prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [09] Fix misleading function name and natspec in `GameItems.sol`
### Description
The function `instantiateNeuronContract` should be renamed to `setNeuronContract`, because it conveys what the function actually does.
Additionally, update the comment, to be more accurate: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: `L2AssetRouter._ensureTokenRegisteredWithNTV` `assetId` return value is never assigned, which will cause `withdrawToken` to fail
### Description
The `_ensureTokenRegisteredWithNTV` function in the [`L2AssetRouter.sol`](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-10-zksync/blob/cfc1251de29379a9548eeff1eea3c78267288356/er... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: TwapOracle doesn't calculate VADER:USDV exchange rate correctly
### Description
_Submitted by TomFrenchBlockchain_
#### Impact
Detailed description of the impact of this finding.
#### Proof of Concept
On L156 of `TwapOracle` we perform the calculation:
result = ((sumUSD * IERC20Metadata(token).decimal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | token | true | true |
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-05-dodo-cross-chain-dex-judging/issues/416
## Found by
0xc0ffEE, AnomX, CoheeYang, Cybrid, EgisSecurity, X0sauce, edger, hunt1, pyk, silver\_eth, wellbyt3
### Summary
Whenever [`withdrawToNativeChain`](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-05-dodo-cross-chain-dex/b... | Sherlock | 5 | DODO Cross-Chain DEX |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Attackers can increase voting power by incentivizing
### Description
_Submitted by Tomo_
If the benefit to be gained from the outcome of the vote is less than the cost of obtaining the right to vote, the outcome of the vote is influenced.
### Proof of Concept
* [Governor.sol#L248-L297](https://github.co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Compromised or malicious vetoer can veto any proposals with unrestricted power
### Description
_Submitted by rbserver, also found by ayeslick and rvierdiiev_
The `settings.vetoer`, which is the first founder defined by the `FounderParams`, can call the following `veto` function to veto any proposals that a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: Initializers could be front-run
### Description
**Description:**
Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case force a re-deployment. The script deployment is permitting this front-run attack.
**Recommendations:**
Mak... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | true | ## Medium: `getStakedAmount` can be manipulated
### Description
`getStakedAmount` returns `stakedAmount` of Aegis vault within Berachain reward's vault by calling `balanceOf`.
```solidity
function getStakedAmount(IBerachainRewardsVault rewardsVault) private view returns (uint256 stakedAmount) {
if (address(reward... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `createVault` and `changeVault` miss vault assignment checks across tokens
### Description
Each vault must be unique to a token. However, the `createVault` and `changeVault` functions do not check whether the vault key is already assigned to another token. This could result in a vault being overwritten or mist... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | access-control | false | true |
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/main/src/Escher.sol#L11>
<https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/blob/65420cb9c943c32eb7e8c9da60183a413d90067a/contracts/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol#L150>
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/main/src/Escher721Factor... | Code4rena | 5 | Escher |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Sanity check non-zero amount for outgoing transactions
### Description
The non-zero amount check is enforced only for incoming transactions. This means that for outgoing transactions, it is possible to specify a zero amount, enabling a DoS attack vector when attempting to `settle()` for ERC20 token implementat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Important Points to Consider and Keep in Mind Acknowledged
### Description
Granting someone else control over one’s own account – even if the intention is to have limitations in place – is an inherently dangerous operation. Hence, it is of crucial importance that users have a thorough understanding of the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | true | false | ## Low: `MintType` is almost never enforced
