prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | reentrancy | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-union-judging/issues/29
## Found by
CodingNameKiki
## Summary
By following the steps described in `Vulnerability Detail`, user is able to lose all of his staking rewards.
## Vulnerability Detail
The issue occurs in the following steps described below:
1. Kiki calls... | Sherlock | 4 | Union Finance Update |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Redundant `approve(0)` in `BasisTradeVault::depositToTailor`
### Description
`BasisTradeVault::depositToTailor` grants `tailor` an allowance, calls `tailor.deposit(pocket, amount)`, and then sets the allowance back to zero:
```solidity
IERC20(asset()).forceApprove(address(tailor), amount);
tailor.deposit(pock... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Restrict deflationary tokens
### Description
At line https://github.com/tosdis/TosDisFinance/blob/be50dbf8a52a8f919694498bf30394d328d88fbb/StakeMaster/contracts/StakingPool.sol#L124 contract receives token by `safeTransferFrom`, and increases `user.amount` by `_amountToStake`, however that approach doesn't ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Lack of return value check in veFXS may result in failed ERC20 token recovery
### Description
The `veFXS` contract does not check the return value of a call to transfer tokens from the `veFXS` contract to the admin. Without this check, such transfers could fail.
```python
@external
def recoverERC20(token_addr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Missing maximum bounds for rebalance parameters
### Description
The rebalance parameter validation lacks maximum bounds. This could allow the parameters to be so large that it affects the correct function of the pool. When a pool and `BunniToken` are deployed by using the `deployBunniToken` function of the `Bu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Increments can be unchecked
### Description
In Solidity 0.8+, there’s a default overflow check on unsigned integers. It’s possible to uncheck this in for-loops and save some gas at each iteration, but at the cost of some code readability, as this uncheck cannot be made inline.
https://github.com/ethereum/soli... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Avoid repeated comparison with `msg.sender` when looping in `SiloFacet:transferDeposits` | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Not compatible with Rebasing/Deflationary/Inflationary tokens
### Description
_Submitted by 0x1f8b, also found by cmichel, kirk-baird, gzeon, and IllIllI_
The `DepositBoxERC20` contract do not appear to support rebasing/deflationary/inflationary tokens whose balance changes during transfers or over time. T... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Validation Logic
### Description
## Code Review Summary
## Issues Identified
1. **Delay Value Validation**
- Include the assertion:
with the `EInvalidDelayValue` error in `new_timelock` to validate that the provided delay value is one of the allowed options (24 hours or 48 hours).
> _File... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `++i` costs less gas than `++i`, especially when it's used in `for`-loops (`--i`/`i--` too)
### Description
1. File: core-contracts/contracts/CoreCollection.sol (line [279](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-joyn/blob/c9297ccd925ebb2c44dbc6eaa3effd8db5d2368a/core-contracts/contracts/CoreCollection.sol#L279... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use of Low Liquidity Source When Compounding on Arbitrum
### Description
User rewards can be compounded into locked LP tokens via the [`Compounder`](https://github.com/radiant-capital/v2-core/blob/e8f21f103e17736907b62809d1ad902febc53714/contracts/radiant/accessories/Compounder.sol) contract. They can do so [t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | true | true |
Some tokens (like USDT) do not work when changing the allowance from an existing non-zero allowance value. They must first be approved by zero and then the actual allowance must be approved.
### Proof of Concept
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/main/contracts/Lock.sol#L117>
```solidity
functio... | Code4rena | 5 | Tigris Trade |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: from is always msg.sender or address(this)
### Description
See the following diagram:
Above, the "from" address is always `msg.sender` or `address(this)`. For the line in RouteProcessor4.sol#L368:
```solidity
bentoBox.transfer(tokenIn, from, pool, amountIn);
```
The current implementation of the `IBentoBoxMi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Changes to lotSize and tradingLotSize should be atomic
### Description
As discussed in issues [M01](#m01) and [M06](#m06), `tradingLotSize` and `lotSize` depend on each other, and [cannot be changed such that `tradingLotSize % lotSize != 0`](https://github.com/mcdexio/mai-protocol-v2/blob/4b198083ec4ae2d685... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Unused/empty `receive()`/`fallback()` function
### Description
If the intention is for the Ether to be used, the function should call another function, otherwise it should revert (e.g. `require(msg.sender == address(weth))`). Having no access control on the function means that someone may send Ether to the con... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: _updatesponsor implementation contradicts sponsor role in pool and open 's backrunning attack vectors
### Description
The following is the definition of sponsor (aka trustor) and related information from the protocol docs:
### Impact
Sponsor "snatching" scenarios are possible. The core protocol definition of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Typos and documentation errors
### Description
The code comments have typos at some places:
1. **Redundant comment** in `SmartSessionBase`: `enableUserPolicies()`.
