instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jspGetNamedField(JsVar *object, const char* name, bool returnName) {
JsVar *child = 0;
if (jsvHasChildren(object))
child = jsvFindChildFromString(object, name, false);
if (!child) {
child = jspGetNamedFieldInParents(object, name, returnName);
if (!child && jsvIsFunction(object) && strcmp(name, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR)==0) {
JsVar *value = jsvNewObject(); // prototype is supposed to be an object
child = jsvAddNamedChild(object, value, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR);
jsvUnLock(value);
}
}
if (returnName) return child;
else return jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(child);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMenuList::didSetSelectedIndex(int listIndex)
{
didUpdateActiveOption(toHTMLSelectElement(node())->listToOptionIndex(listIndex));
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_audio_suspend(struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message)
{
struct snd_usb_audio *chip = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct snd_usb_stream *as;
struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer;
struct list_head *p;
if (chip == (void *)-1L)
return 0;
chip->autosuspended = !!PMSG_IS_AUTO(message);
if (!chip->autosuspended)
snd_power_change_state(chip->card, SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D3hot);
if (!chip->num_suspended_intf++) {
list_for_each_entry(as, &chip->pcm_list, list) {
snd_pcm_suspend_all(as->pcm);
as->substream[0].need_setup_ep =
as->substream[1].need_setup_ep = true;
}
list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list)
snd_usbmidi_suspend(p);
list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list)
snd_usb_mixer_suspend(mixer);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_alloc_cluster_offset(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t guest_offset,
uint64_t *host_offset, unsigned int *nb_clusters)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
trace_qcow2_do_alloc_clusters_offset(qemu_coroutine_self(), guest_offset,
*host_offset, *nb_clusters);
/* Allocate new clusters */
trace_qcow2_cluster_alloc_phys(qemu_coroutine_self());
if (*host_offset == 0) {
int64_t cluster_offset =
qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, *nb_clusters * s->cluster_size);
if (cluster_offset < 0) {
return cluster_offset;
}
*host_offset = cluster_offset;
return 0;
} else {
int ret = qcow2_alloc_clusters_at(bs, *host_offset, *nb_clusters);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
*nb_clusters = ret;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ConditionalizedRequestUpdatesCacheHelper(
const Response& net_response_1,
const Response& net_response_2,
const Response& cached_response_2,
const char* extra_request_headers) {
MockHttpCache cache;
const char* kUrl = "http://foobar.com/main.css";
static const Response kUnexpectedResponse = {
"HTTP/1.1 500 Unexpected",
"Server: unexpected_header",
"unexpected body"
};
MockTransaction mock_network_response = { 0 };
mock_network_response.url = kUrl;
AddMockTransaction(&mock_network_response);
MockTransaction request = { 0 };
request.url = kUrl;
request.method = "GET";
request.request_headers = "";
net_response_1.AssignTo(&mock_network_response); // Network mock.
net_response_1.AssignTo(&request); // Expected result.
std::string response_headers;
RunTransactionTestWithResponse(
cache.http_cache(), request, &response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(net_response_1.status_and_headers(), response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.network_layer()->transaction_count());
EXPECT_EQ(0, cache.disk_cache()->open_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->create_count());
request.load_flags = net::LOAD_ONLY_FROM_CACHE;
kUnexpectedResponse.AssignTo(&mock_network_response); // Network mock.
net_response_1.AssignTo(&request); // Expected result.
RunTransactionTestWithResponse(
cache.http_cache(), request, &response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(net_response_1.status_and_headers(), response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.network_layer()->transaction_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->open_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->create_count());
request.request_headers = extra_request_headers;
request.load_flags = net::LOAD_NORMAL;
net_response_2.AssignTo(&mock_network_response); // Network mock.
net_response_2.AssignTo(&request); // Expected result.
RunTransactionTestWithResponse(
cache.http_cache(), request, &response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(net_response_2.status_and_headers(), response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache.network_layer()->transaction_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->open_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->create_count());
request.request_headers = "";
request.load_flags = net::LOAD_ONLY_FROM_CACHE;
kUnexpectedResponse.AssignTo(&mock_network_response); // Network mock.
cached_response_2.AssignTo(&request); // Expected result.
RunTransactionTestWithResponse(
cache.http_cache(), request, &response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(cached_response_2.status_and_headers(), response_headers);
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache.network_layer()->transaction_count());
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache.disk_cache()->open_count());
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache.disk_cache()->create_count());
RemoveMockTransaction(&mock_network_response);
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on(int cpu, struct delayed_work *dwork,
unsigned long delay)
{
return mod_delayed_work_on(cpu, kblockd_workqueue, dwork, delay);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BlobURLRequestJob::ReadRawData(net::IOBuffer* dest,
int dest_size,
int* bytes_read) {
DCHECK_NE(dest_size, 0);
DCHECK(bytes_read);
DCHECK_GE(remaining_bytes_, 0);
if (error_) {
*bytes_read = 0;
return true;
}
if (remaining_bytes_ < dest_size)
dest_size = static_cast<int>(remaining_bytes_);
if (!dest_size) {
*bytes_read = 0;
return true;
}
DCHECK(!read_buf_);
read_buf_ = new net::DrainableIOBuffer(dest, dest_size);
return ReadLoop(bytes_read);
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 115,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_serial_info(struct edgeport_port *edge_port,
struct serial_struct __user *retinfo)
{
struct serial_struct tmp;
unsigned cwait;
cwait = edge_port->port->port.closing_wait;
if (cwait != ASYNC_CLOSING_WAIT_NONE)
cwait = jiffies_to_msecs(cwait) / 10;
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
tmp.type = PORT_16550A;
tmp.line = edge_port->port->minor;
tmp.port = edge_port->port->port_number;
tmp.irq = 0;
tmp.xmit_fifo_size = edge_port->port->bulk_out_size;
tmp.baud_base = 9600;
tmp.close_delay = 5*HZ;
tmp.closing_wait = cwait;
if (copy_to_user(retinfo, &tmp, sizeof(*retinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t MockNetworkTransaction::GetTotalSentBytes() const {
return sent_bytes_;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_x86_ops->skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return kvm_emulate_wbinvd_noskip(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockContentsView::DoLayout() {
bool landscape = login_layout_util::ShouldShowLandscape(GetWidget());
for (auto& action : rotation_actions_)
action.Run(landscape);
const display::Display& display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestWindow(
GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow());
SetPreferredSize(display.size());
SizeToPreferredSize();
Layout();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void v9fs_setattr(void *opaque)
{
int err = 0;
int32_t fid;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsIattr v9iattr;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dI", &fid, &v9iattr);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MODE) {
err = v9fs_co_chmod(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.mode);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_ATIME | P9_ATTR_MTIME)) {
struct timespec times[2];
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME_SET) {
times[0].tv_sec = v9iattr.atime_sec;
times[0].tv_nsec = v9iattr.atime_nsec;
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME_SET) {
times[1].tv_sec = v9iattr.mtime_sec;
times[1].tv_nsec = v9iattr.mtime_nsec;
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
err = v9fs_co_utimensat(pdu, &fidp->path, times);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
/*
* If the only valid entry in iattr is ctime we can call
* chown(-1,-1) to update the ctime of the file
*/
if ((v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_UID | P9_ATTR_GID)) ||
((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_CTIME)
&& !((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MASK) & ~P9_ATTR_CTIME))) {
