instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceTimingInfo* ResourceFetcher::GetNavigationTimingInfo() {
return navigation_timing_info_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hmac_sha1_init(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
ctx->config.data_format = HASH_DATA_8_BITS;
ctx->config.algorithm = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
ctx->config.oper_mode = HASH_OPER_MODE_HMAC;
ctx->digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
return hash_init(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (!shouldIgnoreElement(element))
MarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
if (isHTMLHeadElement(element)) {
result.appendLiteral("<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, m_document->suggestedMIMEType(), m_document->isHTMLDocument());
result.appendLiteral("; charset=");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, m_document->characterSet(), m_document->isHTMLDocument());
if (m_document->isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral("\" />");
else
result.appendLiteral("\">");
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(gd)
{
#if HAVE_LIBT1
T1_CloseLib();
#endif
#if HAVE_GD_FONTMUTEX && HAVE_LIBFREETYPE
gdFontCacheMutexShutdown();
#endif
UNREGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void __div0(void)
{
printk("Division by zero in kernel.\n");
dump_stack();
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WasShown() {
if (render_widget_) {
static_cast<blink::WebFrameWidget*>(render_widget_->webwidget())->
setVisibilityState(blink::WebPageVisibilityStateVisible, false);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, WasShown());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_parse_status(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char *value = NULL;
struct Buffy *inc = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
struct ImapStatus *status = NULL;
unsigned int olduv, oldun;
unsigned int litlen;
short new = 0;
short new_msg_count = 0;
char *mailbox = imap_next_word(s);
/* We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(mailbox, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
mailbox = idata->buf;
s = mailbox + litlen;
*s = '\0';
s++;
SKIPWS(s);
}
else
{
s = imap_next_word(mailbox);
*(s - 1) = '\0';
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mailbox);
}
status = imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 1);
olduv = status->uidvalidity;
oldun = status->uidnext;
if (*s++ != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS\n");
return;
}
while (*s && *s != ')')
{
value = imap_next_word(s);
errno = 0;
const unsigned long ulcount = strtoul(value, &value, 10);
if (((errno == ERANGE) && (ulcount == ULONG_MAX)) || ((unsigned int) ulcount != ulcount))
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS number\n");
return;
}
const unsigned int count = (unsigned int) ulcount;
if (mutt_str_strncmp("MESSAGES", s, 8) == 0)
{
status->messages = count;
new_msg_count = 1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("RECENT", s, 6) == 0)
status->recent = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDNEXT", s, 7) == 0)
status->uidnext = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDVALIDITY", s, 11) == 0)
status->uidvalidity = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UNSEEN", s, 6) == 0)
status->unseen = count;
s = value;
if (*s && *s != ')')
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
mutt_debug(3, "%s (UIDVALIDITY: %u, UIDNEXT: %u) %d messages, %d recent, %d unseen\n",
status->name, status->uidvalidity, status->uidnext,
status->messages, status->recent, status->unseen);
/* caller is prepared to handle the result herself */
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_STATUS)
{
memcpy(idata->cmddata, status, sizeof(struct ImapStatus));
return;
}
mutt_debug(3, "Running default STATUS handler\n");
/* should perhaps move this code back to imap_buffy_check */
for (inc = Incoming; inc; inc = inc->next)
{
if (inc->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
continue;
if (imap_parse_path(inc->path, &mx) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing mailbox %s, skipping\n", inc->path);
continue;
}
if (imap_account_match(&idata->conn->account, &mx.account))
{
if (mx.mbox)
{
value = mutt_str_strdup(mx.mbox);
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, value, mutt_str_strlen(value) + 1);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
else
value = mutt_str_strdup("INBOX");
if (value && (imap_mxcmp(mailbox, value) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "Found %s in buffy list (OV: %u ON: %u U: %d)\n", mailbox,
olduv, oldun, status->unseen);
if (MailCheckRecent)
{
if (olduv && olduv == status->uidvalidity)
{
if (oldun < status->uidnext)
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else if (!olduv && !oldun)
{
/* first check per session, use recent. might need a flag for this. */
new = (status->recent > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
#ifdef USE_SIDEBAR
if ((inc->new != new) || (inc->msg_count != status->messages) ||
(inc->msg_unread != status->unseen))
{
mutt_menu_set_current_redraw(REDRAW_SIDEBAR);
}
#endif
inc->new = new;
if (new_msg_count)
inc->msg_count = status->messages;
inc->msg_unread = status->unseen;
if (inc->new)
{
/* force back to keep detecting new mail until the mailbox is
opened */
status->uidnext = oldun;
}
FREE(&value);
return;
}
FREE(&value);
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int lvl, int opt,
char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tsk_set_importance(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
tsk_set_unreliable(tsk, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
tsk_set_unreturnable(tsk, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Image* DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::GetIcon() const {
return &ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetNativeImageNamed(
IDR_PRODUCT_LOGO_32);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::ShowCertificateViewer(
scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate> certificate) {
WebContents* inspected_contents = is_docked_ ?
GetInspectedWebContents() : main_web_contents_;
Browser* browser = NULL;
int tab = 0;
if (!FindInspectedBrowserAndTabIndex(inspected_contents, &browser, &tab))
return;
gfx::NativeWindow parent = browser->window()->GetNativeWindow();
::ShowCertificateViewer(inspected_contents, parent, certificate.get());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadGRAYImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(size_t) image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.gray[100x100+10+20]).
*/
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
scene=0;
count=0;
length=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::PassiveInsecureContentFound(const GURL& resource_url) {
GetDelegate()->PassiveInsecureContentFound(resource_url);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordReadyToCommitUntilCommitHistogram(base::TimeDelta delay,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Navigation.Renderer.ReadyToCommitUntilCommit", delay);
if (transition & ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Renderer.ReadyToCommitUntilCommit.BackForward", delay);
} else if (ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Navigation.Renderer.ReadyToCommitUntilCommit.Reload",
delay);
} else if (ui::PageTransitionIsNewNavigation(transition)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.Renderer.ReadyToCommitUntilCommit.NewNavigation", delay);
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid page transition: " << transition;
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebIDBFactory* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::idbFactory() {
return WebKit::WebIDBFactory::create();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_mem_cgroup_per_zone_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, int node)
{
kfree(memcg->info.nodeinfo[node]);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_moving(const person_t* person)
{
return person->num_commands > 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::SetOpenWhenComplete(bool open) {
open_when_complete_ = open;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usb_xhci_realize(struct PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
int i, ret;
Error *err = NULL;
XHCIState *xhci = XHCI(dev);
dev->config[PCI_CLASS_PROG] = 0x30; /* xHCI */
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01; /* interrupt pin 1 */
dev->config[PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE] = 0x10;
dev->config[0x60] = 0x30; /* release number */
if (xhci->numintrs > MAXINTRS) {
xhci->numintrs = MAXINTRS;
}
while (xhci->numintrs & (xhci->numintrs - 1)) { /* ! power of 2 */
xhci->numintrs++;
}
if (xhci->numintrs < 1) {
xhci->numintrs = 1;
}
if (xhci->numslots > MAXSLOTS) {
xhci->numslots = MAXSLOTS;
}
if (xhci->numslots < 1) {
xhci->numslots = 1;
}
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_ENABLE_STREAMS)) {
xhci->max_pstreams_mask = 7; /* == 256 primary streams */
} else {
xhci->max_pstreams_mask = 0;
}
if (xhci->msi != ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF) {
ret = msi_init(dev, 0x70, xhci->numintrs, true, false, &err);
/* Any error other than -ENOTSUP(board's MSI support is broken)
* is a programming error */
assert(!ret || ret == -ENOTSUP);
if (ret && xhci->msi == ON_OFF_AUTO_ON) {
/* Can't satisfy user's explicit msi=on request, fail */
error_append_hint(&err, "You have to use msi=auto (default) or "
"msi=off with this machine type.\n");
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
assert(!err || xhci->msi == ON_OFF_AUTO_AUTO);
/* With msi=auto, we fall back to MSI off silently */
error_free(err);
}
usb_xhci_init(xhci);
xhci->mfwrap_timer = timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, xhci_mfwrap_timer, xhci);
memory_region_init(&xhci->mem, OBJECT(xhci), "xhci", LEN_REGS);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_cap, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_cap_ops, xhci,
"capabilities", LEN_CAP);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_oper, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_oper_ops, xhci,
"operational", 0x400);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_runtime, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_runtime_ops, xhci,
"runtime", LEN_RUNTIME);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_doorbell, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_doorbell_ops, xhci,
"doorbell", LEN_DOORBELL);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, 0, &xhci->mem_cap);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_OPER, &xhci->mem_oper);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_RUNTIME, &xhci->mem_runtime);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_DOORBELL, &xhci->mem_doorbell);
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numports; i++) {
XHCIPort *port = &xhci->ports[i];
uint32_t offset = OFF_OPER + 0x400 + 0x10 * i;
port->xhci = xhci;
memory_region_init_io(&port->mem, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_port_ops, port,
port->name, 0x10);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, offset, &port->mem);
}
pci_register_bar(dev, 0,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY|PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64,
&xhci->mem);
if (pci_bus_is_express(dev->bus) ||
xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_FORCE_PCIE_ENDCAP)) {
ret = pcie_endpoint_cap_init(dev, 0xa0);
assert(ret >= 0);
}
if (xhci->msix != ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF) {
/* TODO check for errors, and should fail when msix=on */
msix_init(dev, xhci->numintrs,
&xhci->mem, 0, OFF_MSIX_TABLE,
&xhci->mem, 0, OFF_MSIX_PBA,
0x90, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyIOData::SetCustomProxyConfigClient(
network::mojom::CustomProxyConfigClientPtrInfo config_client_info) {
proxy_config_client_.Bind(std::move(config_client_info));
UpdateCustomProxyConfig();
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::PlatformFileError ModifyCacheState(
const FilePath& source_path,
const FilePath& dest_path,
GDataCache::FileOperationType file_operation_type,
const FilePath& symlink_path,
bool create_symlink) {
if (source_path != dest_path) {
bool success = false;
if (file_operation_type == GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE)
success = file_util::Move(source_path, dest_path);
else if (file_operation_type == GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_COPY)
success = file_util::CopyFile(source_path, dest_path);
if (!success) {
base::PlatformFileError error = SystemToPlatformError(errno);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Error "
<< (file_operation_type == GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE ?
