prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: UNSAFE MATH CALCULATIONS
### Description
Testing revealed that calculations within the smart contract did not make use of a safe math library. While Solidity pragma > 0.8.0 reverts to overflows by default, the code was making use of an older compiler version; thus it is vulnerable to integer overflows and unde... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | false | false | ## High: Possible burn of zero shares
### Description
Due to rounding errors a user can burn zero shares: https://github.com/mixbytes/lido-dot-ksm/blob/76a10efa5f223c4c613f26794802b8fb9bb188e1/contracts/Lido.sol#L522
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a check so that a user couldn't burn zero shares. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Constant names incompatible with the ERC20 standard
### Description
[`QiibeeToken`](https://github.com/qiibee/qb-contracts/blob/26d5963491c26a56938c723a342b666d3b478ea7/contracts/QiibeeToken.sol) declares the obligatory [`ERC20`](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20-token-standard.md) st... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | true | false | ## High: Use of `msg.value` inside a loop
### Description
The `batchCommitToMint` function attempts to call the `commitToMint` function multiple times within a loop, each time using the same `msg.value` that was provided when `batchCommitToMint` was called. While the `commitToMint` function works correctly on its own,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | flash-loan | true | false | ## High: `decreaseLever` uses incorrect position address when withdrawing
### Description
`decreaseLever` will always revert for `Position4626` associated vaults.
### Proof of Concept
When decreasing lever, the control is passed over to the actual implementation contract for the `flashLoan` execution:
Inside the `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: FLOATING PRAGMA
### Description
The project contains many instances of floating pragma. Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, either... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Using `uint32` for Timestamps
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> We acknowledge this point. Using uint32 for timestamps is for gas or storage efficiency. We expect major upgrades or redeployments in the next decade or so, so this... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `isMethodCallAllowed` should have `view` visibility
### Description
`isMethodCallAllowed` can be marked as `view` method: https://github.com/MetaLex-Tech/borg-core/blob/b89ff5b7796047bbb6123c97192cfcff33e6b7f5/src/borgCore.sol#L599
### Recommendation
We recommend changing the visibility of the function. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Redundant Owner Variable in EndPointGov Contract
### Description
The `EndPointGov` contract inherits from both `OwnableUpgradeable` and `AccessControlUpgradeable`. However, the contract does not utilize the `owner` variable and associated functionality provided by the `OwnableUpgradeable` contract. This redund... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Unexpected revert on initializeloan with borrower-signed signature if msg.sender is approved by both parties
### Description
In `OriginationController::initializeLoan`, it is expected that "the external signer must come from the opposite side of the loan as the caller". Thus, if `msg.sender` is approved by (or... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Check Item Existence
### Description
## Kiosk Item Management
The functions `list` and `list_with_purchase_cap` add items to the kiosk, allowing users to purchase them. However, they do not verify that the items exist in the kiosk.
## Remediation
To ensure proper functionality, check if the items exist in t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: For modern and more readable code; update import usages
### Description
Our Solidity code is also cleaner in another way that might not be noticeable: the struct Point. We were importing it previously with global import but not using it. The Point struct `polluted the source code` with an unnecessary object we... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Ownership can be transferred to a restricted address
### Description
**Description:** `sUSBD` prevents restricting the current `owner()` and `treasury` in `sUSBD::setRestrictedStatus`, and it also prevents setting `treasury` to an address with a non-`NONE` restricted status in `sUSBD::setTreasury`.