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_UID)) {
v9iattr.uid = -1;
}
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_GID)) {
v9iattr.gid = -1;
}
err = v9fs_co_chown(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.uid,
v9iattr.gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_SIZE)) {
err = v9fs_co_truncate(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
err = offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 167,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::vertexAttribI4iv(GLuint index,
const Vector<GLint>& v) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (v.size() < 4) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "vertexAttribI4iv", "invalid array");
return;
}
ContextGL()->VertexAttribI4iv(index, v.data());
SetVertexAttribType(index, kInt32ArrayType);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fire_sched_out_preempt_notifiers(struct task_struct *curr,
struct task_struct *next)
{
if (static_key_false(&preempt_notifier_key))
__fire_sched_out_preempt_notifiers(curr, next);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_create_write_struct(png_const_charp user_png_ver, png_voidp error_ptr,
png_error_ptr error_fn, png_error_ptr warn_fn)
{
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
return (png_create_write_struct_2(user_png_ver, error_ptr, error_fn,
warn_fn, png_voidp_NULL, png_malloc_ptr_NULL, png_free_ptr_NULL));
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_kick(struct vhost_work *work)
{
pr_debug("%s: The handling func for control queue.\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gss_get_mic (minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
msg_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
gss_buffer_t msg_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_get_mic_args(minor_status, context_handle,
qop_req, message_buffer, msg_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_get_mic) {
status = mech->gss_get_mic(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
msg_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 168,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int av_parser_change(AVCodecParserContext *s,
AVCodecContext *avctx,
uint8_t **poutbuf, int *poutbuf_size,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size, int keyframe){
if(s && s->parser->split){
if((avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_GLOBAL_HEADER) || (avctx->flags2 & CODEC_FLAG2_LOCAL_HEADER)){
int i= s->parser->split(avctx, buf, buf_size);
buf += i;
buf_size -= i;
}
}
/* cast to avoid warning about discarding qualifiers */
*poutbuf= (uint8_t *) buf;
*poutbuf_size= buf_size;
if(avctx->extradata){
if( (keyframe && (avctx->flags2 & CODEC_FLAG2_LOCAL_HEADER))
/*||(s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I && (s->flags & PARSER_FLAG_DUMP_EXTRADATA_AT_NOKEY))*/
/*||(? && (s->flags & PARSER_FLAG_DUMP_EXTRADATA_AT_BEGIN)*/){
int size= buf_size + avctx->extradata_size;
*poutbuf_size= size;
*poutbuf= av_malloc(size + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
memcpy(*poutbuf, avctx->extradata, avctx->extradata_size);
memcpy((*poutbuf) + avctx->extradata_size, buf, buf_size + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::AppendPage(PDFEngine* engine, int index) {
pages_[index]->Unload();
pages_[index]->set_calculated_links(false);
pp::Size curr_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
FPDFPage_Delete(doc_, index);
FPDF_ImportPages(doc_, static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(engine)->doc(), "1", index);
pp::Size new_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
if (curr_page_size != new_page_size)
LoadPageInfo(true);
client_->Invalidate(GetPageScreenRect(index));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t yr_object_get_integer(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* integer_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
integer_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
integer_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (integer_obj == NULL)
return UNDEFINED;
assertf(integer_obj->type == OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER,
"type of \"%s\" is not integer\n", field);
return integer_obj->value.i;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunBeforeUnloadConfirm(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_reload,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->WillRunBeforeUnloadConfirm();
bool suppress_this_message =
!rfhi->is_active() ||
ShowingInterstitialPage() || !delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs(this) ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
if (suppress_this_message) {
rfhi->JavaScriptDialogClosed(reply_msg, true, base::string16());
return;
}
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_ = true;
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager(this);
dialog_manager_->RunBeforeUnloadDialog(
this, is_reload,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed, base::Unretained(this),
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(), reply_msg,
false));
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuProcessHost::software_rendering() {
return software_rendering_;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaPlayerService::instantiate() {
defaultServiceManager()->addService(
String16("media.player"), new MediaPlayerService());
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_bvr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
{
__u64 *r = &vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state.dbg_bvr[rd->reg];
if (copy_from_user(r, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int amd_pinconf_set(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev, unsigned int pin,
unsigned long *configs, unsigned num_configs)
{
int i;
u32 arg;
int ret = 0;
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
enum pin_config_param param;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = pinctrl_dev_get_drvdata(pctldev);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < num_configs; i++) {
param = pinconf_to_config_param(configs[i]);
arg = pinconf_to_config_argument(configs[i]);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + pin*4);
switch (param) {
case PIN_CONFIG_INPUT_DEBOUNCE:
pin_reg &= ~DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg |= arg & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
break;
case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_DOWN:
pin_reg &= ~BIT(PULL_DOWN_ENABLE_OFF);
pin_reg |= (arg & BIT(0)) << PULL_DOWN_ENABLE_OFF;
break;
case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_UP:
pin_reg &= ~BIT(PULL_UP_SEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= (arg & BIT(0)) << PULL_UP_SEL_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~BIT(PULL_UP_ENABLE_OFF);
pin_reg |= ((arg>>1) & BIT(0)) << PULL_UP_ENABLE_OFF;
break;
case PIN_CONFIG_DRIVE_STRENGTH:
pin_reg &= ~(DRV_STRENGTH_SEL_MASK
<< DRV_STRENGTH_SEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= (arg & DRV_STRENGTH_SEL_MASK)
<< DRV_STRENGTH_SEL_OFF;
break;
default:
dev_err(&gpio_dev->pdev->dev,
"Invalid config param %04x\n", param);
ret = -ENOTSUPP;
}
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + pin*4);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
{
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
/*
* this function is called immediately after a message has been
* serialized
*/
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
if (frag == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
if (is_ccs) {
/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
((s->version ==
DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
== (unsigned int)s->init_num);
} else {
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
}
frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
/* save current state */
frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch =
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer);
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] =
(unsigned
char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
seq64be[7] =
(unsigned
char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if (item == NULL) {
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
return 0;
}
pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_usbmidi_out_urb_complete(struct urb *urb)
{
struct out_urb_context *context = urb->context;
struct snd_usb_midi_out_endpoint *ep = context->ep;
unsigned int urb_index;
spin_lock(&ep->buffer_lock);
urb_index = context - ep->urbs;
ep->active_urbs &= ~(1 << urb_index);
if (unlikely(ep->drain_urbs)) {
ep->drain_urbs &= ~(1 << urb_index);
wake_up(&ep->drain_wait);
}
spin_unlock(&ep->buffer_lock);
if (urb->status < 0) {
int err = snd_usbmidi_urb_error(urb);
if (err < 0) {
if (err != -ENODEV)
mod_timer(&ep->umidi->error_timer,
jiffies + ERROR_DELAY_JIFFIES);
return;
}
}
snd_usbmidi_do_output(ep);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadRequiredFeatures(string16* error) {