2. **Wrong comment** in `SmartSession`: `validateUserOp()` ⇒ it should be "userOp.sender = msg.sender".
3. **Spelling mistakes** at other places li... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: setreservefreeze should trigger the collateralconfigurationchanged event if ltv is changed in the config
### Description
When `setReserveFreeze` is executed, based on `freeze` and `_isPendingLtvSet[asset]`, the LTV value of the config could be changed. When LTV is changed, usually the `PoolConfigurator` trigger... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Transaction output value will be truncated in logged error message
### Description
Casting the float value `txOut.Value` to `int64` will truncate the decimals, resulting in a confusing error message that logs a very small transaction output value.
### Recommendation
Consider multiplying `txOut.Value` with `1e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | logic-error | true | false | ## Medium: Margin call uses stale edge price
### Description
The `check_long_margin_call` and `check_short_margin_call` functions determine whether positions should be liquidated based on edge prices retrieved from the price trees before applying funding rate updates and rebalancing. This causes positions to be liquid... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Cordinated group of attacker can artificially lower quorum threshold during active proposals forcing malicious proposals to pass without true majority support.
### Description
A critical timing-based vulnerability exists in `governance.sol` system that allows malicious actors to manipulate voting quorums th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: `unstake` should update exchange rates first
### Description
_Submitted by cmichel_
The `unstake` function does not immediately update the exchange rates. It first computes the `validatorSharesRemove = tokensToShares(amount, v.exchangeRate)` **with the old exchange rate**.
Only afterwards, it updates the ex... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: The duration during the transfer can truncate the true domain expiration period
### Description
## Context: CommitmentOrderflow.sol#L296
**Description:** When a domain is transferred from another issuer to 3DNS, a duration is specified. This duration is checked during the `processCommitment`, `CommitmentOr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Avoid Duplicated Code
### Description
## Kiosk.move Code Refactor
`kiosk.move` utilizes assert statements to check whether the `KioskOwnerCap` matches the `Kiosk`. Instead of invoking `has_access`, the duplicated code discovered in `has_access` is incorporated.
## RUST Code Snippet
## Remediation
Replace ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Reward Token Loss for LPs During NFT Position Transfer
### Description
In **DeliHook v4 pools**, when a liquidity provider (LP) transfers their NFT position to a new owner, the **auto-claiming of rewards** is executed in favor of the new owner instead of the previous owner.
As a result, the previous LP per... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: MultichainCompact and BatchCompact incompatible with ERC712 due to incorrect hashing
### Description
In order to work with major wallets like MetaMask, the Compact aims to be ERC712 compatible so that users can easily and directly sign messages for the contract. However, due to incorrect handling of `idsAndAm... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: LPs can withdraw immediately even with withdrawal cooldown
### Description
The withdrawal cooldown period for Backstop LPs is now configured using `backstopLPConfig.withdrawCooldownDurationInSeconds`, such that the withdrawal cooldown period is turned on when it is greater than 0 and turned off when it is e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Liquidation is vulnerable to sandwich attacks
### Description
_Submitted by danb, also found by leastwood_
When an account is liquidated, there is no minimum amount of the swap, which makes it vulnerable for sandwich attacks.
