instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnAddTextTrack(const TextTrackConfig& config,
const AddTextTrackDoneCB& done_cb) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
const WebInbandTextTrackImpl::Kind web_kind =
static_cast<WebInbandTextTrackImpl::Kind>(config.kind());
const blink::WebString web_label = blink::WebString::FromUTF8(config.label());
const blink::WebString web_language =
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(config.language());
const blink::WebString web_id = blink::WebString::FromUTF8(config.id());
std::unique_ptr<WebInbandTextTrackImpl> web_inband_text_track(
new WebInbandTextTrackImpl(web_kind, web_label, web_language, web_id));
std::unique_ptr<media::TextTrack> text_track(new TextTrackImpl(
main_task_runner_, client_, std::move(web_inband_text_track)));
done_cb.Run(std::move(text_track));
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irda_queue_t *hashbin_get_first( hashbin_t* hashbin)
{
irda_queue_t *entry;
int i;
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin != NULL, return NULL;);
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return NULL;);
if ( hashbin == NULL)
return NULL;
for ( i = 0; i < HASHBIN_SIZE; i ++ ) {
entry = hashbin->hb_queue[ i];
if ( entry) {
hashbin->hb_current = entry;
return entry;
}
}
/*
* Did not find any item in hashbin
*/
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_test_dir(char *tmp_dir, const char *files, ...) {
va_list ap;
assert_se(mkdtemp(tmp_dir) != NULL);
va_start(ap, files);
while (files != NULL) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = strappend(tmp_dir, files);
assert_se(touch_file(path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0) == 0);
files = va_arg(ap, const char *);
}
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 170,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __swiotlb_sync_sg_for_cpu(struct device *dev,
struct scatterlist *sgl, int nelems,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
int i;
if (!is_device_dma_coherent(dev))
for_each_sg(sgl, sg, nelems, i)
__dma_unmap_area(phys_to_virt(dma_to_phys(dev, sg->dma_address)),
sg->length, dir);
swiotlb_sync_sg_for_cpu(dev, sgl, nelems, dir);
}
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 56,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void OptimizeImageTransparency(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*dispose_image;
register Image
*next;
/*
Run the image through the animation sequence
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
next=GetFirstImageInList(image);
dispose_image=CloneImage(next,next->page.width,next->page.height,
MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose_image == (Image *) NULL)
return;
dispose_image->page=next->page;
dispose_image->page.x=0;
dispose_image->page.y=0;
dispose_image->dispose=NoneDispose;
dispose_image->background_color.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(dispose_image);
while ( next != (Image *) NULL )
{
Image
*current_image;
/*
Overlay this frame's image over the previous disposal image
*/
current_image=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (current_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return;
}
(void) CompositeImage(current_image,next->matte != MagickFalse ?
OverCompositeOp : CopyCompositeOp,next,next->page.x,next->page.y);
/*
At this point the image would be displayed, for the delay period
**
Work out the disposal of the previous image
*/
if (next->dispose == BackgroundDispose)
{
RectangleInfo
bounds=next->page;
bounds.width=next->columns;
bounds.height=next->rows;
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
bounds.width+=bounds.x;
bounds.x=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.x+bounds.width) > (ssize_t) current_image->columns)
bounds.width=current_image->columns-bounds.x;
if (bounds.y < 0)
{
bounds.height+=bounds.y;
bounds.y=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.y+bounds.height) > (ssize_t) current_image->rows)
bounds.height=current_image->rows-bounds.y;
ClearBounds(current_image,&bounds);
}
if (next->dispose != PreviousDispose)
{
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
dispose_image=current_image;
}
else
current_image=DestroyImage(current_image);
/*
Optimize Transparency of the next frame (if present)
*/
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next != (Image *) NULL) {
(void) CompositeImage(next,ChangeMaskCompositeOp,dispose_image,
-(next->page.x),-(next->page.y));
}
}
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 88,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::OnGpuControlLostContextMaybeReentrant() {
share_group_->Lose();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMemoryHeap> BpMemory::getMemory(ssize_t* offset, size_t* size) const
{
if (mHeap == 0) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IMemory::getInterfaceDescriptor());
if (remote()->transact(GET_MEMORY, data, &reply) == NO_ERROR) {
sp<IBinder> heap = reply.readStrongBinder();
ssize_t o = reply.readInt32();
size_t s = reply.readInt32();
if (heap != 0) {
mHeap = interface_cast<IMemoryHeap>(heap);
if (mHeap != 0) {
mOffset = o;
mSize = s;
}
}
}
}
if (offset) *offset = mOffset;
if (size) *size = mSize;
return mHeap;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 173,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __printk_ratelimit(const char *func)
{
return ___ratelimit(&printk_ratelimit_state, func);
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void packet_inc_pending(struct packet_ring_buffer *rb)
{
this_cpu_inc(*rb->pending_refcnt);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
{
if (dbgregs->flags)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.db, dbgregs->db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.dr6 = dbgregs->dr6;
kvm_update_dr6(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.dr7 = dbgregs->dr7;
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
struct trace_buffer *trace_buf = &tr->trace_buffer;
struct trace_buffer *max_buf = &tr->max_buffer;
struct trace_array_cpu *data = per_cpu_ptr(trace_buf->data, cpu);
struct trace_array_cpu *max_data = per_cpu_ptr(max_buf->data, cpu);
max_buf->cpu = cpu;
max_buf->time_start = data->preempt_timestamp;
max_data->saved_latency = tr->max_latency;
max_data->critical_start = data->critical_start;
max_data->critical_end = data->critical_end;
strncpy(max_data->comm, tsk->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
max_data->pid = tsk->pid;
/*
* If tsk == current, then use current_uid(), as that does not use
* RCU. The irq tracer can be called out of RCU scope.