if (!LoadName(error) ||
!LoadVersion(error))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void update_misfit_status(struct task_struct *p, struct rq *rq) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC_ALT(ossl_init_no_add_all_ciphers,
ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
{
/* Do nothing */
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool megasas_use_msi(MegasasState *s)
{
return s->flags & MEGASAS_MASK_USE_MSI;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__unix_find_socket_byname(struct net *net,
struct sockaddr_un *sunname,
int len, int type, unsigned int hash)
{
struct sock *s;
sk_for_each(s, &unix_socket_table[hash ^ type]) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (!net_eq(sock_net(s), net))
continue;
if (u->addr->len == len &&
!memcmp(u->addr->name, sunname, len))
goto found;
}
s = NULL;
found:
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char* dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(char event)
{
switch(event)
{
CASE_RETURN_STR(A2DP_CTRL_CMD_NONE)
CASE_RETURN_STR(A2DP_CTRL_CMD_CHECK_READY)
CASE_RETURN_STR(A2DP_CTRL_CMD_START)
CASE_RETURN_STR(A2DP_CTRL_CMD_STOP)
CASE_RETURN_STR(A2DP_CTRL_CMD_SUSPEND)
default:
return "UNKNOWN MSG ID";
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::CommitLazyLastAccessTimes() {
if (lazy_last_access_times_.empty())
return true;
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
sql::Transaction transaction(db_.get());
if (!transaction.Begin())
return false;
for (const auto& pair : lazy_last_access_times_) {
static const char kSql[] =
"UPDATE Groups SET last_access_time = ? WHERE group_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, pair.second.ToInternalValue()); // time
statement.BindInt64(1, pair.first); // group_id
statement.Run();
}
lazy_last_access_times_.clear();
return transaction.Commit();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OnWindowDidShow() {
if (window_has_shown_)
return;
window_has_shown_ = true;
startup_metric_utils::RecordBrowserWindowDisplay(base::TimeTicks::Now());
if (!is_type_tabbed())
return;
GlobalErrorService* service =
GlobalErrorServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
GlobalError* error = service->GetFirstGlobalErrorWithBubbleView();
if (error)
error->ShowBubbleView(this);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheHost::MarkAsForeignEntry(const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
storage()->MarkEntryAsForeign(
main_resource_was_namespace_entry_ ? namespace_entry_url_ : document_url,
cache_document_was_loaded_from);
SelectCache(document_url, kAppCacheNoCacheId, GURL());
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI int php_var_unserialize_ex(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER)
{
var_entries *orig_var_entries = (*var_hash)->last;
zend_long orig_used_slots = orig_var_entries ? orig_var_entries->used_slots : 0;
int result;
result = php_var_unserialize_internal(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
if (!result) {
/* If the unserialization failed, mark all elements that have been added to var_hash
* as NULL. This will forbid their use by other unserialize() calls in the same
* unserialization context. */
var_entries *e = orig_var_entries;
zend_long s = orig_used_slots;
while (e) {
for (; s < e->used_slots; s++) {
e->data[s] = NULL;
}
e = e->next;
s = 0;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 62,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::DidOverscroll(gfx::Vector2d overscroll_delta,
gfx::Vector2dF overscroll_velocity) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
Java_AwContents_didOverscroll(env, obj.obj(), overscroll_delta.x(),
overscroll_delta.y(), overscroll_velocity.x(),
overscroll_velocity.y());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
#endif
int ret;
size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
}
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 5 protocol version
* 6 . 9 UNIX time()
* 10 . 37 random bytes
*/
buf = ssl->out_msg;
p = buf + 4;
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, p );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
p += 4;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
p += 28;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 );
/*
* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
* It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext().
* If not, try looking up session ID in our cache.
*/
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 &&
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE &&
#endif
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 &&
ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL &&
ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
}
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 )
{
/*
* New session, create a new session id,
* unless we're about to issue a session ticket
*/
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
{
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id,
n ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
else
{
/*
* Resuming a session
*/
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
/*
* 38 . 38 session id length
* 39 . 38+n session id
* 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite
* 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg.
* 42+n . 43+n extensions length
* 44+n . 43+n+m extensions
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->compression );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) );
/* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) )
{
#endif
/*
* First write extensions, then the total length
*/
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) );
if( ext_len > 0 )
{
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF );
p += ext_len;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
}
#endif
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 86,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unregister_pernet_device(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (&ops->list == first_device)
first_device = first_device->next;
unregister_pernet_operations(ops);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLManager::IsFenceSyncReleased(uint64_t release) {
return release <= command_buffer_->GetLastState().release_count;
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SupervisedUserService::OnBlacklistFileChecked(const base::FilePath& path,
const GURL& url,
bool file_exists) {
DCHECK(blacklist_state_ == BlacklistLoadState::LOAD_STARTED);
if (file_exists) {
LoadBlacklistFromFile(path);
return;
}
DCHECK(!blacklist_downloader_);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("supervised_users_blacklist", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Supervised Users"
description:
"Downloads a static blacklist consisting of hostname hashes of "
"common inappropriate websites. This is only enabled for child "
"accounts and only if the corresponding setting is enabled by the "
"parent."
trigger:
"The file is downloaded on demand if the child account profile is "
"created and the setting is enabled."
data:
"No additional data is sent to the server beyond the request "
"itself."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"The feature can be remotely enabled or disabled by the parent. In "
"addition, if sign-in is restricted to accounts from a managed "
"domain, those accounts are not going to be child accounts."
chrome_policy {
RestrictSigninToPattern {
policy_options {mode: MANDATORY}
RestrictSigninToPattern: "*@manageddomain.com"
}
}
})");
auto factory = content::BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(profile_)
->GetURLLoaderFactoryForBrowserProcess();
blacklist_downloader_.reset(new FileDownloader(
url, path, false, std::move(factory),
base::BindOnce(&SupervisedUserService::OnBlacklistDownloadDone,
base::Unretained(this), path),
traffic_annotation));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int ret;
time_t minwait_secs = 0;
int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
/* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp,
&minwait_secs, 0);
/* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */
if (minwait_secs != 0)
max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
/*
* if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
* and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
* alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
*
* this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
* analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
*/
if (options.client_alive_interval) {
uint64_t keepalive_ms =
(uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
client_alive_scheduled = 1;
if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms)
max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
}
#if 0
/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
#endif
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
notify_prepare(*readsetp);
/*
* If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
* descriptor.
