instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void deliver_local_response(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
struct ipmi_recv_msg *msg)
{
if (deliver_response(intf, msg))
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, unhandled_local_responses);
else
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, handled_local_responses);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::android::ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray> AwContents::GetCertificate(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
content::NavigationEntry* entry =
web_contents_->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!entry)
return ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray>();
int cert_id = entry->GetSSL().cert_id;
scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate> cert;
bool ok = content::CertStore::GetInstance()->RetrieveCert(cert_id, &cert);
if (!ok)
return ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray>();
std::string der_string;
net::X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(cert->os_cert_handle(), &der_string);
return base::android::ToJavaByteArray(env,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(der_string.data()), der_string.length());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
unsigned int size_left, enum compat_mwt type,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state, const void *base)
{
int growth = 0;
char *buf;
if (size_left == 0)
return 0;
buf = (char *) match32;
while (size_left >= sizeof(*match32)) {
struct ebt_entry_match *match_kern;
int ret;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) state->buf_kern_start;
if (match_kern) {
char *tmp;
tmp = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) tmp;
}
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, buf, sizeof(*match32));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
size_left -= sizeof(*match32);
/* add padding before match->data (if any) */
ret = ebt_buf_add_pad(state, ebt_compat_entry_padsize());
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (match32->match_size > size_left)
return -EINVAL;
size_left -= match32->match_size;
ret = compat_mtw_from_user(match32, type, state, base);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
BUG_ON(ret < match32->match_size);
growth += ret - match32->match_size;
growth += ebt_compat_entry_padsize();
buf += sizeof(*match32);
buf += match32->match_size;
if (match_kern)
match_kern->match_size = ret;
WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
}
return growth;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecuteScript(blink::WebFrame* frame,
const char* script_format,
const base::Value& parameters) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(parameters, &json);
std::string script = base::StringPrintf(script_format, json.c_str());
frame->executeScript(blink::WebString(base::UTF8ToUTF16(script)));
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iwbmp_read_bits(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
rctx->img->width = rctx->width;
rctx->img->height = rctx->height;
if(rctx->fileheader_size>0) {
size_t expected_offbits;
expected_offbits = rctx->fileheader_size + rctx->infoheader_size +
rctx->bitfields_nbytes + rctx->palette_nbytes;
if(rctx->bfOffBits==expected_offbits) {
;
}
else if(rctx->bfOffBits>expected_offbits && rctx->bfOffBits<1000000) {
if(!iwbmp_skip_bytes(rctx, rctx->bfOffBits - expected_offbits)) goto done;
}
else {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid BMP bits offset");
goto done;
}
}
if(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RGB) {
if(!bmpr_read_uncompressed(rctx)) goto done;
}
else if(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 || rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4) {
if(!bmpr_read_rle(rctx)) goto done;
}
else {
iw_set_errorf(rctx->ctx,"Unsupported BMP compression or image type (%d)",(int)rctx->compression);
goto done;
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipc_addid(struct ipc_ids *ids, struct kern_ipc_perm *new, int size)
{
kuid_t euid;
kgid_t egid;
int id;
int next_id = ids->next_id;
if (size > IPCMNI)
size = IPCMNI;
if (ids->in_use >= size)
return -ENOSPC;
idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
spin_lock_init(&new->lock);
new->deleted = false;
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock(&new->lock);
id = idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new,
(next_id < 0) ? 0 : ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0,
GFP_NOWAIT);
idr_preload_end();
if (id < 0) {
spin_unlock(&new->lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
return id;
}
ids->in_use++;
current_euid_egid(&euid, &egid);
new->cuid = new->uid = euid;
new->gid = new->cgid = egid;
if (next_id < 0) {
new->seq = ids->seq++;
if (ids->seq > IPCID_SEQ_MAX)
ids->seq = 0;
} else {
new->seq = ipcid_to_seqx(next_id);
ids->next_id = -1;
}
new->id = ipc_buildid(id, new->seq);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcListFonts(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xListFontsReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xListFontsReq, stuff->nbytes);
return ListFonts(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], stuff->nbytes,
stuff->maxNames);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecolorallocatealpha)
{
zval *IM;
long red, green, blue, alpha;
gdImagePtr im;
int ct = (-1);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rllll", &IM, &red, &green, &blue, &alpha) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ct = gdImageColorAllocateAlpha(im, red, green, blue, alpha);
if (ct < 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG((long)ct);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(int) cJSON_GetArraySize(const cJSON *array)
{
cJSON *child = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
if (array == NULL)
{
return 0;
}
child = array->child;
while(child != NULL)
{
size++;
child = child->next;
}
/* FIXME: Can overflow here. Cannot be fixed without breaking the API */
return (int)size;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline __u32 btrfs_mask_flags(umode_t mode, __u32 flags)
{
if (S_ISDIR(mode))
return flags;
else if (S_ISREG(mode))
return flags & ~FS_DIRSYNC_FL;
else
return flags & (FS_NODUMP_FL | FS_NOATIME_FL);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPR_NameToID(struct rx_call *call, namelist *aname, idlist *aid)
{
afs_int32 code;
code = nameToID(call, aname, aid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_NmToIdEvent, code, AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_NameToID: code %d\n", code));
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_read_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd,
pgoff_t pgoff, unsigned int flags, pte_t orig_pte)
{
struct page *fault_page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Let's call ->map_pages() first and use ->fault() as fallback
* if page by the offset is not ready to be mapped (cold cache or
* something).
*/
if (vma->vm_ops->map_pages && fault_around_bytes >> PAGE_SHIFT > 1) {
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
do_fault_around(vma, address, pte, pgoff, flags);
if (!pte_same(*pte, orig_pte))
goto unlock_out;
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
}
ret = __do_fault(vma, address, pgoff, flags, NULL, &fault_page);
if (unlikely(ret & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_NOPAGE | VM_FAULT_RETRY)))
return ret;
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
if (unlikely(!pte_same(*pte, orig_pte))) {
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
unlock_page(fault_page);
page_cache_release(fault_page);
return ret;
}
do_set_pte(vma, address, fault_page, pte, false, false);
unlock_page(fault_page);
unlock_out:
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 57,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
skb_queue_head_init(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
tcp_init_xmit_timers(sk);
tcp_prequeue_init(tp);
icsk->icsk_rto = TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
tp->mdev = TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
/* So many TCP implementations out there (incorrectly) count the
* initial SYN frame in their delayed-ACK and congestion control
* algorithms that we must have the following bandaid to talk
* efficiently to them. -DaveM
*/
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
/* See draft-stevens-tcpca-spec-01 for discussion of the
* initialization of these values.