### Proof of Concept
Alice's long position can be liquidated, bob notices it an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: `LockedBalance` library should drop parameters to 96/32 bits
### Description
_Submitted by cmichel_
[LockedBalance.sol#L56](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-02-foundation/blob/4d8c8931baffae31c7506872bf1100e1598f2754/contracts/libraries/LockedBalance.sol#L56)
The `LockedBalance` contract takes 256-bit a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Royalty | false | false | _Submitted by leastwood_
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-joyn/blob/main/core-contracts/contracts/CoreCollection.sol>
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-joyn/blob/main/royalty-vault/contracts/RoyaltyVault.sol>
### Impact
The Joyn documentation mentions that Joyn royalty vaults should be equipped to handle... | Code4rena | 3 | Joyn |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Vaults won't work with tokens that revert on a 0 value approval
### Description
;
### Impact
BNB vaults won't work, and so does other tokens that revert on a zero value approval
https://github.com/d-xo/weird-erc20?tab=readme-ov-file#revert-on-zero-value-approvals
### Recommendation
_No response_ | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Unstoppable Proposal
### Description
**Update**
The client fixed the issue in commit `0b6cd1e719d9628cff535ad53da7d4bc5dfc4fd4` and provided the following explanation:
> A check has been added on the _reachedQuorum and _votePassed functions to avoid the scenario described in the audit.
**File(s) affected:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Protocol is going to ingest stale data for some Chainlink feeds
### Description
The protocol integrates a lower and upper bound for their staleness checks when using Chainlink. However, a flawed assumption has been made regarding how low the heartbeat of a Chainlink feed can be, which causes the protocol to co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: `settlement.cairo` doesn't process callback correctly leading to `CrossChainMsgStatus` marked as SUCCESS even if it failed on destination chain
### Description
When a cross-chain message is sent it can return a callback with status `FAILED` or `SUCCESS`. The problem is that even if the cross-chain message fai... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Funds May Be Stolen if Two Merkle Windows Use Different Tokens
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `29182b640a367be84f865374d8acceac405c071b`.
Recommendation implemented, the token is now included in the Merkle verification.
**Description:** The `MerkleDistributor` cont... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Utility Functions Are Made Public Unnecessarily
### Description
The atlas contract implements a series of utility functions that are responsible for verifying certain aspects of execution, for example, who called the function. Those functions are intended to be used internally. However, they are marked with a ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Borrowers can surpass `liquidityThresholdPercent` and borrow to near 100% of the principal
### Description
Borrowers can borrow up to 100% of the principal due to [getPrincipalAmountAvailableToBorrow](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-04-teller-finance/blob/main/teller-protocol-v2-audit-2024/packages/c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Premature createPair function call will result in the creation of unusable delegation pairs
### Description
Users use the `createPair` function of `UniswapV2Factory.sol` to create new trading pairs. This function allows the users to create a pair in sweep-n-flip or delegate such creation to external DEXes if ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Vault: Withdrawals can be frontrun to cause users to burn tokens without receiving funds in return
### Description
_Submitted by hickuphh3_
##### Impact
Let us assume either of the following cases:
1. The vault / protocol is to be winded down or migrated, where either the protocol is halted and `withdraw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `storage` pointer to a structure is cheaper than copying each value of the structure into `memory`, same for `array` and `mapping` (7 instances)
### Description
Deployment Gas Saved: **188 639**
Method Call Gas Saved: **5 032**
It may not be obvious, but every time you copy a storage `struct`/`array`/`mapping... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: The repaying action in `BBLeverage.sellCollateral` function pulls YieldBox shares of asset from wrong address
### Description
The `sellCollateral` function is used to sell a user's collateral to obtain YieldBox shares of the asset and repay the user's loan. However, in the BBLeverage contract, it calls `_re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: | Zero Address Checks
### Description
**Description**
The `constructor`, `transferTempAdmin`, and `updateProtocolFeeRecipient` functions all assign important address contract variables without ensuring any of them are not the zero address.