*/
if (packet_have_data_to_write())
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
* from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
*/
if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
max_time_ms = 100;
if (max_time_ms == 0)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
tvp = &tv;
}
/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret == -1) {
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
client_alive_check();
notify_done(*readsetp);
}
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 72,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::OnLoadedInstalledExtensions() {
if (updater_.get()) {
updater_->Start();
}
ready_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSIONS_READY,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebRequestPermissions::HideRequest(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const extensions::WebRequestInfo& request) {
if (request.is_web_view)
return false;
if (request.is_pac_request)
return true;
bool is_request_from_browser = request.render_process_id == -1;
bool is_request_from_webui_renderer = false;
if (!is_request_from_browser) {
if (request.is_web_view)
return false;
if (extension_info_map &&
extension_info_map->process_map().Contains(extensions::kWebStoreAppId,
request.render_process_id)) {
return true;
}
is_request_from_webui_renderer =
content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
request.render_process_id);
}
return IsSensitiveURL(request.url, is_request_from_browser ||
is_request_from_webui_renderer) ||
!HasWebRequestScheme(request.url);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsUIBindings::DevToolsUIBindings(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: profile_(Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())),
android_bridge_(DevToolsAndroidBridge::Factory::GetForProfile(profile_)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
delegate_(new DefaultBindingsDelegate(web_contents_)),
devices_updates_enabled_(false),
frontend_loaded_(false),
reloading_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
g_instances.Get().push_back(this);
frontend_contents_observer_.reset(new FrontendWebContentsObserver(this));
web_contents_->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
file_helper_.reset(new DevToolsFileHelper(web_contents_, profile_, this));
file_system_indexer_ = new DevToolsFileSystemIndexer();
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
web_contents_);
embedder_message_dispatcher_.reset(
DevToolsEmbedderMessageDispatcher::CreateForDevToolsFrontend(this));
}
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::UpdatePriority() {
if (!destroyed_)
process_->UpdateClientPriority(this);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lock_mount(struct path *path)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt;
retry:
mutex_lock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (unlikely(cant_mount(path->dentry))) {
mutex_unlock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
return -ENOENT;
}
down_write(&namespace_sem);
mnt = lookup_mnt(path);
if (likely(!mnt))
return 0;
up_write(&namespace_sem);
mutex_unlock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
path_put(path);
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_root);
goto retry;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ResponseWriter::Finish(int net_error,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
return net::OK;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(lcfirst)
{
zend_string *str;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S", &str) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!ZSTR_LEN(str)) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
ZVAL_STRINGL(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
php_lcfirst(Z_STRVAL_P(return_value));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
#endif
uprobe_free_utask(tsk);
/* Get rid of any cached register state */
deactivate_mm(tsk, mm);
/*
* Signal userspace if we're not exiting with a core dump
* because we want to leave the value intact for debugging
* purposes.
*/
if (tsk->clear_child_tid) {
if (!(tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_COREDUMP) &&
atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid);
sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE,
1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
}
/*
* All done, finally we can wake up parent and return this mm to him.
* Also kthread_stop() uses this completion for synchronization.
*/
if (tsk->vfork_done)
complete_vfork_done(tsk);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webViewExitFullscreen(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
if (priv->fullscreenVideoController)
priv->fullscreenVideoController->exitFullscreen();
#endif
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_enumerate_device(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int err;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(udev->bus);
if (udev->config == NULL) {
err = usb_get_configuration(udev);
if (err < 0) {
if (err != -ENODEV)
dev_err(&udev->dev, "can't read configurations, error %d\n",
err);
return err;
}
}
/* read the standard strings and cache them if present */
udev->product = usb_cache_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iProduct);
udev->manufacturer = usb_cache_string(udev,
udev->descriptor.iManufacturer);
udev->serial = usb_cache_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber);
err = usb_enumerate_device_otg(udev);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_OTG_WHITELIST) && hcd->tpl_support &&
!is_targeted(udev)) {
/* Maybe it can talk to us, though we can't talk to it.
* (Includes HNP test device.)
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_OTG) && (udev->bus->b_hnp_enable
|| udev->bus->is_b_host)) {
err = usb_port_suspend(udev, PMSG_AUTO_SUSPEND);
if (err < 0)
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "HNP fail, %d\n", err);
}
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
usb_detect_interface_quirks(udev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::OnCanMakePaymentEventSkipped(
ValidateCanMakePaymentCallback callback) {
can_make_payment_result_ = true;
has_enrolled_instrument_result_ = false;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(std::move(callback), this, can_make_payment_result_));
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_cc_op(DisasContext *s, CCOp op)
{
int dead;
if (s->cc_op == op) {
return;
}
/* Discard CC computation that will no longer be used. */
dead = cc_op_live[s->cc_op] & ~cc_op_live[op];
if (dead & USES_CC_DST) {
tcg_gen_discard_tl(cpu_cc_dst);
}
if (dead & USES_CC_SRC) {
tcg_gen_discard_tl(cpu_cc_src);
}
if (dead & USES_CC_SRC2) {
tcg_gen_discard_tl(cpu_cc_src2);
}
if (dead & USES_CC_SRCT) {
tcg_gen_discard_tl(cpu_cc_srcT);
}
if (op == CC_OP_DYNAMIC) {
/* The DYNAMIC setting is translator only, and should never be
stored. Thus we always consider it clean. */
s->cc_op_dirty = false;
} else {
/* Discard any computed CC_OP value (see shifts). */
if (s->cc_op == CC_OP_DYNAMIC) {
tcg_gen_discard_i32(cpu_cc_op);
}
s->cc_op_dirty = true;
}
s->cc_op = op;
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXCodec::configureCodec(const sp<MetaData> &meta) {
ALOGV("configureCodec protected=%d",
(mFlags & kEnableGrallocUsageProtected) ? 1 : 0);
if (!(mFlags & kIgnoreCodecSpecificData)) {
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size;
if (meta->findData(kKeyESDS, &type, &data, &size)) {
ESDS esds((const char *)data, size);
CHECK_EQ(esds.InitCheck(), (status_t)OK);
const void *codec_specific_data;
size_t codec_specific_data_size;
esds.getCodecSpecificInfo(
&codec_specific_data, &codec_specific_data_size);
addCodecSpecificData(
codec_specific_data, codec_specific_data_size);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyAVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
unsigned profile, level;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseAVCCodecSpecificData(
data, size, &profile, &level)) != OK) {
ALOGE("Malformed AVC codec specific data.");
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGI(
"AVC profile = %u (%s), level = %u",
profile, AVCProfileToString(profile), level);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyHVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
