instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_delete_file (const DBusString *filename,
DBusError *error)
{
const char *filename_c;
_DBUS_ASSERT_ERROR_IS_CLEAR (error);
filename_c = _dbus_string_get_const_data (filename);
if (DeleteFileA (filename_c) == 0)
{
dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED,
"Failed to delete file %s: %s\n",
filename_c, _dbus_strerror_from_errno ());
return FALSE;
}
else
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sd_init(struct sched_domain_topology_level *tl, int cpu)
{
struct sched_domain *sd = *per_cpu_ptr(tl->data.sd, cpu);
int sd_weight, sd_flags = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/*
* Ugly hack to pass state to sd_numa_mask()...
*/
sched_domains_curr_level = tl->numa_level;
#endif
sd_weight = cpumask_weight(tl->mask(cpu));
if (tl->sd_flags)
sd_flags = (*tl->sd_flags)();
if (WARN_ONCE(sd_flags & ~TOPOLOGY_SD_FLAGS,
"wrong sd_flags in topology description\n"))
sd_flags &= ~TOPOLOGY_SD_FLAGS;
*sd = (struct sched_domain){
.min_interval = sd_weight,
.max_interval = 2*sd_weight,
.busy_factor = 32,
.imbalance_pct = 125,
.cache_nice_tries = 0,
.busy_idx = 0,
.idle_idx = 0,
.newidle_idx = 0,
.wake_idx = 0,
.forkexec_idx = 0,
.flags = 1*SD_LOAD_BALANCE
| 1*SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE
| 1*SD_BALANCE_EXEC
| 1*SD_BALANCE_FORK
| 0*SD_BALANCE_WAKE
| 1*SD_WAKE_AFFINE
| 0*SD_SHARE_CPUCAPACITY
| 0*SD_SHARE_PKG_RESOURCES
| 0*SD_SERIALIZE
| 0*SD_PREFER_SIBLING
| 0*SD_NUMA
| sd_flags
,
.last_balance = jiffies,
.balance_interval = sd_weight,
.smt_gain = 0,
.max_newidle_lb_cost = 0,
.next_decay_max_lb_cost = jiffies,
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
.name = tl->name,
#endif
};
/*
* Convert topological properties into behaviour.
*/
if (sd->flags & SD_SHARE_CPUCAPACITY) {
sd->flags |= SD_PREFER_SIBLING;
sd->imbalance_pct = 110;
sd->smt_gain = 1178; /* ~15% */
} else if (sd->flags & SD_SHARE_PKG_RESOURCES) {
sd->imbalance_pct = 117;
sd->cache_nice_tries = 1;
sd->busy_idx = 2;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
} else if (sd->flags & SD_NUMA) {
sd->cache_nice_tries = 2;
sd->busy_idx = 3;
sd->idle_idx = 2;
sd->flags |= SD_SERIALIZE;
if (sched_domains_numa_distance[tl->numa_level] > RECLAIM_DISTANCE) {
sd->flags &= ~(SD_BALANCE_EXEC |
SD_BALANCE_FORK |
SD_WAKE_AFFINE);
}
#endif
} else {
sd->flags |= SD_PREFER_SIBLING;
sd->cache_nice_tries = 1;
sd->busy_idx = 2;
sd->idle_idx = 1;
}
sd->private = &tl->data;
return sd;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::MoveCaretSelection(const WebPoint& point_in_viewport) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::moveCaretSelection");
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const IntPoint point_in_contents =
GetFrame()->View()->ViewportToFrame(point_in_viewport);
GetFrame()->Selection().MoveCaretSelection(point_in_contents);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dwc3_gadget_suspend_interrupt(struct dwc3 *dwc,
unsigned int evtinfo)
{
enum dwc3_link_state next = evtinfo & DWC3_LINK_STATE_MASK;
if (dwc->link_state != next && next == DWC3_LINK_STATE_U3)
dwc3_suspend_gadget(dwc);
dwc->link_state = next;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState Convert(
arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState state) {
switch (state) {
case arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::NOT_READY:
return ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::NOT_READY;
case arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::STOPPED:
return ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::STOPPED;
case arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::RUNNING:
return ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::RUNNING;
}
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid state: " << static_cast<int>(state);
return ash::mojom::VoiceInteractionState::NOT_READY;
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_flipflags(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf1;
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf2;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry1;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry2;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_buf *bp1;
struct xfs_buf *bp2;
int error;
#ifdef DEBUG
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr1;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr2;
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc;
int namelen1, namelen2;
char *name1, *name2;
#endif /* DEBUG */
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_flipflags(args);
/*
* Read the block containing the "old" attr
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp1);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Read the block containing the "new" attr, if it is different
*/
if (args->blkno2 != args->blkno) {
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno2,
-1, &bp2);
if (error)
return error;
} else {
bp2 = bp1;
}
leaf1 = bp1->b_addr;
entry1 = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf1)[args->index];
leaf2 = bp2->b_addr;
entry2 = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf2)[args->index2];
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr1, leaf1);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr1.count);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0);
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr2, leaf2);
ASSERT(args->index2 < ichdr2.count);
ASSERT(args->index2 >= 0);
if (entry1->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf1, args->index);
namelen1 = name_loc->namelen;
name1 = (char *)name_loc->nameval;
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf1, args->index);
namelen1 = name_rmt->namelen;
name1 = (char *)name_rmt->name;
}
if (entry2->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf2, args->index2);
namelen2 = name_loc->namelen;
name2 = (char *)name_loc->nameval;
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf2, args->index2);
namelen2 = name_rmt->namelen;
name2 = (char *)name_rmt->name;
}
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(entry1->hashval) == be32_to_cpu(entry2->hashval));
ASSERT(namelen1 == namelen2);
ASSERT(memcmp(name1, name2, namelen1) == 0);
#endif /* DEBUG */
ASSERT(entry1->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT((entry2->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE) == 0);
entry1->flags &= ~XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp1,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf1, entry1, sizeof(*entry1)));
if (args->rmtblkno) {
ASSERT((entry1->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0);
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf1, args->index);
name_rmt->valueblk = cpu_to_be32(args->rmtblkno);
name_rmt->valuelen = cpu_to_be32(args->valuelen);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp1,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf1, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
entry2->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp2,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf2, entry2, sizeof(*entry2)));
if ((entry2->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0) {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf2, args->index2);
name_rmt->valueblk = 0;
name_rmt->valuelen = 0;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp2,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf2, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
/*
* Commit the flag value change and start the next trans in series.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 1
| 166,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CaptivePortalDetector::FetchingURL() const {
return url_fetcher_.get() != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 128,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::TestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::CanOpenDownload() {
const bool is_complete = GetState() == DownloadItem::COMPLETE;
return (!IsDone() || is_complete) && !IsTemporary() &&
!file_externally_removed_;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::AdjustGetPname(GLenum pname) {
if (GL_MAX_SAMPLES == pname &&
features().use_img_for_multisampled_render_to_texture) {
return GL_MAX_SAMPLES_IMG;
}
if (GL_ALIASED_POINT_SIZE_RANGE == pname &&
gl_version_info().is_desktop_core_profile) {
return GL_POINT_SIZE_RANGE;
}
return pname;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PropertyChanged() const { return property_changed_; }
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rsa_private_key_prepare(struct rsa_private_key *key)
{
mpz_t n;
/* The size of the product is the sum of the sizes of the factors,
* or sometimes one less. It's possible but tricky to compute the
* size without computing the full product. */
mpz_init(n);
mpz_mul(n, key->p, key->q);
key->size = _rsa_check_size(n);
mpz_clear(n);
return (key->size > 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromePluginServiceFilter::OverriddenPlugin::OverriddenPlugin()
: render_view_id(MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_nic_net_timeout(struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
hns_tx_timeout_reset(priv);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FS_FTell( fileHandle_t f ) {
int pos;
if ( fsh[f].zipFile == qtrue ) {
pos = unztell( fsh[f].handleFiles.file.z );
} else {
pos = ftell( fsh[f].handleFiles.file.o );
}
return pos;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBlock::updateImageLoadingPriorities()
{
Vector<ImageResource*> images;
appendImagesFromStyle(images, *style());
if (images.isEmpty())
return false;
LayoutRect viewBounds = viewRect();
LayoutRect objectBounds = absoluteContentBox();
bool isVisible;
if (!objectBounds.isEmpty())
isVisible = viewBounds.intersects(objectBounds);
else
isVisible = viewBounds.contains(objectBounds);
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::VisibilityStatus status = isVisible ?
