prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: No good way to disable routes in HubPool
### Description
Within the `SpokePool` there exists the [`enabledDepositRoutes` mapping](https://github.com/across-protocol/contracts-v2/blob/bf03255cbd1db3045cd2fbf1580f24081f46b43a/contracts/SpokePool.sol#L58), which lists routes that have been approved for deposits (... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: NDS min/max value should be properly validated to avoid tx to always fail/skip loop
### Description
`PositionsManagerForAaveLogic` is currently initialized with a default value of `NDS = 20`. The `NDS` value is used by `MatchingEngineForAave` when it needs to call `DoubleLinkedList.insertSorted` in both `up... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use a more recent Solidity version
### Description
The compiler version used 0.8.9 is a bit old (current version is 0.8.19). This version was released more than a year ago and there have been four applicable bug fixes to this version since then. While it seems that those bugs don't apply to the Parcel project,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | integer-overflow | true | false | ## Low: Unnecessary validation in `Ignite::getRegistrationsByAccount`
### Description
In [`Ignite::getRegistrationsByAccount`](https://github.com/Benqi-fi/ignite-contracts/blob/bbca0ddb399225f378c1d774fb70a7486e655eea/src/Ignite.sol#L512-L536), there is [validation](https://github.com/Benqi-fi/ignite-contracts/blob/bb... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Potential out of gas in while loops
### Description
The while loops in `offboard()` and `getApprovers()` can run out of gas if a large number of approvers is added. This is unlikely to occur in practice because adding approvers is a privileged operation.
```solidity
function offboard() external {
...
whil... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect information in redeem-documentation
### Description
Currently, the protocol documentation file `03-Fund-Flows` section `B.Redeeming` states that in order to execute `redeem`, `benefactor` must send USDB to the `USDBMinting` contract. However, this is not implemented in the code. The code calls the `U... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Add `unchecked {}` for subtractions where the operands cannot underflow because of a previous `require()` or `if`-statement
### Description
`require(a `require(a <= b); unchecked { x = b - a }`
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-10-blur/blob/2fdaa6e13b544c8c11d1c022a575f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Computation of internal stack hash uses wrong prefix string
### Description
The `prover::machine::Machine::stack_hashes` function computes hashes of the co-thread frame stacks, value stacks, and internal stack using a prefix string (figure 26.1). The value stack and the internal stack pass in the same prefix (“... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | liquidation | true | false | ## Gas: `GlobalImpliedCollateralService.swingTraderCollateralRatio()`: should use memory instead of storage variable
### Description
See @audit tag | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Including Interest In Vault CR Calculation
### Description
## Redeem Collateral and Liquidate
The `redeem_collateral` and `liquidate` functions calculate the collateral ratio (CR) for a vault, which is used in redemption and liquidation calculations. However, these functions do not account for the updated ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: In the constructor, there is no return of incorrect address identification
### Description
In case of incorrect address definition in the constructor , there is no way to fix it because of the variables are immutable.
[OffchainDNSResolver.sol#L44-L45](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-ens/blob/45ea10bacb... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Votes can't be delegated
### Description
The protocol is missing some function to delegate votes to other users.