unsigned profile, level;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseHEVCCodecSpecificData(
data, size, &profile, &level)) != OK) {
ALOGE("Malformed HEVC codec specific data.");
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGI(
"HEVC profile = %u , level = %u",
profile, level);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyVorbisInfo, &type, &data, &size)) {
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyVorbisBooks, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyOpusHeader, &type, &data, &size)) {
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyOpusCodecDelay, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyOpusSeekPreRoll, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
}
}
int32_t bitRate = 0;
if (mIsEncoder) {
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyBitRate, &bitRate));
}
if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_NB, mMIME)) {
setAMRFormat(false /* isWAMR */, bitRate);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_WB, mMIME)) {
setAMRFormat(true /* isWAMR */, bitRate);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AAC, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate, aacProfile;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyAACProfile, &aacProfile)) {
aacProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull;
}
int32_t isADTS;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyIsADTS, &isADTS)) {
isADTS = false;
}
status_t err = setAACFormat(numChannels, sampleRate, bitRate, aacProfile, isADTS);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("setAACFormat() failed (err = %d)", err);
return err;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MPEG, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels)
&& meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate)) {
setRawAudioFormat(
mIsEncoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AC3, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels;
int32_t sampleRate;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
status_t err = setAC3Format(numChannels, sampleRate);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("setAC3Format() failed (err = %d)", err);
return err;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_ALAW, mMIME)
|| !strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_MLAW, mMIME)) {
int32_t sampleRate;
int32_t numChannels;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate)) {
sampleRate = 8000;
}
setG711Format(sampleRate, numChannels);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_RAW, mMIME)) {
CHECK(!mIsEncoder);
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
setRawAudioFormat(kPortIndexInput, sampleRate, numChannels);
}
if (!strncasecmp(mMIME, "video/", 6)) {
if (mIsEncoder) {
setVideoInputFormat(mMIME, meta);
} else {
status_t err = setVideoOutputFormat(
mMIME, meta);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
}
int32_t maxInputSize;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, &maxInputSize)) {
setMinBufferSize(kPortIndexInput, (OMX_U32)maxInputSize);
}
initOutputFormat(meta);
if (mNativeWindow != NULL
&& !mIsEncoder
&& !strncasecmp(mMIME, "video/", 6)
&& !strncmp(mComponentName, "OMX.", 4)) {
status_t err = initNativeWindow();
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sas_change_queue_depth(struct scsi_device *sdev, int depth)
{
struct domain_device *dev = sdev_to_domain_dev(sdev);
if (dev_is_sata(dev))
return __ata_change_queue_depth(dev->sata_dev.ap, sdev, depth);
if (!sdev->tagged_supported)
depth = 1;
return scsi_change_queue_depth(sdev, depth);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 83,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext4_ext_max_entries(struct inode *inode, int depth)
{
int max;
if (depth == ext_depth(inode)) {
if (depth == 0)
max = ext4_ext_space_root(inode, 1);
else
max = ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 1);
} else {
if (depth == 0)
max = ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 1);
else
max = ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 1);
}
return max;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int o2nm_depend_item(struct config_item *item)
{
return configfs_depend_item(&o2nm_cluster_group.cs_subsys, item);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentUtilityClient::DecodeImageAndSend(
const std::vector<unsigned char>& encoded_data,
bool shrink_to_fit,
int request_id) {
SkBitmap decoded_image = DecodeImage(encoded_data, shrink_to_fit);
if (decoded_image.empty()) {
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_DecodeImage_Failed(request_id));
} else {
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_DecodeImage_Succeeded(decoded_image,
request_id));
}
ReleaseProcessIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetWindowAttributeEventListener(const AtomicString& event_type,
EventListener* listener) {
LocalDOMWindow* dom_window = this->domWindow();
if (!dom_window)
return;
dom_window->SetAttributeEventListener(event_type, listener);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
if (alg == NULL)
return NULL;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
return NULL;
if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 164,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xts_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[8];
struct xts_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.tweak_ctx = aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx),
.tweak_fn = aesni_xts_tweak,
.crypt_ctx = aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx),
.crypt_fn = lrw_xts_decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
ret = xts_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
kernel_fpu_end();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xpendingCommand(client *c) {
int justinfo = c->argc == 3; /* Without the range just outputs general
informations about the PEL. */
robj *key = c->argv[1];
robj *groupname = c->argv[2];
robj *consumername = (c->argc == 7) ? c->argv[6] : NULL;
streamID startid, endid;
long long count;
/* Start and stop, and the consumer, can be omitted. */
if (c->argc != 3 && c->argc != 6 && c->argc != 7) {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
return;
}
/* Parse start/end/count arguments ASAP if needed, in order to report
* syntax errors before any other error. */
if (c->argc >= 6) {
if (getLongLongFromObjectOrReply(c,c->argv[5],&count,NULL) == C_ERR)
return;
if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[3],&startid,0) == C_ERR)
return;
if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&endid,UINT64_MAX) == C_ERR)
return;
}
/* Lookup the key and the group inside the stream. */
robj *o = lookupKeyRead(c->db,c->argv[1]);
streamCG *group;
if (o && checkType(c,o,OBJ_STREAM)) return;
if (o == NULL ||
(group = streamLookupCG(o->ptr,groupname->ptr)) == NULL)
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such key '%s' or consumer "
"group '%s'",
(char*)key->ptr,(char*)groupname->ptr);
return;
}
/* XPENDING <key> <group> variant. */
if (justinfo) {
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,4);
/* Total number of messages in the PEL. */
addReplyLongLong(c,raxSize(group->pel));
/* First and last IDs. */
if (raxSize(group->pel) == 0) {
addReply(c,shared.nullbulk); /* Start. */
addReply(c,shared.nullbulk); /* End. */
addReply(c,shared.nullmultibulk); /* Clients. */
} else {
/* Start. */
raxIterator ri;
raxStart(&ri,group->pel);
raxSeek(&ri,"^",NULL,0);
raxNext(&ri);
streamDecodeID(ri.key,&startid);
addReplyStreamID(c,&startid);
/* End. */
raxSeek(&ri,"$",NULL,0);
raxNext(&ri);
streamDecodeID(ri.key,&endid);
addReplyStreamID(c,&endid);
raxStop(&ri);
/* Consumers with pending messages. */
raxStart(&ri,group->consumers);
raxSeek(&ri,"^",NULL,0);
void *arraylen_ptr = addDeferredMultiBulkLength(c);
size_t arraylen = 0;
while(raxNext(&ri)) {
streamConsumer *consumer = ri.data;
if (raxSize(consumer->pel) == 0) continue;
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,2);
addReplyBulkCBuffer(c,ri.key,ri.key_len);
addReplyBulkLongLong(c,raxSize(consumer->pel));
arraylen++;
}
setDeferredMultiBulkLength(c,arraylen_ptr,arraylen);
raxStop(&ri);
}
}
/* XPENDING <key> <group> <start> <stop> <count> [<consumer>] variant. */
else {
streamConsumer *consumer = consumername ?