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sysctl_tcp_reordering;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_specific;
icsk->icsk_ca_ops = &tcp_init_congestion_ops;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss;
sk->sk_write_space = sk_stream_write_space;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_specific;
#endif
/* TCP Cookie Transactions */
if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0) {
/* Default, cookies without s_data_payload. */
tp->cookie_values =
kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->cookie_values),
sk->sk_allocation);
if (tp->cookie_values != NULL)
kref_init(&tp->cookie_values->kref);
}
/* Presumed zeroed, in order of appearance:
* cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never,
* s_data_constant, s_data_in, s_data_out
*/
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[1];
sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tcp_rmem[1];
local_bh_disable();
percpu_counter_inc(&tcp_sockets_allocated);
local_bh_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void S_AL_StartLocalSound(sfxHandle_t sfx, int channel)
{
srcHandle_t src;
if(S_AL_CheckInput(0, sfx))
return;
src = S_AL_SrcAlloc(SRCPRI_LOCAL, -1, channel);
if(src == -1)
return;
S_AL_SrcSetup(src, sfx, SRCPRI_LOCAL, -1, channel, qtrue);
srcList[src].isPlaying = qtrue;
qalSourcePlay(srcList[src].alSource);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *P )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
dbl_count++;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT)
if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */
mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
/* Special case for A = -3 */
if( grp->A.p == NULL )
{
/* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( U );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &U ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M );
}
else
{
/* M = 3.X^2 */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M );
/* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 )
{
/* M += A.Z^4 */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &S, &S ) ); MOD_MUL( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( M );
}
}
/* S = 4.X.Y^2 */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &P->X, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &S, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( S );
/* U = 8.Y^4 */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &T, &T ) ); MOD_MUL( U );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U );
/* T = M^2 - 2.S */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &M, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T, &S ) ); MOD_SUB( T );
/* S = M(S - T) - U */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &T ) ); MOD_SUB( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &S, &S, &M ) ); MOD_MUL( S );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &S, &S, &U ) ); MOD_SUB( S );
/* U = 2.Y.Z */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); MOD_MUL( U );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &U, 1 ) ); MOD_ADD( U );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &U ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err trgr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackGroupBox *ptr = (GF_TrackGroupBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackGroupBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_array_dump(ptr->groups, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackGroupBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_bin_file_deref_by_bind(RBinBind *binb) {
RBin *bin = binb? binb->bin: NULL;
RBinFile *a = r_bin_cur (bin);
return r_bin_file_deref (bin, a);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::SetActiveForWidget(bool active) {
if (webview())
webview()->SetIsActive(active);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Element::getAttributeNodeNS(const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& localName)
{
if (!elementData())
return 0;
QualifiedName qName(nullAtom, localName, namespaceURI);
synchronizeAttribute(qName);
const Attribute* attribute = elementData()->getAttributeItem(qName);
if (!attribute)
return 0;
return ensureAttr(attribute->name());
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TestContentClient::GetUserAgent(bool* overriding) const {
*overriding = false;
return std::string("TestContentClient");
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wake_up_idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
if (cpu == smp_processor_id())
return;
/*
* This is safe, as this function is called with the timer
* wheel base lock of (cpu) held. When the CPU is on the way
* to idle and has not yet set rq->curr to idle then it will
* be serialized on the timer wheel base lock and take the new
* timer into account automatically.
*/
if (rq->curr != rq->idle)
return;
/*
* We can set TIF_RESCHED on the idle task of the other CPU
* lockless. The worst case is that the other CPU runs the
* idle task through an additional NOOP schedule()
*/
set_tsk_need_resched(rq->idle);
/* NEED_RESCHED must be visible before we test polling */
smp_mb();
if (!tsk_is_polling(rq->idle))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_read_guest_page_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
gfn_t ngfn, void *data, int offset, int len,
u32 access)
{
struct x86_exception exception;
gfn_t real_gfn;
gpa_t ngpa;
ngpa = gfn_to_gpa(ngfn);
real_gfn = mmu->translate_gpa(vcpu, ngpa, access, &exception);
if (real_gfn == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return -EFAULT;
real_gfn = gpa_to_gfn(real_gfn);
return kvm_read_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, real_gfn, data, offset, len);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ucounts *inc_user_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
return inc_ucount(ns, uid, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES);
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 76,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> CreateVertexAttribManager(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
bool client_visible) {
return vertex_array_manager()->CreateVertexAttribManager(
client_id, service_id, group_->max_vertex_attribs(), client_visible,
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::PausePageScheduledTasks(bool paused) {
SendPageMessage(
new PageMsg_PausePageScheduledTasks(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, paused));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page,
unsigned int len)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *page_bufs = NULL;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
int ret = 0, err = 0;
int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode);
struct buffer_head *inode_bh = NULL;
ClearPageChecked(page);
if (inline_data) {
BUG_ON(page->index != 0);
BUG_ON(len > ext4_get_max_inline_size(inode));
inode_bh = ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(inode, len, page);
if (inode_bh == NULL)
goto out;
} else {
page_bufs = page_buffers(page);
if (!page_bufs) {
BUG();
goto out;
}
ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len,
NULL, bget_one);
}
/*
* We need to release the page lock before we start the
* journal, so grab a reference so the page won't disappear
* out from under us.
*/
get_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
put_page(page);
goto out_no_pagelock;
}
BUG_ON(!ext4_handle_valid(handle));
lock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (page->mapping != mapping) {
/* The page got truncated from under us */
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (inline_data) {
BUFFER_TRACE(inode_bh, "get write access");
ret = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, inode_bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, inode_bh);
} else {
ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL,
do_journal_get_write_access);
err = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL,
write_end_fn);
}
if (ret == 0)
ret = err;
EXT4_I(inode)->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
err = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_bufs, 0, len,
NULL, bput_one);
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
out:
unlock_page(page);
out_no_pagelock:
brelse(inode_bh);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackwardsCharacterIterator::advance(int count)
{
if (count <= 0) {
ASSERT(!count);
return;
}
m_atBreak = false;
int remaining = m_textIterator.length() - m_runOffset;
if (count < remaining) {
m_runOffset += count;
m_offset += count;
return;
}
count -= remaining;
m_offset += remaining;
for (m_textIterator.advance(); !atEnd(); m_textIterator.advance()) {
int runLength = m_textIterator.length();
if (runLength == 0)
m_atBreak = true;
else {
if (count < runLength) {
m_runOffset = count;
m_offset += count;
return;
}
count -= runLength;
m_offset += runLength;
}
}
m_atBreak = true;
m_runOffset = 0;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rtmsg_ifinfo(int type, struct net_device *dev, unsigned int change)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
size_t if_info_size;
skb = nlmsg_new((if_info_size = if_nlmsg_size(dev, 0)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
err = rtnl_fill_ifinfo(skb, dev, type, 0, 0, change, 0, 0);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in if_nlmsg_size() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_LINK, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
return;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE void spice_server_set_name(SpiceServer *s, const char *name)
{
free(spice_name);
spice_name = spice_strdup(name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long scale_rt_capacity(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long max = arch_scale_cpu_capacity(sd, cpu);
unsigned long used, free;
unsigned long irq;
irq = cpu_util_irq(rq);
if (unlikely(irq >= max))
return 1;
used = READ_ONCE(rq->avg_rt.util_avg);
used += READ_ONCE(rq->avg_dl.util_avg);
if (unlikely(used >= max))
return 1;
free = max - used;
return scale_irq_capacity(free, irq, max);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON:
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
case MSR_K8_SYSCFG:
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG:
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_MTRRcap:
data = 0x500 | KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR;
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return get_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case 0xcd: /* fsb frequency */
data = 3;
break;
/*
* MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID
* Conservative value valid for even the basic CPU models.
* Models 0,1: 000 in bits 23:21 indicating a bus speed of
* 100MHz, model 2 000 in bits 18:16 indicating 100MHz,
* and 266MHz for model 3, or 4. Set Core Clock
* Frequency to System Bus Frequency Ratio to 1 (bits
* 31:24) even though these are only valid for CPU
* models > 2, however guests may end up dividing or
* multiplying by zero otherwise.