*/
if (tsk == current)
max_data->uid = current_uid();
else
max_data->uid = task_uid(tsk);
max_data->nice = tsk->static_prio - 20 - MAX_RT_PRIO;
max_data->policy = tsk->policy;
max_data->rt_priority = tsk->rt_priority;
/* record this tasks comm */
tracing_record_cmdline(tsk);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::sendCommand(
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd, OMX_S32 param) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
if (param == OMX_StateIdle) {
bufferSource->omxIdle();
} else if (param == OMX_StateLoaded) {
bufferSource->omxLoaded();
setGraphicBufferSource(NULL);
}
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
const char *paramString =
cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet ? asString((OMX_STATETYPE)param) : portString(param);
CLOG_STATE(sendCommand, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SendCommand(mHandle, cmd, param, NULL);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(sendCommand, err, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MemoryTracker* memory_tracker() {
return group_->memory_tracker();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::RetireBlock(size_t idx) {
if (blocks_[idx] == nullptr) {
QUIC_BUG << "Try to retire block twice";
return false;
}
delete blocks_[idx];
blocks_[idx] = nullptr;
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Retired block with index: " << idx;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSshortLong8(uint64 value)
{
if (value>0x7FFF)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPagesNative(blink::WebFrame* frame,
int page_count) {
const PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params& params = *print_pages_params_;
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = params.params;
PrintMsg_PrintPage_Params page_params;
page_params.params = print_params;
if (params.pages.empty()) {
for (int i = 0; i < page_count; ++i) {
page_params.page_number = i;
PrintPageInternal(page_params, frame);
}
} else {
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.pages.size(); ++i) {
if (params.pages[i] >= page_count)
break;
page_params.page_number = params.pages[i];
PrintPageInternal(page_params, frame);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunMojoCallbacks() {
if (generate_stream_cb) {
std::move(generate_stream_cb)
.Run(MEDIA_DEVICE_FAILED_DUE_TO_SHUTDOWN, std::string(),
MediaStreamDevices(), MediaStreamDevices());
}
if (open_device_cb) {
std::move(open_device_cb)
.Run(false /* success */, std::string(), MediaStreamDevice());
}
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_async_page_not_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_async_pf *work)
{
struct x86_exception fault;
trace_kvm_async_pf_not_present(work->arch.token, work->gva);
kvm_add_async_pf_gfn(vcpu, work->arch.gfn);
if (!(vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val & KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENABLED) ||
(vcpu->arch.apf.send_user_only &&
kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 0))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu);
else if (!apf_put_user(vcpu, KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT)) {
fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
fault.error_code_valid = true;
fault.error_code = 0;
fault.nested_page_fault = false;
fault.address = work->arch.token;
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_sigtimedwait, const sigset_t __user *, uthese,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo, const struct timespec __user *, uts,
size_t, sigsetsize)
{
sigset_t these;
struct timespec ts;
siginfo_t info;
int ret;
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&these, uthese, sizeof(these)))
return -EFAULT;
if (uts) {
if (copy_from_user(&ts, uts, sizeof(ts)))
return -EFAULT;
}
ret = do_sigtimedwait(&these, &info, uts ? &ts : NULL);
if (ret > 0 && uinfo) {
if (copy_siginfo_to_user(uinfo, &info))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct MACH0_(obj_t)* MACH0_(new_buf)(RBuffer *buf, bool verbose) {
struct MACH0_(obj_t) *bin = R_NEW0 (struct MACH0_(obj_t));
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
bin->kv = sdb_new (NULL, "bin.mach0", 0);
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
bin->size = buf->length;
bin->verbose = verbose;
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf->buf, bin->size)){
return MACH0_(mach0_free) (bin);
}
if (!init (bin)) {
return MACH0_(mach0_free)(bin);
}
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apply_to_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
pte_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
pte_t *pte;
int err;
pgtable_t token;
spinlock_t *uninitialized_var(ptl);
pte = (mm == &init_mm) ?
pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, addr) :
pte_alloc_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
if (!pte)
return -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(pmd_huge(*pmd));
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
token = pmd_pgtable(*pmd);
do {
err = fn(pte++, token, addr, data);
if (err)
break;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
if (mm != &init_mm)
pte_unmap_unlock(pte-1, ptl);
return err;
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GaiaCookieManagerService::GaiaCookieRequest::CreateAddAccountRequest(
const std::string& account_id,
const std::string& source) {
return GaiaCookieManagerService::GaiaCookieRequest(
GaiaCookieManagerService::GaiaCookieRequestType::ADD_ACCOUNT, account_id,
source);
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 128,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mwifiex_config_start_uap(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg)
{
if (mwifiex_send_cmd(priv, HostCmd_CMD_UAP_SYS_CONFIG,
HostCmd_ACT_GEN_SET,
UAP_BSS_PARAMS_I, bss_cfg, true)) {
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR,
"Failed to set AP configuration\n");
return -1;
}
if (mwifiex_send_cmd(priv, HostCmd_CMD_UAP_BSS_START,
HostCmd_ACT_GEN_SET, 0, NULL, true)) {
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR,
"Failed to start the BSS\n");
return -1;
}
if (priv->sec_info.wep_enabled)
priv->curr_pkt_filter |= HostCmd_ACT_MAC_WEP_ENABLE;
else
priv->curr_pkt_filter &= ~HostCmd_ACT_MAC_WEP_ENABLE;
if (mwifiex_send_cmd(priv, HostCmd_CMD_MAC_CONTROL,
HostCmd_ACT_GEN_SET, 0,
&priv->curr_pkt_filter, true))
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 88,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::CookiesRead(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& frame_url,
const net::CookieList& cookie_list,
bool blocked_by_policy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
TabSpecificContentSettings* settings = Get(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (settings) {
settings->OnCookiesRead(url, frame_url, cookie_list,
blocked_by_policy);
}
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagefilledpolygon)
{
php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int user_init(struct file *fp)
{
unsigned int rcvctrl_ops = 0;
struct hfi1_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt = fd->uctxt;
/* make sure that the context has already been setup */
if (!test_bit(HFI1_CTXT_SETUP_DONE, &uctxt->event_flags))
return -EFAULT;
/* initialize poll variables... */
uctxt->urgent = 0;
uctxt->urgent_poll = 0;
/*
* Now enable the ctxt for receive.
* For chips that are set to DMA the tail register to memory
* when they change (and when the update bit transitions from
* 0 to 1. So for those chips, we turn it off and then back on.
* This will (very briefly) affect any other open ctxts, but the
* duration is very short, and therefore isn't an issue. We
* explicitly set the in-memory tail copy to 0 beforehand, so we
* don't have to wait to be sure the DMA update has happened
* (chip resets head/tail to 0 on transition to enable).
*/
if (uctxt->rcvhdrtail_kvaddr)
clear_rcvhdrtail(uctxt);
/* Setup J_KEY before enabling the context */
hfi1_set_ctxt_jkey(uctxt->dd, uctxt->ctxt, uctxt->jkey);
rcvctrl_ops = HFI1_RCVCTRL_CTXT_ENB;
if (HFI1_CAP_KGET_MASK(uctxt->flags, HDRSUPP))
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_TIDFLOW_ENB;
/*
* Ignore the bit in the flags for now until proper
* support for multiple packet per rcv array entry is
* added.
*/
if (!HFI1_CAP_KGET_MASK(uctxt->flags, MULTI_PKT_EGR))
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_ONE_PKT_EGR_ENB;
if (HFI1_CAP_KGET_MASK(uctxt->flags, NODROP_EGR_FULL))
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_NO_EGR_DROP_ENB;
if (HFI1_CAP_KGET_MASK(uctxt->flags, NODROP_RHQ_FULL))
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_NO_RHQ_DROP_ENB;
/*
* The RcvCtxtCtrl.TailUpd bit has to be explicitly written.
* We can't rely on the correct value to be set from prior
* uses of the chip or ctxt. Therefore, add the rcvctrl op
* for both cases.