streamLookupConsumer(group,consumername->ptr,0):
NULL;
/* If a consumer name was mentioned but it does not exist, we can
* just return an empty array. */
if (consumername && consumer == NULL) {
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,0);
return;
}
rax *pel = consumer ? consumer->pel : group->pel;
unsigned char startkey[sizeof(streamID)];
unsigned char endkey[sizeof(streamID)];
raxIterator ri;
mstime_t now = mstime();
streamEncodeID(startkey,&startid);
streamEncodeID(endkey,&endid);
raxStart(&ri,pel);
raxSeek(&ri,">=",startkey,sizeof(startkey));
void *arraylen_ptr = addDeferredMultiBulkLength(c);
size_t arraylen = 0;
while(count && raxNext(&ri) && memcmp(ri.key,endkey,ri.key_len) <= 0) {
streamNACK *nack = ri.data;
arraylen++;
count--;
addReplyMultiBulkLen(c,4);
/* Entry ID. */
streamID id;
streamDecodeID(ri.key,&id);
addReplyStreamID(c,&id);
/* Consumer name. */
addReplyBulkCBuffer(c,nack->consumer->name,
sdslen(nack->consumer->name));
/* Milliseconds elapsed since last delivery. */
mstime_t elapsed = now - nack->delivery_time;
if (elapsed < 0) elapsed = 0;
addReplyLongLong(c,elapsed);
/* Number of deliveries. */
addReplyLongLong(c,nack->delivery_count);
}
raxStop(&ri);
setDeferredMultiBulkLength(c,arraylen_ptr,arraylen);
}
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __ims_pcu_execute_command(struct ims_pcu *pcu,
u8 command, const void *data, size_t len,
u8 expected_response, int response_time)
{
int error;
pcu->expected_response = expected_response;
init_completion(&pcu->cmd_done);
error = ims_pcu_send_command(pcu, command, data, len);
if (error)
return error;
if (expected_response &&
!wait_for_completion_timeout(&pcu->cmd_done,
msecs_to_jiffies(response_time))) {
dev_dbg(pcu->dev, "Command 0x%02x timed out\n", command);
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::strokeNarrow(SplashPath *path) {
SplashPipe pipe;
SplashXPath *xPath;
SplashXPathSeg *seg;
int x0, x1, y0, y1, xa, xb, y;
SplashCoord dxdy;
SplashClipResult clipRes;
int nClipRes[3];
int i;
nClipRes[0] = nClipRes[1] = nClipRes[2] = 0;
xPath = new SplashXPath(path, state->matrix, state->flatness, gFalse);
pipeInit(&pipe, 0, 0, state->strokePattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->strokeAlpha * 255),
gFalse, gFalse);
for (i = 0, seg = xPath->segs; i < xPath->length; ++i, ++seg) {
if (seg->y0 <= seg->y1) {
y0 = splashFloor(seg->y0);
y1 = splashFloor(seg->y1);
x0 = splashFloor(seg->x0);
x1 = splashFloor(seg->x1);
} else {
y0 = splashFloor(seg->y1);
y1 = splashFloor(seg->y0);
x0 = splashFloor(seg->x1);
x1 = splashFloor(seg->x0);
}
if ((clipRes = state->clip->testRect(x0 <= x1 ? x0 : x1, y0,
x0 <= x1 ? x1 : x0, y1))
!= splashClipAllOutside) {
if (y0 == y1) {
if (x0 <= x1) {
drawSpan(&pipe, x0, x1, y0, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
} else {
drawSpan(&pipe, x1, x0, y0, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
} else {
dxdy = seg->dxdy;
if (y0 < state->clip->getYMinI()) {
y0 = state->clip->getYMinI();
x0 = splashFloor(seg->x0 + ((SplashCoord)y0 - seg->y0) * dxdy);
}
if (y1 > state->clip->getYMaxI()) {
y1 = state->clip->getYMaxI();
x1 = splashFloor(seg->x0 + ((SplashCoord)y1 - seg->y0) * dxdy);
}
if (x0 <= x1) {
xa = x0;
for (y = y0; y <= y1; ++y) {
if (y < y1) {
xb = splashFloor(seg->x0 +
((SplashCoord)y + 1 - seg->y0) * dxdy);
} else {
xb = x1 + 1;
}
if (xa == xb) {
drawPixel(&pipe, xa, y, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
} else {
drawSpan(&pipe, xa, xb - 1, y, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
xa = xb;
}
} else {
xa = x0;
for (y = y0; y <= y1; ++y) {
if (y < y1) {
xb = splashFloor(seg->x0 +
((SplashCoord)y + 1 - seg->y0) * dxdy);
} else {
xb = x1 - 1;
}
if (xa == xb) {
drawPixel(&pipe, xa, y, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
} else {
drawSpan(&pipe, xb + 1, xa, y, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
xa = xb;
}
}
}
}
++nClipRes[clipRes];
}
if (nClipRes[splashClipPartial] ||
(nClipRes[splashClipAllInside] && nClipRes[splashClipAllOutside])) {
opClipRes = splashClipPartial;
} else if (nClipRes[splashClipAllInside]) {
opClipRes = splashClipAllInside;
} else {
opClipRes = splashClipAllOutside;
}
delete xPath;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media_status_t AMediaCodec_flush(AMediaCodec *mData) {
return translate_error(mData->mCodec->flush());
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 162,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit genl_pernet_exit(struct net *net)
{
netlink_kernel_release(net->genl_sock);
net->genl_sock = NULL;
}
Commit Message: genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setCustomValidity(const String& error)
{
FormAssociatedElement::setCustomValidity(error);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *get_delta(struct object_entry *entry)
{
unsigned long size, base_size, delta_size;
void *buf, *base_buf, *delta_buf;
enum object_type type;
buf = read_sha1_file(entry->idx.sha1, &type, &size);
if (!buf)
die("unable to read %s", sha1_to_hex(entry->idx.sha1));
base_buf = read_sha1_file(entry->delta->idx.sha1, &type, &base_size);
if (!base_buf)
die("unable to read %s", sha1_to_hex(entry->delta->idx.sha1));
delta_buf = diff_delta(base_buf, base_size,
buf, size, &delta_size, 0);
if (!delta_buf || delta_size != entry->delta_size)
die("delta size changed");
free(buf);
free(base_buf);
return delta_buf;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::handleFocusEvent(Element* oldFocusedElement, FocusDirection direction)
{
m_inputTypeView->handleFocusEvent(oldFocusedElement, direction);
m_inputType->enableSecureTextInput();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_transform_image(png_store* PNG_CONST ps, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte PNG_CONST bit_depth, unsigned int palette_number,
int interlace_type, png_const_charp name)
{
context(ps, fault);
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_infop pi;
png_structp pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
png_uint_32 h;
/* In the event of a problem return control to the Catch statement below
* to do the clean up - it is not possible to 'return' directly from a Try
* block.