**Recommendation**
Evaluate whether or not each of these addresses c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | true | false | ## Gas: Using `calldata` instead of `memory` for read-only arguments in `external` functions saves gas
### Description
When a function with a `memory` array is called externally, the `abi.decode()` step has to use a for-loop to copy each index of the `calldata` to the `memory` index. **Each iteration of this for-loop ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Memory Alignment
### Description
## getReturnData and Memory Alignment Issues
`getReturnData` utilizes inline assembly in a manner that deviates from YUL specifications. Specifically, the free pointer `ptr`, which indicates the next area of memory to be allocated, is not guaranteed to be aligned by `0x20`. Fo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Lack of validation in the IntentValidationModule contract can lead to inconsistent state
### Description
Lack of validation in the state-modifying functions of the `IntentValidationModule` contract can cause users to be locked out of the system. As shown in Figure 2.1, the `setDeviceKey` function in the `Inte... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | token | true | false | ## High Risk Severity Report
## Context
1. `WstETHAdapter.sol#L136-142`
2. `CAdapter.sol#L130-154`
3. `Periphery.sol#L253-272`
## Situation
The function `wrapUnderlying()` of `WstETHAdapter` does not return any value, which means it returns 0. On the contrary, the function `wrapUnderlying()` of `CAdapter` returns the... | Spearbit | 5 | Sense |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: totalNftMintCount can be replaced with ERC721 totalSupply()
### Description
## Handle
pauliax
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
I can't find a reason why totalNftMintCount in Factory can't be replaced with ERC721 totalSupply() to make it less error-prone. As nfthub.mint issues a new token it should automa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Lack of Redeem Feature
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-05-USSD-judging/issues/958
## Found by
0xMosh, 0xRobocop, BugBusters, WATCHPUG, ast3ros, ctf\_sec, juancito, sashik\_eth, shealtielanz, shogoki, the\_endless\_sea, ustas
## Summary
## Vulnerability Detail
The whitepap... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: UNHANDLED ERRORS
### Description
There are a few instances where error handling has not been implemented for functions that might return an error.
Code Location
-------------
[price-feeder/oracle/provider/huobi.go, Lines 384-387](https://github.com/umee-network/umee/blob/rafilx/umeed-cosmwasmd/price-feeder/o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | true | false | ## High: Subtraction in `variance()` will revert due to underflow
### Description
The function `variance()` in Statistics.sol subtracts the average from each number in the array but the type is uint, because of that the function will revert unless all numbers are the same
### Impact
This function is called in the `fi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: Protocol will not benefit from slashing mechanism when remaining penalty bigger than `minThreshold`
### Description
During the withdraw process, the function `settleFunds()` get called. This function first calculates the `operatorShare` and the `penaltyAmount`. If the `operatorShare`
function settleFund... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: LiFi protocol isn’t hardened
### Description
The usage of the LiFi protocol depends largely on off-chain APIs. It takes all values, fees, limits, chain IDs, and addresses to be called from the APIs and doesn’t verify them. Several elements are not connected via smart contracts but via the API, for example:
- ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Inability to refinance within the same pool due to exceeding the pool balance
### Description
The `refinance` function in the `Lender` contract allows a borrower to refinance a loan to a new offer. However, when refinancing within the same pool, the pool balance may not be sufficient as the balance is checked ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: [01] Callers/buyers can control `protocolRewardsRecipients` to receive self-rebates
### Description
The `ERC20TokenEmitter.buyToken()` function is designed in such a way that the caller (or buyer) can fully control the `protocolRewardsRecipients` parameter, which includes the `builder`, `purchaseReferral`, and... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | token | true | false | ## Gas: Tightly pack storage variables/optimize the order of variable declaration (Save 6.3K gas)
### Description
**Note the following lines and the explanation to understand the why and how the packing would be achieved**
**This packing is only achievable as we can reduce the size of time variable from uint256 to ui... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: `borgCore._checkDirectorsSignatures()` calculates the number of directors' signatures incorrectly if the total number of signatures > threshold
### Description
`Safe.execTransaction()` [allows](https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account/blob/c266ffc2d75c8d6cd545cf24e54444b069793e53/contracts/Safe.sol... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Use of `transfer` instead of `safeTransfer` is not recommended
### Description
It is good to add a `require` statement that checks the return value of token transfers, or to use something like OpenZeppelin's `safeTransfer`/`safeTransferFrom`, even if one is sure that the given token reverts in case of a failur... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Updating oracle with post-swap `lnImpliedRate` allows TWAP manipulation
### Description
`TokiHookLogic.beforeSwap()` incorrectly updates the oracle observation with the new `lnImpliedRate`. As a result, the observation “closes” the entire elapsed interval using the **post-swap** rate, as if it were active f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `keySize` and `iterations` Insufficiently Large
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `8b90784`. The client provided the following explanation: This is fixed by [HAS-1](https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/hash-pack/95a96750-4624-412c-876e-5965dc021e70/index.html#findi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Use a more recent version of solidity
### Description
In 0.8.15 the conditions necessary for inlining are relaxed. Benchmarks show that the change significantly decreases the bytecode size (which impacts the deployment cost) while the effect on the runtime gas usage is smaller.