However, t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | false | false | ## Medium: DoS for distribute and `distributeBulk` method
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In Contract `MPROMasterDistributor.sol`, the method `getAllTokenDistribution()` calculates the tokens so far available to distribute. In this method, if a reduction is added and a user... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Withdrawals logic allows MEV exploits of TVL changes and zero-slippage zero-fee swaps
### Description
Deposit and withdrawal requests can be done immediately with no costs or fees, and both use the current oracle prices and TVL calculation ([`deposit`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-04-renzo/blob/main/con... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Usage of Manually Updated Prices Could Result in Protocol Insolvency in Case of Low Update Frequency and Significant Price Deviation
### Description
**Update**
The client has resolved the issue by giving priority to Oracle price feeds over manually updated prices. However, the `BaseOracle` contract still incl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Missing event emit in privileged functions
### Description
- The function `setMaxVotingNum()` is missing an event emit. If governance were to reduce `maxVotingNum`, which is the maximum number of staking tokens a voter can vote for at once, then votes where `stakingToken-Vote.length > maxVotingNum` will revert... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: `StRSRVotes.delegateBySig()` misses check for delegation to happen in the era intended by the signer
### Description
The `StRSRVotes.delegateBySig()` function allows a signer to delegate voting power to a designed delegate via a gasless call.
If we look at the logic that verifies the signature verification:
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Stargate Pools conversion rate leads to token accumulation inside the Balancer contract
### Description
Stargate pools conversion rate leads to token accumulation inside the `Balancer` contract and dangling allowances to the StargateRouter contract. This breaks the expected behavior of the rebalancing proce... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Attackers can get most of RAACToken rewards by withdrawing dust amount from StabilityPool multiple times
### Description
When a user withdraws deposited RToken from StabilityPool, the pool transfers corresponding RAACToken rewards to the user. The reward amount is calculated currently deposited RToken *pro ra... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: LendingPool deposits do not work with CurveVault due to lack of funds
### Description
The `LendingPool` contract includes functionality to deposit `crvUSD` into the Curve Vault when a `curveVault` address is configured. However, there's an accounting error in the deposit flow:
 
1. When a user deposi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Missing Call to `_resetAmendmentParams` in `setMetaVesTGovVariables`
### Description
This issue has been identified in the `setMetaVesTGovVariables` function of the [MetaVesTController](https://github.com/MetaLex-Tech/MetaVesT/blob/b614405e60bce8b852e46d06c03fd47b04d86dde/src/MetaVesTController.sol#L507-L509)... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: USE ++I INSTEAD OF I++ IN LOOPS FOR GAS OPTIMIZATION
### Description
In all the loops, the variable `i` is incremented using `i++`. It is known that, in loops, using `++i` costs less gas per iteration than `i++`. This also affects variables incremented inside the loop code block.
Code Location
-------------
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Incorrect Decimal Precision Conversions
### Description
## Exchange Calculations and Decimal Precision Issues
In various sections within Exchange, there are instances where calculations involve the multiplication and division of constants and variables with distinct decimal precisions. These calculations may... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | true | false | ## Medium: Debt calculation should be rounded up during repayment
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** Low
**Likelihood:** High
**Description**
In case of partial repayment of the debt `LiquidityPool#repay` function calculates the user's debt that is left based on current debt and amount of repayment (line 171... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Collateral can be deposited in a finished pool
### Description
_Submitted by pedroais_
#### Proof of Concept
The depositCollateral function doesn't check the status of the pool so collateral can be deposited in a finished loan. This can happen by mistake and all funds will be lost.
#### Recommended Miti... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect comment regarding the configuration of `DebtToken::FLASH_LOAN_FEE` parameter
### Description
**Description:** `DebtToken::_flashFee` divides by `10000`, hence if `FLASH_LOAN_FEE = 1` then:
So the comment indicating that 1 = 0.0001% is incorrect:
**Bima:**
Fixed in commit [4ae0be3](https://github.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Reactivated gauges can’t queue up rewards ✓ Fixed
### Description
Active gauges as set in `ERC20Gauges.addGauge()` function by authorised users get their rewards queued up in the `FlywheelGaugeRewards._queueRewards()` function. As part of it, their associated struct `QueuedRewards` updates its `storedCycle` v... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: MISCALCULATION OF MAX LOAN TO VALUE WHEN MINTING COINS
### Description
In the `mint_stable_coin` function from **krp-cdp-contracts/central\_control** contract, the max loan to value is miscalculated because the `collaterals_values` is increased in every step of the loop instead of storing the temporal value. ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: Missing Upgrade Path for `PirexRewards` Implementation
### Description
With the current and contracts, it is not possible to upgrade the contract.
### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Document the operational plan for contract upgrades. Also, consider using the UUPS proxy pattern to upgrade contract implementat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Potential blocking of `removeNodeDelegatorContractFromQueue` calls
### Description
The issue is found in the [`LRTDepositPool.removeNodeDelegatorContractFromQueue`](https://github.com/Kelp-DAO/KelpDAO-contracts/blob/8c62af6057402f4616cc2a1d3218a277a864ee2c/contracts/LRTDepositPool.sol#L263) function.
This ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Duplicated staker check
### Description
In lines [236](https://github.com/AudiusProject/audius-protocol/blob/6f3b31562b9d4c43cef91af0a011986a2580fba2/eth-contracts/contracts/Governance.sol#L236) and [340](https://github.com/AudiusProject/audius-protocol/blob/6f3b31562b9d4c43cef91af0a011986a2580fba2/eth-contrac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: Excess ETH sent to AxiomV2Broadcaster won't be refunded to users
### Description
If the sum of all `bridgePayment` values is strictly less than `msg.value`, the excess ETH won't be returned to the user after the call. Instead, it will be kept in the contract and will sponsor the following users' calls, which r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: External method missing a NatSpec
### Description
The `arbitrumSwaps` method in `ArbitrumSwaps` is missing a NatSpec doc, add one to improve the code technical documentation. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | other | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-olympus-judging/issues/222
## Found by
0x52
## Summary
SingleSidedLiquidityVault allows the admin tokens from the vault contract. This can only be done once the vault has been deactivated but there is nothing stopping the contract from being reactivated after a tok... | Sherlock | 5 | Olympusdao |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Access Control Bypass on Owner-Only Function Calls
### Description
**Update**
A check has been added in `executeFromPluginExternal()`, which rejects any calls to the MSCA itself. Fixed in `807823b260e5617f81c6784aee639a2fcce549b9`.
**Update**
The upgrade flow has not been reworked as part of the fixes and... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Edge Case Leading to Inconsistent LP Share Minting
### Description
When `getEffectivePoolValue` approaches zero due to unrealized profits held by traders, the LP share calculations in `calcLpOut` exhibit inconsistent behavior. Specifically:
1. **Inflated LP Shares**: As `getEffectivePoolValue` approaches z... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Chainlink's `latestRoundData` might return stale or incorrect results
### Description
In the `PriceFeed` contract, the protocol uses a ChainLink aggregator to fetch the `latestRoundData()`, but there is no check if the return value indicates stale data. The only check present is for the `quoteAnswer` to be ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Sandwich Attack | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-carapace-judging/issues/26
## Found by
libratus, monrel, jkoppel, chaduke, immeas, 0Kage
## Summary
``accruePremiumAndExpireProtections()`` will increase ``totalSTokenUnderlying``, and thus increase the exchange rate of the ``ProtectionPool``. A malicious user can l... | Sherlock | 4.5 | Carapace |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: compiler crash during assert codegen
### Description
There is a crash bug when vyper generates assert code.
### Impact
Low Risk | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Compromise of a single oracle enables limited control of the dAPI value
### Description
By compromising only one oracle, an attacker could gain control of the median price of a dAPI and set it to a value within a certain range. The dAPI value is the median of all values provided by the oracles. If the number ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Sending more TAP tokens to the `TapToken.sol` contract does not actually increase the total amount to be distributed
### Description
Within the `TapToken` contract, the to-be-distributed balance is tracked by the `dso_supply`. Every week a percentage of is distributed to the users via `oTAP` emissions.
If... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Vault.claim should be called before `pushTotalUnderlyingToController`
### Description
Vault.claim should be called before `pushTotalUnderlyingToController`.
### Impact
Underlying amount sent to xController is not accurate, actually vault can have more funds. Exhange rate is also not accurate.
