prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Cache storage variable
### Description
`pot.amountWon[msg.sender]` and `pots[_potId].participants.length` are read twice. Caching them results in saving one storage read.
### Recommendation
Cache this data in variables to avoid reading from storage multiple times. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect gap slot amount due to incorrect variable counting
### Description
_Resolved_
In many contracts, contracts layouts are trying to reach 50 variable slot by adding gap slots, however, variable countings are incorrect for some contracts. ELytraConfig contract leaves a 43-slot gap at the end of contract... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Redundant Array Bounds Checks
### Description
## Redundant Bounds Checks in Array Accesses
We have noticed multiple usages of explicit bounds checks for array accesses. For example, a `require` statement was used in `MultipleRewardsTimeLockPoolV3` in order to check that `_depositId` is in bounds.
## Example
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | true | ## Low: Insufficient clamping in `HookletLib::hookletBeforeSwap` can result in unexpected reverts
### Description
`HookletLib::hookletBeforeSwap` and `HookletLib::hookletBeforeSwapView` decode the fee and price override data returned from external hooklet calls, applying a clamping operation on these values to ensure ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: No pause mechanism in case of depeg of XCHF token
### Description
The system allows minting 1-1 FrankenCoin with the same amount of XCHF tokens. In the case the stable coin XCHF depegs from its value it will greatly affect the value of the FrankenCoin ZCHF token, as they can be redeemed immediately.
### Recom... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: Order of Operations Will Reduce Output Precision
### Description
In the `EmergencyWithdraw` library, the code [gets the amount of tokens](https://github.com/radiant-capital/riz/blob/65ca7bb55550d30388e2b2277fefe5686ab7e4e8/src/libraries/EmergencyWithdraw.sol#L84) owed to the user for each reserve in the mar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: Secondary Currency debt is not managed by the Notional Controller
### Description
Some of the Notional Strategy Vaults may allow for secondary currencies to be borrowed as part of the same strategy. For example, a strategy may allow for USDC to be its primary borrow currency as well as have ETH as its secondar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Instance TTL Not Updated on All Operations
### Description
Whenever operations modifying the data stored in the `instance` storage of the token contract such as minting or burning tokens are performed, the entire `instance` TTL [is increased](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/stellar-contracts/blob/01dbcb53d3992... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Sending tokens to a Strategy when `totalSupply` is 0 can permanently make the Vault unavailable
### Description
### Finding description and impact
Before the first deposit or when all shares have been withdrawn making `totalSupply` zero, an attacker can manipulate `totalAssets` by directly sending tokens t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Non-exploitable reentrancies
### Description
Reentrancy in CitadelMinter.mintAndDistribute() (src/CitadelMinter.sol#169-243):
External calls:
- citadelToken.mint(address(this),mintable) (src/CitadelMinter.sol#178-180)
- IVault(cachedXCitadel).deposit(lockingAmount) (src/CitadelMinter.sol#195-197)
- xCi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: State variables saleOpen & presaleOpen of Smart Contract CryptoBearWatchClub are allocated to regulate current state of contract.
### Description
**Description**
CryptoBearWatchClub.sol, saleOpen & presaleOpen
**Recommendation**:
use one state variable to indicate current phase, e.g. state variable with ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Unexecutable proposals when `Actions.MigrateKernel` is not last instruction
### Description
_Submitted by Lambda_
In `INSTR.sol`, it is correctly checked that a `ChangeExecutor` instruction only occurs at the last position to avoid situations where the other instructions are deemed as invalid.
However, th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: `differenceInBps` is calculated with a precision of 10^4
### Description
Since `STABLES_RATIO_MULTIPLIER` is 10,000, `differenceInBps` is calculated with a precision of 10^4.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-11-ethena-labs/blob/main/contracts/ustb/UStbMinting.sol#L568
It needs to calculate it with higher ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Withdraw (in USDC) without any fees can motivate users to withdraw high amounts
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
In Contract GlmRouter.sol, there are no withdrawal limit and fee restrictions on users using the method `requestWithdrawal()`.
