prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: riskPoolBalance is not used
### Description
For each winner picking, a portion of the funds is taken to account for risk balance. This balance is never used again, and the only way to retrieve it is for the owner to include it in the Merkle tree, which is not the intended use for the risk pool.
### Recomme... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: No Check for Initializing Parameters of TokenBridge ✓ Fixed
### Description
In `TokenBridge` contract’s `initialize` function, there is no check for initializing parameters including `_securityCouncil`, `_messageService`, `_tokenBeacon` and `_reservedTokens`. If any of these address is set to 0 or other inval... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | false | false | ## High: Potential Read-Only Reentrancy
### Description
The [`getTraderBalance`](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/09b6188e028650b9c1758010846080c5f8c80f8e/src/OnchainLOB.sol#L154) function is vulnerable to read-only reentrancy attacks, especially with ERC-777 tokens. This vulnerability arises beca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `UniswapV3Swapper` and `UniswapV2Swapper` will fail when depositing received ETH into YieldBox
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** Medium, as it causes swap to fail
**Likelihood:** Medium, as it occurs when depositing WETH to YieldBox
**Description**
When `UniswapV3Swapper.swap()` is called with `d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Extraneous Events
### Description
Many functions in the `Accounts` contract complete successfully and emit extraneous events when there is no operation to be performed. For example, it’s possible to [authorize a signer](https://github.com/celo-org/celo-monorepo/blob/f64b4c5b5228ecbf41e3e7cfdbb8c0e9a983eea2/pac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: LibOracle fails to check the fidelity of price data from WETH/USDC pool, which can lead to price manipulation
### Description
As per the [documentation](https://dittoeth.com/technical/oracles), LibOracle should only be returning the TWAP price from the WETH/USDC pool if the amount of WETH in the pool is >= 100... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Incorrect logical check in `endGame` function
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** High
**Likelihood:** High
**Description**
The `endGame` function in the `Game` contract fails to function correctly due to an erroneous logical check. This function, intended to handle the payouts at the end of a game, ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | access-control | false | true |
If the seller cancels before the sale startTime then all funds should be moved to saleReceiver without any deduction (Assuming seller has sent some ETH accidentally before sell start). But in `FixedPrice.sol` contract, fees are deducted even when seller cancels before the sale startTime which could lead to loss of fun... | Code4rena | 5 | Escher |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Slippage value doesn't account for `bridgeFee`
### Description
The `bridgeFee` is applied each time the `unlock()` function in `PortalV2` and the `mint()` function in `SynthesisV2` are used.
https://github.com/eywa-protocol/eywa-clp/blob/d68ba027ff19e927d64de123b2b02f15a43f8214/contracts/PortalV2.sol#L89-L92
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: PDA Seed Constants
### Description
## Constants for PDA Seeds
The strings that are provided as seeds for the PDA accounts like `marcostatev1`, `marcopoolv1`, `marcofarmv1`, `marcoproviderv1`, etc., should be defined in one place as constants and used where required, similar to the constant `PROGRAM_SEED` in `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Vulnerable NPM Dependencies may allow critical server-side impact
### Description
Several critical, moderate, and low-severity vulnerabilities were identified in third-party NPM dependencies used by the application. These issues affect cryptographic functions, input validation, file handling, and middleware op... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: `MochiTreasuryV0.sol` Is Unusable In Its Current State
### Description
_Submitted by leastwood_
#### Impact
`MochiTreasuryV0.sol` interacts with Curve's voting escrow contract to lock tokens for 90 days, where it can be later withdrawn by the governance role. However, `VotingEscrow.vy` does not allow contr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | false | false | ## Medium: Unsafe casting
### Description
In [line 554 of the `TaxCollector`](https://github.com/reflexer-labs/geb/blob/261407b6b332c2063e4256aa5f9b223d52dad7e1/src/TaxCollector.sol#L554) contract, the value of [`coinBalance(receiver)` is an `uint`](https://github.com/reflexer-labs/geb/blob/261407b6b332c2063e4256aa5f9... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCKED COLLATERAL AND SETH BALANCE ARE NOT ADEQUATELY CAPPED
### Description
The differences between `lockedCollateral.base` and `sETH balance` in the liquidity pool are not limited to opening **long call** positions. These differences could create distorted liquidity values with the follo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Potential For Manipulating Randomness
### Description
The randomness (entropy) is obtained by committing to a future block hash when purchasing cards. This entropy is solidified into the contract state when `callback()` on line [227] is called (by anyone). This determines which cards the user will get from the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Unstaking does not update the mapping sETHUserClaimForKnot
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/4b6828e9c807f2f7c569e6d721ca1289f7cf7112/contracts/syndicate/Syndicate.sol#L245
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
If a user stakes some sETH, and after some t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Rounding down in \_exitCollateral() function can cause loss of precision leading to loss of funds for users
### Description
There is 1 instance of this issue:
https://github.com/open-dollar/od-contracts/blob/f4f0246bb26277249c1d5afe6201d4d9096e52e6/src/contracts/proxies/actions/CommonActions.sol#L118
In the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: Attacker can DOS the rebalance mechanism
### Description
When the code tries to perform the rebalance in the `rebalanceOrderPreHook()` function code checks that the token balance BunniHook is equal to `amount` which is the order amount.