*/
if (HFI1_CAP_KGET_MASK(uctxt->flags, DMA_RTAIL))
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_TAILUPD_ENB;
else
rcvctrl_ops |= HFI1_RCVCTRL_TAILUPD_DIS;
hfi1_rcvctrl(uctxt->dd, rcvctrl_ops, uctxt->ctxt);
/* Notify any waiting slaves */
if (uctxt->subctxt_cnt) {
clear_bit(HFI1_CTXT_MASTER_UNINIT, &uctxt->event_flags);
wake_up(&uctxt->wait);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_add_sa_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = &ue->state;
struct xfrm_mark m;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->id.daddr, p->id.spi, p->id.proto, p->family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
return err;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = -EINVAL;
if (x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
goto out;
km_state_expired(x, ue->hard, nlh->nlmsg_pid);
if (ue->hard) {
__xfrm_state_delete(x);
xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, 1, true);
}
err = 0;
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AccessibilityButtonState AXObject::checkboxOrRadioValue() const {
const AtomicString& checkedAttribute =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kChecked);
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "true"))
return ButtonStateOn;
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "mixed")) {
AccessibilityRole role = ariaRoleAttribute();
if (role == CheckBoxRole || role == MenuItemCheckBoxRole)
return ButtonStateMixed;
}
return ButtonStateOff;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t debugfs_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t count, loff_t *offp)
{
struct port *port;
char *buf;
ssize_t ret, out_offset, out_count;
out_count = 1024;
buf = kmalloc(out_count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
port = filp->private_data;
out_offset = 0;
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count,
"name: %s\n", port->name ? port->name : "");
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"guest_connected: %d\n", port->guest_connected);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"host_connected: %d\n", port->host_connected);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"outvq_full: %d\n", port->outvq_full);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"bytes_sent: %lu\n", port->stats.bytes_sent);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"bytes_received: %lu\n",
port->stats.bytes_received);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"bytes_discarded: %lu\n",
port->stats.bytes_discarded);
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"is_console: %s\n",
is_console_port(port) ? "yes" : "no");
out_offset += snprintf(buf + out_offset, out_count - out_offset,
"console_vtermno: %u\n", port->cons.vtermno);
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, offp, buf, out_offset);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_set_dh_param_ctx( ssl_context *ssl, dhm_context *dhm_ctx )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mpi_copy(&ssl->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mpi_copy", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mpi_copy(&ssl->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mpi_copy", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int swaps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq;
int ret;
ret = seq_open(file, &swaps_op);
if (ret)
return ret;
seq = file->private_data;
seq->poll_event = atomic_read(&proc_poll_event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct nfs_commit_data *nfs_commitdata_alloc(void)
{
struct nfs_commit_data *p = mempool_alloc(nfs_commit_mempool, GFP_NOIO);
if (p) {
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pages);
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::MakeCurrent() {
if (!context_.get() || !context_->MakeCurrent(surface_.get()))
return false;
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during MakeCurrent.";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveParagraphForwardAndModifySelection(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kExtend,
SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kParagraph, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN btif_hl_save_mdl_cfg(UINT8 mdep_id, UINT8 item_idx,
tBTA_HL_MDL_CFG *p_mdl_cfg){
btif_hl_mdl_cfg_t *p_mdl=NULL;
BOOLEAN success = FALSE;
btif_hl_app_cb_t *p_acb;
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, len;
bt_status_t bt_status;
btif_hl_evt_cb_t evt_param;
int *p_channel_id;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s mdep_id=%d item_idx=%d, local_mdep_id=%d mdl_id=0x%x dch_mode=%d",
__FUNCTION__, mdep_id, item_idx, p_mdl_cfg->local_mdep_id,
p_mdl_cfg->mdl_id, p_mdl_cfg->dch_mode );
if(btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_mdepId(mdep_id,&app_idx))
{
p_acb = BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
p_mdl = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CFG_PTR(app_idx, item_idx);
p_channel_id = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CFG_CHANNEL_ID_PTR(app_idx, item_idx);
if (p_mdl)
{
memcpy(&p_mdl->base, p_mdl_cfg, sizeof(tBTA_HL_MDL_CFG));
if (btif_hl_find_mcl_idx(app_idx, p_mdl->base.peer_bd_addr , &mcl_idx))
{
p_mcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
if (p_mcb->pcb.in_use)
*p_channel_id = p_mcb->pcb.channel_id;
else
*p_channel_id = btif_hl_get_next_channel_id(p_acb->app_id);
p_mdl->extra.mdep_cfg_idx = p_mcb->pcb.mdep_cfg_idx;
p_mdl->extra.data_type = p_acb->sup_feature.mdep[p_mcb->pcb.mdep_cfg_idx].mdep_cfg.data_cfg[0].data_type;
if (!btif_hl_find_peer_mdep_id(p_acb->app_id, p_mcb->bd_addr,
p_acb->sup_feature.mdep[p_mcb->pcb.mdep_cfg_idx].mdep_cfg.mdep_role,
p_acb->sup_feature.mdep[p_mcb->pcb.mdep_cfg_idx].mdep_cfg.data_cfg[0].data_type,
&p_mdl->extra.peer_mdep_id))
{
p_mdl->extra.peer_mdep_id = BTA_HL_INVALID_MDEP_ID;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_idx=%d item_idx=%d mld_id=0x%x",
__FUNCTION__, app_idx, item_idx, p_mdl->base.mdl_id);
evt_param.update_mdl.app_idx = app_idx;
len = sizeof(btif_hl_update_mdl_t);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("send BTIF_HL_UPDATE_MDL event app_idx=%d ",app_idx);
if ((bt_status = btif_transfer_context (btif_hl_proc_cb_evt, BTIF_HL_UPDATE_MDL,
(char*) &evt_param, len, NULL)) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
success = TRUE;
}
ASSERTC(bt_status == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "context transfer failed", bt_status);
}
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s success=%d ",__FUNCTION__, success );
return success;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int afiucv_hs_callback_rx(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (!iucv) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
/* write stuff from iucv_msg to skb cb */
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
IUCV_SKB_CB(skb)->offset = 0;
spin_lock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) {
/* handle rcv queue full */
skb_queue_tail(&iucv->backlog_skb_q, skb);
}
} else
skb_queue_tail(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q, skb);
spin_unlock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool is_store_user_clean(struct kmem_cache *cachep)
{
return atomic_read(&cachep->store_user_clean) == 1;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCreateAndConsumeTextureINTERNAL(
GLuint client_id,
const volatile GLbyte* data) {
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCreateAndConsumeTextureINTERNAL",
"context", logger_.GetLogPrefix(),
"mailbox[0]", static_cast<unsigned char>(data[0]));
Mailbox mailbox =
Mailbox::FromVolatile(*reinterpret_cast<const volatile Mailbox*>(data));
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !mailbox.Verify()) << "CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM was "
"passed a mailbox that was not "
"generated by GenMailboxCHROMIUM.";
if (!client_id) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM",
"invalid client id");
return;
}
TextureRef* texture_ref = GetTexture(client_id);
if (texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM", "client id already in use");
return;
}
Texture* texture =
Texture::CheckedCast(group_->mailbox_manager()->ConsumeTexture(mailbox));
if (!texture) {