### Description
The contract has an enumeration `MintType` which defines several types of mints:
```solidity
enum MintType {
OpenMint,
Whitelist,
Claim,
Burn
}
```
But there are never any checks for these mint types, for example:
* there is no check for `Min... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Fail fast in `LiquidationBranch::checkLiquidatableAccounts`
### Description
In `LiquidationBranch::checkLiquidatableAccounts` there is no point calling `GlobalConfiguration::load` if the function is going to exit early because `upperBound - lowerBound == 0`. Hence only load global config if this isn't the case... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect accounting in `veRAACToken::emergencyWithdraw` and `veRAACToken::withdraw` due to missing `totalLocked` update
### Description
The `veRAACToken::emergencyWithdraw` and `veRAACToken::withdraw` functions allow users to withdraw locked tokens. However, neither function updates the `_lockState.totalLo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Consider enforcing a min TWAP interval in `StrategyPassiveManagerUniswap::setTwapInterval` to avoid dangerous assignment
### Description
**Description:** The way TWAP oracle works in UniswapV3 is:
$$tickCumulative(pool,time_{A},time_{B}) = \sum_{i=time_{A}}^{time_{B}} Price_{i}(pool)$$
$$TWAP(pool,time_{A},t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: KnightingRound tokenOutPrice changes
### Description
_Submitted by reassor, also found by cccz and cmichel_
`Function.buy` buys the tokens for whatever price is set as `tokenOutPrice`. This might lead to accidental collisions or front-running attacks when user is trying to buy the tokens and his transactio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: RPC DOS via `TraceTx`
### Description
The `TraceTx` method in `x/evm/keeper/grpc_query.go` implements a gRPC query interface that allows simulation and tracing of specific transactions based on provided configurations. This method enables users to perform detailed execution simulations for transactions in a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Incorrect withdrawn funds
### Description
## Withdrawal Queue Process Overview
In `process_withdraw_queue`, the formula for calculating the amount of USDC tokens to return depends on the value of `redeemable_mint.supply`. If the instruction is processing more than two withdrawal requests, then `redeemable_mi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Unnecessary initialization
### Description
`startTime`: unnecessary initialization to zero.
https://github.com/MetaLex-Tech/borg-core/blob/9074503d37cfa1d777ef16f6c88b84c98b4f54eb/src/libs/conditions/deadManSwitchCondition.sol#L11
### Recommendation
We recommend making improvements from the description. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Non-assembly method available
### Description
`assembly{ id := chainid() }` => `uint256 id = block.chainid`, `assembly { size := extcodesize() }` => `uint256 size = address().code.length`
*There is 1 instance of this issue:* | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Collector Role Is Not Relinquished During Lock Transferral
### Description
Owners of a lock can set collector addresses through the [`setCollectAddress`](https://github.com/uncx-private-repos/liquidity-locker-univ3-contracts/blob/342c621cc93a13882601b30e547907877f3e3f86/contracts/UNCX_ProofOfReservesV2_UniV3.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Public functions not called by the contract should be declared external instead
### Description
Contracts are allowed to override their parents’ functions and change the visibility from external to public and can save gas by doing so.
`withdraw`
- [Pool.sol#L44](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-non-fung... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect Proposers in `_obtainProposalMsg()` Due to Dynamic Node Count
### Description
**Update**
The client fixed the issue in commit `40b267f11cee1b822fe90e80902f2718efa5fa8d` by no longer obtaining the proposers of a proposal in `_obtainProposalMsg()`. Instead, the proposers of a proposal can be queried vi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Lack of Validation Checks
### Description
## Batch Liquidation of Troves in Trove Manager
The `batch_liquidate_troves` function in the trove-manager is missing checks for active troves, sorted order, and duplicate entries, which affects the proper functioning of the liquidation process.
