prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Roles manager can never be updated
### Description
The Atlendis Labs protocol uses role-based access control to manage permissions and privileges. The manager of the roles is responsible for granting and revoking roles; if necessary, the role manager can be transferred to another address by governance via the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | true | ## High: Unvalidated _vault address in VaultAdapter allows interest rate manipulation
### Description
The `VaultAdapter.rate` function accepts an unvalidated `_vault` address and makes external calls to it without verifying that it is a legitimate vault. An attacker can supply a malicious contract as the vault address... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Improper Implementation of Cosmos SDK Upgrade Procedures
### Description
The regulation module in the Scallop Bank chain does not fully adhere to the Cosmos SDK upgrade procedures. Specifically, the module's ConsensusVersion() method is static and does not reflect proper version management as recommended by C... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: Usage of legacy Coin standard
### Description
Following [AIP-63](https://github.com/aptos-foundation/AIPs/blob/main/aips/aip-63.md), the Aptos team is transitioning from the `Coin` standard to the `Fungible Asset` (FA) standard. It's advisable to adopt the FA standard from the outset to circumvent potential mi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Minipool owner can create unliquidatable loan, imposing bad debt on main lending pool
### Description
In the scenario where the minipool owner is not the same entity as the main pool admin, and the minipool has some borrowing capacity from the main lending pool (available flow), the minipool owner can creat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: New Min/max Price Ratio Can Break Current Price Ratio
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation: This is a good validation to have, but due to the stored constant on ‘Lib_PredeployAddresses’ for the implementation for BobaGasPriceOracle, we... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Missing transferred value check
### Description
There is a check at line https://github.com/MetaLex-Tech/borg-core/blob/9074503d37cfa1d777ef16f6c88b84c98b4f54eb/src/borgCore.sol#L154 which passes if there is any calldata specified for the call. It will also pass if there is some value transferred together w... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Operator Validation in registerOperator Function
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**:
In the registerOperator function of the SymbiosisMiddleware contract, there is a critical bug in the operator validation process. The function is incorrectly checking if th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: OrderNFT ownership and market host transfers are done separately
### Description
The market host is entitled to 80% of the fees collected and can set the URI of the corresponding orderToken NFT. However, transferring the market host and the orderToken NFT is done separately. It is thus possible for a market ho... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing checks for `address(0x0)` when assigning values to `address` state variables
### Description
*There are 5 instances of this issue:*
https://github.com/debtdao/Line-of-Credit/blob/e8aa08b44f6132a5ed901f8daa231700c5afeb3a/contracts/modules/credit/LineOfCredit.sol#L56
https://github.com/debtdao/Line-of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | true | false | ## Medium: Unclaimable reserve assets will accrue in a pool due to the difference between interest paid on borrows and interest earned on supplies
### Description
The interest paid on borrows is calculated in a compounding fashion, but the interest earned on supplying assets is calculated in a fixed way. As a result m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: `unsafeTransfer` results in cumulativeFees increasing
### Description
`Deposit` function in **FeeDistributor**, performs TRSY transfer as follows:
[FeeDistributor.sol:L81-L84](https://github.com/FydeTreasury/veFyde/blob/9148db3e070235465257268bcb0bc333c1d4313a/src/FeeDistributor.sol#L81-L84)
Looking at the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Scaling `winningThreshold` incorrectly reduces randomness distribution
### Description
**Description:** When a user has a boost that results in a >100% probability of winning, the contract adjusts `winningThreshold` to match `boostedTotalProbabilities` in [`Spin::_fulfillRandomness`](https://github.com/Consens... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: Satellite chains can't execute `onlyGovernance` functions
### Description
Satellite chains only queue and execute via `SummerTimelockController`, they never route execution through OZ `Governor::execute`. Any function guarded by `onlyGovernance` (which relies on OZ’s internal governance-call queue) is effec... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect Implementation
### Description
## Handle
0xsomeone
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
The `tokenByIndex` function appears to not perform correctly as it simply checks its input argument and returns it.
## Proof of Concept
N/A.
## Tools Used
Manual Review.