```solidity
// ensure we have exactly args.amount tokens
if (args.cu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Using `storage` instead of `memory` for structs/arrays saves gas
### Description
When fetching data from a storage location, assigning the data to a `memory` variable causes all fields of the struct/array to be read from storage, which incurs a Gcoldsload (**2100 gas**) for *each* field of the struct/array. If... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Upgrading Account Does Not Verify if Tokens Are Sent
### Description
The owner of the `Collateral` contract can [approve](https://github.com/AmperaFoundation/sol-contracts/blob/4c4423791b3427153937881fc5287a81283ee141/contracts/Collateral.sol#L560) addresses using code supporting the `ICollateral` interface as... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Don't perform storage reads unless necessary
### Description
Reading from storage is expensive; don't perform storage reads unless necessary.
* `contracts/service/ServiceConsumer.sol`
```diff
// in `onlyMaster` don't load trust manager unless required
modifier onlyMaster {
- IDSTrustService trustMa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Use short reason strings can save gas
### Description
*Note: Minor optimation, the amount of gas saved is minor, change when you see fit.*
Every reason string takes at least 32 bytes.
Use short reason strings that fits in 32 bytes or it will become more expensive.
Instances include:
[StakingRewards.sol#L17... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Enormous gas spendings in migration functionality.
### Description
**Description**
Perpetual TokensFarm.sol, Perpetual TokensFarmSDK.sol: function migrateUserStakes().
The lastStakeMigrated storage variable is written on every step of the double cycle, which provides enormous gas spendings. Also, it is especi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | integer-overflow | true | true | ## Medium: Precision loss causes systematic under-reporting of voting power for high decimal tokens
### Description
The `NormalizedTokenDecimalsVPCalc::_normalizeVaultTokenDecimals()` causes voting power loss for legitimate stakeholders when high-decimal tokens (>24 decimals) are used. This occurs due to integer divi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: New shares overwrite previously recorded shares.
### Description
**Description**
line 186, 189, function _saveUserShares().
Shares and proportionateDeposit should be added to balances, instead of just being assigned.
Since a user is able to perform transfer shares without withdrawing them, it is possible tha... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: [15] Variable being initialized with the default value
### Description
Unsigned integers will already be initalized with zero on their declaration, e.g. there's no need to manually assign zero.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L68 | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Reentrancy attack possible on `RootBridgeAgent.retrySettlement()` with missing access control for `RootBridgeAgentFactory.createBridgeAgent()`
### Description
`RootBridgeAgent.retrySettlement()` is lacking a `lock` modifier to prevent reentrancy and `RootBridgeAgentFactory.createBridgeAgent()` is missing acce... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unused parameters in various functions
### Description
Throughout the contract, various function parameters are not used but need to be present to conform to EIP-7540. For example, in the `requestDeposit` function, the `owner` and `data` parameter names can be removed. This adjustment would also make the check... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Access Control Mechanism Based on a List of `acceptedContracts` Can Ultimately Lead to Draining Funds
### Description
**Update**
The accepted contracts pattern was removed. Now functions are protected with a new modifier `onlyLendingMarketController`. Also `TokenVault` does not have privileged access to `Lend... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Owners Length Check
### Description
## create_multisig Instruction Issue
The `create_multisig` instruction does not validate the length of the `owners` parameter. This can cause the program to panic if the length is larger than `max_owners`, which is used to calculate the size for the MultiSig structu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [09] Don't allow adding a new derivative when staking/unstaking is paused
### Description
When the system is in pause mode, e.g. staking and unstaking is blocked, consider adding a check to prevent new derivatives from being added, e.g.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafE... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Events not emitted on calling critical functions
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Acknowledged
SakeVaultV2.sol/Water.sol - No events emitted on changing significant parameters of the contracts by admin and assets transfers.
