project -- on the "Dmitriy Mendeleyev" NIS) are continuing the study of the radioecological situation in the Northern Seas. Expedition work will be concluded at the end of October 1993. The final results of the radioecological research can be obtained after processing, under laboratory conditions, of the samples of the environment that were taken and also after the comparison, summarization and analysis of the data obtained during the course of the study of maritime areas which will require a certain amount of time. It seems to be advisable to note that this problem, being universal, can be resolved only at the state level within the framework of the realization of a purposeful Russian Federation State Program for dealing with radioactive wastes and spent nuclear materials and for writing them off and dumping them. COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993. |
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