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::Visible : ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::NotVisible;
LayoutRect screenArea;
if (!objectBounds.isEmpty()) {
screenArea = viewBounds;
screenArea.intersect(objectBounds);
}
for (Vector<ImageResource*>::iterator it = images.begin(), end = images.end(); it != end; ++it)
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::resourceLoadPriorityOptimizer()->notifyImageResourceVisibility(*it, status, screenArea);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::ref()
{
++m_refCount;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __netlink_change_ngroups(struct sock *sk, unsigned int groups)
{
struct listeners *new, *old;
struct netlink_table *tbl = &nl_table[sk->sk_protocol];
if (groups < 32)
groups = 32;
if (NLGRPSZ(tbl->groups) < NLGRPSZ(groups)) {
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = rcu_dereference_protected(tbl->listeners, 1);
memcpy(new->masks, old->masks, NLGRPSZ(tbl->groups));
rcu_assign_pointer(tbl->listeners, new);
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
}
tbl->groups = groups;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: service_manager::Identity CoordinatorImpl::GetClientIdentityForCurrentRequest()
const {
return bindings_.dispatch_context();
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fuse_req *get_reserved_req(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
do {
wait_event(fc->reserved_req_waitq, ff->reserved_req);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
if (ff->reserved_req) {
req = ff->reserved_req;
ff->reserved_req = NULL;
req->stolen_file = get_file(file);
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
} while (!req);
return req;
}
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 97,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void shrink_dcache_for_umount(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
WARN(down_read_trylock(&sb->s_umount), "s_umount should've been locked");
dentry = sb->s_root;
sb->s_root = NULL;
do_one_tree(dentry);
while (!hlist_bl_empty(&sb->s_anon)) {
dentry = dget(hlist_bl_entry(hlist_bl_first(&sb->s_anon), struct dentry, d_hash));
do_one_tree(dentry);
}
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResizeObserverController& Document::EnsureResizeObserverController() {
if (!resize_observer_controller_)
resize_observer_controller_ = new ResizeObserverController();
return *resize_observer_controller_;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON_bool) cJSON_IsInvalid(const cJSON * const item)
{
if (item == NULL)
{
return false;
}
return (item->type & 0xFF) == cJSON_Invalid;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::OnMimeHandlerViewGuestOnLoadCompleted(
int /* unused */) {
if (!render_frame())
return;
guest_loaded_ = true;
if (pending_messages_.empty())
return;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(frame->MainWorldScriptContext());
for (const auto& pending_message : pending_messages_)
PostJavaScriptMessage(isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Value>::New(isolate, pending_message));
pending_messages_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DoCallback(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(callback_retval_);
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EXPORTED int mboxlist_allmbox(const char *prefix, mboxlist_cb *proc, void *rock, int incdel)
{
struct allmb_rock mbrock = { NULL, 0, proc, rock };
int r = 0;
if (incdel) mbrock.flags |= MBOXTREE_TOMBSTONES;
if (!prefix) prefix = "";
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix),
allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbrock.mbentry);
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 rio_get_link(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
return np->link_status;
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long ext4_zero_range(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
loff_t len, int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
handle_t *handle = NULL;
unsigned int max_blocks;
loff_t new_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
int credits;
int partial_begin, partial_end;
loff_t start, end;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
trace_ext4_zero_range(inode, offset, len, mode);
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Round up offset. This is not fallocate, we neet to zero out
* blocks, so convert interior block aligned part of the range to
* unwritten and possibly manually zero out unaligned parts of the
* range.
*/
start = round_up(offset, 1 << blkbits);
end = round_down((offset + len), 1 << blkbits);
if (start < offset || end > offset + len)
return -EINVAL;
partial_begin = offset & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
partial_end = (offset + len) & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
lblk = start >> blkbits;
max_blocks = (end >> blkbits);
if (max_blocks < lblk)
max_blocks = 0;
else
max_blocks -= lblk;
inode_lock(inode);
/*
* Indirect files do not support unwritten extnets
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
(offset + len > i_size_read(inode) ||
offset + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
inode_dio_wait(inode);
/* Preallocate the range including the unaligned edges */
if (partial_begin || partial_end) {
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file,
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits) >> blkbits,
(round_up((offset + len), 1 << blkbits) -
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits)) >> blkbits,
new_size, flags);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Zero range excluding the unaligned edges */
if (max_blocks > 0) {
flags |= (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN |
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE);
/*
* Prevent page faults from reinstantiating pages we have
* released from page cache.
*/
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
ret = ext4_break_layouts(inode);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
goto out_mutex;
}
ret = ext4_update_disksize_before_punch(inode, offset, len);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages */
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, start, end - 1);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size,
flags);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
if (!partial_begin && !partial_end)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* In worst case we have to writeout two nonadjacent unwritten
* blocks and update the inode
*/
credits = (2 * ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks(inode, 2)) + 1;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode))
credits += 2;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MISC, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, ret);
goto out_mutex;
}
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
if (new_size) {
ext4_update_inode_size(inode, new_size);
} else {
/*
* Mark that we allocate beyond EOF so the subsequent truncate
* can proceed even if the new size is the same as i_size.