Users can always redeem th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Unable to recover ERC1155 tokens in WithdrawalVault
### Description
Goldsand implements `callRecoverERC20()` and `callRecoverERC721()` to recover ERC20 and ERC721 tokens in WithdrawalVault, but does not implement a function to recover ERC1155 tokens in WithdrawalVault.
### Recommendation
It is recommended to ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Cannot Remove First Item From the `allBorrowers` List
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `f6ebde3c56a4e9ad3120e83c9c1eb5a9710b411e`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Same as [ELA-6](https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/elara-finance/ceaf2e43-2883-4f4f-... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Pending comments
### Description
There are two pending comments in the MagicSpend contract code:
1. A comment that mentions "TODO: Consider TSTORE" above the `_gasMaxCostExcess` mapping. Since this mapping is always cleared by the end of every transaction, transient storage would indeed be useful in this scena... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: The `increaseStakeAndLock()` Function Prevents Users from Increasing Stake Amount Only
### Description
The function `increaseStakeAndLock()` is meant to allow users to increase stake amount AND/OR increase their lock durations, however, this is not how the current logic works in the `increaseStakeAndLock()`... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Usage of `Errors` can reduce gas cost and contract size at HolyPaladinToken.sol
### Description
### Target codebase
Where it uses `require` in [`HolyPaladinToken.sol`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-paladin/blob/9c26ec8556298fb1dc3cf71f471aadad3a5c74a0/contracts/HolyPaladinToken.sol).
There are 39 cal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Round up fees in `OUSGInstantManager::_getInstantMintFees` and `_getInstantRedemptionFees` to favor the protocol
### Description
Solidity rounds down by default so consider explicitly rounding up fees in `OUSGInstantManager::_getInstantMintFees` and `_getInstantRedemptionFees` to favor the protocol. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `set_strategy` will incorrectly remove `last_asset_value`
### Description
`set_strategy` can be called by governance to change the list of an adapter's strategies. This could incorporate a new adapter or change the previous adapter's ratio. However, it will incorrectly remove the `last_asset_value` of the a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: REDUNDANT CODE - GAS OPTIMIZATION
### Description
In `TokenManager` contract, there is redundant require statement. The following lines check if length of array elements are equal.
### Recommendation
**SOLVED:** The `Biconomy team` solved this issue by reducing the `require` functions from two to only one `re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Whitelist setters do not emit events
### Description
The [`TransferWhitelist` contract](https://github.com/celo-org/celo-monorepo/blob/db2e561e1f13220a98743a7999818e48a5089d13/packages/protocol/contracts/common/TransferWhitelist.sol#L11) is used to whitelist addresses.
Addresses and contract identifiers can... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Preallocate function has no sanity checks
### Description
`preallocate` in Crowdsale.sol [L239](https://github.com/CoinFabrik/ico/blob/142f43f3bec4afd0ffff3fce06946cf67cb0272f/contracts/Crowdsale.sol#L239) has no checks regarding the amount of tokens being non-zero, the receiver address being non-zero, the st... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | storage | true | false | ## High: Alligator gives gas refunds but does not receive gas refunds
### Description
The `AlligatorV2.sol` contract has a function `castRefundableVotesWithReasonBatched()` which tracks the gas used and provides a refund to the user. This mirrors the functionality used by `NounsLogicV2` to provide voting refunds.
How... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: `_getUniswapTwapWei()` will show incorrect price for negative ticks cause it doesn't round up for negative ticks
### Description
Take a look at
This function is used to get twap price tick using uniswap oracle. it uses `pool.observe()` to get `tickCumulatives` array which is then used to calculate `int24... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Fee-on-Transfer Tokens Can Cause Accounting Discrepancies in Asset Recovery Functions
### Description
The `AssetRecovererLib` library, which is used by `CSAccounting`, `CSFeeDistributor`, and potentially other contracts inheriting from `AssetRecoverer`, contains a `recoverERC20()` function that is vulnerable t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: [55] Consider adding emergency-stop functionality
### Description
Adding a way to quickly halt protocol functionality in an emergency, rather than having to pause individual contracts one-by-one, will make in-progress hack mitigation faster and much less stressful.
