prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | true | ## Low: The `latestHistoryArr` Storage Array Is Ever Growing
### Description
The `latestHistoryArr` storage array is intended to only record the last `LATEST_HISTORY_LENGTH` yeets, see code below:
```solidity
if (latestHistoryArr.length >= LATEST_HISTORY_LENGTH) {
delete latestHistoryArr[0];
}
latestHistoryArr.pus... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Use `msg.sender` when calling `safeTransfer` in `RequestsManager::cancelMint, cancelBurn`
### Description
`RequestsManager::cancelMint` first enforces that `request.provider == msg.sender`:
```solidity
_assertAddress(request.provider, msg.sender);
```
Hence it can directly use `msg.sender` instead of `req... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Block overhead limits may be exceeded
### Description
In `_getOverheadForTransaction` some overhead values can go over their maximum values if the transaction data or the public data posted (e.g., state changes) are large:
* [`_encodingLength`](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-2-contracts/blob/3f345c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Grammatical errors in code and comments
### Description
Many comments are poorly written, with some containing grammatical or typing errors (e.g. [“*desgined*”](https://github.com/OpenBazaar/smart-contracts/blob/c4f02cdd41cb85d28bba637a01f20a8ee8bb04bd/contracts/escrow/Escrow_v1_0.sol#L11), [“*transaction does... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Update State After Admin Action | false | false | ## Severity: Medium Risk
## Context
`withdrawal-manager::WithdrawalManager.sol#L123`
## Description
The initial cycle time will be wrong if there's already an upcoming config change that changes the cycle duration.
### Example
```plaintext
currentCycleId: 100
config[0] = currentConfig = {initialCycleId: 1, cycleDura... | Spearbit | 5 | Maple Finance |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Withdrawal flow of users will get broken if their position 's CallbackParams are set as null
### Description
In case a user creates a position in Core with non-null `CallbackParams` and then sets those parameters to a null value, their withdraw transaction cannot be processed. The opposite situation is also pos... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Mismatched Agent Distribution Amounts
### Description
**Update**
The client acknowledged the issue and provided the following explanation:
> In this process: gpu_fee and platform_fee represent the value of NMT that needs to be distributed to GPU providers and the platform, respectively, measured in USDC. Thes... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Missing `offset` check will cause integer overflow violating ELF specification
### Description
There is an integer overflow in offset calculation in `Elf::new()` function.
```rust
for j in 0..len {
let offset = (offset + i + j) as usize; // integer overflow
let byte = source_code
.get(offset)
.ok_... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Use assembly in place of abi.decode to extract calldata values more efficiently
### Description
Instead of using abi.decode, we can use assembly to decode our desired calldata values directly. This will allow us to avoid decoding calldata values that we will not use.
### Please note these instances were not i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: All CASH tokens approved to Augur can be emptied
### Description
A [`MarketFactory`](https://github.com/AugurProject/augur/blob/9a33c3269e812d0cb66d49b61a72db58e32e4749/packages/augur-core/source/contracts/factories/MarketFactory.sol) has a [`createMarket`](https://github.com/AugurProject/augur/blob/9a33c3269... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `_harvestManagementFee` does not consider claimable fallback shares
### Description
When calculating `currentTotalSupply` within `_harvestManagementFee`, the current balance and pending redeem requests of the `feeCollector` are excluded. However, the calculation does not account for the claimable fallback shar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Add a timelock to functions that set key variables
### Description
Functions like `setLeveragePercent` and `setLiquidationThresholdPercent` for both [`IsolatedMarginTrading`](https://github.com/code-423n4/marginswap/blob/main/contracts/IsolatedMarginTrading.sol) and [`CrossMarginTrading`](https://github.com... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | false | ## High: Data corruption in NFTFloorOracle; Denial of Service
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-paraspace/blob/main/paraspace-core/contracts/misc/NFTFloorOracle.sol#L335
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
During `_removeFeeder` operation in `NFTFloorOracle` contract, the feeder... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: Wormhole Fee Calculation Discrepancy
### Description
## Function Documentation
_sendTokenBridgeMessageNative performs cross-chain communication, sending a TokenBridge message with the given payload and amount in native tokens.
