id stringlengths 24 24 | title stringlengths 3 59 | context stringlengths 151 3.71k | question stringlengths 12 217 | answers dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
57325ecbe99e3014001e672b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What agency failed to accurately price risk involved in mortgage-related financial products? | {
"text": [
"credit rating agencies"
],
"answer_start": [
1321
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e672c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What practices should have been adjusted by governments to address 21st-century financial markets? | {
"text": [
"regulatory"
],
"answer_start": [
1487
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a65 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | What are MBS as related to the housing and credit booms? | {
"text": [
"mortgage-backed securities"
],
"answer_start": [
83
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a66 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | What are CDO as related to the housing and credit booms? | {
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligations"
],
"answer_start": [
120
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a67 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | When housing prices declined, who reported significant losses from being heavily invested in subprime MBS? | {
"text": [
"major global financial institutions"
],
"answer_start": [
391
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a68 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | Who could invest in the U.S. housing market through MBS and CDO? | {
"text": [
"institutions and investors around the world"
],
"answer_start": [
281
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a69 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | MBS and CDO derive their value from? | {
"text": [
"mortgage payments and housing prices"
],
"answer_start": [
190
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadb | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What year did the foreclosure epidemic begin? | {
"text": [
"late 2006"
],
"answer_start": [
174
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadc | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | How much are total losses estimated to be from falling home prices? | {
"text": [
"trillions of U.S. dollars"
],
"answer_start": [
477
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadd | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What is the financial incentive when a home is worth less than the mortgage loan? | {
"text": [
"foreclosure"
],
"answer_start": [
114
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eade | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What other financial instruments had significant defaults and losses as a result of the crisis expanding from housing to other parts of the economy? | {
"text": [
"other loan types"
],
"answer_start": [
319
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadf | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What continues to drain consumer wealth and erode the strength of banks? | {
"text": [
"foreclosure epidemic"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab72 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What institutions comprise the shadow banking system? | {
"text": [
"investment banks and hedge funds"
],
"answer_start": [
567
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab73 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What institutions are not subject to the same regulations as commercial banks? | {
"text": [
"investment banks and hedge funds"
],
"answer_start": [
567
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab74 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What process caused the financial system to both expand and become fragile? | {
"text": [
"financialization"
],
"answer_start": [
165
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab75 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What policy has U.S. Government emphasized from the 1970's onward? | {
"text": [
"deregulation"
],
"answer_start": [
243
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab76 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | Since the 1970's, what has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, but resulted in less oversight and less disclosure? | {
"text": [
"U.S. Government policy"
],
"answer_start": [
183
]
} |
5732a8641d5d2e14009ff885 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial commitments. | Some regulated banks did not have sufficient financial cushions in place to absorb what losses as a result of the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"MBS"
],
"answer_start": [
221
]
} |
5732a8641d5d2e14009ff886 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial commitments. | What was a consequence of the large loan defaults and MBS losses in 2007? | {
"text": [
"slowing economic activity"
],
"answer_start": [
302
]
} |
5732a8641d5d2e14009ff887 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial commitments. | Who provided funds to encourage lending and restore faith in commercial banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"central banks"
],
"answer_start": [
398
]
} |
5732a8641d5d2e14009ff888 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial commitments. | Who bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs as an answer to the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"Governments"
],
"answer_start": [
552
]
} |
5732a8641d5d2e14009ff889 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial commitments. | What impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend in the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"large loan defaults or MBS losses"
],
"answer_start": [
198
]
} |
5732aa5bcc179a14009dabdc | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels". | When did the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report its findings? | {
"text": [
"January 2011"
],
"answer_start": [
70
]
} |