## Issues Identif... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Misleading comments
### Description
Within the codebase, some misleading comments or docstrings were identified. For example:
* [Line 271 of `Accounts.sol`](https://github.com/celo-org/celo-monorepo/blob/f64b4c5b5228ecbf41e3e7cfdbb8c0e9a983eea2/packages/protocol/contracts/common/Accounts.sol#L271) indicates ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: Replay attack (EIP712 signed transaction)
### Description
[contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L212](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L212)
Signed transaction can be replaye... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | false | false | ## High: Reentrancy in settleAuction(): malicious publisher can bypass index timelock mechanism, inject malicious index, and rug the basket
### Description
_Submitted by kenzo, also found by itsmeSTYJ and jonah1005_
The `settleAuction()` function calls `withdrawBounty()` before setting `auctionOngoing = false`, there... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: NatSpec is missing
### Description
NatSpec is missing for the following functions, constructor and modifier: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `internal` functions only called once can be inlined to save gas
### Description
### Proof Of Concept
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-wenwin/tree/main/src/Lottery.sol#L203
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-wenwin/tree/main/src/Lottery.sol#L279
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-wenwin/tree/m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Unnecessary access control and incorrect mutability
### Description
The `BalancerPoolHelper` contract limits access to its [`getSwapFeePercentage`](https://github.com/radiant-capital/v2-core/blob/e8f21f103e17736907b62809d1ad902febc53714/contracts/radiant/zap/helpers/BalancerPoolHelper.sol#L453) function with t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Lack of rounding protection for open price of a perpetual contract
### Description
The assignment to `open_price`, when updating it to reflect a filled order, rounds down. It could potentially drift low through the actions of a user intent on getting a lower-than-fair `open_price` for manipulation purposes. S... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Early funds withdrawers can get bonus in multiples of vested bonus tokens (e.g. 2-times, 3-times, etc.)
### Description
_Submitted by hubble, also found by Ruhum_
### Vulnerability details
The function setBonusToken allows the same BonusToken to be added more than once to the array bonusTokens.
functi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [08]
### Description
Even after a vetoer is burned, the owner can still update it. This can reduce the confidence in the system, as the owner always has complete veto control. Consider making the burning operation final. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: User can avoid bankrupting by calling `PositionManager.moveLiquidity` where to index is bankrupted index
### Description
Bucket could become insolvent and in that case all LP within the bucket are zeroed out (lenders lose all their LP). Because of that, `PositionManager.reedemPositions` [will not allow to red... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Pauser accounts can reset the pause period indefinitely
### Description
The [`HoldefiPauser` contract](https://github.com/holdefi/Holdefi/blob/f4df394d7cf6df347b1f1e9af8e2676c5933c2c9/contracts/HoldefiPauser.sol) implements a pausable functionality for certain cases. [Each one of them](https://github.com/holde... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Centralization Risks
### Description
**Severity** - Low
**Status** - Acknowledged
**Description**
All privileged and critical state changing functions are protected with a onlyOwner modifier, it should be made sure that the owner is a multisig with a timelock. Handling all the power to a single address will... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Arithmetic gas optimisation
### Description
**Severity:** Low
**Path:** St1nch.sol:_withdraw#L202
**Description:**
In the function `St1nch.sol:_withdraw` on line 202 the unlock time of the deposit is set to the minimum of the original unlock time and the current timestamp. However, this arithmetic operatio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `swEXIT::setWithdrawRequestMaximum` and `setWithdrawRequestMinimum` lacking validation can lead to a state where `withdrawRequestMinimum > withdrawRequestMaximum`
### Description
**Description:** Invariant `withdrawRequestMinimum withdrawRequestMaximum`.
**Recommended mitigation:**
**Swell:** Fixed in comm... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: Oracles’ internalId Can Be Duplicated, Leading to Unrecoverable Link Tokens
### Description
The `internalId` is constructed from the Keccak hash of `msg.sender` and `_externalId` (which is an arbitrary value sent by the caller). Although the Chainlinked contracts increment this value, it is possible for con... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: addLiquidity(...) can be griefed
### Description
An attacker can DoS/block another user from providing liquidity to the Hyperdrive. The attack works as follows:
1. The attacker frontruns a transaction that would call `addLiquidity(...)` by opening the maximum possible short. In case of no or small outstandin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Not checking for 0 addresses
### Description
Some constructors do not check that an initialized `address` is not `0`. This could result in loss of control or locked funds. Examples include:
* [`beneficiary` address](https://github.com/fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core/blob/29aeefddd97f31c7f2a598fb3dca3ef24dc0be... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Miscellaneous General Comments
### Description
This section details miscellaneous findings discovered by the testing team that do not have direct security implications:
1. **Use of Magic Numbers**
Constants should be defined rather than using magic numbers. The number `50400` is used for `MAX_WITHDRAWAL_D... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Comments not updated after branching
### Description
There are a lot of references to the old owner-related code. The comments should be updated to talk about the new RBAC system
1. File: src/KnightingRound.sol
$ grep owner src/KnightingRound.sol
* @notice Finalize the sale after sale duration. Can onl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: Potential signature malleability in ERC865Token
### Description
As [highlighted in the EIP 865’s ongoing discussion](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/865#issuecomment-456921193), its current full implementation is affected by a signature malleability issue, steaming from the fact that in the current ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect fee amount set when gauge is killed
### Description
Expected value is 5%, but `FEE_DENOM = 1_000_000`. Hence, the actual protocol fee set is a lot lower.