"moving " : "copying ")
<< source_path.value()
<< " to " << dest_path.value();
return error;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << (file_operation_type == GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE ?
"Moved " : "Copied ")
<< source_path.value()
<< " to " << dest_path.value();
}
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "No need to move file: source = destination";
}
if (symlink_path.empty())
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
bool deleted = util::DeleteSymlink(symlink_path);
if (deleted) {
DVLOG(1) << "Deleted symlink " << symlink_path.value();
} else {
if (errno != ENOENT)
PLOG(WARNING) << "Error deleting symlink " << symlink_path.value();
}
if (!create_symlink)
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
if (!file_util::CreateSymbolicLink(dest_path, symlink_path)) {
base::PlatformFileError error = SystemToPlatformError(errno);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Error creating symlink " << symlink_path.value()
<< " for " << dest_path.value();
return error;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Created symlink " << symlink_path.value()
<< " to " << dest_path.value();
}
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
unsigned long flags;
struct sighand_struct *psig;
bool autoreap = false;
u64 utime, stime;
BUG_ON(sig == -1);
/* do_notify_parent_cldstop should have been called instead. */
BUG_ON(task_is_stopped_or_traced(tsk));
BUG_ON(!tsk->ptrace &&
(tsk->group_leader != tsk || !thread_group_empty(tsk)));
if (sig != SIGCHLD) {
/*
* This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
* Check if it has changed security domain.
*/
if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
sig = SIGCHLD;
}
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
/*
* We are under tasklist_lock here so our parent is tied to
* us and cannot change.
*
* task_active_pid_ns will always return the same pid namespace
* until a task passes through release_task.
*
* write_lock() currently calls preempt_disable() which is the
* same as rcu_read_lock(), but according to Oleg, this is not
* correct to rely on this
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, task_active_pid_ns(tsk->parent));
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(task_cred_xxx(tsk->parent, user_ns),
task_uid(tsk));
rcu_read_unlock();
task_cputime(tsk, &utime, &stime);
info.si_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(utime + tsk->signal->utime);
info.si_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(stime + tsk->signal->stime);
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code & 0x7f;
if (tsk->exit_code & 0x80)
info.si_code = CLD_DUMPED;
else if (tsk->exit_code & 0x7f)
info.si_code = CLD_KILLED;
else {
info.si_code = CLD_EXITED;
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code >> 8;
}
psig = tsk->parent->sighand;
spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
if (!tsk->ptrace && sig == SIGCHLD &&
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN ||
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDWAIT))) {
/*
* We are exiting and our parent doesn't care. POSIX.1
* defines special semantics for setting SIGCHLD to SIG_IGN
* or setting the SA_NOCLDWAIT flag: we should be reaped
* automatically and not left for our parent's wait4 call.
* Rather than having the parent do it as a magic kind of
* signal handler, we just set this to tell do_exit that we
* can be cleaned up without becoming a zombie. Note that
* we still call __wake_up_parent in this case, because a
* blocked sys_wait4 might now return -ECHILD.
*
* Whether we send SIGCHLD or not for SA_NOCLDWAIT
* is implementation-defined: we do (if you don't want
* it, just use SIG_IGN instead).
*/
autoreap = true;
if (psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
sig = 0;
}
if (valid_signal(sig) && sig)
__group_send_sig_info(sig, &info, tsk->parent);
__wake_up_parent(tsk, tsk->parent);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
return autoreap;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write)
return ret;
if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100 ||
sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"perf: Dynamic interrupt throttling disabled, can hang your system!\n");
WRITE_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns, 0);
} else {
update_perf_cpu_limits();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
{
int i, idx;
const EVP_MD *md;
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
return 1;
/* Should never happen */
if (!c)
return 0;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
{
unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
switch(sig_alg)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
break;
#endif
default:
continue;
}
if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
{
md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
if (md)
{
c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
}
}
}
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
* supported it stays as NULL.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
{
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HistoryEntry* HistoryController::GetCurrentEntry() {
return current_entry_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 143,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_set_static_target_properties(struct scsi_device *sdev,
bool is_target_prop)
{
u16 target_index = 0;
u8 interface_type;
u32 device_qd = MEGASAS_DEFAULT_CMD_PER_LUN;
u32 max_io_size_kb = MR_DEFAULT_NVME_MDTS_KB;
u32 tgt_device_qd;
struct megasas_instance *instance;
struct MR_PRIV_DEVICE *mr_device_priv_data;
instance = megasas_lookup_instance(sdev->host->host_no);
mr_device_priv_data = sdev->hostdata;
interface_type = mr_device_priv_data->interface_type;
/*
* The RAID firmware may require extended timeouts.
*/
blk_queue_rq_timeout(sdev->request_queue, scmd_timeout * HZ);
target_index = (sdev->channel * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL) + sdev->id;
switch (interface_type) {
case SAS_PD:
device_qd = MEGASAS_SAS_QD;
break;
case SATA_PD:
device_qd = MEGASAS_SATA_QD;
break;
case NVME_PD:
device_qd = MEGASAS_NVME_QD;
break;
}
if (is_target_prop) {
tgt_device_qd = le32_to_cpu(instance->tgt_prop->device_qdepth);
if (tgt_device_qd &&
(tgt_device_qd <= instance->host->can_queue))
device_qd = tgt_device_qd;
/* max_io_size_kb will be set to non zero for
* nvme based vd and syspd.