**Recommendation**
Emit an event in the body of the admin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Insufficient non existent token check can be weaponised
### Description
## Context: SafeTransferLib.sol
In `SafeTransferLib.sol`, it doesn't check if the token address provided has code or not. This means calling `SafeTransferFrom` with a token address that does not have any code does not revert.
There are mu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Liquidated users can mix and manipulate stable and variable borrowings through exploitative liquidation process
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://testnet.snowtrace.io/address/0xc1FBF54B25816B60ADF322d8A1eaCA37D9A50317
Impacts:
* Protocol insolvency
## Description
## Brief/Intro... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Lack of timelock implementation in burning flow
### Description
Docs state that the processing stage should be time-locked for 48 hours before execution burning however, code implementation lacks of any timelocks allowing instant execution of burning after requests are processed. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | signature | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-hats-judging/issues/37
## Found by
cccz, Dug, duc, Met, obront, roguereddwarf, Allarious, GimelSec, carrot
## Summary
The safe's threshold is supposed to be set with the lower value of the `validSignerCount` and the `targetThreshold` (intended to serve as the maxim... | Sherlock | 5 | Hats |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: TRST-H-2 Lack of child rewarder reserves could lead to freeze of funds
### Description
**Description:**
In ComplexRewarder.sol, `onReward()` is used to distribute rewards for previous time period,
using the complex rewarder and any child rewarders. If the complex rewarder does not have
enough tokens to hand... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unnecessary Matching in Unstake Process ✓ Fixed
### Description
Function `unstakeProcessed` in `StakedLyxToken` contract, when `unstakeAmount > totalPendingUnstake`, all the unstake requests should be able to be processed, thus no need to go through the matching, as a result, extra gas in the matching can be s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | true | false | ## Medium: The value of LP token can be manipulated by the first minister, which allows the attacker to dilute future liquidity providers' shares
### Description
_Submitted by WatchPug, also found by camden, danb, and hyh_
For the first minter of an Exchange pool, the ratio of `X/Y` and the `totalSupply` of the LP to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | false | false | ## Medium: LP rewards in `liquidity_lockbox` can be arbitraged
### Description
The [`liquidity_lockbox`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-autonolas/blob/main/lockbox-solana/solidity/liquidity_lockbox.sol) contract is designed to handle liquidity positions in a specific Orca LP pool. Users can deposit their LP NFT... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Unstaking calculates user share at request time, ignoring slashing — leading to DoS and unfair distribution
### Description
### Finding Description and Impact
Users can stake both INIT and LP tokens into different validator pools by calling functions like `deposit_init_for_xinit` or `stake_asset`. To exit,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [03] The new `require(dictionary.length / 8 <= encodedData.length / 2)` check allows malicious operators to always pass in malformed data to the bootloader to ensure that all users gas gets burnt without executing the tx.
### Description
### Proof of Concept
Take a look at https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-0... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | true | false | ## High: `isolateRepay()` lack of check `onBehalf == nftOwner`
### Description
When calling `isolateRepay()` we can specify `nftTokenIds` and `onBehalf`.
The current implementation just restricts `onBehalf!=address(0)` and does not restrict `onBehalf == nftOwner`.
This way, we can maliciously specify `onBehalf!=nftO... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Owner can bypass time checks in markets and collateral assets
### Description
The [`HoldefiSettings` contract](https://github.com/holdefi/Holdefi/blob/f4df394d7cf6df347b1f1e9af8e2676c5933c2c9/contracts/HoldefiSettings.sol) is in charge of managing some of the most important actions that the admin of the syste... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Code Reuse May Lead to Wormhole Replay Attack Due to VAA Hash Not Being Marked as Processed
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Processed message hashes are now being recorded. Addressed in: `74496b665998e7cb3b9cb7101756e78cc1569d1a`.