*/
case MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID:
data = 1 << 24;
break;
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
data = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_read(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
data = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS:
/* TSC increment by tick */
data = 1000ULL;
/* CPU multiplier */
data |= (((uint64_t)4ULL) << 40);
break;
case MSR_EFER:
data = vcpu->arch.efer;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock;
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
data = vcpu->arch.time;
break;
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return get_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Provide expected ramp-up count for K7. All other
* are set to zero, indicating minimum divisors for
* every field.
*
* This prevents guest kernels on AMD host with CPU
* type 6, model 8 and higher from exploding due to
* the rdmsr failing.
*/
data = 0x20000000;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = get_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, pdata);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return get_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
default:
if (!ignore_msrs) {
pr_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
} else {
pr_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
data = 0;
}
break;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *arm_iommu_alloc_attrs(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
struct page **pages;
void *addr = NULL;
*handle = DMA_ERROR_CODE;
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
if (gfp & GFP_ATOMIC)
return __iommu_alloc_atomic(dev, size, handle);
/*
* Following is a work-around (a.k.a. hack) to prevent pages
* with __GFP_COMP being passed to split_page() which cannot
* handle them. The real problem is that this flag probably
* should be 0 on ARM as it is not supported on this
* platform; see CONFIG_HUGETLBFS.
*/
gfp &= ~(__GFP_COMP);
pages = __iommu_alloc_buffer(dev, size, gfp, attrs);
if (!pages)
return NULL;
*handle = __iommu_create_mapping(dev, pages, size);
if (*handle == DMA_ERROR_CODE)
goto err_buffer;
if (dma_get_attr(DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING, attrs))
return pages;
addr = __iommu_alloc_remap(pages, size, gfp, prot,
__builtin_return_address(0));
if (!addr)
goto err_mapping;
return addr;
err_mapping:
__iommu_remove_mapping(dev, *handle, size);
err_buffer:
__iommu_free_buffer(dev, pages, size, attrs);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoAudioOutputIPC::CloseStream() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
stream_provider_.reset();
stream_.reset();
binding_.Close();
delegate_ = nullptr;
weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayerTreeHost::~LayerTreeHost() {
CHECK(!inside_main_frame_);
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHostInProcess::~LayerTreeHostInProcess");
mutator_host_->SetMutatorHostClient(nullptr);
RegisterViewportLayers(nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
if (root_layer_) {
root_layer_->SetLayerTreeHost(nullptr);
root_layer_ = nullptr;
}
if (proxy_) {
DCHECK(task_runner_provider_->IsMainThread());
proxy_->Stop();
proxy_ = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_completion_get_string (struct t_gui_completion *completion,
const char *property)
{
return gui_completion_get_string (completion, property);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct task_struct *task;
const struct cred *cred;
struct pid_namespace *pid = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
rcu_read_lock();
stat->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
* it only makes getattr() consistent with readdir().
*/
return -ENOENT;
}
if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
task_dumpable(task)) {
cred = __task_cred(task);
stat->uid = cred->euid;
stat->gid = cred->egid;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 49,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __nfs4_file_get_access(struct nfs4_file *fp, u32 access)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&fp->fi_lock);
if (access & NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE)
atomic_inc(&fp->fi_access[O_WRONLY]);
if (access & NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ)
atomic_inc(&fp->fi_access[O_RDONLY]);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void devinet_sysctl_unregister(struct in_device *idev)
{
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::JavaScriptIsolatedWorldRequest::JavaScriptIsolatedWorldRequest(
int id,
bool notify_result,
int routing_id,
base::WeakPtr<RenderFrameImpl> render_frame_impl)
: id_(id),
notify_result_(notify_result),
routing_id_(routing_id),
render_frame_impl_(render_frame_impl) {
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetFillModeAndMask(const Cmd& cmd,
GLenum* out_fill_mode,
GLuint* out_mask) {
GLenum fill_mode;
if (!GetFillMode(cmd, &fill_mode))
return false;
GLuint mask = static_cast<GLuint>(cmd.mask);
/* The error INVALID_VALUE is generated if /fillMode/ is COUNT_UP_CHROMIUM
or COUNT_DOWN_CHROMIUM and the effective /mask/+1 is not an integer
power of two */
if ((fill_mode == GL_COUNT_UP_CHROMIUM ||
fill_mode == GL_COUNT_DOWN_CHROMIUM) &&
GLES2Util::IsNPOT(mask + 1)) {
ERRORSTATE_SET_GL_ERROR(error_state_, GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name_,
"mask+1 is not power of two");
return false;
}
*out_fill_mode = fill_mode;
*out_mask = mask;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BnMemoryHeap::BnMemoryHeap() {
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void inc_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node,
int objects) {}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int mask = 0;
int ret;
if (IS_NOSEC(inode))
return 0;
mask = should_remove_suid(dentry);
ret = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret)
mask |= ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
return mask;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& PresentationConnection::interfaceName() const {
return EventTargetNames::PresentationConnection;
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int irda_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_irda *addr = (struct sockaddr_irda *) uaddr;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
lock_sock(sk);
/* Don't allow connect for Ultra sockets */
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if ((sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (sk->sk_protocol == IRDAPROTO_ULTRA))
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
err = 0;
goto out; /* Connect completed during a ERESTARTSYS event */
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto out;
}
err = -EISCONN; /* No reconnect on a seqpacket socket */
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_irda))
goto out;
/* Check if user supplied any destination device address */
if ((!addr->sir_addr) || (addr->sir_addr == DEV_ADDR_ANY)) {
/* Try to find one suitable */
err = irda_discover_daddr_and_lsap_sel(self, addr->sir_name);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), auto-connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Use the one provided by the user */
self->daddr = addr->sir_addr;
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), daddr = %08x\n", __func__, self->daddr);
/* If we don't have a valid service name, we assume the
* user want to connect on a specific LSAP. Prevent
* the use of invalid LSAPs (IrLMP 1.1 p10). Jean II */
if((addr->sir_name[0] != '\0') ||
(addr->sir_lsap_sel >= 0x70)) {
/* Query remote LM-IAS using service name */
err = irda_find_lsap_sel(self, addr->sir_name);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Directly connect to the remote LSAP
* specified by the sir_lsap field.
* Please use with caution, in IrDA LSAPs are
* dynamic and there is no "well-known" LSAP. */
self->dtsap_sel = addr->sir_lsap_sel;
}
}
/* Check if we have opened a local TSAP */
if (!self->tsap)
irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
/* Move to connecting socket, start sending Connect Requests */
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
sk->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
/* Connect to remote device */
err = irttp_connect_request(self->tsap, self->dtsap_sel,
self->saddr, self->daddr, NULL,
self->max_sdu_size_rx, NULL);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* Now the loop */
err = -EINPROGRESS;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && (flags & O_NONBLOCK))
goto out;
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (wait_event_interruptible(*(sk_sleep(sk)),
(sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT)))
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (sk->sk_prot->disconnect(sk, flags))
sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (!err)
err = -ECONNRESET;
goto out;
}
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
/* At this point, IrLMP has assigned our source address */
self->saddr = irttp_get_saddr(self->tsap);
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int send_stream(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct msghdr my_msg;
struct iovec my_iov;
struct iovec *curr_iov;
int curr_iovlen;
char __user *curr_start;
u32 hdr_size;
int curr_left;
int bytes_to_send;
int bytes_sent;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Handle special cases where there is no connection */
if (unlikely(sock->state != SS_CONNECTED)) {
if (sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED) {
res = send_packet(NULL, sock, m, total_len);
goto exit;
} else if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -EPIPE;
goto exit;
} else {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
}
if (unlikely(m->msg_name)) {
res = -EISCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (total_len > (unsigned int)INT_MAX) {
res = -EMSGSIZE;
goto exit;
}
/*
* Send each iovec entry using one or more messages
*
* Note: This algorithm is good for the most likely case
* (i.e. one large iovec entry), but could be improved to pass sets
* of small iovec entries into send_packet().
