instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ims_pcu_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct ims_pcu *pcu = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
/*
* See if we are dealing with control or data interface. The cleanup
* happens when we unbind primary (control) interface.
*/
if (alt->desc.bInterfaceClass != USB_CLASS_COMM)
return;
sysfs_remove_group(&intf->dev.kobj, &ims_pcu_attr_group);
ims_pcu_stop_io(pcu);
if (pcu->bootloader_mode)
ims_pcu_destroy_bootloader_mode(pcu);
else
ims_pcu_destroy_application_mode(pcu);
ims_pcu_buffers_free(pcu);
kfree(pcu);
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::readValue(
ScriptState* scriptState) {
if (!getGatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!getGatt()->device()->isValidCharacteristic(
m_characteristic->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kInvalidCharacteristic));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
getGatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteCharacteristicReadValue(
m_characteristic->instance_id,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::ReadValueCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_stream_memory_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret TSRMLS_DC)
{
return FAILURE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcScreenSaverQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
xScreenSaverQueryVersionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.majorVersion = SERVER_SAVER_MAJOR_VERSION,
.minorVersion = SERVER_SAVER_MINOR_VERSION
};
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverQueryVersionReq);
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xScreenSaverQueryVersionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaReadMem(const l_uint8 *data,
size_t size)
{
FILE *fp;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadMem");
if (!data)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("data not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((fp = fopenReadFromMemory(data, size)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not opened", procName, NULL);
pta = ptaReadStream(fp);
fclose(fp);
if (!pta) L_ERROR("pta not read\n", procName);
return pta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cryptd_free_aead(struct cryptd_aead *tfm)
{
crypto_free_aead(&tfm->base);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_is_pdf14trans_compositor(const gs_composite_t * pct)
{
return (pct->type == &gs_composite_pdf14trans_type
|| pct->type == &gs_composite_pdf14trans_no_clist_writer_type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitDecoder(
"", // extensions
false, // has alpha
false, // has depth
false, // has stencil
false, // request alpha
false, // request depth
false, // request stencil
true); // bind generates resource
SetupDefaultProgram();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int32_t modplugresamplingmode_to_filterlength(int mode)
{
if(mode<0){
return 1;
}
switch(mode){
case MODPLUG_RESAMPLE_NEAREST: return 1; break;
case MODPLUG_RESAMPLE_LINEAR: return 2; break;
case MODPLUG_RESAMPLE_SPLINE: return 4; break;
case MODPLUG_RESAMPLE_FIR: return 8; break;
}
return 8;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 87,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmxnet3_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
if (s->msix_used) {
if (!vmxnet3_use_msix_vectors(s, VMXNET3_MAX_INTRS)) {
VMW_WRPRN("Failed to re-use MSI-X vectors");
msix_uninit(d, &s->msix_bar, &s->msix_bar);
s->msix_used = false;
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i, idx, r = 0;
pfn_t identity_map_pfn;
u32 tmp;
if (!enable_ept)
return 0;
/* Protect kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
if (likely(kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done))
goto out2;
identity_map_pfn = kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = alloc_identity_pagetable(kvm);
if (r < 0)
goto out2;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
&tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
if (r < 0)
goto out;
}
kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
out2:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_zlib_output_encoding(TSRMLS_D)
{
zval **enc;
if (!ZLIBG(compression_coding)) {
zend_is_auto_global(ZEND_STRL("_SERVER") TSRMLS_CC);
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER] && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]), "HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING", sizeof("HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING"), (void *) &enc)) {
convert_to_string(*enc);
if (strstr(Z_STRVAL_PP(enc), "gzip")) {
ZLIBG(compression_coding) = PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_GZIP;
} else if (strstr(Z_STRVAL_PP(enc), "deflate")) {
ZLIBG(compression_coding) = PHP_ZLIB_ENCODING_DEFLATE;
}
}
}
return ZLIBG(compression_coding);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8InspectorClient* ensureDebuggerClient()
{
if (m_inspectorClient)
return m_inspectorClient;
InspectedContext* inspectedContext = ensureInspectedContext();
if (!inspectedContext)
return nullptr;
m_inspectorClient = inspectedContext->inspector()->client();
return m_inspectorClient;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImageBitmap* ImageBitmap::create(PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> image) {
return new ImageBitmap(std::move(image));
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 140,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderThreadImpl::PostTaskToAllWebWorkers(const base::Closure& closure) {
return WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->PostTaskToAllThreads(closure);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void napi_busy_loop(unsigned int napi_id,
bool (*loop_end)(void *, unsigned long),
void *loop_end_arg)
{
unsigned long start_time = loop_end ? busy_loop_current_time() : 0;
int (*napi_poll)(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget);
void *have_poll_lock = NULL;
struct napi_struct *napi;
restart:
napi_poll = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
napi = napi_by_id(napi_id);
if (!napi)
goto out;
preempt_disable();
for (;;) {
int work = 0;
local_bh_disable();
if (!napi_poll) {
unsigned long val = READ_ONCE(napi->state);
/* If multiple threads are competing for this napi,
* we avoid dirtying napi->state as much as we can.