### Recommen... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect comment in `FieldFacet::_sow` NatSpec
### Description
The [comment](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Beanstalk/blob/c7a20e56a0a6659c09314a877b440198eff0cd81/protocol/contracts/beanstalk/field/FieldFacet.sol#L131) explaining how `FundraiserFacet::fund` bypasses soil updates in the `FieldFacet::_sow` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Malicious `emissionToken` could poison rewards for a market
### Description
When distributing rewards for a market, each `emissionConfig` is looped over and sent rewards for. `disburseBorrowerRewardsInternal` as an example, the same holds true for `disburseSupplierRewardsInternal`:
If one transfer reverts... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | false | ## High: ABI struct mismatch in band config
### Description
`LiquidityWindow` defines a `localIPolicyManager.BandConfig` struct that does not match the layout used by `PolicyManager`. This compiles because function selectors depend only on the function name and inputs, but the return value is ABI-decoded using the cal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Parameter Setter | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-11-bond-judging/issues/9
## Found by
rvierdiiev
## Summary
When BondBaseSDA.setIntervals function is called then meta.tuneBelowCapacity param is not updated which has impact on price tuning.
## Vulnerability Detail
BondBaseSDA.setIntervals function allows for market ow... | Sherlock | 3 | Bond Protocol |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Consider implementing two-step procedure for updating protocol addresses
### Description
### Relevant GitHub Links
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-10-SteadeFi/blob/main/contracts/strategy/gmx/GMXVault.sol#L585-L588
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-10-SteadeFi/blob/main/contracts/strategy/gmx/GMXVault.sol#L575-L5... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Rebate Estimator Address Desync
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `61d09e20ba5b567e86c0806174237bbbc2c5c498`.
The OasisSwap team removed the `setRebateEstimator()` function. The `getRebate()` function inherit values from the factory contract.
**File(s) affected:**`O... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Wrapped token name is the unwrapped token name
### Description
The `WrappedElon` contract serves as a wrapper for `$ELON` tokens. Here is how its constructor looks like:
The problem is that instead of naming the token with the same name, prepended with the "Wrapped" word, it is using the same name as the unw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Delegators can redelegate stakes to jailed delegatee
### Description
The internal `_updateDelegation` helper method does not prevent users from delegating to a validator that is jailed, allowing honest users to accidentally lose access to their stake. The delegate function is responsible for handling both d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Watcher could miss edges validated by time
### Description
The Watcher service is a single point that stores information related to edge confirmations that can be used by other components of the validator. The Watch function is the main functionality that continuously polls for new edge-related events.
Whe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused import
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Resolved
**Import**: cw2::get_contract_version
**Line**: 9
**Description**:
The imported function is never used in the code.
**Recommendation**:
Remove unused import. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Operator can finalize for non-existent `finalShnarf`
### Description
In the previous version of `LineaRollup::_finalizeBlocks` there was this check which ensured that the final shnarf was associated with a block number:
```solidity
if (
shnarfFinalBlockNumbers[_finalizationData.finalSubmissionData.shnarf]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Partial Liquidation Should Not Be Allowed
### Description
## ExecuteLiquidateBid Instruction
In the `ExecuteLiquidateBid` instruction, the liquidator specifies how many loan notes to burn with the `amount` argument. This is subsequently used to calculate how many tokens they must transfer.
Later, the progr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Function token() ofcloneERC1155ERC20Pair() reads from wrong location
### Description
The function `token()` loads the token data from position 81. However, on ERC1155 pairs, it should load it from position 93. Currently, it doesn't retrieve the right values, and the code won't function correctly.
### Recomme... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Users can omit to update the price feed to use stale prices
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** High
**Likelihood:** Low
**Description**
> [!NOTE]
> All functions that internally call `_updatePriceFeeds()` are vulnerable to this attack.