**File(s) affected:**`WormholeBaseUpgradeable.sol`
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Methods should be declared as external
### Description
**Description**
In order to decrease the gas usage, next methods should be declared as external:
TokenDistributor.initialize() (TokenDistributor.sol#27-52)
TokenDistributor.getClaimsStartTime() (TokenDistributor.sol#61-63)
TokenDistributor.getNextEpochSta... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | storage | false | false | ## High: Unnecessary claim step for sale contributors
### Description
Contributors participate in the sale by transferring their balance to a set of trusted addresses managed by Unikrn, who then distribute the tokens in a later step via the `TokenDistribution` contract. Token allocations are set for each contributor, ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Funds Can Be Sent to Zero Address
### Description
**Update**
The client fixed the issue in `90c745b90c80dae0de74da4a9d2fd6814d18b2fc` by checking the `beneficiary` address before the transfer.
**File(s) affected:**`ZNSTreasury.sol`
**Description:** The protocol permits domain owners to designate a beneficiar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: [05] Racing conditions between `release()` and `slash()` might cause `release()` tx reverts
### Description
Suppose a user is approved for a refund of fines from a previous round. But before `release()` is settled, the user is slashed again in the current round. `release()` and `slash()` racing might occur and... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: TOFT and USDO Modules Can Be Selfdestructed
### Description
https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapiocaz-audit/blob/bcf61f79464cfdc0484aa272f9f6e28d5de36a8f/contracts/tOFT/modules/BaseTOFTOptionsModule.sol#L189-L200>
All TOFT and USDO modules have public functions that allow an attacker to supply an ad... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Unlocking offers does not return any funds
### Description
When a user unlocks (i.e., cancels) an offer, the offer is deleted from the protocol, but the purchase tokens are not returned to the user.
On line [235] of `TermAuctionOfferLocker.sol`, a call to `termRepoServicer.unlockOfferAmount()` should return ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Incorrect logic in `GaugeV1.notifyRewardAmount()`
### Description
The `notifyRewardAmount()` function in the `GaugeV1` contract uses an incorrect value for creating a Merkl campaign. Instead of the `amount_` parameter, it uses `balanceOf(address(this))`, while missing `transferFrom()` despite having a `forceA... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: [09] Missing Method to Remove Stale Validators
### Description
**Contract Name:** `DefaultOracle.sol`
**Description:**
The contract lacks a mechanism to remove inactive validators, allowing stale data to persist and potentially skew performance metrics.
**Mitigation:**
Add a function to remove stale validato... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Potential griefing with DoS by front-running vault creation with same `vaultID`
### Description
The `vaultID` for a new vault being built is required to be specified by the user building a vault via the `build()` function (instead of being assigned by the Cauldron/protocol). An attacker can observe a `build... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: `VotingEscrow.sol::checkpoint` is completely broken
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/VotingEscrow.sol
Impacts:
- Protocol insolvency
## Description
## Brief/Intro
`VotingEscrow.sol::checkpoint` is completely broken becaus... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: liquidate rounding leads to incorrect debtValue
### Description
In the [`BetaBank` `liquidate` function](https://github.com/beta-finance/beta-private/blob/9e73eaf40e5118125d6925b29e4fb9ad8bf8e113/contracts/BetaBank.sol#L360), the `_amount` of debt specified is repaid by calling [`BToken` `repay`](https://githu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Updating the Recipient Wallet of an Active Schedule with an Incorrect Address May Lead to Losing This Allocation
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> We are not exposing this function publicly, so people are going to use it only th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: Wrong price calculation in DnGmxJuniorVaultManager.sol
### Description
in `DnGmxJuniorVaultManager.sol` at line:647:
`usdcPrice` should be on denominator and `MAX_PRECISION` on numerator
(cf pricing in Vault: uint256 redemptionAmount = _usdgAmount.mul(PRICE_PRECISION).div(price);)
https://github.com/sherlo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | false | false | ## Low: Borrowing non-approved tokens can bypass trading restrictions
### Description
In the `Inch_Module` swap functions, the output token is verified to ensure it is approved by the protocol. This validation helps maintain trust that only pre-approved tokens will be traded.
