instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vdi_port_on_free_self_token(void *opaque)
{
if (inputs_inited() && reds->pending_mouse_event) {
spice_debug("pending mouse event");
reds_handle_agent_mouse_event(inputs_get_mouse_state());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_timer_sasl_cb (void *data, int remaining_calls)
{
struct t_irc_server *server;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) remaining_calls;
server = (struct t_irc_server *)data;
if (!server)
return WEECHAT_RC_ERROR;
server->hook_timer_sasl = NULL;
if (!server->is_connected)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: sasl authentication timeout"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
irc_server_sendf (server, 0, NULL, "CAP END");
}
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emulator_set_rflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong val)
{
kvm_set_rflags(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), val);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CCITTFaxStream::reset() {
int code1;
ccittReset(gFalse);
if (codingLine != NULL && refLine != NULL) {
eof = gFalse;
codingLine[0] = columns;
} else {
eof = gTrue;
}
while ((code1 = lookBits(12)) == 0) {
eatBits(1);
}
if (code1 == 0x001) {
eatBits(12);
endOfLine = gTrue;
}
if (encoding > 0) {
nextLine2D = !lookBits(1);
eatBits(1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_evt_handle_kick(struct vhost_work *work)
{
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = container_of(work, struct vhost_virtqueue,
poll.work);
struct vhost_scsi *vs = container_of(vq->dev, struct vhost_scsi, dev);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
if (!vq->private_data)
goto out;
if (vs->vs_events_missed)
vhost_scsi_send_evt(vs, NULL, NULL, VIRTIO_SCSI_T_NO_EVENT, 0);
out:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_tmpname(char *fnametmp, const char *fname, BOOL make_unique)
{
int maxname, length = 0;
const char *f;
char *suf;
if (tmpdir) {
/* Note: this can't overflow, so the return value is safe */
length = strlcpy(fnametmp, tmpdir, MAXPATHLEN - 2);
fnametmp[length++] = '/';
}
if ((f = strrchr(fname, '/')) != NULL) {
++f;
if (!tmpdir) {
length = f - fname;
/* copy up to and including the slash */
strlcpy(fnametmp, fname, length + 1);
}
} else
f = fname;
if (!tmpdir) { /* using a tmpdir avoids the leading dot on our temp names */
if (*f == '.') /* avoid an extra leading dot for OS X's sake */
f++;
fnametmp[length++] = '.';
}
/* The maxname value is bufsize, and includes space for the '\0'.
* NAME_MAX needs an extra -1 for the name's leading dot. */
maxname = MIN(MAXPATHLEN - length - TMPNAME_SUFFIX_LEN,
NAME_MAX - 1 - TMPNAME_SUFFIX_LEN);
if (maxname < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "temporary filename too long: %s\n", fname);
fnametmp[0] = '\0';
return 0;
}
if (maxname) {
int added = strlcpy(fnametmp + length, f, maxname);
if (added >= maxname)
added = maxname - 1;
suf = fnametmp + length + added;
/* Trim any dangling high-bit chars if the first-trimmed char (if any) is
* also a high-bit char, just in case we cut into a multi-byte sequence.
* We are guaranteed to stop because of the leading '.' we added. */
if ((int)f[added] & 0x80) {
while ((int)suf[-1] & 0x80)
suf--;
}
/* trim one trailing dot before our suffix's dot */
if (suf[-1] == '.')
suf--;
} else
suf = fnametmp + length - 1; /* overwrite the leading dot with suffix's dot */
if (make_unique) {
static unsigned counter_limit;
unsigned counter;
if (!counter_limit) {
counter_limit = (unsigned)getpid() + MAX_UNIQUE_LOOP;
if (counter_limit > MAX_UNIQUE_NUMBER || counter_limit < MAX_UNIQUE_LOOP)
counter_limit = MAX_UNIQUE_LOOP;
}
counter = counter_limit - MAX_UNIQUE_LOOP;
/* This doesn't have to be very good because we don't need
* to worry about someone trying to guess the values: all
* a conflict will do is cause a device, special file, hard
* link, or symlink to fail to be created. Also: avoid
* using mktemp() due to gcc's annoying warning. */
while (1) {
snprintf(suf, TMPNAME_SUFFIX_LEN+1, ".%d", counter);
if (access(fnametmp, 0) < 0)
break;
if (++counter >= counter_limit)
return 0;
}
} else
memcpy(suf, TMPNAME_SUFFIX, TMPNAME_SUFFIX_LEN+1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipgre_netlink_parms(struct nlattr *data[],
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms)
{
memset(parms, 0, sizeof(*parms));
parms->iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
if (!data)
return;
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LINK])
parms->link = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_GRE_LINK]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS])
parms->i_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS])
parms->o_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY])
parms->i_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY])
parms->o_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL])
parms->iph.saddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE])
parms->iph.daddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TTL])
parms->iph.ttl = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TTL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TOS])
parms->iph.tos = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TOS]);
if (!data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC] || nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC]))
parms->iph.frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4fv(GLuint index, const GLfloat* v) {
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttrib4fv", index, v)) {
glVertexAttrib4fv(index, v);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundChannel::stop()
{
bool stopped;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
stopped = doStop_l();
}
if (stopped) {
mSoundPool->done_l(this);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsWebcamAvailableOnSystem(WebContents* web_contents) {
std::string result;
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
web_contents, kHasVideoInputDeviceOnSystem, &result));
return result == kHasVideoInputDevice;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::overrideContainingBlockContentLogicalHeight() const
{
ASSERT(hasOverrideContainingBlockLogicalHeight());
return gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalHeightMap->get(this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RelayReadDirectory(const FilePath& file_path,
base::FileUtilProxy::ReadDirectoryCallback* callback)
: callback_(callback), file_path_(file_path) {
DCHECK(callback);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DateTimeChooserImpl::endChooser()
{
if (!m_popup)
return;
m_chromeClient->closePagePopup(m_popup);
}
Commit Message: AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 111,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::registerSVGFontFaceElement(SVGFontFaceElement* element)
{
m_svgFontFaceElements.add(element);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE int DecodeBlockTypeAndLength(int safe,
BrotliState* s, int tree_type) {
uint32_t max_block_type = s->num_block_types[tree_type];
int tree_offset = tree_type * BROTLI_HUFFMAN_MAX_TABLE_SIZE;
const HuffmanCode* type_tree = &s->block_type_trees[tree_offset];
const HuffmanCode* len_tree = &s->block_len_trees[tree_offset];
BrotliBitReader* br = &s->br;
uint32_t* ringbuffer = &s->block_type_rb[tree_type * 2];
uint32_t block_type;
/* Read 0..15 + 3..39 bits */
if (!safe) {
block_type = ReadSymbol(type_tree, br);
s->block_length[tree_type] = ReadBlockLength(len_tree, br);
} else {
BrotliBitReaderState memento;
BrotliBitReaderSaveState(br, &memento);
if (!SafeReadSymbol(type_tree, br, &block_type)) return 0;
if (!SafeReadBlockLength(s, &s->block_length[tree_type], len_tree, br)) {
s->substate_read_block_length = BROTLI_STATE_READ_BLOCK_LENGTH_NONE;
BrotliBitReaderRestoreState(br, &memento);
return 0;
}
}
if (block_type == 1) {
block_type = ringbuffer[1] + 1;
} else if (block_type == 0) {
block_type = ringbuffer[0];
} else {
block_type -= 2;
}
if (block_type >= max_block_type) {
block_type -= max_block_type;
}
ringbuffer[0] = ringbuffer[1];
ringbuffer[1] = block_type;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<IPC::ChannelHandle>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(p.pipe.handle == NULL);
#endif // defined (OS_WIN)
WriteParam(m, p.name);
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
WriteParam(m, p.socket);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tgr128_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 * out)
{
u8 D[64];
tgr192_final(desc, D);
memcpy(out, D, TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(D, TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_hsdir_routers_changed(void)
{
consider_republishing_rend_descriptors = 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::AttachGuest(int element_instance_id) {
BrowserPluginManager::Get()->Attach(element_instance_id);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u16 dev_cap_txqueue(struct net_device *dev, u16 queue_index)
{
if (unlikely(queue_index >= dev->real_num_tx_queues)) {
if (net_ratelimit()) {
WARN(1, "%s selects TX queue %d, but "
"real number of TX queues is %d\n",
dev->name, queue_index,
dev->real_num_tx_queues);
}
return 0;
}
return queue_index;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_truncate_inode_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *inode,
u64 new_size, u32 min_type)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
u64 extent_start = 0;
u64 extent_num_bytes = 0;
u64 extent_offset = 0;
u64 item_end = 0;
u64 mask = root->sectorsize - 1;
u32 found_type = (u8)-1;
int found_extent;
int del_item;
int pending_del_nr = 0;
int pending_del_slot = 0;
int extent_type = -1;
int ret;
int err = 0;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
BUG_ON(new_size > 0 && min_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->reada = -1;
/*
* We want to drop from the next block forward in case this new size is
* not block aligned since we will be keeping the last block of the
* extent just the way it is.