*/
if ((offset + len) > i_size_read(inode))
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
/* Zero out partial block at the edges of the range */
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset, len);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC)
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_mutex:
inode_unlock(inode);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 90,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TransformationMatrix AffineTransform::toTransformationMatrix() const
{
return TransformationMatrix(m_transform[0], m_transform[1], m_transform[2],
m_transform[3], m_transform[4], m_transform[5]);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.convertToSpecifiedUnits");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(args.Holder());
if (wrapper->role() == AnimValRole) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, unitType, toUInt32(args[0]));
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
imp.convertToSpecifiedUnits(unitType, lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
else
wrapper->commitChange();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteVIPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
const char
*metadata;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned int
channels;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,VIPS_MAGIC_LSB);
else
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,VIPS_MAGIC_MSB);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
channels=image->matte ? 4 : 3;
if (IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
channels=image->matte ? 2 : 1;
else if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channels=image->matte ? 5 : 4;
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,channels);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,0);
if (image->depth == 16)
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) VIPSBandFormatUSHORT);
else
{
image->depth=8;
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) VIPSBandFormatUCHAR);
}
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,VIPSCodingNONE);
switch(image->colorspace)
{
case CMYKColorspace:
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,VIPSTypeCMYK);
break;
case GRAYColorspace:
if (image->depth == 16)
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, VIPSTypeGREY16);
else
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, VIPSTypeB_W);
break;
case RGBColorspace:
if (image->depth == 16)
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, VIPSTypeRGB16);
else
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, VIPSTypeRGB);
break;
default:
case sRGBColorspace:
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,VIPSTypesRGB);
break;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
(void) WriteBlobFloat(image,(image->x_resolution / 10));
(void) WriteBlobFloat(image,(image->y_resolution / 10));
}
else if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
{
(void) WriteBlobFloat(image,(image->x_resolution / 25.4));
(void) WriteBlobFloat(image,(image->y_resolution / 25.4));
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image,0);
}
/*
Legacy, Offsets, Future
*/
for (y=0; y < 24; y++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelRed(p));
if (channels == 2)
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelAlpha(p));
else
{
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelGreen(p));
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelBlue(p));
if (channels >= 4)
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
else
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelAlpha(p));
}
else if (channels == 5)
{
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
WriteVIPSPixel(image,GetPixelAlpha(p));
}
}
p++;
}
}
metadata=GetImageProperty(image,"vips:metadata");
if (metadata != (const char*) NULL)
WriteBlobString(image,metadata);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_compressBlock_internal(ZSTD_CCtx* zc,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize)
{
ZSTD_matchState_t* const ms = &zc->blockState.matchState;
size_t cSize;
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compressBlock_internal (dstCapacity=%zu, dictLimit=%u, nextToUpdate=%u)",
dstCapacity, ms->window.dictLimit, ms->nextToUpdate);
assert(srcSize <= ZSTD_BLOCKSIZE_MAX);
/* Assert that we have correctly flushed the ctx params into the ms's copy */
ZSTD_assertEqualCParams(zc->appliedParams.cParams, ms->cParams);
if (srcSize < MIN_CBLOCK_SIZE+ZSTD_blockHeaderSize+1) {
ZSTD_ldm_skipSequences(&zc->externSeqStore, srcSize, zc->appliedParams.cParams.searchLength);
cSize = 0;
goto out; /* don't even attempt compression below a certain srcSize */
}
ZSTD_resetSeqStore(&(zc->seqStore));
ms->opt.symbolCosts = &zc->blockState.prevCBlock->entropy; /* required for optimal parser to read stats from dictionary */
/* a gap between an attached dict and the current window is not safe,
* they must remain adjacent, and when that stops being the case, the dict
* must be unset */
assert(ms->dictMatchState == NULL || ms->loadedDictEnd == ms->window.dictLimit);
/* limited update after a very long match */
{ const BYTE* const base = ms->window.base;
const BYTE* const istart = (const BYTE*)src;
const U32 current = (U32)(istart-base);
if (sizeof(ptrdiff_t)==8) assert(istart - base < (ptrdiff_t)(U32)(-1)); /* ensure no overflow */
if (current > ms->nextToUpdate + 384)
ms->nextToUpdate = current - MIN(192, (U32)(current - ms->nextToUpdate - 384));
}
/* select and store sequences */
{ ZSTD_dictMode_e const dictMode = ZSTD_matchState_dictMode(ms);
size_t lastLLSize;
{ int i;
for (i = 0; i < ZSTD_REP_NUM; ++i)
zc->blockState.nextCBlock->rep[i] = zc->blockState.prevCBlock->rep[i];
}
if (zc->externSeqStore.pos < zc->externSeqStore.size) {
assert(!zc->appliedParams.ldmParams.enableLdm);
/* Updates ldmSeqStore.pos */
lastLLSize =
ZSTD_ldm_blockCompress(&zc->externSeqStore,
ms, &zc->seqStore,
zc->blockState.nextCBlock->rep,
src, srcSize);
assert(zc->externSeqStore.pos <= zc->externSeqStore.size);
} else if (zc->appliedParams.ldmParams.enableLdm) {
rawSeqStore_t ldmSeqStore = {NULL, 0, 0, 0};
ldmSeqStore.seq = zc->ldmSequences;
ldmSeqStore.capacity = zc->maxNbLdmSequences;
/* Updates ldmSeqStore.size */
CHECK_F(ZSTD_ldm_generateSequences(&zc->ldmState, &ldmSeqStore,
&zc->appliedParams.ldmParams,
src, srcSize));
/* Updates ldmSeqStore.pos */
lastLLSize =
ZSTD_ldm_blockCompress(&ldmSeqStore,
ms, &zc->seqStore,
zc->blockState.nextCBlock->rep,
src, srcSize);
assert(ldmSeqStore.pos == ldmSeqStore.size);
} else { /* not long range mode */
ZSTD_blockCompressor const blockCompressor = ZSTD_selectBlockCompressor(zc->appliedParams.cParams.strategy, dictMode);
lastLLSize = blockCompressor(ms, &zc->seqStore, zc->blockState.nextCBlock->rep, src, srcSize);
}
{ const BYTE* const lastLiterals = (const BYTE*)src + srcSize - lastLLSize;
ZSTD_storeLastLiterals(&zc->seqStore, lastLiterals, lastLLSize);
} }
/* encode sequences and literals */
cSize = ZSTD_compressSequences(&zc->seqStore,
&zc->blockState.prevCBlock->entropy, &zc->blockState.nextCBlock->entropy,
&zc->appliedParams,
dst, dstCapacity,
srcSize,
zc->entropyWorkspace, HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE /* statically allocated in resetCCtx */,
zc->bmi2);
out:
if (!ZSTD_isError(cSize) && cSize != 0) {
/* confirm repcodes and entropy tables when emitting a compressed block */
ZSTD_compressedBlockState_t* const tmp = zc->blockState.prevCBlock;
zc->blockState.prevCBlock = zc->blockState.nextCBlock;
zc->blockState.nextCBlock = tmp;
}
/* We check that dictionaries have offset codes available for the first
* block. After the first block, the offcode table might not have large
* enough codes to represent the offsets in the data.
*/
if (zc->blockState.prevCBlock->entropy.fse.offcode_repeatMode == FSE_repeat_valid)
zc->blockState.prevCBlock->entropy.fse.offcode_repeatMode = FSE_repeat_check;
return cSize;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.start = ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.start + insn_len;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
set_seg_override(ctxt, (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3);
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
set_seg_override(ctxt, ctxt->b & 7);
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->twobyte = 1;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
--ctxt->_eip;
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
--ctxt->_eip;
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0 || (ctxt->d & Undefined))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (!(ctxt->d & VendorSpecific) && ctxt->only_vendor_specific_insn)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!ctxt->has_seg_override)
set_seg_override(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_seg);
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!ctxt->has_seg_override)
set_seg_override(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = seg_override(ctxt);
if (ctxt->memop.type == OP_MEM && ctxt->ad_bytes != 8)
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea = (u32)ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
done:
if (ctxt->memopp && ctxt->memopp->type == OP_MEM && ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea += ctxt->_eip;
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::removeChild(Node* oldChild, ExceptionState& es)
{
ASSERT(refCount() || parentOrShadowHostNode());
RefPtr<Node> protect(this);
if (!oldChild || oldChild->parentNode() != this) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotFoundError);
return;
}
RefPtr<Node> child = oldChild;
document().removeFocusedElementOfSubtree(child.get());
if (FullscreenElementStack* fullscreen = FullscreenElementStack::fromIfExists(&document()))
fullscreen->removeFullScreenElementOfSubtree(child.get());
if (child->parentNode() != this) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotFoundError);
return;
}
willRemoveChild(child.get());
if (child->parentNode() != this) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotFoundError);
return;
}
{
RenderWidget::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
Node* prev = child->previousSibling();
Node* next = child->nextSibling();
removeBetween(prev, next, child.get());
childrenChanged(false, prev, next, -1);
ChildNodeRemovalNotifier(this).notify(child.get());
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZSTD_parameters ZSTD_getParams(int compressionLevel, unsigned long long srcSizeHint, size_t dictSize) {