*/
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
h = transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, transform_width(pp, colour_type, bit_depth), h,
bit_depth, colour_type, interlace_type,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
# if defined(PNG_READ_zTXt_SUPPORTED) && defined(PNG_WRITE_zTXt_SUPPORTED)
# define TEXT_COMPRESSION PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_zTXt
# else
# define TEXT_COMPRESSION PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE
# endif
{
static char key[] = "image name"; /* must be writeable */
size_t pos;
png_text text;
char copy[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
/* Yuck: the text must be writable! */
pos = safecat(copy, sizeof copy, 0, ps->wname);
text.text = copy;
text.text_length = pos;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 1/*do tRNS*/);
png_write_info(pp, pi);
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) !=
transform_rowsize(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
/* Somewhat confusingly this must be called *after* png_write_info
* because if it is called before, the information in *pp has not been
* updated to reflect the interlaced image.
*/
int npasses = png_set_interlace_handling(pp);
int pass;
if (npasses != npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_byte buffer[TRANSFORM_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, buffer, colour_type, bit_depth, y);
png_write_row(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
{
static char key[] = "end marker";
static char comment[] = "end";
png_text text;
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
text.text = comment;
text.text_length = (sizeof comment)-1;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* And store this under the appropriate id, then clean up. */
store_storefile(ps, FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0));
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
/* Use the png_store returned by the exception. This may help the compiler
* because 'ps' is not used in this branch of the setjmp. Note that fault
* and ps will always be the same value.
*/
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init shm_init (void)
{
ipc_init_proc_interface("sysvipc/shm",
#if BITS_PER_LONG <= 32
" key shmid perms size cpid lpid nattch uid gid cuid cgid atime dtime ctime rss swap\n",
#else
" key shmid perms size cpid lpid nattch uid gid cuid cgid atime dtime ctime rss swap\n",
#endif
IPC_SHM_IDS, sysvipc_shm_proc_show);
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static StubLocalFrameClientWithParent* Create(Frame* parent) {
return new StubLocalFrameClientWithParent(parent);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCacheMetadataMap::ScanCacheDirectory(
const std::vector<FilePath>& cache_paths,
GDataCache::CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type,
CacheMap* cache_map,
ResourceIdToFilePathMap* processed_file_map) {
DCHECK(cache_map);
DCHECK(processed_file_map);
file_util::FileEnumerator enumerator(
cache_paths[sub_dir_type],
false, // not recursive
static_cast<file_util::FileEnumerator::FileType>(
file_util::FileEnumerator::FILES |
file_util::FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS),
util::kWildCard);
for (FilePath current = enumerator.Next(); !current.empty();
current = enumerator.Next()) {
std::string resource_id;
std::string md5;
std::string extra_extension;
util::ParseCacheFilePath(current, &resource_id, &md5, &extra_extension);
int cache_state = GDataCache::CACHE_STATE_NONE;
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
std::string reason;
if (!IsValidSymbolicLink(current, sub_dir_type, cache_paths, &reason)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an invalid symlink: " << current.value()
<< ": " << reason;
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (iter != cache_map->end()) { // Entry exists, update pinned state.
iter->second.cache_state =
GDataCache::SetCachePinned(iter->second.cache_state);
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
continue;
}
cache_state = GDataCache::SetCachePinned(cache_state);
} else if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING) {
std::string reason;
if (!IsValidSymbolicLink(current, sub_dir_type, cache_paths, &reason)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an invalid symlink: " << current.value()
<< ": " << reason;
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (iter == cache_map->end() || !iter->second.IsDirty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an symlink to a non-dirty file: "
<< current.value();
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
continue;
} else if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT ||
sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_TMP) {
FilePath unused;
if (file_util::ReadSymbolicLink(current, &unused)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing a symlink in persistent/tmp directory"
<< current.value();
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
if (extra_extension == util::kMountedArchiveFileExtension) {
DCHECK(sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT);
file_util::Delete(current, false);
} else {
cache_state = GDataCache::SetCachePresent(cache_state);
if (md5 == util::kLocallyModifiedFileExtension) {
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT) {
cache_state |= GDataCache::SetCacheDirty(cache_state);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing a dirty file in tmp directory: "
<< current.value();
file_util::Delete(current, false);
continue;
}
}
}
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected sub directory type: " << sub_dir_type;
}
cache_map->insert(std::make_pair(
resource_id, GDataCache::CacheEntry(md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state)));
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopRemovedDevice(
MediaDeviceType type,
const MediaDeviceInfo& media_device_info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(type == MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT ||
type == MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT);
MediaStreamType stream_type = ConvertToMediaStreamType(type);
std::vector<int> session_ids;
for (const LabeledDeviceRequest& labeled_request : requests_) {
const DeviceRequest* request = labeled_request.second;
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : request->devices) {
const std::string source_id = GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(
request->salt, request->security_origin, media_device_info.device_id);
if (device.id == source_id && device.type == stream_type) {
session_ids.push_back(device.session_id);
if (request->device_stopped_cb) {
request->device_stopped_cb.Run(labeled_request.first, device);
}
}
}
}
for (const int session_id : session_ids)
StopDevice(stream_type, session_id);
AddLogMessageOnIOThread(
base::StringPrintf(
"Media input device removed: type=%s, id=%s, name=%s ",
(stream_type == MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE ? "audio" : "video"),
media_device_info.device_id.c_str(), media_device_info.label.c_str())
.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String AudioHandler::ChannelInterpretation() {
switch (new_channel_interpretation_) {
case AudioBus::kSpeakers:
return "speakers";
case AudioBus::kDiscrete:
return "discrete";
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: standard_text_validate(standard_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi, int check_end)
{
png_textp tp = NULL;
png_uint_32 num_text = png_get_text(pp, pi, &tp, NULL);
if (num_text == 2 && tp != NULL)
{
standard_check_text(pp, tp, "image name", dp->ps->current->name);
/* This exists because prior to 1.5.18 the progressive reader left the
* png_struct z_stream unreset at the end of the image, so subsequent
* attempts to use it simply returns Z_STREAM_END.