## Recommended Mitigation Steps
I ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Standardize fee denomination
### Description
In relation to L02, there are conflicting definitions of the fee denomination. `BASE_DIVISOR` says that fees are in `Basis points * 100`, while the comment in `getTransferFees()` says they are specified in `basis points * 10`. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | false | false | ## Low: Smart-account benefactors cannot use ERC-1271 signature validation and delegated signers at the same time
### Description
In `USBDMinting::_verifySignature`, a smart-account benefactor cannot use its own ERC-1271 signature logic and delegated signers simultaneously. As soon as any delegate is added to `_delega... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Unused constant `ERC20TOKEN_ERC1820_INTERFACE_ID`.
### Description
**Description**
contract ERC20
ERC20TOKEN_ERC1820_INTERFACE_ID is never used
**Recommendation**
Remove the unused constant `ERC20TOKEN_ERC1820_INTERFACE_ID`.
**Re-audit comment**
Unresolved | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Events is missing indexed fields
### Description
Index event fields make the field more quickly accessible to off-chain.
Each event should use three indexed fields if there are three or more fields.
Instances in: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: The minimum time for earning as a referrer can be bypassed resulting in user claiming earnings before the minimum time.
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
For a referrer to be valid to earn, a minimum of X days since referring should have passed. This is checked by the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | false | ## Low: Missing Fixing Window Data Accumulation After Daily Reset in `drv_update`
### Description
When `drv_update` resets fixing data for a new day, the current `last_asset_tokens` and `last_crncy_tokens` are discarded instead of being accumulated into the new day's fixing data, leading to incomplete fixing price cal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: The reverting functions
### Description
[L-03] The reverting functions _calculateRewards and _transferRewards should be removed, as they are already implemented in the child contract
There are two functions in Quest.sol, which reverts incase they are called. By the revert names, we can understand that these tw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: changeSpotPriceAndDelta() only uses ERC721 version of balanceOf()
### Description
The function `changeSpotPriceAndDelta()` uses `balanceOf()` with one parameter. This is the ERC721 variant. In order to support ERC1155, a second parameter of the NFT id has to be supplied.
```solidity
function changeSpotPriceA... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | false | false | ## Medium: Anyone can open a flash loan for an unprotected receiver
### Description
The [`flashLoan` function](https://gitlab.com/aave-tech/dlp/contracts/blob/1f8e5e65a99a887a5a13ad9af6486ebf93f57d02/contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol#L602) in the `LendingPool` contract allows anyone to execute a flash loan on the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | true | false | ## High: INTEGER UNDERFLOW IN THE DEPOSIT FUNCTION
### Description
In the Solidity programming language, an integer underflow occurs when an integer variable is decremented below its minimum possible value. In Solidity, all integer variables have a fixed size and a fixed range of possible values. For example, `a uint8... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Receipt Token Minting for Fee on Transfer Tokens
### Description
The `MultipliBridger` contract's deposit mechanism fails to properly account for fee-on-transfer (FoT) tokens. The vulnerability manifests in the `deposit` function, which invokes `TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(token, msg.sender, a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: No storage gaps for upgradeable contracts might lead to storage slot collision
### Description
When implementing upgradable contracts that inherit, it is important that there are storage gaps in case new storage variables are later added to the inherited contracts. If a storage gap variable isn't added, when t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Rename mapping
### Description
**Severity** : Informational
**Status** : Resolved
**Description** :
In Contract TokenMigration.sol, the mapping angelInvestors and strageticInvestors store the user's shares. It is advised to rename these mappings to angelInvestorShares and strageticInvestorShares for better ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Nonexistent role can be set in Withdrawable contract
### Description
The internal [`setWithdrawRole` function](https://github.com/UMAprotocol/protocol/blob/9d403ddb5f2f07194daefe7da51e0e0a6306f2c4/core/contracts/common/implementation/Withdrawable.sol#L47) of the `Withdrawable` contract can be used by derived c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `++i` costs less gas compared to `i++` or `i += 1` (same for `--i` vs `i--` or `i -= 1`)
### Description
Pre-increments and pre-decrements are cheaper.