*/
max_io_size_kb = le32_to_cpu(instance->tgt_prop->max_io_size_kb);
}
if (instance->nvme_page_size && max_io_size_kb)
megasas_set_nvme_device_properties(sdev, (max_io_size_kb << 10));
scsi_change_queue_depth(sdev, device_qd);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_connected(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, LPVOID pData,
UINT32 dataLength)
{
UINT error;
UINT32 status;
UINT32 index;
ADDIN_ARGV* args;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_CHANNEL_HANDLE;
status = drdynvc->channelEntryPoints.pVirtualChannelOpenEx(drdynvc->InitHandle,
&drdynvc->OpenHandle, drdynvc->channelDef.name, drdynvc_virtual_channel_open_event_ex);
if (status != CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "pVirtualChannelOpen failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(status), status);
return status;
}
drdynvc->queue = MessageQueue_New(NULL);
if (!drdynvc->queue)
{
error = CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_New failed!");
goto error;
}
drdynvc->queue->object.fnObjectFree = drdynvc_queue_object_free;
drdynvc->channel_mgr = dvcman_new(drdynvc);
if (!drdynvc->channel_mgr)
{
error = CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_new failed!");
goto error;
}
settings = (rdpSettings*) drdynvc->channelEntryPoints.pExtendedData;
for (index = 0; index < settings->DynamicChannelCount; index++)
{
args = settings->DynamicChannelArray[index];
error = dvcman_load_addin(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, args, settings);
if (CHANNEL_RC_OK != error)
goto error;
}
if ((error = dvcman_init(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_init failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
goto error;
}
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_CAPABILITIES;
if (!(drdynvc->thread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, drdynvc_virtual_channel_client_thread,
(void*) drdynvc,
0, NULL)))
{
error = ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "CreateThread failed!");
goto error;
}
error:
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 74,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::CreateNavigationHandle() {
DCHECK_EQ(frame_tree_node_->navigation_request(), this);
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node = frame_tree_node_;
std::vector<GURL> redirect_chain;
if (!begin_params_->client_side_redirect_url.is_empty())
redirect_chain.push_back(begin_params_->client_side_redirect_url);
redirect_chain.push_back(common_params_.url);
bool is_external_protocol =
!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsHandledURL(common_params_.url);
net::HttpRequestHeaders headers;
headers.AddHeadersFromString(begin_params_->headers);
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> navigation_handle =
NavigationHandleImpl::Create(
common_params_.url, redirect_chain, frame_tree_node_,
!browser_initiated_,
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(
common_params_.navigation_type),
common_params_.navigation_start, nav_entry_id_,
common_params_.started_from_context_menu,
common_params_.should_check_main_world_csp,
begin_params_->is_form_submission, std::move(navigation_ui_data_),
common_params_.method, std::move(headers), common_params_.post_data,
Referrer::SanitizeForRequest(common_params_.url,
common_params_.referrer),
common_params_.has_user_gesture, common_params_.transition,
is_external_protocol, begin_params_->request_context_type,
begin_params_->mixed_content_context_type,
common_params_.input_start);
if (!frame_tree_node->navigation_request()) {
return;
}
navigation_handle_ = std::move(navigation_handle);
if (!begin_params_->searchable_form_url.is_empty()) {
navigation_handle_->set_searchable_form_url(
begin_params_->searchable_form_url);
navigation_handle_->set_searchable_form_encoding(
begin_params_->searchable_form_encoding);
}
if (common_params_.source_location) {
navigation_handle_->set_source_location(
common_params_.source_location.value());
}
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void my_skip_input_data_fn(j_decompress_ptr cinfo, long num_bytes)
{
struct iwjpegrcontext *rctx = (struct iwjpegrcontext*)cinfo->src;
size_t bytes_still_to_skip;
size_t nbytes;
int ret;
size_t bytesread;
if(num_bytes<=0) return;
bytes_still_to_skip = (size_t)num_bytes;
while(bytes_still_to_skip>0) {
if(rctx->pub.bytes_in_buffer>0) {
nbytes = rctx->pub.bytes_in_buffer;
if(nbytes>bytes_still_to_skip)
nbytes = bytes_still_to_skip;
rctx->pub.bytes_in_buffer -= nbytes;
rctx->pub.next_input_byte += nbytes;
bytes_still_to_skip -= nbytes;
}
if(bytes_still_to_skip<1) return;
ret = (*rctx->iodescr->read_fn)(rctx->ctx,rctx->iodescr,
rctx->buffer,rctx->buffer_len,&bytesread);
if(!ret) bytesread=0;
rctx->pub.next_input_byte = rctx->buffer;
rctx->pub.bytes_in_buffer = bytesread;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnStartDevice(int stream_id, int session_id) {
VLOG(1) << "AudioInputRendererHost::OnStartDevice(stream_id="
<< stream_id << ", session_id = " << session_id << ")";
session_entries_[session_id] = stream_id;
media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->Start(session_id, this);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_INLINE_TRACE() {
visitor->Trace(execution_context_);
BaseFetchContext::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestFillFormEmptyName(const char* html, bool unowned) {
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
ASSERT_EQ(1U, forms.size());
WebInputElement input_element = GetInputElementById("firstname");
FormData form;
FormFieldData field;
EXPECT_TRUE(
FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form, &field));
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form.origin);
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("TestForm"), form.name);
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields = form.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(3U, fields.size());
FormFieldData expected;
expected.form_control_type = "text";
expected.max_length = WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength();
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("firstname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[0]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("lastname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[1]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("email");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[2]);
form.fields[0].value = ASCIIToUTF16("Wyatt");
form.fields[1].value = ASCIIToUTF16("Earp");
form.fields[2].value = ASCIIToUTF16("wyatt@example.com");
FillForm(form, input_element);
FormData form2;
FormFieldData field2;
EXPECT_TRUE(
FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form2, &field2));
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form2.origin);
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("TestForm"), form2.name);
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form2.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields2 = form2.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(3U, fields2.size());
expected.form_control_type = "text";
expected.max_length = WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength();
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("firstname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Wyatt");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[0]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("lastname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Earp");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[1]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("email");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("wyatt@example.com");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[2]);
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet SyncManager::GetEncryptedDataTypesForTest() const {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
return GetEncryptedTypes(&trans);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
{
PA_DATA *pa;
pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
if(pa == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
md->val = pa;
md->len++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,
int write, void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
int (*conv)(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, int *valp,
int write, void *data),
void *data)
{
int *i, vleft, first = 1, err = 0;
size_t left;
char *kbuf = NULL, *p;
if (!tbl_data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp || (*ppos && !write)) {
*lenp = 0;
return 0;
}
i = (int *) tbl_data;
vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(*i);
left = *lenp;
if (!conv)
conv = do_proc_dointvec_conv;
if (write) {
if (*ppos) {
switch (sysctl_writes_strict) {
case SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT:
goto out;
case SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN:
warn_sysctl_write(table);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
p = kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buffer, left);
if (IS_ERR(kbuf))
return PTR_ERR(kbuf);
}
for (; left && vleft--; i++, first=0) {
unsigned long lval;
bool neg;
if (write) {
left -= proc_skip_spaces(&p);
if (!left)
break;
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &lval, &neg,
proc_wspace_sep,
sizeof(proc_wspace_sep), NULL);
if (err)
break;
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 1, data)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
} else {
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 0, data)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!first)
err = proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t');
if (err)
break;
err = proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, lval, neg);
if (err)
break;
}
}
if (!write && !first && left && !err)
err = proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
if (write && !err && left)
left -= proc_skip_spaces(&p);
if (write) {
kfree(kbuf);
if (first)
return err ? : -EINVAL;
}
*lenp -= left;
out:
*ppos += *lenp;
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListController::DismissAppList() {
if (IsAppListVisible() && can_close_app_list_) {
current_view_->GetWidget()->Hide();
timer_.Stop();
FreeAnyKeepAliveForView();
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TimeAdvance() {
WebView().Scheduler()->SetVirtualTimePolicy(
PageScheduler::VirtualTimePolicy::kAdvance);
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: my_asnprintf (char *resultbuf, size_t *lengthp, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
char *ret;
va_start (args, format);
ret = vasnprintf (resultbuf, lengthp, format, args);
va_end (args);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::AddMessageToConsole(
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel level,
const std::string& message) {
blink::WebConsoleMessage wcm(level, WebString::FromUTF8(message));
frame_->AddMessageToConsole(wcm);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_rc_vendor_cmd(tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb, tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_RCB* p_rcb;
if ((p_cb->features & (BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT | BTA_AV_FEAT_VENDOR)) ==
(BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT | BTA_AV_FEAT_VENDOR)) {
if (p_data->hdr.layer_specific < BTA_AV_NUM_RCB) {
p_rcb = &p_cb->rcb[p_data->hdr.layer_specific];
AVRC_VendorCmd(p_rcb->handle, p_data->api_vendor.label,
&p_data->api_vendor.msg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConvolverNode::setBuffer(AudioBuffer* buffer)
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
if (!buffer)
return;
unsigned numberOfChannels = buffer->numberOfChannels();
size_t bufferLength = buffer->length();
bool isBufferGood = numberOfChannels > 0 && numberOfChannels <= 4 && bufferLength;
ASSERT(isBufferGood);
if (!isBufferGood)
return;
RefPtr<AudioBus> bufferBus = AudioBus::create(numberOfChannels, bufferLength, false);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < numberOfChannels; ++i)
bufferBus->setChannelMemory(i, buffer->getChannelData(i)->data(), bufferLength);
bufferBus->setSampleRate(buffer->sampleRate());
bool useBackgroundThreads = !context()->isOfflineContext();
OwnPtr<Reverb> reverb = adoptPtr(new Reverb(bufferBus.get(), AudioNode::ProcessingSizeInFrames, MaxFFTSize, 2, useBackgroundThreads, m_normalize));
{
MutexLocker locker(m_processLock);
m_reverb = reverb.release();
m_buffer = buffer;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix threading races on ConvolverNode::m_reverb in ConvolverNode::latencyFrames()
According to the crash report (https://cluster-fuzz.appspot.com/testcase?key=6515787040817152),
ConvolverNode::m_reverb races between ConvolverNode::latencyFrames() and ConvolverNode::setBuffer().
This CL adds a proper lock for ConvolverNode::m_reverb.