## Code Snippet
As shown in the code above, the function calculates the message ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: The interest oracle’s money market is not validated upon DInterest initialization
### Description
A `DInterest` contract must have the same money market as its interest oracle. The function that sets the interest oracle checks this invariant (Figure 1.1).
```solidity
function setInterestOracle(address newV... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: `getPositionRisk()` will return a wrong value of risk
### Description
In order to interact with SPELL the users need to `lend()` some collateral which is known as **Isolated Collateral** and the SoftVault will deposit them into Compound protocol to generate some lending interest (to earn passive yield)
###... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: `initialCollateralDeltaAmount` is incorrectly interpreted as a USD value when calculating estimated remaining collateral
### Description
Decrease orders have checks to ensure that if collateral is withdrawn, that there is enough left that the liquidation checks will still pass. The code that calculates the re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: TribalChief - Setting the totalAllocPoint to zero shouldn’t be allowed
### Description
`TribalChief.updatePool` will revert in the case `totalAllocPoint = 0`, which will essentially cause users' funds and rewards to be locked.
### Recommendation
`TribalChief.add` and `TribalChief.set` should assert that `t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Potential Data Corruption in Trie Structure
### Description
The issue is identified within the[`removeOrderFromNonRightmostNodeDescendants`](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/09b6188e028650b9c1758010846080c5f8c80f8e/src/TrieLib.sol#L780-L795) function of the `Trie` contract.
There is a cr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [14] Some token IDs can not be validated due to default riskPartner being zero
### Description
*Note: At the judge’s request [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-panoptic-findings/issues/481#issuecomment-1875219281), this downgraded issue from the same warden has been included in this report for comple... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: vestedzerolend whitelist logic is incorrectly implemented
### Description
The whitelist and blacklist logic is implemented inside the `_afterTokenTransfer` function that is called when tokens are minted, burned, or transferred from an account to another:
```solidity
function _afterTokenTransfer(
address ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: A Transaction May Not Distribute All Funds
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `b9979de6ba2d63e833d96b153477580b1c6d4e6f`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Changed the balancing inequality to the equality
**File(s) affected:**`Hinkal.sol`
**Descriptio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: LauncherPlugin.enablePool allows enabling pools without an initialized gauge
### Description
The Voter contract allows the creation of gauges for provided pools by calling each of the gauge creation functions. However, `LauncherPlugin.enablePool` does not check that the provided pool has a gauge created for it... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: ` validateCallback()` is vulnerable to a birthday attack
### Description
### Preface
This is likely to be a contentious issue, so the reviewer will deviate from the usual submission template to make a clear case for this issue.
The [birthday paradox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_problem) refers ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Double Verification For Admin Change
### Description
## Changing Global Configuration Admin Authority
The current process to change the global configuration admin authority is a simple single-step process;
there is no confirmation step. Once the transaction is submitted, the admin authority change is irreve... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | true | ## Low: Allocator can drain the MetaMorpho vault if a future IRM queries token balance
### Description
The Allocator role in the MetaMorpho vault is responsible for distributing the portfolio and managing the risks of the vault. The Allocator cannot supply the assets to an unauthorized market (market with `supplyCap =... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: potCreator can block liquidity rotation
### Description
Only `potCreator` can call `rotateLiquidity()`. If `potCreator` for any reason doesn't call this function, funds are permanently locked. The only way to withdraw it would be to use the merkle tree, which we have recommended to change to so that it can't ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Closing L2 gateways and misconfigurations can lead to L2 tokens being unbacked
### Description
## L2TokenGateway Configuration Issues
**Context:** L2TokenGateway.sol#L139
**Description:** There are several ways to configure the L1 and L2 gateway `l1ToL2Token` mappings that end up with the L2 tokens becoming u... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Verification for Chapter Creation
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**:
The createAirdropProject function does not verify whether chapters are successfully created.