*/
if (val & (NAPIF_STATE_DISABLE | NAPIF_STATE_SCHED |
NAPIF_STATE_IN_BUSY_POLL))
goto count;
if (cmpxchg(&napi->state, val,
val | NAPIF_STATE_IN_BUSY_POLL |
NAPIF_STATE_SCHED) != val)
goto count;
have_poll_lock = netpoll_poll_lock(napi);
napi_poll = napi->poll;
}
work = napi_poll(napi, BUSY_POLL_BUDGET);
trace_napi_poll(napi, work, BUSY_POLL_BUDGET);
count:
if (work > 0)
__NET_ADD_STATS(dev_net(napi->dev),
LINUX_MIB_BUSYPOLLRXPACKETS, work);
local_bh_enable();
if (!loop_end || loop_end(loop_end_arg, start_time))
break;
if (unlikely(need_resched())) {
if (napi_poll)
busy_poll_stop(napi, have_poll_lock);
preempt_enable();
rcu_read_unlock();
cond_resched();
if (loop_end(loop_end_arg, start_time))
return;
goto restart;
}
cpu_relax();
}
if (napi_poll)
busy_poll_stop(napi, have_poll_lock);
preempt_enable();
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int dn_current_mss(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
int mss_now = min_t(int, scp->segsize_loc, scp->segsize_rem);
/* Other data messages are limited to 16 bytes per packet */
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return 16;
/* This works out the maximum size of segment we can send out */
if (dst) {
u32 mtu = dst_mtu(dst);
mss_now = min_t(int, dn_mss_from_pmtu(dst->dev, mtu), mss_now);
}
return mss_now;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dev_add_pack(struct packet_type *pt)
{
int hash;
spin_lock_bh(&ptype_lock);
if (pt->type == htons(ETH_P_ALL))
list_add_rcu(&pt->list, &ptype_all);
else {
hash = ntohs(pt->type) & PTYPE_HASH_MASK;
list_add_rcu(&pt->list, &ptype_base[hash]);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ptype_lock);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void testNonAnimatedCanvasUpdate()
{
m_testSurface->initializeCurrentFrame();
m_fakeImageBufferClient->fakeDraw();
m_testSurface->getPicture();
m_testSurface->getPicture();
EXPECT_EQ(2, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(true);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 132,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::NotifyAllProgress(const GURL& url) {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
AddAllAssociatedHostsToNotifier(&host_notifier);
host_notifier.SendProgressNotifications(
url, url_file_list_.size(), url_fetches_completed_);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct pdf_doc *pdf_create(int width, int height, struct pdf_info *info)
{
struct pdf_doc *pdf;
struct pdf_object *obj;
pdf = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pdf_doc));
pdf->width = width;
pdf->height = height;
/* We don't want to use ID 0 */
pdf_add_object(pdf, OBJ_none);
/* Create the 'info' object */
obj = pdf_add_object(pdf, OBJ_info);
if (info)
obj->info = *info;
/* FIXME: Should be quoting PDF strings? */
if (!obj->info.date[0]) {
time_t now = time(NULL);
struct tm tm;
#ifdef _WIN32
struct tm *tmp;
tmp = localtime(&now);
tm = *tmp;
#else
localtime_r(&now, &tm);
#endif
strftime(obj->info.date, sizeof(obj->info.date),
"%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
}
if (!obj->info.creator[0])
strcpy(obj->info.creator, "pdfgen");
if (!obj->info.producer[0])
strcpy(obj->info.producer, "pdfgen");
if (!obj->info.title[0])
strcpy(obj->info.title, "pdfgen");
if (!obj->info.author[0])
strcpy(obj->info.author, "pdfgen");
if (!obj->info.subject[0])
strcpy(obj->info.subject, "pdfgen");
pdf_add_object(pdf, OBJ_pages);
pdf_add_object(pdf, OBJ_catalog);
pdf_set_font(pdf, "Times-Roman");
return pdf;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LoginHtmlDialog::LoginHtmlDialog(Delegate* delegate,
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window,
const std::wstring& title,
const GURL& url,
Style style)
: delegate_(delegate),
parent_window_(parent_window),
title_(title),
url_(url),
style_(style),
bubble_frame_view_(NULL),
is_open_(false) {
gfx::Rect screen_bounds(chromeos::CalculateScreenBounds(gfx::Size()));
width_ = static_cast<int>(kDefaultWidthRatio * screen_bounds.width());
height_ = static_cast<int>(kDefaultHeightRatio * screen_bounds.height());
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath WallpaperManager::GetDeviceWallpaperDir() {
base::FilePath wallpaper_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_CHROMEOS_WALLPAPERS, &wallpaper_dir)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to get wallpaper dir.";
return base::FilePath();
}
return wallpaper_dir.Append(kDeviceWallpaperDir);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 127,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Visibility WebContentsImpl::GetVisibility() const {
return visibility_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) uaddr;
int ret = -EINVAL;
int chk_addr_ret;
ret = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip_bind_lookup(&init_net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
goto out;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(&init_net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr);
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
l2tp_ip_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
ret = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cuse_parse_devinfo(char *p, size_t len, struct cuse_devinfo *devinfo)
{
char *end = p + len;
char *uninitialized_var(key), *uninitialized_var(val);
int rc;
while (true) {
rc = cuse_parse_one(&p, end, &key, &val);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (!rc)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "DEVNAME") == 0)
devinfo->name = val;