*/
if (root->ref_cows || root == root->fs_info->tree_root)
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, (new_size + mask) & (~mask), (u64)-1, 0);
/*
* This function is also used to drop the items in the log tree before
* we relog the inode, so if root != BTRFS_I(inode)->root, it means
* it is used to drop the loged items. So we shouldn't kill the delayed
* items.
*/
if (min_type == 0 && root == BTRFS_I(inode)->root)
btrfs_kill_delayed_inode_items(inode);
key.objectid = ino;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
key.type = (u8)-1;
search_again:
path->leave_spinning = 1;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
err = ret;
goto out;
}
if (ret > 0) {
/* there are no items in the tree for us to truncate, we're
* done
*/
if (path->slots[0] == 0)
goto out;
path->slots[0]--;
}
while (1) {
fi = NULL;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
found_type = btrfs_key_type(&found_key);
if (found_key.objectid != ino)
break;
if (found_type < min_type)
break;
item_end = found_key.offset;
if (found_type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
extent_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end +=
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end += btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
fi);
}
item_end--;
}
if (found_type > min_type) {
del_item = 1;
} else {
if (item_end < new_size)
break;
if (found_key.offset >= new_size)
del_item = 1;
else
del_item = 0;
}
found_extent = 0;
/* FIXME, shrink the extent if the ref count is only 1 */
if (found_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
goto delete;
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
u64 num_dec;
extent_start = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
if (!del_item) {
u64 orig_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
extent_num_bytes = new_size -
found_key.offset + root->sectorsize - 1;
extent_num_bytes = extent_num_bytes &
~((u64)root->sectorsize - 1);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi,
extent_num_bytes);
num_dec = (orig_num_bytes -
extent_num_bytes);
if (root->ref_cows && extent_start != 0)
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
} else {
extent_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf,
fi);
extent_offset = found_key.offset -
btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
/* FIXME blocksize != 4096 */
num_dec = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_start != 0) {
found_extent = 1;
if (root->ref_cows)
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
}
}
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
/*
* we can't truncate inline items that have had
* special encodings
*/
if (!del_item &&
btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi) == 0) {
u32 size = new_size - found_key.offset;
if (root->ref_cows) {
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
new_size);
}
size =
btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(size);
btrfs_truncate_item(trans, root, path,
size, 1);
} else if (root->ref_cows) {
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
found_key.offset);
}
}
delete:
if (del_item) {
if (!pending_del_nr) {
/* no pending yet, add ourselves */
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
pending_del_nr = 1;
} else if (pending_del_nr &&
path->slots[0] + 1 == pending_del_slot) {
/* hop on the pending chunk */
pending_del_nr++;
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
} else {
BUG();
}
} else {
break;
}
if (found_extent && (root->ref_cows ||
root == root->fs_info->tree_root)) {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(path);
ret = btrfs_free_extent(trans, root, extent_start,
extent_num_bytes, 0,
btrfs_header_owner(leaf),
ino, extent_offset, 0);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
if (found_type == BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY)
break;
if (path->slots[0] == 0 ||
path->slots[0] != pending_del_slot) {
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path,
pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root, ret);
goto error;
}
pending_del_nr = 0;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto search_again;
} else {
path->slots[0]--;
}
}
out:
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path, pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
}
error:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmci_transport_send_attach(struct sock *sk,
struct vmci_handle handle)
{
return vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(
sk, VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_ATTACH,
0, 0, NULL, VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID,
handle);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
unsigned int data_was_unread;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, timeout:%ld\n", __func__, sk, timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSING;
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
/* Clean up any skbs sitting on the receive queue. */
data_was_unread = sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
data_was_unread += sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sctp_sk(sk)->pd_lobby);
/* Walk all associations on an endpoint. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &ep->asocs) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
/* A closed association can still be in the list if
* it belongs to a TCP-style listening socket that is
* not yet accepted. If so, free it. If not, send an
* ABORT or SHUTDOWN based on the linger options.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
sctp_association_free(asoc);
continue;
}
}
if (data_was_unread || !skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.lobby) ||
!skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.reasm) ||
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) && !sk->sk_lingertime)) {
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, NULL, 0);
sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
} else
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
}
/* On a TCP-style socket, block for at most linger_time if set. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && timeout)
sctp_wait_for_close(sk, timeout);
/* This will run the backlog queue. */
release_sock(sk);
/* Supposedly, no process has access to the socket, but
* the net layers still may.