ZSTD_parameters params;
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, srcSizeHint, dictSize);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_getParams (cLevel=%i)", compressionLevel);
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
params.cParams = cParams;
params.fParams.contentSizeFlag = 1;
return params;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_CheckForResend( void ) {
int port;
char info[MAX_INFO_STRING];
char data[MAX_INFO_STRING + 10];
if ( clc.demoplaying ) {
return;
}
if ( clc.state != CA_CONNECTING && clc.state != CA_CHALLENGING ) {
return;
}
if ( cls.realtime - clc.connectTime < RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT ) {
return;
}
clc.connectTime = cls.realtime; // for retransmit requests
clc.connectPacketCount++;
switch ( clc.state ) {
case CA_CONNECTING:
#ifndef STANDALONE
if (!com_standalone->integer && clc.serverAddress.type == NA_IP && !Sys_IsLANAddress( clc.serverAddress ) )
CL_RequestAuthorization();
#endif
Com_sprintf(data, sizeof(data), "getchallenge %d %s", clc.challenge, com_gamename->string);
NET_OutOfBandPrint(NS_CLIENT, clc.serverAddress, "%s", data);
break;
case CA_CHALLENGING:
port = Cvar_VariableValue ("net_qport");
Q_strncpyz( info, Cvar_InfoString( CVAR_USERINFO ), sizeof( info ) );
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(com_legacyprotocol->integer == com_protocol->integer)
clc.compat = qtrue;
if(clc.compat)
Info_SetValueForKey(info, "protocol", va("%i", com_legacyprotocol->integer));
else
#endif
Info_SetValueForKey(info, "protocol", va("%i", com_protocol->integer));
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "qport", va("%i", port ) );
Info_SetValueForKey( info, "challenge", va("%i", clc.challenge ) );
Com_sprintf( data, sizeof(data), "connect \"%s\"", info );
NET_OutOfBandData( NS_CLIENT, clc.serverAddress, (byte *) data, strlen ( data ) );
cvar_modifiedFlags &= ~CVAR_USERINFO;
break;
default:
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "CL_CheckForResend: bad clc.state" );
}
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: prepare_task_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next)
{
fire_sched_out_preempt_notifiers(prev, next);
prepare_lock_switch(rq, next);
prepare_arch_switch(next);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t *first_not_zeroed)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
int flexbg_flag = 0;
ext4_group_t i, grp = sbi->s_groups_count;
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
flexbg_flag = 1;
ext4_debug("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1 || flexbg_flag)
last_block = ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
if ((grp == sbi->s_groups_count) &&
!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
grp = i;
block_bitmap = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, block_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_bitmap = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_table);
return 0;
}
ext4_lock_group(sb, i);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sb, i, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
i, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sb, i,
gdp)), le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
return 0;
}
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
if (!flexbg_flag)
first_block += EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb);
}
if (NULL != first_not_zeroed)
*first_not_zeroed = grp;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
ChildThreadImpl::Shutdown();
quota_dispatcher_.reset();
file_system_dispatcher_.reset();
WebFileSystemImpl::DeleteThreadSpecificInstance();
blink::MainThreadIsolate()->DumpAndResetStats();
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDumpBlinkRuntimeCallStats))
blink::LogRuntimeCallStats();
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kSingleProcess))
base::Process::TerminateCurrentProcessImmediately(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte)
{
unsigned int gen;
spte &= ~shadow_mmio_mask;
gen = (spte >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_GEN_LOW_MASK;
gen |= (spte >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) << MMIO_GEN_LOW_SHIFT;
return gen;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct isakmp *base,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ikev2_sub0_print(ndo, base, np,
ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int debugMutexNotheld(sqlite3_mutex *pX){
sqlite3_debug_mutex *p = (sqlite3_debug_mutex*)pX;
return p==0 || p->cnt==0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LoadingStateChangedDelegate()
: loadingStateChangedCount_(0)
, loadingStateToDifferentDocumentCount_(0) {
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WallpaperManager::ShouldSetDeviceWallpaper(const AccountId& account_id,
std::string* url,
std::string* hash) {
if (!g_browser_process->platform_part()
->browser_policy_connector_chromeos()
->IsEnterpriseManaged()) {
return false;
}
const base::DictionaryValue* dict = nullptr;
if (!CrosSettings::Get()->GetDictionary(kDeviceWallpaperImage, &dict) ||
!dict->GetStringWithoutPathExpansion("url", url) ||
!dict->GetStringWithoutPathExpansion("hash", hash)) {
return false;
}
if (user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsUserLoggedIn())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_grayspot_get_color_mapping_procs(const gx_device * dev)
{
return &pdf14_DeviceGrayspot_procs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool will_write_block(struct port *port)
{
bool ret;
if (!port->guest_connected) {
/* Port got hot-unplugged. Let's exit. */
return false;
}
if (!port->host_connected)
return true;
spin_lock_irq(&port->outvq_lock);
/*
* Check if the Host has consumed any buffers since we last
* sent data (this is only applicable for nonblocking ports).
*/
reclaim_consumed_buffers(port);
ret = port->outvq_full;
spin_unlock_irq(&port->outvq_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int dn_check_state(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_dn *addr, int addrlen, long *timeo, int flags)
{
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
switch (scp->state) {
case DN_RUN:
return 0;
case DN_CR:
return dn_confirm_accept(sk, timeo, sk->sk_allocation);
case DN_CI:
case DN_CC:
return dn_wait_run(sk, timeo);
case DN_O:
return __dn_connect(sk, addr, addrlen, timeo, flags);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_DEBUG_RECIRC(struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (!enable_debug) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_VENDOR_TYPE;
}
ofpact_put_DEBUG_RECIRC(out);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ResourceLoadComplete(
mojom::ResourceLoadInfoPtr resource_load_info) {
GlobalRequestID global_request_id;
if (main_frame_request_ids_.first == resource_load_info->request_id) {
global_request_id = main_frame_request_ids_.second;
} else if (resource_load_info->resource_type ==
content::ResourceType::kMainFrame) {
deferred_main_frame_load_info_ = std::move(resource_load_info);
return;
}
delegate_->ResourceLoadComplete(this, global_request_id,
std::move(resource_load_info));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_free_open_state(struct nfs4_state *state)
{
kfree(state);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sf_read_double (SNDFILE *sndfile, double *ptr, sf_count_t len)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
sf_count_t count, extra ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_WRITE)
{ psf->error = SFE_NOT_READMODE ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (len % psf->sf.channels)
{ psf->error = SFE_BAD_READ_ALIGN ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (len <= 0 || psf->read_current >= psf->sf.frames)
{ psf_memset (ptr, 0, len * sizeof (double)) ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->read_double == NULL || psf->seek == NULL)
{ psf->error = SFE_UNIMPLEMENTED ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->last_op != SFM_READ)
if (psf->seek (psf, SFM_READ, psf->read_current) < 0)
return 0 ;
count = psf->read_double (psf, ptr, len) ;
if (psf->read_current + count / psf->sf.channels <= psf->sf.frames)
psf->read_current += count / psf->sf.channels ;
else
{ count = (psf->sf.frames - psf->read_current) * psf->sf.channels ;
extra = len - count ;
psf_memset (ptr + count, 0, extra * sizeof (double)) ;
psf->read_current = psf->sf.frames ;
} ;
psf->last_op = SFM_READ ;
return count ;
} /* sf_read_double */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 95,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(zlib)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "ZLib Support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Stream Wrapper", "compress.zlib://");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Stream Filter", "zlib.inflate, zlib.deflate");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Compiled Version", ZLIB_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Linked Version", (char *) zlibVersion());
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageScaleBilinear(gdImagePtr im, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
if (im->trueColor) {
return gdImageScaleBilinearTC(im, new_width, new_height);
} else {
return gdImageScaleBilinearPalette(im, new_width, new_height);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 58,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::MatchesValidityPseudoClasses() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _forkexec_slurmstepd(uint16_t type, void *req,
slurm_addr_t *cli, slurm_addr_t *self,
const hostset_t step_hset, uint16_t protocol_version)
{
pid_t pid;
int to_stepd[2] = {-1, -1};
int to_slurmd[2] = {-1, -1};
if (pipe(to_stepd) < 0 || pipe(to_slurmd) < 0) {
error("_forkexec_slurmstepd pipe failed: %m");
return SLURM_FAILURE;
}
if (_add_starting_step(type, req)) {
error("_forkexec_slurmstepd failed in _add_starting_step: %m");
return SLURM_FAILURE;
}
if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
error("_forkexec_slurmstepd: fork: %m");
close(to_stepd[0]);
close(to_stepd[1]);
close(to_slurmd[0]);
close(to_slurmd[1]);
_remove_starting_step(type, req);
return SLURM_FAILURE;
} else if (pid > 0) {
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
#if (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 0)
int i;
time_t start_time = time(NULL);
#endif
/*
* Parent sends initialization data to the slurmstepd
* over the to_stepd pipe, and waits for the return code
* reply on the to_slurmd pipe.