BidOrdersFacet.sol ([20-20](https://github.c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect stake limit check
### Description
The `LidoTreasuryConnector.deposit()` function is designed to submit ETH into the Lido pool, with the amount being bounded by the current stake limit:
```solidity
if (lidoCurrentStakeLimit <= amount) {
revert StakeLimit(lidoCurrentStakeLimit, amount);
}
```... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Mooniswap pairs cannot be unpaused
### Description
The `MooniswapFactoryGovernance` contract has a [`shutdown` function](https://github.com/1inch-exchange/mooniswap-v2/blob/b9c06335fb1d68b19054442547fc677f42795b44/contracts/governance/MooniswapFactoryGovernance.sol#L48) that can be used to pause the contrac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | true | ## High: Changing _initializableSlot() can cause _disableInitializers() to actually enable initializers
### Description
The `_initializableSlot()` method of `Initializable.sol` dictates the storage slot in which the "initialize version" (a `uint64`) and "initialized flag" (`bool`) are to be stored for the purpose of a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | false | false | ## Low: Missing zero check for the result of `ecrecover()`
### Description
The function `SecuritizeSwap::doExecuteByInvestor()` validates the provided signature was actually signed by an actor with a role `ROLE_ISSUER` or `ROLE_MASTER`.
In the validation, `ecrecover()` is used but the result is not validated to be non... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Admin/Owner roles may be burned by mistake
### Description
If the admin or owner of the InstaRegistry contract mistakenly calls the [`setAddress`](https://github.com/InstaDApp/contract-v2/blob/4863c0c4156af7ded9cdb38b66e5f5e527c4a6d0/contracts/InstaRegistry.sol#L37) function without explicitly entering an i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | false | ## High: Stat calculator returns incorrect report for swETH
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokemak-judging/issues/587
## Found by
xiaoming90
Stat calculator returns incorrect reports for swETH, causing multiple implications that could lead to losses to the protocol,
## Vulnerabi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | false | false | ## Gas: Numerous Gas Optimizations
### Description
This finding is dedicated to the numerous gas optimizations that can be applied across the codebase.
- The `tradeValid`, `cancelOffer`, and `acceptTrade` functions should have their `memory` arrays declared as `calldata`, significantly reducing the gas costs of the f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: GoDirectComparisonOfErrors (rpc/websockets.go, server/json_rpc.go, wallets/usbwallet/ledger.go)
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Recommendation**:
Use errors.Is() for error comparison to handle wrapped errors correctly. For example, in rpc/websockets.go, change err == http.ErrSe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: In transit funds inaccessible after removing a vault or contract updates
### Description
When calling `removeVault()`, there could still be funds in transit, while being stored in one of the escrows. The administration is kept in `lockedRequests[][]` and `investments[][]`. `unlockDepositRequest()` and `execute... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `constant`s should be defined rather than using magic numbers
### Description
*There are 95 instances of this issue. For in-depth details, see the warden's [full report](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-velodrome-findings/issues/128).* | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | false | false | ## Medium: Allowed zero `flashLoan`
### Description
Zero `flashLoan` doesn't earn fees. It only consumes gas and emits an "empty" event
https://github.com/CreamFi/compound-protocol/blob/23a4ae93adc70334553f5a83429a4e967c1eefaa/contracts/CCollateralCapErc20.sol#L160
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a check in `f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | access-control | true | false | ## Gas: optimization recommendations
### Description
## TANIssuanceHistory.sol Review
## Context
TANIssuanceHistory.sol#L131
## Description and Recommendations
1. **Skip Zero Amount Transfers**
In `increaseClaimableByBatch()`, there's inconsistent handling of zero amounts. Zero checks are performed before updat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Attempting to Vote After 50%+ Have Been Reached Will Always Revert
### Description
The `acceptMigrationDestination()` function is meant to be callable by anyone in order to vote for the new migration. The voting mechanism works by minting the NFT for the current Adapter state when 50%+ quorum is reached, which... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: ExternalManagement module uses the same storage slot as HyperCore StakingModule
### Description
_Resolved_
`StakingModuleExternalManagement` defines its storage under the same ERC-7201 namespace (`"stHYPE.storage.StakingModule"`) that is also used by `HyperCoreStakingModule`.