**Scenario**: If the `createChapter` function in the `AirdropZap` contract fails, it cou... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | initialization | false | false | ## Gas: optimization in accounting variables
### Description
Some state variables are being initialized to zero even though the default value of their data types is zero. They are `periodFinish` and `rewardRate`. This costs additional gas, but this step is not required.
### Recommendation
Consider removing the value ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Return values of `approve()` not checked
### Description
Not all `IERC20` implementations `revert()` when there's a failure in `approve()`. The function signature has a `boolean` return value and they indicate errors that way instead. By not checking the return value, operations that should have marked as fail... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: The oracle implementation may return stale prices
### Description
Users who want to utilize the `bridgeOutRunes()` function in the `pontis-bridge-v1.sol` contract, have to pay fees in the native token. First the `fetchPrices()` function is called which returns the `runePrice` and `nativePrice`. Both of those p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Use of Non-Standard ERC-677 Token Interface
### Description
### Finding Description and Impact
The protocol implements the ERC-677 token standard, which is not an officially finalized ERC standard. This introduces several risks:
1. The standard could change or be deprecated since it’s not finalized
2. Limite... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: Gamer rewards are reduced due to fund pulls before accrual of rewards
### Description
During rebalancing, funds can be pulled from yield generating protocols before rewards (reward per DERBY token) were calculated. Gamers may receive reduced rewards even though the allocated funds remained in protocols over... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Missing gas cost estimation in `swap-router` PBC
### Description
In the `swap-router` PBC the code estimation logic is commented-out, as follows:
```
// const INTERNAL_GAS_COST_APPROVE_CALLBACK: GasCost = 100;
// const INTERNAL_GAS_COST_EXECUTE_SWAP_CALLBACK: GasCost = 450000;
// const INTERNAL_GAS_COST_CANCE... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: `reduce_position` doesn’t update margin mapping correctly
### Description
`reduce_position` function decrease the margin amount of the position but doesn't add it back to the user's margin mapping, making it impossible to withdraw the margin.
### Impact
Users will lose their margin tokens.
### Recommendatio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Should ensure loan collateral is not immediately seizable
### Description
For the Oracle version there are checks to make sure that the current valuation is above the amount loaned. There should be a similar check that the loan duration is not zero. Zero is not useful for flash loans because of the origination... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | access-control | true | true | ## Context
(No context files were provided by the reviewer)
## Summary
The `VaultFactory::createVault` function is missing access controls, allowing anyone to call it. This vulnerability can be abused to DDoS and/or hijack legitimate vault creation attempts.
## Finding Description
In the `VaultFactory::createVault` f... | Cantina | 5 | Term Structure |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Missing payable
### Description
_Submitted by robee_
The following functions are not payable but uses msg.value - therefore the function must be payable.
This can lead to undesired behavior.
LPool.sol, addReserves should be payable since using msg.value
**[ColaM12 (OpenLeverage) confirmed and resolved]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Convenience contract fails to function if asset or collateral is an ERC20 token with fees
### Description
_Submitted by Ruhum_
There are ERC20 tokens that collect fees with each transfer. If the asset or collateral used in a pair is of that type, the Convenience contract fails to function. It always sends ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | flash-loan | true | true | ## Low: Flash loans can be taken for free
### Description
Unlike other AMM implementations, `SolidlyV2Pair` calculates fees independently for each underlying pool token. Showing just the `amount0Out` calculation:
```solidity
if (amount0Out > 0) {
uint256 amount1In = balance1 - (_reserve1 - amount1Out);
uint256... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Unnecessary Calculation For 18-Decimal Tokens In `_convertToE18()`
### Description
Both `MidasIssuanceVaultAdapter._convertToE18()` and `MidasRedemptionVaultAdapter._convertToE18()` perform unnecessary multiplication and division operations when the token already has 18 decimals. For tokens that use 18 decimal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [21] Remove redundant checks when withdrawing a position
### Description
Take a look at the position withdrawal logic [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-11-mantra-dex/blob/26714ea59dab7ecfafca9db1138d60adcf513588/contracts/farm-manager/src/position/commands.rs# L414-L421):
The `is_expired` function in... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Strategy can report loss and gain at the same time
### Description
For now strategy can [report](https://github.com/iearn-finance/yearn-vaults/blob/054034304c7912d227d460feadc23177103de0b9/contracts/Vault.vy#L1246) loss and gain at the same time. It's not a problem according to the code logic but it's little b... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Facilitators can borrow assets and never repay it back
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
It is mentioned in the documentation that a `Facilitator` has the capability to borrow assets from the `vault`. However, upon reviewing the `AdvancedOrderEngine` smart contract... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | true | ## Low: Forced doubling of minimum tick spacing
### Description
Currently, the maximum number of price limits usable is **872** (type(uint120).max / log(1.1)). The relative tick spacing limit can be exploited to force ticks to be approximately 2x spaced apart instead.