### Recommendation
```solidity
/// @dev set the new fees in the pair to 95/5
- ramsesV3PoolFactory.setPoolFeeProtocol(pair, 5);
+ ramsesV3PoolFact... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Interest rates are updated incorrectly
### Description
#### Resolution
This issue was independently discovered by the Aave developers and had already been fixed by the end of the audit.
The function `updateInterestRates()` updates the borrow rates of a reserve. Since the rates depend on the available li... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Borrow fees can be arbitrarily increased without the maker providing any value
### Description
The SpotHedgeBaseMaker LPs can maximize their LP returns by closing their trades against other whitelisted makers
### Impact
Value extraction in the form of excessive fees, at the expense of traders on the other ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Fixed reward percentage for liquidators in the eUSD vault may cause a liquidation crisis
### Description
To not lose generality, the same issue is present in the `LybraPEUSDVaultBase` contract.
Liquidations are essential for a lending protocol to maintain the over-collateralization of the protocol. Hence, ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Function `setNewBatch()` from `SystemContext.sol` can be optimized
### Description
**File:** `SystemContext.sol`
This issue requires code-refactoring of some code, thus it was reported separately.
[File: code/system-contracts/contracts/SystemContext.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-zksync/blob/main/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Avoid duplicated code
### Description
Duplicate code makes it harder to understand the code’s intention and thus, auditing the code correctly. It also increases the risk of introducing hidden bugs when modifying one of the copies of some code and not the others.
The logic in [transfer](https://github.com/Win... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | true | ## Medium: Wrong `accLoanRatePerSeconds` in `repay()` can lead to underflow
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-10-real-wagmi-judging/issues/119
## Found by
HHK, handsomegiraffe
When a Lender call the [`repay()`](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-10-real-wagmi/blob/b33752757fd6a9f40... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: Deposit cap not updated on withdrawals
### Description
User deposits are capped by [increasing the `totalDepositedAmountPerUser`](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-2-contracts/blob/3f345ce52bc378c4b5d710c80d817db170775049/ethereum/contracts/zksync/facets/Mailbox.sol#L266) counter. However, the counter is ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Use of revert strings over custom errors
### Description
Throughout the file in scope, there are several instances of use of revert strings over custom errors.
In Solidity development, replacing hard-coded revert message strings with the `Error()` syntax is an optimization strategy that can significantly ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: `setApprovalForAll()` function is double initialized in the child contract
### Description
At the moment, there is a double function initialization of the ERC1155 `setApprovalForAll()` function both in the parent `RWASegWrap` and the child `SecuritizeRWASegWrap` contracts:
```
// @inheritdoc IERC1155
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Potential mismatch in allowed gas limit for sequenced and queued transactions
### Description
Both enqueued and sequenced transactions are expected to be limited in the amount of gas they can consume. For enqueued transactions the [`enqueue` function](https://github.com/ben-chain/contracts-v2/blob/a935e276f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Liquidators will not be incentivized to liquidate certain PartyB accounts due to the lack of incentives
### Description
Liquidating certain accounts does not provide a liquidation fee to the liquidators. Liquidators will not be incentivized to liquidate such accounts, which may lead to liquidation being del... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Address Variable Names
### Description
## Parameter Naming Guidelines
Several functions and one structure use `address` as the parameter name:
1. `fees::fees_write`
2. `fees::fees_remove`
3. `protocol::end`
4. `protocol::streamflow_fee`
5. `protocol::withdrawal_frequency`
6. `protocol::automatic_withdrawal`
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: MISSING VIEW FUNCTION THAT DISPLAYS ALL THE TICKETS OWNED BY A USER
### Description
In the `RaffleMintV1` contract, there is no view function that displays what tickets are currently owned by a user.