bool result = GenTexturesHelper(1, &client_id);
DCHECK(result);
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM", "invalid mailbox name");
return;
}
texture_ref = texture_manager()->Consume(client_id, texture);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MessageService::AllocatePortIdPair(int* port1, int* port2) {
int channel_id = g_next_channel_id.GetNext();
int port1_id = channel_id * 2;
int port2_id = channel_id * 2 + 1;
DCHECK(IS_OPENER_PORT_ID(port1_id));
DCHECK(GET_OPPOSITE_PORT_ID(port1_id) == port2_id);
DCHECK(GET_OPPOSITE_PORT_ID(port2_id) == port1_id);
DCHECK(GET_CHANNEL_ID(port1_id) == GET_CHANNEL_ID(port2_id));
DCHECK(GET_CHANNEL_ID(port1_id) == channel_id);
DCHECK(GET_CHANNEL_OPENER_ID(channel_id) == port1_id);
DCHECK(GET_CHANNEL_RECEIVERS_ID(channel_id) == port2_id);
*port1 = port1_id;
*port2 = port2_id;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SSW( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SSW
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_ge(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPge(box_ar(box1), box_ar(box2)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_BUNDLE(const struct ofpact_bundle *bundle,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
int slaves_len = ROUND_UP(2 * bundle->n_slaves, OFP_ACTION_ALIGN);
struct nx_action_bundle *nab;
ovs_be16 *slaves;
size_t i;
nab = (bundle->dst.field
? put_NXAST_BUNDLE_LOAD(out)
: put_NXAST_BUNDLE(out));
nab->len = htons(ntohs(nab->len) + slaves_len);
nab->algorithm = htons(bundle->algorithm);
nab->fields = htons(bundle->fields);
nab->basis = htons(bundle->basis);
nab->slave_type = htonl(mf_nxm_header(MFF_IN_PORT));
nab->n_slaves = htons(bundle->n_slaves);
if (bundle->dst.field) {
nab->ofs_nbits = nxm_encode_ofs_nbits(bundle->dst.ofs,
bundle->dst.n_bits);
nab->dst = htonl(nxm_header_from_mff(bundle->dst.field));
}
slaves = ofpbuf_put_zeros(out, slaves_len);
for (i = 0; i < bundle->n_slaves; i++) {
slaves[i] = htons(ofp_to_u16(bundle->slaves[i]));
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
const u_char *p;
const u_char *ep;
const u_char *start;
const u_char marker[] = {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
};
struct bgp bgp;
uint16_t hlen;
ep = dat + length;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < dat + length)
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": BGP"));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) /* lets be less chatty */
return;
p = dat;
start = p;
while (p < ep) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(p[0], 1))
break;
if (p[0] != 0xff) {
p++;
continue;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(p[0], sizeof(marker)))
break;
if (memcmp(p, marker, sizeof(marker)) != 0) {
p++;
continue;
}
/* found BGP header */
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], BGP_SIZE); /*XXX*/
memcpy(&bgp, p, BGP_SIZE);
if (start != p)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tstr));
hlen = ntohs(bgp.bgp_len);
if (hlen < BGP_SIZE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n[|BGP Bogus header length %u < %u]", hlen,
BGP_SIZE));
break;
}
if (ND_TTEST2(p[0], hlen)) {
if (!bgp_header_print(ndo, p, hlen))
return;
p += hlen;
start = p;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n[|BGP %s]",
tok2str(bgp_msg_values,
"Unknown Message Type",
bgp.bgp_type)));
break;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 93,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *attrs[XFRMA_MAX+1];
const struct xfrm_link *link;
int type, err;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (in_compat_syscall())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
if (type > XFRM_MSG_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
type -= XFRM_MSG_BASE;
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
type == (XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE)) &&
(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP)) {
if (link->dump == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
{
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = link->dump,
.done = link->done,
};
return netlink_dump_start(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
}
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, xfrm_msg_min[type], attrs,
link->nla_max ? : XFRMA_MAX,
link->nla_pol ? : xfrma_policy, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (link->doit == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return link->doit(skb, nlh, attrs);
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 167,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser::DownloadClosePreventionType Browser::OkToCloseWithInProgressDownloads(
int* num_downloads_blocking) const {
DCHECK(num_downloads_blocking);
*num_downloads_blocking = 0;
if (IsAttemptingToCloseBrowser())
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_OK;
if (!g_browser_process->profile_manager())
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_OK;
int total_download_count = DownloadService::DownloadCountAllProfiles();
if (total_download_count == 0)
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_OK; // No downloads; can definitely close.
int profile_window_count = 0;
int total_window_count = 0;
for (BrowserList::const_iterator iter = BrowserList::begin();
iter != BrowserList::end(); ++iter) {
Browser* const browser = *iter;
if (browser == this || browser->IsAttemptingToCloseBrowser())
continue;
if ((*iter)->profile() == profile())
profile_window_count++;
total_window_count++;
}
if (total_window_count == 0) {
*num_downloads_blocking = total_download_count;
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_BROWSER_SHUTDOWN;
}
DownloadService* download_service =
DownloadServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
if (profile_window_count == 0 && download_service->DownloadCount() > 0 &&
profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
*num_downloads_blocking = download_service->DownloadCount();
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_LAST_WINDOW_IN_INCOGNITO_PROFILE;
}
return DOWNLOAD_CLOSE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_Minify(char *json)
{
char *into=json;
while (*json)
{
if (*json==' ') json++;
else if (*json=='\t') json++; /* Whitespace characters. */
else if (*json=='\r') json++;
else if (*json=='\n') json++;
else if (*json=='/' && json[1]=='/') while (*json && *json!='\n') json++; /* double-slash comments, to end of line. */
else if (*json=='/' && json[1]=='*') {while (*json && !(*json=='*' && json[1]=='/')) json++;json+=2;} /* multiline comments. */
else if (*json=='\"'){*into++=*json++;while (*json && *json!='\"'){if (*json=='\\') *into++=*json++;*into++=*json++;}*into++=*json++;} /* string literals, which are \" sensitive. */
else *into++=*json++; /* All other characters. */
}
*into=0; /* and null-terminate. */
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::ProcessDied(bool already_dead) {
int exit_code = 0;
base::TerminationStatus status =
child_process_launcher_.get() ?
child_process_launcher_->GetChildTerminationStatus(already_dead,
&exit_code) :
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
RendererClosedDetails details(GetHandle(), status, exit_code);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
Source<RenderProcessHost>(this),
Details<RendererClosedDetails>(&details));
child_process_launcher_.reset();
channel_.reset();
gpu_message_filter_ = NULL;
IDMap<RenderWidgetHost>::iterator iter(&render_widget_hosts_);
while (!iter.IsAtEnd()) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(iter.GetCurrentValue())->OnMessageReceived(
ViewHostMsg_RenderViewGone(iter.GetCurrentKey(),
static_cast<int>(status),
exit_code));
iter.Advance();
}
ClearTransportDIBCache();
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 116,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __alloc_bootmem_huge_page(struct hstate *h)
{
struct huge_bootmem_page *m;
int nr_nodes, node;
for_each_node_mask_to_alloc(h, nr_nodes, node, &node_states[N_MEMORY]) {
void *addr;
addr = memblock_alloc_try_nid_raw(
huge_page_size(h), huge_page_size(h),
0, MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, node);
if (addr) {
/*
* Use the beginning of the huge page to store the
* huge_bootmem_page struct (until gather_bootmem
* puts them into the mem_map).