For a `uint256 i` variable, the following is true with the Optimizer enabled at 10k:
**Increment:**
* `i += 1` is the most expensive form
* `i++` costs 6 ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Offchain distribution can be challenged even after the challenge period is over
### Description
There is a constraint on the `approveOffChainDistribution()` function, i.e., it only allows approval-and-distribution of USUAL token rewards if the challenge period for the queued merkle tree is over. However, there... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Metadata size validation
### Description
The `authority` account of each `endo_avs` is entitled to update its metadata information, including `name`, `symbol` and `uri`, as strings. However, there are no verifications in place to prevent those user-provided inputs from being excessively large.
`- prog... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | signature | false | false | ## Gas: Simplify cooldownAssets and cooldownShares using named returns in StakedUSDeV2
### Description
The functions `cooldownAssets` and `cooldownShares` in the `StakedUSDeV2` contract currently declare a return variable within the function body and then explicitly return it at the end. This can be simplified and mad... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: State variables should be cached in stack variables rather than re-reading them from storage
### Description
The instances below point to the second+ access of a state variable within a function. Caching of a state variable replaces each Gwarmaccess (**100 gas**) with a much cheaper stack read. Other less obvi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: PaymentSplitter Beneficiary Amounts to Release Are Not Retrievable
### Description
The [`PaymentSplitter` implementation](https://github.com/Brushfam/openbrush-contracts/blob/553347354de6d0ead6a335ba4c197bdd01fb2d12/contracts/src/finance/payment_splitter/mod.rs) lacks a public function for beneficiaries to per... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `constant`s should be defined rather than using magic numbers
### Description
Even [assembly](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-opensea-seaport/blob/9d7ce4d08bf3c3010304a0476a785c70c0e90ae7/contracts/lib/TokenTransferrer.sol#L35-L39) can benefit from using readable constants instead of hex/numeric literals... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Upon failing to back unbacked debt _reconcileProcessPortal() will leave the converted asset in the contract
### Description
When routers front liquidity for the protocol’s users, they are later reconciled once the bridge has optimistically verified transfers from the source chain. Upon being reconciled, the `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: 64-hop Traversal in `getHigherLevelParents()` Enables Commission Bypass Via Long Chains
### Description
The `getHigherLevelParents()` traverses up to 64 parent hops and only returns the nearest parent for each strictly higher level. An attacker can create a chain of 64 accounts with the same/lower levels, e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Kicked oDAO members' votes taken into account Acknowledged
### Description
oDAO members can vote on proposals or submit external data to the system, acting as an oracle. Data submission is based on a vote by itself, and multiple oDAO members must submit the same data until a configurable threshold (51% by ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: [11] `require()`/`revert()` strings longer than 32 bytes cost extra gas
### Description
See [original submission](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-factorydao-findings/issues/95) for full details. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Missing/Limited Test Suite
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `08ac9cbb07ba87ed6cefbf7d831f5bd88df2799e`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Modify according to recommendations.
**Description:** The project appears to have a limited test suite. Contract... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: LPs cannot specify min amount received in burn function, causing loss of fund for them
### Description
LPs cannot set minimum base or quote amounts when burning LP tokens, leading to potential losses due to price fluctuations during transactions.
### Impact
LPs may receive significantly lower amounts than ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Incompatible with Deflationary and ERC-777 Tokens
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged". The Vector Reserve team provided the following explanation:
> _Not compatible with ERC777 (Will not use ERC777s as well) - Acknowledged_
**Description:** The contracts are not designed to accommodate deflat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | true | false | ## Medium: Griefing attack possible by frontrunning the callDiamondWithEIP2612Signature function call
### Description
The `callDiamondWithEIP2612Signature` function performs two distinct actions:
1. Calls `ERC20.permit` to submit the signature provided by `msg.sender`, ensuring the contract has sufficient allowance to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: [23] Consider emitting an event at the end of the constructor
### Description
This will allow users to easily exactly pinpoint when and by whom a contract was constructed.