For instance, take the price limit of **1 ETH**.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: Cross chain repayment updates wrong borrow balance
### Description
The function `CoreRouter::repayBorrowInternal()` only updates user's `borrowBalance` (which is the borrow balance same-chain). This can cause cross chain repayment to update wrong borrow balance
### Impact
- Potential unable to repay cross ch... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | true | false | ## High: An attacker, could make a malicious smart contract that is going to borrow money from the flash loan function, and in the flashCallback function that he implements, he could call the send function from the DeBridgeGate contract, adding the balance back in the contract but also emitting a Send event, that will ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Variables names too similar.
### Description
**Description**
BlockBank.sol, line 10
Constant TOTAL_SUPPLY is too similar to BEP20._totalSupply and may lead to
misunderstanding during development.
**Recommendation**:
Consider using a different name, i.e SUPPLY_CAP. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Oracle Reporting Delays Can Unfairly Impact Less Sophisticated Users
### Description
The LidoOracle contract is responsible for reporting the state of Eth2 to the Lido system, and directly controls the amount of stETH in circulation. Because the LidoOracle can only report once per frame (day by default), there... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Some wei of LP fees may not be distributed due to precision loss
### Description
The function `distributeLpFeesToLps()` distributes LP fees to LPs by calculating `lpFeesShare` for each LP. However, calculating `lpFeesShare` may result in a minor precision loss, and as a result, some minor portion of `lpFeesTot... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: RDNT Bridge Fee Is Being Overcharged
### Description
The new Radiant OFT v2 token allows cross-chain [transfers](https://github.com/radiant-capital/v2-core/blob/e8f21f103e17736907b62809d1ad902febc53714/contracts/radiant/token/RadiantOFT.sol#L109-L128) via LayerZero. Such a transfer involves two types of fees: ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: Denial of Service via Mint Limit Exhaustion
### Description
## Token Swap Vulnerability
`claim_native` and `return_native` in bridge allow users to swap wrapped tokens (WT) for native tokens and vice versa. However, an attacker can repeatedly cycle a small token amount between minting (`claim_native`) and ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: PROPOSALS WITH IDENTICAL TRANSACTIONS ARE ALLOWED
### Description
Proposals that contain identical transactions (`target`, `value`, `signature`, `data` values) can be proposed. The **GovHub** contract allow duplicate transactions.