*/
m = addr;
goto found;
}
}
return 0;
found:
BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(virt_to_phys(m), huge_page_size(h)));
/* Put them into a private list first because mem_map is not up yet */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->list);
list_add(&m->list, &huge_boot_pages);
m->hstate = h;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AwContents::SetIsPaused(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, bool paused) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
browser_view_renderer_.SetIsPaused(paused);
ContentViewCore* cvc =
ContentViewCore::FromWebContents(web_contents_.get());
if (cvc) {
cvc->PauseOrResumeGeolocation(paused);
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rosecmp(rose_address *addr1, rose_address *addr2)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
if (addr1->rose_addr[i] != addr2->rose_addr[i])
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::OnDidUpdateFrameOwnerProperties(
const FrameOwnerProperties& properties) {
CHECK(frame_tree_node_->parent());
SiteInstance* parent_instance =
frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
if (render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() != parent_instance) {
render_frame_host_->Send(new FrameMsg_SetFrameOwnerProperties(
render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID(), properties));
}
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
if (pair.second->GetSiteInstance() != parent_instance) {
pair.second->Send(new FrameMsg_SetFrameOwnerProperties(
pair.second->GetRoutingID(), properties));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForHostedAppAvailability() {
bool has_toolbar =
browser_->is_type_tabbed() ||
extensions::HostedAppBrowserController::IsForExperimentalHostedAppBrowser(
browser_);
if (window() && window()->ShouldHideUIForFullscreen())
has_toolbar = false;
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU, has_toolbar);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netdev_printk(const char *level, const struct net_device *dev,
const char *format, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, format);
vaf.fmt = format;
vaf.va = &args;
r = __netdev_printk(level, dev, &vaf);
va_end(args);
return r;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsURL(Profile* profile,
const GURL& base_url,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock,
const std::string& panel) {
if (base_url.SchemeIs("data"))
return base_url;
std::string frontend_url(
!remote_frontend.empty() ?
remote_frontend :
base_url.is_empty() ? chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsURL : base_url.spec());
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&"));
if (shared_worker_frontend)
url_string += "&isSharedWorker=true";
if (v8_only_frontend)
url_string += "&v8only=true";
if (remote_frontend.size()) {
url_string += "&remoteFrontend=true";
} else {
url_string += "&remoteBase=" + DevToolsUI::GetRemoteBaseURL().spec();
}
if (can_dock)
url_string += "&can_dock=true";
if (panel.size())
url_string += "&panel=" + panel;
return DevToolsUI::SanitizeFrontendURL(GURL(url_string));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodFloatArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodFloatArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
float float_arg;
float_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLFloat>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodFloatArg(float_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::HideDevToolsContainer() {
devtools_focus_tracker_->FocusLastFocusedExternalView();
devtools_container_->SetVisible(false);
contents_split_->InvalidateLayout();
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void write_ivf_frame_header(FILE *outfile,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt)
{
char header[12];
vpx_codec_pts_t pts;
if(pkt->kind != VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT)
return;
pts = pkt->data.frame.pts;
mem_put_le32(header, pkt->data.frame.sz);
mem_put_le32(header+4, pts&0xFFFFFFFF);
mem_put_le32(header+8, pts >> 32);
(void) fwrite(header, 1, 12, outfile);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void ImageLoader::EnqueueImageLoadingMicroTask(
UpdateFromElementBehavior update_behavior,
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy) {
std::unique_ptr<Task> task =
Task::Create(this, update_behavior, referrer_policy);
pending_task_ = task->GetWeakPtr();
Microtask::EnqueueMicrotask(
WTF::Bind(&Task::Run, WTF::Passed(std::move(task))));
delay_until_do_update_from_element_ =
IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(element_->GetDocument());
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestInterstitialPageDelegate::CommandReceived(const std::string& command) {
interstitial_page_->CommandReceived();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void conditionalMethod3MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::conditionalMethod3Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Prelin8free(cmsContext ContextID, void* ptr)
{
_cmsFree(ContextID, ptr);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ocfs2_unlock_pages(struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc)
{
int i;
/*
* w_target_locked is only set to true in the page_mkwrite() case.
* The intent is to allow us to lock the target page from write_begin()
* to write_end(). The caller must hold a ref on w_target_page.
*/
if (wc->w_target_locked) {
BUG_ON(!wc->w_target_page);
for (i = 0; i < wc->w_num_pages; i++) {
if (wc->w_target_page == wc->w_pages[i]) {
wc->w_pages[i] = NULL;
break;
}
}
mark_page_accessed(wc->w_target_page);
put_page(wc->w_target_page);
}
ocfs2_unlock_and_free_pages(wc->w_pages, wc->w_num_pages);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThread::RemoveRoute(int32 routing_id) {
widget_count_--;
return ChildThread::RemoveRoute(routing_id);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool roleAllowsReadonly(AccessibilityRole role) {
return role == GridRole || role == CellRole || role == TextFieldRole ||
role == ColumnHeaderRole || role == RowHeaderRole ||
role == TreeGridRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint8_t side_info(NeAACDecStruct *hDecoder, element *ele,
bitfile *ld, ic_stream *ics, uint8_t scal_flag)
{
uint8_t result;
ics->global_gain = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 8
DEBUGVAR(1,67,"individual_channel_stream(): global_gain"));
if (!ele->common_window && !scal_flag)
{
if ((result = ics_info(hDecoder, ics, ld, ele->common_window)) > 0)
return result;
}
if ((result = section_data(hDecoder, ics, ld)) > 0)
return result;
if ((result = scale_factor_data(hDecoder, ics, ld)) > 0)
return result;
if (!scal_flag)
{
/**
** NOTE: It could be that pulse data is available in scalable AAC too,
** as said in Amendment 1, this could be only the case for ER AAC,
** though. (have to check this out later)
**/
/* get pulse data */
if ((ics->pulse_data_present = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,68,"individual_channel_stream(): pulse_data_present"))) & 1)
{
if ((result = pulse_data(ics, &(ics->pul), ld)) > 0)
return result;
}
/* get tns data */
if ((ics->tns_data_present = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,69,"individual_channel_stream(): tns_data_present"))) & 1)
{
#ifdef ERROR_RESILIENCE
if (hDecoder->object_type < ER_OBJECT_START)
#endif
tns_data(ics, &(ics->tns), ld);
}
/* get gain control data */
if ((ics->gain_control_data_present = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,70,"individual_channel_stream(): gain_control_data_present"))) & 1)
{
#ifdef SSR_DEC
if (hDecoder->object_type != SSR)
return 1;
else
gain_control_data(ld, ics);
#else
return 1;
#endif
}
}
#ifdef ERROR_RESILIENCE
if (hDecoder->aacSpectralDataResilienceFlag)
{
ics->length_of_reordered_spectral_data = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 14
DEBUGVAR(1,147,"individual_channel_stream(): length_of_reordered_spectral_data"));
if (hDecoder->channelConfiguration == 2)
{
if (ics->length_of_reordered_spectral_data > 6144)
ics->length_of_reordered_spectral_data = 6144;
} else {
if (ics->length_of_reordered_spectral_data > 12288)
ics->length_of_reordered_spectral_data = 12288;
}
ics->length_of_longest_codeword = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 6
DEBUGVAR(1,148,"individual_channel_stream(): length_of_longest_codeword"));
if (ics->length_of_longest_codeword >= 49)
ics->length_of_longest_codeword = 49;
}
/* RVLC spectral data is put here */
if (hDecoder->aacScalefactorDataResilienceFlag)
{
if ((result = rvlc_decode_scale_factors(ics, ld)) > 0)
return result;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct ext2_inode_info *ei = (struct ext2_inode_info *) foo;
rwlock_init(&ei->i_meta_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR
init_rwsem(&ei->xattr_sem);