The tickets would be mixed after `clearRaffle()` is called, which makes it very difficult for users to know wh... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Updating fee share when an overriding referrer exists
### Description
This is how the referrer fee is assigned in the BeeKeeper function ->
But it is possible that the above referrer has an overriding referrer, in that case, the fee share for the overriding referrer should also be updated.
If `referrerOverr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing and Incomplete Documentation
### Description
Throughout the codebase, there are multiple code instances that do not have docstrings.
* The [`upgradeChainFromVersion`](https://github.com/matter-labs/era-contracts/blob/d5c5d7a7c3a458f131e5de72c6c134a172e6763d/l1-contracts/contracts/state-transition/cha... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: A math quirk in Javascript allows anyone to take down any validator or the full network with an HTTP GET request.
### Description
Report type: Blockchain/DLT
Target: https://github.com/shardeum/shardeum/tree/dev
Impacts:
- Network not being able to confirm new transactions (total network shutdown)
## Desc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Maintainer can bypass exit game quarantine by registering not-yet-deployed contracts ✓ Addressed
### Description
The plasma framework uses an `ExitGameRegistry` to allow the maintainer to add new exit games after deployment. An exit game is any arbitrary contract. In order to prevent the maintainer from add... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `PreMarkets::createOffer` allows a user to create an offer with `eachTradeTax` more than `Constants.EACH_TRADE_TAX_MAXINUM` allowing the user to even charge 100% of the future sales
### Description
`PreMarkets::createOffer` allows a user to create an offer with `eachTradeTax` more than `Constants.EACH_TRADE_TA... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Wrong token transfer in `executeWithdrawal()`
### Description
The `executeWithdrawal` function in the `DepositUSD` contract is incorrectly implemented to send ETH instead of the USD tokens (e.g., DAI, sDAI) that users originally deposited.
The contract attempts to send ETH using `call{value: amount}` even th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Repeated Function
### Description
The `_toBytes32` [`internal` function](https://github.com/across-protocol/contracts/blob/401e24ccca1b3af919dd521e58acd445297b65b6/contracts/erc7683/ERC7683OrderDepositor.sol#L355) of the `ERC7683OrderDepositor` contract has the same logic as the imported `toBytes32` [function]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Incorrect Reward Updates upon xINTX Minting
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `2a51fba4fcbba13c524b2b9ddbc736c8eadaf9ee`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Fixed using lastTokenId instead of _tokenId.
**File(s) affected:**`StakedINTX.sol`
**Description... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Multiple contracts cannot be paused
### Description
For safety, tapioca has added `whenNotPaused` restrictions to multiple contracts
But there is no method provided to modify the `_paused` state
If a security event occurs, it cannot be paused at all
### Impact
Due to the inability to modify `_paused`, it p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Multiple native OFTs can be created for the same token mint
### Description
According to the technical docs :
> each token mint can be associated with up to 1 native OFT and unlimited adapter OFTs
The protocol emphasizes that each token mint can be associated with only **one Native OFT** but can have multipl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Utilization Of Unsuitable Rounding Direction
### Description
## Loss of Funds Scenario in Lending Pool
There is a possibility of a loss of funds scenario in `lending_pool` due to the incorrect rounding direction in the share calculations during borrowing and withdrawing, resulting in inaccurate conversion be... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: Token Authorities Seed Collision
### Description
## Token Holder Accounts
The Token holder accounts `debt_originator` and `collateral_token_holder` are used to hold debt and collateral tokens owned by the program PDA accounts.