else
printk(KERN_WARNING "CUSE: unknown device info \"%s\"\n",
key);
}
if (!devinfo->name || !strlen(devinfo->name)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "CUSE: DEVNAME unspecified\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 58,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::ProcessHandle RenderProcessHostImpl::GetHandle() {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return base::Process::Current().handle();
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() || child_process_launcher_->IsStarting())
return base::kNullProcessHandle;
return child_process_launcher_->GetHandle();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
{
return sys_getpgid(0);
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrame::DocumentAttached() {
DCHECK(GetDocument());
GetEditor().Clear();
GetEventHandler().Clear();
Selection().DocumentAttached(GetDocument());
GetInputMethodController().DocumentAttached(GetDocument());
GetSpellChecker().DocumentAttached(GetDocument());
GetTextSuggestionController().DocumentAttached(GetDocument());
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_CORE_DECLARE(void) ap_add_file_conf(apr_pool_t *p, core_dir_config *conf,
void *url_config)
{
void **new_space;
if (!conf->sec_file)
conf->sec_file = apr_array_make(p, 2, sizeof(ap_conf_vector_t *));
new_space = (void **)apr_array_push(conf->sec_file);
*new_space = url_config;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, mungServer)
{
zval *mungvalues, *data;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "a", &mungvalues) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "No values passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues)) > 4) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Too many values passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
phar_request_initialize();
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(mungvalues), data) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(data) != IS_STRING) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Non-string value passed to Phar::mungServer(), expecting an array of any of these strings: PHP_SELF, REQUEST_URI, SCRIPT_FILENAME, SCRIPT_NAME");
return;
}
if (Z_STRLEN_P(data) == sizeof("PHP_SELF")-1 && !strncmp(Z_STRVAL_P(data), "PHP_SELF", sizeof("PHP_SELF")-1)) {
PHAR_G(phar_SERVER_mung_list) |= PHAR_MUNG_PHP_SELF;
}
if (Z_STRLEN_P(data) == sizeof("REQUEST_URI")-1) {
if (!strncmp(Z_STRVAL_P(data), "REQUEST_URI", sizeof("REQUEST_URI")-1)) {
PHAR_G(phar_SERVER_mung_list) |= PHAR_MUNG_REQUEST_URI;
}
if (!strncmp(Z_STRVAL_P(data), "SCRIPT_NAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_NAME")-1)) {
PHAR_G(phar_SERVER_mung_list) |= PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_NAME;
}
}
if (Z_STRLEN_P(data) == sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME")-1 && !strncmp(Z_STRVAL_P(data), "SCRIPT_FILENAME", sizeof("SCRIPT_FILENAME")-1)) {
PHAR_G(phar_SERVER_mung_list) |= PHAR_MUNG_SCRIPT_FILENAME;
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FloatRect ChromeClientImpl::windowRect()
{
WebRect rect;
if (m_webView->client())
rect = m_webView->client()->rootWindowRect();
else {
rect.width = m_webView->size().width;
rect.height = m_webView->size().height;
}
return FloatRect(rect);
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Clipboard::WriteText(const char* text_data, size_t text_len) {
char* data = new char[text_len];
memcpy(data, text_data, text_len);
InsertMapping(kMimeTypeText, data, text_len);
InsertMapping("TEXT", data, text_len);
InsertMapping("STRING", data, text_len);
InsertMapping("UTF8_STRING", data, text_len);
InsertMapping("COMPOUND_TEXT", data, text_len);
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::ContentCompression()
: algo(0), settings(NULL), settings_len(0) {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SupervisedUserService::SetExtensionsActive() {
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_);
extensions::ManagementPolicy* management_policy =
extension_system->management_policy();
if (management_policy) {
if (active_)
management_policy->RegisterProvider(this);
else
management_policy->UnregisterProvider(this);
extension_system->extension_service()->CheckManagementPolicy();
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _handle_old_batch_job_launch(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
if (msg->msg_type != REQUEST_BATCH_JOB_LAUNCH) {
error("_handle_batch_job_launch: "
"Invalid response msg_type (%u)", msg->msg_type);
return;
}
/* (resp_msg.msg_type == REQUEST_BATCH_JOB_LAUNCH) */
debug2("Processing RPC: REQUEST_BATCH_JOB_LAUNCH");
last_slurmctld_msg = time(NULL);
_rpc_batch_job(msg, false);
slurm_free_job_launch_msg(msg->data);
msg->data = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_recommended_min_free_kbytes(void)
{
struct zone *zone;
int nr_zones = 0;
unsigned long recommended_min;
extern int min_free_kbytes;
if (!test_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags) &&
!test_bit(TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_REQ_MADV_FLAG,
&transparent_hugepage_flags))
return 0;
for_each_populated_zone(zone)
nr_zones++;
/* Make sure at least 2 hugepages are free for MIGRATE_RESERVE */
recommended_min = pageblock_nr_pages * nr_zones * 2;
/*
* Make sure that on average at least two pageblocks are almost free
* of another type, one for a migratetype to fall back to and a
* second to avoid subsequent fallbacks of other types There are 3
* MIGRATE_TYPES we care about.