#endif
mutex_init(&ei->truncate_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
init_rwsem(&ei->dax_sem);
#endif
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cleanup_backslash_1(char *p)
{
int mb, dos;
mb = dos = 0;
while (*p) {
if (*(unsigned char *)p > 127)
mb = 1;
if (*p == '\\') {
/* If we have not met any multi-byte characters,
* we can replace '\' with '/'. */
if (!mb)
*p = '/';
dos = 1;
}
p++;
}
if (!mb || !dos)
return (0);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetAfterTranslateStrings(
std::vector<base::string16>* strings,
bool* swap_languages,
bool autodetermined_source_language) {
DCHECK(strings);
if (autodetermined_source_language) {
size_t offset;
base::string16 text = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_TRANSLATE_INFOBAR_AFTER_MESSAGE_AUTODETERMINED_SOURCE_LANGUAGE,
base::string16(),
&offset);
strings->push_back(text.substr(0, offset));
strings->push_back(text.substr(offset));
return;
}
DCHECK(swap_languages);
std::vector<size_t> offsets;
base::string16 text = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_TRANSLATE_INFOBAR_AFTER_MESSAGE, base::string16(), base::string16(),
&offsets);
DCHECK_EQ(2U, offsets.size());
*swap_languages = (offsets[0] > offsets[1]);
if (*swap_languages)
std::swap(offsets[0], offsets[1]);
strings->push_back(text.substr(0, offsets[0]));
strings->push_back(text.substr(offsets[0], offsets[1] - offsets[0]));
strings->push_back(text.substr(offsets[1]));
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ncq_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
NCQTransferState *ncq_tfs = (NCQTransferState *)opaque;
IDEState *ide_state = &ncq_tfs->drive->port.ifs[0];
ncq_tfs->aiocb = NULL;
if (ret == -ECANCELED) {
return;
}
if (ret < 0) {
bool is_read = ncq_tfs->cmd == READ_FPDMA_QUEUED;
BlockErrorAction action = blk_get_error_action(ide_state->blk,
is_read, -ret);
if (action == BLOCK_ERROR_ACTION_STOP) {
ncq_tfs->halt = true;
ide_state->bus->error_status = IDE_RETRY_HBA;
} else if (action == BLOCK_ERROR_ACTION_REPORT) {
ncq_err(ncq_tfs);
}
blk_error_action(ide_state->blk, action, is_read, -ret);
} else {
ide_state->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
}
if (!ncq_tfs->halt) {
ncq_finish(ncq_tfs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxPopupViewGtk::InvalidateLine(size_t line) {
GdkWindow* gdk_window = gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(window_));
GdkRectangle line_rect = GetRectForLine(
line, GetWindowRect(gdk_window).width()).ToGdkRectangle();
gdk_window_invalidate_rect(gdk_window, &line_rect, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit padlock_fini(void)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(0);
if (c->x86_model >= 0x0f) {
crypto_unregister_shash(&sha1_alg_nano);
crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg_nano);
} else {
crypto_unregister_shash(&sha1_alg);
crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::OnChildDisconnected() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
early_exit_watcher_.StopWatching();
#endif
if (child_process_.get() || data_.handle) {
int exit_code;
base::TerminationStatus status = GetTerminationStatus(
true /* known_dead */, &exit_code);
switch (status) {
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_CRASHED:
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION: {
delegate_->OnProcessCrashed(exit_code);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&NotifyProcessCrashed, data_, exit_code));
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("ChildProcess.Crashed2",
static_cast<ProcessType>(data_.process_type),
PROCESS_TYPE_MAX);
break;
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_OOM_PROTECTED:
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED_BY_OOM:
#endif
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED: {
delegate_->OnProcessCrashed(exit_code);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&NotifyProcessKilled, data_, exit_code));
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("ChildProcess.Killed2",
static_cast<ProcessType>(data_.process_type),
PROCESS_TYPE_MAX);
break;
}
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING: {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("ChildProcess.DisconnectedAlive2",
static_cast<ProcessType>(data_.process_type),
PROCESS_TYPE_MAX);
}
default:
break;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("ChildProcess.Disconnected2",
static_cast<ProcessType>(data_.process_type),
PROCESS_TYPE_MAX);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED_BY_OOM) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("ChildProcess.Killed2.OOM",
static_cast<ProcessType>(data_.process_type),
PROCESS_TYPE_MAX);
}
#endif
}
channel_ = nullptr;
delete delegate_; // Will delete us
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLint>& v) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(location, v);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::menubarVisible()
{
return m_menubarVisible;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXRenderFillRectangles (ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (extra_len &&
(extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len)))
{
memcpy (extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j) memcpy (stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root)
{
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if(x_off || y_off) {
xRectangle *rects = (xRectangle *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof (xRectangle);
while (i--)
{
rects->x -= x_off;
rects->y -= y_off;
rects++;
}
}
}
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderFillRectangles]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Sp_toUpperCase(js_State *J)
{
const char *src = checkstring(J, 0);
char *dst = js_malloc(J, UTFmax * strlen(src) + 1);
const char *s = src;
char *d = dst;
Rune rune;
while (*s) {
s += chartorune(&rune, s);
rune = toupperrune(rune);
d += runetochar(d, &rune);
}
*d = 0;
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, dst);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pushstring(J, dst);
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, dst);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 90,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidReceiveRendererFrame() {
view_->DidReceiveRendererFrame();
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WorkerThread::stopInShutdownSequence()
{
stopInternal();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jsvArrayInsertBefore(JsVar *arr, JsVar *beforeIndex, JsVar *element) {
if (beforeIndex) {
JsVar *idxVar = jsvMakeIntoVariableName(jsvNewFromInteger(0), element);
if (!idxVar) return; // out of memory
JsVarRef idxRef = jsvGetRef(jsvRef(idxVar));
JsVarRef prev = jsvGetPrevSibling(beforeIndex);
if (prev) {
JsVar *prevVar = jsvRef(jsvLock(prev));
jsvSetInteger(idxVar, jsvGetInteger(prevVar)+1); // update index number
jsvSetNextSibling(prevVar, idxRef);
jsvUnLock(prevVar);
jsvSetPrevSibling(idxVar, prev);
} else {
jsvSetPrevSibling(idxVar, 0);
jsvSetFirstChild(arr, idxRef);
}
jsvSetPrevSibling(beforeIndex, idxRef);
jsvSetNextSibling(idxVar, jsvGetRef(jsvRef(beforeIndex)));
jsvUnLock(idxVar);
} else
jsvArrayPush(arr, element);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_variable_tables ()
{
if (shell_variables == 0)
{
shell_variables = global_variables = new_var_context ((char *)NULL, 0);
shell_variables->scope = 0;
shell_variables->table = hash_create (0);
}
if (shell_functions == 0)
shell_functions = hash_create (0);
#if defined (DEBUGGER)
if (shell_function_defs == 0)
shell_function_defs = hash_create (0);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::SharedMemoryHandle MockRenderThread::HostAllocateSharedMemoryBuffer(
uint32 buffer_size) {
base::SharedMemory shared_buf;
if (!shared_buf.CreateAndMapAnonymous(buffer_size)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cannot map shared memory buffer";
return base::SharedMemory::NULLHandle();
}
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle;
shared_buf.GiveToProcess(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(), &handle);
return handle;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int extract_status_code(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
char *buf_code;
char *begin;
char *end = buffer + size;
size_t inc = 0;
int code;
/* Allocate the room */
buf_code = (char *)MALLOC(10);
/* Status-Code extraction */
while (buffer < end && *buffer++ != ' ') ;
begin = buffer;
while (buffer < end && *buffer++ != ' ')
inc++;
strncat(buf_code, begin, inc);
code = atoi(buf_code);
FREE(buf_code);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overflow in extract_status_code()
Issue #960 identified that the buffer allocated for copying the
HTTP status code could overflow if the http response was corrupted.