This violates EIP-7201’s require... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Vesting contract cannot work with ETH, although it's supposed to.
### Description
Vesting contract cannot work with native token, although it's supposed to.
### Impact
Vesting contract is unusable with ETH
### Recommendation
make the following check
```solidity
if (address(token) != address(1)) token.s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Remove boolean condition that will always be `false` from `LiquidationBranch::liquidateAccounts`
### Description
Consider this section of code from `LiquidationBranch::liquidateAccounts`:
```solidity
// if account is not liquidatable, skip to next account
// account is liquidatable if requiredMaintenanceMargin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Missing Reward Address Checks
### Description
## Analysis of MultiReward Pools Vulnerabilities
In the multi-reward pools `MultiRewardsBasePoolV2` and `MultiRewardsBasePoolV3`, the claim and distribute functions do not check if the provided `_reward` argument is included in `rewardTokens`. For instance, the `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Remove redundant calls to `EnumerableSet::contains`
### Description
**Description:** `EnumerableSet::_add` and `_remove` already [call](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol#L75) `_contains` (or perform similar logic), hence there is no nee... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Add a specific test that uses vaults for both BASE_VAULT and QUOTE_VAULT in MorphoChainlinkO- racleV2Test
### Description
The `MorphoChainlinkOracleV2Test` test contract covers the test cases when a Vault is passed as an input parameter for the `BASE_VAULT` or `QUOTE_VAULT` internal variables. Currently, there ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: _burn() approved users cannot execute normally
### Description
In `ZeroLocker.sol`, we can grant other users permission to operate NFTs through `approve()` or `setApprovalForAll()`. However, the current implementation of `_burn()` is incorrect, resulting in only the owner being able to execute `withdraw()` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | front-running | true | true |
The CashManager contract contains `setEpochDuration` function which is used by `MANAGER_ADMIN` role to update the `epochDuration` parameter.
```solidity
function setEpochDuration(uint256 _epochDuration) external onlyRole(MANAGER_ADMIN) {
uint256 oldEpochDuration = epochDuration;
epochDuration = _epochDurati... | Code4rena | 5 | Ondo Finance |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `mVeNFT` DOS can't trigger the vote function
### Description
The `VoterUpgradeableV2.sol` contract has the function `attachToManagedNFT()`, users use it to delegate their `veFNX` voting power to a `mVeNFT`. One of the things this function does after receiving the new voting power is sub-call to `_poke()` an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Factory's deployment config parameters should be explicit about its values
### Description
The `deployAndInitialize` and `deployTarget` functions accept a `_config` parameter. Its `linker-Factory`, `linkerCodeHash`, `feeCollector`, and `governance` values are taken from the contract's current storage values. I... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Uniqueness of `offer_id` Not Enforced
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> We are aware of this possibility. The offer ids will be stored in another off chain application and will be kept unique, we are not checking this on chain. ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Implement separate interfaces for validation hooks and execution hooks
### Description
Clave accounts are compatible with two types of hooks: **validation hooks** and **execution hooks**. Both of these hooks use the same `IHook` interface, which means both hooks must implement functions that they may not actua... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [06] Market pause is not checked during `contraction`
### Description
In the `Fed` contract, during the `expansion` method is checked that the market is not paused, this requirement is not done during the `contraction`.
### Affected Source Code
* [Fed.sol:105](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-10-inverse/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Transaction Failure Due To Race Condition
### Description
## Purchase Transaction Process
When a buyer initiates a purchase transaction, the seller’s profile issues a receipt. This receipt contains crucial information, such as the master ID and the user profile associated with the transaction. Meanwhile, afte... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Function `cooldown()` is not protected when protocol in emergency mode
### Description
_Submitted by hubble_
[HolyPaladinToken.sol#L228-L235](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-paladin/blob/9c26ec8556298fb1dc3cf71f471aadad3a5c74a0/contracts/HolyPaladinToken.sol#L228-L235)
Function cooldown() is not pro... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: pairTokenBase and poolBase template contracts instances are not initialized
### Description
The constructor of the `PoolFactory` contract creates three template contract instances, but only one is initialized: `poolCommitterBase`. The other two contract instances (`pairTokenBase` and `poolBase`) are not ini... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Replay Attack | true | true | _Submitted by 0x1f8b_
Signature replay in `PoolTemplate`.