*/
recommended_min += pageblock_nr_pages * nr_zones *
MIGRATE_PCPTYPES * MIGRATE_PCPTYPES;
/* don't ever allow to reserve more than 5% of the lowmem */
recommended_min = min(recommended_min,
(unsigned long) nr_free_buffer_pages() / 20);
recommended_min <<= (PAGE_SHIFT-10);
if (recommended_min > min_free_kbytes)
min_free_kbytes = recommended_min;
setup_per_zone_wmarks();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ClientControlledShellSurface::DelegateFactoryCallback& GetFactoryForTesting() {
using CallbackType = ClientControlledShellSurface::DelegateFactoryCallback;
static base::NoDestructor<CallbackType> factory;
return *factory;
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 137,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetDeferImeStartup(bool defer) {}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::AdvanceBytesRead(int result) {
DCHECK_GT(result, 0);
current_item_offset_ += result;
if (current_item_offset_ == item_length_list_[current_item_index_])
AdvanceItem();
remaining_bytes_ -= result;
DCHECK_GE(remaining_bytes_, 0);
read_buf_->DidConsume(result);
DCHECK_GE(read_buf_->BytesRemaining(), 0);
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 115,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_ppe_cnt_clr_ce(struct hns_ppe_cb *ppe_cb)
{
dsaf_set_dev_bit(ppe_cb, PPE_TNL_0_5_CNT_CLR_CE_REG,
PPE_CNT_CLR_CE_B, 1);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderThreadImpl::GetGpuRasterizationMSAASampleCount() {
return gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OpenUnixSocket(const char * path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
int s;
int rv;
s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(s < 0)
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "socket(AF_UNIX): %m");
return -1;
}
/* unlink the socket pseudo file before binding */
rv = unlink(path);
if(rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "unlink(unixsocket, \"%s\"): %m", path);
close(s);
return -1;
}
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
if(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) < 0)
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind(unixsocket, \"%s\"): %m", path);
close(s);
return -1;
}
else if(listen(s, 5) < 0)
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "listen(unixsocket): %m");
close(s);
return -1;
}
/* Change rights so everyone can communicate with us */
if(chmod(path, 0666) < 0)
{
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "chmod(\"%s\"): %m", path);
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: minissdpd.c: Initialize pointers to NULL (fix)
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 73,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
UCHAR *eapol,
USHORT eapol_len,
UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
USHORT key_ver)
{
UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
/* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
/* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP) {
/* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
md5_hmac(eapol, eapol_len, KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, c_mic);
} else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
/* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
sha1_hmac(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
} else
/* key descriptor version not recognized */
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
/* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 51,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::write(const FlattenableHelperInterface& val)
{
status_t err;
const size_t len = val.getFlattenedSize();
const size_t fd_count = val.getFdCount();
err = this->writeInt32(len);
if (err) return err;
err = this->writeInt32(fd_count);
if (err) return err;
void* const buf = this->writeInplace(PAD_SIZE(len));
if (buf == NULL)
return BAD_VALUE;
int* fds = NULL;
if (fd_count) {
fds = new int[fd_count];
}
err = val.flatten(buf, len, fds, fd_count);
for (size_t i=0 ; i<fd_count && err==NO_ERROR ; i++) {
err = this->writeDupFileDescriptor( fds[i] );
}
if (fd_count) {
delete [] fds;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void in_update_aux_channels(struct stream_in *in,
effect_handle_t effect)
{
uint32_t aux_channels;
channel_config_t channel_config;
int status;
aux_channels = in_get_aux_channels(in);
channel_config.main_channels = in->main_channels;
channel_config.aux_channels = aux_channels;
status = in_reconfigure_channels(in,
effect,
&channel_config,
(aux_channels != in->aux_channels));
if (status != 0) {
ALOGV("in_update_aux_channels(): in_reconfigure_channels error %d", status);
/* resetting aux channels configuration */
aux_channels = 0;
channel_config.aux_channels = 0;
in_reconfigure_channels(in, effect, &channel_config, true);
}
ALOGV("%s: aux_channels=%d, in->aux_channels_changed=%d", __func__, aux_channels, in->aux_channels_changed);
if (in->aux_channels != aux_channels) {
in->aux_channels_changed = true;
in->aux_channels = aux_channels;
do_in_standby_l(in);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
{
return m_timecodeScale;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init aac_init(void)
{
int error;
printk(KERN_INFO "Adaptec %s driver %s\n",
AAC_DRIVERNAME, aac_driver_version);
error = pci_register_driver(&aac_pci_driver);
if (error < 0)
return error;
aac_cfg_major = register_chrdev( 0, "aac", &aac_cfg_fops);
if (aac_cfg_major < 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"aacraid: unable to register \"aac\" device.\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t ctrl_set_dbg_options(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
va_list args) {
(void)ctx;
(void)args;
return VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mp_put_chars(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
mp_start(tty);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostManager::Observe(
int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSING:
RendererProcessClosing(
Source<RenderProcessHost>(source).ptr());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FcCacheInsert (FcCache *cache, struct stat *cache_stat)
{
FcCacheSkip **update[FC_CACHE_MAX_LEVEL];
FcCacheSkip *s, **next;
int i, level;
lock_cache ();
/*
* Find links along each chain
*/
next = fcCacheChains;
for (i = fcCacheMaxLevel; --i >= 0; )
{
for (; (s = next[i]); next = s->next)
if (s->cache > cache)
break;
update[i] = &next[i];
}
/*
* Create new list element
*/
level = random_level ();
if (level > fcCacheMaxLevel)
{
level = fcCacheMaxLevel + 1;
update[fcCacheMaxLevel] = &fcCacheChains[fcCacheMaxLevel];
fcCacheMaxLevel = level;
}
s = malloc (sizeof (FcCacheSkip) + (level - 1) * sizeof (FcCacheSkip *));
if (!s)
return FcFalse;
s->cache = cache;
s->size = cache->size;
FcRefInit (&s->ref, 1);
if (cache_stat)
{
s->cache_dev = cache_stat->st_dev;
s->cache_ino = cache_stat->st_ino;
s->cache_mtime = cache_stat->st_mtime;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
s->cache_mtime_nano = cache_stat->st_mtim.tv_nsec;
#else
s->cache_mtime_nano = 0;
#endif
}
else
{
s->cache_dev = 0;
s->cache_ino = 0;
s->cache_mtime = 0;
s->cache_mtime_nano = 0;
}
/*
* Insert into all fcCacheChains
*/
for (i = 0; i < level; i++)
{
s->next[i] = *update[i];
*update[i] = s;
}
unlock_cache ();
return FcTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 10,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64_t RenderThreadImpl::GetIdleNotificationDelayInMs() const {
return idle_notification_delay_in_ms_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
{
return ASN1_i2d_fp((I2D_OF(void))i2d_RSA_PUBKEY,fp,rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrame::PrintNavigationErrorMessage(const Frame& target_frame,
const char* reason) {
String target_frame_description =
target_frame.IsLocalFrame()
? "with URL '" +
ToLocalFrame(target_frame).GetDocument()->Url().GetString() +
"'"
: "with origin '" +
target_frame.GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->ToString() +
"'";
String message =
"Unsafe JavaScript attempt to initiate navigation for frame " +
target_frame_description + " from frame with URL '" +
GetDocument()->Url().GetString() + "'. " + reason + "\n";
DomWindow()->PrintErrorMessage(message);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(phar) /* {{{ */
{
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
phar_orig_compile_file = zend_compile_file;
zend_compile_file = phar_compile_file;
phar_save_resolve_path = zend_resolve_path;
zend_resolve_path = phar_resolve_path;
phar_object_init(TSRMLS_C);
phar_intercept_functions_init(TSRMLS_C);
phar_save_orig_functions(TSRMLS_C);
return php_register_url_stream_wrapper("phar", &php_stream_phar_wrapper TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void midi_attr_release(struct config_item *item)
{
struct f_midi_opts *opts = to_f_midi_opts(item);
usb_put_function_instance(&opts->func_inst);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usb_audio_create(struct usb_interface *intf,
struct usb_device *dev, int idx,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk,
unsigned int usb_id,
struct snd_usb_audio **rchip)
{
struct snd_card *card;
struct snd_usb_audio *chip;
int err;
char component[14];
*rchip = NULL;
switch (snd_usb_get_speed(dev)) {
case USB_SPEED_LOW:
case USB_SPEED_FULL:
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
case USB_SPEED_WIRELESS:
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
case USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS:
break;
default:
dev_err(&dev->dev, "unknown device speed %d\n", snd_usb_get_speed(dev));
return -ENXIO;
}
err = snd_card_new(&intf->dev, index[idx], id[idx], THIS_MODULE,
sizeof(*chip), &card);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "cannot create card instance %d\n", idx);
return err;
}
chip = card->private_data;
mutex_init(&chip->mutex);
init_waitqueue_head(&chip->shutdown_wait);
chip->index = idx;
chip->dev = dev;
chip->card = card;
chip->setup = device_setup[idx];
chip->autoclock = autoclock;
atomic_set(&chip->active, 1); /* avoid autopm during probing */
atomic_set(&chip->usage_count, 0);
atomic_set(&chip->shutdown, 0);
chip->usb_id = usb_id;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->pcm_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->ep_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->midi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->mixer_list);
card->private_free = snd_usb_audio_free;
strcpy(card->driver, "USB-Audio");
sprintf(component, "USB%04x:%04x",
USB_ID_VENDOR(chip->usb_id), USB_ID_PRODUCT(chip->usb_id));
snd_component_add(card, component);
usb_audio_make_shortname(dev, chip, quirk);
usb_audio_make_longname(dev, chip, quirk);
snd_usb_audio_create_proc(chip);
*rchip = chip;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix UAF decrement if card has no live interfaces in card.c
If a USB sound card reports 0 interfaces, an error condition is triggered
and the function usb_audio_probe errors out. In the error path, there was a
use-after-free vulnerability where the memory object of the card was first
freed, followed by a decrement of the number of active chips. Moving the
decrement above the atomic_dec fixes the UAF.