Code Location
-------------
[GovHub.sol#L97](https://github.com/coredao-org/co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Redundant Import of SafeERC20 and IERC20 in ATokenWrapper Contract
### Description
The `ATokenWrapper` contract includes an import statement for `@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol`, in addition to importing `@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol`. Upon review of the contract's fu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Did Not Approve To Zero First Causing Certain Token Transfer To Fail
### Description
_Submitted by xiaoming90, also found by 0xNineDec, hyh, Ruhum, and slywaters_
[BridgeFacet.sol#L984](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-06-connext/blob/4dd6149748b635f95460d4c3924c7e3fb6716967/contracts/contracts/core/conn... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Emiting `CredibleAccountModule_InvoiceManagerUpdated` Event When Calling `configure()` Function in `CredibleAccountModule`
### Description
When changing the `invoiceManager`, we emit an event that the address of the invoice manager has been changed. This is done when changing it via the `CredibleAccoun... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: ETH CAN GET STUCK IN THE CONTRACT
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The contract implements a receive() function. The purpose of this receive function is to receive the ETH as a result of a withdraw() from its wrapped version, they confirm it in the NatSpec commen... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Missing Input Validation
### Description
**Update**
Addressed in: `ecd9512a6864881ea246eed6514e21065bd262a6` and `25774e72a8e802b0e1e65d75aeb192141bbffec7`. The client provided the following explanation:
> _Added new validations for only parameters that have a risk of breaking protocol._
**File(s) affected:*... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Allowing the Protocol Admins to Pause Liquidation Operations Can Lead to Bad Debt
### Description
**Update**
The client provided the following explanation:
> not a concern
**File(s) affected:**`lending_core/sources/lending.move`, `isolated_lending/sources/isolated_lending.move`
**Description:** The protocol... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Concern on Withdrawal
### Description
**Update**
The team mitigates the issue by adding a limit `MAX_WITHDRAWALS_PER_PERIOD` to the withdrawal. For each epoch, one cannot withdraw more than the limit. This mitigation solves another exploit scenario brought by the DEX Labs team (described below). Note that the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Admin Cannot Pause Vault Operations to Mitigate Protocol Risk
### Description
The `VaultSetting` struct within the `Vault` contract includes an `isPaused` boolean field intended to allow administrators to pause core vault operations such as deposits and withdrawals during abnormal or high-risk scenarios. Th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Change text in recovery command template
### Description
A more descriptive text for the recovery command template would be the one used in the `EmailRecoveryCommandHandler.sol`, i.e.
```
Recover account {ethAddr} using recovery hash {string}
```
as the template accepts the hash, not the actual address.
###... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: README is missing important information
### Description
The README.md files on the root of the git repositories are the first documents that most developers will read, so they should be complete, clear, concise and accurate.
The [README.md of the Solo project](https://github.com/dydxprotocol/solo/blob/17df84... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Inflexible Fee Recipient Field Blocks Open Relaying
### Description
Currently, every `DepositData` and `SwapAndDepositData` payload must include a hard-coded [fee recipient address](https://github.com/across-protocol/contracts/blob/b84dbfae35030e0f2caa5509b632c10106a32330/contracts/interfaces/SpokePoolPeripher... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Pool managers can steal all other pools' pending deposits from `globalEscrow` via malicious `requestManager` swapping
### Description
The request manager system allows attackers to steal all pending user deposits from `globalEscrow`. An attacker can create fraudulent deposit requests with a malicious request ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Unbounded message processing
### Description
## UDP Receiver Function Analysis
**Context:** `udp.rs#L16`
**Description:**
The `receiver_` function processes incoming UDP messages in an infinite loop without any rate limiting or backpressure mechanisms.
**Recommendation:**
Implement rate limiting at the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: Missing event in `GaugeFactoryV1`
### Description
The `createGauge()` function in the `GaugeFactoryV1` contract doesn't emit an event when creating a new gauge:
```solidity
function createGauge(...) external returns (address) {
if (msg.sender != s_escrowVoteManager) {
revert InvalidCaller();
}
address ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect contract natspec for ERC1155TotalBalanceChangeEnforcer
### Description
The contract natspec for `ERC1155TotalBalanceChangeEnforcer` has several instances of incorrect descriptions about how the balance state is stored in the enforcer.