In 0.8.17 prevent the incorrect... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: TGE Date Update Affects Previous Vestings
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The setTgeDate function of ERC20Vesting updates the tgeStartDate each time it is called. However, this update applies to all vesting schedules, including previous ones, potentially causing ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Non-library/interface files should use fixed compiler versions, not floating ones
### Description
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-golom/blob/e5efa8f9d6dda92a90b8b2c4902320acf0c26816/contracts/governance/GolomToken.sol#L2 | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Non-standard treatment of a from address of 0 ✓ Fixed
### Description
A number of functions throughout the system treat a `from` address of `0` as equivalent to `msg.sender`. In some cases, this seems to violate existing standards (e.g. in ERC20 transfers). In other cases, it is merely surprising.
`ERC1400ER... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: BlsBn254 is not available in certain chains due to hardcoded gas limit
### Description
EcParing precompile always fails on certain chains due to the hardcoded gas limit, so BlsBn254 is not available on certain chains.
### Impact
BlsBn254 is not available on some chains.
### Recommendation
The gas cost req... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: First Liquidity provider can claim all initial pool rewards
### Description
Liquidity providers can add liquidity to the protocol using the depositCollateralAndIncreaseShare or depositLiquidityAndIncreaseShare functions, both functions call the \_increaseUserShare function to stake the users liquidity and acc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `wfCashERC4626` contract does not conform to `EIP4626`
### Description
The `wfCashERC4626` contract implements the `EIP4626` standard ([EIP-4626: Tokenized Vault Standard](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4626)).
However, according to `EIP4626`, the below-mentioned functions do not fully adhere to the specs... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: `_handleOpenFees` returns an incorrect value for `_feePaid`. This directly impacts margin calculations
### Description
### Impact
Formula for `fee paid` in [Line 734](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/main/contracts/Trading.sol#L734) is incorrect leading to incorrect margin calculations. Si... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Emission Cap Bypass Through Rollover Accumulation
### Description
In `CLGauge._notifyRewardAmount()`, rollover tokens are added after the emission cap check has been performed. The cap is enforced in `notifyRewardAmount()`, but rollover is added afterward in the internal function. This allows gauges to receive... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Caching storage values in memory
### Description
The code can be optimized by minimising the number of SLOADs. SLOADs are expensive (100 gas) compared to MLOADs/MSTOREs (3 gas). Here, storage values should get cached in memory (see the `@audit` tags for further details): | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Constant keccak expressions are evaluated at compile time
### Description
Solidity evaluates constant keccak expressions at compile time. The assignments to constant variables can be changed to the keccak expressions instead of the evaluated hash values.
### Recommendation
Consider updating the assignments to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Don't update state | true | false | ## Security Issue Report
## Severity
**High Risk**
## Context
LienToken.sol#L102-187
## Description
We never update the collateral state hash anywhere in the `buyoutLien` function. As a result, once all checks are passed, payment will be transferred from the buyer to the seller, but the seller will retain ownership ... | Spearbit | 5 | Astaria |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | false | ## Medium: Locked liquidity when a game contract is removed from `Staking.authorizedGames`
### Description
The `Staking.removeAuthorizedGame()` function is meant to remove a game contract's authorization so it can no longer interact with the `Staking` contract. However, if there is `lockedLiquidity` locked by a game c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Access Control | false | false | **Severity:** High
**Description:** According to the documentation and the current implementation, anyone can create a new StakePet contract and feed any address for the `YIELD_TOKEN`. As long as a contract implements `IYieldToken` interface, the contract will be created without problems.