This is important as not all users will participate in DAO voting (as there is no direct incentive), and those votes could be delegated to other users they trust and will be actively participating ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: PermitPositionManagerApproval should use the correct type for the status parameter
### Description
The `status` parameter of the signature refers to the enum `PositionManagerApproval` value. The Enum type in Solidity can represent at max 256 values and are of type `uint8`. Consider being consistent with the re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: `ParticlePositionManager::onERC721Received` allows all ERC721 tokens
### Description
[``ParticlePositionManager::onERC721Received``](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-particle/blob/main/contracts/protocol/ParticlePositionManager.sol#L98-L111):
As you see above all ERC721 tokens are accepted. This can cau... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Open `TODO` in the code
### Description
There is an open `TODO` in `unlockFor` - this implies changes that might not be audited. Resolve it or remove it | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | USDT | true | false | ## Severity: Medium Risk
## Context
- **NomadFacet.sol**: Lines 176-242
- **AssetLogic.sol**: Lines 308-362, 263-295
- **PortalFacet.sol**: Lines 179-197
- **Executor.sol**: Lines 142-339
## Description
Some functions like `_reconcileProcessPortal` of `BaseConnextFacet` and `_swapAssetOut` of `AssetLogic` do `safeApp... | Spearbit | 5 | Connext |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: Remove owner calls can be replayed to remove a different owner at the same index, leading to severe issues when combined with lack of last owner guard
### Description
Users are able to upgrade their account's owners via either directly onto the contract with a regular transaction or via an ERC-4337 EntryPoint... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `DeployUsdxlUtils`: `UsdxlInterestRateStrategy` contract is deployed twice
### Description
`DeployUsdxlUtils`: The function `_deployUsdxl` deploys `UsdxlInterestRateStrategy` in step 3 :
But in step 10 of `_deployUsdxl`, calls `_updateUsdxlInterestRateStrategy()` which deploys `UsdxlInterestRateStrategy` for... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | storage | true | false | ## High: An account that confirms a transaction via AssetProxyOwner can indefinitely block that transaction ✓ Fixed
### Description
When a transaction reaches the required number of confirmations in `confirmTransaction()`, its confirmation time is recorded:
**code/contracts/multisig/contracts/src/MultiSigWalletWithT... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: 10] lastRewardBlock Should Be Updated to Current Block When Resuming Emissions
### Description
**Severity:** Medium
**Path:** contracts/ZEALInfinityPool.sol#L300-L304
**Description:** When emissions are paused and later resumed via the `setEmissionsPaused(false) `function in the `ZEALInfinityPool` contra... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: FiatTokenV1 / V2: Remove `whenNotPaused` modifier from `cancelAuthorization()` and `decreaseAllowance()` functions
### Description
Just like how `removeMinter()` doesn’t have the `whenNotPaused` modifier, it would be very beneficial useful (eg. when a hack / rug pull occurs) to allow users to revoke allowances... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: BOT role to RepricingOracle contract
### Description
The access control on both `swEXIT.processWithdrawals()` and `RepricingOracle.submitSnapshotV2()` check for the `SwellLib.BOT` role via `checkRole(SwellLib.BOT)`, even though the latter function calls the former. Giving the `SwellLib.BOT` role to the `Repric... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [07] `IRuniverseLand.PlotSize` contains non-mintable sizes
### Description
The enum `PlotSize` als contains entries for 256x256, ..., 4096x4096 plots, although they are not mintable using these contracts. Consider removing them in order to not confuse developers that built on top of the project and use this in... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: The PublicERC6492Validator won't work on all evm compatible chains due to reverting veri- fier not being deployed
### Description
The `SignatureCheckerLib.isValidERC6492SignatureNow` function won't work as expected if the reverting verifier is not deployed. There are some popular EVM compatible chains where it ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | true | false | ## Medium: Signature library does not revert on invalid signature
### Description
There is no check to ensure `ecrecover()` does not return zero. As such, any invalid signature is treated as valid and returned as the zero address.
### Impact
The impact of this could potentially be quite severe. Anyone could forge any... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Locked funds from tokenization are credited twice to user leading to protocol fund loss
### Description
The tokens optionally locked during tokenization are released twice on acquiring conviction back from an NFT. (The incorrect double debit of locked funds during tokenization has been filed as a separate fin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: The missing check for a recipient's address
### Description
There are two functions - https://github.com/cryptoalgebra/Algebra/blob/bddd6487c86e0d6afef39638159dc403a91ba433/src/periphery/contracts/base/PeripheryPayments.sol#L21 and https://github.com/cryptoalgebra/Algebra/blob/bddd6487c86e0d6afef39638159dc403a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Unsecure `transferFrom`
### Description
_Submitted by 0x1f8b, also found by 0xNineDec and StErMi_
The security of the `Yieldy` contract is delegated to the compiler used.