5732aa5bcc179a14009dabde | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels". | What agency failed to stem the tide of toxic mortgages contributing to the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"Federal Reserve"
],
"answer_start": [
206
]
} |
5732aa5bcc179a14009dabdf | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels". | Who was not prepared for the financial crisis in 2007 by lacking a full understanding of the financial system? | {
"text": [
"key policy makers"
],
"answer_start": [
539
]
} |
5732aa5bcc179a14009dabe0 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that "the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels". | Which business sector contributed to the financial crisis by acting recklessly and taking on too much risk? | {
"text": [
"financial firms"
],
"answer_start": [
332
]
} |
5732ac07328d981900601ffd | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs. | What caused mortgage lenders to relax underwriting standards and approve riskier mortgages? | {
"text": [
"tough competition"
],
"answer_start": [
19
]
} |
5732ac07328d981900601ffe | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs. | In what year were high underwriting standards relaxed? | {
"text": [
"2003"
],
"answer_start": [
454
]
} |
5732ac07328d981900601fff | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs. | What years were the worst mortgage loans originated? | {
"text": [
"2004–2007"
],
"answer_start": [
694
]
} |
5732ac07328d981900602000 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs. | What years had the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for GSEs? | {
"text": [
"2004–2007"
],
"answer_start": [
694
]
} |
5732ac07328d981900602001 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | During a period of tough competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and when the supply of creditworthy borrowers was limited, mortgage lenders relaxed underwriting standards and originated riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers. In the view of some analysts, the relatively conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards prior to 2003. However, as market power shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated. The worst loans were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the lowest market share for the GSEs. | Who policed mortgage originators and maintained relatively high standards prior to 2003? | {
"text": [
"government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)"
],
"answer_start": [
322
]
} |
5732add9cc179a14009dabf0 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed. | How many Democratic appointees wrote the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission? | {
"text": [
"six"
],
"answer_start": [
79
]
} |
5732add9cc179a14009dabf1 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed. | Who claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans - a claim that is widely disputed? | {
"text": [
"Paul Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
655
]
} |
5732add9cc179a14009dabf2 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed. | Several reports written by various agencies concluded that which policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"government affordable housing policy"
],
"answer_start": [
279
]
} |
5732add9cc179a14009dabf3 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed. | How many Republican appointees wrote the minority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission? | {
"text": [
"4"
],
"answer_start": [
147
]
} |
5732add9cc179a14009dabf4 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, written by the six Democratic appointees, the minority report, written by 3 of the 4 Republican appointees, studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of several independent scholars generally contend that government affordable housing policy was not the primary cause of the financial crisis. Although they concede that governmental policies had some role in causing the crisis, they contend that GSE loans performed better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and performed better than some loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios. Paul Krugman has even claimed that the GSE never purchased subprime loans – a claim that is widely disputed. | According to reports, which loans performed better than some loans securitized by private investment banks? | {
"text": [
"GSE loans"
],
"answer_start": [
471
]
} |
5732afd2328d981900602007 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion. | Which government-sponsored entities had massive risky loan purchases? | {
"text": [
"Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac"
],
"answer_start": [
361
]
} |
5732afd2328d981900602008 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion. | How many estimated substandard loans did Fannie and Freddie have in 2008? | {
"text": [
"13 million"
],
"answer_start": [
596
]
} |
5732afd2328d981900602009 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion. | What was the value of the estimated 13 million substandard loans held by Fannie and Freddie in 2008? | {
"text": [
"over $2 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
634
]
} |
5732afd2328d98190060200a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion. | How many ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie were named in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case? | {
"text": [
"6"
],
"answer_start": [
476
]
} |
5732afd2328d98190060200b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In his dissent to the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J. Wallison stated his belief that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced directly and primarily to affordable housing policies initiated by HUD in the 1990s and to massive risky loan purchases by government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Later, based upon information in the SEC's December 2011 securities fraud case against 6 ex-executives of Fannie and Freddie, Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto estimated that, in 2008, Fannie and Freddie held 13 million substandard loans totaling over $2 trillion. | Peter J. Wallison believes that the one of the roots of the financial crisis can be traced to affordable housing policies by which agency in the 1990s? | {