An attacker can create a mal... | Cyfrin | 3 | Stakepet |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Correct overlying aToken can be determined automatically
### Description
When initializing an AaveV3Pocket contract, the contract receives:
- **underlyingToken_**: The address of the underlying ERC20 token, e.g. DAI.
- **overlyingToken_**: The address of the overlying ERC20 aToken belonging to Aave, e.g. aDAI.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: getCurrentInterestRates() does not calculate the interests correctly
### Description
The current borrow rate in `getCurrentInterestRates()` is calculated as:
```solidity
// borrow rate
uint256 currentVariableBorrowRate = transferFunction(getControllerError(getNormalizedError(utilizationRate)));
```
This d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: LendingPoolFactory missing logic
### Description
The `LendingPoolFactory` contract inherits from Solmate's `Auth` contract, which is used to restrict access to certain functions. However, there is no function with the `requireAuth` modifier that restricts its access, which makes this inheritance useless.
```... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Data representing tree users, mismatch can take place
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
dpnm_sc.sol - in init, msg.sender is added to users of the tree in the contract dpnmMain, but there is no guarantee that the deployer msg.sender of dpnmMain is the root of the tre... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: No way to Pause/Block messages in case of emergency
### Description
Currently, the Receiver contract has no way to:
1. Pause all functionality on the receiving side in case of an emergency (hacking event).
2. Block accidental or malicious messages from being processed.
### Recommendation
1. If the contract i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing check for 0 value transferred
### Description
There is a missing check for `fee != 0`:
https://github.com/MetaLex-Tech/LeXscrow/blob/94ca277528bb25b8421dc127941c18915144eb29/src/EthLexscrow.sol#L292.
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a check that the transferred `fee` value is not zero. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: It's possible to withdraw from VoteModule bypassing unlockTime
### Description
Supposed flow is following:
1. Users deposit xRex into VoteModule and vote.
2. New epoch starts; Minter calls `xRex.rebase()`. In other words, those xRex tokens become a reward to distribute between voters of the previous week.
3. V... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Deploy flow of `Talos` is broken
### Description
The `Talos` protocol can't be deployed in a right way.
### Proof of Concept
`TalosBaseStrategy` needs `TalosManager` to be passed in the constructor:
But `TalosManager` needs `Strategy` to be passed into the constructor:
### Recommended Mitigation Steps... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | false | ## Medium: SingleSidedLiquidityVault.withdraw will decreases ohmMinted, which will make the calculation involving ohmMinted incorrect
### Description
SingleSidedLiquidityVault.withdraw will decreases ohmMinted, which will make the calculation involving ohmMinted incorrect.
### Impact
It will make the calculation invo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Sandwich attack on astroport sweep
### Description
The collector contract allows anyone to `sweep`, swapping an asset token to ANC through astro port.
Note that `belief_price` is not set and `config.max_spread` might not be set as well or misconfigured.
This allows an attacker to create a contract to perfo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Users cannot opt out of hybrid node delegation
### Description
_Resolved_
The `BobStaking::alterHybridNodeDelegatee` function prevents users from opting out of hybrid node delegation by enforcing whitelist validation on all new delegatee addresses, including `address(0)`:
Since `address(0)` will never be in... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: batch() does not indicate return values of the underlying batch calls
### Description
The `batch()` function allows users and contracts to execute a list of arbitrary functions in a single transaction. Whenever one of these underlying calls reverts, it will be caught, and the complete batch is reverted, indica... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use syntax sugar
### Description
**Description**
At:
src/processor.rs:213
You can replace two statements with `if let res` to make the is_ok check, unwrap and set it to
the variable at once.
Also at:
src/processor.rs:253
You can rewrite it with `else if let ...`
Also at:
src/processor.rs:236
You may use https... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: NODE INTEGRATION ENABLED
### Description
In Electron, nodeIntegration is a boolean option that can be used to determine whether node integration is enabled, allows JavaScript to leverage Node.js primitives and modules.