### Proof of Concept
The `allowance` of an account does not have to reflect the real balance of an account, however in the `transferFr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | true | false | ## Medium: Missing input validation on flash close fee factors
### Description
The `FliquidatorFTM` contract allows authorized parties to set the flash close fee factor. The factor is provided as two integers denoting numerator and denominator. Due to a lack of boundary checks, it is possible to set unrealistically hi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Vault Token Can Be Incorrectly Added as a Withdrawal Asset
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `188498cfd641fea3ea3a232f1fceb95bec3d5bdd`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Fixed
**File(s) affected:**`src/WithdrawController.sol`
**Description:** In the `W... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: compatibility: authorizeOperator and revokeOperator should revert when the caller and operator are the same account ✓ Fixed
### Description
From [ERC 777](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-777):
>
> NOTE: The *holder* (`msg.sender`) is always an `operator` for itself. This right SHALL NOT be revoked. He... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Interfaces should be moved to separate files
### Description
Most of the other interfaces in this project are in their own file in the interfaces directory. The interfaces below do not follow this pattern | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | true | ## Low: Reward loss risk when transitioning between reward vault types
### Description
When a user's default reward vault type for an asset is changed (e.g., from NATIVE or BGTM to INFRARED) in the `InfraredBGTMetaVault` contract, current logic attempts to claim outstanding rewards before switching the type. However, ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: CloseFactor unbounded
### Description
In `Comptroller.sol`, it is mentioned that `closeFactorMantissa` should be greater than `closeFactorMinMantissa` and less than `closeFactorMaxMantissa`. But in `_setCloseFactor`, these are not checked, meaning `closeFactorMantissa` can be set to a value outside the boundar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: Publish-subscribe protocol users are vulnerable to a denial of service
### Description
The API3 system implements a publish-subscribe protocol through which a requester can receive a callback from an API when specified conditions are met. These conditions can be hard-coded when the Airnode is configured or st... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Missing `initializer` modifier on constructor
### Description
OpenZeppelin [recommends](https://forum.openzeppelin.com/t/uupsupgradeable-vulnerability-post-mortem/15680/5) that the `initializer` modifier be applied to constructors in order to avoid potential griefs, [social engineering](https://forum.openzeppe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Not optimal data type
### Description
At the line https://github.com/RealityCards/RealityCards-Contracts/blob/8c0b05b25a7deef25f98532ae2f8afd4f9a84360/contracts/RCFactory.sol#L42 uses an array. But with the use of structure, the code will become clearer.
### Recommendation
It is recommended to make a structur... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Flawed Logic in case of Shared Escrow
### Description
## Vulnerability in `pool::try_autoclose_pool`
The vulnerability in `pool::try_autoclose_pool` lies in the logic for handling `PoolType::Token`. Specifically, the function checks the `pool.amount` field to decide whether the pool has enough SOL to purchas... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: Lack of domain separator validation allows for replay attacks on different chains
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The execute function in Forwarder contract is designed to process requests by verifying the authenticity of signatures using the `_verifySig` function. ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Malicious user can control premium emissions to steal margin from other traders
### Description
A malicious user can force premiums to be applied in a positive direction for their positions. They can effectively steal margin from other traders that have filled the other side of their positions.
### Impact
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: Fixed participants can claim more premium than expected
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** High, wrong premium amount will allow some participants to withdraw more than others
**Likelihood:** High, always occur as fixed participants will claim premiums
**Description**
`claimFixedPremium()` is called... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | initialization | false | false | ## Gas: Initialising to Default Values
### Description
When initialising a variable to its default variable, it is cheaper to leave blank. I ran a test in remix that initialises a single variable and got a saving of 2,246 gas.
contract Test {
uint256 public variable = 0; (69,312 gas)
vs
uint256 public variab... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Funds lock if all users choose same direction and price is incorrect
### Description
The only way to withdraw tokens from the contract (excluding the fees sent to the treasury) is through `claimReward()`.
```solidity
function claimReward(uint256 marketId, uint256 roundId) external {
Round memory round = m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: V3AMO integration with V3 does not collect LP fees when burning liquidity.