"text": [
"HUD"
],
"answer_start": [
275
]
} |
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded. | Which administration called for investigation into the soundness of GSEs in the early and mid-2000s? | {
"text": [
"Bush administration"
],
"answer_start": [
32
]
} |
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7d | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded. | Who uncovered accounting discrepancies in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? | {
"text": [
"Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)"
],
"answer_start": [
374
]
} |
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded. | On what date did the House Financial Services Committee hold a hearing to assess safety and soundness issues regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? | {
"text": [
"September 10, 2003"
],
"answer_start": [
189
]
} |
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a7f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded. | What was the result of the House Financial Services Committee on September 10, 2003 regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? | {
"text": [
"The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation"
],
"answer_start": [
498
]
} |
5732b191d6dcfa19001e8a80 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In the early and mid-2000s, the Bush administration called numerous times for investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime mortgages. On September 10, 2003, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies within the two entities. The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation. Some believe this was an early warning to the systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that went unheeded. | Who rebuked OFHEO in 2003 for their attempt at regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? | {
"text": [
"House Financial Services Committee"
],
"answer_start": [
213
]
} |
5732b3a5328d981900602017 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending. | What was the value of mortgage lending made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders to low and mid level income borrowers and neighborhoods from 1993-1998? | {
"text": [
"$467 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
117
]
} |
5732b3a5328d981900602018 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending. | What percent of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act covered lenders from 1993 to 1998? | {
"text": [
"10%"
],
"answer_start": [
289
]
} |
5732b3a5328d981900602019 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending. | What does CRA stand for? | {
"text": [
"Community Reinvestment Act"
],
"answer_start": [
162
]
} |
5732b3a5328d98190060201a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending. | What percent of sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions in the run-up to the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"25%"
],
"answer_start": [
521
]
} |
5732b3a5328d98190060201b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to 1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S. mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998, but in the run-up to the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA. In addition, an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded that the CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later. Furthermore, most sub-prime loans were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending. | What percent of sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA in the run-up to the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"25%"
],
"answer_start": [
599
]
} |
5732b589cc179a14009dac1e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans. | When did CRA make rule changes to relax underwriting standards? | {
"text": [
"1995"
],
"answer_start": [
262
]
} |
5732b589cc179a14009dac1f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans. | How much were CRA loan commitments between 1994 and 2007? | {
"text": [
"$4.5 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
541
]
} |
5732b589cc179a14009dac20 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans. | What was the Federal Reserve's assumption regarding what makes a loan subprime? | {
"text": [
"high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average)"
],
"answer_start": [
729
]
} |
5732b589cc179a14009dac21 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans. | How did the Federal Reserve classify CRA loans? | {
"text": [
"prime"
],
"answer_start": [
666
]
} |
5732b589cc179a14009dac22 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | To other analysts the delay between CRA rule changes (in 1995) and the explosion of subprime lending is not surprising, and does not exonerate the CRA. They contend that there were two, connected causes to the crisis: the relaxation of underwriting standards in 1995 and the ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Both causes had to be in place before the crisis could take place. Critics also point out that publicly announced CRA loan commitments were massive, totaling $4.5 trillion in the years between 1994 and 2007. They also argue that the Federal Reserve’s classification of CRA loans as “prime” is based on the faulty and self-serving assumption that high-interest-rate loans (3 percentage points over average) equal “subprime” loans. | When were ultra-low interest rates initiated by the Federal Reserve? | {
"text": [
"after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001"
],
"answer_start": [
333
]
} |
5732b89acc179a14009dac32 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs. | What financial innovation enabled investment banks and hedge funds to make large wagers? | {
"text": [
"credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs."