BUG=223962
No tests because the crash depends on threading races and thus not reproducible.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23514037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157245 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestURLFetcher::AppendChunkToUpload(const std::string& data,
bool is_last_chunk) {
DCHECK(!did_receive_last_chunk_);
did_receive_last_chunk_ = is_last_chunk;
chunks_.push_back(data);
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader =
port->mBuffers.editItemAt(mNumSamplesOutput & 1).mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
++mInputBufferCount;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
uint8_t *bitstream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
uint32_t *start_code = (uint32_t *)bitstream;
bool volHeader = *start_code == 0xB0010000;
if (volHeader) {
PVCleanUpVideoDecoder(mHandle);
mInitialized = false;
}
if (!mInitialized) {
uint8_t *vol_data[1];
int32_t vol_size = 0;
vol_data[0] = NULL;
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) || volHeader) {
vol_data[0] = bitstream;
vol_size = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
MP4DecodingMode mode =
(mMode == MODE_MPEG4) ? MPEG4_MODE : H263_MODE;
Bool success = PVInitVideoDecoder(
mHandle, vol_data, &vol_size, 1,
outputBufferWidth(), outputBufferHeight(), mode);
if (!success) {
ALOGW("PVInitVideoDecoder failed. Unsupported content?");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
MP4DecodingMode actualMode = PVGetDecBitstreamMode(mHandle);
if (mode != actualMode) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetPostProcType((VideoDecControls *) mHandle, 0);
bool hasFrameData = false;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else if (volHeader) {
hasFrameData = true;
}
mInitialized = true;
if (mode == MPEG4_MODE && handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
if (!hasFrameData) {
continue;
}
}
if (!mFramesConfigured) {
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = port->mBuffers.editItemAt(1).mHeader;
PVSetReferenceYUV(mHandle, outHeader->pBuffer);
mFramesConfigured = true;
}
uint32_t useExtTimestamp = (inHeader->nOffset == 0);
uint32_t timestamp = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (useExtTimestamp) {
mPvToOmxTimeMap.add(mPvTime, inHeader->nTimeStamp);
timestamp = mPvTime;
mPvTime++;
}
int32_t bufferSize = inHeader->nFilledLen;
int32_t tmp = bufferSize;
if (PVDecodeVideoFrame(
mHandle, &bitstream, ×tamp, &tmp,
&useExtTimestamp,
outHeader->pBuffer) != PV_TRUE) {
ALOGE("failed to decode video frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mPvToOmxTimeMap.valueFor(timestamp);
mPvToOmxTimeMap.removeItem(timestamp);
inHeader->nOffset += bufferSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
++mInputBufferCount;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (mWidth * mHeight * 3) / 2;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mNumSamplesOutput;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 174,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReleaseLeftMouseButton() {
ReleaseMouseButton(ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipip_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
/* All the routers (except for Linux) return only
8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.
*/
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
int err;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
return 0;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return 0;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
return 0;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return 0;
break;
}
err = -ENOENT;
rcu_read_lock();
t = ipip_tunnel_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), iph->daddr, iph->saddr);
if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
goto out;
if (time_before(jiffies, t->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO))
t->err_count++;
else
t->err_count = 1;
t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _archive_read_free(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct archive_read_passphrase *p;
int i, n;
int slots;
int r = ARCHIVE_OK;
if (_a == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY | ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL, "archive_read_free");
if (a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_CLOSED
&& a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL)
r = archive_read_close(&a->archive);
/* Call cleanup functions registered by optional components. */
if (a->cleanup_archive_extract != NULL)
r = (a->cleanup_archive_extract)(a);
/* Cleanup format-specific data. */
slots = sizeof(a->formats) / sizeof(a->formats[0]);
for (i = 0; i < slots; i++) {
a->format = &(a->formats[i]);
if (a->formats[i].cleanup)
(a->formats[i].cleanup)(a);
}
/* Free the filters */
__archive_read_free_filters(a);
/* Release the bidder objects. */
n = sizeof(a->bidders)/sizeof(a->bidders[0]);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (a->bidders[i].free != NULL) {
int r1 = (a->bidders[i].free)(&a->bidders[i]);
if (r1 < r)
r = r1;
}
}
/* Release passphrase list. */
p = a->passphrases.first;
while (p != NULL) {
struct archive_read_passphrase *np = p->next;
/* A passphrase should be cleaned. */
memset(p->passphrase, 0, strlen(p->passphrase));
free(p->passphrase);
free(p);
p = np;
}
archive_string_free(&a->archive.error_string);
if (a->entry)
archive_entry_free(a->entry);
a->archive.magic = 0;
__archive_clean(&a->archive);
free(a->client.dataset);
free(a);
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 50,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT void uncurl_free_info(struct uncurl_info *uci)
{
free(uci->host);
free(uci->path);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 84,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::RType_SceneLog(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
uint64_t idx = 0;
if (request::findValue(&req, "idx") != "")
{
idx = std::strtoull(request::findValue(&req, "idx").c_str(), nullptr, 10);
}
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "SceneLog";
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ROWID, nValue, Date FROM SceneLog WHERE (SceneRowID==%" PRIu64 ") ORDER BY Date DESC", idx);
if (!result.empty())
{
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : result)
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = itt;
int nValue = atoi(sd[1].c_str());
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = sd[0];
root["result"][ii]["Date"] = sd[2];
root["result"][ii]["Data"] = (nValue == 0) ? "Off" : "On";
ii++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff_head *q = &sk->sk_error_queue;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_next = NULL;
bool icmp_next = false;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&q->lock, flags);
skb = __skb_dequeue(q);
if (skb && (skb_next = skb_peek(q)))
icmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags);
if (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) && !icmp_next)
sk->sk_err = 0;
if (skb_next)
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Magick_png_read_raw_profile(png_struct *ping,Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info, png_textp text,int ii)
{
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*dp;
register png_charp
sp;
size_t
extent,
length,
nibbles;
StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
unhex[103]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,10,11,12,
13,14,15};
sp=text[ii].text+1;
extent=text[ii].text_length;
/* look for newline */
while ((*sp != '\n') && extent--)
sp++;
/* look for length */
while (((*sp == '\0' || *sp == ' ' || *sp == '\n')) && extent--)
sp++;
if (extent == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"missing profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
length=StringToLong(sp);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" length: %lu",(unsigned long) length);
while ((*sp != ' ' && *sp != '\n') && extent--)
sp++;
if (extent == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"invalid profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* allocate space */
if (length == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"invalid profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_warning(ping, "unable to copy profile");
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* copy profile, skipping white space and column 1 "=" signs */
dp=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
nibbles=length*2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) nibbles; i++)
{
while (*sp < '0' || (*sp > '9' && *sp < 'a') || *sp > 'f')
{
if (*sp == '\0')
{
png_warning(ping, "ran out of profile data");
return(MagickFalse);
}
sp++;
}
if (i%2 == 0)
*dp=(unsigned char) (16*unhex[(int) *sp++]);
else
(*dp++)+=unhex[(int) *sp++];
}
/*
We have already read "Raw profile type.