[ The original problem was introduced in 3.1 kernel, while it was
developed in a different form. The Fixes tag below indicates the
original commit but it doesn't mean that the patch is applicable
cleanly. -- tiwai ]
Fixes: 362e4e49abe5 ("ALSA: usb-audio - clear chip->probing on error exit")
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 75,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 gf_net_parse_date(const char *val)
{
u64 current_time;
char szDay[50], szMonth[50];
u32 year, month, day, h, m, s, ms;
s32 oh, om;
Float secs;
Bool neg_time_zone = GF_FALSE;
#ifdef _WIN32_WCE
SYSTEMTIME syst;
FILETIME filet;
#else
struct tm t;
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
#endif
szDay[0] = szMonth[0] = 0;
year = month = day = h = m = s = 0;
oh = om = 0;
secs = 0;
if (sscanf(val, "%d-%d-%dT%d:%d:%gZ", &year, &month, &day, &h, &m, &secs) == 6) {
}
else if (sscanf(val, "%d-%d-%dT%d:%d:%g-%d:%d", &year, &month, &day, &h, &m, &secs, &oh, &om) == 8) {
neg_time_zone = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (sscanf(val, "%d-%d-%dT%d:%d:%g+%d:%d", &year, &month, &day, &h, &m, &secs, &oh, &om) == 8) {
}
else if (sscanf(val, "%3s, %d %3s %d %d:%d:%d", szDay, &day, szMonth, &year, &h, &m, &s)==7) {
secs = (Float) s;
}
else if (sscanf(val, "%9s, %d-%3s-%d %02d:%02d:%02d GMT", szDay, &day, szMonth, &year, &h, &m, &s)==7) {
secs = (Float) s;
}
else if (sscanf(val, "%3s %3s %d %02d:%02d:%02d %d", szDay, szMonth, &day, &year, &h, &m, &s)==7) {
secs = (Float) s;
}
else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[Core] Cannot parse date string %s\n", val));
return 0;
}
if (month) {
month -= 1;
} else {
if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Jan")) month = 0;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Feb")) month = 1;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Mar")) month = 2;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Apr")) month = 3;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "May")) month = 4;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Jun")) month = 5;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Jul")) month = 6;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Aug")) month = 7;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Sep")) month = 8;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Oct")) month = 9;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Nov")) month = 10;
else if (!strcmp(szMonth, "Dec")) month = 11;
}
#ifdef _WIN32_WCE
memset(&syst, 0, sizeof(SYSTEMTIME));
syst.wYear = year;
syst.wMonth = month + 1;
syst.wDay = day;
syst.wHour = h;
syst.wMinute = m;
syst.wSecond = (u32) secs;
SystemTimeToFileTime(&syst, &filet);
current_time = (u64) ((*(LONGLONG *) &filet - TIMESPEC_TO_FILETIME_OFFSET) / 10000000);
#else
t.tm_year = year>1000 ? year-1900 : year;
t.tm_mday = day;
t.tm_hour = h;
t.tm_min = m;
t.tm_sec = (u32) secs;
t.tm_mon = month;
if (strlen(szDay) ) {
if (!strcmp(szDay, "Mon") || !strcmp(szDay, "Monday")) t.tm_wday = 0;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Tue") || !strcmp(szDay, "Tuesday")) t.tm_wday = 1;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Wed") || !strcmp(szDay, "Wednesday")) t.tm_wday = 2;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Thu") || !strcmp(szDay, "Thursday")) t.tm_wday = 3;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Fri") || !strcmp(szDay, "Friday")) t.tm_wday = 4;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Sat") || !strcmp(szDay, "Saturday")) t.tm_wday = 5;
else if (!strcmp(szDay, "Sun") || !strcmp(szDay, "Sunday")) t.tm_wday = 6;
}
current_time = gf_mktime_utc(&t);
if ((s64) current_time == -1) {
return 1;
}
if (current_time == 0) {
return 1;
}
#endif
if (om || oh) {
s32 diff = (60*oh + om)*60;
if (neg_time_zone) diff = -diff;
current_time = current_time + diff;
}
current_time *= 1000;
ms = (u32) ( (secs - (u32) secs) * 1000);
return current_time + ms;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 90,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CatalogueUnrefFPEs (FontPathElementPtr fpe)
{
CataloguePtr cat = fpe->private;
FontPathElementPtr subfpe;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cat->fpeCount; i++)
{
subfpe = cat->fpeList[i];
subfpe->refcount--;
if (subfpe->refcount == 0)
{
FontFileFreeFPE (subfpe);
xfree(subfpe->name);
xfree(subfpe);
}
}
cat->fpeCount = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name )
{
int ret;
size_t len, tag_len;
mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
unsigned char tag;
mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
/* Get main sequence tag */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
if( *p + len != end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
while( *p < end )
{
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA );
tag = **p;
(*p)++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) != MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG );
/* Skip everything but DNS name */
if( tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 ) )
{
*p += tag_len;
continue;
}
/* Allocate and assign next pointer */
if( cur->buf.p != NULL )
{
if( cur->next != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );
cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) );
if( cur->next == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED );
cur = cur->next;
}
buf = &(cur->buf);
buf->tag = tag;
buf->p = *p;
buf->len = tag_len;
*p += buf->len;
}
/* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
cur->next = NULL;
if( *p != end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 61,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void H264SwDecMemcpy(void *dest, void *src, u32 count) {
memcpy(dest, src, count);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionAppItem::~ExtensionAppItem() {
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutoFillManager::AutoFillManager(TabContents* tab_contents)
: tab_contents_(tab_contents),
personal_data_(NULL),
download_manager_(tab_contents_->profile()),
disable_download_manager_requests_(false),
metric_logger_(new AutoFillMetrics),
cc_infobar_(NULL) {
DCHECK(tab_contents);
personal_data_ =
tab_contents_->profile()->GetOriginalProfile()->GetPersonalDataManager();
download_manager_.SetObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserView::CanResize() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cryptd_blkcipher_decrypt(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->tfm);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
cryptd_blkcipher_crypt(ablkcipher_request_cast(req), child, err,
crypto_blkcipher_crt(child)->decrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GlobalConfirmInfoBar::TabInsertedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
int index,
bool foreground) {
MaybeAddInfoBar(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_bin_java_check_reset_cp_obj(RBinJavaCPTypeObj *cp_obj, ut8 tag) {
bool res = false;
if (tag < R_BIN_JAVA_CP_METAS_SZ) {
if (tag != cp_obj->tag) {
if (cp_obj->tag == R_BIN_JAVA_CP_UTF8) {
free (cp_obj->info.cp_utf8.bytes);
cp_obj->info.cp_utf8.bytes = NULL;
cp_obj->info.cp_utf8.length = 0;
free (cp_obj->name);
cp_obj->name = NULL;
res = true;
}
cp_obj->tag = tag;
cp_obj->metas->type_info = (void *) &R_BIN_JAVA_CP_METAS[tag];
cp_obj->name = strdup (R_BIN_JAVA_CP_METAS[tag].name);
res = true;
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid tag\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid tag '%d'.\n", tag);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ApplyBlockElementCommand::rangeForParagraphSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(const VisiblePosition& endOfCurrentParagraph, Position& start, Position& end)
{
start = startOfParagraph(endOfCurrentParagraph).deepEquivalent();