* Also, sctp_destroy_sock() needs to be called with addr_wq_lock
* held and that should be grabbed before socket lock.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* Hold the sock, since sk_common_release() will put sock_put()
* and we have just a little more cleanup.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
sk_common_release(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
sock_put(sk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(sock);
}
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 68,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_protocols_from_ofp_version(enum ofp_version version)
{
switch (version) {
case OFP10_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF10_STD_ANY | OFPUTIL_P_OF10_NXM_ANY;
case OFP11_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF11_STD;
case OFP12_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF12_OXM;
case OFP13_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF13_OXM;
case OFP14_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF14_OXM;
case OFP15_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF15_OXM;
case OFP16_VERSION:
return OFPUTIL_P_OF16_OXM;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::GetNamedElements(
const AtomicString& name,
HeapVector<Member<Element>>& named_items) {
elements()->NamedItems(name, named_items);
Element* element_from_past = ElementFromPastNamesMap(name);
if (named_items.size() && named_items.front() != element_from_past) {
AddToPastNamesMap(named_items.front().Get(), name);
} else if (element_from_past && named_items.IsEmpty()) {
named_items.push_back(element_from_past);
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kFormNameAccessForPastNamesMap);
}
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_mod(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(this, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SVGDocumentExtensions* Document::svgExtensions()
{
return m_svgExtensions.get();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MessageLoop* message_loop() { return message_loop_; }
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client)
: m_client(client)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(m_client, m_client);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::CanShowInFolder() {
return !IsCancelled() && !file_externally_removed_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fixup_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address, unsigned int fault_flags,
bool *unlocked)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
vm_fault_t ret, major = 0;
if (unlocked)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
retry:
vma = find_extend_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma || address < vma->vm_start)
return -EFAULT;
if (!vma_permits_fault(vma, fault_flags))
return -EFAULT;
ret = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, fault_flags);
major |= ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
int err = vm_fault_to_errno(ret, 0);
if (err)
return err;
BUG();
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_TRIED)) {
*unlocked = true;
fault_flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
goto retry;
}
}
if (tsk) {
if (major)
tsk->maj_flt++;
else
tsk->min_flt++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GPMF_RawDataSize(GPMF_stream *ms)
{
if (ms && ms->pos+1 < ms->buffer_size_longs)
{
uint32_t size = GPMF_DATA_PACKEDSIZE(ms->buffer[ms->pos + 1]);
if (GPMF_OK != IsValidSize(ms, size >> 2)) return 0;
return size;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 88,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SampleGamepads(blink::WebGamepads* data) {
gamepad_shared_memory_reader_->SampleGamepads(*data);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_constraints(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
struct regulation_constraints *constraints = rdev->constraints;
char buf[80] = "";
int count = 0;
int ret;
if (constraints->min_uV && constraints->max_uV) {
if (constraints->min_uV == constraints->max_uV)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%d mV ",
constraints->min_uV / 1000);
else
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%d <--> %d mV ",
constraints->min_uV / 1000,
constraints->max_uV / 1000);
}
if (!constraints->min_uV ||
constraints->min_uV != constraints->max_uV) {
ret = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
if (ret > 0)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "at %d mV ", ret / 1000);
}
if (constraints->uV_offset)
count += sprintf(buf, "%dmV offset ",
constraints->uV_offset / 1000);
if (constraints->min_uA && constraints->max_uA) {
if (constraints->min_uA == constraints->max_uA)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%d mA ",
constraints->min_uA / 1000);
else
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%d <--> %d mA ",
constraints->min_uA / 1000,
constraints->max_uA / 1000);
}
if (!constraints->min_uA ||
constraints->min_uA != constraints->max_uA) {
ret = _regulator_get_current_limit(rdev);
if (ret > 0)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "at %d mA ", ret / 1000);
}
if (constraints->valid_modes_mask & REGULATOR_MODE_FAST)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "fast ");
if (constraints->valid_modes_mask & REGULATOR_MODE_NORMAL)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "normal ");
if (constraints->valid_modes_mask & REGULATOR_MODE_IDLE)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "idle ");
if (constraints->valid_modes_mask & REGULATOR_MODE_STANDBY)
count += sprintf(buf + count, "standby");
if (!count)
sprintf(buf, "no parameters");
rdev_dbg(rdev, "%s\n", buf);
if ((constraints->min_uV != constraints->max_uV) &&
!(constraints->valid_ops_mask & REGULATOR_CHANGE_VOLTAGE))
rdev_warn(rdev,
"Voltage range but no REGULATOR_CHANGE_VOLTAGE\n");
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TreeView::NodeDetails* TreeView::GetNodeDetailsByTreeItem(HTREEITEM tree_item) {
DCHECK(tree_view_ && tree_item);
TV_ITEM tv_item = {0};
tv_item.hItem = tree_item;
tv_item.mask = TVIF_PARAM;
if (TreeView_GetItem(tree_view_, &tv_item))
return GetNodeDetailsByID(static_cast<int>(tv_item.lParam));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnComponentCloudPolicyUpdated() {
CloudPolicyManager::OnComponentCloudPolicyUpdated();
StartRefreshSchedulerIfReady();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MODRET auth_pass(cmd_rec *cmd) {
const char *user = NULL;
int res = 0;
if (logged_in) {
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_503, _("You are already logged in"));
}
user = pr_table_get(session.notes, "mod_auth.orig-user", NULL);
if (user == NULL) {
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.orig-user", NULL);
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_503, _("Login with USER first"));
}
/* Clear any potentially cached directory config */
session.anon_config = NULL;
session.dir_config = NULL;
res = setup_env(cmd->tmp_pool, cmd, user, cmd->arg);
if (res == 1) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
c = add_config_param_set(&cmd->server->conf, "authenticated", 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned char));
*((unsigned char *) c->argv[0]) = TRUE;
set_auth_check(NULL);
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
if (session.sf_flags & SF_ANON) {
if (pr_table_add_dup(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd",
pr_fs_decode_path(cmd->server->pool, cmd->arg), 0) < 0) {
pr_log_debug(DEBUG3,
"error stashing anonymous password in session.notes: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
}
logged_in = TRUE;
if (pr_trace_get_level(timing_channel)) {
unsigned long elapsed_ms;
uint64_t finish_ms;
pr_gettimeofday_millis(&finish_ms);