### Description
SolidlyV3AMO supplies liquidity for the Boost-USD pool. When users call `unfarmBuyBurn` to burn liquidity from SolidlyV3AMO, the LP fees should be collected as well. However, the current integration does not correctly c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Superpositions.onlyminter() has wrong implemerantion, leading to wrong access control
### Description
The `SuperPositions.onlyMinter()` function has a faulty implementation, which results in incorrect access control. The issue arises because the current implementation compares the `formImplementationId` inste... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [08] Update stale modifiers from `VaultManagerV1` used in `VaultManagerV2`
### Description
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-04-dyad/blob/4a987e536576139793a1c04690336d06c93fca90/src/core/VaultManagerV2.sol#L49-L51
This modifier is used to know if a vault is licensed or not; however, the implementation is s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Edge cases with rebalanceCooldown and rebalanceWindow
### Description
If `rebalanceCooldown < rebalanceWindow` then `onlyWhenRebalancing` is immediately true, which is probably unwanted. The modifiers `onlyWhenNotRebalancing` and `onlyWhenRebalancing` are each other's inverses, but their code is different. If ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-08-velar-artha-judging/issues/96
### Description
## https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-08-velar-artha-judging/issues/96
PARAMS = {
'MIN_FEE' : 1_00000000,
'MAX_FEE' : 1_00000000, # 10%/block
'PROTOCOL_FEE' : 1000,
'LIQUIDATION_FEE' : 2,
'MIN_LONG_COLL... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [03] `Runiverse.withdrawAll` uses `send` instead of `call` to send ETH
### Description
The function `withdrawAll` uses `send` for sending ETH. This function only provides a 2300 gas stipend, which might not be sufficient. However, in this context this is not very severe in my opinion because the function is on... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Unaccounted Extended Credit Value
### Description
## User Collection Management
In User, collections owned by users are organized as a linked list structure. When a user possesses a key with a locking credit of zero, invoking `recalculateMinMaintCredit` facilitates the removal of the corresponding collection... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: User can give himself approval for all assets held by `MagnetarV2` contract
### Description
When calling [MagnetarV2.\_permit(...)](https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapioca-periph-audit/blob/023751a4e987cf7c203ab25d3abba58f7344f213/contracts/Magnetar/MagnetarV2.sol#L1025-L1049) through invoking a permit (or per... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Unused code
### Description
An observation reveals that the `migrate` entry point has neither been defined nor included in the `csprUSD` contract's entry point definitions.
Consequently, this entry point will not be acknowledged by the contract and will remain inaccessible from external sources.
Furthermore,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistency in byte size of maxInterestRate
### Description
In `RouterStorage`, `maxInterestRate` has a size of `uint88`. However, when being set from `file()`, it is capped at `uint48` by the `safeCastTo48()` function.
### Recommendation
Make sure these two values align. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Protocol can collect less or more fees than expected due to constant `claimFee` per transaction regardless of how many boxes are claimed
### Description
`DropBox::claimDropBoxes` allows users to pass an array of `boxIds` to claim per transaction while charging a constant `claimFee` per transaction:
```solidity... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: `collateral` should be immutable
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In the contract RWAHub.sol on the line 25 there is a state variable which value is assigned during in the constructor and not defined elsewhere in the code.
**Recommendation**:
add the `immut... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Prefer explicit function for renouncing ownership and 2-step ownership transfer
### Description
**Description:** [`RewardsDistributor::setOwner`](https://github.com/SolidlyV3/v3-rewards/blob/6dfb435392ffa64652c8f88c98698756ca80cf28/contracts/RewardsDistributor.sol#L459-L462) and [`SolidlyV3Factory::setOwner`](... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | upgrade | false | true | ## Low: Missing storage gap in `AbstractERC721Multiplier` can lead to upgrade storage slot collision
### Description
[`AbstractERC721Multiplier`](https://github.com/dexe-network/DeXe-Protocol/tree/f2fe12eeac0c4c63ac39670912640dc91d94bda5/contracts/gov/ERC721/multipliers/AbstractERC721Multiplier.sol) is an upgradeable ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | dos | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-blueberry-judging/issues/45
## Found by
chaduke
## Summary
A borrower might drain the vault by calling ``borrow()`` repeatedly with small borrow amount that converts to a zero debt share each time.