*/
(void) SetImageProfile(image,&text[ii].key[17],profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (image_info->verbose)
(void) printf(" Found a generic profile, type %s\n",&text[ii].key[17]);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1119
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRect(const FloatRect& rect)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *d_absolute_path(const struct path *path,
char *buf, int buflen)
{
struct path root = {};
char *res = buf + buflen;
int error;
prepend(&res, &buflen, "\0", 1);
error = prepend_path(path, &root, &res, &buflen);
if (error > 1)
error = -EINVAL;
if (error < 0)
return ERR_PTR(error);
return res;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err edts_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, edts_AddBox);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ldb_dn_compare(struct ldb_dn *dn0, struct ldb_dn *dn1)
{
unsigned int i;
int ret;
if (( ! dn0) || dn0->invalid || ! dn1 || dn1->invalid) {
return -1;
}
if (( ! dn0->valid_case) || ( ! dn1->valid_case)) {
if (dn0->linearized && dn1->linearized) {
/* try with a normal compare first, if we are lucky
* we will avoid exploding and casfolding */
if (strcmp(dn0->linearized, dn1->linearized) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
if ( ! ldb_dn_casefold_internal(dn0)) {
return 1;
}
if ( ! ldb_dn_casefold_internal(dn1)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (dn0->comp_num != dn1->comp_num) {
return (dn1->comp_num - dn0->comp_num);
}
if (dn0->comp_num == 0) {
if (dn0->special && dn1->special) {
return strcmp(dn0->linearized, dn1->linearized);
} else if (dn0->special) {
return 1;
} else if (dn1->special) {
return -1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < dn0->comp_num; i++) {
char *dn0_name = dn0->components[i].cf_name;
char *dn1_name = dn1->components[i].cf_name;
char *dn0_vdata = (char *)dn0->components[i].cf_value.data;
char *dn1_vdata = (char *)dn1->components[i].cf_value.data;
size_t dn0_vlen = dn0->components[i].cf_value.length;
size_t dn1_vlen = dn1->components[i].cf_value.length;
/* compare attr names */
ret = strcmp(dn0_name, dn1_name);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* compare attr.cf_value. */
if (dn0_vlen != dn1_vlen) {
return dn0_vlen - dn1_vlen;
}
ret = strncmp(dn0_vdata, dn1_vdata, dn0_vlen);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t pktlen(unsigned char *buf)
{
size_t hdr = sizeof(struct udphdr);
return strlen((char *)buf + hdr) + hdr;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static DefragTracker *DefragTrackerGetUsedDefragTracker(void)
{
uint32_t idx = SC_ATOMIC_GET(defragtracker_prune_idx) % defrag_config.hash_size;
uint32_t cnt = defrag_config.hash_size;
while (cnt--) {
if (++idx >= defrag_config.hash_size)
idx = 0;
DefragTrackerHashRow *hb = &defragtracker_hash[idx];
if (DRLOCK_TRYLOCK(hb) != 0)
continue;
DefragTracker *dt = hb->tail;
if (dt == NULL) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
continue;
}
if (SCMutexTrylock(&dt->lock) != 0) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
continue;
}
/** never prune a tracker that is used by a packets
* we are currently processing in one of the threads */
if (SC_ATOMIC_GET(dt->use_cnt) > 0) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
SCMutexUnlock(&dt->lock);
continue;
}
/* remove from the hash */
if (dt->hprev != NULL)
dt->hprev->hnext = dt->hnext;
if (dt->hnext != NULL)
dt->hnext->hprev = dt->hprev;
if (hb->head == dt)
hb->head = dt->hnext;
if (hb->tail == dt)
hb->tail = dt->hprev;
dt->hnext = NULL;
dt->hprev = NULL;
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
DefragTrackerClearMemory(dt);
SCMutexUnlock(&dt->lock);
(void) SC_ATOMIC_ADD(defragtracker_prune_idx, (defrag_config.hash_size - cnt));
return dt;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 67,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void interopDatabaseClearNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s()", __FUNCTION__);
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return;
sBluetoothInterface->interop_database_clear();
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, const char *func,
unsigned int line)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS;
if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
return;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT4_ERROR_FS);
es->s_last_error_time = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
strncpy(es->s_last_error_func, func, sizeof(es->s_last_error_func));
es->s_last_error_line = cpu_to_le32(line);
if (!es->s_first_error_time) {
es->s_first_error_time = es->s_last_error_time;
strncpy(es->s_first_error_func, func,
sizeof(es->s_first_error_func));
es->s_first_error_line = cpu_to_le32(line);
es->s_first_error_ino = es->s_last_error_ino;
es->s_first_error_block = es->s_last_error_block;
}
/*
* Start the daily error reporting function if it hasn't been
* started already
*/
if (!es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_err_report, jiffies + 24*60*60*HZ);
le32_add_cpu(&es->s_error_count, 1);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t GLManager::GenerateFenceSyncRelease() {
return next_fence_sync_release_++;
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int platform_uevent(struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
int rc;
/* Some devices have extra OF data and an OF-style MODALIAS */
rc = of_device_uevent_modalias(dev, env);
if (rc != -ENODEV)
return rc;
rc = acpi_device_uevent_modalias(dev, env);
if (rc != -ENODEV)
return rc;
add_uevent_var(env, "MODALIAS=%s%s", PLATFORM_MODULE_PREFIX,
pdev->name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunFileChooser(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const FileChooserParams& params) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RunFileChooser(render_frame_host, params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
const void *index_key)
{
struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context collapse;
struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0;
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
bool has_meta;
int slot, i;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!edit)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
edit->array = array;
edit->ops = ops;
edit->adjust_count_by = -1;
switch (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result)) {
case assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node:
/* We found a node that should contain the leaf we've been
* asked to remove - *if* it's in the tree.
*/
pr_devel("terminal_node\n");
node = result.terminal_node.node;
for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
ptr = node->slots[slot];
if (ptr &&
assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr) &&
ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
index_key))
goto found_leaf;
}
case assoc_array_walk_tree_empty:
case assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut:
default:
assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
pr_devel("not found\n");
return NULL;
}
found_leaf:
BUG_ON(array->nr_leaves_on_tree <= 0);
/* In the simplest form of deletion we just clear the slot and release
* the leaf after a suitable interval.
*/
edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[slot];
edit->set[0].ptr = &node->slots[slot];
edit->set[0].to = NULL;
edit->adjust_count_on = node;
/* If that concludes erasure of the last leaf, then delete the entire
* internal array.
*/
if (array->nr_leaves_on_tree == 1) {
edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
edit->set[1].to = NULL;
edit->adjust_count_on = NULL;
edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
pr_devel("all gone\n");
return edit;
}
/* However, we'd also like to clear up some metadata blocks if we
* possibly can.
*
* We go for a simple algorithm of: if this node has FAN_OUT or fewer
* leaves in it, then attempt to collapse it - and attempt to
* recursively collapse up the tree.
*
* We could also try and collapse in partially filled subtrees to take
* up space in this node.
*/
if (node->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
struct assoc_array_node *parent, *grandparent;
struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
/* First of all, we need to know if this node has metadata so
* that we don't try collapsing if all the leaves are already
* here.
*/
has_meta = false;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
has_meta = true;
break;
}
}
pr_devel("leaves: %ld [m=%d]\n",
node->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1, has_meta);
/* Look further up the tree to see if we can collapse this node
* into a more proximal node too.
*/
parent = node;
collapse_up:
pr_devel("collapse subtree: %ld\n", parent->nr_leaves_on_branch);
ptr = parent->back_pointer;
if (!ptr)
goto do_collapse;
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
struct assoc_array_shortcut *s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
ptr = s->back_pointer;
if (!ptr)
goto do_collapse;
}
grandparent = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
if (grandparent->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
parent = grandparent;
goto collapse_up;
}
do_collapse:
/* There's no point collapsing if the original node has no meta
* pointers to discard and if we didn't merge into one of that
* node's ancestry.
*/
if (has_meta || parent != node) {
node = parent;
/* Create a new node to collapse into */
new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n0)
goto enomem;
edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
collapse.node = new_n0;
collapse.skip_leaf = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->dead_leaf);
collapse.slot = 0;
assoc_array_subtree_iterate(assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node),
node->back_pointer,
assoc_array_delete_collapse_iterator,
&collapse);
pr_devel("collapsed %d,%lu\n", collapse.slot, new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch);
BUG_ON(collapse.slot != new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1);
if (!node->back_pointer) {
edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(node->back_pointer)) {
BUG();
} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(node->back_pointer)) {
struct assoc_array_node *p =
assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer);
edit->set[1].ptr = &p->slots[node->parent_slot];
} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(node->back_pointer)) {
struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(node->back_pointer);
edit->set[1].ptr = &s->next_node;
}
edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->excised_subtree = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
}
}
return edit;
enomem:
/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
pr_devel("enomem\n");
assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix termination condition in assoc array garbage collection
This fixes CVE-2014-3631.
It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).
When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.
Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.
This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).
This can be reproduced by:
ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
for ((i=1; i<=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
keyctl timeout $last_key 2
Doing this:
echo 3 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
first will speed things up.
If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8136cea7>] [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff812e2a70>] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
[<ffffffff812e3e75>] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
[<ffffffff812e1424>] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
[<ffffffff810a67b6>] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
[<ffffffff810a744b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
[<ffffffff810a7330>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[<ffffffff810ae1a8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff816ffb7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 <4e> 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP <ffff8800aac15d40>
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 37,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sctp_association *sctp_association_init(struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sock *sk,
sctp_scope_t scope,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
int i;
sctp_paramhdr_t *p;
int err;
/* Retrieve the SCTP per socket area. */
sp = sctp_sk((struct sock *)sk);
/* Discarding const is appropriate here. */
asoc->ep = (struct sctp_endpoint *)ep;
asoc->base.sk = (struct sock *)sk;
sctp_endpoint_hold(asoc->ep);
sock_hold(asoc->base.sk);
/* Initialize the common base substructure. */
asoc->base.type = SCTP_EP_TYPE_ASSOCIATION;
/* Initialize the object handling fields. */
atomic_set(&asoc->base.refcnt, 1);
/* Initialize the bind addr area. */
sctp_bind_addr_init(&asoc->base.bind_addr, ep->base.bind_addr.port);
asoc->state = SCTP_STATE_CLOSED;
asoc->cookie_life = ms_to_ktime(sp->assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life);
asoc->user_frag = sp->user_frag;
/* Set the association max_retrans and RTO values from the
* socket values.
*/
asoc->max_retrans = sp->assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt;
asoc->pf_retrans = net->sctp.pf_retrans;
asoc->rto_initial = msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial);
asoc->rto_max = msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_max);
asoc->rto_min = msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_min);
/* Initialize the association's heartbeat interval based on the
* sock configured value.
*/
asoc->hbinterval = msecs_to_jiffies(sp->hbinterval);
/* Initialize path max retrans value. */
asoc->pathmaxrxt = sp->pathmaxrxt;
/* Initialize default path MTU. */
asoc->pathmtu = sp->pathmtu;
/* Set association default SACK delay */
asoc->sackdelay = msecs_to_jiffies(sp->sackdelay);
asoc->sackfreq = sp->sackfreq;
/* Set the association default flags controlling
* Heartbeat, SACK delay, and Path MTU Discovery.