elapsed_ms = (unsigned long) (finish_ms - session.connect_time_ms);
pr_trace_msg(timing_channel, 4,
"Time before successful login (via '%s'): %lu ms", session.auth_mech,
elapsed_ms);
}
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
(void) pr_table_remove(session.notes, "mod_auth.anon-passwd", NULL);
if (res == 0) {
unsigned int max_logins, *max = NULL;
const char *denymsg = NULL;
/* check for AccessDenyMsg */
if ((denymsg = get_param_ptr((session.anon_config ?
session.anon_config->subset : cmd->server->conf),
"AccessDenyMsg", FALSE)) != NULL) {
if (strstr(denymsg, "%u") != NULL) {
denymsg = sreplace(cmd->tmp_pool, denymsg, "%u", user, NULL);
}
}
max = get_param_ptr(main_server->conf, "MaxLoginAttempts", FALSE);
if (max != NULL) {
max_logins = *max;
} else {
max_logins = 3;
}
if (max_logins > 0 &&
++auth_tries >= max_logins) {
if (denymsg) {
pr_response_send(R_530, "%s", denymsg);
} else {
pr_response_send(R_530, "%s", _("Login incorrect."));
}
pr_log_auth(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"Maximum login attempts (%u) exceeded, connection refused", max_logins);
/* Generate an event about this limit being exceeded. */
pr_event_generate("mod_auth.max-login-attempts", session.c);
pr_session_disconnect(&auth_module, PR_SESS_DISCONNECT_CONFIG_ACL,
"Denied by MaxLoginAttempts");
}
return PR_ERROR_MSG(cmd, R_530, denymsg ? denymsg : _("Login incorrect."));
}
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::setShowFPSCounter(ErrorString* errorString, bool show)
{
m_state->setBoolean(PageAgentState::pageAgentShowFPSCounter, show);
if (show && !forceCompositingMode(errorString))
return;
m_client->setShowFPSCounter(show && !m_deviceMetricsOverridden);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PathExists(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return access(path.value().c_str(), F_OK) == 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ewah_bitmap *read_bitmap_1(struct bitmap_index *index)
{
struct ewah_bitmap *b = ewah_pool_new();
int bitmap_size = ewah_read_mmap(b,
index->map + index->map_pos,
index->map_size - index->map_pos);
if (bitmap_size < 0) {
error("Failed to load bitmap index (corrupted?)");
ewah_pool_free(b);
return NULL;
}
index->map_pos += bitmap_size;
return b;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ReloadLoFiImages() {
SendToAllFrames(new FrameMsg_ReloadLoFiImages(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidReloadLoFiImages();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_extension_index(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_STRING paramName,
OMX_OUT OMX_INDEXTYPE* indexType)
{
(void) hComp;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Extension Index in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.QCOM.index.param.video.SyncFrameDecodingMode")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.QCOM.index.param.IndexExtraData")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_PARAM_VIDEO_FRAMEPACKING_EXTRADATA)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoFramePackingExtradata;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_CONFIG_VIDEO_FRAMEPACKING_INFO)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoFramePackingArrangement;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_PARAM_VIDEO_QP_EXTRADATA)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPExtraData;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_PARAM_VIDEO_INPUTBITSINFO_EXTRADATA)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoInputBitsInfoExtraData;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_PARAM_VIDEO_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableExtnUserData;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, OMX_QCOM_INDEX_PARAM_VIDEO_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA)) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamMpeg2SeqDispExtraData;
}
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.enableAndroidNativeBuffers")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexEnableAndroidNativeBuffers;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer2;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer")) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Extension: %s is supported", paramName);
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer;
} else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.getAndroidNativeBufferUsage")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexGetAndroidNativeBufferUsage;
}
#endif
else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode;
}
#ifdef ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK_SUPPORTED
else if (extn_equals(paramName, "OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoAdaptivePlaybackMode;
}
#endif
#ifdef FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED
else if (extn_equals(paramName,"OMX.google.android.index.describeColorFormat")) {
*indexType = (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexFlexibleYUVDescription;
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Extension: %s not implemented", paramName);
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::setAutoLoadImages(bool enable)
{
if (enable == m_autoLoadImages)
return;
m_autoLoadImages = enable;
if (!m_autoLoadImages)
return;
reloadImagesIfNotDeferred();
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebDocumentLoader* WebLocalFrameImpl::GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return DocumentLoaderForDocLoader(
GetFrame()->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tracing_nsecs_write(unsigned long *ptr, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
*ptr = val * 1000;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_pk_ecc_get_sexp (gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp, int mode, mpi_ec_t ec)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc;
gcry_mpi_t mpi_G = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t mpi_Q = NULL;
if (!ec->p || !ec->a || !ec->b || !ec->G || !ec->n || !ec->h)
return GPG_ERR_BAD_CRYPT_CTX;
if (mode == GCRY_PK_GET_SECKEY && !ec->d)
return GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
/* Compute the public point if it is missing. */
if (!ec->Q && ec->d)
ec->Q = _gcry_ecc_compute_public (NULL, ec, NULL, NULL);
/* Encode G and Q. */
mpi_G = _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (ec->G, ec);
if (!mpi_G)
{
rc = GPG_ERR_BROKEN_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
if (!ec->Q)
{
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_CRYPT_CTX;
goto leave;
}
if (ec->dialect == ECC_DIALECT_ED25519)
{
unsigned char *encpk;
unsigned int encpklen;
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (ec->Q, ec, NULL, NULL, 0,
&encpk, &encpklen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
mpi_Q = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, encpk, encpklen*8);
encpk = NULL;
}
else
{
mpi_Q = _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (ec->Q, ec);
}
if (!mpi_Q)
{
rc = GPG_ERR_BROKEN_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
/* Fixme: We should return a curve name instead of the parameters if
if know that they match a curve. */
if (ec->d && (!mode || mode == GCRY_PK_GET_SECKEY))
{
/* Let's return a private key. */
rc = sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL,
"(private-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(h%m)(q%m)(d%m)))",
ec->p, ec->a, ec->b, mpi_G, ec->n, ec->h, mpi_Q, ec->d);
}
else if (ec->Q)
{
/* Let's return a public key. */
rc = sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(h%m)(q%m)))",
ec->p, ec->a, ec->b, mpi_G, ec->n, ec->h, mpi_Q);
}
else
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_CRYPT_CTX;
leave:
mpi_free (mpi_Q);