BridgeRouterFacet.sol ([29-29](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-dittoeth/blob/91faf46078bb6fe8ce9f55bcb717e5d2d302d22e/contracts/face... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: PROTOCOL CAN BECOME UNUSABLE DUE TO DOS
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
There is a problem with the use of for loops in `_pendingInterests` functions. The loops go through `_approvedBorrowers` array so if this array grows enough to txs run out of gas then there... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Remove unused _delegate parameter from BitcornOFT constructor
### Description
The `BitcornOFT.sol` contract's constructor includes an unused `_delegate` parameter that is never utilized in the constructor body:
```solidity
constructor(address _lzEndpoint, address /*_delegate*/ )
OFTCore(18, _lzEndpoint, addre... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Attackers can sandwich changeParameters calls to steal funds
### Description
The `changeParameters` function does not adjust the reserves according to the new parameters, which results in a discrepancy between the virtual reserves of a pool and the reserves of the tokens in the Hyper contract.
An attacker ca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Mistakenly sent eth could be locked
### Description
If ERC20 and eth are transferred at same time, the mistakenly sent eth will be locked.
There are several functions that could be affected and cause user fund lock:
* `addCollateral()`
* `addCredit()`
* `increaseCredit()`
* `depositAndClose()`
* `dep... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Returned Variables from Function Calls in `UniswapV3Pool` Can Cause Underflow Reverting
### Description
In the `_burnLiquidity()` function, the tokens owed for the liquidity are represented as `collect0` or `collect1`. If any of those variables is `0`, one of the `withdrawPayload.fee` will underflow, causing a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Chain Halting Due to Precision Loss in Slashing
### Description
There is potential for precision errors when utilizing `TruncateInt`, particularly when dealing with **TotalLiquidStakedTokens**. For example, `Slash` may be called in ABCI, and the `TruncateInt` function within `Slash` (as shown below) may introd... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Unused Interfaces
### Description
**Update**
The `CreditToken` contract now implements `ICreditToken`.
**File(s) affected:**`oracles/PriceOracle.sol`, `oracles/interfaces/PriceOracle.sol`, `credit/CreditToken.sol`, `credit/interfaces/ICreditToken.sol`
**Description:** There are some cases where an interface ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Missing Guard in `vote_confirm_notification()` Allows Multiple Executions of Proposal Action
### Description
**Update**
The team fixed the issue as recommended. Addressed in: `9266d11f6e9fa9a3ec15ba23c8c4d73165fcad71`.
**File(s) affected:**`contracts/elections_master.fc`
**Description:** The `vote_confirm... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Cancellation of minipool may skip MinipoolCancelMoratoriumSeconds checking if it was cancelled before
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-gogopool/blob/main/contracts/contract/MinipoolManager.sol#L225-L227
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-gogopool/blob/main/contracts... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: Wrong liquidation value when withdrawn amount is non-zero
### Description
## Report
## Severity
Low Risk
## Context
PositionsManagerForAaveLogic.sol#L438-L439
## Situation
When `_withdrawnAmount` is non-zero, the `liquidationValue` computation uses `assetData.liquidationValue` but should use `assetData.liqu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Worker-Induced Denial-of-Service in Deployment Requests Due to Lack of a Cancellation Mechanism
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-03-crestal-network-judging/issues/509
## Found by
0x180db, 0x23r0, 0x73696d616f, 0xDarko, 0xYjs, 0xhiros, AuditKiller, Cybrid, DeLaSoul, DharkArtz... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: `ReportSlashingEvent` reverts if outdated balance is below slashing amount
### Description
`OracleManager::generatePerformance` is supposed to be called once every hour (or at any other interval specified by `MIN_UPDATE_INTERVAL`). It updates the stats of every validator and also updates the `totalBalance`. I... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | true | false | ## Medium: Exchange - validateOrderParam does not check against SUPPORTED_ORDER_VERSION ✓ Fixed
### Description
`validateOrderParam` verifies the signature and version of a provided order. Instead of checking against the contract constant `SUPPORTED_ORDER_VERSION` it, however, checks against a hardcoded version `2` in... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Inaccurate `maxWithdraw` and `maxRedeem` Function Results
### Description
The issue was identified within the [`sUSX`](https://github.com/dforce-network/OFT/blob/2ff5d7a8f9a509006557bf5de72fabf40d1138a5/src/sUSX.sol) contract.