*/
asoc->param_flags = sp->param_flags;
/* Initialize the maximum number of new data packets that can be sent
* in a burst.
*/
asoc->max_burst = sp->max_burst;
/* initialize association timers */
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE] = asoc->rto_initial;
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT] = asoc->rto_initial;
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN] = asoc->rto_initial;
/* sctpimpguide Section 2.12.2
* If the 'T5-shutdown-guard' timer is used, it SHOULD be set to the
* recommended value of 5 times 'RTO.Max'.
*/
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD]
= 5 * asoc->rto_max;
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SACK] = asoc->sackdelay;
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE] = sp->autoclose * HZ;
/* Initializes the timers */
for (i = SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_NONE; i < SCTP_NUM_TIMEOUT_TYPES; ++i)
setup_timer(&asoc->timers[i], sctp_timer_events[i],
(unsigned long)asoc);
/* Pull default initialization values from the sock options.
* Note: This assumes that the values have already been
* validated in the sock.
*/
asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams = sp->initmsg.sinit_max_instreams;
asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams = sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams;
asoc->max_init_attempts = sp->initmsg.sinit_max_attempts;
asoc->max_init_timeo =
msecs_to_jiffies(sp->initmsg.sinit_max_init_timeo);
/* Set the local window size for receive.
* This is also the rcvbuf space per association.
* RFC 6 - A SCTP receiver MUST be able to receive a minimum of
* 1500 bytes in one SCTP packet.
*/
if ((sk->sk_rcvbuf/2) < SCTP_DEFAULT_MINWINDOW)
asoc->rwnd = SCTP_DEFAULT_MINWINDOW;
else
asoc->rwnd = sk->sk_rcvbuf/2;
asoc->a_rwnd = asoc->rwnd;
/* Use my own max window until I learn something better. */
asoc->peer.rwnd = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXWINDOW;
/* Initialize the receive memory counter */
atomic_set(&asoc->rmem_alloc, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&asoc->wait);
asoc->c.my_vtag = sctp_generate_tag(ep);
asoc->c.my_port = ep->base.bind_addr.port;
asoc->c.initial_tsn = sctp_generate_tsn(ep);
asoc->next_tsn = asoc->c.initial_tsn;
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
asoc->highest_sacked = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
asoc->last_cwr_tsn = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
/* ADDIP Section 4.1 Asconf Chunk Procedures
*
* When an endpoint has an ASCONF signaled change to be sent to the
* remote endpoint it should do the following:
* ...
* A2) a serial number should be assigned to the chunk. The serial
* number SHOULD be a monotonically increasing number. The serial
* numbers SHOULD be initialized at the start of the
* association to the same value as the initial TSN.
*/
asoc->addip_serial = asoc->c.initial_tsn;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&asoc->addip_chunk_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&asoc->asconf_ack_list);
/* Make an empty list of remote transport addresses. */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&asoc->peer.transport_addr_list);
/* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association
*
* After the reception of the first data chunk in an
* association the endpoint must immediately respond with a
* sack to acknowledge the data chunk. Subsequent
* acknowledgements should be done as described in Section
* 6.2.
*
* [We implement this by telling a new association that it
* already received one packet.]
*/
asoc->peer.sack_needed = 1;
asoc->peer.sack_generation = 1;
/* Assume that the peer will tell us if he recognizes ASCONF
* as part of INIT exchange.
* The sctp_addip_noauth option is there for backward compatibility
* and will revert old behavior.
*/
if (net->sctp.addip_noauth)
asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
/* Create an input queue. */
sctp_inq_init(&asoc->base.inqueue);
sctp_inq_set_th_handler(&asoc->base.inqueue, sctp_assoc_bh_rcv);
/* Create an output queue. */
sctp_outq_init(asoc, &asoc->outqueue);
if (!sctp_ulpq_init(&asoc->ulpq, asoc))
goto fail_init;
/* Assume that peer would support both address types unless we are
* told otherwise.
*/
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
if (asoc->base.sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&asoc->asocs);
asoc->default_stream = sp->default_stream;
asoc->default_ppid = sp->default_ppid;
asoc->default_flags = sp->default_flags;
asoc->default_context = sp->default_context;
asoc->default_timetolive = sp->default_timetolive;
asoc->default_rcv_context = sp->default_rcv_context;
/* AUTH related initializations */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&asoc->endpoint_shared_keys);
err = sctp_auth_asoc_copy_shkeys(ep, asoc, gfp);
if (err)
goto fail_init;
asoc->active_key_id = ep->active_key_id;
/* Save the hmacs and chunks list into this association */
if (ep->auth_hmacs_list)
memcpy(asoc->c.auth_hmacs, ep->auth_hmacs_list,
ntohs(ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length));
if (ep->auth_chunk_list)
memcpy(asoc->c.auth_chunks, ep->auth_chunk_list,
ntohs(ep->auth_chunk_list->param_hdr.length));
/* Get the AUTH random number for this association */
p = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_random;
p->type = SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM;
p->length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH);
get_random_bytes(p+1, SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH);
return asoc;
fail_init:
sock_put(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_endpoint_put(asoc->ep);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OneClickSigninHelper::CreateSyncStarterCallback() {
return base::Bind(&OneClickSigninHelper::SyncSetupCompletedCallback,
weak_pointer_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StringFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValue(info, FreezeV8Object(ToV8(impl->stringFrozenArrayAttribute(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate()), info.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabStripEmpty() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QPointF QQuickWebView::mapToWebContent(const QPointF& pointInViewCoordinates) const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->pageView->transformFromItem().map(pointInViewCoordinates);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wait_til_ready(void)
{
int status;
int counter;
if (FDCS->reset)
return -1;
for (counter = 0; counter < 10000; counter++) {
status = fd_inb(FD_STATUS);
if (status & STATUS_READY)
return status;
}
if (initialized) {
DPRINT("Getstatus times out (%x) on fdc %d\n", status, fdc);
show_floppy();
}
FDCS->reset = 1;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OmniboxEditModel::State::State(bool user_input_in_progress,
const base::string16& user_text,
const base::string16& gray_text,
const base::string16& keyword,
bool is_keyword_hint,
bool url_replacement_enabled,
OmniboxFocusState focus_state,
FocusSource focus_source,
const AutocompleteInput& autocomplete_input)
: user_input_in_progress(user_input_in_progress),
user_text(user_text),
gray_text(gray_text),
keyword(keyword),
is_keyword_hint(is_keyword_hint),
url_replacement_enabled(url_replacement_enabled),
focus_state(focus_state),
focus_source(focus_source),
autocomplete_input(autocomplete_input) {
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bfd_rt_rlimit_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->bfd_rlimit_rt = get_rt_rlimit(strvec, "bfd");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skb_checksum_setup_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, bool recalculate)
{
int err;
u8 nexthdr;
unsigned int off;
unsigned int len;
bool fragment;
bool done;
fragment = false;
done = false;
off = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb, off, MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
nexthdr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr;
len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len);
while (off <= len && !done) {
switch (nexthdr) {
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_ROUTING: {
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hp;
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb,
off +
sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr),
MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
hp = OPT_HDR(struct ipv6_opt_hdr, skb, off);
nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
off += ipv6_optlen(hp);
break;
}
case IPPROTO_AH: {
struct ip_auth_hdr *hp;
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb,
off +
sizeof(struct ip_auth_hdr),
MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
hp = OPT_HDR(struct ip_auth_hdr, skb, off);
nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
off += ipv6_authlen(hp);
break;
}
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT: {
struct frag_hdr *hp;
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb,
off +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr),
MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
hp = OPT_HDR(struct frag_hdr, skb, off);
if (hp->frag_off & htons(IP6_OFFSET | IP6_MF))
fragment = true;
nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
off += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
break;
}
default:
done = true;
break;
}
}
err = -EPROTO;
if (!done || fragment)
goto out;
switch (nexthdr) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb,
off + sizeof(struct tcphdr),
MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto out;
}
if (recalculate)
tcp_hdr(skb)->check =
~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
err = skb_maybe_pull_tail(skb,
off + sizeof(struct udphdr),
MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct udphdr, check))) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto out;
}
if (recalculate)
udp_hdr(skb)->check =
~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
break;
default:
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage int vprintk(const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
int printed_len = 0;
int current_log_level = default_message_loglevel;
unsigned long flags;
int this_cpu;
char *p;
size_t plen;
char special;
boot_delay_msec();
printk_delay();
/* This stops the holder of console_sem just where we want him */
local_irq_save(flags);
this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
/*
* Ouch, printk recursed into itself!