1. **debt_originator** - `pda(debt_type.account_info.key, debt_type.nonce)`
2. **c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Ambiguity in Approval Flow Due to Lack of Revocation Status Check
### Description
This report identifies a potential ambiguity in the SpendPermissionManager contract’s handling of approved and revoked permissions. Specifically, the `isApproved` function returns false for both unapproved and revoked permissions... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [03] Unsanitized error messages in `gRPC` API responses should be frowned upon
### Description
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-11-nibiru/blob/8ed91a036f664b421182e183f19f6cef1a4e28ea/x/evm/keeper/grpc_query.go#L255-L293
The `gRPC` API endpoints directly return raw error messages to users without any sanit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Import declarations should import specific identifiers, rather than the whole file
### Description
Using import declarations of the form `import {} from "some/file.sol"` avoids polluting the symbol namespace making flattened files smaller, and speeds up compilation.
*There are 13 instances of this issue. (For... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Fee is applied asymmetrically in `sell()` comparing to `buy()`
### Description
The fee is always taken in ETH, so in `buy()` it firstly subtracts the fee from the input amount and only after performing a swap:
However, in `sell()` fee is taken on the output amount. It means that fee size is different from th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Zksync's quorum logic in `GovernorCountingFractional` is broken since it wrongly specifies the COUNTING MODE
### Description
The `GovernorCountingFractional.sol's` quorum logic is broken cause it attempts to only count `for` votes for quorum but wrongly specifies it in the COUNTING MODE
### Impact
The countin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: Refund mechanism for failed cross-chain transactions does not work
### Description
There is a refund mechanism in `USDO` and `TOFT` modules that will return funds when the execution on the destination chain fails.
It happens when `module.delegatecall()` fails, where the following code (see below) will trigge... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: refund – attacker can lock insurance holder’s refunds by calling refund before a refund was allocated ✓ Fixed
### Description
`addPremium` is used to determine the refund amount that an insurance holder is eligible to claim. The amount is stored in the `refundMap` mapping and can then later be claimed by anyo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused Imports
### Description
Some files contain unused imports:
- contracts/adapters/midas/MidasIssuanceVaultAdapter.sol: ICreditManagerV3
- contracts/adapters/midas/MidasRedemptionVaultAdapter.sol: IMidasRedemptionVault
### Recommendation
We recommend removing unused imports.
> **Client's Commentary**
Fix... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: OP Chain deployment process is not compatible with MCP L1
### Description
The reviewed MCP L1 upgrade makes L1 contract implementations re-usable by different OP Chains, via their respective L1 proxy contracts. However, the process of deploying OP Chains wasn’t updated accordingly: when setting up a new chain,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Using idle balance in computing isGranted doesn't account for freezed & blacklisted tokens
### Description
In `MinVotingPowerCondition.isGranted`.
```solidity
function isGranted(address _where, address _who, bytes32 _permissionId, bytes calldata _data)
public
view
override
returns (bool)
{
(_where, _data... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: LACK OF PARAMETER LIMITS
### Description
It has been detected that some parameter-modifying functions do not have logical limits. This may cause the contract to function with parameter values that, although allowed, make no sense in the application context, which might cause various problems or even render ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Don't update state | false | true |
GiantMevAndFeesPool.beforeTokenTransfer will try to distribute the user's current rewards to the user when transferring GaintLP, but since beforeTokenTransfer will not call StakingFundsVault.claimRewards to claim the latest rewards, thus making the calculated accumulatedETHPerLPShare smaller and causing the user to lo... | Code4rena | 4 | Stakehouse Protocol |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Users May Accidentally Deposit into Malicious or Misconfigured Vaults
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**:
Since anyone can deploy a vault via the factory contract and assign themselves as the owner and manager, users might unknowingly deposit funds into vaults contr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect balance computed in `getUsersConfirmedButNotSettledSynthBalance()`
### Description
_Submitted by hack3r-0m and cmichel_
Consider the following state:
User calls `shiftPositionFromLongNextPrice(marketIndex=1, amountSyntheticTokensToShift=100)`
This results in following state changes:
Due to s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Presale round does not return ETH
### Description
**Description**
CryptoBearWatchClub.sol, presaleMint()
presaleMint() function does not return excess ETH amount like the mint() function does. Thus
ETH may be left stuck on the contract.