When invoking any function in the Nabla protocol, users mus... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Large amounts of points can be minted virtually without any cost
### Description
Large amounts of points can be minted virtually without any cost. The points are intended to be used to exchange something of value. A malicious user could abuse this to obtain a large number of points, which could obtain exces... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Attacker Can Redirect Funds To Staking Via Allowances
### Description
In `deligateStake()` the `transferFrom()` function uses an arbitrary value for the `from` address. Before users or owner call `stake()`, `deligateStake()`, `createReward()`, `repayment()` or `depositRewardAmount()` they first approve the St... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing non-existent authorizedImpl validation in AxelarImplementation.dispatchPayload
### Description
In the `AxelarImplementation.dispatchPayload` function, the address of the `AxelarImplementation` contract for the destination chain is read from the `authorizedImpl` storage state. This value may be empty if... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Transfer tokens before minting shares in `rOUSG::wrap`
### Description
`rOUSG::wrap` [L411-413](https://github.com/ondoprotocol/rwa-internal/blob/6747ebada1c867a668a8da917aaaa7a0639a5b7a/contracts/ousg/rOUSG.sol#L411-L413) currently mints shares before transferring tokens used to mint those shares:
```solidity... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: `TRST-M-8` from previous audit still present
### Description
Interest accruing is not paused, when repaying is not allowed.
### Proof of Concept
TRST-M-8 from previous audit describes the fact, that when repaying is paused, then pool still continue accruing interests. Usually this is not considered as a m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Parameter and input variable type mismatch
### Description
The [`isAttestationExpired` function](https://github.com/celo-org/celo-monorepo/blob/b2f0a58fcc7667d41585123aae5b24c47aa894f6/packages/protocol/contracts/identity/Attestations.sol#L751-L753) of the `Attesatations` contract receives a `uint128` paramete... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `_harvestCore()` roi calculation error
### Description
\_harvestCore() roi calculation error,may double
### Proof of Concept
The \_harvestCore() will calculate the roi and repayment values.
The implementation code is as follows:
The last line may cause double counting of losses
For example, the current:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect `excessFeeRefundAddress` and `callValueRefundAddress` are provided when bridging tokens to the L2
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** Medium, `address(this)` is provided for the `excessFeeRefundAddress` and `callValueRefundAddress` parameters when calling `createRetryableTicket`, which could... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: BondCallback: incorrect accounting if quoteToken is rebase token
### Description
*
If the quoteToken is rebase token, the priorBalances may change due to rebasing or airdrop. It may result to an incorrect accounting. However, whether it is exploitable depends on the Bond market's logic.
With the current log... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | flash-loan | true | false | ## Low: [05] `CreateOfferer` uses a custom context implementation instead of an existing SIP
### Description
It is suggested to use an existing [SIP implementation](https://github.com/ProjectOpenSea/SIPs/blob/main/SIPS/sip-7.md) instead of creating a new standard from scratch, which might be prone to errors:
https:/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: If `HERMES` gauge rewards are not queued for distribution every week, they are slashed
### Description
In order to queue weekly `HERMES` rewards for distribution, `FlywheelGaugeRewards::queueRewardsForCycle` must be called during the next cycle (week). If a cycle has passed and no one calls `queueRewardsFor... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: First Characters of Claimed Header Field Value Unchecked for CRLF
### Description
A header field consists of the header field name, followed by a colon, and then the header field value, also called header field body. For a header that has been canonicalized with the “relaxed” algorithm, the header fields are ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: Utilization ratio can exceed 100% due to missing validation in withdrawal functions
### Description
### Finding description
The protocol implements a maximum utilization ratio check via the `require_utilization_below_max` function, which ensures that `utilization = total_liabilities / total_supply` remains b... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: bEIGEN Cannot Be Burnt Due To Transfer Restrictions
### Description
The `burn()` function cannot be called by non-whitelisted accounts if transfer restrictions are enabled, preventing users from burning their bEIGEN tokens.