mpi_free (mpi_G);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackgroundFill(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
bool paint_hover_effect,
SkColor active_color,
SkColor inactive_color,
int fill_id,
int y_inset) const {
const SkPath fill_path =
GetPath(PathType::kFill, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
const float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
canvas->ClipPath(fill_path, true);
if (active || !fill_id) {
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(active ? active_color : inactive_color);
canvas->DrawRect(gfx::ScaleToEnclosingRect(tab_->GetLocalBounds(), scale),
flags);
}
if (fill_id) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scale_scoper(canvas);
canvas->sk_canvas()->scale(scale, scale);
canvas->TileImageInt(*tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetImageSkiaNamed(fill_id),
tab_->GetMirroredX() + tab_->background_offset(), 0, 0,
y_inset, tab_->width(), tab_->height());
}
if (paint_hover_effect) {
SkPoint hover_location(gfx::PointToSkPoint(hover_controller_->location()));
hover_location.scale(SkFloatToScalar(scale));
const SkScalar kMinHoverRadius = 16;
const SkScalar radius =
std::max(SkFloatToScalar(tab_->width() / 4.f), kMinHoverRadius);
DrawHighlight(canvas, hover_location, radius * scale,
SkColorSetA(active_color, hover_controller_->GetAlpha()));
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int zlib_compress_final(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm,
struct comp_request *req)
{
int ret;
struct zlib_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_pcomp_tfm(tfm));
struct z_stream_s *stream = &dctx->comp_stream;
pr_debug("avail_in %u, avail_out %u\n", req->avail_in, req->avail_out);
stream->next_in = req->next_in;
stream->avail_in = req->avail_in;
stream->next_out = req->next_out;
stream->avail_out = req->avail_out;
ret = zlib_deflate(stream, Z_FINISH);
if (ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
pr_debug("zlib_deflate failed %d\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = req->avail_out - stream->avail_out;
pr_debug("avail_in %lu, avail_out %lu (consumed %lu, produced %u)\n",
stream->avail_in, stream->avail_out,
req->avail_in - stream->avail_in, ret);
req->next_in = stream->next_in;
req->avail_in = stream->avail_in;
req->next_out = stream->next_out;
req->avail_out = stream->avail_out;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void util_set_pen(wmfAPI * API, wmfDC * dc)
{
wmf_magick_t
*ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData(API);
wmfPen
*pen = 0;
double
pen_width,
pixel_width;
unsigned int
pen_style,
pen_type;
pen = WMF_DC_PEN(dc);
pen_width = (WMF_PEN_WIDTH(pen) + WMF_PEN_HEIGHT(pen)) / 2;
/* Pixel width is inverse of pixel scale */
pixel_width = (((double) 1 / (ddata->scale_x)) +
((double) 1 / (ddata->scale_y))) / 2;
/* Don't allow pen_width to be much less than pixel_width in order
to avoid dissapearing or spider-web lines */
pen_width = MagickMax(pen_width, pixel_width*0.8);
pen_style = (unsigned int) WMF_PEN_STYLE(pen);
pen_type = (unsigned int) WMF_PEN_TYPE(pen);
(void) pen_type;
/* Pen style specified? */
if (pen_style == PS_NULL)
{
draw_stroke_color_string(WmfDrawingWand,"none");
return;
}
DrawSetStrokeAntialias(WmfDrawingWand, MagickTrue );
DrawSetStrokeWidth(WmfDrawingWand, (unsigned long) MagickMax(0.0, pen_width));
{
LineCap
linecap;
switch ((unsigned int) WMF_PEN_ENDCAP(pen))
{
case PS_ENDCAP_SQUARE:
linecap = SquareCap;
break;
case PS_ENDCAP_ROUND:
linecap = RoundCap;
break;
case PS_ENDCAP_FLAT:
default:
linecap = ButtCap;
break;
}
DrawSetStrokeLineCap(WmfDrawingWand, linecap);
}
{
LineJoin
linejoin;
switch ((unsigned int) WMF_PEN_JOIN(pen))
{
case PS_JOIN_BEVEL:
linejoin = BevelJoin;
break;
case PS_JOIN_ROUND:
linejoin = RoundJoin;
break;
case PS_JOIN_MITER:
default:
linejoin = MiterJoin;
break;
}
DrawSetStrokeLineJoin(WmfDrawingWand,linejoin);
}
{
double
dasharray[7];
switch (pen_style)
{
case PS_DASH: /* ------- */
{
/* Pattern 18,7 */
dasharray[0] = pixel_width * 18;
dasharray[1] = pixel_width * 7;
dasharray[2] = 0;
DrawSetStrokeAntialias(WmfDrawingWand,MagickFalse);
(void) DrawSetStrokeDashArray(WmfDrawingWand,2,dasharray);
break;
}
case PS_ALTERNATE:
case PS_DOT: /* ....... */
{
/* Pattern 3,3 */
dasharray[0] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[1] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[2] = 0;
DrawSetStrokeAntialias(WmfDrawingWand,MagickFalse);
(void) DrawSetStrokeDashArray(WmfDrawingWand,2,dasharray);
break;
}
case PS_DASHDOT: /* _._._._ */
{
/* Pattern 9,6,3,6 */
dasharray[0] = pixel_width * 9;
dasharray[1] = pixel_width * 6;
dasharray[2] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[3] = pixel_width * 6;
dasharray[4] = 0;
DrawSetStrokeAntialias(WmfDrawingWand,MagickFalse);
(void) DrawSetStrokeDashArray(WmfDrawingWand,4,dasharray);
break;
}
case PS_DASHDOTDOT: /* _.._.._ */
{
/* Pattern 9,3,3,3,3,3 */
dasharray[0] = pixel_width * 9;
dasharray[1] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[2] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[3] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[4] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[5] = pixel_width * 3;
dasharray[6] = 0;
DrawSetStrokeAntialias(WmfDrawingWand,MagickFalse);
(void) DrawSetStrokeDashArray(WmfDrawingWand,6,dasharray);
break;
}
case PS_INSIDEFRAME: /* There is nothing to do in this case... */
case PS_SOLID:
default:
{
(void) DrawSetStrokeDashArray(WmfDrawingWand,0,(double *) NULL);
break;
}
}
}
draw_stroke_color_rgb(API,WMF_PEN_COLOR(pen));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const viz::FrameSinkId& RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetFrameSinkId() const {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_ioctl_setflags(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct btrfs_inode *ip = BTRFS_I(inode);
struct btrfs_root *root = ip->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
unsigned int flags, oldflags;
int ret;
u64 ip_oldflags;
unsigned int i_oldflags;
umode_t mode;
if (btrfs_root_readonly(root))
return -EROFS;
if (copy_from_user(&flags, arg, sizeof(flags)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = check_flags(flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EACCES;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ip_oldflags = ip->flags;
i_oldflags = inode->i_flags;
mode = inode->i_mode;
flags = btrfs_mask_flags(inode->i_mode, flags);
oldflags = btrfs_flags_to_ioctl(ip->flags);
if ((flags ^ oldflags) & (FS_APPEND_FL | FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)) {
if (!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (flags & FS_SYNC_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_SYNC;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_SYNC;
if (flags & FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_IMMUTABLE;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_IMMUTABLE;
if (flags & FS_APPEND_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_APPEND;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_APPEND;
if (flags & FS_NODUMP_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NODUMP;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NODUMP;
if (flags & FS_NOATIME_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NOATIME;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NOATIME;
if (flags & FS_DIRSYNC_FL)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_DIRSYNC;
else
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_DIRSYNC;
if (flags & FS_NOCOW_FL) {
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
/*
* It's safe to turn csums off here, no extents exist.
* Otherwise we want the flag to reflect the real COW
* status of the file and will not set it.
*/
if (inode->i_size == 0)