## Vulnerability Detail
This is possible because ``borrow()`` doe... | Sherlock | 4 | Blueberry |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing or Incomplete Documentation
### Description
Docstrings provide essential context for contracts, functions, events, and state variables within smart contracts. They clearly explain intended behavior, usage, and relevant parameters, greatly enhancing readability, maintainability, and ease of security aud... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | false | false | ## High: Wrong accounting logic when syncRewards() is called within beforeWithdraw makes withdrawals impossible
### Description
_Submitted by Lambda, also found by bin2chen and Critical_
`sfrxETH.beforeWithdraw` first calls the `beforeWithdraw` of `xERC4626`, which decrements `storedTotalAssets` by the given amount. ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Custom Errors
### Description
Custom errors from Solidity 0.8.4 are cheaper than revert strings (cheaper deployment cost and runtime cost when the revert condition is met) while providing the same amount of information, as explained [here](https://blog.soliditylang.org/2021/04/21/custom-errors/)
Custom errors... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Emergency withdrawal code present
### Description
Code and functionality for emergency stop and withdrawal is present in this code base.
### Recommendation
To remove the emergency code and fully test all the affected contracts. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: Incorrect response from price feed if called during an onERC1155Received callback Acknowledged
### Description
The ERC 1155 standard requires that smart contracts must implement `onERC1155Received` and `onERC1155BatchReceived` to accept transfers.
This means that on any token received, code run on the re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | true | false | ## Low: [04] Tautology, slippage check is ineffective
### Description
Because `amountOut = amountFeiIn;` and `amountFeiOut = amountIn;` there is no slippage, and no risk for any front-run.
The check below is always true for that reason:
[SimpleFeiDaiPSM.sol#L54-L55](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-09-tribe/blob/7... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Incorrect taking out of `tail` account
### Description
If `creditAccount == tail` then `tail` is not updated properly and this will break the list of accounts:
https://github.com/Gearbox-protocol/gearbox-contracts/blob/0ac33ba87212ce056ac6b6357ad74161d417158a/contracts/core/AccountFactory.sol#L260
### Recomm... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: Unbounded loop when validating Merkle proofs ✓ Fixed
### Description
It seems like the loop for validating Merkle proofs is unbounded. If possible it would be good to have an upper bound to prevent DoS-like attacks. It seems like the depth of the tree, and thus, the length of the proof could be bounded.
T... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Code Maturity
### Description
## Refinement in Selector Expressions
For clarity and conciseness, it is worth considering a refinement in selector expressions, specifically those resembling the format of `TTTrackerTokenV2(address(0)).initialize.selector`. A more concise and equally effective alternative exists... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Unchecked Uint256 to Uint128 Down-Cast May Truncate Very Large Deposits
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `a3b3121`.
**File(s) affected:**`contracts/CampTimelockEscrowNativeOFT.sol`
**Description:** The `bridgeOut()` function performs unchecked down-casting from `uint2... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | true | false | ## High: Fund Loss Due to Lack of Whitelisting and Address Validation in BurnAndBridge Function
### Description
In the **burnAndBridge** function of a smart contract, there is an issue due to the absence of validations for **destChainId** and recipient address. - The function does not check if the **destChainId** prov... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | true | ## Medium: Use of ERC20 tokens that could become inflationary or deflationary
### Description
If the bridge uses an ERC20 token that is inflationary, deflationary, or has any kind of dynamic supply or balance, its bookkeeping may be severely affected. The bridge contract was not designed for tokens that can suddenly c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Less active nominees can be left without rewards after an year of inactivity
### Description
### Impact
The `VoteWeighting` within the protocol requires some sort of activity for nominees at least every 53 weeks to maintain its functionality properly. However, some nominees can be less active. Particularly... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Validation | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-01-ajna-judging/issues/103
## Found by
hyh
## Summary
ERC721Pool's take() and bucketTake() use remaining collateral variable to adjust borrower's collateral ids array after their debt is settled in an auction. In both cases this variable isn't initialized in Auctions'... | Sherlock | 4 | Ajna |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Incompatibility of `ERC20::approve` function with USDT tokens on Ethereum Mainnet chain
### Description
The `ERC-20` standard specifies that [`approve`](https://github.com/Creepybits/openzeppelin/blob/ecafeabad405536f647ac07567a1d74ad60eb14f/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#L81) function should return a bool... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unlocked Pragma
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `85815bfc317cd527c9819e7a8704cee78227c09e`.