These functions do not account for the `MSDController.mintCap` value, which lead... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Grief Attack | false | false | ##### Description
The `permit()` data, once submitted, is publicly accessible in the mempool, allowing anyone to execute the permit by replicating the transaction arguments. Once `permit()` has been called, the second call with identical parameters will revert.
In a scenario where a signed transaction includes `PERM... | MixBytes | 5 | EYWA |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: L16] Multiple wrong comments
### Description
###### Low
In the [`computeVote`](https://github.com/BeamNetwork/currency/blob/51b65c5c7af455391af2bc30d13d761566d8c236/contracts/inflation/CurrencyGovernance.sol#L255) [function of the](https://github.com/BeamNetwork/currency/blob/51b65c5c7af455391af2bc30d13d7615... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: Reentrancy vulnerability in `Basket` contract's `initialize()` method.
### Description
_Submitted by broccolirob_
A malicious "publisher" can create a basket proposal that mixes real ERC20 tokens with a malicious ERC20 token containing a reentrancy callback in it's `approve()` method. When the `initialize(... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: USDC OF THE INTERNAL BALANCE CAN BE DRAINED BY ANY USER THROUGH THE FERTILIZERFACET.MINTFERTILIZER FUNCTION
### Description
In the `FertilizerFacet`, the `mintFertilizer()` function is used to buy Fertilizer in exchange for USDC:
### Recommendation
**SOLVED**: The `Beanstalk team` corrected the issue by cons... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: No default function for transferring ETH or tokens
### Description
None of the contracts (PRBProxy, PRBAnnex, or SablierV2ProxyTarget) provide any way to transfer ETH or Tokens out of the proxy. This seems like a common use case where funds that somehow arrived in the proxy need to be sent out or withdrawn by ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: Collateral redemptions might be prevented unnecessarily
### Description
`TroveManager` does not allow redemption of collateral when the TCR is lower than the MCR.
As we can read in the Liquity V1 [documentation](https://github.com/liquity/dev/tree/main?tab=readme-ov-file#lusd-token-redemption), the purpose of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Vault logic may not be sufficient to claim airdrops.
### Description
One reason noted for creating an external contract address as a vault was to be able to accept airdrops that could be `sweep()`ed by the owner to another address. The vault may offer limited functionality for this behavior since most airdrops r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: TransferBenchmarkLib Understates Native & ERC20 Transfer Costs
### Description
## Severity: Medium Risk
## Context
- `TransferBenchmarkLib.sol#L46-L80`
- `TransferBenchmarkLib.sol#L115-L176`
## Description
### Native Transfer
1. The call to `balance(target)` warms the target account in advance, meaning t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | true | ## High: Loss of decimal precision leads to free tokens
### Description
The Sai system uses the fixed point decimal representation to handle fractional values. Fixed point arithmetic is known to lack precision when dealing with multiplication or division. These operations are used to compute token prices. The resultin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing ETH `receive()` Function Despite Withdraw Functionality
### Description
The `MonsterNFT` contract implements a `withdraw()` function that allows authorized users to withdraw ETH from the contract, indicating that the contract is designed to handle ETH. However, the contract lacks a `receive()`, `fallba... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | false | false | ## Gas: save storage slot
### Description
cache the state variables
### Impact
the gas saved is 20000*2 | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Tokens Can Get Stuck While Finalizing Deposit
### Description
In the `L1BatchBridgeGateway` contract, [`IL1ERC20Gateway.getL2ERC20Address`](https://github.com/scroll-tech/scroll/blob/84f73c76d2cfd0b07640315fc85e7e43eef98498/contracts/src/batch-bridge/L1BatchBridgeGateway.sol#L297) retrieves the corresponding `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Lender is able to seize the collateral by changing the loan parameters
### Description
_Submitted by Ruhum, also found by IllIllI, WatchPug, BowTiedWardens, gzeon, plotchy, and scaraven_
The lender should only be able to seize the collateral if:
* the borrower didn't repay in time
* the collateral loses ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: The worker and reputer's payload may be tampered due to lack of check for the pubkey's ownership
### Description
`InsertBulkWorkerPayload` and `InsertBulkReputerPayload` does not check the ownership of the pubkey.