*/
curr_iov = m->msg_iov;
curr_iovlen = m->msg_iovlen;
my_msg.msg_iov = &my_iov;
my_msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
my_msg.msg_flags = m->msg_flags;
my_msg.msg_name = NULL;
bytes_sent = 0;
hdr_size = msg_hdr_sz(&tport->phdr);
while (curr_iovlen--) {
curr_start = curr_iov->iov_base;
curr_left = curr_iov->iov_len;
while (curr_left) {
bytes_to_send = tport->max_pkt - hdr_size;
if (bytes_to_send > TIPC_MAX_USER_MSG_SIZE)
bytes_to_send = TIPC_MAX_USER_MSG_SIZE;
if (curr_left < bytes_to_send)
bytes_to_send = curr_left;
my_iov.iov_base = curr_start;
my_iov.iov_len = bytes_to_send;
res = send_packet(NULL, sock, &my_msg, bytes_to_send);
if (res < 0) {
if (bytes_sent)
res = bytes_sent;
goto exit;
}
curr_left -= bytes_to_send;
curr_start += bytes_to_send;
bytes_sent += bytes_to_send;
}
curr_iov++;
}
res = bytes_sent;
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_delegreturn_release(void *calldata)
{
kfree(calldata);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string EncodeBitmap(const SkBitmap& bitmap,
ImageEncoding encoding,
int quality) {
gfx::Image image = gfx::Image::CreateFrom1xBitmap(bitmap);
DCHECK(!image.IsEmpty());
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedMemory> data;
if (encoding == ImageEncoding::kPng) {
data = image.As1xPNGBytes();
} else if (encoding == ImageEncoding::kJpeg) {
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes());
if (gfx::JPEG1xEncodedDataFromImage(image, quality, &bytes->data()))
data = bytes;
}
if (!data || !data->front())
return std::string();
std::string base_64_data;
base::Base64Encode(
base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data->front()),
data->size()),
&base_64_data);
return base_64_data;
}
Commit Message: Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <irisu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *lxc_string_replace(const char *needle, const char *replacement, const char *haystack)
{
ssize_t len = -1, saved_len = -1;
char *result = NULL;
size_t replacement_len = strlen(replacement);
size_t needle_len = strlen(needle);
/* should be executed exactly twice */
while (len == -1 || result == NULL) {
char *p;
char *last_p;
ssize_t part_len;
if (len != -1) {
result = calloc(1, len + 1);
if (!result)
return NULL;
saved_len = len;
}
len = 0;
for (last_p = (char *)haystack, p = strstr(last_p, needle); p; last_p = p, p = strstr(last_p, needle)) {
part_len = (ssize_t)(p - last_p);
if (result && part_len > 0)
memcpy(&result[len], last_p, part_len);
len += part_len;
if (result && replacement_len > 0)
memcpy(&result[len], replacement, replacement_len);
len += replacement_len;
p += needle_len;
}
part_len = strlen(last_p);
if (result && part_len > 0)
memcpy(&result[len], last_p, part_len);
len += part_len;
}
/* make sure we did the same thing twice,
* once for calculating length, the other
* time for copying data */
assert(saved_len == len);
/* make sure we didn't overwrite any buffer,
* due to calloc the string should be 0-terminated */
assert(result[len] == '\0');
return result;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_file_exists (const char *file)
{
DWORD attributes = GetFileAttributesA (file);
if (attributes != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES && GetLastError() != ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)
return TRUE;
else
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float MSG_ReadDeltaFloat( msg_t *msg, float oldV ) {
if ( MSG_ReadBits( msg, 1 ) ) {
floatint_t fi;
fi.i = MSG_ReadBits( msg, 32 );
return fi.f;
}
return oldV;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
const struct crypto_options *opt,
const struct frame* frame)
{
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init (&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi)
{
struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->encrypt;
/* Do Encrypt from buf -> work */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher);
const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher);
int outlen;
if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC)
{
CLEAR (iv_buf);
/* generate pseudo-random IV */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
prng_bytes (iv_buf, iv_size);
/* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
if (opt->packet_id)
{
struct packet_id_net pin;
packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM));
ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true));
}
}
else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB)
{
struct packet_id_net pin;
struct buffer b;
ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */
ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */
packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, true);
memset (iv_buf, 0, iv_size);
buf_set_write (&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, &b, true, false));
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT (0);
}
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame)));
/* set the IV pseudo-randomly */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s",
format_hex (BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), 80, &gc));
/* cipher_ctx was already initialized with key & keylen */
ASSERT (cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf));
/* Buffer overflow check */
if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
{
msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d cbs=%d",
buf->capacity,
buf->offset,
buf->len,
work.capacity,
work.offset,
work.len,
cipher_ctx_block_size (ctx->cipher));
goto err;
}
/* Encrypt packet ID, payload */
ASSERT (cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)));
work.len += outlen;
/* Flush the encryption buffer */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_final(ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen));
work.len += outlen;
ASSERT (outlen == iv_size);
/* prepend the IV to the ciphertext */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
uint8_t *output = buf_prepend (&work, iv_size);
ASSERT (output);
memcpy (output, iv_buf, iv_size);
}
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc));
}
else /* No Encryption */
{
if (opt->packet_id)
{
struct packet_id_net pin;
packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM));
ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true));
}
work = *buf;
}
/* HMAC the ciphertext (or plaintext if !cipher) */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
uint8_t *output = NULL;
hmac_ctx_reset (ctx->hmac);
hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work));
output = buf_prepend (&work, hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac));
ASSERT (output);
hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, output);
}
*buf = work;
}
gc_free (&gc);
return;
err:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free (&gc);
return;
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 32,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsAutoReloadVisibleOnlyEnabled() {
const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableOfflineAutoReloadVisibleOnly)) {
return true;
}
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableOfflineAutoReloadVisibleOnly)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24)
{
int rc;
unsigned char p14[14], p16[16], p21[21];
memset(p14, '\0', 14);
memset(p16, '\0', 16);
memset(p21, '\0', 21);
memcpy(p14, passwd, 14);
rc = E_P16(p14, p16);
if (rc)
return rc;
memcpy(p21, p16, 16);
rc = E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code that Eric Biggers
suggested.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9 only
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent, m_inspectorClient));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ep_poll_wakeup_proc(void *priv, void *cookie, int call_nests)
{
ep_wake_up_nested((wait_queue_head_t *) cookie, POLLIN,
1 + call_nests);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pagefault_out_of_memory(void)
{
if (try_set_system_oom()) {
out_of_memory(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
clear_system_oom();
}
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_MEMDIE))
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: load_gimp_2_6_file (gconstpointer data)
{
Gimp *gimp = GIMP (data);
GimpImage *image;
gchar *filename;
GFile *file;
filename = g_build_filename (g_getenv ("GIMP_TESTING_ABS_TOP_SRCDIR"),
"app/tests/files/gimp-2-6-file.xcf",
NULL);
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_free (filename);
image = gimp_test_load_image (gimp, file);
/* The image file was constructed by running
* gimp_write_and_read_file (FALSE, FALSE) in GIMP 2.6 by
* copy-pasting the code to GIMP 2.6 and adapting it to changes in
* the core API, so we can use gimp_assert_mainimage() to make sure
* the file was loaded successfully.