**Recommendation**:
Verify the presaleMint() should not return exces... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | initialization | true | false | ## Gas: `++i` costs less gas compared to `i++` or `i += 1`
### Description
`++i` costs less gas compared to `i++` or `i += 1` for unsigned integer, as pre-increment is cheaper (about 5 gas per iteration). This statement is true even with the optimizer enabled.
The same is also true for `i--`.
`i++` increments `i` an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Emergency Timelock Bypass: No Enforced 1-Day Delay for Emergency Actions
### Description
The `TimelockController` is designed to enforce a delay for governance actions, including emergency actions that are supposed to wait 1 day (`EMERGENCY_DELAY`) before execution. However, the code allows **instant** emergen... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Fee value is not validated in constructor
### Description
The pool fee value is checked in the `setFee` method and in `enableFeeAmount` as well with `require(fee <= 100000);`, but this check is omitted in the `SolidlyV3Pool` constructor, which means the initial fee can be set to a larger value. The check shoul... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Updates to `maintenanceMarginRatio` May Open Positions up to Liquidation
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> MMR values are usually set cautiously to ensure that the current position is not affected.
**File(s) affected:**`Broker.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: Griefer can permanently DOS all the deposits to the `StakingPool`
### Description
Griefer can DOS the whole `StakingPool` by `donating` tokens before the first actual `deposit` comes in. After that, it's not possible for any deposits transactions to complete.
### Impact
Permanent Denial of Service (DOS) of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: Multiple redemptions of position are possible
### Description
The `redeemObligation` function does not change the state of the position to `ObligationRedeemed`. This allows an attacker to call it multiple times, potentially gaining an unlimited amout of the collateral token. Currently, this issue is unexploit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Global Generic and Local Keytypes Are Allowed
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `b9a15b0335423f25bb280c84042408d9bcd60f10`.
**File(s) affected:**`derivation/src/oracle.rs`
**Description:** The `try_from()` function implemented for `MemoryOracleClient` matches the `prei... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: The beneficiaryWithdrawable function can be called by anyone ✓ Fixed
### Description
The `beneficiaryWithdrawable` function is supposed to be called by the Agent when a beneficiary is trying to withdraw funds:
**code/src/Agent/AgentPolice.sol:L320-L341**
```
function beneficiaryWithdrawable(
address reci... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Liquidator can receive outsized incentives by aiming the best liquidable CDPs first
### Description
While the issue is not limited to batch processing and is related to the overall protocol design, we first illustrate the **batch liquidations case** by showing that stale ICRs can be used, which enables the e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: [01] Potential for silent arithmetic overflow in exponent adjustment
### Description
Even if the sign detection bug were somehow “fixed,” the direct usage of `exp(10, N)` in EVM for `\(N \approx 76\)` is still borderline for 256‐bit arithmetic. In particular:
* `\(10^{76}\)` is already `\(\approx 2^{252.8}\)`... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Cancelling an auction refunds the wrong amount for unrevealed offers
### Description
When the admin cancels an auction, an incorrect amount of purchase tokens is returned for unrevealed offers. The array `sortedOffers` is used on line [1162], while it should be `unrevealedOffers`. As a result, the amount for ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: protocolFeeShare() might return a value different than the actual used value
### Description
In the following code snippet:
```solidity
} else if (protocolFee > MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE) {
protocolFee = MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE;
}
```
when `convertFees()` is called, if the `ProtocolConfig` sends back a protoco... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Deployment process for card contracts can be vulnerable to front-running
### Description
The deployment and initialization process for card contracts is not necessarily atomic, as not all the required state variables are stored in the contract deployment init data. To finish the storage initialization, an `op:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Early withdrawal is impossible if the Fee Receiver is not set
### Description
**Severity:** Low
**Path:** St1inch.sol:earlyWithdrawTo#L155-L170
**Description:**
The function `St1inch.sol:earlyWithdrawTo` is designed to give users the opportunity to withdraw earlier than the staking period end time. However... | 0 |
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