- "Tracks initial balance and accumulates expected increases and ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Use `.call{}()` over transfer/send for transferring native token
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In GlmRouter and GlmRebalance contract, there are several instances (sending remaining execution fee to the user, `receive()` method logic) where native tokens are sent to ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: LMPVault: DoS when `feeSink` balance hits `perWalletLimit`
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokemak-judging/issues/679
## Found by
Ch\_301, n33k, warRoom, xiaoming90
The LMPVault token share has a per-wallet limit. LMPVault collects fees as share tokens to the `feeSink` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Multiple Read Operations Against Storage Variables
### Description
**Severity**: Informational/Gas
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The `withdrawETH()` function of the ynETH contract, the `totalDepositedInPool` variable is read multiple times directly from storage. The SLOAD opcode (cold read) will cost... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Marketplace contract can trap funds if the whitelist is disabled
### Description
The Marketplace contract protects listings from receiving offers from unauthorized affiliates through the use of an affiliate whitelist. The `makeOffer` function checks to see if the provided affiliate is `0x0` to prevent trapp... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Incorrect approach to tracking the PnL of a DV
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokemak-judging/issues/589
## Found by
xiaoming90
A DV might be incorrectly marked as not sitting in a loss, thus allowing users to burn all the DV shares, locking in all the loss of the DV and... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: validUntil values of 0 signal infinity and are transformed into type(uint48).max
### Description
The `validUntil` variable is normally a 48-bit timestamp in UNIX seconds to signify up to a point in time a UserOp is valid for. There is an edge case, where setting `0` assumes an infinite validity, and in the code... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Withdrawals Can Be Forcefully Initialised By Anyone
### Description
The `completeWithdrawAccount()` function can be called without `requestWithdrawAccount()` being called first. If `requestWithdrawAccount()` is not called first, `withdrawTimestamp[accountId]` will be 0 by default and, as a result, the `WITHDR... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Missing events for governor only functions that change critical parameters
### Description
The governor only functions that change critical parameters should emit events. Events allow capturing the changed parameters so that off-chain tools/interfaces can register such changes with timelocks that allow users t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Effective price calculations can be affected by edge cases in `Math512Lib::sqrt512` and `Math512Lib::div512by256`
### Description
**Description:** `Math512Lib::sqrt512` implements a full-width integer Newton-Raphson square root. This hinges on the assumption that the initial guess is larger than the upper l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `isHoldAmountAllowed` and `isSubAmountAllowed` wrong subtraction will result in DoS
### Description
The `HoldStableToken` function checks if the given amount can be held by adding `(balance.amount + balance.unsettledAmount-balance.holdAmount)` and `isSubAmountAllowed` checks if `(balance.amount - balance.ho... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Flawed Computation Of Current Vested Amount
### Description
## Vested Amount in Vesting Milestone
`vestedAmount` in VestingMilestone returns the current amount of tokens that have been vested for a particular user’s milestone; this is calculated by:
Calculation of `amountPerInterval` occurs by dividing ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Beneficiary Might Lose Existing Claimable Reward If Registered Again
### Description
**Severity** - Low
**Status** - Resolved
**Description**
A beneficiary can be registered through the `registerBeneficiaries()` function in `MPROVesting.sol` , if the beneficiary already had an amount then this code is execu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Less tokens can be allocated to emission receivers than weekly emissions due to precision loss from division before multiplication
### Description
**Description:** `BabelVault` allows one or more emission receivers to be created and `IncentiveVoting` allows token lockers to vote for how the weekly token emissi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Replay attack due to unprotected TX hash for redeems
### Description
In the `GorplesCoin` contract, the `redeem()` function is susceptible to a replay attack, where the `txHash` parameter could potentially be used multiple times to execute the function with the same data.
This `txHash` parameter, as decoded f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: UniV2ClassDex.sol#uniClassSell() Tokens with fee on transfer are not fully supported
### Description
## Handle
WatchPug
## Vulnerability details
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-openleverage/blob/501e8f5c7ebaf1242572712626a77a3d65bdd3ad/openleverage-contracts/contracts/dex/bsc/UniV2ClassDex.sol#L31... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Typos and grammatical errors in the code
### Description
There are multiple typos and grammatical errors throughout the codebase
- `elegibility` -> `eligibility`
- `logic is affects` -> `logic is affected`
- `you a player wants to claim` -> `a player wants to claim`
- `mintor` -> `minter`
- `All game cont... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Implementation Contract Can Be Initialized
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> We have resolved it during contract deployment.