*/
gimp_assert_mainimage (image,
FALSE /*with_unusual_stuff*/,
FALSE /*compat_paths*/,
FALSE /*use_gimp_2_8_features*/);
}
Commit Message: Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib).
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 81,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vring_used_flags_unset_bit(VirtQueue *vq, int mask)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, flags);
stw_phys(&address_space_memory,
pa, lduw_phys(&address_space_memory, pa) & ~mask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int br_nf_local_in(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (rt && rt == bridge_parent_rtable(in))
skb_dst_drop(skb);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __netif_reschedule(struct Qdisc *q)
{
struct softnet_data *sd;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
q->next_sched = NULL;
*sd->output_queue_tailp = q;
sd->output_queue_tailp = &q->next_sched;
raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sec_establish_key(void)
{
uint32 length = g_server_public_key_len + SEC_PADDING_SIZE;
uint32 flags = SEC_EXCHANGE_PKT;
STREAM s;
s = sec_init(flags, length + 4);
out_uint32_le(s, length);
out_uint8p(s, g_sec_crypted_random, g_server_public_key_len);
out_uint8s(s, SEC_PADDING_SIZE);
s_mark_end(s);
sec_send(s, flags);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
{
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP &&
kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip))
rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
kvm_x86_ops->set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (!kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) || !pit)
return;
timer = &pit->pit_state.pit_timer.timer;
if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SyncMessageStatusReceiver() {}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_U32 omx_venc::dev_start_done(void)
{
return handle->venc_start_done();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLStencilFunc(GLenum func, GLint ref, GLuint mask) {
glStencilFunc(func, ref, mask);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob,
chunk[80],
*p;
unsigned int
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_color_type,
transparent;
size_t
jng_alpha_quality,
jng_quality;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter WriteOneJNGImage()");
blob=(unsigned char *) NULL;
jpeg_image=(Image *) NULL;
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
length=0;
status=MagickTrue;
transparent=image_info->type==GrayscaleAlphaType ||
image_info->type==TrueColorAlphaType ||
image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait;
jng_alpha_sample_depth = 0;
jng_quality=image_info->quality == 0UL ? 75UL : image_info->quality%1000;
jng_alpha_compression_method=image->compression==JPEGCompression? 8 : 0;
jng_alpha_quality=image_info->quality == 0UL ? 75UL :
image_info->quality;
if (jng_alpha_quality >= 1000)
jng_alpha_quality /= 1000;
length=0;
if (transparent != 0)
{
jng_color_type=14;
/* Create JPEG blob, image, and image_info */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image_info for alpha.");
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (jpeg_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image.");
jpeg_image=SeparateImage(image,AlphaChannel,exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
jpeg_image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
jpeg_image->quality=jng_alpha_quality;
jpeg_image_info->type=GrayscaleType;
(void) SetImageType(jpeg_image,GrayscaleType,exception);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(jpeg_image->filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(jpeg_image_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"%s",jpeg_image->filename);
}
else
{
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_color_type=10;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=0;
}
/* To do: check bit depth of PNG alpha channel */
/* Check if image is grayscale. */
if (image_info->type != TrueColorAlphaType && image_info->type !=
TrueColorType && SetImageGray(image,exception))
jng_color_type-=2;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Quality = %d",(int) jng_quality);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Color Type = %d",jng_color_type);
if (transparent != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Compression = %d",jng_alpha_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Depth = %d",jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG Alpha Quality = %d",(int) jng_alpha_quality);
}
}
if (transparent != 0)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method==0)
{
const char
*value;
/* Encode alpha as a grayscale PNG blob */
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating PNG blob.");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"PNG",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"PNG",MagickPathExtent);
jpeg_image_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
/* Exclude all ancillary chunks */
(void) SetImageArtifact(jpeg_image,"png:exclude-chunks","all");
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,
&length,exception);
/* Retrieve sample depth used */
value=GetImageProperty(jpeg_image,"png:bit-depth-written",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
jng_alpha_sample_depth= (unsigned int) value[0];
}
else
{
/* Encode alpha as a grayscale JPEG blob */
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"JPEG",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
jpeg_image_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating blob.");
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,
jpeg_image,&length,
exception);
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Successfully read jpeg_image into a blob, length=%.20g.",
(double) length);
}
/* Destroy JPEG image and image_info */
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(jpeg_image_info->filename);
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
}
/* Write JHDR chunk */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,16L); /* chunk data length=16 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_JHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JHDR,16L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) image->columns);
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) image->rows);
chunk[12]=jng_color_type;
chunk[13]=8; /* sample depth */
chunk[14]=8; /*jng_image_compression_method */
chunk[15]=(unsigned char) (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace ? 0 : 8);
chunk[16]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
chunk[17]=jng_alpha_compression_method;
chunk[18]=0; /*jng_alpha_filter_method */
chunk[19]=0; /*jng_alpha_interlace_method */
(void) WriteBlob(image,20,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,20));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG width:%15lu",(unsigned long) image->columns);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG height:%14lu",(unsigned long) image->rows);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG color type:%10d",jng_color_type);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG sample depth:%8d",8);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG compression:%9d",8);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG interlace:%11d",0);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha depth:%9d",jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha compression:%3d",jng_alpha_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha filter:%8d",0);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" JNG alpha interlace:%5d",0);
}
/* Write any JNG-chunk-b profiles */
(void) Magick_png_write_chunk_from_profile(image,"JNG-chunk-b",logging);
/*
Write leading ancillary chunks
*/
if (transparent != 0)
{
/*
Write JNG bKGD chunk
*/
unsigned char
blue,
green,
red;
ssize_t
num_bytes;
if (jng_color_type == 8 || jng_color_type == 12)
num_bytes=6L;
else
num_bytes=10L;
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) (num_bytes-4L));
PNGType(chunk,mng_bKGD);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_bKGD,(size_t) (num_bytes-4L));
red=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.red);
green=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.green);
blue=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.blue);
*(chunk+4)=0;
*(chunk+5)=red;
*(chunk+6)=0;
*(chunk+7)=green;
*(chunk+8)=0;
*(chunk+9)=blue;
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) num_bytes,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,(uInt) num_bytes));
}
if ((image->colorspace == sRGBColorspace || image->rendering_intent))
{
/*
Write JNG sRGB chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,1L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_sRGB);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_sRGB,1L);
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
chunk[4]=(unsigned char)
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(
(image->rendering_intent));
else
chunk[4]=(unsigned char)
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(
(PerceptualIntent));
(void) WriteBlob(image,5,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,5));
}
else
{
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
/*
Write JNG gAMA chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,4L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_gAMA);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_gAMA,4L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (100000*image->gamma+0.5));
(void) WriteBlob(image,8,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,8));
}
if ((mng_info->equal_chrms == MagickFalse) &&
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x != 0.0))