#### Proof of Concept
The `redeem` method of `PoolTemplate` verifies the data stored in `incident`, and the verification logic of this process is performed as following:
```solidity
require(
MerkleProof.verify(
_merkleProof,
_targets,
... | Code4rena | 5 | InsureDAO |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | false | true |
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-forgeries/blob/fc271cf20c05ce857d967728edfb368c58881d85/src/VRFNFTRandomDraw.sol#L173>
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-forgeries/blob/fc271cf20c05ce857d967728edfb368c58881d85/src/VRFNFTRandomDraw.sol#L304>
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-forgeries/blob/fc271cf20... | Code4rena | 5 | Forgeries |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | signature | false | false | ## Gas: [G-05]
### Description
Gas is saved if the variable in storage: state_lastValsetNonce is not set to zero, since it is its default value (the tests in remix said a difference of 2246). | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | true | false | ## Medium: `Pool._amountToBin()` returns a wrong value when `protocolFeeRatio = 100%`.
### Description
`Pool._amountToBin()` returns a larger value than it should when `protocolFeeRatio = 100%`.
As a result, bin balances might be calculated incorrectly.
### Proof of Concept
`delta.deltaInBinInternal` is used to upd... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | false | false | ## Gas: Unchecking arithmetics operations that can't underflow/overflow
### Description
Solidity version 0.8+ comes with implicit overflow and underflow checks on unsigned integers. When an overflow or an underflow isn't possible (as an example, when a comparison is made before the arithmetic operation), some gas can ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unnecessary stack variable can be removed
### Description
When returning whether am-AMM is enabled, `BunniHook::_amAmmEnabled` uses a stack variable when it is not necessary and the boolean can instead be returned directly. If better readability is required, the assignment could be made to a named return varia... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Centralized Validator Set Is Not Prevented
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> Each relayer will have power of 1 initially. Each relayer needs to approve of the change so the risk of uneven power distribution is mitigated. Also th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `requestWithdrawal` doesn't estimate accurately the available shares for withdrawals
### Description
The `requestWithdrawal` function inaccurately estimates the available shares for withdrawals by including funds stored in the deposit pool into the already deposited EigenLayer shares. This can potentially l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: First depositor can brick market by forcing very large borrow rate
### Description
The borrow rate is computed in `JumpRateModelV4` as a function of the utilisation:
[JumpRateModelV4.sol#L140-L150](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-07-malda/blob/main/malda-lending/src/interest/JumpRateModelV4.sol#L140... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Incorrect reward claim logic causes loss of access to intermediate epoch rewards
### Description
**Description:** In the current implementation of `Rewards::distributeRewards`, all shares are calculated for participants after a 3-epoch delay between the current epoch and the one being distributed. However, an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Missing highestVotingPower Update in argmaxBlockByStake Resulting in Incorrect Block Selection
### Description
The argmaxBlockByStake function is used to identify the block height with the highest cumulative voting power based on the stakes of voting reputers. However, the calculation for highestVotingPower i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Missing minimum withdrawal amount in `requestBurn` can lead to losses for providers
### Description
When an allowed provider requests to burn their RLP for a given collateral token via the `requestBurn` method, they are at the mercy of the `SERVICE_ROLE` which invokes `completeBurns` and can arbitrarily determ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Double check of the `_supports` variable
### Description
At line https://github.com/lidofinance/aragon-apps/blob/7e5cd1961697a1bc514bfebdeab08a296e51d700/apps/voting/contracts/Voting.sol#L374-L380 there is a double check of variable `_supports`.