However, the trader can still borrow non-... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: No Checks If Arguments Are Non-zero
### Description
**File(s) affected:**`rate_oracles/BaseRateOracle.sol`, `rate_oracles/AaveRateOracle.sol`, `AaveFCM.sol`, `Factory.sol`
**Description:** There are no checks if arguments are non-zero in the following functions:
1. `BaseRateOracle.constructor()`,
2. `AaveR... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Arithmetic Operation May Unintentionally Revert When Calculating Keeper Reward
### Description
The pool’s upkeep is maintained by keepers; these are external actors who are incentivized to call pool functions by a reward that is then paid back to them. When calculating this reward, a check is done to verify th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Unchecked math in price oracle is not guaranteed to be safe
### Description
In the Chainlink Price Oracle, we expect the price of the asset to be returned in 8 decimals. We then perform the following calculation to transfer it into `36 - asset decimals` decimals:
While this multiplication is likely to be safe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | cross-chain | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-01-optimism-judging/issues/57
## Found by
rvierdiiev, Bnke0x0, 0xdeadbeef
## Summary
Deposits from L1 to L2 using L1CrossDomainMessenger will fail and will not be replayable when L2CrossDomainMessenger is paused.
## Vulnerability Detail
Both `L1CrossDomainMessenger` an... | Sherlock | 5 | Optimism |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Inefficient initalization in UUPS proxy
### Description
This issue has been identified within the dummy [initialize](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/70b15ec4d9e7578248141604503843716a67d875/src/HanjiLOB.sol#L225) function of the `HanjiLOB` contract.
The current implementation follows th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: M-03 YTokenOracle doesn't account for losses when pricing the yToken
### Description
Yearn vaults use multiple strategies, some of them can incurr a loss, the loss will be charged to the caller when withdrawing (the caller being the protocol).
The [`Ytoken.getPrice`](https://github.com/sentimentxyz/oracle/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: RewardThrottle.setTimekeeper: If changing the timekeeper causes the epoch to change, it will mess up the system
### Description
RewardThrottle.setTimekeeper allows POOL_UPDATER_ROLE to update the timekeeper when RewardThrottle is active:
if newTimekeeper.epoch changes, it will cause the following:
1. Th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Miners Can Re-Roll the VRF Output to Game the Protocol
### Description
_Submitted by leastwood_.
#### Impact
Miners are able to rewrite a chain's history if they dislike the VRF output used by the protocol. Consider the following example:
* A miner or well-funded user is participating in the PoolTogether ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Missing Wormhole Bridge Fees
### Description
## Sending Messages Using Wormhole
In order to send messages using Wormhole, it is necessary to pay the bridge fee during message publication. If an incorrect fee is applied to the message call, the message publishing process will fail.
## Code Example
As a r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | false | false | ## High: Completed listings can be re-entered
### Description
In the protocol, when a listing is completed either by being sold or cancelled, nothing is changed about the listing's state. When re-entering the listing, as long as the contract has the NFT of the listing, the listing is considered valid, even if the NFT ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `maxDeposit` doesn't comply with ERC-4626
### Description
`maxDeposit` doesn't comply with ERC-4626 since depositing the returned amount can cause reverts
### Impact
Failure to comply with the specification which is a mentioned necessity
### Recommendation
Consider the yieldBuffer balance too inside the `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: | For-Loop Increment
### Description
**Description**
Throughout the contracts numerous `for` loops have upper bounds with no risk of overflow for the index. Therefore an unchecked block can be used in the loop to increment the index and save gas.
**Recommendation**
Implement the above suggestion.
**Resolut... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: [06] Considerations for Hardcoding Addresses in Smart Contracts
### Description
In the `_settleAuction` function of the `AuctionHouse` smart contract, setting the `builder` and `purchaseReferral` fields to `address(0)` within the `IERC20TokenEmitter.ProtocolRewardAddresses` struct raises important consideratio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: intents can never be filled because of an incorrectly encoded contract address
### Description
ERC-7683 intents can never be filled in the protocol because an incorrect contract address is used in `FillInstruction.destinationSettler`.