**File(s) affected:**`BountyV1.sol`
**Description:** Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.8.*`. The caret (`^`) bef... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Wrong design/implementation of freeTrial allows attacker to steal funds from the protocol
### Description
_Submitted by WatchPug_
The current design/implementation of `freeTrial` allows users to get full refund before the `freeTrial` ends. Plus, a user can transfer partial of their time to another user using... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | false | false | ## Medium: EXECUTOR has a full write access to the wallet storage
### Description
EXECUTOR has a write access to any storage slots vie the executeShortcut function and delegatecall to a specially crafted library. This allows to trigger
transfer/renounce of the OWNER address and other unintended actions.
https://github... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Sequencers can re-order forced and non-forced batches
### Description
Sequencers have a certain degree of control over how non-forced and forced batches are ordered. Consider the case where we have two sets of batches; non-forced (NF) and forced (F). A sequencer can order the following sets of batches (F1, F2)... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Constants on the left are better
### Description
If you use the constant first you support structures that veil programming errors. And one should only produce code either to add functionality, fix an programming error or trying to support structures to avoid programming errors (like design patterns).
https:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Router - handling of native assetID (0x000..00, e.g. ETH) not implemented
### Description
`Contract.ts` does not implement the native Asset (`0x000...000`; `ETH`). Transaction value is hardcoded to zero. `approveTokensIfNeeded` will likely fail as it will attempt to contract call `0x0` and there is inconsisten... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Allowance reset for incorrect token in `SmartVaultYieldManager::_sellUSDC`
### Description
When swapping `USDC` in `SmartVaultYieldManager::_sellUSDC`, there is an allowance given to the router:
```solidity
IERC20(USDC).safeApprove(uniswapRouter, _balance);
ISwapRouter(uniswapRouter).exactInput(ISwapRouter.Ex... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Missing NatSpec
### Description
In the newest version of the `ClaveImplementation` contract, two new arguments have been added to the `initialize()` function. These two arguments have not yet been added to the function's NatSpec, which would help with further documentation.
### Recommendation
Consider adding ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: TroveManager's RewardIntegral update logic is flawed, users may be receiving less rewards than expected
### Description
TroveManager rewards users with the Bima token based on the amount of debt they have. Rewards are updated by the `_updateIntegrals` function. The updating mechanism is similar to Sushiswap Ma... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Use of Foundry 's ffi cheatcode should be avoided if possible
### Description
The function `constructCreate2Salt()` utilizes Foundry's FFI cheatcode to generate a salt for the deterministic deployment of contracts, which is dependent on the version of those contracts.
**Warning:** The use of FFI is consid... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Deadline Check in the `GluexRouter.swap()` Function
### Description
The `swap()` function in the `GluexRouter.sol` contract executes a route, delegating all calls encoded interactions to the `executor`.
However, this function does not include a **deadline check** to ensure that the swap is executed wi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Conversion Limit Mapping Access Restricted
### Description
The `conversionLimit` mapping in the `LRTConverter` contract lacks a public getter, limiting the ability to access current asset conversion limits. This can hinder effective management and transparency.