**File(s) affected:**`L1StandardBridge.sol`
**Description:**`L1StandardBridge.initialize()` is a publ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Successful bidders can lose significant value due to division rounding
### Description
**Impact:**
High, as possibly significant value will be lost
**Likelihood:**
High, as it will happen with most bids
**Description**
The `fulfillWindow` method calculates the auction reserves and proceeds after a successf... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Shadowed variable
### Description
**Description**
In constructor, local variable “owner” shadows the call for the owner() function of the Ownable
contract.
https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
**Recommendation**:
Consider renaming (for example to _owner). | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use of `abi.encodePacked` with dynamic types inside `keccak256`
### Description
`abi.encodePacked` should not be used with dynamic types when passing the result to a hash function such as `keccak256`. Use `abi.encode` instead, which will pad items to 32 bytes, to [prevent any hash collisions](https://docs.soli... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | false | ## Medium: State not updated when staker address changes
### Description
When changing the staker address via the `set_staker` function in the LT contract, the code fails to update important accounting variables `liquidity.staked` and `liquidity.ideal_staked`. This creates an accounting mismatch in the protocol.
```p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | initialization | true | false | ## Severity: High Risk
## Context
**InvariantCheck, LeveragedPool, PoolCommitter**
## Description
The `checkInvariants()` function of the InvariantCheck contract is called via the modifiers `checkInvariantsBeforeFunction()` and `checkInvariantsAfterFunction()` of both LeveragedPool and PoolCommitter contracts. It is ... | Spearbit | 5 | Tracer |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Underflow Vulnerability in `Market::_allowedBorrow` Function: Oversight with Pearlmit Allowance Handling
### Description
The protocol permits users to authorize spenders using the [MarketERC20::approveBorrow](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-02-tapioca/blob/dc2464f420927409a67763de6ec60fe5c028ab0e/Tap... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Returned value after the call is not checked.
### Description
**Description**
LockToken.sol: function_chargeFees(), line 762.
Variable "refund Success", returned after the call is not verified to be true. Thus, in case the call is reverted, the whole transaction won't revert.
**Recommendation**
Add vali... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Lack of two-step Authority transfer
### Description
The `endoavs` program in-scope allows the current `authority` account of each Endogenous AVS to transfer the `authority` to another account. Such action is permanent and irrevocable.
The existing implementation of the `transfer_authority` instruction employs... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect Conversion To String
### Description
## uint2str Function in Vyper
`uint2str` is a built-in function in Vyper language, which allows users to convert unsigned integers to string representations. It calculates the number of digits required to represent the integer as a string (`n_digits`), and in a l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Potential Token Locking Scenarios
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> These are unlikely scenarios and mitigating these issues may severely increase complexity of the system
**File(s) affected:**`vault/common.func`, `factory.func... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Rounding Mismatch in Finalization Can Make Refunds Insolvent
### Description
The `_finalizeSettlement()` sets global aggregates (`priorityRaiseFilled`, `publicRaiseFilled`, `totalAccepted`) using bucket-level numbers:
- `whitelistAllocated = min(totalPriorityCommitted, whitelistReserve)`
- `publicAllocated = ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | false | false | ## High: `depositFee` can be bypassed via deposit queue
### Description
The deposit fee can be circumvented by a queue deposit + `mintDepositInQueue()` call in the same transaction.
### Impact
Loss of protocol fee revenue.
### Recommendation
Because of the FILO system, charging the dynamic deposit fee will be unfair... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: Predictable price hashes
### Description
Generated price hashes are easy to guess. Bids and offers send a hash of their price as a mechanism for locking in a price whilst not revealing the price publicly. The method of generating these hashes is predictable; the same price will always result in the same hash.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent zero checks
### Description
There are several places in the protocol where input parameters are not checked to be set:
`bridgeAdapterConfigInput.destinationChainId` https://github.com/lidofinance/aave-delivery-infrastructure/blob/41c81975c2ce5b430b283e6f4aab922c3bde1555/src/contracts/CrossChainFor... | 0 |
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