end = endOfCurrentParagraph.deepEquivalent();
document().updateStyleIfNeeded();
bool isStartAndEndOnSameNode = false;
if (RenderStyle* startStyle = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(start)) {
isStartAndEndOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(end) && start.containerNode() == end.containerNode();
bool isStartAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(m_endOfLastParagraph) && start.containerNode() == m_endOfLastParagraph.containerNode();
if (startStyle->preserveNewline() && isNewLineAtPosition(start) && !isNewLineAtPosition(start.previous()) && start.offsetInContainerNode() > 0)
start = startOfParagraph(end.previous()).deepEquivalent();
if (!startStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && start.offsetInContainerNode() > 0) {
int startOffset = start.offsetInContainerNode();
Text* startText = start.containerText();
splitTextNode(startText, startOffset);
start = firstPositionInNode(startText);
if (isStartAndEndOnSameNode) {
ASSERT(end.offsetInContainerNode() >= startOffset);
end = Position(startText, end.offsetInContainerNode() - startOffset);
}
if (isStartAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode) {
ASSERT(m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() >= startOffset);
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(startText, m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() - startOffset);
}
}
}
document().updateStyleIfNeeded();
if (RenderStyle* endStyle = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(end)) {
bool isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(m_endOfLastParagraph) && end.deprecatedNode() == m_endOfLastParagraph.deprecatedNode();
if (endStyle->preserveNewline() && start == end && end.offsetInContainerNode() < end.containerNode()->maxCharacterOffset()) {
int endOffset = end.offsetInContainerNode();
if (!isNewLineAtPosition(end.previous()) && isNewLineAtPosition(end))
end = Position(end.containerText(), endOffset + 1);
if (isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode && end.offsetInContainerNode() >= m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode())
m_endOfLastParagraph = end;
}
if (!endStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && end.offsetInContainerNode() && end.offsetInContainerNode() < end.containerNode()->maxCharacterOffset()) {
RefPtr<Text> endContainer = end.containerText();
splitTextNode(endContainer, end.offsetInContainerNode());
if (isStartAndEndOnSameNode)
start = firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
if (isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode) {
if (m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() == end.offsetInContainerNode())
m_endOfLastParagraph = lastPositionInOrAfterNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
else
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(endContainer, m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() - end.offsetInContainerNode());
}
end = lastPositionInNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
while (p + 4 <= end /* Enough space for another entry. */
&& p[0] >= 'A' && p[0] <= 'Z' /* Sanity-check 1st char of name. */
&& p[1] >= 'A' && p[1] <= 'Z' /* Sanity-check 2nd char of name. */
&& p[2] >= 4 /* Sanity-check length. */
&& p + p[2] <= end) { /* Sanity-check length. */
const unsigned char *data = p + 4;
int data_length = p[2] - 4;
int version = p[3];
switch(p[0]) {
case 'C':
if (p[1] == 'E') {
if (version == 1 && data_length == 24) {
/*
* CE extension comprises:
* 8 byte sector containing extension
* 8 byte offset w/in above sector
* 8 byte length of continuation
*/
int32_t location =
archive_le32dec(data);
file->ce_offset =
archive_le32dec(data+8);
file->ce_size =
archive_le32dec(data+16);
if (register_CE(a, location, file)
!= ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
else if (p[1] == 'L') {
if (version == 1 && data_length == 8) {
file->cl_offset = (uint64_t)
iso9660->logical_block_size *
(uint64_t)archive_le32dec(data);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
break;
case 'N':
if (p[1] == 'M') {
if (version == 1) {
parse_rockridge_NM1(file,
data, data_length);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
break;
case 'P':
/*
* PD extension is padding;
* contents are always ignored.
*
* PL extension won't appear;
* contents are always ignored.
*/
if (p[1] == 'N') {
if (version == 1 && data_length == 16) {
file->rdev = toi(data,4);
file->rdev <<= 32;
file->rdev |= toi(data + 8, 4);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
else if (p[1] == 'X') {
/*
* PX extension comprises:
* 8 bytes for mode,
* 8 bytes for nlinks,
* 8 bytes for uid,
* 8 bytes for gid,
* 8 bytes for inode.
*/
if (version == 1) {
if (data_length >= 8)
file->mode
= toi(data, 4);
if (data_length >= 16)
file->nlinks
= toi(data + 8, 4);
if (data_length >= 24)
file->uid
= toi(data + 16, 4);
if (data_length >= 32)
file->gid
= toi(data + 24, 4);
if (data_length >= 40)
file->number
= toi(data + 32, 4);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
break;
case 'R':
if (p[1] == 'E' && version == 1) {
file->re = 1;
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
else if (p[1] == 'R' && version == 1) {
/*
* RR extension comprises:
* one byte flag value
* This extension is obsolete,
* so contents are always ignored.
*/
}
break;
case 'S':
if (p[1] == 'L') {
if (version == 1) {
parse_rockridge_SL1(file,
data, data_length);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
else if (p[1] == 'T'
&& data_length == 0 && version == 1) {
/*
* ST extension marks end of this
* block of SUSP entries.
*
* It allows SUSP to coexist with
* non-SUSP uses of the System
* Use Area by placing non-SUSP data
* after SUSP data.
*/
iso9660->seenSUSP = 0;
iso9660->seenRockridge = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
break;
case 'T':
if (p[1] == 'F') {
if (version == 1) {
parse_rockridge_TF1(file,
data, data_length);
iso9660->seenRockridge = 1;
}
}
break;
case 'Z':
if (p[1] == 'F') {
if (version == 1)
parse_rockridge_ZF1(file,
data, data_length);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
p += p[2];
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int audit_callback(void* data, security_class_t /* cls */, char* buf, size_t len)
{
struct debugger_request_t* req = reinterpret_cast<debugger_request_t*>(data);
if (!req) {
ALOGE("No debuggerd request audit data");
return 0;
}
snprintf(buf, len, "pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", req->pid, req->uid, req->gid);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int skb_copy_bits(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, void *to, int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
int i, copy;
if (offset > (int)skb->len - len)
goto fault;
/* Copy header. */
if ((copy = start - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, offset, to, copy);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
to += copy;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
skb_frag_t *f = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(f);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
u8 *vaddr;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(skb_frag_page(f));
memcpy(to,
vaddr + f->page_offset + offset - start,
copy);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
to += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (skb_copy_bits(frag_iter, offset - start, to, copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
to += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (!len)
return 0;
fault:
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::GoBack(const PageState& state) {
GoToOffset(-1, state);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void drop_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header)