### Recommendation
The development team has fixe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: depositors face immediate loss in case `equity = 0`
### Description
The vulnerability in the `valueToShares` function exposes users to significant losses in case the equity `(currentAllAssetValue - debtBorrowed)` becomes zero due to strategy losses, users receive disproportionately low shares, and take a lo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use globally available Solidity variables in `C.sol`
### Description
When specifying units of time in Solidity, literal numbers can be used with the suffixes `seconds`, `minutes`, `hours`, `days` and `weeks`. In the `C.sol` constants library, the following is recommended: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: Unchecked output of the ECDSA recover function
### Description
The [`ECDSA.recover` function](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v2.5.1/contracts/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#L28) (in version `2.5.1`) returns `address(0)` if the signature provided is invalid. This function is used twice i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: No Lower Bound for `maxFeeBasisPoints`
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client stated that this is expected by design.
**File(s) affected:**`BatchTrade.sol`
**Description:** The `reduceMaxBasisPoints()` allows the maximum fee to be set to a lower value. It is important t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: RubiconMarket.feeTo set to zero-address can DoS buy function
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-rubicon/blob/8c312a63a91193c6a192a9aab44ff980fbfd7741/contracts/RubiconMarket.sol#L297-L300
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
In the `RubiconMarket` contract, the `feeTo`... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: `LibBytes::packAddressAndStem` calculated twice with the same parameters
### Description
`LibSilo::_removeDepositsFromAccount` [calls](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Beanstalk/blob/dfb418d185cd93eef08168ccaffe9de86bc1f062/protocol/contracts/libraries/Silo/LibSilo.sol#L597) `LibBytes::packAddressAndStem` aft... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | true | ## Low: Misconfigured deploy may lead to unusable system
### Description
The `hat` SaiTub state variable is the system parameter controlling the Sai debt ceiling. It is of type `uint256` and never explicitly initialized, thus taking an initial value of zero. This variable is used to enforce the debt ceiling in `SaiTub.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | integer-overflow | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent Risk Premium Validation in `Accounting` Allows Future Underflows or Zero APR
### Description
`Accounting::calculateRiskPremium` computes `risk = riskX + riskY * pow(tvlRatio, riskK)`.
`Accounting::setRiskParameters` checks that `risk < 1e18` (i.e., less than 100%) immediately after updating the p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: The `Gateway.query()` Function Does Not Return Excess Fees for Executing `Query` Request
### Description
In the `query()` function, the contract `Gateway.sol` requires the users to pay a `estimateFee()` for executing a query.
However, it does not handle the situation where the user pays more `msg.value` th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Potential Hash Collisions in Namespace Constants Due to 4-Byte Limitation
### Description
In the `Namespaces` contract, only the first 4 bytes of the hash are being used to define namespaces (e.g., `bytes4 constant ROLES = bytes4(keccak256("ROLES"));`). This truncation significantly increases the likelihood of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | true | ## Medium: DoS when user want to supply / repay asset using a permit
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://pacific-explorer.manta.network/address/0x2f9bB73a8e98793e26Cb2F6C4ad037BDf1C6B269
Impacts:
- Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
## ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Withdrawals are stuck Forever if Staking is done at a time after `endTime`
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
In contract `StakingManager.sol`, if a user stakes at a time such that the `stake.timestamp > EndTime`, then the users funds will be stuck forever. In other words, if the user s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Not backed by any physical asset
### Description
USD token is what is called a “fiat” currency. Fiat money is an intrinsically worthless object, that is deemed to be money by law (in this case, US law). This means that users of USD token are required to trust the US government to exist and operate correctly i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Rogue users can prevent minting tokens via mintGTToAddress
### Description
The `mintGTToAddress()` function mints tokens for many users via `_safeMint()`. This function makes an `onERC721Received()` callback for each user. If any of these users make the transaction revert, or if attempting to transfer a token ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Accounts not properly removed from roles upon revoking
### Description
When an account is revoked from a role, `_revokeRole` function removes account from the members set.
function _revokeRole(bytes32 role, address account) internal virtual {
if (hasRole(role, account)) {
_roles[role].members.remove(ac... | 0 |
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