*/
if (close(to_stepd[0]) < 0)
error("Unable to close read to_stepd in parent: %m");
if (close(to_slurmd[1]) < 0)
error("Unable to close write to_slurmd in parent: %m");
if ((rc = _send_slurmstepd_init(to_stepd[1], type,
req, cli, self,
step_hset,
protocol_version)) != 0) {
error("Unable to init slurmstepd");
goto done;
}
/* If running under valgrind/memcheck, this pipe doesn't work
* correctly so just skip it. */
#if (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 0)
i = read(to_slurmd[0], &rc, sizeof(int));
if (i < 0) {
error("%s: Can not read return code from slurmstepd "
"got %d: %m", __func__, i);
rc = SLURM_FAILURE;
} else if (i != sizeof(int)) {
error("%s: slurmstepd failed to send return code "
"got %d: %m", __func__, i);
rc = SLURM_FAILURE;
} else {
int delta_time = time(NULL) - start_time;
int cc;
if (delta_time > 5) {
info("Warning: slurmstepd startup took %d sec, "
"possible file system problem or full "
"memory", delta_time);
}
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS)
error("slurmstepd return code %d", rc);
cc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
cc = write(to_stepd[1], &cc, sizeof(int));
if (cc != sizeof(int)) {
error("%s: failed to send ack to stepd %d: %m",
__func__, cc);
}
}
#endif
done:
if (_remove_starting_step(type, req))
error("Error cleaning up starting_step list");
/* Reap child */
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) < 0)
error("Unable to reap slurmd child process");
if (close(to_stepd[1]) < 0)
error("close write to_stepd in parent: %m");
if (close(to_slurmd[0]) < 0)
error("close read to_slurmd in parent: %m");
return rc;
} else {
#if (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 1)
/* memcheck test of slurmstepd, option #1 */
char *const argv[3] = {"memcheck",
(char *)conf->stepd_loc, NULL};
#elif (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 2)
/* valgrind test of slurmstepd, option #2 */
uint32_t job_id = 0, step_id = 0;
char log_file[256];
char *const argv[13] = {"valgrind", "--tool=memcheck",
"--error-limit=no",
"--leak-check=summary",
"--show-reachable=yes",
"--max-stackframe=16777216",
"--num-callers=20",
"--child-silent-after-fork=yes",
"--track-origins=yes",
log_file, (char *)conf->stepd_loc,
NULL};
if (type == LAUNCH_BATCH_JOB) {
job_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->step_id;
} else if (type == LAUNCH_TASKS) {
job_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_step_id;
}
snprintf(log_file, sizeof(log_file),
"--log-file=/tmp/slurmstepd_valgrind_%u.%u",
job_id, step_id);
#elif (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 3)
/* valgrind/drd test of slurmstepd, option #3 */
uint32_t job_id = 0, step_id = 0;
char log_file[256];
char *const argv[10] = {"valgrind", "--tool=drd",
"--error-limit=no",
"--max-stackframe=16777216",
"--num-callers=20",
"--child-silent-after-fork=yes",
log_file, (char *)conf->stepd_loc,
NULL};
if (type == LAUNCH_BATCH_JOB) {
job_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->step_id;
} else if (type == LAUNCH_TASKS) {
job_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_step_id;
}
snprintf(log_file, sizeof(log_file),
"--log-file=/tmp/slurmstepd_valgrind_%u.%u",
job_id, step_id);
#elif (SLURMSTEPD_MEMCHECK == 4)
/* valgrind/helgrind test of slurmstepd, option #4 */
uint32_t job_id = 0, step_id = 0;
char log_file[256];
char *const argv[10] = {"valgrind", "--tool=helgrind",
"--error-limit=no",
"--max-stackframe=16777216",
"--num-callers=20",
"--child-silent-after-fork=yes",
log_file, (char *)conf->stepd_loc,
NULL};
if (type == LAUNCH_BATCH_JOB) {
job_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((batch_job_launch_msg_t *)req)->step_id;
} else if (type == LAUNCH_TASKS) {
job_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_id;
step_id = ((launch_tasks_request_msg_t *)req)->job_step_id;
}
snprintf(log_file, sizeof(log_file),
"--log-file=/tmp/slurmstepd_valgrind_%u.%u",
job_id, step_id);
#else
/* no memory checking, default */
char *const argv[2] = { (char *)conf->stepd_loc, NULL};
#endif
int i;
int failed = 0;
/* inform slurmstepd about our config */
setenv("SLURM_CONF", conf->conffile, 1);
/*
* Child forks and exits
*/
if (setsid() < 0) {
error("_forkexec_slurmstepd: setsid: %m");
failed = 1;
}
if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
error("_forkexec_slurmstepd: "
"Unable to fork grandchild: %m");
failed = 2;
} else if (pid > 0) { /* child */
exit(0);
}
/*
* Just incase we (or someone we are linking to)
* opened a file and didn't do a close on exec. This
* is needed mostly to protect us against libs we link
* to that don't set the flag as we should already be
* setting it for those that we open. The number 256
* is an arbitrary number based off test7.9.
*/
for (i=3; i<256; i++) {
(void) fcntl(i, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
}
/*
* Grandchild exec's the slurmstepd
*
* If the slurmd is being shutdown/restarted before
* the pipe happens the old conf->lfd could be reused
* and if we close it the dup2 below will fail.