{
PrimaryInfo
primary;
/*
Write JNG cHRM chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,32L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_cHRM);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_cHRM,32L);
primary=image->chromaticity.white_point;
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.red_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+12,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+16,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.green_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+20,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+24,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
primary=image->chromaticity.blue_primary;
PNGLong(chunk+28,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+32,(png_uint_32) (100000*primary.y+0.5));
(void) WriteBlob(image,36,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,36));
}
}
if (image->resolution.x && image->resolution.y && !mng_info->equal_physs)
{
/*
Write JNG pHYs chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,9L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_pHYs);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_pHYs,9L);
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32)
(image->resolution.x*100.0/2.54+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32)
(image->resolution.y*100.0/2.54+0.5));
chunk[12]=1;
}
else
{
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32)
(image->resolution.x*100.0+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32)
(image->resolution.y*100.0+0.5));
chunk[12]=1;
}
else
{
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) (image->resolution.x+0.5));
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) (image->resolution.y+0.5));
chunk[12]=0;
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,13,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,13));
}
if (mng_info->write_mng == 0 && (image->page.x || image->page.y))
{
/*
Write JNG oFFs chunk
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,9L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_oFFs);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_oFFs,9L);
PNGsLong(chunk+4,(ssize_t) (image->page.x));
PNGsLong(chunk+8,(ssize_t) (image->page.y));
chunk[12]=0;
(void) WriteBlob(image,13,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,13));
}
if (mng_info->write_mng == 0 && (image->page.width || image->page.height))
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,9L); /* data length=8 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_vpAg);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_vpAg,9L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) image->page.width);
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) image->page.height);
chunk[12]=0; /* unit = pixels */
(void) WriteBlob(image,13,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,13));
}
if (transparent != 0)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method==0)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
len;
/* Write IDAT chunk header */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write IDAT chunks from blob, length=%.20g.",(double)
length);
/* Copy IDAT chunks */
len=0;
p=blob+8;
for (i=8; i<(ssize_t) length; i+=len+12)
{
len=(((unsigned int) *(p ) & 0xff) << 24) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 1) & 0xff) << 16) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 2) & 0xff) << 8) +
(((unsigned int) *(p + 3) & 0xff) ) ;
p+=4;
if (*(p)==73 && *(p+1)==68 && *(p+2)==65 && *(p+3)==84) /* IDAT */
{
/* Found an IDAT chunk. */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,len);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,len);
(void) WriteBlob(image,len+4,p);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image, crc32(0,p,(uInt) len+4));
}
else
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping %c%c%c%c chunk, length=%.20g.",
*(p),*(p+1),*(p+2),*(p+3),(double) len);
}
p+=(8+len);
}
}
else if (length != 0)
{
/* Write JDAA chunk header */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write JDAA chunk, length=%.20g.",(double) length);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(chunk,mng_JDAA);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JDAA,length);
/* Write JDAT chunk(s) data */
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(crc32(0,chunk,4),blob,
(uInt) length));
}
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/* Encode image as a JPEG blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image_info.");
jpeg_image_info=(ImageInfo *) CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (jpeg_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating jpeg_image.");
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(jpeg_image->filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(jpeg_image_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
jpeg_image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Created jpeg_image, %.20g x %.20g.",(double) jpeg_image->columns,
(double) jpeg_image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (jng_color_type == 8 || jng_color_type == 12)
jpeg_image_info->type=GrayscaleType;
jpeg_image_info->quality=jng_quality;
jpeg_image->quality=jng_quality;
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image_info->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_image->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating blob.");
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_image_info,jpeg_image,&length,
exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Successfully read jpeg_image into a blob, length=%.20g.",
(double) length);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Write JDAT chunk, length=%.20g.",(double) length);
}
/* Write JDAT chunk(s) */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(chunk,mng_JDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_JDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(crc32(0,chunk,4),blob,(uInt) length));
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(jpeg_image_info->filename);
jpeg_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_image_info);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
/* Write any JNG-chunk-e profiles */
(void) Magick_png_write_chunk_from_profile(image,"JNG-chunk-e",logging);
/* Write IEND chunk */
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,0L);
PNGType(chunk,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,4));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit WriteOneJNGImage()");
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 63,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::WriteValueCallback(
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
const Vector<uint8_t>& value,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothResult result) {
if (!resolver->getExecutionContext() ||
resolver->getExecutionContext()->isContextDestroyed())
return;
if (!getGatt()->RemoveFromActiveAlgorithms(resolver)) {
resolver->reject(BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerDisconnected));
return;
}
if (result == mojom::blink::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS) {
setValue(BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ConvertWTFVectorToDataView(value));
resolver->resolve();
} else {
resolver->reject(BluetoothError::take(resolver, result));
}
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelZip(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const PSDCompressionType compression,
const size_t compact_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
count,
length,
packet_size,
row_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
z_stream
stream;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is ZIP compressed");
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(compact_size,
sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
row_size=image->columns*packet_size;
count=image->rows*row_size;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(count,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
(void) ReadBlob(image,compact_size,compact_pixels);
stream.next_in=(Bytef *)compact_pixels;
stream.avail_in=(uInt) compact_size;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *)pixels;
stream.avail_out=(uInt) count;
if (inflateInit(&stream) == Z_OK)
{
int
ret;
while (stream.avail_out > 0)
{
ret=inflate(&stream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END))
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
}
if (compression == ZipWithPrediction)
{
p=pixels;
while (count > 0)
{
length=image->columns;
while (--length)
{
if (packet_size == 2)
{
p[2]+=p[0]+((p[1]+p[3]) >> 8);
p[3]+=p[1];
}
else
*(p+1)+=*p;
p+=packet_size;
}
p+=packet_size;
count-=row_size;
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,channels,y,type,p,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
p+=row_size;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Added missing null check.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 68,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned WorkerThread::workerThreadCount()
{
MutexLocker lock(threadSetMutex());
return workerThreads().size();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_bool lh_table_lookup_ex(struct lh_table* t, const void* k, void **v)
{
struct lh_entry *e = lh_table_lookup_entry(t, k);
if (e != NULL) {
if (v != NULL) *v = (void *)e->v;
return TRUE; /* key found */
}
if (v != NULL) *v = NULL;
return FALSE; /* key not found */
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformsES3CHROMIUMHelper(
GLuint program,
std::vector<int8_t>* result) {
DCHECK(result);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