As the result, the data from worker or reputer may be tampered.
### Impact
The worker and reput... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: A borrower can not repay to a USDC blacklisted lender
### Description
A borrower transfers `LOAN_TOKEN` directly to a lender when repaying their loan will cause the loan can not to be repaid when the lender is blacklisted by the `LOAN_TOKEN`.
### Impact
1. The borrower can not repay their loan
2. The borro... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Assigning both Keeper and Governance roles to _admin is risky
### Description
Infrared has two key roles: **Governor** and **Keeper**.
- **Governor**:
- Access controls critical protocol functions.
- Initially expected to be a multisig with plans to transition to a token-based governance.
- **Keeper**:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: The fee may be changed during the auction.
### Description
**Description**
The platform owner can change the fee of the platform at any time without any restrictions at any moment during the existence of the auction. As a result, if this functionality is used in bad faith, you can change the fee of the auc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: `execute()` with `isFailed == true` always reverts
### Description
_Resolved_
The `Execute.execute()` function accepts `isFailed` parameter but will always revert when called with `isFailed == true`, due to agent not being created:
Since no agent token is created when `isFailed == true`, the `agent` address... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: A single holder can grief the payouts of all holders forwarding their payouts to the same forwarder
### Description
**Description:** This grief attack is similar to [issue [*Forwarders can lose payouts of the holders forwarding to them*](#forwarders-can-lose-payouts-of-the-holders-forwarding-to-them)](https:/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | liquidation | true | false | ## Gas: Prefer array assignment over pushing elements in for-loops
### Description
It is more cost-effective to directly assign `tokenAddresses` to `s_collateralTokens`.
Saving on gas based on the number of elements in `tokenAddresses`: (was measured without gas optimizer)
| | 1 Element in `tokenAddresses` | 2 Elem... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: OFT Transfers Revert if Chains Have Different Local Decimals
### Description
In the `OFTTransportAdapter` contract, the `_transferViaOFT` function [checks](https://github.com/across-protocol/contracts/blob/c5d7541037d19053ce2106583b1b711037483038/contracts/libraries/OFTTransportAdapter.sol#L97) if the expec... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect comments
### Description
**Instances (2)**
1. Auction Loan liquidator -> User Vault
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-06-gondi/blob/ab1411814ca9323c5d427739f5771d3907dbea31/src/lib/UserVault.sol#L13
2. `address(0)` = ETH -> address(0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE) = ETH
https://gith... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | true | false | ## Low: Standard ERC-20 approve function usage.
### Description
**Description**
Ethereum mempool is the place where all pending transactions sit until the miner decides to include them into the block. For most cases, transactions with the highest gas prices are included first as the miners get the gas price for inclu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Calling TermMaxMarket.setLsf leaks value to attackers via a sandwich attack
### Description
## TermMax AMM Vulnerability Report
## Context
(No context files were provided by the reviewer)
## Relevant Context
TermMax implements a novel AMM model via which users can access fixed-rate or leveraged yield strate... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: makePayment doesn't properly update stack, so most payments don't pay off debt
### Description
As we loop through individual payments in `_makePayment`, each is called with:
```solidity
(newStack, spent) = _payment(
s,
stack,
uint8(i),
totalCapitalAvailable,
address(msg.sender)
);
```
This call re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Unclaimed LP Tokens in Zap Contract
### Description
This issue has been identified within the `zapOut` function of the `Zap` contract.
When the `proportional` parameter is set to `false`, LP tokens may remain on the contract after the operation completes. An attacker could exploit this by passing custom S... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: NO NEED TO INITIALIZE VARIABLES WITH DEFAULT VALUES
### Description
Initialization to 0 or false is not necessary, as these are the default values in Solidity.