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW
| BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
} else {
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW;
}
} else {
/*
* Revert back under same assuptions as above
*/
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
if (inode->i_size == 0)
ip->flags &= ~(BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW
| BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM);
} else {
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW;
}
}
/*
* The COMPRESS flag can only be changed by users, while the NOCOMPRESS
* flag may be changed automatically if compression code won't make
* things smaller.
*/
if (flags & FS_NOCOMP_FL) {
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS;
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS;
} else if (flags & FS_COMPR_FL) {
ip->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS;
ip->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS;
} else {
ip->flags &= ~(BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS | BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS);
}
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out_drop;
}
btrfs_update_iflags(inode);
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
out_drop:
if (ret) {
ip->flags = ip_oldflags;
inode->i_flags = i_oldflags;
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewDialogController::EraseInitiatorInfo(
WebContents* preview_dialog) {
PrintPreviewDialogMap::iterator it = preview_dialog_map_.find(preview_dialog);
if (it == preview_dialog_map_.end())
return;
RemoveObservers(it->second);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t getStringObjectSdsUsedMemory(robj *o) {
serverAssertWithInfo(NULL,o,o->type == OBJ_STRING);
switch(o->encoding) {
case OBJ_ENCODING_RAW: return sdsZmallocSize(o->ptr);
case OBJ_ENCODING_EMBSTR: return zmalloc_size(o)-sizeof(robj);
default: return 0; /* Just integer encoding for now. */
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_intmgr_timer_resume(E1000IntrDelayTimer *timer)
{
if (timer->running) {
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(timer);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTIsSimpleFilter(FilterEncodingNode *psNode)
{
if (FLTValidForBBoxFilter(psNode)) {
if (FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "DWithin") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Intersect") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Intersects") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Equals") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Disjoint") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Touches") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Crosses") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Within") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Contains") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Overlaps") == 0 &&
FLTNumberOfFilterType(psNode, "Beyond") == 0)
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: txid_snapshot_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
TxidSnapshot *snap = (TxidSnapshot *) PG_GETARG_VARLENA_P(0);
StringInfoData str;
uint32 i;
initStringInfo(&str);
appendStringInfo(&str, TXID_FMT ":", snap->xmin);
appendStringInfo(&str, TXID_FMT ":", snap->xmax);
for (i = 0; i < snap->nxip; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
appendStringInfoChar(&str, ',');
appendStringInfo(&str, TXID_FMT, snap->xip[i]);
}
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(str.data);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_free_stateid_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs_free_stateid_data *data = calldata;
nfs41_sequence_done(task, &data->res.seq_res);
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, data->server, NULL, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
}
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LiveSyncTest::SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* cl) {
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod))
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod, "p2p");
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncSessions))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncSessions);
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls);
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundNetworking))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundNetworking);
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _run_prolog(job_env_t *job_env, slurm_cred_t *cred)
{
DEF_TIMERS;
int rc, diff_time;
char *my_prolog;
time_t start_time = time(NULL);
static uint16_t msg_timeout = 0;
static uint16_t timeout;
pthread_t timer_id;
pthread_attr_t timer_attr;
pthread_cond_t timer_cond = PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER;
pthread_mutex_t timer_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
timer_struct_t timer_struct;
bool prolog_fini = false;
char **my_env;
my_env = _build_env(job_env);
setenvf(&my_env, "SLURM_STEP_ID", "%u", job_env->step_id);
if (cred) {
slurm_cred_arg_t cred_arg;
slurm_cred_get_args(cred, &cred_arg);
setenvf(&my_env, "SLURM_JOB_CONSTRAINTS", "%s",
cred_arg.job_constraints);
gres_plugin_job_set_env(&my_env, cred_arg.job_gres_list);
slurm_cred_free_args(&cred_arg);
}
if (msg_timeout == 0)
msg_timeout = slurm_get_msg_timeout();
if (timeout == 0)
timeout = slurm_get_prolog_timeout();
slurm_mutex_lock(&conf->config_mutex);
my_prolog = xstrdup(conf->prolog);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&conf->config_mutex);
slurm_attr_init(&timer_attr);
timer_struct.job_id = job_env->jobid;
timer_struct.msg_timeout = msg_timeout;
timer_struct.prolog_fini = &prolog_fini;
timer_struct.timer_cond = &timer_cond;
timer_struct.timer_mutex = &timer_mutex;
pthread_create(&timer_id, &timer_attr, &_prolog_timer, &timer_struct);
START_TIMER;
if (timeout == (uint16_t)NO_VAL)
rc = _run_job_script("prolog", my_prolog, job_env->jobid,
-1, my_env, job_env->uid);
else
rc = _run_job_script("prolog", my_prolog, job_env->jobid,
timeout, my_env, job_env->uid);
END_TIMER;
info("%s: run job script took %s", __func__, TIME_STR);
slurm_mutex_lock(&timer_mutex);
prolog_fini = true;
pthread_cond_broadcast(&timer_cond);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&timer_mutex);
diff_time = difftime(time(NULL), start_time);
info("%s: prolog with lock for job %u ran for %d seconds",
__func__, job_env->jobid, diff_time);
if (diff_time >= (msg_timeout / 2)) {
info("prolog for job %u ran for %d seconds",
job_env->jobid, diff_time);
}
_remove_job_running_prolog(job_env->jobid);
xfree(my_prolog);
_destroy_env(my_env);
pthread_join(timer_id, NULL);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err totl_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TOTLBox *ptr = (GF_TOTLBox *)s;
ptr->nbBytes = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unfreeze_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, int tail)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, page_to_nid(page));
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c = get_cpu_slab(s, smp_processor_id());
ClearSlabFrozen(page);
if (page->inuse) {
if (page->freelist) {
add_partial(n, page, tail);
stat(c, tail ? DEACTIVATE_TO_TAIL : DEACTIVATE_TO_HEAD);
} else {
stat(c, DEACTIVATE_FULL);
if (SlabDebug(page) && (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER))
add_full(n, page);
}
slab_unlock(page);
} else {
stat(c, DEACTIVATE_EMPTY);
if (n->nr_partial < MIN_PARTIAL) {
/*
* Adding an empty slab to the partial slabs in order
* to avoid page allocator overhead. This slab needs
* to come after the other slabs with objects in
* so that the others get filled first. That way the
* size of the partial list stays small.