The `burn()` function calls `_beforeTokenTransfer()`, which has the following check:
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: try-catch Block Can Still Revert
### Description
In the [`_unsubscribe`](https://github.com/Uniswap/v4-periphery/blob/df47aa9ba521fc15ffd339dc773d32f5fc4c91fc/src/base/Notifier.sol#L46-L55) function of [`Notifier.sol`](https://github.com/Uniswap/v4-periphery/blob/df47aa9ba521fc15ffd339dc773d32f5fc4c91fc/src/ba... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: USING REVERT STRINGS INSTEAD OF CUSTOM ERRORS
### Description
It was identified that revert strings are used in the `AssetToken`, `BaseAccessControlPausable` and `BaseAccessControlPausableUpgradeable` contracts. Starting from Solidity v0.8.4, there is a convenient and gas-efficient way to explain to users why ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Missing validations for canonical bump seed
### Description
There is a PDA check, but the code is missing a canonical bump seed check. Users should be able to specify the bump as an argument to ensure that it's the correct one:
`src/processor/liquidate.rs#L54-L64`
Another similar issue can be found also in ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: `PREPInitialized` event emitted but not declared
### Description
_Resolved_
In Nexus.sol, take a look at the `installModule` function:
It emits `ModuleInstalled`, which the protocol has defined in the Constants.sol function.
But, this is not the case for `PREPInitialized(r)`:
The ABI won't include this e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Jump in creation code leads to reverting of the starknet transaction
### Description
If the creation code consists of `JUMP` or `JUMPI` opcode for `offset` less than `creation code length`, then the starknet transaction reverts.
The [`evm.cairo::jump`](https://github.com/kkrt-labs/kakarot/blob/7411a5520e8a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: UNNECESSARY CALL
### Description
The `_unpausePools` is not needed on `closeReport` since the `_pausePools` is only called on `startVoting`. Once `startVoting` is called, which sets the `currentReport.status = VOTING_STATUS`, the `closeReport` can not be called due to the `currentReport.status != PENDING_STATU... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use of Floating Solidity Version
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
The contracts specify an unlocked (floating) Solidity version using pragma solidity ^0.8.25;. While this allows the contracts to compile with future Solidity versions, it also introduces potential ri... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: When borrowers repay USDS, it is sent to the wrong address, allowing anyone to burn Protocol Owned Liquidity and build bad debt for USDS
### Description
When a user repays the USDS he has borrowed, it is taken from him and kept for burning. The Liquidizer contract is updated with the new amount repaid. The US... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: Rebalancer can steal funds from markets by sending to custom receiver through Everclear Bridge
### Description
The rebalancer contract is called on `sendMsg` with a message encoded as bytes (`_msg.message`). This message is specific for the bridge contract, and in the case of `EverclearBridge` it is of the fo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: InplaceFFT will panic if given a zero-length slice
### Description
If `InplaceFFT` is given a zero-length slice, it will panic with a divide by zero error. For example:
```go
func TestInplaceFFT(t *testing.T) {
fs := NewFFTSettings(4)
err := fs.InplaceFFT([]fr.Element{}, []fr.Element{}, true)
if err ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Proposal execution not handling returned data
### Description
The public [`execute` function](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol-alpha/blob/6858417c91921208c0b3ff342b11065c09665b1b/contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#L196) of the `GovernorAlpha` contract allows anyone to execute a queu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `_distribute()` function in RFPSimpleStrategy contract has wrong requirement causing DOS
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-09-Gitcoin-judging/issues/492
## Found by
0xarno, 0xdeadbeef, 0xkaden, BenRai, GimelSec, HHK, KingNFT, WATCHPUG, ZdravkoHr., ace13567, alexxander, dany.a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Update State After Admin Action | true | false | ## Severity: High Risk
## Context
AeraVaultV1.sol#L599-L639
## Description
The current `updateWeightsGradually` is using `startTime` instead of the minimal start time that should be `Math.max(block.timestamp, startTime)`. Because internally Balancer will use `startTime = Math.max(currentTime, startTime);` as the `sta... | Spearbit | 5 | Gauntlet |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect condition on getCurrentPeriod Severity: Quality Assurance
### Description
**Description:**
If block.timestamp>=endDate then all reward period have been processed and rewardPeriods could be returned directly. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: 5] Early Pair Creation Breaks Fair Launch of New Moon Tokens And Gives An Attacker The Possibility To Steal All KAS from BondingCurvePool
### Description
**Severity:** Critical
**Path:** contracts/BondingCurvePool.sol#L234-L265
**Description:** A bonding curve is designed to create fair and manipulation-re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Approval race conditions on the `ERC314Implementation`
### Description
**Description**
The "approve race condition" in `ERC314Implementation::approve` is a vulnerability that occurs when changing an allowance from one non-zero value to another. If an owner first approves a spender for a certain amount of toke... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: During stake or deposit, users would not be rewarded the correct Concur token, when MasterChef has under-supply of it
### Description
_Submitted by hubble, also found by CertoraInc and Czar102_
During stake or deposit, users would not be transferred the correct Concur token, when MasterChef has under-suppl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Ownership Can Be Renounced
### Description
**Update**
Acknowledged. The client's response: "We confirm this behaviour is intended."