### Recommendation
Consider using `bytes20(uint160(Eco7683DestinationSettle... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Counter Length Incorrectly Returned
### Description
**Update**
Addressed in: `53eca440c3ebfba15382eea2238703c0f96e1df9`and `80918c8208233a9d7ebd3660f4a85c802cb3771e`. The client adjusted the listing and sales count.
**File(s) affected:**`Listings.sol`
**Description:** Both the `Listings.listingCount()` and `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: CoreCollection's token transfer can be disabled
### Description
_Submitted by hyh, also found by robee_
### Impact
When royaltyAsset is an ERC20 that doesn't allow zero amount transfers, the following griefing attack is possible, entirely disabling CoreCollection token transfer by precision degradation a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Swapped Tokens During `finalize()` Permanently Stuck in `DaosLive` Due to Missing Withdrawal Mechanism
### Description
When performing a token swap for `snipeAmount` in the `finalize()` function, using the `IUniRouter.exactInputSingle()` function in the following code snippet:
```solidity
IUniRouter uniRoute... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Users can't withdraw their own refunds themselves
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Location**: BandoERC20FulfillableV1.sol, BandoFulfillableV1.sol
**Description**
In the current implementation, if a user has a pending refund, they have to wait for the service fulfiler or the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: [14] Complex casting
### Description
Consider whether the number of casts is really necessary, or whether using a different type would be more appropriate. Alternatively, add comments to explain in detail why the casts are necessary, and any implicit reasons why the cast does not introduce an overflow.
Uniswa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: Possible miner incentive for chain reorgs if ETHBlockDelay is too small
### Description
## Handle
tensors
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
If ETHBlockDelay is too small and the incentive for miners is large enough, it would profitable for miners to attempt
to double spend by depositing assets, waiting fo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | other | true | true | ## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/588c84b7bb354d20cbca6034544c4faa46e6a80e/contracts/BondNFT.sol#L177-L183
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/588c84b7bb354d20cbca6034544c4faa46e6a80e/contracts/BondNFT.sol#L235-L242
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
In `BondNFT.sol#c... | Code4rena | 4 | Tigris Trade |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | access-control | false | false | ## Gas: Aliased counterpart gateway address can be stored as an immutabe variable
### Description
The `L2TokenGateway.finalizeInboundTransfer()` function checks whether the `msg.sender` is the aliased version of the counterpart gateway address at L1. According to Arbitrum documentation, the aliased version is calculat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Absence of Overflow Check in from_str_hex Function
### Description
The [`from_str_hex`](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/rust-contracts-stylus/blob/a67ab7068ac94a5a1ad48ae632050c8d28f9ab25/lib/crypto/src/arithmetic/uint.rs#L745) function does not include an overflow check when parsing hexadecimal strings into a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Use constants for `sd59x18(0)` and `ud60x18(0)`
### Description
`prb-math` provides constants for `sd59x18(0)` and `ud60x18(0)` to avoid having to continuously calculate them or define your own constants.
### Recommendation
Use aliased imports to prevent naming clashes:
```solidity
import { UD60x18, ud60x18, ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect Variance Calculation
### Description
## Oracle Price Calculation Issue
In the market, `oracle_price_from_a_and_b` combines prices from two oracle accounts (`oracle_a` and `oracle_b`), checks for staleness and variance, and returns the adjusted and converted price if it meets the criteria.