Code Location
-------------
```
BtcLightClient.sol::170 => for(uint i = 0; i uint256 totalWeight=0;
BtcLightClient.sol::196 => for (uint256 inde... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: 3S-LENFT-N26 GenesisNFT.sol: use payable(address(this)) instead of payable(this)
### Description
The current implementation of the GenesisNFT.sol contract has the following receive function:
```solidity
// Function to receive Ether
receive() external payable {
revert("G:RECEIVE_NOT_ALLOWED");
}
```
This functi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect logic in `Bits::unsetBit` when applied to a zero bit
### Description
`Bits::unsetBit` might not work as expected for cases when the bit to be unset is not 1.
It is currently implemented as:
```solidity
function unsetBit(
uint bitmap,
uint bit
) internal pure returns (uint) {
return bitm... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Active and pending bets can be cancelled by anyone
### Description
**Description:** [`Bet::cancel`](https://github.com/gskril/wannabet-v2/blob/d7333369548874cb99e9648ea2424ac1e67cc23f/contracts/src/Bet.sol#L163-L176) allows any address (except the maker) to cancel a bet while it is in the `ACTIVE` or `PENDI... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Default max_loss on underlying vault
### Description
At line: https://github.com/jmonteer/yearnV2-strat-SNX-staking/blob/91b839df4a350d80cb583795bccafe0836fdb732/contracts/Strategy.sol#L512 the `withdrawFromSUSDVault()` function is not specifying max_loss parameter. This can lead to unavailability of withd... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [FIXED] Missing zero address validation for recepient leads to possible loss of fund in `TopUpAllowedRecipients`
### Description
In the function [`createEVMScript`](https://github.com/lidofinance/easy-track/tree/425f4a254ceb2be389f669580b9dc76618e92756/contracts/EVMScriptFactories/TopUpAllowedRecipients.sol#L9... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: generateMnemonic
### Description
The `generateMnemonic` function can throw an exception due to an invalid argument (Figure 11.1). This is not recommended, as a caller might propagate the `null` return value to other parts of the program, and the nullability has to be dealt with, possibly in multiple remote pl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | true | false | ## Medium: potentialDebt is not compared against a new lien's maxPotentialDebt in_appendStack
### Description
In `_appendStack`, we have the following block:
```solidity
newStack = new Stack[](stack.length + 1);
newStack[stack.length] = newSlot;
uint256 potentialDebt = _getOwed(newSlot, newSlot.point.end);
...
if (
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Impossible withdraw for smart contract
### Description
If any smart contract deposits NFT to StakingRewardsV3 it must have `onERC721Received()` function or `withdraw()` will always revert:
https://github.com/keep3r-network/StakingRewardsV3/tree/13ecc6966ae1a413f62224382bfd4d64b1a22351/contracts/StakingRewards... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Update of poolManager() will cripple TransferProxy s
### Description
Other contracts have a way to update the `poolManager()`. If they do that, the old `poolManager()` won't be able to continue functioning normally. Consequently, `transferAssets()` can't be used anymore and the assets will stay stuck in the `T... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | true | false | ## Gas: `NFTVault.sol`: `struct PositionPreview` can be tightly packed to save 1 storage slot
### Description
From (see `@audit` tags):
To: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: Someone can create non-liquidatable auction if the collateral asset fails on transferring to `address(0)`
### Description
_Submitted by antonttc, also found by 0x52_
[Witch.sol#L176](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-yield/blob/main/contracts/Witch.sol#L176)
[Witch.sol#L399](https://github.com/code-423n4... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Wallet file permissions
### Description
Wallets are created with default file-access permissions (0666 & ~umask). On some systems, this may result in the creation of a world-readable file.
```javascript
fs.writeFile(filename, JSON.stringify(encryptedWallet), (err) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
return;
}... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | false | false | ## Medium: Block of the emergency withdrawal of arbitrary tokens.
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**description**
TestStake::emergency WithdrawErc20()::availableBalance. The local variable availableBalance is calculated independently of the address of the withdrawn ERC20 token. Consequentl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Failure to Clear Investor Attributes After Removal
### Description
## Investor Removal in Registry Service
In `registry_service::remove_investor`, when an investor is removed, only their main record in the `investors` table is deleted. Any associated data, such as compliance attributes, remains in the `att... | 0 |
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