*/
if (unlikely(printk_cpu == this_cpu)) {
/*
* If a crash is occurring during printk() on this CPU,
* then try to get the crash message out but make sure
* we can't deadlock. Otherwise just return to avoid the
* recursion and return - but flag the recursion so that
* it can be printed at the next appropriate moment:
*/
if (!oops_in_progress && !lockdep_recursing(current)) {
recursion_bug = 1;
goto out_restore_irqs;
}
zap_locks();
}
lockdep_off();
raw_spin_lock(&logbuf_lock);
printk_cpu = this_cpu;
if (recursion_bug) {
recursion_bug = 0;
strcpy(printk_buf, recursion_bug_msg);
printed_len = strlen(recursion_bug_msg);
}
/* Emit the output into the temporary buffer */
printed_len += vscnprintf(printk_buf + printed_len,
sizeof(printk_buf) - printed_len, fmt, args);
p = printk_buf;
/* Read log level and handle special printk prefix */
plen = log_prefix(p, ¤t_log_level, &special);
if (plen) {
p += plen;
switch (special) {
case 'c': /* Strip <c> KERN_CONT, continue line */
plen = 0;
break;
case 'd': /* Strip <d> KERN_DEFAULT, start new line */
plen = 0;
default:
if (!new_text_line) {
emit_log_char('\n');
new_text_line = 1;
}
}
}
/*
* Copy the output into log_buf. If the caller didn't provide
* the appropriate log prefix, we insert them here
*/
for (; *p; p++) {
if (new_text_line) {
new_text_line = 0;
if (plen) {
/* Copy original log prefix */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
emit_log_char(printk_buf[i]);
printed_len += plen;
} else {
/* Add log prefix */
emit_log_char('<');
emit_log_char(current_log_level + '0');
emit_log_char('>');
printed_len += 3;
}
if (printk_time) {
/* Add the current time stamp */
char tbuf[50], *tp;
unsigned tlen;
unsigned long long t;
unsigned long nanosec_rem;
t = cpu_clock(printk_cpu);
nanosec_rem = do_div(t, 1000000000);
tlen = sprintf(tbuf, "[%5lu.%06lu] ",
(unsigned long) t,
nanosec_rem / 1000);
for (tp = tbuf; tp < tbuf + tlen; tp++)
emit_log_char(*tp);
printed_len += tlen;
}
if (!*p)
break;
}
emit_log_char(*p);
if (*p == '\n')
new_text_line = 1;
}
/*
* Try to acquire and then immediately release the
* console semaphore. The release will do all the
* actual magic (print out buffers, wake up klogd,
* etc).
*
* The console_trylock_for_printk() function
* will release 'logbuf_lock' regardless of whether it
* actually gets the semaphore or not.
*/
if (console_trylock_for_printk(this_cpu))
console_unlock();
lockdep_on();
out_restore_irqs:
local_irq_restore(flags);
return printed_len;
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBlockFlow* RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement(RenderObject* newChild)
{
RenderBlockFlow* columnsBlockAncestor = 0;
if (!newChild->isText() && newChild->style()->columnSpan() && !newChild->isBeforeOrAfterContent()
&& !newChild->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !newChild->isInline() && !isAnonymousColumnSpanBlock()) {
columnsBlockAncestor = containingColumnsBlock(false);
if (columnsBlockAncestor) {
RenderObject* curr = this;
while (curr && curr != columnsBlockAncestor) {
if (curr->isRenderBlock() && toRenderBlock(curr)->continuation()) {
columnsBlockAncestor = 0;
break;
}
curr = curr->parent();
}
}
}
return columnsBlockAncestor;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlockPainter::PaintChild(const LayoutBox& child,
const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
LayoutPoint child_point =
layout_block_.FlipForWritingModeForChildForPaint(&child, paint_offset);
if (!child.HasSelfPaintingLayer() && !child.IsFloating() &&
!child.IsColumnSpanAll())
child.Paint(paint_info, child_point);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Instance::DocumentLoadComplete(int page_count) {
FormTextFieldFocusChange(false);
if (progress_bar_.visible())
progress_bar_.Fade(false, kProgressFadeTimeoutMs);
DCHECK(document_load_state_ == LOAD_STATE_LOADING);
document_load_state_ = LOAD_STATE_COMPLETE;
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.LoadSuccess");
if (did_call_start_loading_) {
pp::PDF::DidStopLoading(this);
did_call_start_loading_ = false;
}
if (on_load_callback_.is_string())
ExecuteScript(on_load_callback_);
if (!IsPrintPreview()) {
int initial_page = GetInitialPage(url_);
if (initial_page >= 0)
ScrollToPage(initial_page);
}
if (!full_)
return;
if (!pp::PDF::IsAvailable())
return;
int content_restrictions =
CONTENT_RESTRICTION_CUT | CONTENT_RESTRICTION_PASTE;
if (!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_COPY))
content_restrictions |= CONTENT_RESTRICTION_COPY;
if (!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_PRINT_LOW_QUALITY) &&
!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_PRINT_HIGH_QUALITY)) {
printing_enabled_ = false;
if (current_tb_info_ == kPDFToolbarButtons) {
CreateToolbar(kPDFNoPrintToolbarButtons,
arraysize(kPDFNoPrintToolbarButtons));
UpdateToolbarPosition(false);
Invalidate(pp::Rect(plugin_size_));
}
}
pp::PDF::SetContentRestriction(this, content_restrictions);
pp::PDF::HistogramPDFPageCount(this, page_count);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void user_tick_function_call(user_tick_function_entry *tick_fe TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval retval;
zval *function = tick_fe->arguments[0];
/* Prevent reentrant calls to the same user ticks function */
if (! tick_fe->calling) {
tick_fe->calling = 1;
if (call_user_function( EG(function_table), NULL,
function,
&retval,
tick_fe->arg_count - 1,
tick_fe->arguments + 1
TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
zval_dtor(&retval);
} else {
zval **obj, **method;
if (Z_TYPE_P(function) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call %s() - function does not exist", Z_STRVAL_P(function));
} else if ( Z_TYPE_P(function) == IS_ARRAY
&& zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(function), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS
&& zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(function), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS
&& Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT
&& Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call %s::%s() - function does not exist", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call tick function");
}
}
tick_fe->calling = 0;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setChunkOffsetParams(
uint32_t type, off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
CHECK(type == kChunkOffsetType32 || type == kChunkOffsetType64);
mChunkOffsetOffset = data_offset;
mChunkOffsetType = type;
if (data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumChunkOffsets = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mChunkOffsetType == kChunkOffsetType32) {
if ((data_size - 8) / 4 < mNumChunkOffsets) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
if ((data_size - 8) / 8 < mNumChunkOffsets) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_right(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPgt((circle1->center.x - circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.x + circle2->radius)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GetImageId() const {
return wallpaper::WallpaperResizer::GetImageId(user_wallpaper_);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fpa_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct thread_info *thread = task_thread_info(target);
thread->used_cp[1] = thread->used_cp[2] = 1;
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&thread->fpstate,
0, sizeof(struct user_fp));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isValidFormControlElement()
{
ASSERT(m_isValid == valid());
return m_isValid;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: epass2003_gen_key(struct sc_card *card, sc_epass2003_gen_key_data * data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_EXT_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE] = { 0 };
u8 sbuf[SC_MAX_EXT_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE] = { 0 };
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if(len == 256)
{
sbuf[0] = 0x02;
}
else
{
sbuf[0] = 0x01;
}
sbuf[1] = (u8) ((len >> 8) & 0xff);
sbuf[2] = (u8) (len & 0xff);
sbuf[3] = (u8) ((data->prkey_id >> 8) & 0xFF);
sbuf[4] = (u8) ((data->prkey_id) & 0xFF);
sbuf[5] = (u8) ((data->pukey_id >> 8) & 0xFF);
sbuf[6] = (u8) ((data->pukey_id) & 0xFF);
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen = 7;
apdu.data = sbuf;
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "generate keypair failed");
/* read public key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x00);
if(len == 256)
{
apdu.p1 = 0x00;
}
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen = 2;
apdu.data = &sbuf[5];
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 0x00;
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "get pukey failed");
if (len < apdu.resplen)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
data->modulus = (u8 *) malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
memcpy(data->modulus, rbuf, len);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetUniformiv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* params) {
api()->glGetUniformivRobustANGLEFn(GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_),
location, bufsize * sizeof(*params),
length, params);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::DataPipeConsumerDispatcher(
NodeController* node_controller,
const ports::PortRef& control_port,
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion shared_ring_buffer,
const MojoCreateDataPipeOptions& options,
uint64_t pipe_id)
: options_(options),
node_controller_(node_controller),
control_port_(control_port),
pipe_id_(pipe_id),
watchers_(this),
shared_ring_buffer_(std::move(shared_ring_buffer)) {}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImportCbYCrYQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 10:
{
Quantum
cbcr[4];
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x+=4)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
cbcr[i]=(Quantum) (quantum);
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[1],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[3],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case F2FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
cmd = F2FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
break;
case F2FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
cmd = F2FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return f2fs_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long) compat_ptr(arg));
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSTestInterface::JSTestInterface(Structure* structure, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, PassRefPtr<TestInterface> impl)
: JSDOMWrapper(structure, globalObject)
, m_impl(impl.leakRef())
{
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xscale2_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(unsigned long of_flags,
enum xscale_counters counter)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (counter) {
case XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER:
ret = of_flags & XSCALE2_CCOUNT_OVERFLOW;
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER0:
ret = of_flags & XSCALE2_COUNT0_OVERFLOW;
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER1:
ret = of_flags & XSCALE2_COUNT1_OVERFLOW;
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER2:
ret = of_flags & XSCALE2_COUNT2_OVERFLOW;
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER3:
ret = of_flags & XSCALE2_COUNT3_OVERFLOW;
break;
default:
WARN_ONCE(1, "invalid counter number (%d)\n", counter);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotificationsEngine::init()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t streamTrimByLength(stream *s, size_t maxlen, int approx) {
if (s->length <= maxlen) return 0;
raxIterator ri;
raxStart(&ri,s->rax);
raxSeek(&ri,"^",NULL,0);
int64_t deleted = 0;
while(s->length > maxlen && raxNext(&ri)) {
unsigned char *lp = ri.data, *p = lpFirst(lp);
int64_t entries = lpGetInteger(p);
/* Check if we can remove the whole node, and still have at
* least maxlen elements. */
if (s->length - entries >= maxlen) {
lpFree(lp);
raxRemove(s->rax,ri.key,ri.key_len,NULL);
raxSeek(&ri,">=",ri.key,ri.key_len);
s->length -= entries;
deleted += entries;
continue;
}
/* If we cannot remove a whole element, and approx is true,
* stop here. */
if (approx) break;
/* Otherwise, we have to mark single entries inside the listpack
* as deleted. We start by updating the entries/deleted counters. */
int64_t to_delete = s->length - maxlen;
serverAssert(to_delete < entries);
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,entries-to_delete);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek deleted field. */
int64_t marked_deleted = lpGetInteger(p);
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,marked_deleted+to_delete);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek num-of-fields in the master entry. */
/* Skip all the master fields. */
int64_t master_fields_count = lpGetInteger(p);
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek the first field. */
for (int64_t j = 0; j < master_fields_count; j++)
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip all master fields. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the zero master entry terminator. */
/* 'p' is now pointing to the first entry inside the listpack.