],
"answer_start": [
516
]
} |
5732b89acc179a14009dac33 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs. | Credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and CDOS are all types of what? | {
"text": [
"derivatives"
],
"answer_start": [
497
]
} |
5732b89acc179a14009dac34 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs. | Which magazine had an article where Michael Lewis spoke with a trader about bad loans? | {
"text": [
"Portfolio Magazine"
],
"answer_start": [
125
]
} |
5732b89acc179a14009dac35 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs. | What financial innovation allows investment banks and hedge banks to make large wagers? | {
"text": [
"derivatives"
],
"answer_start": [
497
]
} |
5732b89acc179a14009dac36 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs. | What are some names of derivatives? | {
"text": [
"credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs"
],
"answer_start": [
516
]
} |
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments. | Peter J. Wallison believes that the huge number of these loans led to the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"substandard"
],
"answer_start": [
633
]
} |
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3d | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments. | What type downpayments do substandard loans generally have? | {
"text": [
"low or no downpayments"
],
"answer_start": [
668
]
} |
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments. | According to Peter J. Wallison, why did the U.S. residential housing bubble led to financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans"
],
"answer_start": [
596
]
} |
5732bad2cc179a14009dac3f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments. | Other countries had large residential housing bubbles that deflated during what years? | {
"text": [
"1997–2007"
],
"answer_start": [
240
]
} |
5732bad2cc179a14009dac40 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Countering Krugman, Peter J. Wallison wrote: "It is not true that every bubble—even a large bubble—has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates." Wallison notes that other developed countries had "large bubbles during the 1997–2007 period" but "the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the United States when the 1997–2007 [bubble] deflated." According to Wallison, the reason the U.S. residential housing bubble (as opposed to other types of bubbles) led to financial crisis was that it was supported by a huge number of substandard loans – generally with low or no downpayments. | Peter J. Wallison's conclusions regarding the financial crisis are not in agreement with this economist's views? | {
"text": [
"Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
11
]
} |
57332627d058e614000b5744 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote: | Who believed that the growth of the commercial real estate bubble indicated that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis? | {
"text": [
"Krugman"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
} |
57332627d058e614000b5745 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote: | When did Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders issue a report about commercial mortgage-backed securities? | {
"text": [
"December 2010"
],
"answer_start": [
304
]
} |
57332627d058e614000b5746 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote: | According to business journalist Kimberly Amadeo, when did the first signs of decline in real estate occur? | {
"text": [
"2006"
],
"answer_start": [
742
]
} |
57332627d058e614000b5747 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote: | What are CMBS? | {
"text": [
"commercial mortgage-backed securities"
],
"answer_start": [
386
]
} |
57332627d058e614000b5748 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Krugman's contention (that the growth of a commercial real estate bubble indicates that U.S. housing policy was not the cause of the crisis) is challenged by additional analysis. After researching the default of commercial loans during the financial crisis, Xudong An and Anthony B. Sanders reported (in December 2010): "We find limited evidence that substantial deterioration in CMBS [commercial mortgage-backed securities] loan underwriting occurred prior to the crisis." Other analysts support the contention that the crisis in commercial real estate and related lending took place after the crisis in residential real estate. Business journalist Kimberly Amadeo reports: "The first signs of decline in residential real estate occurred in 2006. Three years later, commercial real estate started feeling the effects. Denice A. Gierach, a real estate attorney and CPA, wrote: | According to most analysts, what crisis took place after the crisis in residential real estate? | {
"text": [
"the crisis in commercial real estate"
],
"answer_start": [
517
]
} |
573328a6d058e614000b574e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. | What is one investment assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies? | {
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligation"
],
"answer_start": [
509
]
} |
573328a6d058e614000b574f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. | How much was invested worldwide in fixed income investments? | {
"text": [
"$70 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
107
]
} |
573328a6d058e614000b5750 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. | How much did the pool of money invested worldwide in fixed income investments grow in size from 2000 to 2007? | {
"text": [
"roughly doubled in size"
],
"answer_start": [
266
]
} |
573328a6d058e614000b5751 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. | What is an example of a product Wall Street invented to answer the demand for income generating investments? | {
"text": [
"mortgage-backed security"
],
"answer_start": [
476
]
} |