*/
if ((to_stepd[0] != conf->lfd)
&& (to_slurmd[1] != conf->lfd))
slurm_shutdown_msg_engine(conf->lfd);
if (close(to_stepd[1]) < 0)
error("close write to_stepd in grandchild: %m");
if (close(to_slurmd[0]) < 0)
error("close read to_slurmd in parent: %m");
(void) close(STDIN_FILENO); /* ignore return */
if (dup2(to_stepd[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
error("dup2 over STDIN_FILENO: %m");
exit(1);
}
fd_set_close_on_exec(to_stepd[0]);
(void) close(STDOUT_FILENO); /* ignore return */
if (dup2(to_slurmd[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
error("dup2 over STDOUT_FILENO: %m");
exit(1);
}
fd_set_close_on_exec(to_slurmd[1]);
(void) close(STDERR_FILENO); /* ignore return */
if (dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
error("dup2 /dev/null to STDERR_FILENO: %m");
exit(1);
}
fd_set_noclose_on_exec(STDERR_FILENO);
log_fini();
if (!failed) {
if (conf->chos_loc && !access(conf->chos_loc, X_OK))
execvp(conf->chos_loc, argv);
else
execvp(argv[0], argv);
error("exec of slurmstepd failed: %m");
}
exit(2);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dm_create(int minor, struct mapped_device **result)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
md = alloc_dev(minor);
if (!md)
return -ENXIO;
dm_sysfs_init(md);
*result = md;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BinaryUploadService::OnUploadComplete(Request* request,
bool success,
const std::string& response_data) {
if (!IsActive(request))
return;
if (!success) {
FinishRequest(request, Result::UPLOAD_FAILURE,
DeepScanningClientResponse());
return;
}
DeepScanningClientResponse response;
if (!response.ParseFromString(response_data)) {
FinishRequest(request, Result::UPLOAD_FAILURE,
DeepScanningClientResponse());
return;
}
active_uploads_.erase(request);
OnGetResponse(request, response);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReportContentSecurityPolicyViolation(
const content::CSPViolationParams& violation_params) {
frame_->ReportContentSecurityPolicyViolation(
BuildWebContentSecurityPolicyViolation(violation_params));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsNetworkServiceRunningInProcess() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kSingleProcess) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkServiceInProcess));
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageHandler::InnerSwapCompositorFrame() {
if (!host_)
return;
if (frames_in_flight_ > kMaxScreencastFramesInFlight)
return;
if (++frame_counter_ % capture_every_nth_frame_)
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* const view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(host_->GetView());
if (!view || !view->IsSurfaceAvailableForCopy())
return;
const gfx::Size surface_size = view->GetCompositorViewportPixelSize();
if (surface_size.IsEmpty())
return;
const gfx::Size snapshot_size = DetermineSnapshotSize(
surface_size, screencast_max_width_, screencast_max_height_);
if (snapshot_size.IsEmpty())
return;
double top_controls_height =
last_compositor_frame_metadata_.top_controls_height;
double top_controls_shown_ratio =
last_compositor_frame_metadata_.top_controls_shown_ratio;
std::unique_ptr<Page::ScreencastFrameMetadata> page_metadata =
BuildScreencastFrameMetadata(
surface_size, last_compositor_frame_metadata_.device_scale_factor,
last_compositor_frame_metadata_.page_scale_factor,
last_compositor_frame_metadata_.root_scroll_offset,
top_controls_height, top_controls_shown_ratio);
if (!page_metadata)
return;
view->CopyFromSurface(
gfx::Rect(), snapshot_size,
base::BindOnce(&PageHandler::ScreencastFrameCaptured,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(page_metadata)));
frames_in_flight_++;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lookup_iova(
struct rxe_mem *mem,
u64 iova,
int *m_out,
int *n_out,
size_t *offset_out)
{
size_t offset = iova - mem->iova + mem->offset;
int map_index;
int buf_index;
u64 length;
if (likely(mem->page_shift)) {
*offset_out = offset & mem->page_mask;
offset >>= mem->page_shift;
*n_out = offset & mem->map_mask;
*m_out = offset >> mem->map_shift;
} else {
map_index = 0;
buf_index = 0;
length = mem->map[map_index]->buf[buf_index].size;
while (offset >= length) {
offset -= length;
buf_index++;
if (buf_index == RXE_BUF_PER_MAP) {
map_index++;
buf_index = 0;
}
length = mem->map[map_index]->buf[buf_index].size;
}
*m_out = map_index;
*n_out = buf_index;
*offset_out = offset;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int calc_sq_size(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_qp_init_attr *attr,
struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
int wqe_size;
int wq_size;
if (!attr->cap.max_send_wr)
return 0;
wqe_size = calc_send_wqe(attr);
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "wqe_size %d\n", wqe_size);
if (wqe_size < 0)
return wqe_size;
if (wqe_size > MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, max_wqe_sz_sq)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "wqe_size(%d) > max_sq_desc_sz(%d)\n",
wqe_size, MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, max_wqe_sz_sq));
return -EINVAL;
}
qp->max_inline_data = wqe_size - sq_overhead(attr) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_inline_seg);
attr->cap.max_inline_data = qp->max_inline_data;
if (attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SIGNATURE_EN)
qp->signature_en = true;
wq_size = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->cap.max_send_wr * wqe_size);
qp->sq.wqe_cnt = wq_size / MLX5_SEND_WQE_BB;
if (qp->sq.wqe_cnt > (1 << MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, log_max_qp_sz))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "send queue size (%d * %d / %d -> %d) exceeds limits(%d)\n",
attr->cap.max_send_wr, wqe_size, MLX5_SEND_WQE_BB,
qp->sq.wqe_cnt,
1 << MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, log_max_qp_sz));
return -ENOMEM;
}
qp->sq.wqe_shift = ilog2(MLX5_SEND_WQE_BB);
qp->sq.max_gs = get_send_sge(attr, wqe_size);
if (qp->sq.max_gs < attr->cap.max_send_sge)
return -ENOMEM;
attr->cap.max_send_sge = qp->sq.max_gs;
qp->sq.max_post = wq_size / wqe_size;
attr->cap.max_send_wr = qp->sq.max_post;
return wq_size;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ocfs2_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int status;
int mode = file->f_flags;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
trace_ocfs2_file_open(inode, file, file->f_path.dentry,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len,
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, mode);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
status = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (status)
goto leave;
}
spin_lock(&oi->ip_lock);
/* Check that the inode hasn't been wiped from disk by another
* node. If it hasn't then we're safe as long as we hold the
* spin lock until our increment of open count. */
if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_DELETED) {
spin_unlock(&oi->ip_lock);
status = -ENOENT;
goto leave;
}
if (mode & O_DIRECT)
oi->ip_flags |= OCFS2_INODE_OPEN_DIRECT;
oi->ip_open_count++;
spin_unlock(&oi->ip_lock);
status = ocfs2_init_file_private(inode, file);
if (status) {
/*
* We want to set open count back if we're failing the
* open.
*/
spin_lock(&oi->ip_lock);
oi->ip_open_count--;
spin_unlock(&oi->ip_lock);
}
leave:
return status;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dir)->root;
int err = 0;
int drop_on_err = 0;
u64 objectid = 0;
u64 index = 0;
/*
* 2 items for inode and ref
* 2 items for dir items
* 1 for xattr if selinux is on
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
err = btrfs_find_free_ino(root, &objectid);
if (err)
goto out_fail;
inode = btrfs_new_inode(trans, root, dir, dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, btrfs_ino(dir), objectid,
S_IFDIR | mode, &index);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto out_fail;
}
drop_on_err = 1;
/* these must be set before we unlock the inode */
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &btrfs_dir_file_operations;
err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err)
goto out_fail_inode;
btrfs_i_size_write(inode, 0);
err = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (err)
goto out_fail_inode;
err = btrfs_add_link(trans, dir, inode, dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, 0, index);
if (err)
goto out_fail_inode;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
/*
* mkdir is special. We're unlocking after we call d_instantiate
* to avoid a race with nfsd calling d_instantiate.