*
* kmem_cache_shrink can reclaim any empty slabs from the
* partial list.
*/
add_partial(n, page, 1);
slab_unlock(page);
} else {
slab_unlock(page);
stat(get_cpu_slab(s, raw_smp_processor_id()), FREE_SLAB);
discard_slab(s, page);
}
}
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ps_table_release( PS_Table table )
{
FT_Memory memory = table->memory;
if ( (FT_ULong)table->init == 0xDEADBEEFUL )
{
FT_FREE( table->block );
FT_FREE( table->elements );
FT_FREE( table->lengths );
table->init = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const FeatureInfo::FeatureFlags& features() const {
return feature_info_->feature_flags();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API ut16 r_bin_java_calculate_field_access_value(const char *access_flags_str) {
return calculate_access_value (access_flags_str, FIELD_ACCESS_FLAGS);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdo_stmt_iter_get_key(zend_object_iterator *iter, zval *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct php_pdo_iterator *I = (struct php_pdo_iterator*)iter->data;
if (I->key == (ulong)-1) {
ZVAL_NULL(key);
} else {
ZVAL_LONG(key, I->key);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTApplyFilterToLayer(FilterEncodingNode *psNode, mapObj *map, int iLayerIndex)
{
layerObj *layer = GET_LAYER(map, iLayerIndex);
if ( ! layer->vtable) {
int rv = msInitializeVirtualTable(layer);
if (rv != MS_SUCCESS)
return rv;
}
return layer->vtable->LayerApplyFilterToLayer(psNode, map, iLayerIndex);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *alloc_event_data(int cpu)
{
int size;
cpumask_t *mask;
struct etm_event_data *event_data;
/* First get memory for the session's data */
event_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct etm_event_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data)
return NULL;
/* Make sure nothing disappears under us */
get_online_cpus();
size = num_online_cpus();
mask = &event_data->mask;
if (cpu != -1)
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mask);
else
cpumask_copy(mask, cpu_online_mask);
put_online_cpus();
/*
* Each CPU has a single path between source and destination. As such
* allocate an array using CPU numbers as indexes. That way a path
* for any CPU can easily be accessed at any given time. We proceed
* the same way for sessions involving a single CPU. The cost of
* unused memory when dealing with single CPU trace scenarios is small
* compared to the cost of searching through an optimized array.
*/
event_data->path = kcalloc(size,
sizeof(struct list_head *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data->path) {
kfree(event_data);
return NULL;
}
return event_data;
}
Commit Message: coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 83,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_realloc_simple(mrb_state *mrb, void *p, size_t len)
{
void *p2;
p2 = (mrb->allocf)(mrb, p, len, mrb->allocf_ud);
if (!p2 && len > 0 && mrb->gc.heaps) {
mrb_full_gc(mrb);
p2 = (mrb->allocf)(mrb, p, len, mrb->allocf_ud);
}
return p2;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SHPIX( INS_ARG )
{
TT_F26Dot6 dx, dy;
Long point;
if ( CUR.top < CUR.GS.loop )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
dx = MulDiv_Round( args[0],
(Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.x,
0x4000 );
dy = MulDiv_Round( args[0],
(Long)CUR.GS.freeVector.y,
0x4000 );
while ( CUR.GS.loop > 0 )
{
CUR.args--;
point = CUR.stack[CUR.args];
if ( BOUNDS( point, CUR.zp2.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
MOVE_Zp2_Point( point, dx, dy, TRUE );
CUR.GS.loop--;
}
CUR.GS.loop = 1;
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: show_adj_route_vpn (struct vty *vty, struct peer *peer, struct prefix_rd *prd)
{
struct bgp *bgp;
struct bgp_table *table;
struct bgp_node *rn;
struct bgp_node *rm;
struct attr *attr;
int rd_header;
int header = 1;
char v4_header[] = " Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path%s";
bgp = bgp_get_default ();
if (bgp == NULL)
{
vty_out (vty, "No BGP process is configured%s", VTY_NEWLINE);
return CMD_WARNING;
}
for (rn = bgp_table_top (bgp->rib[AFI_IP][SAFI_MPLS_VPN]); rn;
rn = bgp_route_next (rn))
{
if (prd && memcmp (rn->p.u.val, prd->val, 8) != 0)
continue;
if ((table = rn->info) != NULL)
{
rd_header = 1;
for (rm = bgp_table_top (table); rm; rm = bgp_route_next (rm))
if ((attr = rm->info) != NULL)
{
if (header)
{
vty_out (vty, "BGP table version is 0, local router ID is %s%s",
inet_ntoa (bgp->router_id), VTY_NEWLINE);
vty_out (vty, "Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal%s",
VTY_NEWLINE);
vty_out (vty, "Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete%s%s",
VTY_NEWLINE, VTY_NEWLINE);
vty_out (vty, v4_header, VTY_NEWLINE);
header = 0;
}
if (rd_header)
{
u_int16_t type;
struct rd_as rd_as;
struct rd_ip rd_ip;
u_char *pnt;
pnt = rn->p.u.val;
/* Decode RD type. */
type = decode_rd_type (pnt);
/* Decode RD value. */
if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
decode_rd_as (pnt + 2, &rd_as);
else if (type == RD_TYPE_IP)
decode_rd_ip (pnt + 2, &rd_ip);
vty_out (vty, "Route Distinguisher: ");
if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
vty_out (vty, "%u:%d", rd_as.as, rd_as.val);
else if (type == RD_TYPE_IP)
vty_out (vty, "%s:%d", inet_ntoa (rd_ip.ip), rd_ip.val);
vty_out (vty, "%s", VTY_NEWLINE);
rd_header = 0;
}
route_vty_out_tmp (vty, &rm->p, attr, SAFI_MPLS_VPN);
}
}
}
return CMD_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mark(void)
{
struct ifsock *ifs;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
if (ifs->out != -1)
ifs->stale = 1;
else
ifs->stale = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_init_opendata_res(struct nfs4_opendata *p)
{
p->o_res.f_attr = &p->f_attr;
p->o_res.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
p->c_res.seqid = p->c_arg.seqid;
p->o_res.server = p->o_arg.server;
p->o_res.access_request = p->o_arg.access;
nfs_fattr_init(&p->f_attr);
nfs_fattr_init_names(&p->f_attr, &p->owner_name, &p->group_name);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int picolcd_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
struct picolcd_data *data;
int error = -ENOMEM;
dbg_hid(PICOLCD_NAME " hardware probe...\n");
/*
* Let's allocate the picolcd data structure, set some reasonable
* defaults, and associate it with the device
*/
data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct picolcd_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (data == NULL) {
hid_err(hdev, "can't allocate space for Minibox PicoLCD device data\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_no_cleanup;
}
spin_lock_init(&data->lock);
mutex_init(&data->mutex);
data->hdev = hdev;
data->opmode_delay = 5000;
if (hdev->product == USB_DEVICE_ID_PICOLCD_BOOTLOADER)
data->status |= PICOLCD_BOOTLOADER;
hid_set_drvdata(hdev, data);
/* Parse the device reports and start it up */
error = hid_parse(hdev);
if (error) {
hid_err(hdev, "device report parse failed\n");
goto err_cleanup_data;
}
error = hid_hw_start(hdev, 0);
if (error) {
hid_err(hdev, "hardware start failed\n");
goto err_cleanup_data;
}
error = hid_hw_open(hdev);
if (error) {
hid_err(hdev, "failed to open input interrupt pipe for key and IR events\n");
goto err_cleanup_hid_hw;
}
error = device_create_file(&hdev->dev, &dev_attr_operation_mode_delay);
if (error) {
hid_err(hdev, "failed to create sysfs attributes\n");
goto err_cleanup_hid_ll;
}
error = device_create_file(&hdev->dev, &dev_attr_operation_mode);
if (error) {
hid_err(hdev, "failed to create sysfs attributes\n");
goto err_cleanup_sysfs1;
}
if (data->status & PICOLCD_BOOTLOADER)
error = picolcd_probe_bootloader(hdev, data);
else
error = picolcd_probe_lcd(hdev, data);
if (error)
goto err_cleanup_sysfs2;
dbg_hid(PICOLCD_NAME " activated and initialized\n");
return 0;
err_cleanup_sysfs2:
device_remove_file(&hdev->dev, &dev_attr_operation_mode);
err_cleanup_sysfs1:
device_remove_file(&hdev->dev, &dev_attr_operation_mode_delay);
err_cleanup_hid_ll:
hid_hw_close(hdev);
err_cleanup_hid_hw:
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
err_cleanup_data:
kfree(data);
err_no_cleanup:
hid_set_drvdata(hdev, NULL);
return error;
}
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldUseProcessPerSite(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& effective_url) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
if (chrome::search::ShouldAssignURLToInstantRenderer(effective_url, profile))
return true;
if (!effective_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return false;
ExtensionService* extension_service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
if (!extension_service)
return false;
const Extension* extension = extension_service->extensions()->
GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(effective_url));
if (!extension)
return false;
if (extension->GetType() == Manifest::TYPE_HOSTED_APP) {
if (!extension->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kBackground) ||
!extension->allow_background_js_access()) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServerFieldType AutofillDialogViews::TypeForCombobox(
const views::Combobox* combobox) const {
for (DetailGroupMap::const_iterator it = detail_groups_.begin();
it != detail_groups_.end(); ++it) {
const DetailsGroup& group = it->second;
if (!delegate_->SectionIsActive(group.section))
continue;
for (ComboboxMap::const_iterator combo_it = group.comboboxes.begin();
combo_it != group.comboboxes.end(); ++combo_it) {
if (combo_it->second == combobox)
return combo_it->first;
}
}
return UNKNOWN_TYPE;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_NPP_SetWindow(rpc_connection_t *connection)
{
D(bug("handle_NPP_SetWindow\n"));
int error;
PluginInstance *plugin;
NPWindow *window;
error = rpc_method_get_args(connection,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, &plugin,
RPC_TYPE_NP_WINDOW, &window,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPP_SetWindow() get args", error);
return error;
}
NPError ret = g_NPP_SetWindow(PLUGIN_INSTANCE_NPP(plugin), window);
if (window) {
if (window->ws_info) {
free(window->ws_info);
window->ws_info = NULL;
}
free(window);
}
return rpc_method_send_reply(connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, ret, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::RemoveEntryFromResourceMap(GDataEntry* entry) {
resource_map_.erase(entry->resource_id());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::FilePath& DownloadItemImpl::GetTargetFilePath() const {
return destination_info_.target_path;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static netdutils::Status validateResponse(NetlinkResponse response, size_t len) {
if (len < sizeof(nlmsghdr)) {
ALOGW("Invalid response message received over netlink");
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EBADMSG, "Invalid message");
}
switch (response.hdr.nlmsg_type) {
case NLMSG_NOOP:
case NLMSG_DONE:
return netdutils::status::ok;
case NLMSG_OVERRUN:
ALOGD("Netlink request overran kernel buffer");
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EBADMSG, "Kernel buffer overrun");
case NLMSG_ERROR:
if (len < sizeof(NetlinkResponse::_err_)) {
ALOGD("Netlink message received malformed error response");
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EBADMSG, "Malformed error response");
}
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(
-response.err.err.error,
"Error netlink message"); // Netlink errors are negative errno.