The assignment at line https://github.com/lidofinance/aragon-app... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Rounding Error Accumulation in Partial Order Fills Leads to Unfair Cost Distribution
### Description
**Note:**
This finding was submitted after careful consideration. The impact is negligible in practice, as it only manifests when an order is partially filled multiple times, causing tiny rounding errors to acc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Dust will get stuck on the contract
### Description
If the decimals of `reward` and `rewarded` tokens differ (e.g., 18 decimals and 6 decimals), the calculation of the `accumulator` will always lead to some dust being stuck on the contract without the ability to claim it: https://github.com/euler-xyz/reward-st... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: USERS REWARDS LOSS IF FARM SET START REWARDS AFTER DEPOSITS
### Description
During the initialization of the **FarmState**, the **start\_time** is assigned a default value of zero. If this value is not modified before users make deposits, it will create the impression that the **FarmState** has started, allowi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: MixinRefunds: frontrun updateKeyPricing() for free profit
### Description
_Submitted by itsmeSTYJ_
A malicious user is able to withdraw all payments that were paid to a lock owner if the owner increases the keyPrice.
#### Proof of Concept
When `updateKeyPricing()` is called to increase the price of a key... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Non-existent permit function
### Description
The vault implements a [`mintWithPermit`](https://github.com/pods-finance/yield-contracts/blob/9389ab46e9ecdd1ea1fd7228c9d9c6821c00f057/contracts/vaults/BaseVault.sol#L131) and [`depositWithPermit`](https://github.com/pods-finance/yield-contracts/blob/9389ab46e9e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused and uncleared storage mapping
### Description
In the **PledgeAgent** contract, the `btcReceiptMap` mapping is declared but not used anywhere in the contract’s logic. While it is marked as deprecated in the comments, its values are not cleared, leaving data potentially lingering in storage. This can lead... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: TRST-M-8 protectedQuote can be manipulated by calling processDepositQueue when large price moves in base asset occur
### Description
**Description:**
The protectedQuote storage variable ensures that a portion of the liquidity pool is preserved
even in the case of a “contract adjustment event” (i.e. when th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Inaccurate royalty calculation in WERC721::royaltyInfo function
### Description
## Context
**File:** WERC721.sol#L70
**Description:** A unit mismatch exists between how the Bridge and WERC721 contracts handle royalty percentages. The Bridge contract uses 0.001 ether to represent 1%, while WERC721's `royalty... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Simplify the logic in OrchidDirectory.pull() ✓ Fixed
### Description
`pull()` is the most complex function in `OrchidDirectory`, due to its need to handle removing a node altogether when its stake amount reaches 0.
The current logic for removing an interior node is roughly this:
* Given a node to be rem... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Liquidations will leave dust when repaying expired maturities, making it impossible to clear bad debt putting the protocol at a risk of insolvency
### Description
`Market::liquidate()` gets the maximum assets to liquidate from `Auditor::checkLiquidation()`. Then, when repaying maturities, when they have exp... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | true | ## Low: scaleToX64() and scalefromX64() are not inverses of each other
### Description
The `Units` library provides the `scaleToX64()` and `scalefromX64()` helper functions to convert unsigned integers to signed 64x64 fixed-point values, and vice versa. Due to rounding errors, these functions are not direct inverses o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Wrong calculation of surge fee when `lastSurgeTimestamp` overflows
### Description
In the `BunniHookLogic.beforeSwap` and `BunniQuoter.quoteSwap` functions the calculation of `lastSurgeTimestamp` is as follows:
The comment acknowledges that timestamp values can overflow and it is not considered a problem, as... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | true | false | ## Medium: FlashAuction doesn't pass the initiator to the recipient
### Description
Existing flashloans pass the initiator to the recipient in the function's params, e.g. [AAVE](https://github.com/aave/aave-v3-core/blob/master/contracts/flashloan/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol#L29) or [Uniswap](https://github.com/U... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Function parameter not used
### Description
At the line
https://github.com/lidofinance/aragon-apps/blob/8c46da8704d0011c42ece2896dbf4aeee069b84a/apps/voting/contracts/Voting.sol#L211, the `canForward()` function has 2 parameters. But the second parameter has no name and is not used anywhere.
In the `IForwa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Centralization Risks
### Description
**Update**
The client acknowledged the issue and provided the following explanation:
> FixedLock.sol: This contract is used for locking early cooperative users' assets. The logic of this contract includes reward-related logic, but it will never distribute any rewards.