This commit changes the way the status code is read, avoids copying
data, and also ensures that the status code is three digits long,
is non-negative and occurs on the first line of the response.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void br_multicast_group_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge *br = mp->br;
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || timer_pending(&mp->timer))
goto out;
mp->mglist = false;
if (mp->ports)
goto out;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
hlist_del_rcu(&mp->hlist[mdb->ver]);
mdb->size--;
call_rcu_bh(&mp->rcu, br_multicast_free_group);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 30,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_event_create_kernel_counter(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
struct task_struct *task,
perf_overflow_handler_t overflow_handler,
void *context)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
int err;
/*
* Get the target context (task or percpu):
*/
event = perf_event_alloc(attr, cpu, task, NULL, NULL,
overflow_handler, context);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err;
}
ctx = find_get_context(event->pmu, task, cpu);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto err_free;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, cpu);
++ctx->generation;
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return event;
err_free:
free_event(event);
err:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (cbi) { // CBI A, b
int a = (buf[0] >> 3) & 0x1f;
int b = buf[0] & 0x07;
RStrBuf *io_port;
op->family = R_ANAL_OP_FAMILY_IO;
op->type2 = 1;
op->val = a;
io_port = __generic_io_dest (a, 0, cpu);
ESIL_A ("0xff,%d,1,<<,^,%s,&,", b, io_port);
r_strbuf_free (io_port);
io_port = __generic_io_dest (a, 1, cpu);
ESIL_A ("%s,", r_strbuf_get (io_port));
r_strbuf_free (io_port);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: move_reading_point(struct archive_read *a, uint64_t offset)
{
struct xar *xar;
xar = (struct xar *)(a->format->data);
if (xar->offset - xar->h_base != offset) {
/* Seek forward to the start of file contents. */
int64_t step;
step = offset - (xar->offset - xar->h_base);
if (step > 0) {
step = __archive_read_consume(a, step);
if (step < 0)
return ((int)step);
xar->offset += step;
} else {
int64_t pos = __archive_read_seek(a, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (pos == ARCHIVE_FAILED) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Cannot seek.");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
xar->offset = pos;
}
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 61,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init i8042_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
{
int error;
i8042_platform_device = dev;
if (i8042_reset == I8042_RESET_ALWAYS) {
error = i8042_controller_selftest();
if (error)
return error;
}
error = i8042_controller_init();
if (error)
return error;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
if (i8042_dritek)
i8042_dritek_enable();
#endif
if (!i8042_noaux) {
error = i8042_setup_aux();
if (error && error != -ENODEV && error != -EBUSY)
goto out_fail;
}
if (!i8042_nokbd) {
error = i8042_setup_kbd();
if (error)
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Ok, everything is ready, let's register all serio ports
*/
i8042_register_ports();
return 0;
out_fail:
i8042_free_aux_ports(); /* in case KBD failed but AUX not */
i8042_free_irqs();
i8042_controller_reset(false);
i8042_platform_device = NULL;
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 86,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScrollAnchor::SetScroller(ScrollableArea* scroller) {
DCHECK_NE(scroller_, scroller);
DCHECK(scroller);
DCHECK(scroller->IsRootFrameViewport() ||
scroller->IsPaintLayerScrollableArea());
scroller_ = scroller;
ClearSelf();
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 136,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document& FrameSelection::GetDocument() const {
DCHECK(LifecycleContext());
return *LifecycleContext();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_items(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct load_command lc = {0, 0};
ut8 loadc[sizeof (struct load_command)] = {0};
bool is_first_thread = true;
ut64 off = 0LL;
int i, len;
bin->uuidn = 0;
bin->os = 0;
bin->has_crypto = 0;
if (bin->hdr.sizeofcmds > bin->size) {
bprintf ("Warning: chopping hdr.sizeofcmds\n");
bin->hdr.sizeofcmds = bin->size - 128;
}
for (i = 0, off = sizeof (struct MACH0_(mach_header)); \
i < bin->hdr.ncmds; i++, off += lc.cmdsize) {
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct load_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("mach0: out of bounds command\n");
return false;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, loadc, sizeof (struct load_command));
if (len < 1) {
bprintf ("Error: read (lc) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
return false;
}
lc.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&loadc[0], bin->big_endian);
lc.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&loadc[4], bin->big_endian);
if (lc.cmdsize < 1 || off + lc.cmdsize > bin->size) {
bprintf ("Warning: mach0_header %d = cmdsize<1. (0x%llx vs 0x%llx)\n", i,
(ut64)(off + lc.cmdsize), (ut64)(bin->size));
break;
}
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.offset", i), off, 0);
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.format", i), "xd cmd size", 0);
switch (lc.cmd) {
case LC_DATA_IN_CODE:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "data_in_code", 0);
break;
case LC_RPATH:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "rpath", 0);
break;
case LC_SEGMENT_64:
case LC_SEGMENT:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "segment", 0);
bin->nsegs++;
if (!parse_segments (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing segment\n");
bin->nsegs--;
return false;
}
break;
case LC_SYMTAB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "symtab", 0);
if (!parse_symtab (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing symtab\n");
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYSYMTAB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dysymtab", 0);
if (!parse_dysymtab(bin, off)) {
bprintf ("error parsing dysymtab\n");
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYLIB_CODE_SIGN_DRS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylib_code_sign_drs", 0);
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_MACOSX:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_macosx", 0);
bin->os = 1;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_IPHONEOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_iphoneos", 0);
bin->os = 2;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_TVOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_tvos", 0);
bin->os = 4;
break;
case LC_VERSION_MIN_WATCHOS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version_min_watchos", 0);
bin->os = 3;
break;
case LC_UUID:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "uuid", 0);
{
struct uuid_command uc = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct uuid_command) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("UUID out of obunds\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_fread_at (bin->b, off, (ut8*)&uc, "24c", 1) != -1) {
char key[128];
char val[128];
snprintf (key, sizeof (key)-1, "uuid.%d", bin->uuidn++);
r_hex_bin2str ((ut8*)&uc.uuid, 16, val);
sdb_set (bin->kv, key, val, 0);
}
}
break;
case LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64:
/* TODO: the struct is probably different here */
case LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "encryption_info", 0);
{
struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command) eic = {0};
ut8 seic[sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command))] = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command)) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("encryption info out of bounds\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, seic, sizeof (struct MACH0_(encryption_info_command))) != -1) {
eic.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&seic[0], bin->big_endian);
eic.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&seic[4], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptoff = r_read_ble32 (&seic[8], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptsize = r_read_ble32 (&seic[12], bin->big_endian);
eic.cryptid = r_read_ble32 (&seic[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->has_crypto = eic.cryptid;