573328a6d058e614000b5752 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. | In the 2000s, investors were seeking higher yields than those offered by this investment? | {
"text": [
"U.S. Treasury bonds"
],
"answer_start": [
202
]
} |
57332ba74776f41900660730 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested. | What is the name of the securities that enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime? | {
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligation"
],
"answer_start": [
4
]
} |
57332ba74776f41900660731 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested. | What was the outcome of collateralized debt obligations? | {
"text": [
"extending or increasing the housing bubble"
],
"answer_start": [
144
]
} |
57332ba74776f41900660732 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested. | What type ratings did securities first in line receive from rating agencies? | {
"text": [
"investment-grade ratings"
],
"answer_start": [
433
]
} |
57332ba74776f41900660733 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested. | What type pool do collateralized debt obligations place their payments from mortgages into? | {
"text": [
"single pool"
],
"answer_start": [
309
]
} |
57332ba74776f41900660734 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested. | What securities had lower credit ratings but potentially a higher rate of return? | {
"text": [
"Securities with lower priority"
],
"answer_start": [
480
]
} |
57332d064776f4190066074e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. | How much had average U.S. housing prices declined by September 2008? | {
"text": [
"over 20%"
],
"answer_start": [
63
]
} |
57332d064776f4190066074f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. | When was the peak of U.S. housing prices? | {
"text": [
"mid-2006"
],
"answer_start": [
83
]
} |
57332d064776f41900660750 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. | How many foreclosure proceedings were initiated by lenders in 2007? | {
"text": [
"nearly 1.3 million"
],
"answer_start": [
322
]
} |
57332d064776f41900660751 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. | What was the percentage increase on foreclosure proceedings from 2007 to 2008? | {
"text": [
"81%"
],
"answer_start": [
421
]
} |
57332d064776f41900660752 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. | How many U.S. mortgages were either delinquent or in foreclosure by September 2009? | {
"text": [
"14.4%"
],
"answer_start": [
578
]
} |
573332054776f41900660774 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis. | Was was the federal funds rate target lowered to by the Federal Reserve in 2003? | {
"text": [
"1.0%"
],
"answer_start": [
133
]
} |
573332054776f41900660775 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis. | What is one reason the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target to 1.0% in 2003? | {
"text": [
"to combat a perceived risk of deflation"
],
"answer_start": [
266
]
} |
573332054776f41900660776 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis. | In the early 2000s, what type bubble did some economists believe the Fed needed to create to replace the Nasdaq bubble? | {
"text": [
"a housing bubble"
],
"answer_start": [
479
]
} |
573332054776f41900660777 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis. | What contributed greatly to the severity of the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"excessive credit growth"
],
"answer_start": [
600
]
} |
573332054776f41900660778 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of deflation. As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble". Moreover, empirical studies using data from advanced countries show that excessive credit growth contributed greatly to the severity of the crisis. | What encouraged borrowing from 2000 to 2003? | {
"text": [
"Lower interest rates"
],
"answer_start": [
0
]
} |
573334094776f41900660786 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. | Per Bernanke, how much did the U.S. current account deficit increase between 1996 and 2004? | {
"text": [
"$650 billion"
],
"answer_start": [
93
]
} |
573334094776f41900660787 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. | What percentage of GDP was the U.S. current account deficit in 2004? | {
"text": [
"5.8%"
],
"answer_start": [
120
]
} |
573334094776f41900660788 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. | What emerging economies did the U.S. borrow money from between 1996 and 2004 to finance its imports? | {
"text": [
"Asia and oil-exporting nations"
],
"answer_start": [
308
]
} |
573334094776f41900660789 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. | What type account is needed by the U.S. to balance an account deficit? | {
"text": [
"capital account"
],
"answer_start": [
462
]
} |
573334094776f4190066078a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. | Where did the U.S. obtain capital to finance its imports? | {
"text": [
"foreign funds"
],
"answer_start": [
554
]
} |
573335cbd058e614000b5780 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst. | When did the Fed begin raising Fed funds rate significantly? | {
"text": [
"July 2004"
],
"answer_start": [
61
]
} |
573335cbd058e614000b5781 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst. | What does ARM stand for: | {
"text": [
"adjustable-rate mortgage"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
} |
573335cbd058e614000b5782 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst. | How do asset prices generally move in relation to interest rates? | {
"text": [
"inversely"
],
"answer_start": [
342
]
} |
573335cbd058e614000b5783 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it became riskier to speculate in housing. U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst. | Beginning in July 2004, what did the Fed do to make ARM rates more expensive for homeowners? | {
"text": [
"raised the Fed funds rate"
],
"answer_start": [
13
]
} |
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