*/
unlock_new_inode(inode);
drop_on_err = 0;
out_fail:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (drop_on_err) {
inode_dec_link_count(inode);
iput(inode);
}
btrfs_balance_delayed_items(root);
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
return err;
out_fail_inode:
unlock_new_inode(inode);
goto out_fail;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_get_module_started(const char *module_name) /* {{{ */
{
zend_module_entry *module;
return (zend_hash_find(&module_registry, module_name, strlen(module_name)+1, (void**)&module) == SUCCESS && module->module_started) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_object_value php_create_incomplete_object(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object *object;
zend_object_value value;
value = zend_objects_new(&object, class_type TSRMLS_CC);
value.handlers = &php_incomplete_object_handlers;
object_properties_init(object, class_type);
return value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputType::ShouldRespectAlignAttribute() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
PassRefPtr<IDBKey> key(createIDBKeyFromValue(exec, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->idbKey(key);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::LoadHTML(const char* html) {
std::string url_str = "data:text/html;charset=utf-8,";
url_str.append(html);
GURL url(url_str);
WebURLRequest request(url);
request.setCheckForBrowserSideNavigation(false);
GetMainFrame()->loadRequest(request);
FrameLoadWaiter(view_->GetMainRenderFrame()).Wait();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nlmsvc_insert_block(struct nlm_block *block, unsigned long when)
{
spin_lock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
nlmsvc_insert_block_locked(block, when);
spin_unlock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HRESULT RegisterWithGoogleDeviceManagement(const base::string16& mdm_url,
const base::string16& email,
const std::string& data) {
switch (g_enrollment_status) {
case EnrollmentStatus::kForceSuccess:
return S_OK;
case EnrollmentStatus::kForceFailure:
return E_FAIL;
case EnrollmentStatus::kDontForce:
break;
}
if (IsEnrolledWithGoogleMdm(mdm_url)) {
LOGFN(INFO) << "Already enrolled to Google MDM";
return S_OK;
}
base::ScopedNativeLibrary library(
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("MDMRegistration.dll")));
auto register_device_with_management_function =
GET_MDM_FUNCTION_POINTER(library, RegisterDeviceWithManagement);
if (!register_device_with_management_function) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "GET_MDM_FUNCTION_POINTER(RegisterDeviceWithManagement)";
return false;
}
std::string data_encoded;
base::Base64Encode(data, &data_encoded);
return register_device_with_management_function(
email.c_str(), mdm_url.c_str(), base::UTF8ToWide(data_encoded).c_str());
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 130,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_ps(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(on_ps_internal(pt, lseg));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DoCallback(int rv) {
ASSERT_NE(NOT_BLOCKED, state_);
CompletionCallback callback = callback_;
Reset();
callback.Run(rv);
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(InspectorPageAgent) {
visitor->Trace(inspected_frames_);
visitor->Trace(inspector_resource_content_loader_);
InspectorBaseAgent::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UINT32 GKI_get_os_tick_count(void) {
struct timespec timespec;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×pec);
return (timespec.tv_sec * 1000) + (timespec.tv_nsec / 1000000);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
{
char c='*';
if (p == 0) c='.';
if (p == 1) c='+';
if (p == 2) c='*';
if (p == 3) c='\n';
putc(c, stderr);
fflush(stderr);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 46,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int DecodeIPV6Packet (ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len)
{
if (unlikely(len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)) {
return -1;
}
if (unlikely(IP_GET_RAW_VER(pkt) != 6)) {
SCLogDebug("wrong ip version %" PRIu8 "",IP_GET_RAW_VER(pkt));
ENGINE_SET_INVALID_EVENT(p, IPV6_WRONG_IP_VER);
return -1;
}
p->ip6h = (IPV6Hdr *)pkt;
if (unlikely(len < (IPV6_HEADER_LEN + IPV6_GET_PLEN(p))))
{
ENGINE_SET_INVALID_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_PKT);
return -1;
}
SET_IPV6_SRC_ADDR(p,&p->src);
SET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p,&p->dst);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 87,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int print_msg_junit_test(char *code,FILE* fd,char header,char segregationLevel)
{
unsigned short int i,j,l,m,msglen;
int k;
char r,*msg;
unsigned char *payload;
payload=(unsigned char*)code;
memcpy(&i,code,2);/*the CODE of the request/response*/
memcpy(&j,&code[MSG_START_IDX],2);/*where the MSG starts*/
memcpy(&msglen,&code[MSG_LEN_IDX],2);/*how long the MSG is*/
i=ntohs(i);
j=ntohs(j);
msglen=ntohs(msglen);
if(header==0){
fwrite(code,1,j+msglen,fd);
fwrite(&theSignal,1,4,fd);
return 0;
}
msg=(char*)&payload[j];
r=(i<100)?1:0;
if(r){
if(segregationLevel & ALSO_RURI){
k=htonl(50);
fwrite(&k,1,4,fd);
fwrite(msg,1,50,fd);
k=htonl((long)payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX]);
fwrite(&k,1,4,fd);
fwrite(&payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX+1],1,payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX],fd);
fwrite(&theSignal,1,4,fd);
}
i=REQUEST_URI_IDX+1+payload[REQUEST_URI_IDX];
}else{
i=REQUEST_URI_IDX;
}
j=payload[i];
i++;
for(k=i;k<i+(j*3);k+=3){
memcpy(&l,&payload[k+1],2);
memcpy(&m,&payload[k+4],2);
l=ntohs(l);
m=ntohs(m);
if(header==(char)payload[k] ||
(header=='U' &&
(payload[k]=='f' ||
payload[k]=='t' ||
payload[k]=='m' ||
payload[k]=='o' ||
payload[k]=='p')))
dump_headers_test(msg,msglen,&payload[i+(j*3)+l+3],m-l,payload[k],fd,segregationLevel);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: seas: safety check for target buffer size before copying message in encode_msg()
- avoid buffer overflow for large SIP messages
- reported by Stelios Tsampas
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t IPCThreadState::transact(int32_t handle,
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data,
Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
status_t err = data.errorCheck();
flags |= TF_ACCEPT_FDS;
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BC_TRANSACTION thr " << (void*)pthread_self() << " / hand "
<< handle << " / code " << TypeCode(code) << ": "
<< indent << data << dedent << endl;
}
if (err == NO_ERROR) {
LOG_ONEWAY(">>>> SEND from pid %d uid %d %s", getpid(), getuid(),
(flags & TF_ONE_WAY) == 0 ? "READ REPLY" : "ONE WAY");
err = writeTransactionData(BC_TRANSACTION, flags, handle, code, data, NULL);
}
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
if (reply) reply->setError(err);
return (mLastError = err);
}
if ((flags & TF_ONE_WAY) == 0) {
#if 0
if (code == 4) { // relayout
ALOGI(">>>>>> CALLING transaction 4");
} else {
ALOGI(">>>>>> CALLING transaction %d", code);
}
#endif
if (reply) {
err = waitForResponse(reply);
} else {
Parcel fakeReply;
err = waitForResponse(&fakeReply);
}
#if 0
if (code == 4) { // relayout
ALOGI("<<<<<< RETURNING transaction 4");
} else {
ALOGI("<<<<<< RETURNING transaction %d", code);
}
#endif
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BR_REPLY thr " << (void*)pthread_self() << " / hand "
<< handle << ": ";
if (reply) alog << indent << *reply << dedent << endl;
else alog << "(none requested)" << endl;
}
} else {
err = waitForResponse(NULL, NULL);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_oom_score(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
{
unsigned long points = 0;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid_alive(task))
points = oom_badness(task, NULL, NULL,
totalram_pages + total_swap_pages);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return sprintf(buffer, "%lu\n", points);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(GET_PARAM(1));
ResetModel();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AudioManager* AudioSystemImpl::GetAudioManager() const {
return audio_manager_;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BookmarkManagerView::ShowContextMenu(views::View* source,
int x,
int y,
bool is_mouse_gesture) {
DCHECK(source == table_view_ || source == tree_view_);
bool is_table = (source == table_view_);
ShowMenu(GetWidget()->GetNativeView(), x, y,
is_table ? BookmarkContextMenu::BOOKMARK_MANAGER_TABLE :
BookmarkContextMenu::BOOKMARK_MANAGER_TREE);
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: streq_nocase_uprcase(const char *str1,
const char *str2)
{
while (*str1 && *str2) {
if (*str1 != uprcase(*str2))
return FALSE;
str1++;
str2++;
}
return *str1 == 0 && *str2 == 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rio_exit (void)
{
pci_unregister_driver (&rio_driver);
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_min_max_with_quirks(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval,
int default_min, struct snd_kcontrol *kctl)
{
/* for failsafe */
cval->min = default_min;
cval->max = cval->min + 1;
cval->res = 1;
cval->dBmin = cval->dBmax = 0;
if (cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_BOOLEAN ||
cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_INV_BOOLEAN) {
cval->initialized = 1;
} else {
int minchn = 0;
if (cval->cmask) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CHANNELS; i++)
if (cval->cmask & (1 << i)) {
minchn = i + 1;
break;
}
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_MAX, (cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->max) < 0 ||
get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_MIN, (cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->min) < 0) {
usb_audio_err(cval->head.mixer->chip,
"%d:%d: cannot get min/max values for control %d (id %d)\n",
cval->head.id, snd_usb_ctrl_intf(cval->head.mixer->chip),
cval->control, cval->head.id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn,
&cval->res) < 0) {
cval->res = 1;
} else {
int last_valid_res = cval->res;
while (cval->res > 1) {
if (snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value(cval, UAC_SET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn,
cval->res / 2) < 0)
break;
cval->res /= 2;
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->res) < 0)
cval->res = last_valid_res;
}
if (cval->res == 0)
cval->res = 1;
/* Additional checks for the proper resolution
*
* Some devices report smaller resolutions than actually
* reacting. They don't return errors but simply clip
* to the lower aligned value.