*/
if (check_end)
standard_check_text(pp, tp+1, "end marker", "end");
}
else
{
char msg[64];
sprintf(msg, "expected two text items, got %lu",
(unsigned long)num_text);
png_error(pp, msg);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::DestroyAccessibilityTree(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (args.Length() != 1 || !args[0]->IsNumber()) {
ThrowInvalidArgumentsException(this);
return;
}
int tree_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
auto iter = tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree_id);
if (iter == tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
TreeCache* cache = iter->second;
tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(tree_id);
axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(&cache->tree);
delete cache;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: endDocumentDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.endDocument()\n");
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerListReverseIterator<Layer> LayerTreeHost::rend() {
return LayerListReverseIterator<Layer>(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_pmu_enable_bts(u64 config)
{
unsigned long debugctlmsr;
debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
debugctlmsr |= DEBUGCTLMSR_TR;
debugctlmsr |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS;
debugctlmsr |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTINT;
if (!(config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS))
debugctlmsr |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_OS;
if (!(config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR))
debugctlmsr |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_USR;
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
{
if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu) {
/*
* We are here if userspace calls get_regs() in the middle of
* instruction emulation. Registers state needs to be copied
* back from emulation context to vcpu. Userspace shouldn't do
* that usually, but some bad designed PV devices (vmware
* backdoor interface) need this to work
*/
emulator_writeback_register_cache(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
}
regs->rax = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
regs->rbx = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
regs->rcx = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
regs->rdx = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
regs->rsi = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
regs->rdi = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
regs->rsp = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
regs->rbp = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
regs->r8 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R8);
regs->r9 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R9);
regs->r10 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R10);
regs->r11 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R11);
regs->r12 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R12);
regs->r13 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R13);
regs->r14 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R14);
regs->r15 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R15);
#endif
regs->rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
regs->rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit AutomationMessageFilter(AutomationInternalCustomBindings* owner)
: owner_(owner),
removed_(false) {
DCHECK(owner);
content::RenderThread::Get()->AddFilter(this);
task_runner_ = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebCString WebPageSerializer::serializeToMHTML(WebView* view)
{
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> mhtml = serializePageToMHTML(toWebViewImpl(view)->page(), MHTMLArchive::UseDefaultEncoding);
return WebCString(mhtml->data(), mhtml->size());
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void platform_device_put(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
if (pdev)
put_device(&pdev->dev);
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline Guchar div255(int x) {
return (Guchar)((x + (x >> 8) + 0x80) >> 8);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::limitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StatusBubble* Browser::GetStatusBubble() {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kKioskMode))
return NULL;
return window_ ? window_->GetStatusBubble() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptedIdleTaskController& Document::EnsureScriptedIdleTaskController() {
if (!scripted_idle_task_controller_)
scripted_idle_task_controller_ = ScriptedIdleTaskController::Create(this);
return *scripted_idle_task_controller_;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTransportSocketPoolStalled(HttpNetworkSession* session) {
return session->GetTransportSocketPool(HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)
->IsStalled();
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_setDfsFlag(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface, jboolean dfs) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("setting dfs flag to %s, %p", dfs ? "true" : "false", handle);
u32 nodfs = dfs ? 0 : 1;
wifi_error result = hal_fn.wifi_set_nodfs_flag(handle, nodfs);
return result == WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
{
unsigned char *opt = *option;
unsigned char *tag;
unsigned char opt_iter;
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len;
u8 tag_len;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
u32 tag_iter;
/* caller already checks for length values that are too large */
opt_len = opt[1];
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
goto validate_return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(get_unaligned_be32(&opt[2]));
if (doi_def == NULL) {
err_offset = 2;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
opt_iter = CIPSO_V4_HDR_LEN;
tag = opt + opt_iter;
while (opt_iter < opt_len) {
for (tag_iter = 0; doi_def->tags[tag_iter] != tag[0];)
if (doi_def->tags[tag_iter] == CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID ||
++tag_iter == CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag_len = tag[1];
if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
switch (tag[0]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
/* We are already going to do all the verification
* necessary at the socket layer so from our point of
* view it is safe to turn these checks off (and less
* work), however, the CIPSO draft says we should do
* all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't
* really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate
* ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */
if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) {
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
/* This is a non-standard tag that we only allow for
* local connections, so if the incoming interface is
* not the loopback device drop the packet. */
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len != CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
default:
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag += tag_len;
opt_iter += tag_len;
}
validate_return_locked:
rcu_read_unlock();
validate_return:
*option = opt + err_offset;
return err_offset;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageDestroy (gdImagePtr im)
{
int i;
if (im->pixels) {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
}
if (im->tpixels) {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
gdFree(im->tpixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->tpixels);
}
if (im->AA_opacity) {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
gdFree(im->AA_opacity[i]);
}
gdFree(im->AA_opacity);
}
if (im->polyInts) {
gdFree(im->polyInts);
}
if (im->style) {
gdFree(im->style);
}
gdFree(im);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void report_tpr_access(struct kvm_lapic *apic, bool write)
{
if (apic->vcpu->arch.tpr_access_reporting)
__report_tpr_access(apic, write);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GamepadProvider::GamepadProvider(
GamepadConnectionChangeClient* connection_change_client,
std::unique_ptr<GamepadDataFetcher> fetcher)
: is_paused_(true),
have_scheduled_do_poll_(false),
devices_changed_(true),
ever_had_user_gesture_(false),
sanitize_(true),
gamepad_shared_buffer_(new GamepadSharedBuffer()),
connection_change_client_(connection_change_client) {
Initialize(std::move(fetcher));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool collect_subsytems(void)
{
char *line = NULL;
nih_local char **cgm_subsys_list = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
FILE *f = NULL;
if (subsystems) // already initialized
return true;
subsystems_inone = malloc(2 * sizeof(char *));
if (!subsystems_inone)
return false;
subsystems_inone[0] = "all";
subsystems_inone[1] = NULL;
if (lxc_list_controllers(&cgm_subsys_list)) {
while (cgm_subsys_list[nr_subsystems]) {
char **tmp = NIH_MUST( realloc(subsystems,
(nr_subsystems+2)*sizeof(char *)) );
tmp[nr_subsystems] = NIH_MUST(
strdup(cgm_subsys_list[nr_subsystems++]) );
subsystems = tmp;
}
if (nr_subsystems)
subsystems[nr_subsystems] = NULL;
goto collected;
}
INFO("cgmanager_list_controllers failed, falling back to /proc/self/cgroups");
f = fopen_cloexec("/proc/self/cgroup", "r");
if (!f) {
f = fopen_cloexec("/proc/1/cgroup", "r");
if (!f)
return false;
}
while (getline(&line, &sz, f) != -1) {
/* file format: hierarchy:subsystems:group,
* with multiple subsystems being ,-separated */
char *slist, *end, *p, *saveptr = NULL, **tmp;
if (!line[0])
continue;
slist = strchr(line, ':');
if (!slist)
continue;
slist++;
end = strchr(slist, ':');
if (!end)
continue;
*end = '\0';
for (p = strtok_r(slist, ",", &saveptr);
p;
p = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &saveptr)) {
tmp = realloc(subsystems, (nr_subsystems+2)*sizeof(char *));
if (!tmp)
goto out_free;
subsystems = tmp;
tmp[nr_subsystems] = strdup(p);
tmp[nr_subsystems+1] = NULL;
if (!tmp[nr_subsystems])
goto out_free;
nr_subsystems++;
}
}
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
free(line);
line = NULL;
collected:
if (!nr_subsystems) {
ERROR("No cgroup subsystems found");
return false;
}
/* make sure that cgroup.use can be and is honored */
const char *cgroup_use = lxc_global_config_value("lxc.cgroup.use");
if (!cgroup_use && errno != 0)
goto out_good;
if (cgroup_use) {
if (!verify_and_prune(cgroup_use)) {
free_subsystems();
return false;
}
subsystems_inone[0] = NIH_MUST( strdup(cgroup_use) );
cgm_all_controllers_same = false;
}
out_good:
return true;
out_free:
free(line);
if (f)
fclose(f);
free_subsystems();
return false;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,538 |
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