As a result, this could lead to full remote system compromise if you are rendering untru... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Contract upgrades can catastrophically fail if the storage layout changes
### Description
The NuCypher contracts use the proxy pattern for upgradability. Due to the way in which the pattern implements upgrades, the storage layout of the contracts must not change between deployments. Unfortunately, the Solidity... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: transferBalance() might send incorrect balance to the balance tracker
### Description
When `from` equals `to` and the balance tracker is enabled, `transferBalance()` will send `newFromBalance` to the `balanceTracker.balanceTrackerHook()` call. However, it should send `newToBalance`, which is the actual final b... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | logic | false | false | ## Low: Potentially invalid funds recipient when closing auction account.
### Description
**Description**
Potentially invalid recipient of funds from closing the auction account. In the Auction House contract, at the time of closing the auction, the close_account function specifies 'payer' as the destination account.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Ambiguity In Swap Direction
### Description
## Next Bin Array Index with Liquidity
`next_bin_array_index_with_liquidity`, in `BinArrayBitmapExtension`, determines the direction of the search (up or down) based on whether the start index is greater or less than the end index. When the start and end indices ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: setLeveragePercent should check that new _leveragePercent >= 100
### Description
## Email address
pauliax6@gmail.com
## Handle
paulius.eth
## Eth address
0x523B5b2Cc58A818667C22c862930B141f85d49DD
## Vulnerability details
function setLeveragePercent should check that the _leveragePercent >= 100 so th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: A modifier used only once and not being inherited should be inlined to save gas
### Description
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-forgeries/blob/fc271cf20c05ce857d967728edfb368c58881d85/src/ownable/OwnableUpgradeable.sol#L44-L49
The above modifer is only used in the following:
https://github.com/code-42... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Storage variables changed with toggle functions should have public visibility
### Description
The storage variables `isPaused`, and `isKycEnabled` have `private` visibility.
The problem is that there is no easy way to check their current states off-chain or by other contracts on-chain. This is also problemat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Reduce approval before transferring tokens in `rOUSG::transferFrom`
### Description
**Description:** `rOUSG::transferFrom` [L286-289](https://github.com/ondoprotocol/rwa-internal/blob/6747ebada1c867a668a8da917aaaa7a0639a5b7a/contracts/ousg/rOUSG.sol#L286-L289) currently checks approvals, transfers the tokens t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | true | false | ## Low: Lack of `deadline` protection for swap
### Description
There are 2 instances of these
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-decent/blob/07ef78215e3d246d47a410651906287c6acec3ef/src/swappers/UniSwapper.sol#L153
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-decent/blob/07ef78215e3d246d47a410651906287c6acec3ef/src/sw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | true | false | ## Medium: `_updateSettlementPostBurn()` may not correctly reduce `s_grossPremiumLast[chunkKey]`
### Description
`s_grossPremiumLast[]` definitions are as follows:
> /// @dev Per-chunk `last` value that gives the aggregate amount of premium owed to all sellers when multiplied by the total amount of liquidity `totalLi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Vote | true | true | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokensoft-judging/issues/41
## Found by
0xDanielH, 0xDjango, 0xbranded, 0xlx, AkshaySrivastav, BenRai, Czar102, Musaka, VAD37, Yuki, caventa, dany.armstrong90, jah, jkoppel, kutugu, magellanXtrachev, ni8mare, p-tsanev, p12473, pengun, r0bert, stopthecap, twicek, y1cu... | Sherlock | 5 | Tokensoft |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Possible race condition when wXTZ owns tokens
### Description
As described in [TOB-WXTZ-011](link-to-doc), the token contract does not check approvals when the `from` address is the contract itself. As a result, anyone is allowed to claim those tokens.
### Recommendation
**Short term:** Disallow users from c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Wrong fee estimate in `getlzFee()` function
### Description
Function `getlzFee()` is supposed to calculate the Layerzero bridge message fee inside deposit contracts. The issue is that the code uses the wrong `dataSend` value to estimate the bridge fee:
```solidity
bytes memory dataSend = abi.encode(1, _r... | 0 |
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