case XFRM_MSG_NEWSA:
break;
}
if (response.hdr.nlmsg_type < XFRM_MSG_BASE /*== NLMSG_MIN_TYPE*/ ||
response.hdr.nlmsg_type > XFRM_MSG_MAX) {
ALOGD("Netlink message responded with an out-of-range message ID");
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EBADMSG, "Invalid message ID");
}
return netdutils::status::ok;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Core::ClosePeerConnection(uint64_t peer_connection_id) {
RequestContext request_context;
GetNodeController()->ClosePeerConnection(peer_connection_id);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::Reset() {
ProcessPendingFormForUpload();
DCHECK(!pending_form_data_);
AutofillHandler::Reset();
form_interactions_ukm_logger_.reset(
new AutofillMetrics::FormInteractionsUkmLogger(
client_->GetUkmRecorder()));
address_form_event_logger_.reset(new AutofillMetrics::FormEventLogger(
/*is_for_credit_card=*/false, form_interactions_ukm_logger_.get()));
credit_card_form_event_logger_.reset(new AutofillMetrics::FormEventLogger(
/*is_for_credit_card=*/true, form_interactions_ukm_logger_.get()));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
autofill_assistant_.Reset();
#endif
has_logged_autofill_enabled_ = false;
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ = false;
did_show_suggestions_ = false;
user_did_type_ = false;
user_did_autofill_ = false;
user_did_edit_autofilled_field_ = false;
enable_ablation_logging_ = false;
masked_card_ = CreditCard();
unmasking_query_id_ = -1;
unmasking_form_ = FormData();
unmasking_field_ = FormFieldData();
forms_loaded_timestamps_.clear();
initial_interaction_timestamp_ = TimeTicks();
external_delegate_->Reset();
filling_contexts_map_.clear();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_qtdemux_get_src_query_types (GstPad * pad)
{
static const GstQueryType src_types[] = {
GST_QUERY_POSITION,
GST_QUERY_DURATION,
GST_QUERY_SEEKING,
0
};
return src_types;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *canonical_list_pattern(const char *reference, const char *pattern)
{
int patlen = strlen(pattern);
int reflen = strlen(reference);
char *buf = xmalloc(patlen + reflen + 1);
buf[0] = '\0';
if (*reference) {
if (reference[reflen-1] == imapd_namespace.hier_sep &&
pattern[0] == imapd_namespace.hier_sep)
--reflen;
memcpy(buf, reference, reflen);
buf[reflen] = '\0';
}
strcat(buf, pattern);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_finish_ordered_io(struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered_extent)
{
struct inode *inode = ordered_extent->inode;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = NULL;
struct extent_io_tree *io_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
int compress_type = 0;
int ret;
bool nolock;
nolock = btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&ordered_extent->list)); /* Logic error */
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, 0, ordered_extent);
if (nolock)
trans = btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(root);
else
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
trans = NULL;
goto out;
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_update_inode_fallback(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) /* -ENOMEM or corruption */
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out;
}
lock_extent_bits(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset + ordered_extent->len - 1,
0, &cached_state);
if (nolock)
trans = btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(root);
else
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
trans = NULL;
goto out_unlock;
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_COMPRESSED, &ordered_extent->flags))
compress_type = ordered_extent->compress_type;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
BUG_ON(compress_type);
ret = btrfs_mark_extent_written(trans, inode,
ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
ordered_extent->len);
} else {
BUG_ON(root == root->fs_info->tree_root);
ret = insert_reserved_file_extent(trans, inode,
ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->start,
ordered_extent->disk_len,
ordered_extent->len,
ordered_extent->len,
compress_type, 0, 0,
BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG);
}
unpin_extent_cache(&BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree,
ordered_extent->file_offset, ordered_extent->len,
trans->transid);
if (ret < 0) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
add_pending_csums(trans, inode, ordered_extent->file_offset,
&ordered_extent->list);
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, 0, ordered_extent);
ret = btrfs_update_inode_fallback(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) { /* -ENOMEM or corruption */
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
unlock_extent_cached(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
ordered_extent->len - 1, &cached_state, GFP_NOFS);
out:
if (root != root->fs_info->tree_root)
btrfs_delalloc_release_metadata(inode, ordered_extent->len);
if (trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (ret)
clear_extent_uptodate(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
ordered_extent->len - 1, NULL, GFP_NOFS);
/*
* This needs to be done to make sure anybody waiting knows we are done
* updating everything for this ordered extent.
*/
btrfs_remove_ordered_extent(inode, ordered_extent);
/* once for us */
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered_extent);
/* once for the tree */
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered_extent);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cc::SurfaceId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SurfaceIdForTesting() const {
return delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->SurfaceIdForTesting()
: cc::SurfaceId();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHost* Wait() {
if (!captured_render_process_host_)
run_loop_.Run();
return captured_render_process_host_;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->uint8ArrayAttribute()), imp);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_flush_log_file(void)
{
always_flush_log_file = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_event_release_kernel(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
/*
* There are two ways this annotation is useful:
*
* 1) there is a lock recursion from perf_event_exit_task
* see the comment there.
*
* 2) there is a lock-inversion with mmap_sem through
* perf_event_read_group(), which takes faults while
* holding ctx->mutex, however this is called after
* the last filedesc died, so there is no possibility
* to trigger the AB-BA case.
*/
mutex_lock_nested(&ctx->mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
perf_group_detach(event);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
perf_remove_from_context(event);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
free_event(event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_current_pgrp_orphaned(void)
{
int retval;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
retval = will_become_orphaned_pgrp(task_pgrp(current), NULL);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::ImageSkia PageInfoUI::GetChosenObjectIcon(
const ChosenObjectInfo& object,
bool deleted,
SkColor related_text_color) {
const gfx::VectorIcon* icon = &gfx::kNoneIcon;
switch (object.ui_info.content_settings_type) {
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_CHOOSER_DATA:
icon = &vector_icons::kUsbIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SERIAL_CHOOSER_DATA:
icon = &vector_icons::kSerialPortIcon;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
if (deleted) {
return gfx::CreateVectorIconWithBadge(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color),
kBlockedBadgeIcon);
}
return gfx::CreateVectorIcon(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color));
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void RunWork() {
base::PlatformFileError error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
base::PlatformFile file =
base::CreatePlatformFile(
path_,
base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_WRITE,
NULL,
&error_code);
if (error_code != base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
set_error_code(error_code);
return;
}
if (!base::TruncatePlatformFile(file, length_))
set_error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
base::ClosePlatformFile(file);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::FormTextFieldFocusChange(bool in_focus) {
if (!text_input_.get())
return;
if (in_focus)
text_input_->SetTextInputType(PP_TEXTINPUT_TYPE_DEV_TEXT);
else
text_input_->SetTextInputType(PP_TEXTINPUT_TYPE_DEV_NONE);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::globus_gass_server_superez_init( char **gass_url, int port )
{
static const char* command = "GASS_SERVER_INIT";
if ( server->globus_gass_server_url != NULL ) {
*gass_url = strdup( server->globus_gass_server_url );
return 0;
}
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%d",port);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
*gass_url = strdup(result->argv[2]);
server->globus_gass_server_url = strdup(result->argv[2]);
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_ResumeParser(XML_Parser parser) {
enum XML_Status result = XML_STATUS_OK;
if (parser == NULL)
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_SUSPENDED) {
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NOT_SUSPENDED;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_PARSING;
parser->m_errorCode = parser->m_processor(
parser, parser->m_bufferPtr, parser->m_parseEndPtr, &parser->m_bufferPtr);
if (parser->m_errorCode != XML_ERROR_NONE) {
parser->m_eventEndPtr = parser->m_eventPtr;
parser->m_processor = errorProcessor;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
} else {
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
result = XML_STATUS_SUSPENDED;
break;
case XML_INITIALIZED:
case XML_PARSING:
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer) {
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_FINISHED;
return result;
}
default:;
}
}
XmlUpdatePosition(parser->m_encoding, parser->m_positionPtr,
parser->m_bufferPtr, &parser->m_position);
parser->m_positionPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
return result;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap0_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt length;
if ( table + 2 + 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2; /* skip format */
length = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( table + length > valid->limit || length < 262 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check glyph indices whenever necessary */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt n, idx;
p = table + 6;
for ( n = 0; n < 256; n++ )
{
idx = *p++;
if ( idx >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_usb_video_processing_unit(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
{
static const int *control_bits[] = {
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[0],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[1],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[2],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[3],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[4],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[5],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[6],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[7],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[8],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[9],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[10],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[11],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[12],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[13],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[14],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[15],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[16],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[17],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D[18],
NULL
};
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(array_length(control_bits) == (1+array_length(hf_usb_vid_proc_control_D)));
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_src_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_max_multiplier, tvb, offset+1, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
offset = dissect_bmControl(tree, tvb, offset, ett_processing_controls, control_bits);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_iProcessing, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
/* UVC 1.1 added bmVideoStandards */
if (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 0)
{
static const int *standard_bits[] = {
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[0],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[1],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[2],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[3],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[4],
&hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D[5],
NULL
};
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(array_length(standard_bits) == (1+array_length(hf_usb_vid_proc_standards_D)));
proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset, hf_usb_vid_proc_standards,
ett_video_standards, standard_bits, ENC_NA);
++offset;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 51,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bdrv_enable_copy_on_read(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
bs->copy_on_read++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NaClIPCAdapter::BlockingReceive(char* output_buffer,
size_t output_buffer_size) {
int retval = 0;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
while (locked_data_.to_be_received_.empty() &&
!locked_data_.channel_closed_)
cond_var_.Wait();
if (locked_data_.channel_closed_) {
retval = -1;
} else {
retval = LockedReceive(output_buffer, output_buffer_size);
DCHECK(retval > 0);
}
}
cond_var_.Signal();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,283 |
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