helper_->GetUniformsES3CHROMIUM(program, kResultBucketId);
GetBucketContents(kResultBucketId, result);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_caller_access_to_name(struct fuse* fuse,
const struct fuse_in_header *hdr, const struct node* parent_node,
const char* name, int mode) {
/* Always block security-sensitive files at root */
if (parent_node && parent_node->perm == PERM_ROOT) {
if (!strcasecmp(name, "autorun.inf")
|| !strcasecmp(name, ".android_secure")
|| !strcasecmp(name, "android_secure")) {
return false;
}
}
/* Root always has access; access for any other UIDs should always
* be controlled through packages.list. */
if (hdr->uid == 0) {
return true;
}
/* No extra permissions to enforce */
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::~BluetoothSocketConnectFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardEmulatedTouchEvent(
const blink::WebTouchEvent& touch_event,
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* target) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardEmulatedTouchEvent");
ForwardTouchEventWithLatencyInfo(touch_event,
ui::LatencyInfo(ui::SourceEventType::TOUCH));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nlmsg_get_proto(struct nl_msg *msg)
{
return msg->nm_protocol;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TaskService::PostStaticTask(RunnerId runner_id, base::OnceClosure task) {
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> runner;
GetTaskRunner(runner_id)->PostTask(FROM_HERE, std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 132,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipip6_dev_free(struct net_device *dev)
{
free_percpu(dev->tstats);
free_netdev(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_image_copycmpt(jas_image_t *dstimage, int dstcmptno,
jas_image_t *srcimage, int srccmptno)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *newcmpt;
if (dstimage->numcmpts_ >= dstimage->maxcmpts_) {
if (jas_image_growcmpts(dstimage, dstimage->maxcmpts_ + 128)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (!(newcmpt = jas_image_cmpt_copy(srcimage->cmpts_[srccmptno]))) {
return -1;
}
if (dstcmptno < dstimage->numcmpts_) {
memmove(&dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno + 1], &dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno],
(dstimage->numcmpts_ - dstcmptno) * sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t *));
}
dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno] = newcmpt;
++dstimage->numcmpts_;
jas_image_setbbox(dstimage);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetStateFromMessageReply(
const gpu::CommandBuffer::State& state) {
CheckLock();
last_state_lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
if (state.generation - last_state_.generation < 0x80000000U)
last_state_ = state;
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
OnGpuStateError();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsDDS(const unsigned char *magick, const size_t length)
{
if (length < 4)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"DDS ", 4) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 65,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPage::setBatchEditingActive(bool active)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->setBatchEditingActive(active);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_pe64_bytes(const ut8 *buf, ut64 length) {
int idx, ret = false;
if (!buf || length <= 0x3d) {
return false;
}
idx = buf[0x3c] | (buf[0x3d]<<8);
if (length >= idx + 0x20) {
if (!memcmp (buf, "MZ", 2) && !memcmp (buf+idx, "PE", 2) && !memcmp (buf+idx+0x18, "\x0b\x02", 2)) {
ret = true;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table_root *root, struct ctl_table *table, int op)
{
int mode;
if (root->permissions)
mode = root->permissions(root, current->nsproxy, table);
else
mode = table->mode;
return test_perm(mode, op);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reinit_ports(struct ofproto *p)
{
struct ofproto_port_dump dump;
struct sset devnames;
struct ofport *ofport;
struct ofproto_port ofproto_port;
const char *devname;
COVERAGE_INC(ofproto_reinit_ports);
sset_init(&devnames);
HMAP_FOR_EACH (ofport, hmap_node, &p->ports) {
sset_add(&devnames, netdev_get_name(ofport->netdev));
}
OFPROTO_PORT_FOR_EACH (&ofproto_port, &dump, p) {
sset_add(&devnames, ofproto_port.name);
}
SSET_FOR_EACH (devname, &devnames) {
update_port(p, devname);
}
sset_destroy(&devnames);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static QIOChannel *nbd_receive_starttls(QIOChannel *ioc,
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
const char *hostname, Error **errp)
{
nbd_opt_reply reply;
QIOChannelTLS *tioc;
struct NBDTLSHandshakeData data = { 0 };
TRACE("Requesting TLS from server");
if (nbd_send_option_request(ioc, NBD_OPT_STARTTLS, 0, NULL, errp) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
TRACE("Getting TLS reply from server");
if (nbd_receive_option_reply(ioc, NBD_OPT_STARTTLS, &reply, errp) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (reply.type != NBD_REP_ACK) {
error_setg(errp, "Server rejected request to start TLS %" PRIx32,
reply.type);
nbd_send_opt_abort(ioc);
return NULL;
}
if (reply.length != 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Start TLS response was not zero %" PRIu32,
reply.length);
nbd_send_opt_abort(ioc);
return NULL;
}
TRACE("TLS request approved, setting up TLS");
tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_client(ioc, tlscreds, hostname, errp);
if (!tioc) {
return NULL;
}
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(tioc), "nbd-client-tls");
data.loop = g_main_loop_new(g_main_context_default(), FALSE);
TRACE("Starting TLS handshake");
qio_channel_tls_handshake(tioc,
nbd_tls_handshake,
&data,
NULL);
if (!data.complete) {
g_main_loop_run(data.loop);
}
g_main_loop_unref(data.loop);
if (data.error) {
error_propagate(errp, data.error);
object_unref(OBJECT(tioc));
return NULL;
}
return QIO_CHANNEL(tioc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lsi_transfer_data(SCSIRequest *req, uint32_t len)
{
LSIState *s = LSI53C895A(req->bus->qbus.parent);
int out;
assert(req->hba_private);
if (s->waiting == LSI_WAIT_RESELECT || req->hba_private != s->current ||
(lsi_irq_on_rsl(s) && !(s->scntl1 & LSI_SCNTL1_CON))) {
if (lsi_queue_req(s, req, len)) {
return;
}
}
out = (s->sstat1 & PHASE_MASK) == PHASE_DO;
/* host adapter (re)connected */
trace_lsi_transfer_data(req->tag, len);
s->current->dma_len = len;
s->command_complete = 1;
if (s->waiting) {
if (s->waiting == LSI_WAIT_RESELECT || s->dbc == 0) {
lsi_resume_script(s);
} else {
lsi_do_dma(s, out);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 3,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bomb_out(Ssh ssh, char *text)
{
ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
logevent(text);
connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text);
sfree(text);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PasswordAutofillAgent::DidClearAutofillSelection(
const WebFormControlElement& control_element) {
const WebInputElement* element = ToWebInputElement(&control_element);
if (!element)
return false;
WebInputElement username_element;
WebInputElement password_element;
PasswordInfo* password_info;
if (!FindPasswordInfoForElement(*element, &username_element,
&password_element, &password_info)) {
return false;
}
ClearPreview(&username_element, &password_element);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 137,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLInputElement::selectionDirectionForBinding(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "The input element's type ('" + m_inputType->formControlType() + "') does not support selection.");
return String();
}
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::selectionDirection();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gamma_info_imp(gamma_display *dp, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
/* Reuse the standard stuff as appropriate. */
standard_info_part1(&dp->this, pp, pi);
/* If requested strip 16 to 8 bits - this is handled automagically below
* because the output bit depth is read from the library. Note that there
* are interactions with sBIT but, internally, libpng makes sbit at most
* PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 when doing the following.
*/
if (dp->scale16)
# ifdef PNG_READ_SCALE_16_TO_8_SUPPORTED
png_set_scale_16(pp);
# else
/* The following works both in 1.5.4 and earlier versions: */
# ifdef PNG_READ_16_TO_8_SUPPORTED
png_set_strip_16(pp);
# else
png_error(pp, "scale16 (16 to 8 bit conversion) not supported");
# endif
# endif
if (dp->expand16)
# ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_16_SUPPORTED
png_set_expand_16(pp);
# else
png_error(pp, "expand16 (8 to 16 bit conversion) not supported");
# endif
if (dp->do_background >= ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
{
/* This tests the alpha mode handling, if supported. */
int mode = dp->do_background - ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET;
/* The gamma value is the output gamma, and is in the standard,
* non-inverted, represenation. It provides a default for the PNG file
* gamma, but since the file has a gAMA chunk this does not matter.
*/
PNG_CONST double sg = dp->screen_gamma;
# ifndef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
PNG_CONST png_fixed_point g = fix(sg);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_alpha_mode(pp, mode, sg);
# else
png_set_alpha_mode_fixed(pp, mode, g);
# endif
/* However, for the standard Porter-Duff algorithm the output defaults
* to be linear, so if the test requires non-linear output it must be
* corrected here.