* We have to run entry after entry, marking entries as deleted
* if they are already not deleted. */
while(p) {
int flags = lpGetInteger(p);
int to_skip;
/* Mark the entry as deleted. */
if (!(flags & STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED)) {
flags |= STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED;
lp = lpReplaceInteger(lp,&p,flags);
deleted++;
s->length--;
if (s->length <= maxlen) break; /* Enough entries deleted. */
}
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip ID ms delta. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip ID seq delta. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Seek num-fields or values (if compressed). */
if (flags & STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_SAMEFIELDS) {
to_skip = master_fields_count;
} else {
to_skip = lpGetInteger(p);
to_skip = 1+(to_skip*2);
}
while(to_skip--) p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the whole entry. */
p = lpNext(lp,p); /* Skip the final lp-count field. */
}
/* Here we should perform garbage collection in case at this point
* there are too many entries deleted inside the listpack. */
entries -= to_delete;
marked_deleted += to_delete;
if (entries + marked_deleted > 10 && marked_deleted > entries/2) {
/* TODO: perform a garbage collection. */
}
/* Update the listpack with the new pointer. */
raxInsert(s->rax,ri.key,ri.key_len,lp,NULL);
break; /* If we are here, there was enough to delete in the current
node, so no need to go to the next node. */
}
raxStop(&ri);
return deleted;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JPEGImageDecoder::setFailed()
{
m_reader.clear();
return ImageDecoder::setFailed();
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowWorkerFileSystem(
const GURL& url,
content::ResourceContext* context,
const std::vector<content::GlobalFrameRoutingId>& render_frames,
base::Callback<void(bool)> callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
content_settings::CookieSettings* cookie_settings =
io_data->GetCookieSettings();
bool allow = cookie_settings->IsCookieAccessAllowed(url, url);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
GuestPermissionRequestHelper(url, render_frames, callback, allow);
#else
FileSystemAccessed(url, render_frames, callback, allow);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document& Document::axObjectCacheOwner() const
{
Document* top = const_cast<Document*>(this);
LocalFrame* frame = this->frame();
if (!frame)
return *top;
while (frame && frame->owner() && frame->owner()->isLocal()) {
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = toHTMLFrameOwnerElement(frame->owner());
top = &owner->document();
frame = top->frame();
}
if (top->frame() && top->frame()->pagePopupOwner()) {
ASSERT(!top->m_axObjectCache);
return top->frame()->pagePopupOwner()->document().axObjectCacheOwner();
}
ASSERT(top);
return *top;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SynthesizeGLError(
GLenum error,
const char* function_name,
const char* description,
ConsoleDisplayPreference display) {
String error_type = GetErrorString(error);
if (synthesized_errors_to_console_ && display == kDisplayInConsole) {
String message = String("WebGL: ") + error_type + ": " +
String(function_name) + ": " + String(description);
PrintGLErrorToConsole(message);
}
if (!isContextLost()) {
if (!synthetic_errors_.Contains(error))
synthetic_errors_.push_back(error);
} else {
if (!lost_context_errors_.Contains(error))
lost_context_errors_.push_back(error);
}
probe::didFireWebGLError(canvas(), error_type);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::globus_gram_client_get_jobmanager_version(const char * resource_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_GET_JOBMANAGER_VERSION";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!resource_contact) resource_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(resource_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc < 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
kmem_cache_free(nfs_inode_cachep, NFS_I(inode));
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Node> WebPagePrivate::contextNode(TargetDetectionStrategy strategy)
{
EventHandler* eventHandler = focusedOrMainFrame()->eventHandler();
const FatFingersResult lastFatFingersResult = m_touchEventHandler->lastFatFingersResult();
bool isTouching = lastFatFingersResult.isValid() && strategy == RectBased;
if (m_webSettings->doesGetFocusNodeContext() && !isTouching) {
RefPtr<Node> node;
node = m_page->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame()->document()->focusedNode();
if (node) {
IntRect visibleRect = IntRect(IntPoint(), actualVisibleSize());
if (!visibleRect.intersects(getNodeWindowRect(node.get())))
return 0;
}
return node.release();
}
if (isTouching && lastFatFingersResult.isTextInput())
return lastFatFingersResult.node(FatFingersResult::ShadowContentNotAllowed);
if (strategy == RectBased) {
FatFingersResult result = FatFingers(this, lastFatFingersResult.adjustedPosition(), FatFingers::Text).findBestPoint();
return result.node(FatFingersResult::ShadowContentNotAllowed);
}
if (strategy == FocusBased)
return m_inputHandler->currentFocusElement();
IntPoint contentPos;
if (isTouching)
contentPos = lastFatFingersResult.adjustedPosition();
else
contentPos = mapFromViewportToContents(m_lastMouseEvent.position());
HitTestResult result = eventHandler->hitTestResultAtPoint(contentPos, false /*allowShadowContent*/);
return result.innerNode();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetCursorPositionX(int cursor_pos) {
return test_api_->GetRenderText()->GetCursorBounds(
gfx::SelectionModel(cursor_pos, gfx::CURSOR_FORWARD), false).x();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_socket_finished_connecting_(evutil_socket_t fd)
{
int e;
ev_socklen_t elen = sizeof(e);
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void*)&e, &elen) < 0)
return -1;
if (e) {
if (EVUTIL_ERR_CONNECT_RETRIABLE(e))
return 0;
EVUTIL_SET_SOCKET_ERROR(e);
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkBitmap* Extension::GetCachedImageImpl(const ExtensionResource& source,
const gfx::Size& max_size) const {
const FilePath& path = source.relative_path();
ImageCache::iterator i = image_cache_.find(
ImageCacheKey(path, SizeToString(max_size)));
if (i != image_cache_.end())
return &(i->second);
i = image_cache_.find(ImageCacheKey(path, std::string()));
if (i != image_cache_.end()) {
SkBitmap& image = i->second;
if (image.width() <= max_size.width() &&
image.height() <= max_size.height())
return &(i->second);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: namePush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * value)
{
if (ctxt == NULL) return (-1);
if (ctxt->nameNr >= ctxt->nameMax) {
const xmlChar * *tmp;
tmp = (const xmlChar * *) xmlRealloc((xmlChar * *)ctxt->nameTab,
ctxt->nameMax * 2 *
sizeof(ctxt->nameTab[0]));
if (tmp == NULL) {
goto mem_error;
}
ctxt->nameTab = tmp;
ctxt->nameMax *= 2;
}
ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr] = value;
ctxt->name = value;
return (ctxt->nameNr++);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,373 |
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