{
struct ctl_dir *parent = header->parent;
if (--header->nreg)
return;
put_links(header);
start_unregistering(header);
if (!--header->count)
kfree_rcu(header, rcu);
if (parent)
drop_sysctl_table(&parent->header);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TemplateURL::FindSearchTermsInURL(
const GURL& url,
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data,
base::string16* search_terms,
url::Parsed::ComponentType* search_term_component,
url::Component* search_terms_position) const {
DCHECK(search_terms);
search_terms->clear();
for (const TemplateURLRef& ref : url_refs_) {
if (ref.ExtractSearchTermsFromURL(url, search_terms, search_terms_data,
search_term_component, search_terms_position)) {
return !search_terms->empty();
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HttpBridge::URLFetchState::URLFetchState() : url_poster(NULL),
aborted(false),
request_completed(false),
request_succeeded(false),
http_response_code(-1),
os_error_code(-1) {}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iscsi_extract_key_value(char *textbuf, char **key, char **value)
{
*value = strchr(textbuf, '=');
if (!*value) {
pr_err("Unable to locate \"=\" separator for key,"
" ignoring request.\n");
return -1;
}
*key = textbuf;
**value = '\0';
*value = *value + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 30,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnAuthRequired(
net::URLRequest* request,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (request->load_flags() & net::LOAD_DO_NOT_PROMPT_FOR_LOGIN) {
request->CancelAuth();
return;
}
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(request, auth_info)) {
request->CancelAuth();
return;
}
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type = HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(request);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
if (resource_type == HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS) {
request->CancelAuth();
return;
}
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(!info->login_delegate()) <<
"OnAuthRequired called with login_delegate pending";
if (delegate_) {
info->set_login_delegate(delegate_->CreateLoginDelegate(
auth_info, request));
}
if (!info->login_delegate())
request->CancelAuth();
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *ctx) {
ctx->buf[0] = 0x67452301;
ctx->buf[1] = 0xefcdab89;
ctx->buf[2] = 0x98badcfe;
ctx->buf[3] = 0x10325476;
ctx->bits[0] = 0;
ctx->bits[1] = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in multipart handling
Close cesanta/dev#6974
PUBLISHED_FROM=4d4e4a46eceba10aec8dacb7f8f58bd078c92307
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 67,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TT_Load_Context( TT_ExecContext exec,
TT_Face face,
TT_Size size )
{
FT_Int i;
FT_ULong tmp;
TT_MaxProfile* maxp;
FT_Error error;
exec->face = face;
maxp = &face->max_profile;
exec->size = size;
if ( size )
{
exec->numFDefs = size->num_function_defs;
exec->maxFDefs = size->max_function_defs;
exec->numIDefs = size->num_instruction_defs;
exec->maxIDefs = size->max_instruction_defs;
exec->FDefs = size->function_defs;
exec->IDefs = size->instruction_defs;
exec->pointSize = size->point_size;
exec->tt_metrics = size->ttmetrics;
exec->metrics = *size->metrics;
exec->maxFunc = size->max_func;
exec->maxIns = size->max_ins;
for ( i = 0; i < TT_MAX_CODE_RANGES; i++ )
exec->codeRangeTable[i] = size->codeRangeTable[i];
/* set graphics state */
exec->GS = size->GS;
exec->cvtSize = size->cvt_size;
exec->cvt = size->cvt;
exec->storeSize = size->storage_size;
exec->storage = size->storage;
exec->twilight = size->twilight;
/* In case of multi-threading it can happen that the old size object */
/* no longer exists, thus we must clear all glyph zone references. */
FT_ZERO( &exec->zp0 );
exec->zp1 = exec->zp0;
exec->zp2 = exec->zp0;
}
/* XXX: We reserve a little more elements on the stack to deal safely */
/* with broken fonts like arialbs, courbs, timesbs, etc. */
tmp = (FT_ULong)exec->stackSize;
error = Update_Max( exec->memory,
&tmp,
sizeof ( FT_F26Dot6 ),
(void*)&exec->stack,
maxp->maxStackElements + 32 );
exec->stackSize = (FT_Long)tmp;
if ( error )
return error;
tmp = exec->glyphSize;
error = Update_Max( exec->memory,
&tmp,
sizeof ( FT_Byte ),
(void*)&exec->glyphIns,
maxp->maxSizeOfInstructions );
exec->glyphSize = (FT_UShort)tmp;
if ( error )
return error;
exec->pts.n_points = 0;
exec->pts.n_contours = 0;
exec->zp1 = exec->pts;
exec->zp2 = exec->pts;
exec->zp0 = exec->pts;
exec->instruction_trap = FALSE;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeCrosDisksClient::FakeCrosDisksClient()
: unmount_call_count_(0),
unmount_success_(true),
format_call_count_(0),
format_success_(true),
rename_call_count_(0),
rename_success_(true),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedBooleanAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedBooleanAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue Document::registerElement(ScriptState* script_state,
const AtomicString& name,
const ElementRegistrationOptions& options,
ExceptionState& exception_state,
V0CustomElement::NameSet valid_names) {
HostsUsingFeatures::CountMainWorldOnly(
script_state, *this,
HostsUsingFeatures::Feature::kDocumentRegisterElement);
if (!RegistrationContext()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kNotSupportedError, "No element registration context is available.");
return ScriptValue();
}
V0CustomElementConstructorBuilder constructor_builder(script_state, options);
RegistrationContext()->RegisterElement(this, &constructor_builder, name,
valid_names, exception_state);
return constructor_builder.BindingsReturnValue();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool isPlainTextMarkup(Node *node)
{
if (!node->isElementNode() || !node->hasTagName(divTag) || static_cast<Element*>(node)->hasAttributes())
return false;
if (node->childNodeCount() == 1 && (node->firstChild()->isTextNode() || (node->firstChild()->firstChild())))
return true;
return (node->childNodeCount() == 2 && isTabSpanTextNode(node->firstChild()->firstChild()) && node->firstChild()->nextSibling()->isTextNode());
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool blk_update_request(struct request *req, blk_status_t error,
unsigned int nr_bytes)
{
int total_bytes;
trace_block_rq_complete(req, blk_status_to_errno(error), nr_bytes);
if (!req->bio)
return false;
if (unlikely(error && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(req) &&
!(req->rq_flags & RQF_QUIET)))
print_req_error(req, error);
blk_account_io_completion(req, nr_bytes);
total_bytes = 0;
while (req->bio) {
struct bio *bio = req->bio;
unsigned bio_bytes = min(bio->bi_iter.bi_size, nr_bytes);
if (bio_bytes == bio->bi_iter.bi_size)
req->bio = bio->bi_next;
/* Completion has already been traced */
bio_clear_flag(bio, BIO_TRACE_COMPLETION);
req_bio_endio(req, bio, bio_bytes, error);
total_bytes += bio_bytes;
nr_bytes -= bio_bytes;
if (!nr_bytes)
break;
}
/*
* completely done
*/
if (!req->bio) {
/*
* Reset counters so that the request stacking driver
* can find how many bytes remain in the request
* later.
*/
req->__data_len = 0;
return false;
}
req->__data_len -= total_bytes;
/* update sector only for requests with clear definition of sector */
if (!blk_rq_is_passthrough(req))
req->__sector += total_bytes >> 9;
/* mixed attributes always follow the first bio */
if (req->rq_flags & RQF_MIXED_MERGE) {
req->cmd_flags &= ~REQ_FAILFAST_MASK;
req->cmd_flags |= req->bio->bi_opf & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK;
}
if (!(req->rq_flags & RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD)) {
/*
* If total number of sectors is less than the first segment
* size, something has gone terribly wrong.