*/
if (mode == PNG_ALPHA_STANDARD && sg != 1)
{
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_gamma(pp, sg, dp->file_gamma);
# else
png_fixed_point f = fix(dp->file_gamma);
png_set_gamma_fixed(pp, g, f);
# endif
}
}
# else
png_error(pp, "alpha mode handling not supported");
# endif
}
else
{
/* Set up gamma processing. */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_gamma(pp, dp->screen_gamma, dp->file_gamma);
# else
{
png_fixed_point s = fix(dp->screen_gamma);
png_fixed_point f = fix(dp->file_gamma);
png_set_gamma_fixed(pp, s, f);
}
# endif
if (dp->do_background)
{
# ifdef PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED
/* NOTE: this assumes the caller provided the correct background gamma!
*/
PNG_CONST double bg = dp->background_gamma;
# ifndef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
PNG_CONST png_fixed_point g = fix(bg);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_background(pp, &dp->background_color, dp->do_background,
0/*need_expand*/, bg);
# else
png_set_background_fixed(pp, &dp->background_color,
dp->do_background, 0/*need_expand*/, g);
# endif
# else
png_error(pp, "png_set_background not supported");
# endif
}
}
{
int i = dp->this.use_update_info;
/* Always do one call, even if use_update_info is 0. */
do
png_read_update_info(pp, pi);
while (--i > 0);
}
/* Now we may get a different cbRow: */
standard_info_part2(&dp->this, pp, pi, 1 /*images*/);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Process_Event( grEvent* event )
{
FTDemo_String_Context* sc = &status.sc;
int ret = 0;
if ( event->key >= '1' && event->key < '1' + N_RENDER_MODES )
{
status.render_mode = event->key - '1';
event_render_mode_change( 0 );
return ret;
}
switch ( event->key )
{
case grKeyEsc:
case grKEY( 'q' ):
ret = 1;
break;
case grKeyF1:
case grKEY( '?' ):
event_help();
break;
case grKEY( 'a' ):
handle->antialias = !handle->antialias;
status.header = handle->antialias
? (char *)"anti-aliasing is now on"
: (char *)"anti-aliasing is now off";
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
break;
case grKEY( 'b' ):
handle->use_sbits = !handle->use_sbits;
status.header = handle->use_sbits
? (char *)"embedded bitmaps are now used when available"
: (char *)"embedded bitmaps are now ignored";
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
break;
case grKEY( 'f' ):
handle->autohint = !handle->autohint;
status.header = handle->autohint
? (char *)"forced auto-hinting is now on"
: (char *)"forced auto-hinting is now off";
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
break;
case grKEY( 'h' ):
handle->hinted = !handle->hinted;
status.header = handle->hinted
? (char *)"glyph hinting is now active"
: (char *)"glyph hinting is now ignored";
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
break;
case grKEY( 'l' ):
handle->low_prec = !handle->low_prec;
status.header = handle->low_prec
? (char *)"rendering precision is now forced to low"
: (char *)"rendering precision is now normal";
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
break;
case grKEY( 'k' ):
sc->kerning_mode = ( sc->kerning_mode + 1 ) % N_KERNING_MODES;
status.header =
sc->kerning_mode == KERNING_MODE_SMART
? (char *)"pair kerning and side bearing correction is now active"
: sc->kerning_mode == KERNING_MODE_NORMAL
? (char *)"pair kerning is now active"
: (char *)"pair kerning is now ignored";
break;
case grKEY( 't' ):
sc->kerning_degree = ( sc->kerning_degree + 1 ) % N_KERNING_DEGREES;
status.header =
sc->kerning_degree == KERNING_DEGREE_NONE
? (char *)"no track kerning"
: sc->kerning_degree == KERNING_DEGREE_LIGHT
? (char *)"light track kerning active"
: sc->kerning_degree == KERNING_DEGREE_MEDIUM
? (char *)"medium track kerning active"
: (char *)"tight track kerning active";
break;
case grKEY( 'V' ):
sc->vertical = !sc->vertical;
status.header = sc->vertical
? (char *)"using vertical layout"
: (char *)"using horizontal layout";
break;
case grKEY( 'G' ):
sc->gamma_ramp = sc->gamma_ramp ? NULL : status.gamma_ramp;
status.header = sc->gamma_ramp
? (char *)"gamma correction is now on"
: (char *)"gamma correction is now off";
break;
case grKEY( 'g' ):
event_gamma_change( 0.1 );
break;
case grKEY( 'v' ):
event_gamma_change( -0.1 );
break;
case grKEY( 'n' ):
event_font_change( 1 );
break;
case grKEY( 'p' ):
event_font_change( -1 );
break;
case grKeyUp: event_size_change( 64 ); break;
case grKeyDown: event_size_change( -64 ); break;
case grKeyPageUp: event_size_change( 640); break;
case grKeyPageDown: event_size_change( -640 ); break;
case grKeyLeft: event_angle_change( -3 ); break;
case grKeyRight: event_angle_change( 3 ); break;
case grKeyF7: event_angle_change( -30 ); break;
case grKeyF8: event_angle_change( 30 ); break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void RelinquishCacheNexusPixels(NexusInfo *nexus_info)
{
if (nexus_info->mapped == MagickFalse)
(void) RelinquishAlignedMemory(nexus_info->cache);
else
(void) UnmapBlob(nexus_info->cache,(size_t) nexus_info->length);
nexus_info->cache=(Quantum *) NULL;
nexus_info->pixels=(Quantum *) NULL;
nexus_info->metacontent=(void *) NULL;
nexus_info->length=0;
nexus_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindow::UnlockCompositor() {
DCHECK(compositor_lock_);
compositor_lock_ = NULL;
if (draw_on_compositor_unlock_) {
draw_on_compositor_unlock_ = false;
ScheduleDraw();
}
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::resumeScriptedAnimationControllerCallbacks()
{
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->resume();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PixarLogSetupDecode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "PixarLogSetupDecode";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
PixarLogState* sp = DecoderState(tif);
tmsize_t tbuf_size;
assert(sp != NULL);
/* Make sure no byte swapping happens on the data
* after decompression. */
tif->tif_postdecode = _TIFFNoPostDecode;
/* for some reason, we can't do this in TIFFInitPixarLog */
sp->stride = (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG ?
td->td_samplesperpixel : 1);
tbuf_size = multiply_ms(multiply_ms(multiply_ms(sp->stride, td->td_imagewidth),
td->td_rowsperstrip), sizeof(uint16));
/* add one more stride in case input ends mid-stride */
tbuf_size = add_ms(tbuf_size, sizeof(uint16) * sp->stride);
if (tbuf_size == 0)
return (0); /* TODO: this is an error return without error report through TIFFErrorExt */
sp->tbuf = (uint16 *) _TIFFmalloc(tbuf_size);
if (sp->tbuf == NULL)
return (0);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN)
sp->user_datafmt = PixarLogGuessDataFmt(td);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"PixarLog compression can't handle bits depth/data format combination (depth: %d)",
td->td_bitspersample);
return (0);
}
if (inflateInit(&sp->stream) != Z_OK) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "%s", sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
return (0);
} else {
sp->state |= PLSTATE_INIT;
return (1);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void root_add_used(struct btrfs_root *root, u32 size)
{
spin_lock(&root->accounting_lock);
btrfs_set_root_used(&root->root_item,
btrfs_root_used(&root->root_item) + size);
spin_unlock(&root->accounting_lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_DEBUG( INS_ARG )
{
DO_DEBUG
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 tg3_get_msglevel(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
return tp->msg_enable;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,564
|
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