**File(s) affected:**`Erc20Reserve.sol`, `All contracts inheriting from Ownable or OwnableUpgradeable`
**Description:** Contracts inheriting from `Ownable` contain a function... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | true | false | ## High: Function `poolManager.sync` called before the unlock process
### Description
In the `BunniHook` contract, there is a function call to `poolManager.sync` at line `BunniHook#L501`, which comes before the initiation of an `unlock` process at line `BunniHook#L505`.
```solidity
File: BunniHook.sol
465: function ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `>=` is cheaper than `>`
### Description
Strict inequalities (`>`) are more expensive than non-strict ones (`>=`). This is due to some supplementary checks (ISZERO, 3 gas)
I suggest using `>=` instead of `>` to avoid some opcodes here: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Users approved for a single token id cannot withdraw or merge for that token id
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/VotingEscrow.sol
Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
## Description... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Staking indexer doesn 't support the spending of multiple Staking transactions
### Description
The `getSpentStaking` function is used to determine if a transaction spent a Staking transaction. If so, this Staking transaction is returned and specific operations are done with this transaction (see `HandleConfir... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `set_allocator()` state update missing causes incorrect balances
### Description
In the `set_allocator` function, the contract intends to adjust the allocation for a given allocator by comparing the new `amount` with the `old_allocation` stored in `self.allocators[allocator]`. However, the function does not... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: APWine PT redemptions can be blocked forever
### Description
APWine PT redemptions can be blocked, causing Illuminate IPTs to be unredeemable
### Impact
_Permanent freezing of funds_
Users that provided their APWine PTs to mint Illuminate PTs (e.g. in order to be an LP in the pool) will have those tokens (t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Protocol Reserve Within A LToken Vault Can Be Lent Out
### Description
Protocol reserve, which serves as a liquidity backstop or to compensate the protocol, within a LToken vault can be lent out to the borrowers.
### Impact
The purpose of the protocol reserve within a LToken vault is to compensate the prot... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | access-control | true | true |
[contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L460-L461](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L460-L461)<br>
[contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L465-L466](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-c... | Code4rena | 4 | Biconomy |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Use require for checking if USDT.approve was successful
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In NarhwhalReferrals contract, in the claimRewards method, if user opted for compound then the USDT is approved first before depositing to the vault.
USDT token contract returns tr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: Attacker can abuse victim's signature for marketplace bid to buy worthless item
### Description
In ParaSpace marketplace, taker may pass maker's signature and fulfil their bid with taker's NFT. The maker can use credit loan to purchase the NFT provided the health factor is positive in the end.
In validateA... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: No slippage protection on `stake()` in SafEth.sol
### Description
`mintAmount` is determined both by `totalStakeValueEth` and `preDepositPrice`. While the former is associated with external interactions beyond users' control, the latter should be linked to a slippage control to incentivize more staker parti... | 0 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.