>
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | false | false | ## High: Funds are stuck in new Locker if Locker address is changed for an already existing airdrop
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
**Location**: Airdrop.sol and AirdropFactory.sol
**Description**
If for an already created airdrop, if the locker address is changed in the factory contract, a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: lack of checks in Factory::setBondPercentDiv allow owner to prevent bonding in Auction::bondForRebalance()
### Description
## Handle
GalloDaSballo
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
`setBondPercentDiv` has no checks for min and max
Setting `bondPercentDiv` to 0 will cause `Auction::bondForRebalance()` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: veALCX holder can mint Unlimited FLUX tokens
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/FluxToken.sol
Impacts:
- Protocol insolvency
## Description
## Brief/Intro
`Voter:poke` function can be called multiple times by the veALCX hol... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Variable names that consist of all capital letters should be reserved for `const`/`immutable` variables
### Description
If the variable needs to be different based on which class it comes from, a `view`/`pure` *function* should be used instead (e.g. like [this](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-cont... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: [10] `Vault` contract's withdrawal functions can be paused while its deposit functions are unpaused
### Description
The `Core.pauseVault` function can be called to pause the `Vault.startRedeem` function and/or `Vault.finishRedeem` function while the `Vault` contract's other functions like `deposit` and `mint` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: UserOpMultiSigVerifier::validateData() fails with more than 256 signatures
### Description
## Security Report
**Severity**: Low Risk
**Context**:
- UserOpMultiSigVerifier.sol#L28
- UserOpMultiSigVerifier.sol#L44-L53
**Description**:
If `signatures.length` is larger than 256, then potentially valid or inval... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: No way to update a Stable Swap once assigned to a key
### Description
Once a Stable Swap is assigned to a key (the hash of the canonical id and domain for token), it cannot be updated nor deleted. A Swap can be hacked or an improved version may be released which will warrant updating the Swap for a key.
### ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Wrong design/implementation of `addLiquidity()` allows attacker to steal funds from the liquidity pool
### Description
_Submitted by WatchPug_
The current design/implementation of Vader pool allows users to `addLiquidity` using arbitrary amounts instead of a fixed ratio of amounts in comparison to Uni v2.
W... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Interest rates can become extreme, allowing denial-of-service attacks
### Description
The Ajna protocol calculates interest rates based on the deviation of the meaningful actual utilization (MAU) from the target utilization (TU). If the MAU is sufficiently higher than the TU, then the interest rate will inc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | true | ## Low: Dust due to rounding tax calculations will accumulate in `AngstromL2` and cannot be recovered
### Description
The sum of rewards owed to positions can be less than the total tax amount due to rounding. While it is correct to round down these proportional share calculations, any dust that is not accounted to `u... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | storage | true | true | **Description:** When price hits or goes below 1, [`Licredity::_afterSwap`](https://github.com/Licredity/licredity-v1-core/blob/e8ae10a7d9f27529e39ca277bf56cef01a807817/src/Licredity.sol#L734-L753) auto back-runs a swap to push price up:
```solidity
if (sqrtPriceX96 <= ONE_SQRT_PRICE_X96) {
// back run swap to reve... | Cyfrin | 5 | Licredity |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: The stale price feed update in the _isLoanLiquidatable can cause loss of funds to the lender
### Description
In the `hyperlend-p2p/LendingP2P` contract, the `_isLoanLiquidatable` function is implemented to check whether a particular loan is liquidatable. The `_isLoanLiquidatable` function is called during t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Check For Unvested Amount
### Description
## VTVLVesting::revokeClaim Vulnerability Overview
In `VTVLVesting::revokeClaim`, `amountWithdrawn` for the claim is compared to `finalVestAmt` to prevent the revocation of a claim that has been fully consumed. This method will fail when a user has not cl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Escrowed NFT can be stolen by anyone if no active buyPrice or auction exists for it
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-02-foundation/blob/main/contracts/mixins/NFTMarketCore.sol#L77-L87
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
If a NFT happens to be in escrow with neither ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Possibility of freezing any bridge token account due to lack of freeze authority check
### Description
There is an absence of checks against the `freeze_authority` for `bridged_token_mint` in `lockbox` and `lockbox2` during the initialization of lockboxes:
- `[account(constraint = bridged_token_mint.mint_a... | 0 |
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