*/
if (cval->min + cval->res < cval->max) {
int last_valid_res = cval->res;
int saved, test, check;
get_cur_mix_raw(cval, minchn, &saved);
for (;;) {
test = saved;
if (test < cval->max)
test += cval->res;
else
test -= cval->res;
if (test < cval->min || test > cval->max ||
snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, minchn, 0, test) ||
get_cur_mix_raw(cval, minchn, &check)) {
cval->res = last_valid_res;
break;
}
if (test == check)
break;
cval->res *= 2;
}
snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, minchn, 0, saved);
}
cval->initialized = 1;
}
if (kctl)
volume_control_quirks(cval, kctl);
/* USB descriptions contain the dB scale in 1/256 dB unit
* while ALSA TLV contains in 1/100 dB unit
*/
cval->dBmin = (convert_signed_value(cval, cval->min) * 100) / 256;
cval->dBmax = (convert_signed_value(cval, cval->max) * 100) / 256;
if (cval->dBmin > cval->dBmax) {
/* something is wrong; assume it's either from/to 0dB */
if (cval->dBmin < 0)
cval->dBmax = 0;
else if (cval->dBmin > 0)
cval->dBmin = 0;
if (cval->dBmin > cval->dBmax) {
/* totally crap, return an error */
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t initAsync(const char *host, unsigned port) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IHDCP::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeCString(host);
data.writeInt32(port);
remote()->transact(HDCP_INIT_ASYNC, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: HDCP: buffer over flow check -- DO NOT MERGE
bug: 20222489
Change-Id: I3a64a5999d68ea243d187f12ec7717b7f26d93a3
(cherry picked from commit 532cd7b86a5fdc7b9a30a45d8ae2d16ef7660a72)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int is_callback(u32 proc)
{
return proc == NLMPROC_GRANTED
|| proc == NLMPROC_GRANTED_MSG
|| proc == NLMPROC_TEST_RES
|| proc == NLMPROC_LOCK_RES
|| proc == NLMPROC_CANCEL_RES
|| proc == NLMPROC_UNLOCK_RES
|| proc == NLMPROC_NSM_NOTIFY;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void brcmf_update_bw40_channel_flag(struct ieee80211_channel *channel,
struct brcmu_chan *ch)
{
u32 ht40_flag;
ht40_flag = channel->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40;
if (ch->sb == BRCMU_CHAN_SB_U) {
if (ht40_flag == IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40)
channel->flags &= ~IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40;
channel->flags |= IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40PLUS;
} else {
/* It should be one of
* IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40 or
* IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40PLUS
*/
channel->flags &= ~IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40;
if (ht40_flag == IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40)
channel->flags |= IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_HT40MINUS;
}
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix4fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
MaybeShared<DOMFloat32Array> v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformMatrixParameters("uniformMatrix4fv", location, transpose,
v.View(), 16, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformMatrix4fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.View()->length() - src_offset)) >> 4,
transpose, v.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::GetAudioInputStreamFactory() {
if (!audio_input_stream_factory_)
GetRemoteInterfaces()->GetInterface(&audio_input_stream_factory_);
return audio_input_stream_factory_.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int blk_set_preempt_only(struct request_queue *q)
{
return blk_queue_flag_test_and_set(QUEUE_FLAG_PREEMPT_ONLY, q);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ImeSetComposition(
const string16& text,
const std::vector<WebKit::WebCompositionUnderline>& underlines,
int selection_start,
int selection_end) {
Send(new ViewMsg_ImeSetComposition(
GetRoutingID(), text, underlines, selection_start, selection_end));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_ext_find_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
short int depth, i, ppos = 0, alloc = 0;
eh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
/* account possible depth increase */
if (!path) {
path = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_ext_path) * (depth + 2),
GFP_NOFS);
if (!path)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
alloc = 1;
}
path[0].p_hdr = eh;
path[0].p_bh = NULL;
i = depth;
/* walk through the tree */
while (i) {
int need_to_validate = 0;
ext_debug("depth %d: num %d, max %d\n",
ppos, le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_max));
ext4_ext_binsearch_idx(inode, path + ppos, block);
path[ppos].p_block = ext4_idx_pblock(path[ppos].p_idx);
path[ppos].p_depth = i;
path[ppos].p_ext = NULL;
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, path[ppos].p_block);
if (unlikely(!bh))
goto err;
if (!bh_uptodate_or_lock(bh)) {
trace_ext4_ext_load_extent(inode, block,
path[ppos].p_block);
if (bh_submit_read(bh) < 0) {
put_bh(bh);
goto err;
}
/* validate the extent entries */
need_to_validate = 1;
}
eh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
ppos++;
if (unlikely(ppos > depth)) {
put_bh(bh);
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"ppos %d > depth %d", ppos, depth);
goto err;
}
path[ppos].p_bh = bh;
path[ppos].p_hdr = eh;
i--;
if (need_to_validate && ext4_ext_check(inode, eh, i))
goto err;
}
path[ppos].p_depth = i;
path[ppos].p_ext = NULL;
path[ppos].p_idx = NULL;
/* find extent */
ext4_ext_binsearch(inode, path + ppos, block);
/* if not an empty leaf */
if (path[ppos].p_ext)
path[ppos].p_block = ext4_ext_pblock(path[ppos].p_ext);
ext4_ext_show_path(inode, path);
return path;
err:
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
if (alloc)
kfree(path);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct in6_addr *ndp_msg_opt_prefix(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset)
{
struct nd_opt_prefix_info *pi =
ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
return &pi->nd_opt_pi_prefix;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *name_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_NameBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_NAME);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_unaligned_ins(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mem_access *ma)
{
int ret, index, count;
unsigned long *rm, *rn;
unsigned char *src, *dst;
unsigned char __user *srcu, *dstu;
index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */
rn = ®s->regs[index];
index = (instruction>>4)&15; /* 0x00F0 */
rm = ®s->regs[index];
count = 1<<(instruction&3);
switch (count) {
case 1: inc_unaligned_byte_access(); break;
case 2: inc_unaligned_word_access(); break;
case 4: inc_unaligned_dword_access(); break;
case 8: inc_unaligned_multi_access(); break;
}
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (instruction>>12) {
case 0: /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
if (instruction & 8) {
/* from memory */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += regs->regs[0];
dst = (unsigned char *)rn;
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, count))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(count, dst);
} else {
/* to memory */
src = (unsigned char *)rm;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 4-count;
#endif
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
dstu += regs->regs[0];
if (ma->to(dstu, src, count))
goto fetch_fault;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case 1: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */
src = (unsigned char*) rm;
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
dstu += (instruction&0x000F)<<2;
if (ma->to(dstu, src, 4))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 2: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */
if (instruction & 4)
*rn -= count;
src = (unsigned char*) rm;
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->to(dstu, src, count))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 5: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 2;
dst = (unsigned char *)rn;
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, 4))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 6: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
if (instruction & 4)
*rm += count;
dst = (unsigned char*) rn;
*(unsigned long*)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, count))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(count, dst);
ret = 0;
break;
case 8:
switch ((instruction&0xFF00)>>8) {
case 0x81: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rn) */
src = (unsigned char *) ®s->regs[0];
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 2;
#endif
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm; /* called Rn in the spec */
dstu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 1;
if (ma->to(dstu, src, 2))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 0x85: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 1;
dst = (unsigned char *) ®s->regs[0];
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 2;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, 2))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(2, dst);
ret = 0;
break;
}
break;
}
return ret;
fetch_fault:
/* Argh. Address not only misaligned but also non-existent.
* Raise an EFAULT and see if it's trapped
*/
die_if_no_fixup("Fault in unaligned fixup", regs, 0);
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,557
|
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