sdb_set (bin->kv, "crypto", "true", 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptid", eic.cryptid, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptoff", eic.cryptoff, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptsize", eic.cryptsize, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "cryptheader", off, 0);
} }
break;
case LC_LOAD_DYLINKER:
{
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylinker", 0);
free (bin->intrp);
bin->intrp = NULL;
struct dylinker_command dy = {0};
ut8 sdy[sizeof (struct dylinker_command)] = {0};
if (off + sizeof (struct dylinker_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot parse dylinker command\n");
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, sdy, sizeof (struct dylinker_command)) == -1) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (LC_DYLD_INFO) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
} else {
dy.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[0], bin->big_endian);
dy.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[4], bin->big_endian);
dy.name = r_read_ble32 (&sdy[8], bin->big_endian);
int len = dy.cmdsize;
char *buf = malloc (len+1);
if (buf) {
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off + 0xc, (ut8*)buf, len);
buf[len] = 0;
free (bin->intrp);
bin->intrp = buf;
}
}
}
break;
case LC_MAIN:
{
struct {
ut64 eo;
ut64 ss;
} ep = {0};
ut8 sep[2 * sizeof (ut64)] = {0};
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "main", 0);
if (!is_first_thread) {
bprintf("Error: LC_MAIN with other threads\n");
return false;
}
if (off + 8 > bin->size || off + sizeof (ep) > bin->size) {
bprintf ("invalid command size for main\n");
return false;
}
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off + 8, sep, 2 * sizeof (ut64));
ep.eo = r_read_ble64 (&sep[0], bin->big_endian);
ep.ss = r_read_ble64 (&sep[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->entry = ep.eo;
bin->main_cmd = lc;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", off + 8, 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "stacksize", ep.ss, 0);
is_first_thread = false;
}
break;
case LC_UNIXTHREAD:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "unixthread", 0);
if (!is_first_thread) {
bprintf("Error: LC_UNIXTHREAD with other threads\n");
return false;
}
case LC_THREAD:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "thread", 0);
if (!parse_thread (bin, &lc, off, is_first_thread)) {
bprintf ("Cannot parse thread\n");
return false;
}
is_first_thread = false;
break;
case LC_LOAD_DYLIB:
case LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "load_dylib", 0);
bin->nlibs++;
if (!parse_dylib (bin, off)){
bprintf ("Cannot parse dylib\n");
bin->nlibs--;
return false;
}
break;
case LC_DYLD_INFO:
case LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY:
{
ut8 dyldi[sizeof (struct dyld_info_command)] = {0};
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dyld_info", 0);
bin->dyld_info = calloc (1, sizeof (struct dyld_info_command));
if (bin->dyld_info) {
if (off + sizeof (struct dyld_info_command) > bin->size){
bprintf ("Cannot parse dyldinfo\n");
R_FREE (bin->dyld_info);
return false;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, dyldi, sizeof (struct dyld_info_command)) == -1) {
free (bin->dyld_info);
bin->dyld_info = NULL;
bprintf ("Error: read (LC_DYLD_INFO) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", off);
} else {
bin->dyld_info->cmd = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[4], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->rebase_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->rebase_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[12], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[20], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->weak_bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[24], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->weak_bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[28], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[32], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[36], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->export_off = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[40], bin->big_endian);
bin->dyld_info->export_size = r_read_ble32 (&dyldi[44], bin->big_endian);
}
}
}
break;
case LC_CODE_SIGNATURE:
parse_signature (bin, off);
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "signature", 0);
/* ut32 dataoff
break;
case LC_SOURCE_VERSION:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "version", 0);
/* uint64_t version; */
/* A.B.C.D.E packed as a24.b10.c10.d10.e10 */
break;
case LC_SEGMENT_SPLIT_INFO:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "split_info", 0);
/* TODO */
break;
case LC_FUNCTION_STARTS:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "function_starts", 0);
if (!parse_function_starts (bin, off)) {
bprintf ("Cannot parse LC_FUNCTION_STARTS\n");
}
break;
case LC_REEXPORT_DYLIB:
sdb_set (bin->kv, sdb_fmt ("mach0_cmd_%d.cmd", i), "dylib", 0);
/* TODO */
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void txtc_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TextConfigBox *ptr = (GF_TextConfigBox*)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->config) gf_free(ptr->config);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static netdev_features_t net_mpls_features(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features,
__be16 type)
{
if (eth_p_mpls(type))
features &= skb->dev->mpls_features;
return features;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page;
int err;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key);
return 0;
}
again:
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page);
if (err < 0)
return err;
page = compound_head(page);
lock_page(page);
if (!page->mapping) {
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page)) {
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
} else {
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.inode = page->mapping->host;
key->shared.pgoff = page->index;
}
get_futex_key_refs(key);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasColorAttachmentWithAlpha(
bool all_draw_buffers) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (!all_draw_buffers || !framebuffer) {
return (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
GetBoundDrawFrameBufferInternalFormat()) & 0x0008) != 0;
}
return framebuffer->HasAlphaMRT();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlockEntry::Kind SimpleBlock::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockSimple;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::allowInlineEventHandlers(Node* node, EventListener* listener, const String& contextURL, const WTF::OrdinalNumber& contextLine)
{
if (!contentSecurityPolicy()->allowInlineEventHandlers(contextURL, contextLine))
return false;
LocalFrame* frame = executingFrame();
if (!frame)
return false;
if (!frame->script().canExecuteScripts(NotAboutToExecuteScript))
return false;
if (node && node->document() != this && !node->document().allowInlineEventHandlers(node, listener, contextURL, contextLine))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
int op_flag,
unsigned int size,
unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
int change = 0;
void *new_data;
if (op_flag > 0) {
if (size > 1024 * 128) /* sane value */
return -EINVAL;
new_data = memdup_user(tlv, size);
if (IS_ERR(new_data))
return PTR_ERR(new_data);
change = ue->tlv_data_size != size;
if (!change)
change = memcmp(ue->tlv_data, new_data, size);
kfree(ue->tlv_data);
ue->tlv_data = new_data;
ue->tlv_data_size = size;
} else {
if (! ue->tlv_data_size || ! ue->tlv_data)
return -ENXIO;
if (size < ue->tlv_data_size)
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_to_user(tlv, ue->tlv_data, ue->tlv_data_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return change;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_table_info(const struct xt_table_info *info,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo)
{
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
int ret;
if (!newinfo || !info)
return -EINVAL;
/* we dont care about newinfo->entries */
memcpy(newinfo, info, offsetof(struct xt_table_info, entries));
newinfo->initial_entries = 0;
loc_cpu_entry = info->entries;
xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET6, info->number);
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, info->size) {
ret = compat_calc_entry(iter, info, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OMX::livesLocally(node_id /* node */, pid_t pid) {
return pid == getpid();
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,986
|
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