*/
if (blk_rq_bytes(req) < blk_rq_cur_bytes(req)) {
blk_dump_rq_flags(req, "request botched");
req->__data_len = blk_rq_cur_bytes(req);
}
/* recalculate the number of segments */
blk_recalc_rq_segments(req);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnFileDownloaded(
const GetFileFromCacheParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
const GURL& content_url,
const FilePath& downloaded_file_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (status == GDATA_CANCELLED) {
cache_->GetCacheEntryOnUIThread(
params.resource_id,
params.md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::UnpinIfPinned,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params.resource_id,
params.md5));
}
bool* has_enough_space = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::FreeDiskSpaceIfNeededFor,
base::Unretained(cache_),
0,
has_enough_space),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnFileDownloadedAndSpaceChecked,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params,
status,
content_url,
downloaded_file_path,
base::Owned(has_enough_space)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ToCastRtpPayloadParamsOrThrow(v8::Isolate* isolate,
const RtpPayloadParams& ext_params,
CastRtpPayloadParams* cast_params) {
cast_params->payload_type = ext_params.payload_type;
cast_params->max_latency_ms = ext_params.max_latency;
cast_params->min_latency_ms =
ext_params.min_latency ? *ext_params.min_latency : ext_params.max_latency;
cast_params->animated_latency_ms = ext_params.animated_latency
? *ext_params.animated_latency
: ext_params.max_latency;
cast_params->codec_name = ext_params.codec_name;
cast_params->ssrc = ext_params.ssrc;
cast_params->feedback_ssrc = ext_params.feedback_ssrc;
cast_params->clock_rate = ext_params.clock_rate ? *ext_params.clock_rate : 0;
cast_params->min_bitrate =
ext_params.min_bitrate ? *ext_params.min_bitrate : 0;
cast_params->max_bitrate =
ext_params.max_bitrate ? *ext_params.max_bitrate : 0;
cast_params->channels = ext_params.channels ? *ext_params.channels : 0;
cast_params->max_frame_rate =
ext_params.max_frame_rate ? *ext_params.max_frame_rate : 0.0;
if (ext_params.aes_key &&
!HexDecode(*ext_params.aes_key, &cast_params->aes_key)) {
isolate->ThrowException(v8::Exception::Error(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, kInvalidAesKey)));
return false;
}
if (ext_params.aes_iv_mask &&
!HexDecode(*ext_params.aes_iv_mask, &cast_params->aes_iv_mask)) {
isolate->ThrowException(v8::Exception::Error(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, kInvalidAesIvMask)));
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < ext_params.codec_specific_params.size(); ++i) {
CastCodecSpecificParams cast_codec_params;
ToCastCodecSpecificParams(ext_params.codec_specific_params[i],
&cast_codec_params);
cast_params->codec_specific_params.push_back(cast_codec_params);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ROWINDEX CSoundFile::PatternBreak(PlayState &state, CHANNELINDEX chn, uint8 param) const
{
if(param >= 64 && (GetType() & MOD_TYPE_S3M))
{
return ROWINDEX_INVALID;
}
state.m_nNextPatStartRow = 0; // FT2 E60 bug
return static_cast<ROWINDEX>(CalculateXParam(state.m_nPattern, state.m_nRow, chn));
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_array_put_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, int i, pdf_obj *item)
{
pdf_array_put(ctx, obj, i, item);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, item);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int avresample_set_compensation(AVAudioResampleContext *avr, int sample_delta,
int compensation_distance)
{
ResampleContext *c;
AudioData *fifo_buf = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (compensation_distance < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (!compensation_distance && sample_delta)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (!avr->resample_needed) {
#if FF_API_RESAMPLE_CLOSE_OPEN
/* if resampling was not enabled previously, re-initialize the
AVAudioResampleContext and force resampling */
int fifo_samples;
int restore_matrix = 0;
double matrix[AVRESAMPLE_MAX_CHANNELS * AVRESAMPLE_MAX_CHANNELS] = { 0 };
/* buffer any remaining samples in the output FIFO before closing */
fifo_samples = av_audio_fifo_size(avr->out_fifo);
if (fifo_samples > 0) {
fifo_buf = ff_audio_data_alloc(avr->out_channels, fifo_samples,
avr->out_sample_fmt, NULL);
if (!fifo_buf)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
ret = ff_audio_data_read_from_fifo(avr->out_fifo, fifo_buf,
fifo_samples);
if (ret < 0)
goto reinit_fail;
}
/* save the channel mixing matrix */
if (avr->am) {
ret = avresample_get_matrix(avr, matrix, AVRESAMPLE_MAX_CHANNELS);
if (ret < 0)
goto reinit_fail;
restore_matrix = 1;
}
/* close the AVAudioResampleContext */
avresample_close(avr);
avr->force_resampling = 1;
/* restore the channel mixing matrix */
if (restore_matrix) {
ret = avresample_set_matrix(avr, matrix, AVRESAMPLE_MAX_CHANNELS);
if (ret < 0)
goto reinit_fail;
}
/* re-open the AVAudioResampleContext */
ret = avresample_open(avr);
if (ret < 0)
goto reinit_fail;
/* restore buffered samples to the output FIFO */
if (fifo_samples > 0) {
ret = ff_audio_data_add_to_fifo(avr->out_fifo, fifo_buf, 0,
fifo_samples);
if (ret < 0)
goto reinit_fail;
ff_audio_data_free(&fifo_buf);
}
#else
av_log(avr, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to set resampling compensation\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
#endif
}
c = avr->resample;
c->compensation_distance = compensation_distance;
if (compensation_distance) {
c->dst_incr = c->ideal_dst_incr - c->ideal_dst_incr *
(int64_t)sample_delta / compensation_distance;
} else {
c->dst_incr = c->ideal_dst_incr;
}
return 0;
reinit_fail:
ff_audio_data_free(&fifo_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx,
X509 *x,
unsigned int *ret_ku_bits,
unsigned int *ret_eku_bits)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int i;
unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_eku_bits)
*ret_eku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto check_kus;
}
/* Start with Extended Key usage */
i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku;
eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (eku) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *certoid;
certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION;
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits);
*ret_eku_bits = eku_bits;
check_kus:
/* Now the Key Usage bits */
if (ret_ku_bits)
*ret_ku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto out;
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
X509_check_ca(x);
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE;
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits);
*ret_ku_bits = ku_bits;
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: svcauth_gss_destroy(SVCAUTH *auth)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
OM_uint32 min_stat;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_destroy()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &gd->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->cname);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
if (gd->client_name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &gd->client_name);
mem_free(gd, sizeof(*gd));
mem_free(auth, sizeof(*auth));
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gssrpc data leakage [CVE-2014-9423]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(), do not copy
bytes from the union context into the handle field we send to the
client. We do not use this handle field, so just supply a fixed
string of "xxxx".
In gss_union_ctx_id_struct, remove the unused "interposer" field which
was causing part of the union context to remain uninitialized.
ticket: 8058 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 46,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __kfree_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_release_all(skb);
kfree_skbmem(skb);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AssertForegroundHelper() : weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compare_scan_result_timestamp(const void *v1, const void *v2) {
const wifi_scan_result *result1 = static_cast<const wifi_scan_result *>(v1);
const wifi_scan_result *result2 = static_cast<const wifi_scan_result *>(v2);
return result1->ts - result2->ts;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShellWindowViews::CanMaximize() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrowserView::GetOTRIconResourceID() const {
int otr_resource_id = IDR_OTR_ICON;
if (ui::GetDisplayLayout() == ui::LAYOUT_TOUCH) {
if (IsFullscreen())
otr_resource_id = IDR_OTR_ICON_FULLSCREEN;
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (base::win::IsMetroProcess())
otr_resource_id = IDR_OTR_ICON_FULLSCREEN;
#endif
}
return otr_resource_id;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t IMemory::size() const {
size_t size;
getMemory(NULL, &size);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,495
|
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