## Code S... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | true | ## Medium: `MAX_DELEGATES` limit can be bypassed
### Description
`delegate()` allows votes to be delegated from one ID to another. Each owner of an ID has a maximum limit of 128 delegates (`MAX_DELEGATES = 128`). However, this limit can be bypassed because the `require` statement does not validate the newly acquired d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: isFactory incorrect comment
### Description
The `isFactory` function has a comment that claims the liquidator factory checks:
```solidity
isFactory("LOAN_MANAGER", address(this));
```
However, the liquidator factory actually calls:
```solidity
isFactory("LOAN_MANAGER", IMapleProxied(msg.sender).factory());
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | true | true | ## Low: BuySheep swapExactTokensForTokensSimple Call Can Be Sandwiched
### Description
In the **SheepDog** contract, the call to:
```solidity
IRouter(router).swapExactTokensForTokensSimple(balGasToken, 1e18, wGasToken, sheep, false, address(this), block.timestamp + 10);
```
within the **buySheep** function is suscep... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: NodeRegistry - Multiple nodes can share slightly different RPC URL ✓ Fixed
### Description
One of the requirements for Node registration is to have a unique URL which is not already used by a different owner. The uniqueness check is done by hashing the provided `_url` and checking if someone already registere... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | oracle | true | false | ## Gas: Cache state variables outside of loop to avoid reading storage on every iteration
### Description
Reading from storage should always try to be avoided within loops. In the following instances, we are able to cache state variables outside of the loop to save a `Gwarmaccess (100 gas)` per loop iteration.
https:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: MultiInvoker doesn't pay keepers refund for l1 calldata
### Description
MultiInvoker doesn't pay keepers refund for l1 calldata, as result keepers can be not incentivized to execute orders.
### Impact
Keeper will not be incentivized to execute orders.
### Recommendation
You need to implement 2 versions of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | true | ## Low: Owners cannot accept or reject re-proposed transactions
### Description
A reproposed transaction cannot be confirmed or rejected by certain owners. A transaction can be proposed, accepted, or rejected. Each transaction is identified by its number.
The transaction structure contains the `status` mapping, which... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Self-referral Prevention
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**:
In the referral.sol The contract does not prevent users from registering themselves using their own referral code, leading to potential abuse where users earn rewards illegitimately.
**Scenario**:
A u... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `Gateway.withBatch()` lacks message count validation enabling permanent DOS via an excessive number of messages in a batch
### Description
An attacker can permanently DOS cross-chain message processing by creating batches with excessive numbers of messages that collectively exceed the block gas limit on the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Optimizations
### Description
In `RaiseCodec.sol` and `TokenCodec.sol`, the `decode` functions decode the data from bits by first left shifting the respective mask to the respective offset and then applying the bitwise AND operator on the bits. The result is again right shifted with the respective offset to ge... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: `masterCreditAccount` remains uninitialized
### Description
`masterCreditAccount` remains uninitialized, so anybody can initialize it:
https://github.com/Gearbox-protocol/gearbox-contracts/blob/0ac33ba87212ce056ac6b6357ad74161d417158a/contracts/core/AccountFactory.sol#L90
### Recommendation
We recommend to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | high | token | true | false | ## High: The `fetchRewards` function in `CurveDepositToken` and `ConvexDepositToken` causes a loss of accrued rewards
### Description
The `fetchRewards` function in `CurveDepositToken` and `ConvexDepositToken` [fails](https://github.com/Bima-Labs/bima-v1-core/blob/09461f0d22556e810295b12a6d7bc5c0efec4627/contracts/sta... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | true | false | ## Low: 8. GASLIMIT AND CHAINID MAX SIZE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ZKEVM AND EVM
### Description
**Severity:** Low
**Path:** [StakeableVestingFactory.sol:deployStakeableVesting:L39-71](https://github.com/0xPolygonHermez/zkevm-rom/blob/develop/main/load-tx-rlp.zkasm)
**Description:**
There is a difference between the tran... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [06] V3 upgrade could depreciate token value due to oversupply
### Description
The forking feature, though rarely happened as [documented in the FAQs](https://mirror.xyz/0x10072dfc23771101dC042fD0014f263316a6E400/iN0FKOn_oYVBzlJkwPwK2mhzaeL8K2-W80u82F7fHj8), could potentially affect the Nouns token value. This... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Residual token allowance
### Description
There are multiple places in the codebase where addresses may retain excess token allowances:
* the [`setUniswapAddress` function](https://github.com/OriginProtocol/origin-dollar/blob/bf4ff28d5944ecc277e66294fd2c702fee5cd58b/contracts/contracts/buyback/Buyback.sol#L42... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Users may cost additional interest
### Description
When a particular user deposit, if it is a case of executing processDepositCancellation after failing to add mobility. But the GMX callback is delayed for a period of time, during which the interest on the borrowed money will be borne by the user already in... | 0 |
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